·CONTENTS VII XVII V11 IX XV XIX XXX) cxly XXX) XXVIIZ PACE PREFACE Introductory Manuscripts Acknowledgment ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION SI The Mandukya Upanisad and its Extent § 2 The Relationship between the Prose Passages of the Manduk ya Upanisad and the Karikas in Book ) $ 3 The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamasastra xlvu The Text of the Āgamasastra Ivar § 5 The Readings of the Text Jx § 6 The Name of the Work Ixi § 7 The Author Ixtri S8 The Date of Gadda pada Ixxu § 9 Alleged Borrowing by Gauda pada Ixxıx S10 The Works of Gauda pada Xxxҳіх SI} The Sources 1xxxx $12 The Brhadaranyala Upanisad as the Main Uparusadıc Source of the Agamasastra lxxXXII $13. Pre Sankara Teachers of the Vedanta and their Works C11 ·COVICN75 PAGE $14. Ilie Conspectus of the Contents of the Agamaśāstra cxili $15. The Philosaphy of Gaudapada.. сxxvii THE ACAMASISIRA 1-219 APPENDIXES 221-308 1. Māņdükya Upanisad 223-228 A. Text 223-225 B. Translation 226-228 I). Variants 229-244 III. Index of Karikās 245-248 IV. index of the Mandūkya Upanişad . 248 V. Index of Important Words in the Karikas . 249 VI. Index of Teachers and Works Quoted or Referred to in the Karikās of the Agamaśāstra 256 VII. Index of Words in the Karikas used in particular Senses originally or mainly in Buddhist Works 258 Vill. Index of Tibetan Verses 259 IX. Index of Teachers, Authors, Scholars, and Places, etc.. 259-264 X. Index of Works 265-273 Xi. Index of Subjects 273-290 ADDENDA ET CORRICENDA. 291-308 .

·PREFACE Introductory It was in July, 1919, that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Visvabharau, Santinikelan, I had to read the Upanişads anew; and in doing so when I, now with a little acquaintance with Buddhism, began to study the Agamaśāstra of Gau dapada, popularly known as the Gaudapădakārika on the Mandūkya Upanışad, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this quite in a different light. I found there something new, In 1922, in the Second All-India Oriental Conference held in this University, which was presided over by my esteemed friend, Prot. Sylvain Lévi, then the first Visiting Professor of the Visvabharati, I read a paper on the subject, in which I said that a book under the title of The Agamašāstra of Gaudapăda, embodying the result of my studies in it, would shortly be ready for the press. But, unfortunately, it could not be done earlier than now. However, I syrole come stray articles in English and Bengali on the subject. While they arrested the attention of certain scholars trained on modern lines, they gave rise to adverse criticism mainly from the orthodox section of my friends strictly following the indigenous interpretation of Upanişad, given by Sankara, the commentalor of the present work.

·V111 ĀGANAŠĀSTRA Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Sankara and his followers, or some other teachers I have attempted in the following pages to present to the readers my own interpretation of the work as I have understood. But in no way do I claim that my interpretation is the interpretation, i.c., the interpretation intended by Gauda pada himself. Gauda pada has not appeared to me and said that mine is the true interpretation, nor has God told me anything to the effect, . nor am lan omniscient being. It is quite natural and well-known to all that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different persons owing to a variety of circumstances, it would be sheer foolishness on my part, I am perfectly conscious, if I pretend to claim by writing the following pages any superiority to the commentator, whether he is or is not identical with the great author of the commentary on the Brahmasūtras, who is known by the same name, $ ankara I have simply put down my views here and I request my readers only to see if the text can be explained also in the I have чау followed here. I may say here in the folloiving words of Yasomitra Kako yuktă ced grähyeyam na ced alo 'ngatha vidhatavyi | na hi visame'rtheshhalitum na sambhaven madréām buddhihlı On points related to Buddhism, which are frequently raised in the course of my explanation. I have in many cases quoled in support of my Views nicre passages than one, though a single passage could sepse ibr ·PREFACE is are purpose, having meant them specially for those of my readers who not adequately acquainted with Buddhist thoughts or have no easy access to Buddhist works. In the present volume I have given a new edition of the text of the Agamaśāstra based on a number of MSS and different editions as described below, followed by an English translation. After this comes my annotation. At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the Alandūkyja Upanisad, Variants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the Āgomaśāstra, and different Indexes as the Contents will show, Manuscripts Let us give here a description of the MSS. referred to above: 1. A'. Adyar Library. No. IX. G. 52. it is in folios 20-28 of the codex. Written in Devanāgari on paper in black ink, punctuated with red marks, and bounded on either side by double lines. Size 12.3" x 4.8". Eleven lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. In this MS we have the MãU and the GK. 2. A? Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 99. Fols. 30-39 of this codes contain the MāU and GK. Size 10" X6".. Number of lines on each page 12 or 13. Written neatly in Devanāgari on paper, punctuated and bounded on each side by a double line. No date, por dhe name of the scribe. 11-12018 ·X AGAMAŠASTRA 3. A.. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 130. Fols, 38-53 of this codex, too, contain MāU together with the GK. Written in modern Deyanāgari on paper, bounded on each side by a triple line. Size 10 1" 5". There are 8 or 9 lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. 4. A. Adyar Library. No IX. B. 181. It is written on hand-made paper in Săradā script. There are 30 folios. Size 9" x 6". Each page has 18-25 lines. The borders of the MS are completely worn out, and last 12 folios are torn and destroyed in the middle. It is written in black ink, but the numbers of the folios are given in English figures in red one. No date is to be found, but from the worn out condition of the codex it seems to be not less than two hundred years old. The name of the scribe is also not given. This codex contains different Upanisads, 19 in all, the Vedāntasāra (Saivadarśana), and the Tailliriya Brāhmaṇa, III, 10.9.11. Here we have also the MāU and only the first prakarana of GK. 5. Bl. Bhandarkdr Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 272 of 1879-80. It is written on paper in Devanāgari. Size 10.5" x 4.7". Originally it had 67 fols., but the first 15 fols are missing, and so we have now only 52 fols. Each page contains 10 to 14 lines. It is dated as 1765 (bana-anga-aſva-avani). but it is not known whether it is Samvat Saka era. This MS contains only the last three Book of the GK beginning with the first kārikā of Book 11. Or ·PREFACE xi 6. B*. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 778 of 1891-96. It is written on paper in Devanāgari. Fols. 45. Size 9" 5". Like the preceding one it, too, has only the last three Books of GK together with Sankara's commentary. The kārikás, specially those in the last Book are numbered very carelessly; thus the last kārikā of the last Book is numbered as 93 instead of 100. No date. nor the name of the scribe. 7. D'. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly in Devanāgari on paper. Size 11.4" x 6". There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. It contains MâU and the GK together with the commentary of Sankara on both of them Originally there were 42 fols., but fols. 18, 19, 30-35 containing kārikās 10-53 of the fourth prakarana are missing. In three or four cases some letters are lost, the paper being torn or damaged. In this MS is written for both b and u. 8. D'. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No, nil. Written neatly on paper measuring 11.2" x 5.6" and bounded on both sides by thick lines. There are 69 fols. It contains phe Mall and the GK with Sankara's commentary on both of them. No date, nor the name of the scribe. 9. D. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. ail. Fols. 2-35. Size 12.2" x 5.5" Written neatly paper in Devanagari. It contains the first 7 passages of the MāU, first 14 kārikās of the first prakarana of the GK and parts of Sankara's comnientary with Ānandagiri's ţikā. on ·AGAMASASTRA 10. 10. India office. No. 2783. In this codex there are three MSS,'*viz., (1) Prapancasāravivarana, (2) Laghukaumudi, and (3) MáU together with the GK only up to the Book I. The slokas of mangalácarana of Sankara's commentary are given with GK. The script is Devanāgari. No date, but it seems to be old. Almost correct. 11. K. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāsi (Benares). No. 290 (Cover No. 9). Written in Bengali character on paper. Size 9.2" X 4.2". Fols. 24. Lines in each page 7. . There is no date, yet it appears to be very modern. Writer's name is not given. There are mistakes and omissions. The MS contains both MāU and GK, 12. K. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāsi (Benares). No. 163. This is a part of a bigger MS of which we have only 24 fols. (29-52). Size 12" x 5". Each page has 9 lines. There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. This MS. contains only the third Book of the GK with Sankara's commentary. It is not quite correct Some of the kărikās are here misplaced. 13. K. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśi (Benares). No. 13 (Cover No. 4). Size 14.3" x 6.2". Script Devanāgari. Fols. 10. Average number of lines in each page 13. Samvat 1907. Written at Vịndāvana. The scribe is not mentioned. It contains the original text of the Mall together with the commentarz' called Māņdākyaparişadarthaprakzis. Though the name of its author is not mentioned here he is no other than Kuranārāyana, a follower of ·PREFACE *m1 the Rāmánuja school. This commentary is published in the Anandashram Series, No. 62. 14. K. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśí (Benares). No. 304 (Cover No. 9). It is the first 12 fols, of a bigger codex. Size 10.3" x 5.4". Number of lines in each page 8. Written on paper in Bengali script. It extends up to the kārikā 12 of Book I together with Ś ankara's commentary. No date. Appearance modern. No name of the scribe. 15. PU'. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 948. Script Devanāgari. Fols 9. Size 12" x 6". Lines on each page 13-18. Date about 1850 V.S., as says one Bhojlal, a manuscript dealer and bookseller from whom it seems to have been secured. It contains Mall up to prabhavāpyayau hi bhucānām. atraite sloka bhavanti, and the GK of Book I. 16. PU. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 746. Script Devanāgari. Fols. 142. Size 14" x 7". Number of lines on each page varies from 13 to 18. No date, but said to be of about 1850 V.S. Obtained at Amritsar, and said to be of Kashmir recension. It contains the MāU and, the GK together with the commentary of Sankata followed by Anandagiri's ţikā. 17. Vs. Visvabharati. No. 1317. It is written in Grantha character on palm-leaf. Fols. 58. Size 15.7" x 1.3". Lines 7-8 on each page. It contains the following works: (1) Srimad Bhagavadgitā (fois 1-29), (2) Isopanışad (fols. 304), (3) Kenopanışad (fols. 306-32"). (4) Kalhopanişad (fols. 325-37'), (5) Praśnopanişad ·XIV AGAMAŠĀSTRA on on 7-8. (fols. 37,-41"), (6) Mundokopanişad (fols. 414-44"}, (7) Mandukyopanişad with GK (fols. 44-52"), and (8) Taittiriyopanişad (fols. 52-58). This MS seems to be about 150 years old, but there is no date nor the name of the scribe. 18. V. Visvabharati. No. 1632. Written palm-leaf in Devanāgari. Fols. 13. Size 11.5" x 4". Lines each page The sctibe was one Vasudeva Bhide, the son of one Närāyana. It was written at Śrīpañcavați in the presence of (god) Srirāmå on the 7th day of the black fortnight of the month of Caitra in the Saka era 1733 (Prajāpati samvatsara)= 1811 A.D. It contains the MāU with the GK beginning with the benedictory Vedic ślokas, bhadram karņebhinº (RV, I. 89. 8), and svasti na indraº (RV, I. 89. 6) to which are added the first two ślokas, viz., prajñānāmśuº and yo viśvātmā° of Sankara with which he is said to have begun his commentary on the Mau. As regards the relationship of the MSS described above it may briefly be observed that A' and A’ are from the same family and have close connexion with AS, IO, PU' and PU?. B' and B? are closely related and so are D and D. Vi and V agree in many cases with A', A, D' and D', Among the MSS mentioned above Aland A' are the worst giving very wrong readings. Yet, at least in one case (IV 564) Al with 10 gives the right reading. See Introduction, $5. The Readings of the Text C ·PREFACE XV In addition to the MSS described above tho readings collected from the thirteen MSS, utilized for the preparation of the second edition of the MāU and GK together with Sankara's commentary and Anandagiri's sub.commentary in the Anandashram Series, No. 10, have also been consulted. The MSS collected for that edition are mentioned here, where necessary, according to the abbreviations used there, viz., K, Kh, G, Gh, etc. Besides, such editions as of Mahesa - candra PalaCalcutta, 1806 Saka era; of.MM. Durga carana Sankhya-Vedanta- tortha, Calcutta, 1331 Bengali era; and of Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S., have been consulted. The most important readings are discussed in their respective places in the main work, whilc variants will be found in the Appendix II, pp. 229 ff. See Introduction, $ 4. Acknowledgment I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the following Institutions, who have kindly given me on loan the MSS described above Adyar Library, Madras ; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; Government Sanskrit College. Benares; India Office, London: Panjab University Library, Lahore; and Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan. I am thankful to my pupils Ści P. Anujan Achan, Government Archäologist, the State ·X2 AGAMIAŠASTRA Museum, Trichur; Sri A. Chalama y ya , Superintendent, the Orphanage, Pithapuram; Śri Anuku Chandra Banerjee, MA, B.L., Assistant Lecturer in Pali, and Sri Aji! Ranjan Bhattacharyya, MA., Ex-Puranchand Nahar Fellow, both of the University of Calcutta : the first two kindly collated for me some of the MISS used in the present edition of the book, and the last two helped me in preparing two of the Indexes appended hereto: I am thankful also to Sri Dinabandhu Ganguli, B.A., the able Superintendent, Calcutta University Press, for the kind carc he has taken in carrying the book through the press, and la Śrx Ramakrishna Chakravarti, M.A., of the same press for his very careful assistance in reading the proofs. I am grateful to my friends Prof. Umeshchandra Bhattacharyya, 11 A., and Pandı Narendrachandra Bhattacharyya, Sámkhya-Mlimāmsā- Vedāntatirtha, M.A. of our University, for their kindly reading some of the proof-sheels. I also offer my sincere thanks to my esteemed friend, Professor Vanamali Chakravarli, Vedāntatirtha, MA., who has given me immense and invaluable help in various ways in my work. He has given me the benefit of discussing with him almost all the difficul points of the book, of reading proofs, and of giving various suggestions. In conclusion I must expresa the deep sense of my gratitude to the authories of the University of Calcutta,

·PREFACE
XV11
and specially to Dr. Syamaprasad Mookersec,
M.A., BL., D.Litt., LL.D., Barrister-at-Law, M.L.A.,
President, Councils of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts
and Science, under whose benign and sympathetic
patronage the book is included in the publications of the
University.
Brahmoorhāra,
CALCUTTA
May, 1943.
VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA
111-1201B

·ABBREVIATIONS Ā Anandagiri. AAA Abhisamayalarikārāloka (Prajñāpăramitas, Vol. 1). Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXVII. AAS Abhidhammatthasamgaha with Vibhávani tikā, ed. Fernando and Silva Colombo, 1898. AK L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasu bandhu traduit et ennoté per Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1923-31. AKB Abhidharmakośabhāsya (Tibetan Text), BB. AKV' Abhidharmakośavyakhyā of Yašomitta, Fasc. I-II, BB. AKV: Abhidharmakosavyākhyā of Yasomitra, ed U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1932-1936. AmK Amarakośa. AN Arguttara Nikaya, PTS. АО Acta Orientalia. Abhidhănappadipika, Colombo, 1900. ĀS Āgamafástra of Gauda pada. AS Arthasálint, PTS. ĀS Ācārănga Satra, PTS. ASP Aştasahasrika Prajñāpäramita, BI. ASU Aştottarasatopanişad, ed. W. Laxman Shastri Pansikar, Nirnaya- AP sagar, 1917.

·XX AGAMAŠASTRA AU Ārmopanişad. AV Atharvaveda! BA Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bi. BAP Bodhicaryāvatārapanjikā, BI BB Bibliotheca Buddhica. Bbh Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1930. See BSB. BBU Brahmabindu Upanisad. BBV Brhadāranyakabhāsyavārstika, Anandashram, 1892-94. BCK Buddhacarita Kāvya, ed. Johnston, 1936. BG Bhagavadgitā. BI Bibliotheca Indica BJS Brahmajāla Sutta in DN, PIO. BP Bhagavata Purana BS Brahmasūtras of Bädarāyana. BSB. Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1930 See Bbh. BU Bịhadārạnyaka Upanisad Chu Chandogya Upanisad. CN Chullanıddesa, PTS. CS Catuḥšataka, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ed. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. Visvabharati, Past II, 1931. CS Catuhiatıkā, ed. Haraprasad Shastri in the Memories of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 449-514. CVP Cittavisuddhiprakaraña, cd. Prabhubhai Patel, Visvabharali (not yet published). See JASB, 1898.

·ABBREVIATIONS xxi DA Divyāvadāna, ed. Cowell and Nail, Cambridge, 1886. DaV Der alter Vedānta von Max Walleser, Heidelberg, 1911. DB Dasabhūmikasūtra, ed. Rahder, Paris, 1926. The edition of the MāU by Durgăcarana. Sankhya-Vedanta-tirtha, Calcutta, 1331, Bengali Era. DN Digha Nikāya, PTS. DP Dhammapada. DPA Dhammapada Athakathā, PTS. DPP Doctrine of Prajñāpāramita. by E. Obermiller, Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX. DS Dharmasaņgraha, ed Kaswara, Max Muller, and Wenzel, Anecdota Oxoniensia. Aryan Series, Oxford, 1885. DSn Dhammasamgani, PTS. DV Daśavaikälıka Sūtra, Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhārasamiti, No. 47. ERE Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, ed Hastings. Ex Expositor, PTS (Translation Series). G The edition of the MāU from the Citā Press, Gorakhpur, 1893 GK Gauçapādakárikā. GM Ganaratnamahodadhi, ed. Bhimasena Śarman, Prayāga (Allahabad), 1894. HU Hitopadeśa, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay, 1887. HV Harivaņía. IU īsā Upanişad. 1 ·xxii AGAMASASTRA JM com. Jagadgururatnamălástava of Sadāśiva. brahmlendra with the of Ātmabodhendra Sarasvati included in Vedantapancaprakarani, Srividyā Press, Kumbhakonam. Jñānasārasamuccaya (Yes.ses.sñin.po. kun.lasbtus.pa), now only in Tibetan. Cordier, III. JS p. 298. JU Jabala Upanişad. KIG Kaivalya Upanisad. KN. Kuranārāyana. KnU Kena Upanişad. KP Kāśyapaparivarta, ed Baron A. Von Staėl-Holstein, Sanghai, 1926. KtU Kausitaki Upanişad. KU Katha Upanişad. KV Kathavatthu, PTS. LA Lankávatāra Sūtra, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyto, 1923. LC Laghucandrıkā, Srividya Press, Kumbhakonam, 1893. LV Lalitavistara, ed. Lefmann, Halle, 1902 and 1908. MA Madhyamakāvatâra (Tibetan Text), BB, 18. French translation by Poussin, Le Muséon, 1907, -MAC Madhvācārya. - MAK Madhyamakālajkāsakārika of Śánti. rakṣita, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Sa, 5301-565.

·ABBREVIATIONS xxi 7 MaU Mandukya Upanişad. MB Mahābhārata, The South Indian Text, ed T. R. Krishnamacharya and T. R. Vyasacharya, Kumbhakonam, 1906.1914. MBU Mandalabrāhmaṇopanisad. MD Mimāmsadarsana. M The editiðn of the MãU by Mahesacandra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Saka Era. MHK Madhyamakahrdayakārikā of Bhavya, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Dza, 1624067. MHKV Madhyamakahrdayakārikāvịtti Tarkajvälā of Bhavya, Tibetan, Sde.dge, Dza, 4067-3296'. MK Malamadhyamakakârıkā of Nāgārjuna, BB, IV. MKU Muktikā Upanişad. MM Mahárthamanjari with commentary, Parimala, TSS. MN Majjhima Nikāya, PTS. MNS Mahāniddesa, PTS, MnU Mahānäradiya Upanisad (Minor Upanişads, Adyar). MnU Mānasollasa of Sureśyara, Nirnayasagar !'ress, Bombay, 1959, V.E., 1825 Ś. E. MP Manorathapwani, Mahāmukutarājavidyālaya' Siam, 2463 Buddha Era. MPă Milindapanha, ed. V. Trenckner, London, 1928.

·χχήν AGAMASASTRA MS or Mahāyānaşātrālankāra, ed. Sylvain-Lévi, MSA Paris, 1907; French To ;1911. : MSBT, MVBT, or MVST, 9.v. MSt Mahăsaddaniti, ed. A. Seclananda Thera, Colombo, 1909. MSV Mimāṁsāšlokavārttika, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1896. MT Madhyāntavibhāgatikā, ed. S. Ya mguchi, Nagao, 1934. MÚ Maitri Upanişad. MuU Mundaka Upanişad. MV Madhyamakavịtti, ed Louis de La Vallée Poussin, BB. IV. MVBT Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāşyaļikā, ed. V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci, Part I, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1932. MVD Madhyāntavibhanga Discourse, translated from Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky, BB, XXX, 1936. MVT Madhyāntavibhága tika of Sthiramati, édition per Susumu Yamaguchi Nagoya, 1934 MVg Mahāvagga of Vinaya, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879. MV Mahāvyutpatti, ed Sakaki, Japan, MVI Mahāvyutpatti, ed. Minaeff, BB. MVu Mahāvastu, ed E, Senart, Pans, 1882-97 N Nagarjuna ·ABBREVIATIONS XIY NS -NAT Nyāyāmţtatarangin of Ramăcarya, ed. T. R. Krishna charya, Nirnayasāgar. NK Nyāyakandali on Praſastapādabhāsya, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, 1895. NPTU Nțsimhapūrvatāpani Upanişad. NPU Náradaparivrājaka Upanişad. Nyāyasūtra. NSi Naiskarmyasiddhi with Candrikā, ed. G. A. Jacob, Bombay, 1891.'. NST Nirupamastotra in Two Hymnsof Catuhslava of Nāgärjuna, ed. G. Tucci, JRAS, 1932, pp. 309 ff No Nirukta of Yāska. NUTU Nțsimhottaratāpan: Upanisad. P Puruşottama. Pan Panini PAS Prajñāpāramitārthasamgraha of Dinnāga as quoted by Obermiller in his paper The Doctrine of Prajñāpäramita, Reprint from Acta Orientalia, Vol. XI. PB Prasastapādabh7sya, ed. v Dvivedin, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, Benares, 1895. PL Pancadasi of Vidyāraṇya. PO Poona Orientalist. PP Padma Purana. PS' Paramarthasāra, of Ādiseşa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. XII, 1911. IV-1201B ·XXVI ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA PS?, of Abhinavagupta, ed. L. D. Barnett, JRAS, 1910, pp. 707 #. PS* --of Ādiseşa, Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes, ed. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Karnatak Publishing House, 1941. PSP Pancavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpājamijā, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28, 1934. PU Praśna Upanişad. PV Pramāņaviniſcaya of Dharmakortti, Tibetan Text. Cordier, III, p. 298. PVK Pramāņavārttika of Dharmakirtti, ed. Rahula Sāíktyāyana, Patna, 1938. PVk? Pramānavārttika of Dharmakirtti with Manoratha Nandin's Commentary, ed. Rahula Sankstyāyana, Patna. RPR Review of Philosophy and Religion, RUTU Rārs.ottaratāpani Upanisad. RV Rgveda S Ś an ka rācārya. Sās Sānkhyasūtra. SB Satapatha Brah.naņa. SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha, BI, 1858. SK Sankhyakārikā of i śvara krşņa. SK Sūtrakrtānga Sulia, Āgamodaya Samiti, 1917. SMV Sārijakamimāmsābhāsyavözlhha, ed. Anantakrishna Sastri and Ashokanath Bhattacharya, Asutosh Sanskrit Series, No. 1, Calcutta, 1941.

·ABBREVIATIONS xxvi SN Samyutta Nikāya, PTS. SNS Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Texte Tibétain, édité et tradiut per Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935, SNE Suttanipāla, PTS. SP Saddharmapundarika, BB, 1912. SP Saddharmapundarika, ed. U. Wogihara, 1934, SR or SRS Samādhirājasūtra, ed. Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur and Pandit Sarat Chandra Sastri, Fasc. I, Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, 1898. SS Subhāşıtasamgraha, ed. C.Bendall, Le Muséon, NS. IV. 1903, V. 1904. SS Sikşāsamuccaya, ed. C Bendall, BB, 1902. $S Saddarsanasamuccaya with Gunaratna's Com., ed L. Suadi, B1, 1905 f. SSP Saptašatika Prajñāpäramită, ed. 6. Tucci, Roma, 1923. SSS Sarvasiddhāntasangraha, ed. Premsundar Bose, Calcutta, 1919. St. LA Studies in Lankávalāra Sūtra by D. T. Suzuki, London, 1930. Svetāśvatara Upanisad, Anandashram, 1905. SV Sivasūtravimarsini of kşemarāja, ed. j. C. Chalterjes, The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Vol. I, 1911, TA Taittiriya Aranyaka, Anandashram, 1898. SU ·xxvin AGAMAŠASTRA TAI TAK TG TJ Tk TM Tattvaratnāvali of Adva y a vajra in Advajavajrasamgraha ed. Haraprasad Shastri, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No, LX, 1927. Tantraloka of Abhinava gupta, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. XXX. Theragātha, PTS.' Tarkajvālā, See MHKV. Trimsikā of Vasubandhu , ed. Sylvain Lévi in the l'iñaptimātrasiddhi, Paris, 1925. Tattvamuktakalāpa and Sarvārthasiddhi of Venkatanátha Deśika with the Ānandadāyini and the Bhävaprakaſa, Bibliotheca Sanskratica, Mysore, 1933, 1940. Tattvaprakāśa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 1936. Tattvasatņgraha of Santuaksita, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. XXX and XXXI, 1926. Trisvabhávanirdesa of Vasubandhu.ed. Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya, Visvabharati, 1939. Tattvasaņgrahapañjikă of Kamala sila, See TS Tripuratāpani Upanisad. Taittiriya Upanisad ТР TS TSN TSP TTU TU ·ABBREVIATIONS XXIX TV . Tantravārttika of Kumārila as printed with the Sabarabhåsya on the MD, Anandashram Series U or UP Upanişad, UC Uttaracarita of Bhavabhūti, US Upadeśasāhasri. VaP Vāyu Purāņa. Vbh Vibhanga, PTS. Vc or Vch Vajracchedikā Prajñāpăramitā, ed. Max Muller, Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881. Ves Vedāntasāra, ed. G. A. Jacob, Nirnayassgar Press, Bombay, 1894. Vip Vişnu Purăņa. Vis Viſaptimátratasıddhi, La Siddhi de Higan. Tsang traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1928-29 ViV Vigrahavyavartani, ed. KP. Jayswal and Rāhula Sänkityayana, JBORS, XXII. Vk Vimſatikā of Yasubandhu. See Tk VM Visuddhimag&a, PTS. VP Vinayapitaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-1883. VS Vājasaneyi-samhità. VSN Vişnusahasranama, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, No. 19, VSt "Vaišeșika Sūtra.

·ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA
present author.
W Srivālulasülraviti, Kashmir Series of Texts
and Studies, No. 39.
YB Yogācārabhūmi of Asanga, MS with
the
YŚ Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra, Bibliotheca
Indica, 1907.
YS
Yogasutra.
Yogavāsiştha Rāmāyaṇa, Nirnayasāgar Press,
1918.
YV

·INTRODUCTION Sl. The Mandükya Upanişad and its Extent What work or works are we to understand by the name of MãU? And what is its real extent? It is generally believed that the MāU comprises only the twelve prose passages beginning with "om ily etad akşaramo" and ending with "ātmānam ya evaņ veda" (see pp. 223.25). It is also assumed that the kārikās of Gaudapāda are mere explanation of these passages These two works are thus separate, though related to each other very closely as text and commentary. But this is not admitted on all hands. Some hold that the Upanişad is composed not only of the Iwelve prose passages referred to above, but also of the kātikās, (sventy-nine in all, attributed io Gaudapåda, as contained in Book 1.- Thus according to them those prose passages and she kārıkās in Book 1 ore regarded as Upanişad or śruli.This view seems to have partly 1 Of these passages the first seven are lound with light variations in some caker also in NPTU, IV 12. NUTU, II, and RUTU. S 1 In 1925 I had an occasion to wnte (IHQ, Vol 1, pp 1198 ) with regard to the present wubject that the view was at least sold as Madhvictry (1199-1274 ADI. the fient champion of the varia school of the Vedanta . philosophy, for, according fa him and his followers, vuch s Vyta* tirtha and Srbiyala, both the prose passages and the kariket referred to are handed down by Vorun in the form el mandska from (ve the commentan on the ALU by Madhviearre with 971- ·xxxii AGAMASASTRA been subscribed to by Sa ikara, the commentator of MaU, who says in the introduction to his commentary niviziya, Kumbhakonam, pp 2-3) in support of ut Afadhvacírya quotes the following two passages from the PP and HV respectively (dhyayan näisyanam devam pranavena ramihilah mandokarpi varunas lustāva barim arz ayam (i) it mandokarūpi san dadaría varunah grutım These lines ate not found, so far as I know, in printed editions of the works Here Madhvacarya writes (ibid, P.2). mandikarípına varunena catūtūpo pârāyano 'tra stuyate He regards the känkes as mantras which are said to have been vigoned by Byabman, the creator. On this be quotes the following couplet Dot yet traced in the same work (p 8). brahmadrston ato mantian praminam sallesvarahi atra sloka bhavantiti cakaraivam pothak pihak ! Vyisatirtha', tikā, too, introduces the kiukas under mantras The commentator of NPTU, who is known by the Dome of Sankari. carya and identical with the author of the Prapancasăra, . Tantic work leee my paper, Sankara s Commentares on the Upan tads, in Sur Asutosh Mookerjec Silver Jubilee Volumes. Orientalia, 2. pp 101 ff. and against it Raghuvara Mirrhului Shastri Procredings and Transactions, Faith Indran Oriental Conference, 1928, Vol l. pp 691 ff, as well ** T. R Chintaman. Proceedings and Transochons, Third Oriental Conference, Madres, 1924, pp 419 4 ) Is also of the same oprion, though he does rot 8110 particulars as to whether the n'seer of the Uponad » Varuns or whether the kankás are seen by Brahman, the Creator. Kuraninyana, another comprentalor of MsU belonging to the Romanus rchool of the Vedanta maintains the same view takips the kenikas in Book I sa mantras, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages form the original Upanırad. Appay y Diksite la Serron different from the celebrated author of the Siddhantalesa) who is a commentator c! the one hundred and eight Upanisado, seems to subscribe to the same veny, for hus commentary on the Upanisad extends only up to the prmke parages and the hanskas of Book I. See the Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscript in the Adyar Library Vol. I, Upanxads, pp 116, 287 8 Alte whot I wrote as abore in 1925 so far as my information goet, it was B. N Krishnamurti Sarma who in 1931 look up the case in nght earnest and advocaled it very strongly His first paper (New Light on the Gaudepodokanka) appeared in RPR, Vol !!, No 1, pp 35 8. He wanted ·XXII $1] INTRODUCTION on it that the first of the four sections (prakarana,catuslaya) of the Agamaśāstra begins with "om ity etad akşaramº" (MãU, 1), though the question as to whether that particular section or all the sections are regarded as śruti or not is noLraised by him - Leaving aside what is said by this Sankara whose identity with the great-author of the commentary on the Brahmasūtras-is-doubtful, it appears plausible that the view under discussion dates back at least from the time of Ra mānuja (1055- 1137 A.D.), as he seems to quote in his commentary on BS, 1. 1. 1, a kārıkā of Gauda pada (1. 16) as śruti. mainly to show that Madhvacanya cannor righely be accused of holding the wrew that the kirikās in Pick Tate regarded as freds, and form a part of the original Mau In doing so he tried to demonstrate that teachers of the three schools of Vedānta, such as Sankara, Anandagiri. Madhus@dana, Brahminanda, Ram&auja, Kara Izdyana, Mahacarye, Madka. Jayatirtha. Vyāsā. cārya evinin. Rimicārya, el," are of the same opinion In the same journal (KFR, 1932, Vol II, No. 1, 1933, VA IV No 2) he wrote Iwo papers moic or the same subject His wratings gave rise to an interesting and long controversy in which tonk part some scholars, such as Y, Subrahmanya Sharma (RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No 3), and A Venkata Subbiah (PO, 1936, Vol | Nos 1-2). B N. Krishnamurt's rejoinder being given in PO, 1936. Vol 1, No 2. and 1937, Vol 11, No 1 Besides, A Venkata Subbiah wrote in 14. 1933, pp 181 f an independent paper entitled The Mārdükyn- Danised and Gauda pāda wluch deserves to be mentioned in this connection Those who think that the two Sankaras, the suthor of the Sarirakabhāsyo on BS and the author of the commentary on AS, are one and the same should consider in the latter not only the question of mangalärarana, thic infenor quality of coinposition of the slokas, the delect of metre (Anandaguri's explanation can hardly be arcepted). and the gramına nical mistakes, but also the explanation offered of such kankás as ! 10 II 37. 25, and IV 83 as to whether it is posible for the former C here his xplanation of the words bhula and abhata in ut 23 with that in IV 3. of sambhüft in Il 25 with that f IU, 12 See note 2 V-12013 ·Xxxiv AGAMAŠASTRA ($1 He writes; jivasyaiva hi nirodhaḥ śrūgate anādimāyayā supto yadă jivaḥ prabudhyata (l. 16) iti ca. By the word śrüyale evidently he regards the line as śruti. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma thinks that the above date is to be pushed back to the time of Sureśvara, the author of the BBV or even that of Sankara, the author of the Sārīrakabhāsya on BS. But in spite of what he has said in support of the view one can hardly accept it when the statements made by the above two teachers themselves are taken into cottsideration. Sureśvara quotes AS, I. || (kāryakāraṇaº) in his NSi, IV.41, and tells us (Op.cit., IV. 44) that it is said by the revered Gaudas.' The word Gauda here refers to Gauda pada. As regards Sankara, he, too, quotes in his commentary on BS, II. 1. 9, a kārikā of Gauda pada (anādimāyayā, l. 16), and says it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedānta,' just as said by him in another case (BS, I. 4. 14) with regard to another kārikā of Gauda pada (mrllohaº, III. 15). Here Sureśvara and Sankara say in the clearest possible language that the kārikās referred to above are by revered teachers. Hence, according to them, they are not sruli. 3 evam gaudaur dtăvidait nah rulyait ayam arthah prabhasilah Tbs line, as in the printed text is metrically deſecuve The word oyam serms to be Omulled here 9 aircktam vedanla43mpradayayıdbh ációja! fatha ca sampradātasido vadanta 7 For detailed discuerson of the question readers are seferred to the cliners and their papers mentioned in dote 2 of this series ·xxxy $1] INTRODUCTION In the face of this clear statement, the passages from some works attributed to Sankara, and as such of doubtful authority, which are quoted by B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma in order to support his view that the kārikās of the Book I are sruli, do not, as it appears to me, carry any particular weight. Sureśvara's words, viz., vedonlokli with regard to GK, I. 14, and agamašāsana with regard to GK, I. 3. which are quoted by him for the same purpose from BBV, I 4, 615 and 744 respectively, do not necessarily imply that the kārikās are sruli in the primary sense of the word, for the same author, Suresvara, takes elsewhere, as we have already seen, one (I. 11) of the CK kārikās of Book l in which the above two kārikās are included, as a statement of Gauda pada. We should remember here that the above phrases are applicable also to works of human origin dealing with the Vedānta or Agama, That this controversy is not new, but an old one 13 known from the words of Rāmācārya, the author of the NAT, p. 223, where with regard to the two kārikās of Gaudapăda, I. 17 and 18, he raises the question as to whether they are śruti, and arrives at the conclusion that they are really so. Thus we rcach the conclusion that at least from the time of Ramanuja, the author of the Sribhāsya of Sce RPR. 1933, Vol IV, No 2 lt 18 interesting to nole here that shetimes the känskas of Book 1 of CK is referred to as Gaudepädiyokteran (LC, p580), and Mändikyopenu: Jadenzarara Goudapēdiyolosako NAT, P 123b) The reader may plunk over here as to how these two words are used here Topsely.

·X*X51 AGASTSTRA riame. BS, there were soinc authoritative teachers according to whom thic karikas of Book 1 of the GK were regarded as sruli and as such they formed a part of the MāU. Speaking generally our old teachers worc śraddhadeva, 'Irust(u),' to use the word of the Salapatha. Brāhmana (1.1.4. 15), with regard to the aullicnticity of our sacred br Sanskrit texts. Any work dealing with Upanisadic maller would readily be accepled by them as Upanişad." Remember the number of Upanisads and their language, subject matter and the way of treatment therein. Are they all Upanişads, though they are called so? The Bhagavadgitā is not an Upanişad in fact, yet, it bears the We all know its colophon in which occurs the following in srimadbhagavadgiłāsu upanişatsu. And it is so only owing to the fact that it is like an Upanişad. The practice of taking what is actually not an Upanişad as an Upanışad appears to have been in existence from the time of Pānını, as says Satyavrata Samaśramin in his Trayiparicaya, Calcutta, 1893, p. 69. From his work (1. 4. 79)" we may gather a word, upanişalkrtya, which means 'having made like an Upanişad.' Does it not lead us to conclude as above? But grammarians differ here on the meaning of the word Upanişad, according to sore it being tallvajñana, the knowledge of reality,' while to others, rahasya, a 'secret' or 'secret doctrine Let us take here the case of Purānas. A Purāņa is said to have five characteristics (purāņam pancalaksanam). But there are Purānas which are, in 9 See Sankara on BG, 11 19 and 20 where he uses the words rc and mantra relemng to the above two stanzas 10 jivikopanisadav aupamye ·INTRODUCTION XXXVI fact, not so, though they are known to us under the sainc name. Similar.is the case with regard to Upanişads and other works. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is not only the Book 1 of GK but also the remaining three Books of it which are sometimes held to be Upanişads, as Advailaprakarana Up., Alatašāntiprakarana Up., etc." We have seen above that according to some authorities including specially Madh vacar ya only Book 1 of GK is śruli, and the Tast three books are not so, and as such they do not form any part of Mau, as does Book 1. In other words, they form a separate work or works with which the former has no connexion. Lit is not so, it will be very difficult 10 explain as to why the Tast three Books are pot commented upon by those teachers. Why have they explained only the Book ?? It cannot be said that these last three Books were not known to them or in their time, as their existence before them can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Ś ankara who flourished long before them hås quoted in his commentary on BS, l. 4. 14, a karikā (Ill. 15) from one of these three Books. The fact that they did not comment upon the last three Books can be explained niveways. First, it might have been their bonest belief that those three Books had no connexion whatsoever with the Mall which, accord-C) ing to them, comprised only the twelve prose passages 11 Sec MSS labelled ZZE of BBRAS. Similarly each of the ate chapters of the NPTU is regarded as a separate Upanisad The case is the same with the TU, the three chapters Siksooalli, Brakma', and Bhrgu) of which are held to be three Upanisads ·Xxxviii ÄGAMASASTRA [$2 and the twenty-nine kārikās of Book 1 of GK. Secondly, it might be said that they could not explain them, for the dominant thoughts therein, viz., Advaitavāda absolute monism and Vijñānavāda 'idealism' would go against their own views, viz., Dvattavāda 'dualism' or Visisļāduailavāda 'qualified monism. The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three Books, too, were really included in or connected with the original Upanisad they would have undoubtedly explained thein, as is done by Puruşottama, the grandson of Vallabhå cārya, the great teacher of the Suddhadvaita 'pure monism' school of the Vedānta." § 2. The Relalionship belween the Prose Passages and the Karikās in Book I As Madh vācārya says,' the (welve prose passages of the Upanisad are divided into four parts.. 1? I have seen the Eommentary only on the first two Looks as edited by Bhatta Ramanatha Sasiria and published from Pustimage- Käryälaya, Bombay, Vikrama 1960 That Purusottam a whole or intended to witte his corrimentary also on Book Ul Adioula Prakorere, known from his own words (ad Loitakhye icarayr yel. p 55 It seems that lie commented or intended to do so also on the last book 13 It is known from the Tibetan sources that in about the first half of the cighth century AD the CK was regarded as an Upan.tal buatro 'ssan bahrhatan bcos). For Kamalasile, a disciple of Sinturakoita 1705 763 AD1 and the author of the Panpita of huis MIAK quotes come kickas from Book, 11 and ill of our work which he calls Uponrşat Sästra 111 to be noted that Kamalasila . remark canno, be considered with reference only to the above Iwo Books i AfaU with Srini asiyazitit, p 8 : Part I, passages 1-6, Part 11. passages 7. Part 111, pak ages 8 11, and Part IV, parage 12 ·$21 INTRODUCTION XXXIX Just after each of them there is a line atraite slokā bhavanti 'here are these stokas.' These introductory lines when compared with similar sentences in different Upanişads' will show that the slokas aré quoted there only to support what has been staled before. And we have already seen that Madhvācārya and others, specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the slokas or kårikås were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards. This will be confirmed if we compare the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding kārikās. The comparison will further show that it is the kārikās on which the prose passages are based and not vice versa. Supposing that the kārikās are explanations of the Upanişad, i.e., of the twelve prose passages which ac generally held ta beso, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original, but it does not or should not gmit the most important and difficult words of points in it. If these facts are borne in mind, it will be evident that it is the karikás that should be regarded as the earlier work, and not the prose passages. Sec HCV'; raa'ere sidda dravanid; u ar', il' 21' +0.7. tad esa sloka bharatt; Chu, 21 3. IN 12', esc iad ena toka, TU, NI II.2 1.ee tad apy ra sloko hlatalı, CHU, 12 5 tad clad sabhyuktan ·w xl AGAMASĀSTRA [52 According to the general view, karikás 1-5 are to be laken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-5.' Now the words saplānga 'with seven limbs,' and 'ckonavimsalimukha with nineteen mouths' in the passages 3 and 4 are the most difficult and they are explained differently by different commentators"; but not even the slightest mention of them is made in the kārikās. Why should the kārıkās which are supposed to have been written in order to explain the text, i.c., the prose passages, omit these two important words? Again, in the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word vatsvānara and not visua, while in the kārikas (l. 1-4, 19, 23) there is only visva and never vaisvānara, Why is this discrepancy? A commentator is to explain what is actually found in the text, he is not allowed to take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words varšvānara and viſva identical or synonymous. It is difficult to account for this alteration. That it is owing to the exigency of metre is an absurd hypothesis." In this connexion, there are three words more, viz., zágarilasthāna, svarnaº, and susuplaº in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively. But they are entirely omitted in the kärikās. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for, in order to It is to be noted that the first to pa ogrs have nothing in the banks * We have them belore us s Sur & herr und on NPTU, IV, Madhya, KX, d r mor pasagra. Vidyaranya on NITI' I and Nindyanan RUTU, 3 6 Antr their projhnoshana in the prese j:**2279 lust auch we lose shonapropria in disiks!

·$2] INTRODUCTION x! understand the main thought of the passages the importance of these three stages, viz., wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, can in no way be ignored. The fact is that the kārikās are_older, and from them, as well as from somс older Upanişads, the Mall, th to which that name is usually hrnce hace a e of the panişads are here in the prose passages simplfied, modified or explained adding something new. Thus, it appears, in the present case, the author of the prose passages having found the word vifua in its special sense nowhere in the Upanışads & seems to have substituted for it vaisvānara which is used in such old Upanişads as ChU (V. 11. 12) and BU (V 9. 1). Now the author of NUTU, I where the entire MāU is quoted with some slight variants, seeing both the words vrśva in the kārıkās and varšvānara." in the older Upanisads, has adopted both of them and simplified the text to some extent.". As to why these two terms are taken together in NUTU and what is 10 ? See pp 223 f. and Deussen Uponişads des Veda, p 574. - Excepting perhaps MU, VI 7 which is not so old 9 On the greatnc39 of Vaišvānara see RV, 1 59 6,98 1. Nt, VII 21-23, BS, I 2 32 The MāU is almost entirely found also in NPTU, I 1 For a different view of Visva-Vaisvanara, Tanjala and Prazóa cf Invata and Prājša, Heranyagarbha and Terjasa, and Vazévánara and Teijasa in PD. I 16 29 13 Scholabhuk calurālmā vivo vaši vinarak pralkamah padah 15 This is also with NPTU, I For example, sūksma is substituted here for pravivikta in the bankās Here sūkşma 19 undoubtedly simpler than praviokta For details the reader is referred to that Up VI-1201B ·xlii ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA {$2 their special significance is clearly shown by Vidya. ranya in his ţikā on it and in PD I. 28-29. See also Ves, S 17. Similarly the three states, jāgarila, suapna, and sușupta in the prose passages (3-4) are later additions from BU, or ChU, or both for a clear exposition of the terms bahisprajna, antahprajña, and ghanaprajna in kärikā 1. That the MāU (i.c., the piose passages) has drawn upon the kārikás and some other Upanisads can be 'gathered from the comparison of both the lexts. In the kārikās we have simply ghanaprajña (1) and anandabhuj (3) or ānanda (4), while the prose passage (5) reads as follows (see p 224): yalra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmayale na kañcana svapnam paśyati (BU, IV. 3.9) fat susuptam, susuptasthāna ekibhūtah" prajñānaghana (BU, IV. 5. 13) evānandamayo (TU, 11.5 l) hy ănandabhuk cetomukhah prājñas trtıyah pādah. Which of these two, the kārika and the passage, is the original, and which is the exposition, may now easily be ascertained. The word ghanaprajna ..n the kārika is no doubt, identical with prajñanaghana in* a somewhat different form, and to explain it the prose passage has introduced the word ekibhūſa found, in fact, in the form of ekibhavati in different Upanisads." prose See PU IV 2 (twice). 14 Ci ekib hayoti, BU, 6 IV 4 2 (seven limes) NPTU IV 1. NUTU, 1 15 See note 14 ·$2) INTRODUCTION xlu The kårikå I. 19 runs thus: viſvasyālvavivakṣāyām ādisāmānyam utkatam | mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmanyam eva ca il And the corresponding prose passage (9) is this: jāgacitasthäno vaiſvānaro "kāraḥ prathamă maträpter adimallvād vā. āpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān adis ca bhavatı ya evam veda. It means that Vaišvānara whose sphere is the waking state is the first mālrā *measure,' the letter a, on account of obtaining (or pervasiveness) or on account of its being the first lāpter ādimatlvad va). One who knows thus obtains one's all desires and becomes first of all Now, if these two texts are compared it will at once be clear that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the Brāhmaṇas. . Here is one point more, In the first text the reason is advanced as to why Visva (=Vaisvanara of the second text) is to be regarded as the letter a. And the reason is sāmānya 'similarity'-similarity between Viſva and the letter a. And this similarity is 'beginning (ādi) or 'obtaining' or 'pervasiveness' (āpti). Now, according to the order of Visva, Taijasa and Prājña, Visva is at the beginning or first (ādi); just so is at the beginning or first the letter a of a, u and m of which Om is composed. Owing to this similarity Visva is said to be identical with the letter a. The second similarity is āpti which by Ś ankara is thus explained: As Viśva pervades all the visible world, so does the letter a all the speech. On account ·xliv AGANAŠĀSIRA 1:2 of this similarity, too, Visva is to be regarded as the letter a. The second text, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity of Visva and a. For, while the first text says that owing to both the similarities of ādi and āpti they are identical, the second text clearly says that it is owing to either of them (apler adimativăd vā). All these seem to be later developments The case is exactly the same with kārıkās 1. 20, 21 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11 of the Upanisas, to which the reader is referred. There is one thing more to be noted with regard to the kārikā I. 21 and the corresponding prose passage II of the Upanişad. In the former one of the two similarities is māna measure' from v ma 'to measure' while in the latter the word is not māna, but miti 'measure' from mi. Similarly, while in the former we have apili 'disappearance' from api-i, in the latter there is laya 'disappearance There is, however, no difference of meaning, as shown, in the two cases. Yet, how far such divergency between an original text and its explanation in Sanskrit can be accounted for is to be considered seriously The conception of atman as having four fourths or quarters (catuspad) is not so explicit in the words of kārikās " as in those of the Upanisad, 2 This idea 16 One may, however, say that the word in the text may be taken in the sense of ca or api But Sankara or Sankarananda does not Bay 30 » Sre 1 10-15 where the fourth stata is described), 24, and 29 (where Oakára is described with or without móta) ·$2) INTRODUCTION xly is, however, fully developed in the Upanişad 2 from the very beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the karikās. The distinction between Turya or Turiya 'fourth' and the other three, viz., Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, as made in the kārikās (1. 10-15), has nothing correspond. ing in the Upanisad, but the nature of Turya, which is expressed in a kārikā (I. 29) simply by two words, siva blissful' and duaita-upasama 'cessation of duality' is thus elaborated in two passages, 7 and 12, of the Upanişad : (i) nāntahprajñam na bahisprajiam nobhayatahprajñam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam adęstam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayasăram prapancopaśamam śântam śivam advaitam caturtham manyante. sa vijñeyah. (ii) amatraś caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapancopasamah sivo 'dvaita evam onkära atmaiva.' samvišaly ātmanātmānam " ya evam veda. These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the kārıkā, 1 29, and consequently appear to be later developments, as shows also the language used here. Again, it is to be noted that though in the Upanişad (1) Brahman or Ātman is said to have four quarters (catuspad) which are explained there later on (3-6),. there is no express mentiort of them in the kārikās which are supposed to be an explanatory work. sa ātmā 18 Sec VS, XXXI 11 žiniastminam abhisarsneša ·xlvi AGARASĀSTRA 152 Compare the karika I. 24 with the prose passage 8 of the Upanisad and it will be found that the former is explained in the latter in some detail and not vicc Ucrsa. The kârıkā (1. 6) opening the discussion about the origin (prabhava) of all things may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the Upanisad: prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām." Here prabhava is described in the kārikás I. 6-9 at some length, but apyalja 'disappearance is not even touched in the kārikās. This would hardly be possible if the karikās were meant to explain the Upanisad. All these considerations lead me to conclude as follows: (i) The kārikās in Book I are not the exposition (vyakhyāna) of the Mau. (it) The MāU is mainly based on the kārıkās,." and not vice versa. (iii) And as such the MāU is later than the kärikās." Here we must remember what Madh v ācārya has said on the point. Serious charges may be and have been brought against him saying " that he is addicted to the fabrication of evidence and that he very frequently cites passages from books which do not and 13 lt 19 taken from KU,IL 2 * It has drawn much also upon some older pansads as will be seen from the text punted herewith, pp 223 4 11 See Max Wallexer Der alter Vedanta, p5 He says that the kātikās do not show that the Upanisad was before them ·$31 INTRODUCTION xlvii did not at any time exist."*92 Or Appayya Dikşita in his Madhuamalavidhvamsana may give a list of such books, or may say of him: tathāpy ānandatīthiyam matam agrāhyam eya nah! yatra vaidikamaryādā bhūyasy akulatām gata | Or, again, most of the authorities cited by him in his commentary on the MāU may not be traced; or one may or may not attach any value to the myth he has given us that Varuna having assumed the form of a frog received the mantras, i.e., the kārikās originally visioned by Brahman, the creator; yet, in the present case, we have to accept, as we have shown above, his view that the mantras or kärıkás are older and on them is based our MāU ? $3. The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Agamaśāstra It is generally held that the Agamaśästra has « four prakaranas or Books, viz , Agamaprakarana, Vailathyaº, Advaitaº, and Alātaśānti. Here arise the following questions · Are these Books, in fact, four parts of the same work, or are they four independent treatises compiled in one volume? Again, is it that . 12 A Venkatasubbiah IA, 1933, p 189 13 Sec RPR, Vol II, p 51 "This view was originally expresied by me long ago in IHQ, 1925. Vol I, .80 119-12$ 295 302 Against thus see s K Belvaltar's observa tror in his Vedanta Philosophy (Sreegopal Baru Mallik Lectures). Part 1 PP 192.193 Elut I do not think that the modificafton of my opinion is Tipeessary ·xlyi AGAMAŠASTRA while one or more of the Books form a work, the remaining one or ones constitute another work? Sankara, the commentator, with his followers, holds that the four Books are the different parts of the same work entitled Agamaśástra, And so, in order to show their mutual connexion first with reference to Books I and II, he writes just at the beginning of his commentary on Book II : "When (the Reality) is known there is no duality' - This is already said (I. 18d),' and it is supported by such śrutis as . There is only one without a second (ChāU, VI. 2. 1).' This is, however, only a statement of scripture (āgamamātra). With a showing that the unreality of duality can be established also by reasoning (upapatti) Book Il is begun with the words 'vaitathyam,' etc." Now, as regards the relationship between Books II and Ils observes (I. I); "The determination of view to 27 other 1 $ could easily refer here also to I 16, 17 and 29 Moreover, in the manner which he has adopted in showing the relationship between the first two Books the following might also be added in his favour, as in his opinion the Agamaprakarana begins with "Om ty clad aksaram ily idi, words, it includes the Mau We read in the concluding kārıka (29) of Book I. dvastasynpasamah fival, which is in fact the same as prapañcopasamam tāntam fivam and prapancopašamo dvaitab of the Alau, 7 and 12 respectively This very thing 19 se-assured u Book II 35 by a phase which is exactly the same in sense as the above, te, prapaĪcopašamo dvastah Again, in 1 10 we have advaitah sarvabhāvānām, and the same thing in one or other form 19 keen in many places in Book Il tasmad advayaļā frā || 331, advaste yojayet smrtim ! 351, advaitam samanuprāpya ll 361 Cj here also advastam paramartho hi (ill 18) And this truth is established there it if ) by strong reasons showing the unreality (vartathya) of all things as in dream Thus does it not show that these tho Bocks are closely connected with each other?

·4 $3] INTRODUCTION xiix Om is made only by a proposition (pratijñāmatra) ; • The Alman is the cessation of expression, blissful and without a second, MāU, 12).' It is also said that When the Reality) is known there is no duality' (1. 29). There in the Book called Non-reality (vailathya), i.e., II, the absence of duality is set forth by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-air, etc. (II. 31), by reasons such as the * capability of being seen' (drśyalva) and 'the state of having the beginning and the end' lādyantavatſua),' and also by reasoning Warka). Now, it is asked: Is it that non-duality can be understood only by scripture or also by reasoning?' The reply is: It can be done also by reasoning. How is it? For this Book III is begun." Finally with reference to Book IV, S says in introducing it: "Through the determination of Om non-duality is proposed (pratijñāła). It is then established (siddha) by showing the non-reality of the different external objects (in Book 1]). Again, in Book III it is directly 'ascertained by scripture (@gama) and reasoning conclud. ing that it is the highest truth (III. 48). At the end it IS hinted that the Dvaitins Dualists and Vaināśikas "Nihilists' are opposed to this view of non-duality which is the meaning of the scripture (āgama), and their views are wrong views as they cause such evil passions as attachment and aversion, on - . 3 Whete is it in Book 11? 3 17. advaitan kim agamamālresa pratipaitavyam ahosval tarkenapa 5 ls fact, it is not 'st the end' (ante, noj is it in any of the orginal kankis It is the commentator's own observation See the commentary on II 7. VH--1201B ·- $3] INTRODUCTION li opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book Il. But he has not done so. Let us consider here another point. We have already seen that in accordance with some teachers such as Madh väcārya, the MāU is composed of the twelve prose passages and the twenty-nine kārikās in Book I. It is quite clear from it that, in their opinion, the work is a complete one having no connexion with any of the remaining three Books of the Āś. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that its subject tratter, 1.c., the determination of Om, is here dealt with completely, as one can easily understand from the last two kärikas of Book I, after reading which one does not feel that anything more remains to be further discussed and elucidated; and, in fact, we see nothing directly of Om in the following Book or Books. Thus it follows that the treatise consisting of the kārıkas of Book I has no relationship to any of the Books that follow. It is also to be noted here that the views of the teachers referred to above cannot be ignored altogether. Further, f Book !) is a continuation of Book I. at could be expected that the former should somehow or other presuppose the latter. But does it do so? If so, where? Moreover, what does one lose if one takes Book II as an independent work on the advaita Vedānta? Does one find in reading this Book in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming ·lu AGAVASASTRA 193 its connexion with Book I? Or does one really feel that without Book I it appears to be incomplele?: That it is complete in itself will be clear if we attentively read at least the concluding portion of it, i.c., kärikās 35-38. Now with regard to the connexion between Books Il and JIJ let us remember what $ says. His words. put briefly, would amount to this that non-dualiis can be understood not only by agama, but by reasoning (tarkd) as well. Consequently to exhibit the reasoning Book Il is required. If that is so, we shall have to accept that according to the object of both the Books Il and illis one and the same. i.c., giving the arguments for non-duality. In that case, why should there be two separate Books instead of one in which all could be included? This leads one to think of a different object for which Book Ill must have been writion. And what this object was will be clear il one comunes the contents with some amount of care Ilere at the beginning (111. 1-?) the author tells us about ‘non. origination' (azalı) ard loving established it concludes in the end[1]], 48) that it is the lughest truth (ullama satyo). in doing so lic discusses the leadinta, and in the connexion the absence of difference between Jive and Brahman. He treats also of . samaidh'intenso aberast concentration called a fororeigo mcani lo tie sceleris. tion of the Truth It is not that thesis no mention of non-duality in this ·$31 INTRODUCTION Im Book. It is there (Ill. 18)," but only incidentally, and as such is not discussed. But can one say rightly that because of the mention of non-duality in this Book, Books II and I must have some direct connexion between them? If so, is it not that there will be no difficulty whatsoever in finding out a relationship between any two works on the same subject? But that relationship will certainly not be as that betwech the different chapters of the same work It is to be noted that s himself has not suggested such relatiopship, Thus it appears to me that there is notlung against . one's thinking that Book III, too, is an independent work on advaita Vedânia. We now come to Book IV. It has already been seen how $ wants to connect it with the preceding Books. He assumes that the views of Dvaitins and Vaināsikas' are to be shown in details in this Book as wrong, and by doing so the conclusion is to be established that the theory of non-duality is right. First, we are to examine here as to how far this assertion can be accepted Let us take for granted that, as he says, owing to their mutual contradiction the views of the Dvaitins and the Vainasikas are wrong and this is to be shown in detail in this Book. But where and how much is it done? Dvaitins are referred to by the word vădinis 'disputants only in two places (IV 3 and 6); but even there in 1 Book III. 18 advastan parpmārtko bi See Book 1 17 advantam paramāthatah 9 See Ii 17 ID Com on IV 1 tad ha vistarcna anyonyayıfuddhataya asamyagdarlanatvam pradariya, tatpratasedhenädvalladartsrasıddhar upasambarlatya ·liv ĀGANASASTRA {$3 the first place, though only their mutual contradiction is simply referred to, no detail of it is to be found. There is no allusion to Vaināśikas in this Book. But if by that word the Buddhists are meant, no mutual contradiction with the Dvaitins, (or among themselves,) is to be found of their views. On the contrary, the author of the AŚ has accepted or approved of them throughout the Book as the present writer has attempted to show. How is it then that in accordance with S, one can expect to understand from this Book that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināšíkas are wrong and the view of non-duality is right? Thus one can hardly connect in this way the present Book with the preceding one or ones. We should also remember here the questions that have already been put in discussing the relationship between Books I and II. See P lii. Is there then no relationship of any kind between Books IV and others? How can it be so? Certainly there is a relationship and it is rather a close one, as the following lines will show. A careful reader will see that a large number of expressions in various forms in the first three Books are literally quoted or alluded to in Book IV. And it will be noticed that some matters dealt with in the former are done so again in the latter. For instance, I, 16 = III. 36" - IV. 81'; 11. 6-7=IV. 31-32"; (cf. II. I, 4 with IV, 33, and Il. 2 with IV. 34'), III, 20-22= IV. 6-8 J.; III. 29-30 11 See 111 2, 48, IV 4, 5 19 The second half is, however, identical 13 Here is a slight variation, and at is that for the word that'a in the formet there is dharma in the latter with regard to the first and the last karikas ·$3] INTRODUCTION lv . = IV. 61-62" ; III. 48=IV. 71. Besides, such expressions or topics as the following are to be found in more than one Book: jñeyābhinna jñāna "the knowledge is not different from the knowable'' is in III. 33 and IV. 1; ajālivada 'the theory of non-origination' in Ill. 2 ff and IV. 3 ff. Such being the case it must be accepted that Book IV is rather closely related 1o other Books. But this relationship is not such as between a work and its different chapters on the following grounds: With reference later Sanskrit works it is a wellknown practice that their commencement is with a mangalăcarana prayer for success' which includes a namaskara 'paying homage to one for whom the authors have regard. Now, as we have at the very beginning : of Book IV a kārikā embodying mangalăcarana, it naturally induces one to think that it is not a chapter of any work, but itself an independent work. It is, however, true that marigalācarana is found not only at the commencement of a work, but also in other places of it, as in the case of the Nyayakandali of Sridhara on the Prasastapadabhāsya, or of the Sanjivani of Mallinātha on the Raghuvamsa. But it is to be noted here that in such cases it is done in each of the chapters, and not in any particular one, whereas in the present case, here in As we have it 14 With the following variations For spandate mayayi manah in Ill iliere i citlam calat măvaya in IV, and for manah in !!! there is ctiam in IV ·Ivi AGAMAŠASTRA (53 only in Book IV, so far as the extant editions and the MSS that are examined can show." Here we may remember a Buddhist work, viz., the Panjikā of Prajñākara mati on the Bodhicaryāvatāra. It consists of nine chapters. Here the mangalācarana is only in the first and the last chapters, and not in others. Evidently the mangalăcarana at the beginning of ils chapter IX does not mean to say that it is an independent work. Considering the contents of this chapter of both the Bodhicaryāvalära and its Pañjikā, which deal with projñāpāromitā, it appears to me that the only thing that can be said is this that the mangalācarana of the Pañjikā simply suggests a special importance of both the works, the Pañjikā and the BA. Thus the mangalācarana of Book IV cannot conclusively show that it is an independent work and not the continuation of the preceding ones But here is a thing which should not be left unnoticed. Both at the beginning and at the end of Book IV there is a mangalācarana in the form of namaskāra 'paying homage.' Does it not imply that the Book is an independent work and complete in itself? Let us discuss here another point. We have already seen that a number of kārıkās in Books II and III 15 We have some ground to think that at the beginning of Book I a few karikás are now $14$ing It is not improbable that there was a mangalācarung in those kārikas 16 As the firet folio of the Ats, the basis of the present edition (Bibliotheca Indical of BAP 15 lost, and the second one, in some parts Jlegible, is broken down, the beginning lines of BAP could not be printed Hence it could not be ascertained from the edition as to whether there is any mangolācarana st the beginning Yet, focmits Tibetan version we know that it actually exut ·INTRODUCTION ly: are repeated in Book IV. Why is this repetition? Moreover, certain things treated of before are discussed again in Book IV; c.g., ajálivāda 'theory of nonorigination' discussed in Ill is discussed again in IV. But why? A point discussed and settled once in a chapter may, if necessary, be alluded to in a subsequent chapter, but why should it be discussed and settled again? Is it not useless? Why should the author of Book IV indulge in such a useless action? This leads one to think that Book IV is an independent work in which the author has incorporated certain things that are already dealt with by him elsewhere, while others are discussed again more elaborately or in a different way. The discussion of the apātivāda is an instance on the point. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent trealises and are put together in a volume under the title of the mīgamašāstra. § 4. The Text of the Agamašāstra We are now to discuss a few points regarding the text of the As, as we have now in the extant editions and the MSS examined for them. Here arises a question : Is it that the text is a complete one? It seems to me that the answer cannot be given in the affirmative. It will at once occur to the mind of a reader that the first kõrika of Book / has found its place Mere quie abruptly. Without any reference to the three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep as described in the VIII-120173 ·lvii AGAMASASTRA prose passages of the MãU this kārikā is not intelligible.' It appears therefore that one or more kārikās here are missing. It may be said that as in Book IV, so here, too, at the beginning of Book ), a mangalācarana is expected, but it is not found. Hence it appears that originally at least one kārika was composed here for it, but subsequently somehow or other it was lost. This point of mangalācarana cannot, however, be much insisted upon. For, in the time of the author of the ĀŚ this practice of mangalācarana was not so much persisted in as in later days. The great Sankara, the author of the $ārīraka-bhāsyo, does not follow it, so far as his undisputed works are concerned.' So it may be that the author did not like it at the beginning of Book I, though he actually followed it in Book IV Thus this point is not of much importance. Let one read kārikās 5 and 6 and say if there is any connexion between them. Kārika 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden The commentator S is silent here on their mutual connexion. Does this not lead one ? This fact should not, however, be taken as a reason for supposing the pricity of the AlãU to the kārikās refuled elsewhere on strong grounds According to ako those who hold that the könkäs of Goudapáda are written as an explanation (eyākhyānal of the MàU, one might naturally expect at the beginning some words 10 that effect, but they are not found In accor dance with this theory also at least one kanka is lost here 1 The commentary on the Sankhya kariká may also be added here, but it is not quite certain that its authat and the author of AS, thaugh both of them are known by the same lame, Gauda pada, are identica! + I 19 dispuled that the beginning slokas of the commentary on the TU. which so hy his name ate aclually written by him ·INTRODUCTION lix to think that a kārika or kārskās are missing here? They might have been in existence in the time of the commentator, and possibly they were commented upon by him, but all this was lost afterwards. Undoubtedly Om is one of the subject matters of Book I which consists of 29 karikás, but until kārika 19 there is no mention whatsoever of the word. "This does not seem to be quite proper. And here is one thing more to be borne in mind; it is this that without a knowledge of the fact that Om can be analysed into a, u, and m this kārika (19) can hardly be understood, so one expects here something like the prose passage 8 of the MāU. With reference to some of the karıkás it appears to me that their original order has been somehow or other changed, so that their proper elucidation has been difficult Let us take kārika Il 33. I am afraid, it does not 6t well here after kárıkā ll. 32. Its right place seems to be after II. 30. Similarly in Book IV kārikās 38, 39, 40 and 41 appear to be 40, 38, 41 and 39 respectively, as is discussed in a foot-szote on p 146. As regards IV. 77, it seems to me that between its (wo lines at least two more lines are lost, as will be seen from the discussion on p 184, to which the reader red. This consideration coupled with that of the variants that are supported by $ in his commentary, as I have discussed in their places, shows that the original text of the AS of Gaudapāda underwent some serious changes at least by the time of 5, if not ealier. is ref ·Ix AGAMASASIRA 85. Rcadings of the Text Wc may now speak here a few words with regard to the readings of the ĀS. The collation of the MSS referred to above as well as of the diffcrent editions of the work has resulted in showing or suggesting true or belter readings in many cases, which have mainly been discussed under the kārikās concerned, giving the grounds for the readings adopted. There are, however, other cases where I have not offered my reasons for selecting a particular rcading, as they can easily be understood by the reader himself. Below will be found, for example, some notable readings that are chosen or suggested : 1. duc lu (l. 11") for dvau tu. 2. samurlatvam na (II 4') for samurlalucna, 3. 'pi pratipadyate (Il. 7') for viprolpadyale Sec IV. 32". 4. vyavasthilan (II. 13") for vyavasthitan. 5. nanyabhāvena (il. 349) for nātmabhāvcna 6. sa-yatha (III., 114) for kham yothā. 7. yad qº (IV 12") for yady a. As we have yadi in ", it cannot again be expected in a; nor it, in that case, be construed properly. Besides, the reading yad a® is actually found in Vi. 8. 'nādih (IV. 23") for 'nādeh, and jätırd) supported by PU' for hy adır. 9 samsāro nopalabhyaté (IV 569) supported by Aland 10 for samsāram na prapadyate. can 1 For a detailed account see Appendix !!, Vanants, pp 229-244 ·INI RODUCTION 10. svabhávena (IV. 57") for sadbhāuena. 11. samurlya (IV. 58-5 supported by Vand S for jāyante. 12. paralantro 'bhiº (IV. 73") for paralantrăbhiº. 13. poralantro 'bhiº (IV. 74) for paralandrabhiº. 14. dharmadhālūh svabhivatah (IV. 81") for dharmo dhātusvaº $6. The Name of the IVork The present work popularly known as Mandukyakārika (or Okārikās) or Gaudapādahārika (or Färikäs) is traditionally called Āgamaśāstra. It is owing to this fact that the commentary on it by S'is called Agamašāstravivarana 1 Sometimes it is named also Āgamagrantha or Upadeśagrantha as some of the colophons show (p. 244), occasionally both of these games are used Together (loc. cit). It is also called or described as Alandukyavärttika,' or Mlandukyopanisad-gaudapadavyākhyāna, or Gaudapādıyakānkā, or simply Gaudapadiya after its author, as is shown by some MSS. Again, sometimes it is referred to as Mandūkyasakha' See the Colophons, pp 231, 234, 236, 244 ? The word väritka is not properly used here, as the present work has not the characteristics of a várfaks, for a caritka 19 said to be a work which criticates what is said, what is not said, and what is said wrongly in the original woik, ax says Rajasekharana bis Katyamimamsā, GOS, No 1, 1916. !1 P 5: uktinuktaduruktacontā vārttikam * Seyana on TA, VIII (p 4$3, VII 2 (p 570) māyāmatram dam dvaitam advaitam patimārthatah | i minçükyaśākháyim frutvikyam udābrtam Here! 17 of our text is referred to For other two namas se Sl, note R. P. XXXY ·Ixi: AGAM ASASIRA {:6 may be noticed here that two MSS, D' and D, describe the work as Vedāntamüla 'origin of the Vedānta' which is very significant. Now let us discuss as to why this book is called Āgamaśāstra. The word agama among other things means 'a traditional doctrine' or 'anything handed down and fixed by tradition'; and sästra gives the sense in such cases as the present one, of 'a religious or authoritative treatise. Thus the compound word, Āgamaśāstra, means a śāstra pertaining to agama, i.c., authoritative treatise włoich deals with or is based on a traditional doctrine or doctrines. That the Āgamaśāstra is in fact of such character is fully borne out throughout the book itself, as the following few lines will show. Besides the general meaning 'to remember the root V smr figuratively means also 'to hand down memoriter, declare,' and so its past participial form smita is used in the sense of 'handed down memoriter, or declared, mentioned,' etc. Thus the sentence śāstre smirlam means it is handed down memoriter or declared in a scripture.' And though the subject of the sentence is not expressed in this or similar cases, it is easily understood, it being a teacher or teachers or a similar person or For ögomo sce A1V. pp 268-9 For the Buddhist interpretation of thr word Sõstra one may be referred to NIVST. p 4 from which the following quoled here Sac chăsti ca klesanipun asesin santrāyate durgalito bhayic ca ! lac châsınāt tränagunac ca sastram It is quoted also in MV, p 3 For a description of Sastras acc Rija. sekhara, Op cit, l1 For the significance and importance of the word füstra (Tibetan batan bcos, Chinese lun mark its use in Niginuna's fundamental work, Madhyamakatastra ·€7] INTRODUCTION lani persons who may or may not have been mentioned before. Now with regard to our case the word smita is employed by our author not less than eleven times. This fact clearly shows that our author refers to or deals with some doctrine or doctrines handed down traditionally. This is clear also from his employment of the following phrases in the work: 1. salām iti viniscayah (1.6); 2. svapna āhur mani. șinah (II. 2); 3. svapna āhuh prakāśilam (I). 3); 4. evam āhur manīsinah (11.5): 5. dıştam vedānteșu vicakşå naih (11. 31); 6. iti tattvavido viduh (II. 34); 7. Omunibhir vedapāragaih | nirvikalpo hy ayam drstah prapancopasamo 'dvayah i (11. 35); 8. vādinah kecid (Il. 3), 9. vivadanlo 'dvayā hy evam ajátim khyāpayanti le (IV, 4); 10. khyāpyamānām ajậtim tah (IV.5); 11 jatim icchanti vădinah (IV. 6)." 87. The Author We have already seen,' as the great Sankara says in his commentary on the BS, 1. 4. 14 and II 1.9, that the work was by an Acārya 'teacher' to whom the tradition of the Vedanta was known. But the question 5 1 1, 20, 26, 11 4 7. VIII. IV 32, 45, 88, 90, 94 6 Besides, the following words may be referred to here Iarva (IT). 2 apara (I1 267, 3 ašramond til 271 4 kalecintake (1 8.5 kälarid (1 24). 6 gunaerd:!). 20), 7 citroerd UJ 8 Idig») ud g 241, 9 Agderd (21), 10 prānacid all 20). Il bude'bird Il 25), 12 bhurona-ird 'Il 21) 3. diluib-ivia'n! 20%. Dolus tu ? ?? isbhayer bis 224, 15 manoord 111 25), 16 merlarid lll 23). 17 laya-) od 11 28), 18 lokeusd (11,21). 19 gükimaud (il. 23), 20 Fifintd 1!! 28), 20 shutcrd (1 287 1 See supra. sl. notes 5 and 6. P XXXY ·G lxiv ĀGAMASĀSTRA (97 is: who is that Ācārya? That he is Gaudapăda' is well-known traditionally and found in the colophons of each of the four Books in MSS of the original and its commentary. He is sometimes called Gauda på dá cārya,' Gaudācārya, or simply Gauda. From this we may think that his real name is Gauda, the words -päda, -pada, -carana, or -ācārya being added to it simply as honorific. That his actual name is Gauda is stated very clearly by Balaks ņā nanda Sarasvati (middle of the 17th century A.D.) in his SMV, p. 6, 11. 9:12. Now the question arises : Is the word Gauda his personal name or does it simply signify that he belongs to a country called Gauda?? In Sureśvara's NS, IV. 44, there are two words, Gaudas and Drāvidas, which refer to Gauda pādā cârya, the author of the present work and the great Sankarācārya, the author of the Upadešasähasri, respectively, according : Sometimes we have Gauda pada JM1, 10, and Gaudacarana (SMV. p 5,1 23), most probably for metrical exigency ? Son SU, I 8 (p 30) + PD, 11 23. Sá yana on TA, VIL 2 (p 565) 5 NS, IV 44 6 A Venkatasubbiah 14, 1933, p 1931 is of the same opinion 7 There is evidence to show that the country called Gaudadefu was once regarded as the land between 82 and 88° longitude and 259 and 28' latitude along with the adjacent districts of North Bengal Aaisya P. XIL 30. Karma P. Part I, 20.9 Linga P, Part!, 65, 34 JASB. 1908. PP 2738 Recent jescarches show that the country is ident cal with North Pensal Sec Haranchandra Chaklada: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol 1, Part I pp 45 ·$7] INTRODUCTION lxy to the commentator, J ñānottama. It may be said that as Sankara is referred to by a name related to his native country, Dravida (i.e., Kerala, the modern Malabar), and not by a personal name, so the case must have been the same with Gauda pada; in other words, he, too, 'must have been alluded to by a name connected with his country which is Gauda. Otherwise, why should Sureśvara mention him in a different way? Walleser (op. cit., p. 3) is of opinion that by words of Sureśvara, Gaudas and Drāvidas, we are to understand iwo Vedantic schools. If we are to know by the word Dravidas a school founded by Sankara in Malabar (the representative work of which is here said to be the Upadeśasahasri), we must take also the Gaudas as a native school established in North India in the land of Gaudas," which might have already been much advanced in culture. It is, however, immaterial, to my mind, 10 discuss as to whether the words actually refer to the two the two 6 It may be noliced here that in the second edition (Bombay Sanskrit Serica. No XXXVIII, 1966) of the NS. occurs the following line in Janottama's commentary on IV 44 kevalánām opi drivıdatvaprasiddheh Seeing this the editor Colonel G A Jacob writes in his notes Ip 247) * Who are the kevalas referred to in the commentary?" The fact that the word Recola 13 wrongly whtien, or read, or printed for Kerala, the ancient name of the country. The same mistake occurs also in the revised eethon (1926) of the book, e 193 Wallese thinks that the country mışlı have been so named owing 10 much cultivanon of sugar cane lgado} the word pundsa for Norils Bengal, which also means 'supar-canetof red sariety) IX-12011 ·Ixvi AGAMAŠĀSTRA [57 representative teachers or to the two schools represented by them, both the interpretations being equally possible. It may be pointed out here that merely the word Gauda cannot invariably refer to one who is an inhabitant of the Gaudadesa. One may not actually be an inhabitant of it, yet, may be regarded as a Gauda. Abhinanda, the author of the Yogavāsisthasāra or Laghuyogavāsiştha, though a Kashmirian, is called Gauda. Similarly Brahmananda, the wellknown author of the Laghucandrikā, though not born in Gaudadeśa, has the epithet Gauda, probably as he was educated in Caudadeśa, Bengal, being, as is said, a fellow student of Gadadhara Bhattă cārya. One who has any connexion, past, present, or future;" in respect of oneself or one's ancestors, with the Gaudadesa be a Gauda On this one may be may referred to MD, I. 3. 23 with $ a bara s vā min's commentary in which it is said that a man who has set out for the city of Mathurā is regarded as a Máthura; similarly one who lives in the city of Mathurā, or one who has come out from the city of Mathurā is also called a Mathura." With regard to our author we should remember here the views of Balaksnānanda Sarasvatí already once referred to. He writes (SMB, p 6, 11. 9.12). There was in the country of Kuruksetra a river mathutavām sasan matl widt 10 matkatāsām abhiprasthro méthuta sit mirgalasca ·us $7] INTRODUCTION Ixvii called Hira.r å vati," On its banks ihere were some Gauda people, the pre-eminent of whom was our author, and as he was absorbed in dcep meditation beginning from the Duāpara age, his special name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the general one.' Let notice here the observations made by Valleser (op. cit., pp. 6 ff.). He thinks there was none named Gauda pada who is believed to have been the author of the present work. By the word Gauda-pādas we are to understand the four Books (prakaranas) of the work and Gaudapâdıyakārıkā is the name for the whole work, as found in MSS. This last title seems to be somewhat artificial and it can be 'guessed that the work was commonly known as Gaudapäde in the same way as the provincial expression Bhadracori for Bhadracarya. In fact both the titles Gaudapädı and Āgamaśāstravivarana have been shown by C, F, Hall in one of his contributions." Walleser says further that the quotations from later works correspond to his'opinion that no teacher known as Gauda pada was the author of the book, but it 11 It semains to be identified It is doubtful of the name is correctly written by the scribe of the MS or read or edited accurately by the editors 11 Saudacaranah kuruksetradelagata-hunt&vati-naditirathavagaudejālistesilah dešavišesabhavajātināmnassa prasiddhāh, driparayugam ErabhyRiva samadhinishalvenidhupkajarar apanijāātaviiesibhidhanshmänyanimnaiva lokayıkhyarah 13 Sunbate of micry commar the couldry ef Vidyasagari alika by Anandapurna Vidyasigara on the Khandanakhondakhadya, Rămabhadri, a jaki on the Nyopekost măiyoh by Rimabhadra, 10 ore Dinakarl, Rómaradri, etc etc.

·lxviii AGAMAŠĀSTRA {97 cxisted amons the contemporary people as a fundamental work of a school and not as a production of a definite author. He shows from the Tibetan sources" that though the work was known to the Buddhist authors as a Vedantaśāstra in which the doctrines of the school are explained, nothing is known thaic of Caudapāda who is supposed to have composed it. Sankara in his Särirakabhāya quotes twice, as shown above, from the work referring to our author for authors) as those to whom was known the tradition of the Vedānta (vedanlärthasampiadāyavid or simply sampradayavid). The commentator, Govindā nanda in his Ralnaprabha and Ānan dagiri in his Nyayanirnaya introduce the above opinion of Sankara as the approval of the old' (viddhasammali, BS, I. 4.14 and Il. 1.9) Sureśvara has quoted two Kāríkās (NSi, IV. 41, 42; our text i il and 15 respectively) mentioning their author as Gaudas (gaudarh)," wlule he takes Sankara as the representatre of the Dravida tradition. In the commentary on the NS, Jūānoltara describes the quoled passages as gaudapadiya-vákya. We have already seen in the PD (Il 28) the Gauda teaching, but the commentator, Rāma hosna, does not know # That is the Tibetan translations of Santuakrita Hadhyamala tankuratanka together with its commentary by Kamalaja, as well as of Bhivarek., Vadhyametahidayalurka and its cumonentury Tarkostula by him all Vide intra 1, 11 lowest potirurat Sunrivata nevet malone the name Goudopucla for he d'en 11 at least once in the BhV. IV 489 tp 19 In the *3mm work he has als used the words coudopdue tocar 11 4 397, p 51 and guducurya' || 1 396, p 95] ·. INTRODUCTION Irix the author, he describes the passage quoted as ācārya."" sammali. Sadananda quotes in his Ves, $ 33, two kārikās, III. 44, 45, referring as tad uklam, and Nrsimha Sarasvati, the commentator, does not name their author simply alluding to them as urddhasammali 'the opinion of the old.' Rå matirtha, another commentator, says that it is a contemporary opinion. Again, if we examine Kāśmiraka Yati, the author of the Advailabrahmasiddhi (p. 277) we find no evidence that the Gaudapadakārkā was known to him as a work of a single author Vijñānabhiksu has quoted kārikās (Il. 32, 11%. 5, 26) from the work in his Sankhyapravacanabhāsya, (I. 45, 47; 153; VI. 50). But there is nothing to show that Gauda pada was taken to be their author Walleser thus says that not a single passage " can be quoted from all these texts which can make us believe that Gaudapädi had Gauda pada as its author. We are told. that Sankara received instruction from Govinda .." who was a disciple of Gauda pāda with whom the former had a conversation and he had another conversation with Vyasa himself. The same sort of contradiction is found also with regard to the residence of Govinda, one source gives it as the banks of the Narmada and the other the Himalayas. This sort of things does not give us a historical clue. 16 Not eddha- as wtites Walleret 17 Excepting. as he himself has pointed out, one pasage from $. cominentary on the SU, I 8, where the following line occurs faths ca dukafuso Raud.apudicaryah. But that the commentary is not by the great S is the view not only of walle, er but also of others including the prevent author ·Ixx AGAMAŚĀSTRA Walloser thus finally observes that the whole tradition is fabulous, and with this the last of the arguments in favour of the authorship of Gaudapădı by a certain Gauda pada vanishes. And as one could not explain the word Gaudapādt one imagined a fictitious Gauda pada. Now he adds that for the history of Vedanta we can gather from the preceding discussion that in a time considerably before the activities of Sankara there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauda and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eig century. This school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and Upanışads in the form of a śästra, i.c., a school doctrine and embodied it in a collection of sayings (Spruchsummlung) consisting of the four pādas of the Gaudapādakārikà. Already in the time of Ś ankara this text, the only older Vedānta text which has been preserved and perhaps the only one which was ever produced, enjoys high consideration quite independently of legendary traditions which connect Sarkara with Govinda and Suka with Gauda pada.' The existence of the North Indian school at the beginning of the century preceding Sankara seems well-established. We are, however, to consider here the following without entering into a hair-splitting discussion. There is a text before us known as the Āgomaśăstra or Gaudapădakārıkā, or passing under any other similar name; and of this text there must be author. There may, however, be more than one author. The an ·$7] INTRODUCTION 1xx1 work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself, and not as his personal, view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work iş by one person and yet, it represents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one Gauda When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible? Thus, as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is Gauda, or with the honorific word -pada or ācārya added to it Gauda pāda, or Gaudācārya. Much could be known of any author from the old records on which naturally one inclines to depend for ascertaining the truth. But they are so fantastic and self contradictory in the present .case that it is almost impossible to find out the truth from them." These !! On their unreliability obsersee S к Pelvalkar in het Vedanta Philosophy, Poona, 1929, pp 231-232 "while all the other so-called Pricina. Bthat, or Keraliya Sankaravijayas are prepuced in favour of one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost shameless tampering of tradition and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the -core of falsafication of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other len rack is the case of the pond Sellos en of the School, st need hardly be wondered at af the pronounced opponents belonging to the Madl.vn and the Romanujiya Schools have gone one better, and Indulged In a mriciles throwing of mud in the hope that some of it might stack ·Ixxii AGAMASASTRA 138 records are the accounts of the life of the great Sankara and those who were connected with him in some way or other." Readers desirous of l.nowing these legendary accounts of Gauda pada are referred to those works themselves which are to be used very cautiously, $ 8. The Dale of Gaudapāda Now let us discuss the date of our author, and in doing so we shall begin from one of the old accounts of theschcolalready referred to, viz., JM, in which Gaudas pāda is mentioned as having some connexion with a few Greeks. It is said there (10)' that the feet of Gaudapāda were adored by A yāscya, and he was the preceptor of such Nişāka mystics as Apalūnya: Here Ātmabodhendra, the commentator, adds something on the authority of such works as Gaudapādollāsa of Harimisra, and Patañjalıvijaya. (=carita? of Rāmabhadra Diksital.. He writes that when Gauda pada on a peak of the Himalayas was seeking after the truth of the self under the guidance 19 Gopinath Kaviraj singles out the following books in hie learned Introduction (on Honda) *10 the Brahmostras published from the Acvuta Press, Benares, 1936, pp 26 ff (1) Sankarodigijaya of Msdh a vicary Inot of Vidyā rany a ), 12) Sankaratiyaya of Ānandagini, 13) Senkerabhyudaya of Rajacadamani, 141 Sonkara izaya of cidvilasa, 15) Sarkarovaya of Sadananda, 16. Permyasl kamañori of Sarvajaa Sadakuvabodha, 17 Punyaslokamañjari-panssa of Almabodla, 18. Gururafnamálä ni Sadasivabrahmendia Its tiká, Susuma, by Āima bodhendra is a gnod one ! Whyuñad-ayāts a-puyarādās spalūnādin al sydd anelin! atha guidaparān pları al lácy-fallin atal hos Tcrtia piapidse ·$8] INTRODUCTION 1xxili of ſu ka,' it was through his influence that the wrong Buddhistic views (sauddhodani-kadadhvanām) of the persons headed by Ayarcya who was being attended by such Yoging, belonging to the Western border of the country as Apalūnyà and Damiša (apalunya. damišādyaparāntyayogibhis ca), as well as by Prāvrti, the ſākya chief of Taxila (lakſasiladhisa-śākyapraurti. pramukhaiḥ), were made to disappear. If here one turns over the pages of The Indian Travels of Apollonius of Tyana by Osmond de Beauvoir Priaulx, JRAS, 1860, pp., 70 ff., one will easily see that A palūny a in the Sanskrit text is no other than the Pythagorian philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, who founished in the first century A.D. He travelled to India and came to the court of Phraotes who was the same as Praviti in the Sanskrit text, the king of Taxila. And Damisa of our text is indentical with Damis, * In connection wit Goudapsda', tapatya in the Himalayas the following ricry may be related here from Naiky.n.. ika on Mau The four parts of the All of the recepwon of the RV (yet. dole that the Upanisad is said to belong to the AV) were explained by Gauda pada by his four Books prakaranas) He was a disciple of Suka and the grand preceptor of $ He Hourished at the end of the fe called Deaparo At the hermitage of Badanka by his devotion he propitialed Nitlyana and eing obtained boon from him he entered into a cave of a mountain, 30 that he would not look at the face of any one born in the age of Kali In this sale he » approached by $ and requested 10 come ou! liom the cave, but he did not comply with the request having wiltten the lour Books of his work on the leaves of . Banyan free with 1cd chalk he case them so S, Report of Sars.MIS Southern India by E Hultaichi No i!l.'p 133 But there is no end of such legend, on which one can hardly sely X 12010 ·Ixxiy ĀGAMASĀSTRA ($8 the fellow traveller and friend of Apollonius. The last person in our text, Ayārcya, is the same and one with larchas (probably a corruption from Rac'hyas, op. cit., p. 83, note), a Greek king, All this looks well, but do you gain anything from it about the date in question? The Greek account simply relates the travel of Apollonius, being completely silent about Gauda pāda. There is no doubt that some names of both the accounts are identical, but it does not follow from it that the persons having the same names are also identical. Supposing that the account is true it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great $ into which we do not enter here as useless. Hence without having recourse to such legendary records for the determination of the date of our teacher : Perhaps it is M HiriyBnna (HQ, 1926, pp 415.4161 who has first made the identification Sce also Gopinath Kavirai, op cit, PP 22-23 How far this account is true tysrot easy lo say, Pitaux. the author of the paprs observes (Op cit, p 1041, "of Dami's grography, can only say that it reminds me of a fairy tale.. Who shall explain these discrepancies, account for these mistakes and fix localities thus vaguely. descnbed?" "Reviewing the whole work of Phulostratus (te, the onginal author of the life of Apolloniua) it seems to me that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through and made some stay in India. but that scry possibly he did not visit 1l. our Damis never accompanied him, but of we may judge from cinnamon and pepper-trees, fabuxcated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at the great mart for Indian commoditaca, and resort for Indian merchants-Alexandija ·$8] INI RODUCTION + we should take a safer course by which at least the upper and lower limits of his time can be ascertained. I think we have no reason for discarding what Walleser has said in this respect. So far three Buddhist writers are known to us, who have actually quoted Gauda pada , viz., B hà va viveka (cir. 500-550 A.D.), Santirakṣita (705-762 A.D.), and his disciple Kamalasila. Bhāva viveka is the author of the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā as well as of its commentary Tarkajvāla, the full title being Madhyamakahrdayavrtti Tarkajvālā. în chapter VIII of his work Bhå va vivek a reviews the system of the Vedāntins as he does in other chapters the systems of Sankhya, Vaiseşi ka and Mimă msā. In doing so Bhāva viveka in his TJ. VIII has quoted passages from such texts as ChU, SU and MuU. Besides, there are some other passages quoled, four of them (10-13) being very important in the present .connexion. While the first three have the closest relationship with three kārikās of our text the last (i.c., TJ. VIII. 13) is entirely identical with III. 5 of our 7 . . Or Bhavy.. as he is sometimes called, or Bhavya viveka as suggested from the Tabelan sources 'legs ldan hbycdBhiravivek. was the founder of the Prārangika school of Nagarjuna Mdhyamika system. He much chticed by Candrakirtein his MV. I Bhiva viveka's Prañõpradipašā ira (Nanjio. No 1183) was translated Into Chinese by Prabhakara Mitra in 670-632 AD He was a junior contemporary of Dharmapala (Th Walter On! Yaan Chuang's Travels in India, Il p 222) who lived in the 5th century AD (Winternitz. ffatory of Indian Literature, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol Hl. P. 362) Thus it can be said that the date of Bhivariseka ia 500 AD. or a few years after it ·text. 1xxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA {$8 There is, therefore, not an iota of doubt here that the GK was known to Bhā va viveka, With reference to the other three kārikās cited by Bhava viveka, which are not identified in the GK, but have the closest relationship, we have to seek after another source. As regards śāntiraksita he is the author among others of the Madhyamakalankarakārika as well as of its commentary called Madhyanakalankaravilli, Besides, his disciple Ramala sila has written a Pañjika on the former work just as on the Tatlvasamgraha. śāntara ksita in his MAK, 93, discusses the views of the Aupanisadas (lit. Aupanisadānusārins, Tib. gsan.ba.pahi. rjes.su.hbran.ba.dag), and in doing so he cites there not less than ten kāríkās from our text which is referred to by Ka malaśila in bis Pañikā as an Upanisat sastra, Now as we have seen above we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the GK before Bhã và viveka who has actually quoted it Thus one may ascertain that the time of Gaudapāda is cir. 500 A.D: The following consideration, too, leads us to the same decision, Gauda pada has quoted almost fully, partially or substantially from works of some 6 Generally in Buddhist texts we come across similar words, as Appan adiko (TSP, S1 328), and Uponişod-Laden (BAP, PP 455, 465), and not Vedantacadın or Vadantika il may be noted that though Śãnkurakoita has quoted here to many hänkis from GK he has not done 80 at all in TS (Sis 328-335) either from this or any other work for the kinkis quoted in Tibetan works see our text Il 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20, III 4, 5, 6, 8 ·$8] -INTRODUCTION Ixxvi ? celebrated Buddhist teachers who Aourished between 200 AD, and 400 A.D. For instance, see our text, IV. 2226: svato va parato vāpi na kiſcid vastu jāyale / And read here Nagarjuna's (200 A.D.) MK, XXI. 1300 : na svato jayate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate | See our text, pp. 105 ff. and {27 ff. Again, we read in our Āś, 7ed and 2964; prakrier anyathābhavo na kathañcid bhavisyatil. And in MK, XV. 8«d we have : prakſter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate li The following line occurs in AS, IV. 4": abhatam naiva jāyate! And let us cite here the following froin the C$, 373" of Nagarjuna's disciple Arya deva who probably lived, in the words of Winternitz (A History of Indian Literature, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 350).." at about the turning point of the second and third century, A.D.": nābhūto nãma jāyate il See our text III. 44 (pp. 77-78) : laye sambodhayec cittam viksipta samayet punaḥ sakaṣāyam vijānīyāc chamaprāptam na cảlayet With this read the following froin MAS, XIV. gra- 105 of Maitreyanātha Asanga (400.4.D.): linam cittasya gļhņiyad uddhatam samayet punah | śamaprāpłam upekseta tasminn ālämbane punah || ► ·can no on own Ixxviii AGANASASTRA (58 Thus Gauda pāda quoting the above teachers in way be placed before them, in other words he cannot be assigned a date before 400 A.D. Here we are to consider another kātikā of our author, i.c., IV. 13 which runs thus (see pp. 114-115): jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate | Compare this with the following line quoted in MV, P: 13 from the AKV: utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām anavasthaprasangah. Now this work, AKV, is by Yaśomitra. Before he wrote his commentary the AK of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) there were at least three commentaries, two of them being written by Gunamati (425 A.D) and Vasu mitra, as he himself says in the introductory slokas of his work. This shows that Yaśomitra lived in the 5th century A.D. And so, if Gauda pada's kârika (i.c., IV. 13) is in fact based on the above line of the AKV his date nalurally falls in the 5th century A.D. Certainly this will militate against the traditional time of Sankara or the succession of teachers and disciples of his school. But how far the accounts of this succession upon is a question which has not yet been scttled finally or satisfactorily. Are not the traditional succession lists kept in different Mathas unscrupulously manipulated? Under these circumstances we have no course left to us other than the evidences of can be relied ·as $8] INTRODUCTION Ixxix quotations_and_cross-references in early and reliable texts.* $ 9. Alleged Borrowing by Gaudapăda Let us discuss the question from a different point of view. There is a work Paramarthasāra' attributed to s'eş a who is apparently the mythical šesa, he his referred to in the work itself as adhāra (8), 1.e., jagad-adhāra (87). From this some take him as Patañjali, the less mythical šesa, the author of the Mahābhāsya on Pāņini. It is also called Āryāpañcāšili owing to the. fact that it is composed in eighty-five stanzas in the Arya metre, though in fact there are eighty-seven, stanzas." 10 Our old traditions are so divergent that according to them as well as the modern researches we shall have to place Sankara some time between the 6th century BC and the 9th century AD, orz, 6th century BC. 4th century B.C., 1st century BC., 4th century AD. 6th century AD. and the 9th century (788-820) AD The last date is now accepted by many a scholar See Gopinath Kaviraj, D at. pp 23 A, Belvalkar, op cit, pp 209 f. 9 There are so far at least five cditions of this book, the latest and critical one being by S. S Suryanaz a yana Sastrı (Transhterated Text, English Translation and Notes), Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay, 1941 10 It may be that the first two stanzas which are not in Ārva, but Upajāts, were added later on But, if it is so, as regards the first of them, it was added long before Abhinavagupta who has adopted it just at the beginning of his PS', 1. The last stanza (87 vedantaº) does not also appear to constitute the onginal, being added by a second hand, as is suggested by Suryanarayana Sasın, op cit, 40, note Mark here the edonlowont of the perfect tense, in the word babandha The original number, 85, can however, be obtained by reckoning an'additional stanza between 18 and 19 given from a MS in a foot-note in the Trivandrum edition (PS) being fully supported by PST, 9 (and not 6 as in PSP).

·17 Ixxxii AGANASASTRA [58 in the hope that this may decide the case "He writes : "Both are concerned with the three forms-Visva, Taijasa and Prajña--as veiling the fourth which is the real.' This refers, as he says, 10 PS', 31 and GK, 1. I and 11. The most important thing to be pointed out here first is that belween the two texts, AŚ and PS', the latter is certainly a later development, as a perusal of the texts will show. Let us, however, make an attempt to understand PS', 31 as it is before us without taking any help either from the commentator or from Abhinavagupia.'" The word jāgrat-svapna-susupta is an adjective of vršvataijasaprājña. But what is to be understood from the abrupt statement that Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are jāgrat, svapna and susupta respectively? What are these 'three, Viúva, Taijasa and Prajña) How can one know them? How is one to understand that there is only one and the same who is regarded as three (i.e., Viśva, etc) owing to three different stages (i.e., jagrat, etc.)? How is it that furya undoubtedly referring to l'āsudeva in the preceeding kāķkā (30) is put in the neuter gender, .? Is the last part of the stalement cracily so) Do chadita in PSI. 3) (=ācrta in PP. 34) and baddha in kāryakaronabaddha and karangboddha in GK, 1 11 convey the same idea? We ate to consider here GK, I 15 and NS. (IV 41, 42) where these two kānkss of Gauda pada are quoted 14 He has here the following tuo kārkās {PS!, 34 and 351 srstisthitisamhárā jāgra'ssapnau shauptam ili tasmin | bhantı turise dhamanı tathāpı tair Evitam bhati in the first hall of this kāciki in Ps3 quoted in frol-note 2- szopnam is to by read ag -st'apngu ! jāgrad višvam bhedal sapnas tejah prakasamahatmyat! plājnah culp'ās asthåninaghanalu{t Indah patam luryam ·$8] INTRODUCTION Ixxxi while the latter word is in the masculine?". Moreover, what is the significance of laih in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with châdita in the second half? Again, why is it that eva should be used in the first half after tribhir? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that $eşa's work presupposes that of Gauda pada, and not vice versa. Seșa had before him ĀS, I. 1-5 (as well as Mal, 3.7) upon which he has drawn addig something (ādımadhyanıdhana) more quite independently as he ne throughout his Wh in AS there are five karikās, Sesa has only one, and -even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing PS' and PS4 with the GK here it appears to me that as Sesa could not adequately and consequently his kārıkā became obscure Abhina va gupta added here one kārikā more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidiation, Now, what is the source or sources of Abhinava's interpretation here (kārıkās 34, 35), without which we cannot understand the kārikā of Sesa? Certainly it was not only Gauda pada, for such things as express himself 19 Abhinava is quite jus ihed in putting turya in the neuter gender as he has before it (kanka 341 dhaman, neuter, which is referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from CK, 15, 22 ·$8] INTRODUCTION Ixxxiii while the latter word is in the masculine?" Moreover, what is the significance of laih in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with chädita in the second half? Again, why is it that eva should be used in the first half after tribhir? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that Sesa's work presupposes that of Gauda pāda, and not vice versa. Sesa had before him AS, I 1-5 (as well as MaU, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (adımadhyanidhana) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in ĀS there are five kārikās, ses a has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing PS' and PS with the GK here it appears to me that as Seşa could not express himself adequately and consequently hıs kārıkā became obscure Abhina va gupta added here one kārikā as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidiation. Now, what is the source or sources of Abhinava's interprelation here (kārikās 34, 35),, without which we cannot understand the kārikā of Sesa? Certainly it was not only Gauda pāda, for such things as more, 19 Abhi'n a va is quite justified in putting turya in the neuter gender as he has before it (kankı 341 dhaman, neuter, which 13 referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from GK, I 5, 22 ·*XXXIV AGAMAŠĀSTRA [:8 systisthitisamhāra cannot be known from his work. One is therefore inclined to say with some amount of certainty that it was partly the work of Seșa, and partly the tradition connected with him, though under the present state of our knowledge we do not know if this tradition is recorded anywhere Nevertheless, we have to accept its existence, as we cannot explain the difficulties without it. The question arises here as to how Abhinava came to know that tradition. Does it not persuade one to think that the distance of time belween Sesa and Abhin a va is not as wide as it is supposed to have been? What is there against thinking that PS'and PS: belonged to the same period, though the former must have evidently been a little earlier? In this case the question of the interpretation of the present kārika of Ses a given by Abhinava can very satisfactorily be explained. What is there that can be offered for pushing back the date of PS' to a period before GK) Again, with reference to the creation of the world Ses a in his work which deals with the Vedanta has effected a synthesis of the Sankhya and the Vedānta systems by the introduction of the creation from Upendra (=Visņu = Vasudeva =Hari = Naras ana-Paramātmjan= Brahman) through. prakrte with the gradual evolution from it of buddhi (=mahal), etc In the process of the creation he has accommodated also the theory of anda 'cosmic germ.' found, as for instance, in the Hanusamhlä, ! 8 ff. and the l'isnu Purana, I. 2. 58 ff. Here we are to note what Kulluka observes on Manusamhıra, I 8 ·58] INTRODUCTION 1xxxv abhidhyānapūrvikām srstim vadato manoh prakļtir acetana 'svatanirà pariņamata ity ayam pakso na sammatah. kintu tridandivedāntasiddhānta evabhimatah pratibhāti. It is further elucidated by him in another place (1. 15): nany abhidhyānapūrvakaspşlyabhidhānād vedantasiddhanta eva manor abhimala iti prag uktam, tan na sangacchale. idanim mahadādikrameņa srstyabhidhanad vedantadarśanena ca . paramaimana eväkāśādikramena sựstir uktā.° ucyate, prakrtilo mahadādıhrameņa sptır iti bhagavadbhaskariyadarśane 'py upapadyala qtiº tadvido vadantı." Now Bhaskara is one of the post-Sankara "commentators of the BS Undoubtedly he was in the ninth century A.D. being criticised by Vāca spati Miśra (841 A.D.) in his Bhāmali (BS, III. 3.. 29). Ścşa seems therefore to have been well acquainted with the Vedantic system maintained by Bhāskara and has then combined his theory with that of Manu and others according to whom in the process of ceation there intervenes the theory of anda. I do not therefore think that I can concur with Su r y anar a y ana Sastri in suggesting that " the Paramārthasāra is the original drawn upon.' (p.ix). A Bee Bhaskara 9 commentary on the BS (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1914), II.1 26 tatas ca brahmanah parināmānupapatreh pradhānam estayyam iti tālparyānihah Uday a na observes in his Nyāyakusumāñjali, P 332 brahmaparinater atı bhaskaragotre yujyale ·* much 6. Ixxxvi AGAMAŠĀSTRA 1:9 In passing we are to take up another question in this connexion. B.L. Atreya having noticed common between Kârikās (ie, GK) and Yogavāsiştha not only in thought, but also in language "? concludes that the latter is prior on the following three grounds: (1) The kārikās do not form an independent treatise on the Advaita Philosophy," being a sort of commentary on the Mländukya Upanışad." (2) "On the other hand, the philosopher Vasiştha claims to have received his doctrines directly from the cosmic mind (Brahmă) and to have realised their truth in his own experience. The philosophy of Vasiştha includes almost all the views held by Gaudapāda." And (3) “ Gaudapàda-kärikas represent a later phase of the Advaita philosophy. when it tended to become critical, hostile and polenucal towards other contemporary schools of thought, whereas Yogavāsistha represents the carlier phase As the space at my disposal does not allow me here to enter into a detailed discussion I desire simply lo make a few observations as briefly as can see that I can follow the above aiguienis posing that the GK is sort of commentary and Vasistha received his doctrines directly from Brahmă, are we in any way justified in clunking that the YV is prior to the GK) Docs it follow from that? As regards the thud argument of Atreya he thunks that the Advaita philosophy as represented in tlie GK is of a later phase, because it is ** critical S I do not For, sup- +) Xerawatha and its l'h leurphy 1932. 1415 ·59] INTRODUCTION Ixxxvii hostile and polemical towards other systems. But may one ask here: Is there anything in the GK that may be regarded as critical, hostile and polemical?" If so, what and where is it so ? On the contrary, one may find there (GK, III. 17 ; IV. 3-6) clear non-hostility (avirodha), and there is no instance of anything that is critical and polemical If, however, the mention of different views in the GK is meant thereby, the case is the same also with the YV. It is not always safe to conclude the priority or posteriority of one of two works simply seeing the same or similar passage, or thought, occurring in both of them. For instance, we read the following in the GK, II. 6% and IV. 31 : adāv ante ca yan nästi vartamane pi tat tatha | The same line occurs also in the YV, IV 45. 45 and a similar one in III. 11. 13, as quoted in our text, p. 142, note 3. Now, apart from the question of the date of the GK, can we determine with any amount of certainty the priority or posteriority of one of the two works unless we take into consideration the other factors that are connected herewith? One may be referred here to the present Annotation on GK, IV. 31, and it will be found that the same thought only in slightly different words is expressed in such works as MK and AS, which are undisputably far earlier than YV Now, if we see that Gauda pada has abundantly drawn upon 12 For instance, see III 62 10-11, 84 22-27 .vivadante hy asambuddhah avavikalpavijtmbhutach * Atreya has noticed ·Ixxxviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA { $9 such earlier works can we ever think in this or similar cases that he has borrowed from YV, unless there is any strong ground for doing so? When there are two texts containing the same thing, one earlier and the other later, one may quote from either of them; but to decide definitely as to from which one it is actually done one should discuss carefully. Another instance of what is common to both GK and YV, as noted by Atreya, is the non-difference between the states of wakefulness and dream (jagrat and 'susupla), as found in GK, II. 5 and YV, IV. 9. 11 ff. Here, too, when we see that the first half of the GK clearly refers to the BU, IV. 3-14 (see p 19), upon which, just as upon other Upanisads, Gauda pāda draws so much, as is evident from the work itself," how can we think that YV is here the source of GK? On the contrary; a careful perusal of YV will at once show that in his answer to the question put to him by Rāma about the difference between wakefulness and dream Vasiştha has written a number of slokas (YV, IV. 19.9 ff), and attempted thereby only to explain what is very briefly stated in GK. Does this fact point to the priority or posteriority of YV to GK). 74 See nett section 15 According to Atreya the date of IV is the sixth century AD But his arguments do not appear to me to be strong or concincing be noted here in this connection that there are two things that may specially be mentioned in Svami Bhamananda. paper entuted Prority of the Yegarasitha to Sankurātarya (Sanhara quotes IBS, !!! the l'os hadharmoristro (ed 4 A Fohrer Bam's, 1993, 19.

·$10] INTRODUCTION Ixxxix § 10. The Works of Gaudapāda With regard to the works ascribed to Gauda. pāda the only one that can be accepted with certainty as written by him is the AS. The authorship of a few other books is ascribed to him. The most important of them is a bhāsya on the Sankhyakārikā of i śvarakrsna. There is a bhāsya under his name also on the Uttaragitā. But there is no strong ground for holding that they are actually by Gauda pada, the author of the AS, nor is there anything of the nature that can decide the case otherwise, though i incline to subscribe to the view that they are not by Gauda pāda. A commentary, too, on the NUTU is attributed to him. There are three other works which pass under**the name of Gauda pada as their author. A commentary on the Durgāsapłaśati is one of them. This is referred to by she great Tantric teacher Bhāskara raya in his commentary on the same and (2) mentions the name of Vasistha in his commentary on the BC, XIII 4 But the question whether these two Vasisthas, the Vasistha of YV as well as the Vasistha in the list of the teachers of the Sankara school are identical, remains to be settled, though according to some of the author of the çikis on BG, the Vasastha referred to by Sankara is The author of YV There is a manuscript, No 1405, of this work in the Grantha character in the Visvabharat Library, Santinikelan The following occurs there on folio 240 kavacam bijam aditam argala sastır esgate ! kilakam kilakan prahuh saptašatyām mahimanoh' ati gaudapădadhravacant And again yady apı vedāntamůrdhanyair gaudzpādācāryaih sarvam adam nitvisesacstprabipadakalāstraparatuena vyakhyalam.º SI-12018 ·1xxxx AGAMAŠASTRA (511 work, The other (wo are Taniric treatises, viz., Subhagodaya" and Srividyāratnasūtra. Here arises a question : Can we think that there are two Gauda padas, one Vedāntic and the other Tantric, being the authors of works on the Vedanta and Tantricism respectively? In the Srividyārņava which is a Tantric work by Pragalbhācārya, Sankarăcar y a said to have been the founder of a Tantric school. There is in this work also a list of the succession of his teachers and disciples. But it seems impossible to reconcile this list with the traditional one of the Advaita Vedanta school. So the list in the Srividyārņava hardly helps us in this matter. Nevertheless, we may simply note in the list given here that there are two Gauda padas, one of them being mentioned as Gauda (No. 55) and the other Gauda pada ka (No. 65), who is, in fact, the same as Gauda pada, the suffix -ka being evidently on account of the metrical exigency. On this the reader may form his own judgment. *$11. The Saurces The sources of the Āgamaśāstra, which one naturally desires to know, roughly fall into three classes, viz., 3 '? It 18 paid that there a bhārya on it by $ ankara In she vesse containing the word as quoted by Rajendranatha Chosa in bus Aduaitavāda lin Bengalı), p 227, the at ual reading is Gaudepădakah But Gopinath Kaviraj top at.p 53), who has not quoted the verse, reads only Gaudopáda leaving out the suffix ka which seeins 10 be right ·$11) INTRODUCTION Ixxxxi . (1) Vedic texts : Vedas and Upanişads, (2) Schools or Teachers, and (3) Buddhist works. With regard to class (1), these are mostly Upanişads, Vedas being quoted in not more than two cases (III. 246 and c). It is, however, to be noted in this connexion that when there is a passage which occurs both in a Veda and in an Upanisad it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter. For instance, here in III. 24b we have indro mīyābhir ili. This is found in RV;VI. 17. 18 as well as in BU, 1}.5 19. How can ve, in this case, ascertain that the reference is in fact to the one and not to the other? The case is exactly the same with the second instance ]], 24 c) of a quotation from a Veda. Similarly with regard to 11. 24 we know much of kala 'time from the AV, XIX 53, 54 and the, SU, I 2, IV. 1. But here it is very difficult to conclude whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter, or to the both of them. Again, the Kalavids 'knowers of time' are, as says Ānanda giri, astronomers, and it is not impossible that our aujhor might have alluded to some work of them, or simply to the view held by them or to their school In the course of the present Annotation many references to different Upanisads have been inserted in support of a point or points in our text, but which of them, if any, is in fact meant by the author in any particular case we cannot say definitely. It may be that in some cases the Upanişadic authority, really meant by the author, is different from what the present ·Ixxxxii AGAMAŠASIRA annotator has quoted. For instance, with regard to pāda (11. 21) which is capable of being interpreted differently, various references are given in the Annotation, or still other references may be shown. But it is not easy to ascertain the particular reference or references the author himsc)f intended. Nevertheless, it is certain that the author had in his mind any one or more of these or similar passages when he was writing his book, Among the references in the Annotation the names of the Bhagavadgila (XIII. 22 in 1l. 22 of our text) and the Brahmasülra (II. 3 19-32 in ll, 23 of our text) will be found. But we cannot be sure that these two works are actually drawn upon by our author, though they may elucidate the texts to some extent. Similarly for the explanation of our text there will be found some references in the Annotation to such minor Upanişads (for instance, in II 32) as Avadhūta Up., 8; Aśrama", 4; Ātma°, 31; Jābālaº, 6; Tripurā. tāpaniº, V. 10; Brahmabinduº, 10. But whether these minor Upanışads are prior to the Āgamaśāsira is to be left as an open question, though some of them such as Brahmabinduº and Jabala", are before Sankara as is quite clear from his commentary on BS, III 2 18 and 4. 20 respectively In five places (Ill. 12, 24, 25, 26 and 36) passages from Upanisads are expressly quoted, while in I], Jl and 23 the words Tatturiya and suti are actually mentioned and in ], 3 a passage of the BU, IV. 3. ID is clearly alluded to with the word śrüyotc. Similarly in JI, 5 another passage from the same Upanisad (BU, IV.3.141 ·< $12) INTRODUCTION Іxxxxiii is clearly referred to though with the word manisins' and not śruti as before and usual. In III. 12, 13 and 15 references to Upanisads are also very clear. In two or three more places (1, 2, 8, 9) references seem to have been made to Upanişads.? It will be seen that no Upanisad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, 'Alātaśānti. There is absolutely nothing of the kind As regards class (2) of the sources readers are referred to $ 6: The Name of the Work of the present Introduction, p. lxii, where the names of different schools or teachers alluded to in our text, are mentioned, It appears from these names that some of the schools or teachers mentioned by our author here were undoubtedly prominent at his time, but gradually they have lost their prominence and have fallen almost into a state of oblivion. With regard to class (3) of our sources, 1.e., the Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to the Annotation on II. 31. 32, 35 (cf 38), 44, 46, and most of the kārikās in Book IV. § 12. The Běhadāranyaka Upanisad as the Main Upanışadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra In the preceding section we have seen that the BU is one of the sources of the Āś in which there are As in the Upanisad 11 self IBU, IV 3 14 there is atha khalv ih ih our author seems to have closen to take the nominative as manists and not Sruti. See II 1.5, IV 54, and Appenduz Additional Noles, It! * See the Annotation 3 With regard to the word dardarsa in IV 10) we cannot say definitely that it refers to KU, II 12, as it is often found also in Buddhist works

·it.
ixxxxiv
ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA
1912
some quotations from or references to the former. In
the present section it is proposed to examine to some
extent the inter-relationship of these two works by which
we shall see that the main Upanisadic source of the AS
is the BU.
: From the text of the AS as it is before us it is quite
clear that Gauda pada has drawn much upon
In fact, Book 1 of our text is mainly based on it
Nay, it
may be declared that Booli l of the AS is
nothing but an epitome or essence of the BU, IV. 2-3
with soine clear esposition and an addition of the
upasana' 'meditation of Pranava or Om. By writing
the first Book of the As Gauda pada has in reality
made a key to that portion of the BU, without which
it would have been extremely difhcult to understand
its true significance.
The opening part of the As, 1.8 , the
with the three divisions of the One (ic., Purusa) such
as Visva, ctc (1. 1-4, 10), is to be found only in
different words in the BU, IV. 2-3, as says Sankara
very clearly on BC, IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).
part dealing

·$12] INTRODUCTION IxxXXV We see in our text (I. 1-4, 10) that the One, ice, Puruşa (=Brahman=Ātman of the MāU, 2) owing to different states is called Viśva, Taijasa, Prajña and Turya (or Turiya, I. 15). None of these names excepting Prājña (BU, IV. 3. 21 and 35) is, however, to be found in the BU. For Viſva it reads (IV. 2. 2) Indha 'shining' which is the same as Indra, the former, as the Upanişad would say, being used by people cryptically. As to why the Puruşa is called Indha Sureśvara says (BBV, IV. 2 37) that 'because he shines day and•night' (idhyale 'harnićam yasmād indhanamā talah pumān). This 'shining' implics, according to Anandagiri, his enjoyment of gross things in the waking stale (sihūlārthabhokutvena sadā jāgaie sphürleh). Sankara is found to have employed . both the terms in his commentary on the BU, Indha (BU, IV. 3. 1. p. 519) and Vaišvānara (BU, IV. 2. 2-4, pp 513-519), but not Visva, so far as goes my information, with regard to the commentary referred 10. From the text of the BU (IV. 2. 3, 3. 11, 35) itself it appears that : As in the original of the text, re, BU, IV 3 we have this word • It is a well-known taying in Bushmanas that gods are fond of the cryphic, As It nere, and dislike the evident 'paroksapnyå iva hi devah pratyakıadvusah -BU, IV. 2 21 Suretvara says in BBV, IV 2 371 p 1365) that even now people do nnt like to call a supenser pereen directly by his personal namn pralyaksanāmagiahanam pradsanti jagaty spil freyimso mukamiliis la ily uktim tamayanlı ca In referring to a superiet person the use of amuke 'so and on or on in Bengalı, is #ul found it is to be noted that in the country, at least in Bergal. A woman does not call her husband by his name, but, for it vees such word. A Unt, ·new IxxXXVI AGAMASASTRA ($12 il any other term for l'isva is to be chosen from that work it is only forira 'existing in the body,' 'cmbodied.' Bur Gáuda pada las not accepted it, but has adopted a namc, l'isva, probably thinking the latter to be more expressive of the idea behind it. Finally in the land of the author of MāU it has undergone a further change in the form of Vaišvårara 'common-10-all' perhaps for the same purpose. Of these names 7'urya (or Turiya) 'fourth is cvidemiy not a name in fact, but as it is described after the first three Visua, elc., it is so called, being their fourth. In the BU Indha-Indro is a name, no doubt, but Taijasa and Prajña were originally mere adjectives," becoming names afterwards. Sometimes the appellation Lingālman is found for Taijasa, as writes Sa ikara in his commentary on the BU, IV.2.3 (p. 515), IV. 3. 1 (p. 518). Similarly sausupta is used for Prājña as says Sureśvara (BBV, IV. 3. 5, p. 1377). Undoubtedly this word clearly expresses the state of the Person. As regards the wording of our text in the first Book of Āś with which we are now concerned the following comparison may be made: (1) With regard to Visva our author writes (1.2): daksınāksimukhe viśvah." See here BU, IV. 2 2: indho ha nāmaiņa yo'yam daksıne 'ksan purusah (=BU, II. 3. 5; IV. 2, 2, V.5 2, 4). 5 See BU, II 5 8 fi Mark that the Nau 15 here silent 1 The idea that a person is seea in the ese and specially in the night one is often found in Upanisadic texts Besides the BU quoted above ser Chu. IV 15 1. VR 74, KIU, IV 2. 17. MU, V!!! It simply signifies that ·$12] INTRODUCTION Ixxxxvii (i) In 1:2 we have akāśe ca hrdi prajñah, and we read ya eşo 'nlar hțdaya akāšah in BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3. 4. 22. CJ. TU, I, 6. 1. (ii) In I. 3 there is praviviklabhuj, and in this connexion we read tasmad eșa praviviktāhāratara ivaiva bhavati in the BU, IV.2.3. - (iv) With regard to the third or susupla state of the Person in 1. 3, 4 there is ānandabhuj or ananda, and in BU, IV.3..32 we read eşo'sya parama anandah. See also, Op. cit., IV. 3. 33. It is to be noled here that the above conception of Puruşa is found also in ChU, VIII. 7-12 in the course of Prajāpati's instruction to Indra and Virocana. Here, 100, the first three names, Visua, etc. are not given, Sankara has used different appellations for them; viz., for Visua he writes Aksipuruşa 'eye-person' (VIII. 7, 4. 79), or Chāyāpuruşa 'shadow.person’ (VIII. 10.4), or Chāyālman 'shadow-self' (VIII. 7.4, 8.1,2);"* te l, visible to our eyes, and this means that he is the ordinary incorporated soul Sarira'atman) This is quite evident from Gaudapada', employ. ment of the word mukha after dakşınāks. 11 daksinakşımakhe 'in the front of the right eye'. As to why the right eye is specially mentioned Sureivara says (BBV V 2 37-38. P 1365) that it may be due to some excellence of the light eye, which might have been known to the smp, or to the fact that the right limbs of a man u more vigorout than the left ones. Sometimes the left eye it also referred to “BU, IV. 2. 3). See below # See also ! 4 • That'he sentence yatia supto na kifcana' in the MAU, 5.p. 224, is quoted from the BU, IV 3 19 alieady al own Introduction: $2.pali 10 Heures thin lem also in his corrmentary on BS. 1. 2. 13; on L 3.43 he has also idrira XII-1201B ·$12] INTRODUCTION İxxxxix quite appropriately Utlamapuruşa 'the Highest Self.'12 t That this conception of Puruşa in Chu is a later development of that in the BU goes without saying. Now, though the Chu like the BU is far earlier than our text, there is nothing which can show that it is the former and not the latter which has been drawn upon by our author; yet, we have already seen what can be said in favour of BU. In support of the view that the main source of the AS is BU we may discuss here one point more. The idea of Brahman (=Purusa= Ātman) as having four fourths or quarters (całuspād) at the beginning of the MāU is not a new one as it is found long before it even in the RV, X. 90 313 as well as in CHU, III. 18. 2." The difference of these texts lies, however, in the fact that the quarters (padas) are different in them. For instance, in the RV referred to above all the beings (viſvā bhūlāni) are regarded as one quarter, and the remaining three quarters (tripad) are said to be in the heaven, while in the ChU, IV. 5-8. 1 See BC, XV 17-18 uttamah purusas tv anyah paramātmety udāhịtahi so lokatrayam višya bıbharty advaya iſvarah yasmāt ksaram atito'ham aksarad api cotismah alo'smi loke vede ca prathitah purasottamah ! S has here quoted no ruti Sridhara reters to BU, V 6 ) tsa vā ayam atma), but not appropriately 13 See AS, 11 21 " For minor Upanisads see Brahmopomisad, 2 tatta catuspādam brahma vibhāti: NPIU, V I. AUTU, 1, RUTU, 3. so'yam atmā catuspad ·c AGAMASASTRA 1912 the four quarters each consisting of four parts (całuşkala) are named as Prakāśavat'shining,' Anantavat 'endless,' Jyotismal 'luminous,' and Ayalanavat 'having an abode." In another place of the same Upanisad (Ill. 18. 1-6) the quarters of Brahman are described differently with reference to person (adhyālma) and with reference to divinities (adhidaivala). With reference to person they are speech (vāc), breath (prána), the eye (caksus) and the ear (śrotra) representing respectively with reference to the divinities fire (agni), wind (väyu), the sun (āditya) and quarter (dis). But in the Mall the quarters are described quite in a new way and it is remarkable. It is said that these four quarters are, nothing but the same Self with its four states. The first three of them are waking (jāgraf), dreaming (svapna), and deep sleep (susupla). And the Self with thern is called l'aisvānara, 'common-to-all,' Taijasa 'brilliant, and Prājrīa 'intelligent' respectively. The fourth siale is the true or absolute essence of the Self having no connexion whatsoever with anything else. In this state the Self is regarded as śānta 'quiescent, śiva 'blissful' and advaita 'without a second.' It is to be noted here that while in RV and Chu the Purusa or Brahman is represented as the Universal or World Self, in the MāU it is represented as the individual Self though ultimately in fact it is identical with the Universal Self, Now, it is remarkable that though in the MāU, as 15 For details see the Upanisad ·$12) INTRODUCTION ci we have seen above, there is a clear mention and description of the four quarters of the Self (catuspād), in the AS it is not so. Even the particular word catuspad or any of its possible equivalents is not to be found here. Up to kārika 5 we come across the threefold division of the Self, viz., Visua (instead of Vaišvānara as in the MāU, 3), Taijasa and Prājña (I. 1-4). It is clearly said in our text (I. 1-2) that the One exists in three ways in the body, and this idea is further expressed in 13-5. Yet, it cannot be said from this that the idea of four quarters is altogether unknown to the author of the Āś, as it is implied in l. 10-15 in which the word turya or turiya, which is the same in meaning 'fourth,' as caturtha in the MāU, 7, is used. It is further implied by the author's employment of the word pāda in I. 25. This difference between the Āś and the MāU with regard to the idea of four pādas, implied in the former and expressed in the latter, is significant. It shows that the origin of the ĀS is not the Mall, but the BU in which the idea of pādas in this connexion did not then develop." En passant we should like to discuss one thing There is a very striking difference at the very SO more. 16 See BU, IV I 2-7 where each of the following six things, fãc 'peech, prāna breath,' caksus 'eye,' frotra 'ear,' manos 'mind,' and brez is regarded as a pada Consult Sankara and Sareirara ass, W.I 16ywording "a whor each of the start sa is expired 2110 'having four quarters 17. This fact will also show that the AS is prior to the Ver obscure points of the former are made clear, ·ci AGANIAŠĀSTRA 1:12 beginning between the two texts, MāU and AS. It is this that while the MāU begins (1-2) highly extolling Om symbolically identifying it with Brahman-Aiman, the AS has here nothing of the kind. It simply proceeds gradually to describe the One with its first three stales, l'isua, Taijasa and Prajña (1. 1-5) the fourth having come afterwards (1. 10). Here in the AS till karika 19 there is no mention of, or reference to Om. So it is to be found that here in our text mention is made first of the One and then of Om. This order is quite right and logical. For, here there are tho things, the object which is to be approached or realized (upcya) and its means (upāya) And it is reasonable that the object is stated first and then the means. Here the object is the realization of the Purusi or Solf in iis absolute stale and the means is the mediation of Om 7.2 is donc in the As, but it is quite revers: in the ViU, for here the means Om is said firs: and the gradually the object (3.7) which is reported later on (12) The author of the MU seems to have been much inliuen cd by curler Upaniads, (such og Chu, 11.1. TU, 1 81) and too much bent on the glorificar on or Om, and is why he has changed th: reasonable order found in this AS There is no upesana o licnata in th- BU and this is why our author of unit is dit indude it in the main thess of so Inen ind peol nily of thic BU in when m-103 for the re 12.11on of the object is siuun lauapida las aled the remanns puil.on of the first Book of lis AS citins forth londta and its ufruchu ·$13] INTRODUCTION ci So far with regard to Book 1. Let us now take up Book II and see the connexion it has with the BU. This Book is rightly called Vailathya .unreality as it shows the unreality of the world in the waking state just like that of the experience in dream. This is the subject discussed herein by Gaudapıda with various arguments. And here, too, he has taken his stand on the BU, IV.3, where it is clearly declared that the two states, waking and dream, are in fact one. Not only are passages quoted from the BU, or referred to by him (II. 3, 5), but they are supported by his own arguments. This will be quite clear if one takes pains to read BU, IV. 3 and the second Book of the ĀS. And it should be noted that here in the latter we find the oldest interpretation of that portion of the BU, though in a concise, yet, very substantial form, In Book III we are referred to BU not less than six times (12, 13, 15, 24, 25 and 26). Thus we may safely conclude that the main Upanisadıc source of the AS is the BU, is 13. Pre-Sarkara Teachers of the Vedānla and their Works Setting apart what we know of the Vedānta from the Sruti-prasthāna 'the Course of Revelation' or the Vedic literature, i. e, the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas including the Aranyakas and Upanişads, as well as from the Smíli-prasthāna 'the Course of Trad.tion c Remembered Texts', such as the Mahabhara's with the ·CIV ACANASASIRA ($13 Bhagavadgitá, it may conveniently be divided into two, prc-S a jikara and post-$anka a. Among the teachers of the pre-s a j k as a Vedanta che most distinguished is B á dará y a ņa, the celebrated author of the Brahmasūlras, the source of which is the Upanişads. It is the Brahmasūtras that constitute the Sūtra-prasthana 'the Course of Sutras.' We all know that the difference of opinions is but natural. Owing to various factors the same thing is viewed. differently by different persons. So it is found in the Brāhmaṇas that there are both the offering of oblation before sun-rise (anudita-homa) and the offering of oblation after sun-rise (udila-homa), there being a regular discussion thereof establishing that the latter is preferable and not the former (Ailarcya Brāhmana, XXV. 5-6; Tailtiriya Brahmana, 11. 1. 2-8 ; cf. however, II. 1.2. 12). There are also functions in these Brahmanas, which are discarded saying that these are not to be preferred (ādriya) or performed (kārya), though They are actually enjoined by others. There are many such contradicting, obscure or dubious cases, and an attempt has also been made in later works to find out a solution of these problems.' Now as with regard to karman the teachers had their different views, so they differed also on points of jñana. In some cases they entertained even quite opposite views For instance, with regard to creation while a sage of a certain Upanisad (i.e., TU, II. 7.J; 1 For instance, see MD X 8.0 with reference to Sodafigrehone ·CV $13] INTRODUCTION see ChU, III. 19. 1) tells us : 'In the beginning, verily. this was non-existent (asad vā idam agra äsid).' but from another text (i.e., Aitareya Āranyaka, II. 4. 1) we know: Verily, in the beginning this was only Self (átmå vā idam eka evāgra asid).' And the following is found in the ChU, VI. 2. 1-2, evidently refuting TU, II. 7. 1 quoted above: “Verily, in the beginning this was, my dear, existent only one without a second. On this some say that verily in the beginning this was non-existent only one without a second; from that non-existent the existent was produced. But, my dear, whence could it be? How from non-existent could the existent be produced ? On the contrary, my dear, verily, in the beginning this was existent, only one without a second." From the above it is quite clear that all the śulis do not always tell us the same thing, clearly there is difference among them. Such being the case the question arises as to which of them is to be accepted as valid and which is to be rejected as not valid. How can one say that this is valid, and that is not valid? For, as śruli there is no difference whatsoever. Therefore if you accept one, you will have to accept all of them. And in that case you cannot arrive at any definite • Set with the Pratăia of Punyari ja the Vökyapadiya of Bharts. hari. 1 8 tavyisthasidarūpīrı nikilya ssavkalpazah ckatrinim dvaitinim ca pravida bahadł i sortab? 1 Saakarahas nightly obsered {BS, III 2 15. nahi redztihisi kasyacıd arthavattvam karyacid ananthavattam ita yalzar from praminatvivlesit XIV-1201B.

·313] INTRODUCTION cvii It is well-known that Jaimini and Bā darāya na are the authors of the Mimämsāsūtras and the Brahmasūtras respectively. But there are reasons to think that there were also other authors of the Mimāmsa- and the Brahma-sūtras which are different from the extant ones.*. For instance, Bădari, a teacher, is quoted not less than four times both in the present Mimāmsā- (III. 1.3; VI. 1. 27; VIII. 3 6; IX. 2. 33) and Brahma-sülras (1 2. 30; III.1 11; IV.3. 7; IV. 4. 10). From this it may appear that Bå dari was an author of both the sūtras. But we cannot ascertain only from this that he was actually so. It may be that he had some views on some particular points of karman and Brahman and these are 'alluded to in those two works by their authors Jaimini, as the author of the Mimämsäsūtras is known to us all. He is referred to eleven times in the Brahmasutras on different topics (1 2. 28, 31, 3. 31, 4. 18; III. 2. 40, 4. 2, 18, 40; IV. 3. 12,4 5, 11). Here, too, tre may think that Jaimini wrote also Brahmasūtras. But though' from only this it is not safe to decide that he really did so, Sureśvara's Nsi (2nd ed. by Hinya nna), p. 52, shows that it is a fact. Kāśa křts na, a teacher, is quoted in BS, 1. 4. 22, and his Mimāmsă is mentioned not less than three times by Patanjali in his Alahābhāsya. This Mimāmsä may be both Karmamimömsã and Brahmamimāmsā (i.c., the Klimāmsāsūtras and the Brahmcsūtras). See Belvalkar. Op at, p 140 • See Jazmint a Sariratasülra in the Gerbe-Festgebe, 1987. 7 Kielhorn, Vol ll. pp 206, 249, 335.

·cvit ÁGANASASTRA 313 or either of them, and in this case probably the latter. Badarāyana in his BS refers also to Ātreya (IIl. 4. 44). Āś mar_a_thya (1. 2. 29, 4. 20).. Kärsnäjini (Ill. I. 9), and Audulo miº (1. 4.21, III. 4. 45, IV. 4.6)." Then comes a number of teachers, some of whom flourished before and some after the great Sankara. Some of them explained the BS of Bā darā y ana, some the Bhagavadgită, and some an Upanişad or Upaņişads. There were also some who interpreted more than one kind of the above works. This was done either by writing a gloss (orttı) or a commentary (bhâsya). As we are concerned here with the pre- Sankara Vedānta the following teachers who are connected with it may be mentioned in this connexion. So far as we know the first of all these teachers is Bodhāyana a (about the first or second century A.D.). He wrote a lengthy gloss or commentary (vistirna vrt!:) on the BS of Bådarāyana on which is based the Viśıştādvaita system of Rāmānuja, the Mimāmsasūtras of Jaimini, and the Devatäkānda, in other words, on the whole of the Mimāmsåśâstra This 8 He is mentioned also in MD, IV 317, VI, 7 35 9 The Bhedabheda doctrine of the Nimbár k a school ones its existence to him 10 To them may be added the names of Katya p a alluded to by sin. dilya in his Bhaktrsütros, 29, and of such sages as Asita, Devala, Bhrgu, and Paraba r a referred to in different works But we do not know of they were the authors of different Brahmasütres or if any one of them wrote also Alimāmsāsūtras, though we know something of their views from the fragmentary accounts available from certain books, some of which are referred to above ·1 $13) INTRODUCTION cix uilli is called Krtakoļi (Prapancahidaya, TSS, p. 39; Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1911, p 17). Next comes U pa varsa He is credited with the authorship of a vịtli on both the Mimāmsāsülras and Brahmasülras. This vrtli was, however, in fact a bhāsya or Mahābhāsya and consequently he was regarded as a Mahābhāsyakāra as well as a Vrtlikāra, being the author of the Orlli. According to Rāmā nuja (Vedărthasamgraha, p. 154) and Srinivasa dā sa (Yalindramata. dipikā, Poona ed., p. 2) Guhadeva, Koa pardika (or Kapardin) and Bharuci are three ancient Vedanta teachers and authors. The former two, being referred to by Ra mānuja among the sistas 'wise men', seem to have been in favour of the Visiştādvaita-vāda One Bharuci as an author of a Dharmaśāstra is mentioned in such works as Vijñā nesvara's Mitäksară on the Yājñavalkya-snuti (1. 18, il. 124), and Madha vā - cārya's tikā on the Parāśarasamhita (II. 2. 3. Bombay Sanskrit series ed., p. 510). It is not known if the Vedāntic Bharuciis identical with Bhä ruci, the writer on the Dharmaśästra. If it is so, he may be held to have belonged to the first half of the ninth century A. D. Bharthari's name is found among a host of writers on the Vedánta (Siddhitraya, p. 5). He may be identified with the celebrated author of the Vakyapadiya (600-650 A.D.), the very first kārikā of which points to the Vedāntic doctrine.

·cx AGAMAŠASTRA {$13 (With him is mentioned in the same work Bharti mitra. According to the Nyāyaralnākara on the ślokavårttika (1. 10) he wrote a commentary on the Mimāmsāsūtras and made the Mimâmsāšāsıra atheistic. Whether this Mimamsist BhartỊmitra and the Vedāntic Bhartěmitra are one and the same is not known, nor do we know anything of any Vedāntic work that might have been written by the latter.) -Brahmanandin for Brah māna'n din) is another teacher. He is known as the Vakyakära or. Chandogyavākyakāra quoted or referred to by Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS and Madhusûdana Sarasvati in his tikā on the Samksepaśārīraka (III.218-220). According to Bhā skara on BS, I. 4. 25, Brahmanandin approved the Parināma-vāda, but Madhu s û dana Sarasvati (Op. cit.) is of opinion that it was in fact gradually to lead one to Suddhôdvaita-vāda 'Pure monism through the Vivarta-vāda or the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman which is the only reality, the phenomenal svorld being held to be a mere illusion, After him is Dravidācārya or Dra. midă cârya (cir. 750 A.D). He was in favour of the Visstaduaila-vīda 'Qualified monism' and as such is mentioned and quoted by Rāmánuja in his commentary on Bs. As Madhusudana Sarasvati says (Samkepaśäriraka, I]}. 218-220), he wrote a bhăsya on Brahmanandin's vākyas owing to which the latter was called Vakyakara (Brahinanandi-viracitā.

·$13] INTRODUCTION схі nám vākyānām sütrarūpāņām bhāsyakarta dravidācāryo'pi). It is known from Anandagiri's ţikā on Saakara's bhāsya on the ChU that Dravidā. cārya wrote a vast commentary on the ChU compared with which Sankara's commentary was a smaller one (alpagrantha). He is said to have written a bhāsya also on the BS. Brahmadatta was a renowned teacher of the Vedānta. In the Prapancah;daya he is said to have composed a commentary on the BS. Some of his views are alluded to in such works as the Sarvārthasiddhi (II.16), a ţikā by Venka ța nătha desik a on his Tattvamuktākalapa; Nsi, I. 67-68 ; and Sankara's commentary on the BU, I. 4. 7. One of them may be mentioned here and it is this that it is the long bhāvanā 'meditation of the knowledge arising from the l'edānta-vākya and not the knowledge itself, as holds Sankara, that removes one's illusion. Some informations of him as collected by Hiriyanna will be found in Nsi (2nd ed.). p. xxiii, and. the Journal of Qriental Research, Madras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 1 ff. - See also Gopinath Kaviraj, Op. cit., p. 13 ff. Bhartoprapanca was also a great Vedấntic teacher before Sankara. It is known from the words of Madhusudana Sarasvati (Samksepaśäriraka, 1. 7) that Bhartiprapa nc a explained the Sütras of Vyás a, i.e., Badarāyaṇa (kaiścit_tatsūtram vyācaksāņair bhart,prapancādıbhih). Yamună cārya (Op. cit., p. 5) says that he was one of the writers on .

·Cxil AGAMASASTRA 1:13 the Vedānta, and we know from the introductory lines of Anandaguri's ukł on Sankara's bhásya of BU (p. 2) that while Sankara' commented on the Upanisad belonging to the Kāņva_recension Bharti prapanca wrote his commentary on the text of the Madhyandına recension, and the former's commentary was bigger than that of the latterlo many cases Ānan dagiri in explaining Sureśvara's vārttika on the BU, refers Bhart;prapanca. Of all the commentators before Sa n k'ar a, the works of whom could not yet been discovered it is Bhartprapanca whose quotactions are no_mostly-available For the fragments gleaned together from his writings by Hiriyanna see The Indian Antiquary, 1924, pp. 76-86 ; and Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1925, 439. to or quotes from PP I should like to mention here one teacher more of the pre- ankara Vedanta. He is Sundarapāņdy a. He was a great Mimāmsist and Vedantin of South India (8th century A.D.), His_three karikās (gaunamithyātva) are quoted by Sankara in the last portion of his commentary on BS. 1. ). 4. Amalānanda in his Kalpataru (BS, III. 25) ather three kārikās (nhérenyārohanaprāpyaº). These last three karikás together with two more are cited by Ku masila in his Tantravārſlika (Benares ed.), pp. 852-853. It seems that these kārıkās are from a vārttıka of Sundara pand y. a_that he quotes his ·$14] INTRODUCTION cxli wrote on some' vrtti or bhāşya of some unknown author.11 There were also some teachers who wrote independent works on the Vedānta and of these authors the most distinguišhed is Gauda pāda, the author of our Āgamaśāstra which is the most important work, still extant, representing one of the most remarkable phases of the Vedānta. Here we find the first interprelation of some of the most important śrutis as we shall see later on. § 14. The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra Now we may give here a conspectus of the contents of our text, and in doing so Book I may conveniently be divided into two parts; part (i) containing kārikās I. 1-18, and part(ii) the remaining kārikās, i.e., 1. 19-29. While part (i) discusses what is to be realized, part (ii) is devoted to show its means. It is well-known that in the Upanisads all thoughts centre found the Puruşa (Alman = Bråhman), 'Self' who is 'all that has been and that will be' (RV,X.90.2: puruşa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yac ca bhavyam). He must be known, according to the cages of Upanişads, for the fulllment of the mission of one's life. "Skuppu.wim Sista Journal of Onental Rescarch, 1921, pIff On the main topic of thus section ree Gopinath Kavira). Op ait, and P V.Kane: Proceedings and Trenrechons of the Fifth Indium Onental Conferenes, pp 937 8. XV-1201B.

·cxiv AGAMAŠASTRA ($14 But how can he be known properly? As he is extremely subtle, Gauda pada leads us gradually from the gross to the subtle, following our common and every day experience. - And in doing so he takes his stand on such Upanişads, as the BU and Chu, and shows (l. 1-5) that the self, though in reality, only one (eka eva) semains in the body in three forms (tridhá dehe vyavasthitaḥ), in accordance with his three states, jāgrat 'waking ', svapna 'dream' and sușupla deep sleep." When the self is in the waking state he is called Visva all' (because as an embodied one (śāríra) he is known to every man). In the state of dream he is named Taijasa brilliant' (because he himself is his light (svayamjyotis) in that condition ; i.e., he does not depend for his light on others for seeing things there, as he does in the waking state, in which he is to take light from such things as the sur, the moon, and fire). In the state of deep sleep he is called Prājna 'intelligent' (because he is never dissociated from his intelligence). Viſva is the embodied self (śõrıra älman), hence it is melaphorically said that he remains in the front of one's right eye, meaning thereby that he may be seen reflected in one's right' eye (or in such things as See BU, IV 3 1-9 svena bhāsā ssena Jyolisā prasyapıly alrāyem puusah #yayam yoti bhavat, > BU, JV 3 236 . yad vai tan sa paśyata pasyan vaj 'an pa paiyatı nabi drauur drster vipaulopo vidya'e vinssilsāt na tu tad du stiram asta talo 'nyad varhakam yat paśyel. 3 See p LXXXXVPJS 1 As the right portion of the body of a male person is sad to be more powerful than the left the sellection therein is brighter. Seep lsusb, not 7.

·CXV $14] INTRODUCTION water or a looking-glass). Taijasa is in the mind, as it is here that a man dreams. . Prājāa's seat is in the space of one's heart. Again, Viſva has the consciousness of outside, Taijasa of inside, while. Prājña has his consciousness compact. These three enjoy or experience the grošs, the subtle and blisses respectively. ... In passing the author refers (1.6-9) to the opinion of the sages that all things have their origin and mentions different theories or purposes of creation. The first' theory is this that one creates all as the rays of one's mind (celo'mšu). This simply means that it is the mind that appears in the form of the external world which has, in fact, .no reality. This is the author's own view." Then he reverts to his main subject, the Self, and says (1-10) that besides his thiee forms or quarters (padas) in accordance with the three states, waking, : etc., referred to above, there is one form more ; it is his real, natural or innate form. It has no particular appellation as he is beyond all expressions and is designated by the simple word Turya (or Turiya) fourth' as occupying the fourth place in order with the above three. This Turya is above all changes and duality, all-pervading, and when realized removes all miseries Gauda pada then shows (11-18) some points of mutual agreement and disagreement of these fous forms or quarters (pādas) of the Self, and says that one, if awakened from one's sleep due to illusion 5 BU, IV. 3 32 6.

·CXVI ÁGAMASASTRA (māyā), can realize the state of Turya in which there is no duality at all. Duality, i.e., the expansion of the visible world, or the expressions, is mere illusion, and as such it has absolutely no reality. (Here it may be said that as there is no dualıly, in fact, it does not cease to exist. It is just a knot made and loosened by dint of illusion (māyayaiva krio granthir māyayaiva vimocitah). Nevertheless, we have our common practice with duality, but it is only for our instruction, i e., it is only by that practice that we can understand and attain to the state of .non-duality which is the highest (advaitam paramārthatah). "Here ends the first part of Book 1. The second part (19-29) demonstrates the means for the realization of that non-duality or Turya. It is nothing but the upásena 'meditation (dhyāna) of the Purusa (= Ātman = Brahman), 'Self' through the symbol of Pranava or Om. In Book 11 Gauda pada discusses and establishes the unreality (vatlathya) of the external world. For this purpose he begins this Book as Book I basing it on the BU, specially on its IV. 3.8 ff. He says referring to the sages of that Upanişad that all things in dream are unreal on the following three grounds: 6 See lhe following saying of the Bhagavat le, Buddhal, an quoted in MV, p. 540 akaleng kito grantha skaterana mpakah + Gauda pada does not employ here or elsewhere it c. 1/5.0 IV 34 such words as iş or muna 351 as is generally done in itular cases, but he has here the word manisin This word, which is a Vedic one forening phrase with õhsh, is used twice in our work (11 1.5) as in KU, I 34 and BG, XV!!! 3 (with a vartalion that pre 19 pre xed to āboh).

·an $14] INTRODUCTION cxvii (i) becuase the things (such as a mounlain, or elephant) seen therein are inside the body ; (11) because the time being short one does not see the things having gone to those far places.svhere one dreams them ; and (iii) because one on waking is not found in the place where one dreams oneself to be. Having supported this proposition (II. 3) by, a reference to the BU, IV. 3. 10, he asserts (II. 4) that the things in the waking state, too, are as unreal as those in dream, because in this state also the things are similarly inside the body, for the mind which appears in the form of different things around us is inside the body. Proceeding the teacher says (II. 5) on the authority of a scripture (BU, IV. 3. 14), supported by reasons, that the two states, dream and waking, are the same on account of the fact that the things experienced in them are of the same kind, there being no difference at all. Here, having offered one reason more in his favour and met an objection of his opponent, he says (11.9-10) that the experiences in waking and dream are equally unreal, 'both of them being the creation of the mind. Here arises a question (II. 11): it in both the states the things are unreal, then who is it that cognizes them? Who is it that imagines them? The answer is given (II. 12-15) according to the decision of the Vedānta that it is the Self that imagines himself as the Self through his own illusion, and it is he who cognizes the things. He creates some things in the mind which are not fixed and as such they vanish at once; and he creates also some other things in the mind ·t514 cxviii ÁGAMASASTRA which are outside and fixed. There is, however, no difference between these two sorts of creation--the creation of those inside which exists as long as exists the thought (citta), and the creation of those outside, which exists as long as exists the notion of) the two, i.e., the percepuble (grāhya) and the percipient (grähaka); both of these two creations are only imagined and there is nothing for their difference. Again, the things which are within and not-manifest, and the things which are without and manifest are all imagined, indeed, the only difference there being that the latter are cognized by different organs of sense. As to the creation of the internal and external things he tells us (II. 16) that first one imagines oneself as a personal Self and then various things, internal and external, following the recollection of one's experience. Of this he says further (11,17-18, that as in the dark a piece of rope, or a continuous line of water, etc., not determinately known, is imagined to be a snake, so is imagined the Self. Now when the piece of rope is known determinately the things that are imagined there disappear at once, so is to be known about the ascertainment of the Self (Atman). It is an illusion of the Self owing to which he is imagined differently by differnt persons, such as the Breath (prāna) by those who know it, or Elements (bhūtas) by those who know them (I 19-30). But the reality is, concludes (II. 31-34) the teacher, that according to those & The illustration of 103] sorpa which is so widely known in Vedantic works 19 found perhaps for the brst time here in the AS It is not in any of the Upsniads used for his Concordance by Jacob ·$14) INTRODUCTION CXIX who are well-versed in the Vedānta, the universe is just like a dream (svapna), or an illusion (māyā), or an imaginary town in the sky (gandharvanagara). The highest truth is that there is neither disappearance nor origination; neither bondage, nor one desirous of emancipation. The universe is not manifold, either through its own nature or through that of others; it is neither different nor non-different. The sages (II. 35-38) who have fully mastered the Vedas have seen the truth that it is the cessation of the universe (prapañcopasamal, which is free from duality. Having known this, therefore, one should meditate on non-duality, and having realized it, one should behave as a fool among the people becoming an ascetic, and realizing the truth inward and outward, should remain unmoved from it. Book. Ill is devoted to show the non-origination of the universe. The author proposes (III. 2) that nothing originates, and concludes (Ill. 48) that this is the highest truth. In the course of the discussion he says (ill 5ff) that as the space (ākāśa or mahakāša), owing to jars (ghalas), assumes the forms of the spaces occupied by the JATS (ghaļākāsas), and these forms, when the jars are destroyed, merge into the space, even so springs up the Ātman in the form of Jivas 'individual persons Olving to the conglomerations of the different limbs, etc., and when these conglomerations are destroyed the Jivas merge into the Alman. If the space occupied by one jar is soiled with dust or smoke, not all the spaces occupied by other jars are soiled therewith, even so (i.e., not affected) are the Jivas with reference to happiness, elc. The ·CXX AGAMAŠĀSTRA forms, functions and names of the jars may be different, but the space is the same. This is the case also with Jivas. As the space of a jar is neither a transformation, nor a part of the spacc, so is a jiva neither a transformation nor a part of the Aiman. As the space is never soiled with a dirty thing such as dust and smoke, yet it appears to be so to the ignorant, so appears the Ātman with impurities to those who are not enlightened. In death or birth, in moving forward or backward, he exists in all bodies just like the space. All the conglomerations of limbs, etc., as in dream, are created by the illusion of the Ātman. Now having shown what the Jiva is according to the Upanişads (TA, II, 1-6 and BU, Il 5) Gauda. pāda says (III 13) that the praise of the identity of the Jiva and the Atman as well as the censure of their difference in the Upanişads is reasonable. And so. though their difference is found in some Upanisadic texts it is merely attributable with reference to the future state, and certainly it is not in the primary sense (II. 14-16) Indeed in the scriptures the creation is described with various illustrations showing a distinction between the liva and the Ātman But in fact there is no distinction. It is only to lead one to the truth. For, there are three kinds of people, viz , of the lower, the middle, and the higher visions and in order to help them an upăsana is meant here (by the description of the creation involving some distinction which is mere attributive). Here (Ill. 17-18) with regard to the view of non-duality which he holds, our author says that it ·INTRODUCTION $14] CXX1 does not conflict with that of the dualists and shows how it does not do so. Gauda pāda reverts now (III 19-32) to his main proposition, i.e., non-origination and offers some arguments in favour of it, refuting the views of his opponents. He says that though it is said that it is the unborn that is born, it cannot be maintained. It is true that in the scriptures creation or origination is found both from the existent (bhūta) and the non-existent (abhūla). yet, that which is reasonable is to be accepted. In scriptures origination is said to be through illusion, it is denied there and its cause is negatived. Now, origination may be either of the existent (sal) or of the non-existent (asat), but neither of them is possible. That which exists may originate only through illusion and not in reality; because, if it originates in fact, it is to be accepted that the thing which had already been originated originates again. The origination of the non-existent is not reasonable either in reality or through illusion, as in the case of the son of a barren woman As in dream so in waking there is only the mind, yet it appears in the form of the duality of the percipient and the perceptible. The duality is perceived by the mind, but when it becomes non-mind, i.e., when its function of thinking (manana) ceases, there is no duality. The author says here (Ill. 33-36) that the tnind which becomes non-mind, and as such is free from the states of dream and deep sleep and has no determination (nirvikalpa), is identical with Brahman. XVI-1201B ·cxxii AGAMAŠĀSTRA This state of the suppressed (nig!hita= niruddha) mind is different from that in the deep sleep, because while in the latter it falls into a condition of stupidily (mudha avastha), it is not so in the former. This is attainable (III. 37-47) through an intense abstract concentration, called Asparśayoga 'contactless concentration,' which, though very difficult, can be realized gradually by the means suggested by the author. When by that process the 'mind is completely suppressed being free from the states at stupefaction and distraction, not moving at all and having no senseimage whatsoever, it becomes Brahman And it is said that in this state it rests on itself (svastha), it does not originate and is identical with the knowable which also does not originale. Here the author concludes (11]. 48) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. Gauda pada begins Book IV, unlike the first three ones, with his homage to the 'Greatest of men and the teacher of the yoga known as Asparsayoga, whom the present Writer thinks to be no other than the Buddha (IV. 1-2). Introducing his thesis (IV. 3) hc says that there are two classes of disputants, one of them holding that it is the existent (bhüla) that originales while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (abhūla) But the Advayas (=Advajaväd.nel, i. e., Buddhists declaring that there is no or gination at all maintain that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being (IV. 3-4). Gaudapada who is a Vedantin subscribes to this last view ·$14) INTRODUCTION cxxi11 and says (IV. 5): 'We approve of non-origination declared by them; we do not dispute with them, listen as to how there cannot be any dispute.' He then advances (IV. 6-71) various arguments gathered from Buddhist sources in support of the view attacking and refuting the theory of origination in different ways and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth. In the course of it he shows among others that though it is generally believed that a thing which is not born is born, it cannot be so in reality, for in that case it is to be admitted that nature changes; what is unborn must always remain unborn, it is its nature. Yet, if you say that it takes its birth, then evidently it changes. But what is nature does in no way change (IV. 6-10). The theory that the cause itself is the effect that is born (as held by the Sánkhyas) cannot be maintained (IV. 11-13), nor can there be any reasonable relationship or order between the cause and its effect (IV. 14- 21). Again, nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself; nor is there anything produced that is existent, non-existent, or both existent and nonexistent (IV. 22). It is not possible to prove the beginning of or of an effect, and as such neither of them comes into being (IV. 24). Gauda pada offers here some reasons in his support from the standpoint of the Vijñānavādins (IV. 25.39) showing that the external things are unreal though they appear to be not unreal ; they are, however, false as the experience in dream, being cogcause ·сҳxiy AGAMASASIRA [:14 nizable only by mind (cilladisya). He tells us again (IV. 40-41) that origination cannot be established, for there is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent ; there is no existent arising from the existent, and where is the non-existent arising from the existent ? It is true that the Buddhas have sometimes said of origination, but it is the instruction meant only for those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination (IV.. 42). As an elephant called by illusion is said to exist only owing to the perception and the common practice, so it is said that a thing exists (IV. 44). He declares (IV. 45-46) that there is only vijñana without the two (i e., the percipient and the perceptible), it is quiescent and has no origination (aja); it does not move, it is not an object (vastu), yet, it appears to admit movements, it appears to be an object. Thus the mind and the objects have no origination As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight or crooked, even so the mind when it snovcs appears as the percipient and the perceptible (IV.42) And as the fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance of its being straight or crooked, even so when the mind does not move, it does not appear in the form of the perci. pient and the perceptible (IV. 48). We have already seen that causation (heluphalabhāva) is not reasonable. The author explains it further in the following few kārikās (IV. 53-56) for his main purpose of establishing non-ongination With the same object in view he refules (IV. 57) like the Buddhists ·INTRODUCTION CXXY theories of eternality (sasvata) and annihilation (uccheda), and says (IV. 58) that it is in the empirical truth (samo;tisalya) that things are originated, but not in reality. From an illusive seed may come forth an illusive sprout. This sprout is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation. It is to be known with regard to all things. Therefore there is no room for the appellation of eternal and non-eternal' of anything (IV. 60). As in dream so in waking it is owing to illusion that the mind which is only one moves having the appearance of the external things. Whatever is experienced in dream is nothing but the mind, similarly whatever we see in the waking state is only the mind. As a creature formed of dream or made of illusion or by some supernatural power takes birth and dies, even so all these creatures exist and do not exist. Therefore there is no ſiva that takes birth, there is no possibility of it. "That nothing originates is the highest truth (IV.61-71). The duality consisting of the subject and the object is only the vibration (spandita) of the mind which has, in fact, no object, and consequently has no relation whatsoever to it (IV. 72-74). Owing to the persistent belief in what is non-existent (abhūtābhiniveśa) the mind relates itself to its objects, but when their absence is known it turns back from them having no relation at all (nihsanga). Now, when it so turns back and does not move onwards, that position of it is unwavering, it is then free from sorrow, desire and fear. This is the field of the activities of the Buddhas. It shines forth once for all having no ·cxxvi AGAMAŠĀSTRA origination, nor sleep, nor dream, and is the essence of reality (dharmadhātu, IV. 74-81). This truth is, however, made obscure by the childish with their different notions; yet, one who can realize it attains the state of omniscience free from duality. And if it is so, what is beyond it that one may desire (IV. 82-85)? The author then shows that it is through the 'supra-mundane' (lokoltara) knowledge by the realization of which one may become omoiscient (IV. 86-89). Here he asks us to learn certain things from the Agra yāna (=Mahāyāna) of the Buddhists giving some of its leading thoughts (IV. 90-95). as As the state of detachment (asangatā) of our mind or knowledge is absolutely necessary, he tells us what it is and how it can be effected. Both the objects and their knowledge have no origination, and there is no relation whatsoever between them the knowledge is said to be free from attachment (asarga). Jf this state is not achieved, there is no disappearance of the cover or 'obscuration' (avarana-cyuti) from which we suffer. But in reality there is no cover or obscuration of anything, all the elements of existence being naturally unsullied (IV. 96-98). Concluding, the teacher declares that according to the Buddha the knowledge is not related to its objects, and these two things, i e., the knowledge and its objects, are not mentioned by the Buddha (IV. 99), for, in fact, he has said absolutely nothing, ·$15] INTRODUCTION CXXVII $ 15. The Philosophy of Gaudapāda Let us now make an attempt to discuss a little the philosophy of Gauda pada as it is in our text, though it has already been done to some extent in the preceding section, i.e., the Conspectus of the Contents. As some of the philosophical views of our teacher have already been shown incidentally they will not be repeated here. Indeed, much has been written on this by my predecessors, yet when a new annotation is added hereto the subject may be discussed anew according to the light derived from it. In doing so we should keep our minds free from the influence of later thoughts, for it is not always safe to explain an older text by the thoughts in a subsequent work or works. Now, it goes without saying that our teacher, Gauda pada, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion (11, 12, 31, 35) Naturally, therefore, as a Vedāntist, he treats his subject in accordance with the scriptures (śruti), yet, not without pure reasons Direct or indirect, his reasonings are in many cases based on scriptures (II. 1-10; III. 24-26). But when there are contradictory scriptures, he says (III. 23) that those which are with reasons (yukti yukta) are to be accepted. Besides, throughout the work he has advanced a number of independent grounds which are very cogent. With a view to removing an apparent contradiction in the scripture he would interpret (III 14) a text in its secondary sense saying expressly ·an noncxxvini AGAMASASTRA ($15 that the primary one is not reasonable. The well. known practice of explaining Upanişadic texts in their secondary senses among the later commentators of the Brahmasūtras may be seen first here in Gaudapada's interpretation. Among the Vedāntists Gaudapāda_is Advaitist, the highest truth to him being advaila' duality' (advaitam paramărthatah, J. 17; advaitam paramärtho hi, III. 18; advaite yojayet smrtim, II. 36). He says (11.31) that according to the Vedānta the universe is like dream or illusion or an imaginary town in the sky (gandharvanagara). There is no duality at all, it is mere illusion (I. 17). The statement of the duality in the scripture is "intended for the instruction (of the ignorant), and so when the truth is understood the duality does not exist (1 18) and its cessation is bliss (1. 29; see also II. 35) He says (I. 17) further that the duality is due to illusion (māyā). In order to support this view he quotes scriptures (Ill. 24) which say .There is no plurality (neha nānāsti Liñcana, BU, IV, 4. 19; KU, IV.II)'; and 'Indra appears multiform through māyas' (BU, Il 5. 19)'; and he concludes (III. 24) that 'He (Prajāpatı) is born variously, though (in fact) he does not lake birth (VS, XXX, 19) Having thus offered the scriplural evidence for main- (aining the view that the duality is mere illusion and as such it has no reality, Gauda pada gives us some pure reasons. Here, too, first he refers us to a scriptural text (BU, IV. 3 14) and says (II. 5) that the two ·$15] INTRODUCTION сxxix one, states, dream and waking, are the same and because of the identity of the nature of the things experienced in them. That the things in dream are unreal is well-known to all and it is said also by the wise (BU, IV. 3. 8 ff ), and can be maintained on the following grounds : The things (such as mountains) in dream are within as they are enclosed or in an enclosed place (II }, IV. 33); but if they are real it is impossible. The time being very short, or there being no fixed rule of time, it cannot be said that the dreamer really goes to the distant land dreamt of by him and sees things there. Nor is he seen there when he awakes (II. 2, IV. 34). Again, when he awakes he does not find his friends and others whom he had then in dream grasped (IV. 35). Further, it is said in our scripture (BU, IV. 3. 10) that in dream thers are no chariots, etc., yet, they are seen there. Similarly, in the waking state, too, the things we see around us are unreal on account. of the fact that they are within (II. 4; IV. 33). That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is so also in the middle, i.e., at the present. Therefore, being like the unreal (such as mirage) the external things appear as not unreal (11. 6; IV. 31). In both the cases, dream and waking, things are only imagined by the mind. That which is imagined by the mind within is regarded as non-existent (asat), while that which is imagined by the mind without is regarded as existent; but the unreality of both of them is reasonable and a matter of experience (Jl. 9, 10). Whether in XVII-1200B ·-- AGAMASĀSTRA {$15 dream or waking, whatever is cognizable by the mind is unreal (cittaděśama avastukam, IV. 36). Moreover, in both the states the mind though in its own nalure is undoubtedly without the two (i.e., the percipient and the perceptible), yet it moves osving to illusion with the appearance of the two (III. 30; IV. 62). This duality comprising the movable and the unmovable is therefore perceptible only by the mind. Hence when the mind becomes non-mind, i e., when it ceases from its function of thinking, no duality is experienced (Ill. 31). The cessation of the function of thinking of the mind, or, in other words, the state of non-mind is reached when the mind through its knowledge of the truth of the Ātman does not think anything being noncognizant owing to the absence of the things to be cognized (III. 32) We have seen above that the waking experience is as unreal as the dream experience both of them being due to māyā or mere imagination of the mind that moves on account of māyā (spandate mayază manah, 'Ill. 29 ; cittam calati mājas á IV. 61). That all these external things are the creation of I Caudopida seems to have been fond of comproming con Picture Nena III 17. IV 51 and in considering the spirion c the Darons. 1, thor- wo maintain dualiny, he case }) 17 # that they are frmly Esed in their can do tapetxe conclus one ard contend one another lus bus sew dres net conflict wuh ihm Io e planirs it he way in the the supreme scaluny is non dually, yel, it is not that we do not admit dualy. we do it, so there 1. no conflict amor gut us Tic onls diference among on the that while occording to you duality is in tea'ng 15 well.1 11 appearance we hold that it is only 18 appearance on arcount of IBD, and net also in real' JI. 19 ·$15] INTRODUCTION the mind is further said (IV. 72) and described elaborately by Gauda pāda (IV. 47-52) with a very apt illustration of the fire-brand (alāta). A fire-brand, only when it is moved, and not when it is not moved, appears to be straight or crooked, or so. Now these appearances are not produced from anything other than the fire-brand. And when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. Similarly when the vijñāna' or mind moves and not when it does not move, it appears in the form of the duality consisting of the percipient and the perceptible. These appearances are produced not from anything other than the vijñāna ; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor they enter into it. He says again (IV. 63-66) that as animals seen in dream are visible to the mind of the dreamer and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the dreamer, even so the animals seen in wakefulness are visible to the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the waking one. Clearly this is the Vijñānavāda 'Idealism' before Now taking here into consideration the passages quoted under IV. 72 from the LA, and comparing the kārıkās IV. 47-52 with the corresponding Buddhist passages quoted in the Annotation under IV. 52, one will be struck with the agreement between a Vedāntist and a Vijñảnavādin. One will also be in • Mask here the use of the word chane in these kariks., and not of atta or manas . us.

·CXXX1 AGAMASASIRA 1:15 a position to understand how far Gauda pada is here influenced by the Buddhist thoughts and arguments. It is, lowever, to be noted that Gaudapada. Though much influenced by the Buddhist Thoughts, maintains This position as a Vedāntist It is Truc that he advocates the Vijñānavāda, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upanisadic source, i.c., BU, IV. 3. 14. on which is based his Tundamental statement (Il. 5) that the two states, dream land waking..are one. This Upanişadic seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before Gauda pada, has developed into what we now find in the Āgamaśāstra. But when there are the above and the similar germs of idcalısm in the Upanişads? it must be accepted that it did not first originate with the Buddhists, though it has much developed in their system later on. There are thus two schools of Vijñānavādins, (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauda pada and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is māya (I]]. 29, IV. 61) it is vāsanā (LA, X. 150)' in the second, both of them being without beginning (anadı). Thus māya and vâsană 3 Sec Altareya Upanisad, NII 2-3, TU, WI 5 viñânam brahmeti vya 51 vidānad dhy evaº, 4 háhyo na vidyate hy antho yatha bálair Vikalpyale vasanair luditam cittam atthabhasam pravastate ·315] INTRODUCTION сxxxці may, however, be regarded as the same thing. For vāsanā, though explained as pūrua jñāna previous knowledge' is conceived as a cosmical force, transcendental illusion (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāņa, Leningrad, 1927, p. 209). The real difference then between these two schools in the present case is with regard to the intervention-of-the_Ātman with whom māyā is connected in the first, and his denial in the second where the vâsanã is with the citla. Now, the māyā of the Jiva referred to above like vāsanā has no beginning. He sleeps on account of it being himself deluded by it (1. 16; II. 19). He himself imagines himself and various other things through his own māyā, some of them being within while others without (II. 13). These things, i.e., those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (cilla). as well as those which are without and exist as long as remains the notion of the two, are only imagined (II. 14, 15). In the process of the imagination first he imagines himself as a Jiva personal soul' then various things, external and internal (II. 16). Consequently as in the dark, a piece of rope not known determinately is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., even so is imagined the self ; but when that piece of rope is known determinately the imagined snake, etc., vanish and there is no duality, So is to be known of the ascertainment of the self (II. 17,.18). $ cittamatram na drsyo 'sti dvidhā cittam pravartate 1 grāhyagrahakabhāvena Ilmātmiyam na vidyate" LA, III_21 ·CXXXIV AGAMASASIRA (615 But what is the characteristic of a Jiva ) As we have seen above, Gaudapada explains it (III 3-9) by an apt illustration of akara 'space' or mahakasa'great space and ghalal asas 'spaces occupied by different jars As 11 19 owing to the condition lupadhi) of jars that the akasa is regarded as ghatakasas, so it is on account of the conglomerations (of the different parts of the body) that the Ātman is regarded as Jivas Consequently as when the jars are destroyed spaces occupied by them are completely merged into the great space (mahakasa), even so are merged the livas into Alman when the conglo merations are destroyed (The spaces occupied by all jars are in reality only one, yet if the space occupied by one jar 18 covered by smoke or dust, etc, not all the spaces occupied by all other jars are connected with it The case is the same also with the Jivas in regard to their happiness, etc , ie, if one Jiva feels happiness or suffers pain, not all the Jivas are subjected to it There may be different conditions (upadhıs), their forms, func tions and names may differ from one another, but as regards the space occupied by them there is no difference Similar is the case with reference to the Jivas Again, the space occupied by a jar is neither a transformation (vikara nor a part (avayava) of the space (akasa), similarly a Jiva is neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman Gaudapada says further that the Ātman like the space remains in all the conglomerations or bodies which, too, have no reality as dream being the creation of the illusion of the Alman (III 10) The Jiva is the supreme soul of the 'sheaths' (kosas) as ·CXXXV $15] INTRODUCTION described in the TU, II. 1-6, and the supreme Brahman or Ātman is shown in the Madhuvidya section of the BU, I), 5. That the identity of the Jiva and the Ātman without distinction is praised and their distinction is censured in the scriptures is reasonable (III. 13). for though in some texts their distinction is 10 be found, those texts are to be taken in their secondary sense, the primary one being not reasonable (Ill. 14). Here the distinction is made purposely, it is made out of compassion to help one of inferior vision in one's upāsanā which is for such a person impossible without some sort of distinction (Ill. 11-16). It is not that such a distinction must be a real one. It is said that the mind becomes non-mind and Gauda på da is definitely of opinion that Brahman is nothing but the mind that has become non-mind. He says that the mind in the state of suşupla 'deep sleep' falls into a sleeping stałe llaya), but it does not do so when it is suppressed (nig!hita=niruddha). and indeed that is Brahman above fear and radiant with the light of jnana (III. 35). 'See IV. 77-81, and below. He expresses the same thing in other words saying that when the mind is completely suppressed (niruddha) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything else it becomes Brahman (Ill. 46): yadă na liyate cittam na ca vaiksipyate punahi aninganam anabhăsam nişpannam brahma tat tadā # When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is .

·CXXXV) AGAMAŠĀSTRA [115 distracted again, and as such has no movement, nor any sense-image, then it becomes Brahman.' It is to be pointed out that here for the first time, so far as goes my information, it is found that Brahman is nothing but the cilla which by nirodha is anidra (1, 16; III 36; IV.81;=alina=amūdha), asvapna (1. 16, III. 36; IV.81 ;=auiksipla), aningana (III. 46;= aksipla). and anābhåsa (III. 46;= nirābhāsa: nisakāra arūpaka, 111. 36). Another appellation of this cilta is sanirvāna" with extinction (III, 37), i.e in this state it is extinct. He is jñana 'knowledge' or 'chought' but akalpaka (Ill. 33:= nirvikalpa)'indeterminate and consequently asanga 'having no attachment or relation to any object' (IV. 72, 95;=nihsanga IV, 79, see IV.99= nirvisaya, IV. 72)' Being as such this jnāna is not different from the knowable (jñejabhinna), which is Brahman (111. 33) & The first half of the Karcha imples that in this state of the mind, which cin be reached by Asparsoyoga (111 30.45, IV 2, it is free from the condo kons known in the Yoga (yslems as müdho 'stupefied and cikupta' distracted'( Vyse or the YS, 11) These inoare also expressed by our teacher as andra sleepless' and psi opno 'dscamlers' respectrely III, 36 I 16; IV. 814 7 Vacaspoti YS, I 1) müdharm to tamahsamudrekan tiduautoral. kuptad visistam višesostbematahulaya ládacitkah sihemā & Here saniytana mindromantthita (11131. MU, VI 34, YV, !!! 67.81, = amanastá (11132. Muktı UP 11 29) = unmanibhäta Brahmabando UP, 41 manchkoya 1MU, VI 20) -monur aśa Vukte UP, 11, 10. 35. 36 37 manolaye l'adabında UP. 171-acrilata (lakt UP, R 20} =cadanāslOp et II 32, 34; Sandilya UP. up One Hundred And Eight Uponesods. Nimnayoeger 1917, p. 358, 9 See the Annotation on IV,72 ·INTRODUCTION cxxxvii $15] It is further said that in this state the mind rests in itself (svastha, III. 47;=ålmasamstha, III. 34)." This Brahman of Gauda pāda then points on one side to the state of kaivalya 'the state of being not connected with anything else," or the resting of the Drasts or Puruşa 'Self' in himself (svarūpa, i.e., cinmalra 'pure thought'), as described in YS, I, 3," and on the other to the resting of the citta in the vijñaptimålrată of the Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins According to the latter citta, manas, vijñāna and vijñapti. are synonyms.' Therefore vijñaptimātrata is the same as vijñānamātrata which means the state of pure and simple vijñāna 'intellect' or *consciousness. Here in this state there is the highest cessation of the perceiving faculty of the mind." And this is in their opinion muktı' deliverance."? This is also the highest place of Vişnu'' (KU, 1. 3. 9; MU, VI 26; RV, I. 22. 20; 154, 5 with a slight variation), not only according 13 10 This will remind one of the followɔng in the ChU, VII 24 1-2 Yatra ninyat pafyat nanyac chroli nanyad vijān&ti sa bhūmi sa bhagavah kosmin pratishta iti sve mahim yadı vă na mahimili 11 YS, IV, 34 purus&rthalūnyanda gunanim pratiprasavah kaival, am svarüpapratuthā vi citafakteb 11 tada drastuh svarūpe 'vasthanam 13 Vk, p 3; AK, II 34; MV. p 303, VMed D' Korambi, XIV 82. 14 MSA, XI 47. parama upalambhasya vigamah. Tk, p 29 acitto 'nupalambho 'sals, see TSN, 36 15 viditya nairātmyam dvividham sha dhiman bhavagatam samam tac ca jäätvá pravifatı sa tallvam grahanatab tatas tatra sthânān manasa tha da khyāti tad api tad akhyānam muktih parama upalambhasya rgamah ! MSA, 47 XVIII-1201B ·CXXXVII) AGAMAŠASTRA [$15 to the Upanisadists, but also to the Vaisnavas (BP, II. 1. 19).17 One point is to be discussed here Brahman of the Vedāntists or Gauda pāda (III. 30) is eternal (nitya), and if it is so, how can it be suggested, as done before, that Brahman and the citta in l'uñaptimātrală are the same, for according to Yogācāras jñāna is nof eternal, but momentary (ksanika) ? The following is the solution: In the authoritative Buddhist works the following words are used for nirvana' dhruva enduring amita not dying ', acyula ‘stable', aksara "imperishable', ajarjara 'not decaying' and apalokita" not broken down.' Certainly these words do not imply momentariness, but on the contrary some kind The third ond the first part of the fourth lines are explained there thus talas latra laltvavijfaptumštranthanin monaras tad api laittam na kly Ill vijfaptrmatram tad akhyanam mukth, 16 MBU, P. 12 yan marks tria galerstathat ryssanakarmakoti tan mano vlayam sana tad vienoh paramam padom 17 tatruiksvasayan dhyfsed arzucchinnena ce aski mano Murvieng am yuktılarak koricare na smare! redam tot patamam viunor mano yatra prasidan 1! VM. p. 224. SV, IV 369, Pour in Mi cana, C.XXV. PP. 153.4 19 Payisin hus for it in French Loc cu 1 with query "le Soupçunne" {"suepected' or 'umised'; Put a clear from Buddh.hos. on SV IV. 370 (apalugaliya apalokitam, it is deessed from pro ora and not from pra dakar may appear And so it can be said in the words of y.lom111, TAKV, p. 23) with regard to the densation of the word loka that ujisaha ghilo na lokit See my note, Aponoge of the Alhidhermokolaupadhya In IHQ, Vol II, pp 418 4 . and Poussin', Rejo nder, p 656 ·$15] 21 INTRODUCTION cxxxix of stability. Now the citla in the state of vijñaptimātratā is described variously according to the vareity of the aspects beginning from the Path of Illumination (darśanamārga) in Vasubandhu's Tk, 29-30.20 It is said there to be lokottara jñāna 'super-mundane knowledge,' āšrayaparāvrtli (āśrayasya parāvýttih) 'the revolution or change of the recipient', i.e., the 'alayavijñāna,' and anāsrava dhātu "undefiled element' which is dhruva 'enduring.' Here by the word äśrayaparāvrlfi referred to above we understand, in brief, that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil condition (dauşthulya), viz., the covers' or obscurations '(āvaranas), namely, the knowable (iñeya) and the passions (klesas), the recipient (āśraya), i.e., alayavijñāna, turns back to its natural state in the form of advaya jñāna 'the knowledge free from the two,' i.e., the subject and the object. In other words, the alayavijñāna which was before covered or obscured, the obscurations being now removed, gets its own innate state, i.e., the state of aduaya (= lokottara) jñána. This is called anāsrava dhātu 'undefiled element ',which is dhruva. 24 Sec our text, IV 18, foot note I, where these two kārikās with the introductory line of Sthitamati ate quoted. 21 On these words the commentary of Stharamati may be quoted here. apariculatvat Tib hdras par ma byas. pa dan, for enucrtatvat in the printed text) loke samudicarabhāvēt 1for which Tıb suggests samudayābhāvāt reading kun tu hbyun ba med pa. dan), barvikalpatvat ca lokād ultimam itu jāānam lokottaram ca fad in afrayo tra sarvabiskam tlayavijñānam, tasya parāvıtlır yā dausthulyavipīkadvayavāsanābhāvena parāvtttsh'. nudausthulyatvät sa tu ăstayavigata sty anisravab', dhruvo nityatvad aksayataya, ·cx! AGAMAŠĀSTRA [$15 But what is the true significance of the word dhruva, that is intended here ? Among the 33 descriptive words for nirvăņa found in SN, IV. 368-373 and 46 synonyms for it in AP. 6-9, we have dhruva and never nilya. It is true that sometimes the words nilya, dhruva and sāśvata are used as synonyms (Pali vevecana = vivacana= paryāya), as says Buddhaghosa himself on SN, I. 142. Yet, there is some difference in their meanings. For while śāśvata, according to him, means "always existing' (sadā vijjamānam) dhruva implies 'enduring (dhuvam'i thiram; he writes also on SN, IV. 370: thirathena dhuvam). Jaina teachers, too, are of the same opinion In connexion with the definition of dravya'substance in their system they give the same explanation of the word dhruva or dhrauvya using the same similar words. In the older Upanisads Ātman or Brahman is nilya and not dhruva. The word nilya implies that it does not admit of any change, while dhruva does not do so. Let us give here an illustration, If of a lump of gold a number of different ornaments is made one after another, their forms change, yet, through these changes With regard 10 pipaka dushiga's idam Diccam dam dhuram dam Hassatam See also Sihiramati. Tk. 39, riplaining Jhrudd as quoted in foot-note 21. 13 Tallerthadhigamasutra. V 29 upidavadhrau ayuktam sat 71 Tattuitharajacarthika (Santana Jainagranthamula, 1915). V 2010hp php', Totti adipika on Pretoconazora led ANUpadhye, 19351 II 3 (dhrourya at autht): Tette adipiks on Pancastinamayanara Riguandım Jainalistamsli. 2nd ed), 10 painotierablarocchedoridayor opi uvajter aparitizo dhrauryam, Sanmoutarka (Gujardta Purătaitas mendise. Ahmece bad, 1040 V S), Cas 12, p pidhroue ya esthitta ·515) INTRODUCTION cxl. 6 the same gold continues to exist. Owing to this continuance it can be said that gold is here dhruva enduring', but not nitya eternal' The Alayavijñāna is certainly momentary (ksaņika), as it changes every moment. It does not therefore move forward as one and the same (ekam abhinnam), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (santati) as the food with its currents (srotasã oghavat). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (anādinidhana) till nirvana. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijãāna continues it is dhruva and not niya. It may be pointed out here that there is more than one kind of nityata 'eternity' according to the primary and the secondary senses of the word; viz., (i) kūlasthanityatā 'eternity as unchangeability' as of Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntists; (ii) pariņāmanityata 'eternity as transformation 'as held by the Sánkhyas and the Jainas. To these two may be added, according to the Buddhists, (iii) one more, viz., santalinityată 'eternity as continuance." It may, however, be the same as parināma-nityatā. Where in such cases in Buddhist texts the word nitya is employed it is to be taken in this light. Now in support of the main problem we are here concerned with, the following couplet may be taken into consideration : prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakṣtyāgantavo malah! teşām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram 23 15 Quoted by Jayatirtha representing the views of the Vijñānavadina in hus tiki (sl. 30, on TAK, III, p 35) It is already cited once more on p 70 of our text ·cxlii AGAMAŠASTRA [615 Mark that cilla is said here to be avinaśvara jyofis the light that is not liable to be destroyed. It may therefore be safely concluded that Gauda. pada's Brahman and the cilta in vijñaplimátrata of the Yogăcaras are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is nitya the latter is dhruva. Let us remember here what Gauda pada says about Brahman (III. 35-36, 46-47), -7 as we have seen just now from the Vedāntic point of view, and compare it with what he says in IV. 76-81 % of the field of the activities (uişaya) of the Buddhas' describing See also the following tatrotpannapsadhamsi vijõānam anutpatnapradhvana janam LA, p. 157 See our text p 85, foot note 2 (11) Irānasiddhrituo Vajrayana Texts, GOS, P. 857, XV, 50, referring to attadhara' current af thought on the text read cittadhôrorva for chitte dhårepa in 48) anadınıdhanz bānti sarvadharmefvari ca să | bibhartı sarvarüpani satyadvayasamāśnta !! (111) Op cit, p 75 anadınıdhanam sāntam bodhrattam liv} Op aut.p 86: jäänam amaraham' anabh.lapram (0) Suzuki wiles in his Oatlines of Mfahāyāna Buddhism, 1907, p 348 "Nirvana * sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes, (1) eternal (nitya), (2) blissful (sukha). 13) sell-acting fatman), and (4) pure luci! It is eternal, because it is immaterial, it is blissful, because s is above all sufferings, it 18 self-acting, because it knows no compulsion: it is pure, because it is not defled by passion and error" 3 Brahman is that citta which is unwavering and has no sense image por origination, for sleep, nor dream anunganam anabhāsam (I1I. 46, and ajam anidram asvapnam cíttam (Ill 36). * The field of activities of the aim of the Buddhas is the unwavering position of the mind hasing no originalion, nor sleep, nor dream cittasys anutpatuh []V. 771 and niscalā sthuh (IV. 801, and ajar anidram assapan citfam (IV.81).

·INTRODUCTION cxlu -- $15] and approving the views of the Buddhists ; it will then be clear that the same thing has been said by Gauda pada in two places almost in the same words though from the two different standpoints We have already discussed the Vijñānavāda as it is in our text. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is treated here by Gauda pā da only with a view to the establishment of the Ajātwāda 'the Theory of Non-origination which is one of the most important topics of the philosophy of Gauda pāda. Having proposed to show what it is first in ?11. 2 and then in IV. 5 he declares (III 48) and affirms (IV. 71) that the highest truth is that nothing originates. For details the reader is referred to the Conspectus of the Contents (pp. cxiii-cxxvi) and the work itself, we should like to point out here only a few important aspects of it. The subject is dealt with by our author as a Vedāntist separately in two places, Book II and Book IV. In the former he does so purely from the Vedāntic point of view supporting his thesis by scriptures and grounds based on them or in favour of them, some of these grounds being strikingly similar to those offered by the Buddhists for the same purpose ; while in the latter he expresses his approval on behalf of his schcol regard nz ajālı as declared by the Advayas or Buddhists saying that he does not dispute with them onthis point and asking his followers or the people at large to listen to him as to how there cannot be any dispute. He proceeds then to show throughout the Book IV the ·Схіу AGAMASĀSTRA [$15 arguments of the Buddhists taking even the actual words from their authoritative works in a number of cases. Readers are here referred to our text with Annotation. One point may be pointed out here. In Book IV Gauda pada has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta," as nothing Vedāntic will be found therein. In explaining the Vedānta in accordance with his own light he establishes the Ajālivada in Book III, as we have seen above. Then in Book IV he supports that theory referring to the Buddhists who also hold the same view independently of the Vedāntists. Gaudapāda say's here that his school approves of what they say on this point and shows their arguments one by one. From this it may appear that whatever is said by Gauda pada as the opinion of the Buddhists in that Book is approved or accepted by him, But can it be said strictly ) The Buddhists being the follower of the Middle Path (madhyama pratipad) reject both the extreme views of 'eternity' and 'annihilation (śāśvala- and uccheda-vādas). This is alluded to in our text in IV. 57-60. But how can Gaudapada as a Vedāntist accept it when his Brahman in his own word (II). 33) is elerpal (nilya)? Nevertheless, in the present case, Gauda pida seems to have accepted the middle theory, for, as the case is put here, there may not be raised any objection. Or it may be that Gauda pada has here simply mentioned the view's 5 Even tuch words to Brahmanand Atman are not to be found there ·$15) INTRODUCTION cxl: of the Buddhists as he has done it in some other cases in this Book. For instance, see IV. 90. It is a very striking fact that some of the most remarkable doctrines as discussed and established by Gaudapāda have not been appreciated'in subsequent works on the Vedānta even of the Advaita school; for instance, the peculiar conception of Brahman, the Ajātivāda, the Sarvajñatvavada (IV. 85, 89) and the Vijñānavāda, besides what Gauda på da approves of the views of the Advayavădins or Buddhists is Book Even the great Sankara himself does not appear to subscribe to the above doctrines of our teacher. It need not, however, be said that his Māyāvāda has undoubtedly got strong impetus from the first three Books of the AS. His Adhyāsavada as explained by him in his Sārirakabhäsya and other works has no mention in the AS, though a distant relationship may be found out. Here he is undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist Vijñānavadins specially in explaining their doctrine of Trisvabhāva or Trilaksana 'three characteristics' (IV. 74, pp. 175 #). Of the philosophy of Gauda pada there is much more that deserves to be discussed separately, but in order to avoid prolixity readers are referred to the text itself, specially to its Book IV together with the new Annotation of the present writer, in which he has tried to explain many an important and hitherio obscure point of the work. From this, it is hoped, readers will be in a position to form their own judge XIX-1201B,

·cxlv
AGAMASASTRA
1
{$15
ments as to how much Gauda pada is influenced
by Buddhist thoughts and how much of them he has
adopted into his own system of the Vedānta. 80
30 One may consider here the following words in the Bhavaprakāfa (TAS.
Vol II. p 415) referring to AS, IV 11 23
nanu mandūkyakankisu, Caudapēdācīrs asb madhyamukoktayuktıbhiḥ
karyakarana- (for wrongly printed kāryā kārana) bhāvasya bimurtatramo
shipitam

·BOOK I
bahısprajno vibhur visvo hy antahprajnas tu tasjasah I
ghanaprajnas tatha prajna eka eva tridha sthitah #
The all pervading one is Visva all when he has the
consciousness of outside he is Tanjas a brilliant when he
has the consciousness of inside and when his consciousness 19
concentrated? he is Prajna 'intelligent The one exists in
three forms 2
1 Lterally condensed (ghana) in other words when consc ousnese
does not adme of any d st net on w th n itself as , the case in wakefulness
and in dream
1 See 1 2
2
daksinaksimukhe visvo manasy antas tu taijasah 1
hrdi
prajnas
tridhā dehe vyavasthitah •
akase ca
Visva is in the front of the right eye within the mind
19 Tarjasa while Prána 19 in the sky in the heart
Thus he remains in the body in three ways
VII 74 BU NI 35
IKU IV 17 MU VII !! ChU IV 153
IV 22 V 52 4
BU ! 1 17 IV 2 3
! See pp lxrrxIY IXTIXY and I 3
*

·2
AGAMAŠASTRA
3
visto hi sthulabhun nityam ta jasah praviviktabhuk i
anandabhuk tatha prajñas Iridha bhogam nibodhata
Vasva enjoys what is g70cs Tarja sa what is fine and
Prajna bliss (Thus) know enjoyment to be of three kinds
4
sthulam tarpayate vist am praviviktam (u tarjasam i
anandas ca tatha praji am tridha trptım nibodhata !
The gross satisfies Viss a the fine Tanja sa and blss
Pra, fa (Thus) know satefaction to be of three kinds
5
trisu dhámasu yad bhojyam bhokta Jaś ca prakırttitah i
vedaıtad ubhayam yas tu sa bhunjano na lipy ate a
One who knows both what is sad to be enjoyable and
what 19 said to be the en oyer in three stages is not ta nied
through enjoying
prabhar ah sarı abhūtānim salām ito sanis az ah!
sarvam jinayatı pranas celo míun purusah prihak
The settled op non of sages is that all th ngs have the
oten
(Come hold that the Breath the purusa (self) creates
all the rays of the mind oferend's
For the crea on Pine KBS 1 23 PI .hr . Frahman

·AGAMAŠĀSTRA 3 The objective. world is the vibrations of one's mind (citla. spandita see IV 72) which shines inside These vibrations are called here rays (amsu) and assume different forms just like the rays of the sun on the clouds appearing in the form of the rainbow A vibhūtım prasavam tv anye manyante srsticintakah 1 svapnamayasvarupeti srstır anyair vikalpita 1 Other theorisers about creation assert dogmatically that the creation of the world) is (his) expansion i while others imagine that creation is of the nature of dream and magic 1 ? As in the Upao sads TU 11 6 1 so kimoyata tahu syam prajayeya : Ths vew is held by some of the Vedantists includ ng our teacher (see II 31) and the Buddhists Madhyamikas and Yogiciras 8 Icchamatram prabhoh srstir iti srstau viniscitah 1 kālāt prasutım bhutanam manyante kalacıntakahi Those who are assured about creation såy that creation is the mere volition of the Lord' and those who theonse about Time consider the creation of beings to be from Time: See note on 17 Kuranitiyana follower of Riminui. says that they are Aupanyades or the followers of the Upan pode who say He satyasankalpa one whose purpose is true or fulfilled (Chu, 3 14 21 MU 7 They are Astronomers See SU 11 MB XII 224 227 $S pp 10-11 and spec slly the hymns on Kila ja the AV XIX 53 54 9 ·+ ĀGAMASĀSTRA Now as regards the object of the creation the author says: 9 bhogārtham srstis ity anye kridārtham iti căpare devasyaisa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā spha Il Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of this). enjoyment, while others (are of opinon) that it is for the sake of his spori. It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is already) secured." Kura narayana says here in his tikā: harer atçptasyaiva bhogārtham srstir its anye Srinivasatirtha, an anno - tator of Madhvácārya's commentary on MāU, clearly says that this view is held by Ramanuja or his followers (kecid rāmānujah) i See BU. 14.17. atmavedam'agra ásid eka cva so 'kämayata saya me Ryad arha prazâyeya vitam me ayad atha karma kurviyeti See BS, 11 33 lokavat tu lakaivalyam: MU, VI 1 vagvakridaratı prabhuh 3 The second half of the kinkā 18 quoted as frut in the Madhvabhăsya on BS, 111, 33 10 nivetteh sarvaduḥkhānām iśānaḥ prabhur avyayah I advaitah sarvabhāvānám dévas turyo vibhuḥ smịtah 'The Turya 'fourth one" is said to be all-pervading. efficient in removing all miseries, the shining onc, change less, and of all things without a second, 1 The other three are already mennoned Viiva, Tina ind Praia

·ÅGAMASASTRA
1)
karyakaranabaddhau tav isyete visvataijasau !
prajnah karanabaddhas tu dve tu turye na sidhyalah 6
It is held that those two Visva and Taajasa are
bound with cause and effect Prajna 19 bound with cause
but in Turya neither of them can be asserted
Here according to the commentator cause (kerana) is non
grasping of the truth (tattvagrahana) while effect (karya) is
grasping the truth otherwise (anyathagrahana) See 1 15
These two are common to both Visva and Tanjasa In
Prajna there is only tattvagrahana while in Tury a there
is neither of them Cf PS: 31 PSY 34 39
! Thakar ka quoted in the NS IV 41
12
natmanam na params caiva na satyam napi cintam!
prajnah kıncana samvetti turiyah sarvadık sadā 1
Prajti a knows 'nothing-neither himselt nor others
nesther truth nor falsehood
but Turiya is always
2
all seeing
As to why Prajña is bound with cause (tattvagrahona)
and Turya is not bound with either of cause and effect
(anyathāgrahana) is stated in the following karika
1 See BU IV 3 21
1 Sce IV 84 Cf sada a 11 344
*

·AGAMASASTRA As Prajna does not know anything he is regarded as bound with the cause (tattvägrahana) which 18 just like darkness Itamas)' As regards Turiya there being nothing except himself he 19 all sccing and thus in the absence of all ignorance he is not bound in any way : See US XVI 26 13 dvaitasyagrahanam tulyam ubhayoh prajnaturyayoh 1 bijanıdrayutah prajnah sa ca turye na vidyate | Non recognition of duality is common to both Prajia and Turya but Prajna is with sleep which is a seed (re cause of specific cognition) while it does not exist in Turya In this karika the difference between Prajna and Turya 15 shown In the text nidra sleep implies tattoapratıbodha non realization of truth (II») and as it is the cause of specific cognition in dream and waking it is called bija seed svapnanıdrayutăv adyau prajnas tv asvapnanıdraya i na nidram naiva ca svapnam turye pasyantı niscitah The first two (Visva and Tanjas a) are with sleep and dream' Prajna is with dreamless sleep while those who are certain (about the truth) see neither sleep nor dream in Turya It follows therefore from the above that Turya is not bound either w th cause or with effect 1 Dream (svapna) s knowing otherw te fenyerhagrahome) and sleep in da) as bad before $ non coga ton of truth (tattooprat bodha) See I 15

·>
AGAMASĀSTRA
: '15
anyathả gihnatah svapno nidra' talivam ajanatah !
viparyáse tayoh ksine turiyam padam aśnute ?
Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep
is for him who does not know the Reality The error in these
iwo (svapna and nidra) being destroyed one attains the stage
of Tusiya.'
! See YS, i to
1 See NS, IV 42 US Emu 26.
16
anādimāyayā supto yadá jivah prabudhyate 1
ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tada
When the Jiva sleeping on account of illusion' which has
no beginning is awakened, he realizes (the sale of Turya
which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream
nor duality'
1 The commentator says that the maya is in the form of tathJpret bodhe
and anyathagtahana
See ! 14, 1tl 36. IV 81
prapańco'yadı vidyela nivarteta na samlayah 1
mayāmatram idam dvaitam advartam paramarthatah,
If the capansion of the (vtaible) universe (prapanca) were
(cally) existing it woula'nave ro "cearc'tuenti, no doubt
but this duality is mere illusion in absolute truth there i
non duality

·8 AGAMASASTRA For the meaning of prapanca see Candrakortti on MV р 350 te ca vikalpa anadımatsaſsarabhyastaj janajſeya vacya vacaka kartkarmakriya ghaja pala mukuļa ratha rūpa vedana stri puruza labhalabha sukha duhhha yako ya'o ninda prasamsadı laksa nād vicitrat prapancad upajayante Op cit p 373 prapanco hi vah prapancayaty arthan it krtva 18 sorne One le vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadı kenacit 1 upadesad ayam vado znate dvaitam na vidyate | False creation (oikalpa)' would cease it were created by This statement (of ukalpa) is for the sake of instruction When (the Reality) is known there is no duality It means that if it is held as we hold that the vikalpa 1 = prapanca in the preceding karıks) false creation duality is made by some one it must disappear We say that it is said so in order to instruct the ignorant or stupid people so that they may gradually arrive at the truth (ay anam ava bodhartham-YV II) 84 24) This will be clear from YV (III 84 19 27) from which a few lines are quoted below The second half of the karika is identical with YV III 84 222 and 27b with the single yanation that in 26a there is avibodhad for our upadeśad The reading avibodhad how ever seems to haye actually been avabodhad See the follow ing from YV UI 84 upadesaya sastresu jatah sabdo thavarthajah I pratiyog vyaaccheda amk hy alaksanapaksavan || 19 bhedo desyata evay am vs ayaharan na vastavah vetalo balakasyeva haryartham parıkalpitah | 20 17hat re duality wh ch , only imag nary 1 Lit ut ag ned ·1. 191 AGAMAŠASTRA 9 • emādimayi mithyāsankalpakalpaná mata i ajñānam avabodhartham na tu bhedo 'sti vastuni 24 avibodhād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate 1 jñāte samśāntakalanan maunam evăvašişyate 25 vivadante hy asambudhāḥ syavikalpavijțmbhitazhi. upadeśid ayam vădo jāáte dvaitam na vidyate 27 In a of the kârıkā KN reads na nivarteta for vinivarteta. Accordingly it would give the following meaning vikalpa would not cease if it is created by some one, but the fact is not so, for it is mentioned only for one's instruction KN, however, er lains it differently 19 visvasyätvavivaksāyām ādi sāmānyam utkałam ! mātrāsampratipattau syâd âptisāmānyam eva ca & 'In the desire of saying that Visva is A and in knowing the measure the common quality first' (adi) as well as 'pervading' (aptı) is quite apparent.' Ātman is to be meditated through the symbol Om, and for doing so these two must be regarded as identical This identification of Atman and Om is described in this and the following two kārikās. In the present kấrikā the first part (pada) of Ātman, 01z., Vasva, is identified with the first part or measure (mátrá) of Om, Orz., the letter A. It is to be noted that Om results from the euphonic combination of the three letters (mātrās), A, U and M in such identification there must be some common quality (sūminya dharma) of the things to be I That is, in knowing the identity of the first mitra of Om, 10, A, with the first pida ot Atman, it, Vifra See 1, 20, 21. nola i 1201B-2 ·10 AGA14SASTRA 11. 20 meditated as identical? In the present case there are two common qualities, 'first' (adi) and 'pervading' (õptı). As Visva is the first of the four padas of Ātman. so A is the frst of all the letters of which Om is composed. And, again, as the reward of one who understands this identity of Visva and A is far-reaching (for one attains thereby everything that one may desire), so is far-reaching A, for, as said in the fruti, A is all speech, as it manifests itself in different letters • See bhakttoada in Vedic texta; Norukta, VII 24 bahubhaktıvadını brahmani bhavant and the present writer's Vedic Interpretation and Tradition in the Proceedings of the Sixth Onental Conference held at Patna, P 498 Sayada says in his commentary co the TA, VII. etad apy asfaseyake samimnitam akaro vai sarva vāk saisā sparsomabhu vyajyanina bahvi nānā. rupi bhavati This passage is quoted by commentatore on the BG, X 33 See AA III, 23 with Sayana tasyutasyakāto payah 20 taijasasyotvavijñāna utkarso drśyate sphutam ! mâtrāsampratipattau syâd ubhayatvam tathāvidhamn | 'In understanding that Tanjas a 19 (the letter) U and in knowing the measure, the common quality 'subsequence' (utkarsa) as well as the state of being in the middle of) both (ubhayatva) is clearly seen The common qualities required for identification of Tanjas a with U are utkarsa 'subsequence' and ubhayatua wich is the same as madhyasthatva 'intermediate position.' . 1 That 18, 10 understanding that the second mitrā of Om, re, U, and the second pada of Atman, 1c, Tanja sa are identica! Scel 19, note! and 21, note ·1,21] AGAMAŠASTRA Taija s a is subsequent to Visva and U is subsequent to A ; therefore there is utkarsa Taijasa and U both are in the middle being between Visva and Prajña and A and M respectively 21 makārabhāve prājñasya mānasāmānyam utkatam ! mātrāsampratipattau tu layasāmānyam eva ca u as as 'In the identity of Prajna with the letter) M and in understanding the measure the clear common quality is 'measure' (māna) as well as disappearance' (laya) The commentator's explanation of the kārka, | understand it, is follows In involution Visva and Tajas a enter into Prājña. while in evolution they come out of it, and as such they, as it were, are measured with Prajna, just as grains of barley are measured with prastha 'a special standard of measure' generally a basket made of bamboo or cane of particular cepacity In measuring the grains they are first put into the basket and then they are taken out Now as Visva and Tajas a enter into and come out of Prājña, so in pronouncing Om continually A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M This is the first common quality. called measure (māna) for the identification of Prājña and M The second common quality called 'disappearance' (laya) is this in susupti 'profound. deep and undisturbed sleep' Visva and Taija sa disappear in Prājfia Similarly in pronouncing Om, A and U seem to disappear in M.

·12
AGAMASASTRA
1, 22-24
22
trișu dhāmasu yas tulyain simānyam vetti niścitah i
sa püjyah sarvabhūtānâm vandyaś caiva mahāmunih tl
'One who knows what is equal and common in the three
stages and is certain (about it) is a great sage worthy of
veneration and praise of all beings'
23
akāro nayate viśvam ukāras câpi taijasam 1
makāraś ca punah rājñam nāmātre vidyate gatih 1
'A leads to Visva. U to Taijasa, and M to Prājña:
there is no going to that which has no measure (matra)'
This is the consequence of one's meditating upon the
symbol Om consisting of thrce mātrās, A, U and M The
last põda of the kārıkā speaks of the consequence of the
meditation on the fourth' (Turya) In this state none is led
to anywhere, it itself being the cessation of all duality
(dvaitasya upaśarah).?
1 That is, Turya
2 See I 29
24
onkājam pādalo vidyāt pāda mātra na samśayah 1
onkāram pādaśo jñälvā na kıñcid api cintayet a
'One should understand Om with each of the pădos
'quarters'; no doubt, the pădos are the mētras 'measures"
1 lt 13 said in the onginal Up, 8 pada mātrā mitras ca pădah, wluch meana
that the quarters (pādast of atmen are to be regarded as identical with the
measutes (mãiros) of Om

·1, 25-27] ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 13 And having understood Om with each of the pādas one should not think of anything else.? ? For d ch BG, VI 25 atmasamatham manah kotoa na koñcd opr cintayet See BP, II 1 19 . 25 yuñjīta pranave cetah pranavo brahma nirbhayam pranave nityayuktasya na bhayam vidyate kvacit ) 'One should apply the mind to Om, for Om is Brahman in whom there is no fear. And nowhere is fear for him who is always fixed upon Om.' 1 That is, concentrate ? That is, whose mind is always fixed 26 pranavo hy aparam brahma pranavaś ca pararn smịtahi apūrvo 'nantaro 'bāhyo 'naparah pranavo 'vyayah ) "Omn is said to be the lower, as well as the higher Brahman Om 18 without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside" BU, IV 5 83 anantaro'bāhyab 27 sarvasya pranavo hy ādır madhyam antas tathaiva ca ! evam hi pranavam jñátvá vyaśnute tad anantaram Having 'Om is the beginning, middle, and end of all known Om in this way one attains it immediately. ? Onginal tod It seems to refer to Brahman in the preceding känka commentator takes it to refer to atmabhāva The

·14
IGAMAŠASTRA
(1.28-29
28
pranavam hīśvaram vidyāt sarvasyå hrdi samsthitam'?
sarvavyāpinam onkāram matvā dhiro na socati?
'One should know Om to be the Lord pyesent in the
heart of all. Having understood the all-pervadıng Om a wise
man does not grieve.'
1 BC, XII 17 hrdı sarvasya dhisthitam , KU, II 3 17. adá jananam
hidaye sannivistah
3 KU, I 2 22 ; Il 1.4,3 6
29
amalto 'nantamātras ca dvaitasyopaśamah svahi
onkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janah !!
iti gaudapādiya agamaśāstra agamākhyam
prathamam prakaranam samāpłam
'He and no other person is a sage (munu' who knows
Om which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure,
and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss'
'Here ends, in the gamašāstra of Gaudopada, Book
One, called Traditional Doctrine
11 22

·BOOK II vaitathyam sarvabhāvānām svapna āhur manīsiņah i antaḥsthānāt tu bhāvānām samvitatvena hetunā ti 'The wise say that all things in a dream are unreal, for they are within owing to the fact that they are enclosed.' See 11 4, IV 33 Things such as mountains, elephants, etc, which are seen in a dream are not outside but inside the body But as in reality they cannot exist within the body they must be regarded as unreal. Literally the kārıká means that owing to the fact that the things in a dream are enclosed ((samușta) they are inside (antaḥsthäna), and hence they are unreal (vitatha) But it will be evident from kārika IV 33 in which this very thought is expressed in almost identical words, that the state of being enclosed (samurtatva) is not with reference to things (bhūtas). but to the place (pradesa) This explanation of the author himself may rightly be accepted here and 'also in kātikā 11 4 See Il. 2 eineide the body is ex- 2 adırghatvāc ca kálasya galvă desãn ja paśyati ! pratibuddhraś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyale ! 'The time being not lonz one does not see the things ·16 AGANIASĀSTRA [II, 3 dreamt) by going to different) places ; and no person, on waking, is in the place (where he dreamt himself to be!' It cannot be held that in a dream one goes to different places and sees things in those places, for one may see things in a dream in a very distant land, but the time being short it is impossible to think that the dreamer travels to that distant land and sees the things there Moreover, it is found that a dreamer, on waking, does not see himself in the country where he dreamt himself to be. Thus it follows that the things seen in a dream do not exist in the external world. la cupport of this view the author refers in the next kārıkā tot e BU. IV 3.10 : 3 abhāvasca rathādinām śrüyate nyāyapūrvakam vaitathyam tena vai prăpłam svapna āhuh prakāśitam ! "The non-existence of chariots, etc (seen in a dream), with the reason therefor, is learnt from the śruti? Therefore, it is In this passage 1 Scc BU, IV 3 to which rung as followe. na fatra ratha na rathayogs na panthano bhavanty atha rathān rathayogān pathah stjate latra refers to scapra See also IV 313 svapnånta uccāvacam iyamāno rūpān, devah kutute bahūnı uleva strībhih saha modamano jaksad ulevāpbhayāns patyan As regards the nyāya 'reason' referred to bere, Purasottarna writes. svapnánta uccāvacamiyamāna - 11 mantrenānekaripakaranam uktsa tasman nāyatan bodhayed durbhisayat basmai bhavality anena suptasy. nubandhena sigarane kastam dha yady anyalra gato bhares latšaranam na vaded (>) durbhavsajyam ca yatra suptas tatrarva striya Syapne ramanah skhalite jigrat tām bahih pasyet yato na paśyatı tatah karoti yatah karo', tato rathadyabhāvāb CA svapne pūrvam rathadyabhāvah palcă! karanid ityadınyayapūrvakam evam ·11, 4] AGAMASÄSTRA 17 said that the unreality (of things seen) in a dream, as follows (from the foregoing arguments), is evident, In the next kārika the author proceeds to show the unreality of things in the waking state also applying the same reasons : v4 antahsthānāt tu bhedānām tathā jāgarite smrtam ! yathā tatra tathā svapne samvịtatvam na bhidyate' The same? is declared of the things in waking on account sense 1 The actual reading of d in all printed texts and MSS examined is somettatoena bhidyate which hardly gives any proper The commentary does not help us on this point. It explaing antabsthanat samvitatvena ca svapnadryanām bhāvānām jāgraddeyebhyo bhedah --'on account of being inside as well as of being covered the phenomena in a dream are different from those in waking. But this explanation is hardly possible, for one naturally expects here to know the non-difference (abheda) and not the difference between the things in waking and in dream Accordingly one might disjoin the sandhi Jägraddršyebhyo bhedah in the commentary taking the last word as abhedah and not bhedah, though Anandag in evidently accepts the latter Apart from the propriety of that explanation the question is How should onc construe the second half of the karka? What is įhe nominative of the verb bhidyate? According to the commentator it must be wapnadriya bhava, but it is not in the text, nor can it be understood or supplied from any of the preceding kärskās One may; however, take the line as samoſtatve na bhidyate in this case the nominative is vartathya 'unreality' which is to be supplied from the preceding kārkā The author wants here to show the unreality of the phenomena in the waking state just like that of those in a dream on the same ground, re, antahsthāna which is due to samurlatus of the place Thus it 19 said that the valtathya of the things in wakıng does not differ from that of the things in a dream, for in both the cases samostatve is the same, there being no difference whatsoever. That 19, waitathyam already descnbed in the preceding ksrika 3 The words bhata IV 331, bhāva il 13, 16, 17, 19, 33. III 20, 221, and bheda (II 4,5, 11, 121 are the same as regards the meaning 1201B-3 ·18 ĀGAMASASTRA [I], 5 *4 of the fact that they are inside : for, as there (ie, in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ See Il 1, IV. 33. I should, however, like to suggest the reading as samurtatoam na bhidyale which makes the sense very clear, As to how the state of being enclosed (samostatva) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following kärıkā. (1l 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, IN 29, 30; IV. 61, 62, 64-66), where it is fully explained, as the Vijnanavädins would say, that there being no external thing in reality, whatever we see around us either in waking or in dream is only, nagined (kalpita) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (samurta) Says Dinnäga in his Älambanapariksā, 6, yad antar jãeyarūpam tad bahirvad avabhāsate Purusottama writes here: jägarsta itr, bahir anubhavat katham antalisthatvam ity akaaksāyām svapnatulyavād iti vaktum svapnasyaitattaulyam āha yathi tatret yathā jāgante manodhyato 'rthab sarirasamvitatvena bāhyebhyo bhidyata iti sarirautalisthatvam tathā svapne 'pi pūrvan uktam, tattulyatvāt tathety arthah The commentary rewds in explaining the kauskā Jigraddriyānim bhāvānām vastathyam it pratijna drsyatsad it hetoh. svapnadráyabhāvavad it, drştāntah yatha tatra sapne drsyānam bhavanam vastathyam tatha jagarite 'pi driyatvam avulistam 11. hetöpanayah ta maj Jāgarite'p vaitathy am smrtam itu tigaranam Now the author goes to show further in the next kārika that there is no difference between the two states, waking and dream , in fact they are one : atas 5 svapnajāgarite sthāne Ily ekan ahur mansirab. bhedānām ho samatvena prasiddhenaiva hetuna | The wise say that the two states, dieam and waking, are ·saprayojanåtā tesārn svapne 'pi pratipadyate': 11, 67] ÄGAMAŠĀSTRA 19 one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states), for the reason that has been well established.' The first half of the kārkā refers to BU, IV 3 14 : atho khalv āhur jāgaritadeśa evāsyaisa iti yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti Here esah refers to suapna, as says Sankara esah svapnah. For svapnajāgante sthäne cf. BU, IV.3.9: dve eva sthāne bhavatah 'The reason that has been well established' (prasiddhenava helunā) refers to antahsthana already explained (II I, 4). Though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal How it may be so the author proceeds to say in the following kārkās. 6 ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tatha vitathaiḥ sadęśāḥ santo'vitathā iva laksitāh See IV. 31. "That which is non-existent at the beginning, and at the is so also at the present tie, in the middle); being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal', For a full discussion see IV 31, which is identical with the present kārikā---- That is, being like tarage, etc, which are acknowledged to be unreal by all 7 end. tasmād ādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smitāḥ 1 The reading of b generally found in editions and MISS cxamined is stopne tipradipedyate ; but as the sense requires it should be serupne po prette ·20 ÄGAMAŠASTRA (11.8 'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known Hence owing to their having a beginning and an end, indeed, they are regarded as unreal For particulars seo IV. 32 which is a repetition of the present kārıkā padyate which is actually found in a 11S, D' in IV 32 which is identical with the present künka Here too, MS Vn reads stopne co prati" It 19 supported also by MS Ch 1) of the Comm in Anandasrama ed which has stapne pretiº for avopne vrproti 8 apūrvāḥ sthānidharmā hı yathā svarganivasinām! tān ayam preksate gatvã yathaiveha suśikṣitah || '(The phenomena of dream) are strange, bke (the characteristics) of the inhabitants of the heaven; they are the charac teristics of the person in the place (of dream, 1 e., the dreamer himself) Just like one who is well trained here, he goes and sees them in dream)' I confess this kārika is not quite clear to me I simply write what I have been able to gather from it in the light of the commentator It is to be noted that in al suggest the reading apurvāh sthanidharmah for apūrvam sthanidharmah, so that the former can be connected with tan in c For other readings see the commentary and the Appendix The hāskā seems to say as follows The phenomena of dream, on the analogy of which the objects of the waking experience are held to be unreal, are sometimes strange, as the characteristics of same gods, such as the thousand eyes of Indra, and this is the nature of the dreamer (sthanın 'one in the place' of dream) himself And just as a man who is ·21 II, 9-10] ĀGAMASASTRA well trained goes to a place and sees there strange things, so he sees strange things in a dream, The next two kārikás seek to establish the unreality of dream and waking experience alike. 9 svapnavịttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat i bahis cetogrhitam sad drstam vaitathyam etayoh I jo 'Even in the state of dream that which is imagined by mind within is (regarded as) non-existing lasat), while that which is cognized by mind without is (regarded as) existing (sat). (but) the unreality of (both of them is a matter of experience 10 jāgradvrttāv api tv antaś cetasä kalpitam tv asat i bahis cetogļhitam sad yuktam vaitathyam etayoh : 'In the waking state also, that which is imagined by mind within is regarded as non-existing-(asal), while that which 19 cognized by mind without is regarded as existing, (sat), the unreality of (both them is reasonable Cf these two kârıkās with IV 63-66 The opponent here says that it cannot be said that every. thing in the wahing expenence and dream is unreal, for there must be at least one thing real without which we cannot so on.

·22 AGAMAŠASTRA [II, 11-12 ubhayor api vaitathyam bhedănām sthānayor yadi i ka etān budhyate bhedan ko vai teşām vikalpakah 11 'If in both the states the different things are unreal, well, then who is it that cognizes these things? Who is it that imagines them The answer is given in the following kārika : 12 kalpayaty almanātmānam ātmā devah syamāyayā ! sa eva budhyate bhedān iti vedāntaniscayah " 'It is the self, the shining one, that imagines the self by the self through its own illusion (māyā), and verily it is that (self) which cognizes the things This is the conclusion of the Vedānta' For such use of the word alman in the sense of self see BG, 11, 55, V. 17; VI 5.6 The word dcva.here and in similar cases (I 1; II. 19, 21) does not mean a 'god. Its literal sense is a shining one' and it is used to denote anything that shines in any way, or that which has some sort of glory or power For instance, in Upanisadic texts see PU, II 1, 2 (where the following are called devas kāba, vāyu, ogni, prthvi, vāc, manas, cakşus and śrotra), 5 (vāyu); 8 (prāna), IV 1, 2, 5, 6 (manas), 11 (agni, etc.), BU, IV.3 13(Sankara devo dyotamānah) Purusottama would take the word in the sense of a playing one'. atra deva itt kridāparatvam uktam teneyam kalpanā krislāpareti phalati. It may be noted incidentally that the words prabhu (1 8, 10, 13) and vibhu (1,1, 10) in such cases are not to be ·II, 13] AGANASASTRA 23 connected with the sense of 'goal', they simply mean "powerful'. See BG, V. 14, 15. See also our text ll. 19; SU, IV. 9 In what manner the Štman imagines so is shown in the next kārıkā : 13 vikaroty aparın bhāvān antaś citte 'vyavasthitän 1 niyatāmí ca bahis citta evam kalpayate prabhuha' . 'It brings about ssing things in the mind within, which are not fixed, also some other things in the mind without which are fixed. Thus brings about the powerful one vikaroti 'brings about' (lit 'males variously. Com nána karoti)=kalpayatı (1112) or kalpayate (II, 13. 16, see 14, 30, 33 : 1. 18. U. 9). There are two kinds of things, things in dream, and those in wakefulness, and both of them are imagined in mind The only difference between them is that the former are imagined inside and are not fired vanishing at once, while the latter are imagined outside and are fixed, for they serve our practical purposes. The next kānkā seeks to show that in fact there is no difference between them: In the commentator with a number of editons und VS3 jeada vyavasthitin for ecydewathin which clearly supported by Purusontom. The sense of the triks demands in the first hall 'em appcer lo nipate in the recond hall. end eystkili senyatsland nor everestbile In the phrase bahrhultz tym line and do the commentator roles the first But il must be bakhstte Parasaltame clearly CF antokitte in b word as taheseitiat teads the latter ·24 AGAMASASTRA (11, 14 14 cittakālas ca ye 'ntas tu dvayakālās ca ye bahihi kalpitā eva te sarve višeşo nānyahetukah - “Those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (cittu), and those which are without and exist as long as remains (the notion of the two (te, grahya 'perceptible' and grāhaka 'percipient'), are all merely imagined And (in this respect) there is no difference on any other ground For duaya see III, 29, 30; IV 4, 24, 61, 62, 72, 75, 87. Thate in such cases duaya 'twofold' means grāhya and grāhaka, 'perceptible' and 'percipient' respectively, is quite clear from the words of the author himself (JV 726) : grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam It is also well known throughout the Buddhist literature, for instance, MS, XIV. 28 (p 94) dvayagrahavisamyuktam lokottaram anuttaram nirvikalpam malāpetam jñānam sa labhate punah dvayagrāhavisamyuktam grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhavisamyogāt Op cit. XI 32 (p 63) svadhātuto dvayābhāsāh sàvidyākleśavrttayah: vikalpāh sampravártante dvayadravyavivarjitah | dvayābhāsā its grāhyagrahakābhāsāh dvayadravyavivarjitā Iti grāhyadravyena grāhakadravyena ca See also the following quoted from the Āryadrdha- Soyoporiprccha in MV, p 463 : na hı kulaputra dvayaprabhävită tathāgatadharmată tatra ye dvaye caranti na te samyal prayuktā mithyaprayuktās te vaktayyah katamac ca kulaputra dvayam, prahāsyāmiti dvayam etat aham dvesam prahasyārnili dvayam etat. aham moham prahāsyāmiti dvayam etat aham ragam ·AGAMAŠĀSTRA 25 II: 14-15] TS, 3,538 : prakſtyā bhāsvare citte dvayākārākalankite i dvayākārāvimūdhātmā kah kuryad anyathāmatih (tim) dvayākārāvimūdhātmeti prahinagrāhyagrāhakābhıniveśaḥ -Panyika. Though both of the experiences, ie, the experiences in dream and waking, are mere imaginations, and as such are not different, yet there is some difference between them with regard to the means of their cognition This is shown in the next kārika : 15 avyaktā eva ye 'antas tu sphută eva ca ye bahihi kalpită eva te sarve višesas tv indrıyāntare | 'Those which are unmanifest within and those which are manifest without are all imagined indeed, but there is some difference owing to the difference of the organs of sense (with which they are cognized) The experiences of dream being related only to the mind (manomātrasambandhat) are unmanifest (avyakta= asphula), while those of waking being related to external senses, such as eyes, etc. (caksuradıbhır indryasambandhāt) are manifest (sphuta) Hence it is to be admitted that there is some difference between them But this difference is not due to any reality (astıtvakrta) of external things, for the phenomena of dream, too, appear for the time being to be as real as those of waking Therefore this difference lies in the fact that while the things within are cognized by mind those without are cognized by external The following line of Anandagini is to be noted here specially. ye manasy antarbhāvanārūpatvād asphuſā ye ca manaso bahı upalabhya. mināḥ sphuja bhavantı te sarve manahspandanamărratvena senses 1201B - 4 ·26 AGAMAŠASTRA [U. 15-16 kalpitah. Mark here manaḥspandana and compare the views of the Vijäănavādins which will be more and more evident as we proceed Sec IV. 72 The creation of internal and external things are effected thus: 16 jivam kalpayate pūrvam tato bhāvān phagvidhän ! hahyān adhyātmikāmś caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmetih First one' imagines a personal soul (jival', and then various things,' external and internal. As one knows so une recollects Mark that it is a personal soul (ca) that is first imagined, and then the other things And it is so, because the imagination of the latter depends entirely on that of the former Says the commentator (Il 17) sivakalpanā sarvakalpončrūlom the imagination of jīva is the root of other imaginations This imagination of a personal soul is what is called salkāyadrer' or svakāyadrsti (MK XXIII 5). Palı sakkâyoditih, 'theory of individualıty' in Budshism It is generally knowr as ātmadrsti, Pali attadotthi, or atmavida. Pali aftavāda This satkâyadrste is fourfold thinking that (1) rūpa (so also vedani. samiria, 1 It refers to atmen self.: 11 12. 13 atman, saltva, Jiva, jantu purusa pudzala, etc are synonyms, V, $207, Abh.dhanap adipka, 93, 55, pp 172, 236, NS, Commentary 1 12 Suclı as prūna 'breath,' ctc, See II 19 28 *M1S, XI 5 (p 531 tatra grāhakabhūtam ksyādıl am adhyatmikam grähya bhūtam bāhyam See alsa Vacaspal s ra on the Sankhyakankā, 1 See ZDMG, Vol 64, pp 581 ff, AK, V 7 The Board Concepnon of Buddhism, pp 776 ·taträsydha', parisan for 'tysyan and tu for sein Liriks 1. 2. und 2' respec. II. 161 AGAMAŠĀSTRA 27 samskāra and vijñāna) is ātman, (ul) átman has rūpa, (ii) rūpa is in ātman, and (iv) ātman is in rūpa a This satkāyadrst is the source of all sorts of miseries in the world and consequently their cessation is effected only by giving it up (MK, XVIII, 2; MV. pp 346,361; SS, p. 247) As to how the imagination of all other things is dependent on the satkāyadrsti the following may be quoted from the BAP, pp 491-92 : tathā hy ātinānam paśyatah samskiteşu skandhadhāty āyataneşv ahım iti didhataram utpadyate snehah tatas taddubkhapratikārecchayā sukhābhilāşi dosān pracchädya tadarthitayā guņādhyáropāt tatsādhaneşu pravartate svopakāriņi vayam iti buddhir upajāyate aham mameti ca darsanat paripanthini vidvesah tataḥ samastaduḥkhanidanam sarva eva klesopaklesă labdhaprasárāh pravartante atmamohapravartito duhkhahetur ahankāro bhavati tad uktam ācāryapādaih : yah paśyaty ātmānam tatrāsyaham iti śāśvatasnehah, snehāt sukhesu trsyati trenā dosāms tiraskurute ! gunadarsī paritsyan mameti tatsādhanāny upadatte tenatmabhiniveso yavat tavat sa samsárah 1 ätmani sati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgat parigrahadvesau 1 anayoh sampratıbaddhāh sarve dovih prajāyante r' $ To mention only a few see Den, pp 182-183, $1003, AJN, I, 300, SN, III 16 # 42, 44, 46, 56, 102, ete AIVI. $ 208 rüpan Ilmā svimrvat, rūpavān Atmi alarkāravat, stmiyam Opam bhttyavat, ripe Etme bhi panavat The following may be quoted here which refutes the above view rupan pätmi rūpavin harva câtm3 tupe nātmā tūpam Etrany asac cat This is quoted in SS. P 20, MIV. P 355. BAP reade tasydbaha' for I These stanzas are from PV, 11217-19 tively The last verse is quoted in AAA, p. 67, MX, p. 29 C. the ·28 ĀGAMASASIRA [ll. 16-17 yathāvidyas tathāsmilih 'as one knows so one recollects' implies here that one's imagination of different things follows the recollection of one's experience of the Kapilas (Sankhyasi quoted here See Aniruddha's l'rit on the SaS, V 79. JA, 1962, Sept.Oct, p 291, AK, IX 230 sābankāre manay na samam yatı janmaprabandho nähankāras calatı hrdayād almadrstau tu satyām 1 anyah Sasti jagati ca yato nāsta parātmyavādı nanya: tasmad upasam uvidhes tvanmatad astı mārgah 1 See also the Basic Conception of Buddhism, p 72 17 aniścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpita i sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpıtah 'As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water,' etc , so is imagined the soul (ātmanjiva) "? 1 See note 2 2 In the commentary on sloka 93 of his Aladhyamakalankara which is now available only in its Tibetan version, Tanjurl Mido, sa- XXVIII, 52' I-81' 7. Cordier Nip 37, Santiraksita quotes some kärkás from Books ] and Ill of our work The following is the Tibetan Yersion of the present kárka ji Itar mun khun ma stogs te thag pa sbrul gyi igyun la sogs! dnos por rnam par brtaga pa ltart de tzin bdag kyan sam par brtags : In a Tib has andhakirabile imun khual for andhakāre and in b it takes surpadhara as sarpasya dhora ishrul gyi igsun), and not as sarpa 'snake and dhänt 'continuous line ·29 II. 18-19) AGAMAŠĀSTRA 18 niścitāyām yathā rajjvām vikalpo vinivartate 1 rajjur eveti câdvaitam tadvad ätmaviniscayah 'As the rope being determinately known the thing ima gined vanishes and there is non-duality-it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of atman According to Tib' the reading rayur evett in c is rajur ekaiva (thag. pa gaig ñid), and it appears to be better ind Tib. literally reads ātmāpi niścrtaḥ (bdag kyai nes pa yin) for atmaviniscayah 1 It runs thus 1 ltar thag pa Des toge na! mam par rtog pa Idog hgyur tel thag pa gcig änd gois min pal de Itar bdag kyan nes pa yin 1 19 prāņādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitah māyaisā tasya devasya yayāyam mohitah svayam a' "It (Atman) is imagined as Präna 'breathi or 'life and other innumerable things This is an illusion of it, the shining one' by which it itself is deluded." 1 Sce II. 12 1 See 11 20 Ef 3 Sec BU, IV 4 15 yadastam anupasaynty itmānam devam ad pasa 4 The following is the Tib version brog la sogo pa mtha) yas pahit dnos po de dag mam par bratagal gab g. de bdag bid roos 1 de ni tha dchi gyu ma yın 1 In c the actual reading is dag for bdag and ind there u rsye for any la c there are only air syllables instead of seven One may, however, add bere po after mons ·30 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (11. 19-20 It is said that Ātman is imagined as Prāna and such other things. But what these things are is sta'ed in the following kārikās (20 28) : 20 . prānā iti prānavido bhūtāniti ca tadvidaḥ i guņā iti gunavidas tattvānití ca tadyidah n' 'Those who know prāna 'breath' or 'life (imagine) it as prāna, those who know bhūtas 'elements as bhūtas , those who know guņas 'ingredients' as gunas, and those who know tattvas 'categories,' as tattvas' The knowers of prána are some followers of Upanisads, their view is found in the following • MnU, III 4. prāno hy esa yah sarvabhūtair vibhāti; PU ll. 4: prane sarvam pratisthitam: Chu, 1 11 4-5; BU, NV 4 18; BS, 11, 13 Anandagiri says that they are the votaries of Hiranyagarbha, etc, Vaiseşakas and others The bhulas'elements' are five, viz. earth, water, fire air and sky (or ether) According to Madhyamikas and the Sautrāntikas there are only four elements excluding the sky (CS, IX 3. 5) The Vaibhāsikas, 'however, admit it as bhula (AK, 1.8) Anandagiri says that the view referred to here is held by the Lokāyatıkas who maintain that the first four clements are the origin of the world 1 The following is the Tib version srog du ng pas stog ces brood Abyun po sun zes de zag mar:) yon tan ng mams yon lan soam! yan dag 310 zes de nag mams Tib yon, dag 13 generally used for Skt bamyak and sometimes for bhia, and paramitha, but it is only here ind, so far as I kavt nouced that it is employed for tettre ·32 AGANIASĀSTRA [II. 21-22 Visvabharati, 1933, p. 2 The following is quoted from the last mentioned work: svādhıdaivatayogātmā jagadarthakrtodyamahi bhunjino visayān bhogi mucyate na ca lipyate : 17 yathaiva viçataltvajšo visam àlokya bhakayan: kevalam mucyate năsau rogainuktaś ca jāyate Il The lokavids are, according to A, the followers of the Purānas holding that there are three lokas 'worlds,' viz , bhu 'earth', bhuvas (bhuvar) 'atmosphere,' and svar 'heaven' The devaurds are, as says Ā, the followers of the Deuctakanda, i e., that part of the Veda (c). Nighanļu or Nurukta, VII) which deals with devatäs 'deites' They hold that karmophola *consequence of action' is given by Devatas, Agi, India and others, and not by God 22 vedá iti vedavido yajñā iti ca tadvidah i bhokteti ca bhoktrvido bhojyam iti ca tadvidah n 'The knowers of the Vedas (imagine it) as the Vedas, the knowers of yažñas sacrifices' as yaiñas, the knowers of the bhokti 'enjoyer' as bhokt, and those who know bhoya enjoyable' ze bhoya.' According to A yajñavids are Ba udhāy a na and others. The bhokirvids are the Sankhyas who maintain that alman is only enjoyer (bhoktr) and not also doer (karte) Or sec BC, V. 29. bhoktāram yanatapasām, IX. 24. bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca, XIII 22 bhartă bhoktă maheśvarah See also our text, 1.9 In accordance with the same authority bhojyavids are the cooks (sūpakāros), for in their opinion food (bhojyam vastu) is the principle Cf TU, IN 2-1 annam brahmeti vyajānit, CHU, 1 3 6: anne hidam sarvam sthitam.

·II 23-24) AGAMAŠĀSTRA 33 23 sükşma iti sūksmayidah sthūla iti ca tadvidaḥ 1 mūrta iti mûrtavido 'murta iti ca tadvidah 1 'Those who know what sūksma 'a subtle thing' is (imagine it as sūksma, those who know what sthūla 'a gross thing is as sthūla, those who know what mūrta 'an embodied thing' is as mūrta, and those who know what amurta 'non-embodied' is as amūrta' Suksmaurds are those who hold that the dimension of ātman is like that of an atom (anu). Accordingly they would refer to all the Vaisnava teachers, such as Ramanuja, Nimburka, Madhva, and Vallabha For the discussion see BS, II. 3 19.32 See also MuU. IL 1. sūksmāc ca tat sūksma taram vibhāti, 9. eşo 'nur âtmā cetasä veditayyah, MU, 11 5 sa vā esa sūksmo 'grāhyah. Sthūlavids refer to a class of Lokāyatıkas holding that the gross body is ātman -A. Märtavids are Āgamikas, followers of Ăgarnas (Sawas and Vaisygods), mũrtas trisaladdhari makeºvaras cakraddhāri vã paramārtho bhavatı -Ā The following passage (BU. 11 3 1) may here be cited, dve vāva brahmano sūpe mūstam caivāmürtam ca A says Amūrtavids are Sūnyavādins But see the passage quoted above from the BU 24 kāla it kālavido diſa iti ca tadyidah vádă sti vādavido bhuvanāniti tadvidah! *Those who know kāla 'time' (imagine it) as kala, those who know dis-es directions' or 'quarters' as dif-es, those who know 12010.-5 ·34 AGAMASASTRA III. 24-25 vādas discussions' as vādas, and those who know bhuvanas 'worlds' as bhuvanas.' Kalauids are astronomers Kala is the cause of all existence. See AV, XIX 53, 54, 50, 1, 2, VI. 1 ; SS with Gunaratna, pp 10%. The knowers of dió-cs, as says Ā, are starodayavids, ic, those who know good or bad omens by voices of birds, etc, holding that the dis-es are the highest reality Vādavids are, according to the same authority, those who hold dhātuvāda 'alchemy', mantravāda "formulas of sacred texts,' or 'the science of magic,' and so on. Here vada may, however, refer to discussion' as in NS, I, 1.1.2 1. The knowers of bhuvanas are those who know the system of the worlds (bhuvanakośa) and say that there are in all fourteen of them. See V.P. XXXIII-LX (Bhuvangcinyāsa and yotispracara). . 25 mana iti manovido buddhir iti ca tadvıdah / cittam iti Cittavido dharmādharmau ca tadvidah 'Those who know manas 'mind' imagine it) as manas, those who know buddhi 'intellect as buddhi, those who know citta 'thought' or 'consciousness' as citta, and those who know dharma duty and adharma 'non-duty' as dharma and adharma' Ā says that a particular section of the Lokāyatıkas who opine that manas is the self (atmanl is referred to by the word manovrd, and the knowers of buddh are Buddhists who maintain that the intellect is the self (atman) The knowers of citta are evidently Yogācāras or Viñānavādıns The knowers of dharma and adharma are the Mlimimsists ·31. 26) AGAMAŠĀSTRA 35 26 pancavimsaka ity eke şadvimſa iti căpare 1 ekatrimſaka ity āhur ananta iti căpare il "Some say it to be consisting of twenty-five, some consisting of twenty sıx, some consisting of thuty-one, while others to be endless in number.' Here pańcavimsaka refers to the opinion of the Sankhyas, according to whom there are twenty-five tattvas 'principles.' viz, 1. prakrti, 2. mahat, 3. ahankāra. 4-8 five tanmālras, 9 munas, 10-14. five jñānendriyas, 15-19 five karmendryas, 20.24, five mahābhūtas, and 25 puruşa By şadrumsa we are to understand the view of Patañjalas or the followers of the Yoga system Their tativas are the same as those of the Sankhyas enumerated above plus Iśvara, the twenty-sixth The word ekatrimsaka refers to the view held by the Pasupatas. There are, in fact, thirty-sıx tattvas, viz, 1 śrva, 2 sakti. 3 sadüfica, 4 isvara, 5. vidya', 6 purusa, 7. māyā, 8 kāla. 9 niyati, 10. kala. Il avidya*, 12 raga", 13.prakrit or avyakta, 14. mahat. 15 ahankāra, 16. manas, 17-21 five jñānendryas, 22-26 five karmendnyas, 27-31 five tanmatras, and 32-36 five bhūtas. As Nos, 8.12 are merely the manifestations (vibhutis) of miya, as said by the commentator of the MM, p. 50. one may 1 Nax. 1-5 constitute the tattoa called patt 2 This is according to Ali, p. 59; but TP, IN, 8 clearly reads uidya and the commentator explains it as aštddharidya, 3 Nas 6-12 constatute the tatter known as paša # Nos 13-36 are included in the tatta namned pása 1325, TP. II 5-11, 11! 4. 12. See M11, serses

·36
ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA
(11. 26-28
exclued these five, thus making the number thirty-one as
required in our text.
There is one point to be noted here. According to
TP, IV. 2, between goyakta and buddhi or mahat there
is an additional tattua called guna, but in MM it is not
mentioned
27
lokällokavidah prähur äśramā iti tadvidah I
s.ripumnapumsakam laingāh paraparam athāpare !!
'Those who know lokas 'people (imagine it) as lokus, those
who know aśramas 'stages of religious life' as āśramas, those
who know lugas 'sexes' as a inale, a female, or a eunuch.
while others as para 'higher' and apara 'lower
The lokavids or laukikas are those who hold that
the pleasing of people (lokunuranana) is the real thing --A
See II. 21
The aśramavids are, assays Ā, Daksa and others Probably
they are the writers on religious laws (dharmaśāstrakāras)
Laingas are grammarans, as says Ā
Here parapara refers to those who say that two Brahmans are
to be known, the higher and the lower MU, VI 1. dve
brahmani vedstavye patam caivāparam ca-,
28
srsiu iti srstivido laya iti ca tadvidah (
sthitir iti sthitivıdah sarvam ceha tu sarvadá

·II. 28-30)
AGAMAŠASTRA
37
'Those who know srsti creation' (imagine it) as srsti,' those
who know laya 'destruction' as laya, and those who know
sthiti 'continued existence as sthiti? All (these imaginations)
are always here."
1 See 1. 7.
2 The knowers of sri, laya and sthiti are, according to A, the Paurānikas
'knowers of Purānas
3 It" (tha) refers to Alman
29
yam bhāvam darśayed yasya tam bhāvam sa tu paśyatı 1
tam cāvati sa bhūtvāsau tadgrahah samupaiti tam )
'Whatever thing is presented to him, he sees it; that (älman)
becomes it (r.c, the thing presented), and satisfies him. And
the strong attachment to st 1, e., to the idea that herein lies the
truth) takes possession of him
30
elair eso 'pıthagbhāvaih pethag eveti (aksitaḥ
evam yo veda tattvena kalpayet so višankilahı
'Verily it (ātman) is considered different through these things
that are not different from it One who knows it in fact may
imagine without any hesitation.'
When one sees a piece of rope as a snake, in fact, there is
no difference between these two things, for the snake is nothing
but the piece of rope which simply appears as a snake. Thus
there is only the piece of rope and not the snake which is merely
imposed thereon. In the same way there is only ātman, all
things other than that being mere inagined.

·38 ĀGAMASĀSTRA (11.30-31 The imagination referred to in d of the kārika is with reference to the practical view of the things There is no harm to the man in doing so when he know's the truth 31 svapnamāye yathā dựste gandharyanagaram yathā i tathā viśvam idam dỊstam vedantesu vicakşanaiḥ “As dream and illusion are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who arc wellversed in the Vedantas' the word gandharvanagara 'an' imaginary town in the sky' is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works The thought, too, of the kärıkā has often found expression in them For instance, SR, IX (p 29) yathaiya gandharvapuram marıcıkā, yathan a màyä supinam yathaivai svabhāvasūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā tathopamān jānatha sarvadharman # See MV, p 178 ; AIK, XVII 33 gandharvanagarākārā maricisvapnasannsbhah , LA, X 144 (p 287). gandharvanagarasvapnamāyānırıānasādréih Op cit 875 (p. 374) māyāsvapnanıbhā bhāvā gandharvanagaropamāhi maricyudakacandrābhih svavkalpam vibhivayet v 1 7,ssendar writes to his Popular Scientif Recreations The mirage or Fata Morgana is a very cunous but sufficiently common phenomenon and in the Asiatic and African plains at 19 frequently observed • The Fata Morgana and the onverted images of ships at sea are not uncommon on European coasts Between Sicily and Italy, this effect is seen in the Sea of Riggio with fine effect Palaces, towers, fertile plaint with cattle grazing on them are seen with many other tertefral objects upon the Sea - The Palaces of Fatry Aforgand, p. 649 $ ·II 31 32] AGAMASASIRA 39 See also 279 291 (pp 301 303) In showing the Buddhist view Śanka i a quotes the follow ing in his commentary on BS II 2 28 svapnamayamanıcyudakagandharvanagaradıpratyaya vinaiva bahyenarthena grahyagrahahahara bhavantı The author says in the karıha that this view is of the Vedantins Ś ankara follows it but Ramanuja with others is of the opposite opinion saying (BS II 1) jagad api pararnarthikam eva jnayate The following two karikas show the conclusion 32 no one in 7 na nirodho na cotpattır na baddho na ca sadhakah 1 na mumuksur na vai mukta ity esa paramarthata || There is no disappearance nor origination bondage 'no one who works for success no one who is desirous of emancipation no one who is emancipated --Thus is the highest truth This is what is the essence of Mahayana Buddhism For the wording of na nurodho na cotpattıh cf the opening karika of Nagarjuna s MK p 3 anirodham anutpadam See also BA IX 150 evam ca na nirodho sti na ca bhavo sti sarvada 1 ajatam aniruddham ca tasmat sarvam darp jagat II LA'p 191 aniruddha anutpannas ca bhagavata dharma desyante See also LA IDI X 1 utpadabhangarahıto lokah khapuspasannıbhah 1 Sarva 1 Lit suppress on ·40 ĀGAMASASTRA For bandha and moksa compare the following: CŚ, 179. kasyacit kenacit särdham bandho náma na vidyate parena saha bandhasya viprayogo na yujyate !! LA. 796 nātra kaścin mahămate badhyate na ca mucyate, Op. cit. X. 275. na mokeo na ca bandhanam See also the Āryaratnakūta quoted in MV. pp. 49, 339 and the Chapter called Bandhanamoksapariksā of MK with MV, XVI from which we quote the following (5) atrina. yady apı tvayā samsāranirvāne pratis dohe tathāpr bandhamoksau vidyete na cāvidyamānasya bhāvasvabhāvasya bandhamoksau sambhavatah tasmad bandhamoksasadbhāvad vidyata eva bhāvanām svabhāva iti ucyate syâd bhāvānām svabhavo yadı bandhamoksāv eva syātām na tu sta ity ahana badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharminah ! Āryaratnakūta in MV, p 49 athāyusmān subhūtis tān bhiksūn etad avacat kutrāyusmanto gatah kuto vāgatah te 'vocan na kvacıd gamanāya na kutascid agamanāya bhadanta subhūte bhagavatā dharmo destah. aha ko nămāyusmatām sāsta. ahuh yo notpanno na parinitvāsyatı aha. katham yusmābbir dharmah (rutah āhuh. na bandhanāya na mokşaya Cf Sankhyakārskā, 62 tasmān na badhyate nápi mucyate năpr samearati kascit ? samsaratı badhyate mucyate ca nānāśayā prakītzh 11 We read in the MSA, VI 2 (p 22). na san na cisar da tatha na cānyatha na jāyate vyeti na cāvahiyatel na vardhate nāpi višudhyate punar viſudhyate tat paramārthalaksanam 1 ·II. 32-34] AGAMASASTRA The present känkā is widely quoted in minor Upanişads and other religious and philosophical works of the country sometines with slight variations For instance, see Avadhutopanisad, 8, Atmopanişad, 31, Tripurātā panyupanisad. V 10. Brahmabindupanişad, 10. The reason for what is said above is advanced in the following kărika 33 bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitah 1 bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā u 'It is (ātman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-dual, and the things (themselves), too. are imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-duality is blissful The word advaya 'non-dual' means 'one free from both the perceiver and perceptible (grāhyagrāhakarahta)' The inagination of ātman as different things, such as prāna, etc, which have no existence, is through the advaya For the imagination mainly depends on it, just like the imagination of a snake on a piece of rope, no imagination of a snake is possible, if there is no rope. Similarly things are imagined through the advaya, atman It is the advaya through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of atman as different things, and the imagination of the things themselves Thus advayala 'the state of non-duality' being real is blissful. 34 nányabhávena nānedam na svenāpi kathancana | na pithan nāpıthak kiñcid itt tattvavido viduh a 'It (the world) is not manifold either through its own nature 12111-6 ·42 AGANIASASTRA (11.34-35 or through that of another; there is not either the different or the non-diffcrent--the knowers of truth know this Here in the beginning of a l should like to propose to read nänyabhāvana, as I have done, for nätmabhāvena accepted by all, though the former is not supported by any edition or NIS known to nie My reason is this. The words ātmabhāvena (a) and svena (b) are in fact, one and the same in sense, they do not convey any difference in their meanings which is evidently required here I am afraid, Ś's explanation' can hardly be accepted being unwarranted and far-fetched, as it seems to me Here älmabhāvena appears to be inexplicable. kaving modified the reading as above, I think the words anyathava and sua are actually the same as parabhāca 'nature of other and scabhava 'nature of one's own' respectively, as thoroughly attacked, discussed, and finally refuted in MK and MV, XV (svabhāvapariksā), pp 259 ff. CI Nāgārjuna's pratilyasamutpada which is ( XV, p 3) anekārtham anānārtham. Candrakirti comments. ekaś cāsāv arthas caikārtha 'bhin närthah. na prthag ity arthah, nânărtho bhinnārthah. prtha; its arthah See MK, X 16 ātmanaś ca satattvam ye bhāvānām ca prthak prthak 1 nirdisanti na tan manye asanasy arthalovidān11 See our text IV 91 with notes Itmabhāvena paramirthassarūpera, sena prānād; amani 35 vitarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapäragaih 1 nirvikalpo hy ayam destaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayah ! *This cessation of the expansion of the universe, devoid of duality and imagination, is seen by the sages who have reached ·11.35) ĀGAMASASTRA P the other shore of the locean of the) Vedas and are free from attachment, fear and anger.' The word prapanicopaśama is nowhere found in the pre- Buddhist Brahmanic works It is met with only in later and uninor Upanişads (NPU, 4 I; NUL, I; RUU, 2; for prapanca see SU, 66; KIU, 17), including the Māu, the existence of which before $ is doubtful The word prapanca of praparicopašama is from pra-v pac or V pañc 'to spread out, make clear, or evident. With this is connected "pajpañj from which paſjikā 'a commentary. Rājasekhara writes in his Kauyarnīmāmsā, GOS, 1916, 5 visamapadabhanjikā pañjikā; and we read in Hemacandra's Abhidhānacintamani, 168, 170 niruktom padabhañanam, pañuka padabhanjikā. From this it appears that pañıkā is from a bhanykā (from v bhan; cf. vibhanga from this root in the sense of thorough explanation' used in Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali works) But philologically it can hardly be supported, Let it be as it may, the meaning of prapanca used frequently in subsequent Vedantic works is, according to that system, 'expansion of the universe' or the 'visible world' (prapanicyata iti prapaicah, But in accordance with the Buddhists it means 'verbal designation,' 'expression,' 'word' (prapancyate 'ncna or prapañcayatitt prapancah) Thus anythug that is expressed by a word or the word itself is prapalca according to the Buddhists. (See The Conception of Buddhist Norvāna, pp 48. 91 156, 209.) Candrakitti writes in his A1V. p 373 prapanco hi văk prapancayaty arthānit krvā prapancair aprapañcıtaſ (MK, XVIII. 9) vāgbhu avyākıtam ity aythah These words (vāc) are naturally various as said in the same work, p. 350. See the passage quoted in our text, I, 17. prapañcopaśama which is the same as prapańcoparama (MIV, p 11) and prapancavilaya (discussed by $ in his commentary on BS, HI 2 21) is moksa of the Vedāntists belonging to the school of Gauda pada followed by Ś and nirvana of the ·р tan sa eva 44 AGAMASASTRA [II. 35 Madhyamikas, and the object in view of Nagarjuna in writing his MK as said in MV, p. 4. sarvaprapancopasanasıvalaksanam nirvānaſ sāstrasya prayojanam nit distam He himself says (NIV, p 11): anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aſāsvatam anekártham anánārtham anāgamam anirgamam yah pratityasamutpādam prapancopaśamam šivam deśayāmāsa sambuddhas tam vande vadatām varam u For a fuller explanation of prapancopaſama (and sxva. MãU, 7) from the Buddhist point of view see MK, XXV. 24 with A1V, 538 Carvopalambhopaśdmah prapaſcopašamah śívah. tha hi sarvesām prapancānam nimittānām ya upaśamo 'pravitris nirvānam copajamah prakrtyaivopaśāntatvāc chivah vācām apravrtter vā prapañcopaśamaś cittasyāpravity śivah klesaprahānena vă prapaſcopašamo níravaśesavāsanāprahānena śivah jãeyānupalabdhyā vā prapaſcopasamo jñānānupalabdhyā bivah LA, X 230 (p 295) sorvaprapañcopašamād bhrānto nābhipravartate prajñā yavas yıkalpante bhrântis tās at pravartate 11 For nirvikalpa see MV, p 374 nirvikalpam hi tat (referring to tativa, MIK, XVIII 9) vikalpas cittapracārah tadrahıtatvāt tattvam mrvikalpam Jathoktan sütre. paramārthasatyam katamat yatra jñānasyāpracārah kah punarvado 'ksarānām iti evam nirvikalpam It is to be noted that it is vikalpa from which spring up röga, duesa, moha, etc The word vedapăraga in the text inay be taken here as vedopāra-ga and not veda-pāraga as above meaning 'one conversant with Vedānta (V'eda-põra) 'Cf. vedāntesu vicaksanah (II, 31) ·{1, 36] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 45 36 tasmād evam viditvainam advaite yojayet smrtim 1 advaitam samanuprāpya jadaval lokam ācaret M 15 "Therefore having thus known it (r.e, prapancopatama) one should fix one's memory on non-duality, and having realized non-duality should behave as a fool among people The word sm?fi, Pali sati, mcans one of the five balas 'strengths or powers,' or one of the seven requisites for attaining supreme knowledge (bodhyangas, Pal bohongas) Seg DS, LXVIN, XLIX; MVT. $$ 38, 39, Cy. Chu, VII 26. 7: ahāraſuddhau sattvaſuddhih sattvaſuddhau dhruvā smrtık emitilarnbhe sarvagranthinām vipramokşah Here S explains dhravi smrti as continuous absence of forgetting (Quicchinna avismarana) This nothing buta dhyand meditation Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS, 11 led. Narasimhācārya, Ananda Press, 1909, pp 98 ), supports it: and Vācaspatımıśra, YS, I 20, expressly says that smrti is steady and undisturbed meditation (smrtır dhyanam anäkulam aurksiplam) The word smuts in the present kārkā should be taken in this sense Ford see $ on BS, III 4 50, where he says. 'Let him be free from guile, pride and so on, not inanifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of humself before others He quotes here the following froin a work (smile) (SBE) gudhadharmāśnto vidvàn ajñítacantam caret andhavaj jadavac căpu mūkavac ca mahim caret See Jabala Up. 6; cīsrama Up, 4. Minor Upanisads, Adyar Library. 1921, Vol. I, pp. 154, 161, 184.

·46 AGAMAŠASTRA 111. 37 37 nistutir nirnamaskaro nihsvadhakāra eva ca 1 calācalaniketaś ca yatır yādicchiko bhavet! "Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing svadha, with an unfixed home and acting at random one should become an ascetic The word svadhi (originally sưadha' self.position ' 'self pouqr, inherent power') is a l'edic exclamaton mostly used in offering food to pitis deceased ancestors' It also nicans the food for pits In this case scadhikina kould mean oficring food to pitrs Calucalantketais, in fact aniketa of BG VI 9, and anılaya of BA, VIII 29. 83. both meaning 'homeless' ( apurna 119 sarvatra in B4, Vili 16. anagura homeless' or a homeless wanderer'in Buddhist literature, and in Jains mols (lupa punikasitra, ed Leunant, 1653, :: 27.57 <lc) Ilerc cascola in the cornpound ca valorilia Ninhenkis Sas two word, cala and acala. and consequently lie has fallen into a fical confuwon in explaint The faut is that calacala is one word meaning curc's integrly moung'ic. 'absolutely not fucd Sce the l'utilise sull') in the Alah.bharya on l'anin V12 Por example the following may be quoted: Stipulat who !!! 53 calcolnır otopam whatah khura's, Kirului 17 1991 no 'in 11.0771 vidyal inlinum 11a cal calam, (i olurlarniru penting INV, V, 20 calacalc canapec na ho han ala', The word pidichikadors not imp's almolutels netraped mosements for that is 11elle for alle IS, III + I, 4750 Vari ilin norr of ihe word 'one who is to trattait rigge $* ***** Ib. poti hit ·!! 37-38) ĀGANASASTRA following occurs in the NPU in the Alinor Upanisads, Adyar, Vol. I, pp 147, 153 : nirdvandvo nitnamaskāro nihsvadhākāra eva ca. kasyäpi vandanam akıtvà na-namaskāro na syāhākāro nasvadhākāro na-nindāstutir yàdrcchiko bhavet. 38 tattvam adhyatmikam drstvă tattvam drstvā tu bāhyataḥ i tattvibhūtas tadáråmas tattväd apracyuto bhavet iti gaudapādiya agamaśāstre vaitathākhyam dvitiyam prakaranam samāptam. 'Having realised the truth inward, having also realised the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself). delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved froin it Here ends in the Agamašāstra of Gauda pada Book Two called Unreality' The tattua referred to in the kārikā is nothing but prapancopasama (135) and this is for Vedantists mokso and for Buddhists nirvana=pralityasamutpăda=Sünya The words adhyatmika and bahya are two opposite terms and can respectively be translated by, 'subjective and 'objective', or in some cases by 'ınward' and 'outward' respec. tively, åtman meaning 'body and, according to those who believe in the existence of a separate soul, 'soul' as well. Here bāhyatak is an adverb, and so odhyatmiko too, may be taken as such. Or both of them are to be construed as adjectives. For the thought and wording of the kārikå see the following couplet quoted as a speech of Bhagavat in MV, p. 343 (Poussin JRAS, 1910, p 137). šūnyam adhyātmikan pasja paśys šūnyam bahirgatam na vidyate so 'pi kaścid yo bhavayatı sūnyatām ·BOOK III 1 a upāsanāśrto dharmo jāte brahmaņi vartate) präg utpatter' ajam sarvam tenāsau kępanah smſtah 11 'The dharma 'duty' relating to upāsanā 'worship' arıses wlien Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (dharma) is regarded as miserable' takes dharma to signify worshipper (opāsaka, sādhawa) A simply follows him explaining. dehasya dháranād dharmo jivah Upāsanā depends upon the duality of an upasaka 'worshpper' and an upāsya 'one to be worshipped' This dualty also in its turn is possible only when that one Brahman is jāta 'bom', ie, manifests himself in the form of this universe Has jāti or prajāti 'birth' or growing forth' or bahubhāra 'becoming many' is often found in the Upanisads . TU, II 6: so 'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya, ChU, VI 2 1-3 tad aiksata bahu syātri prajāyeya, 3.23 seyam devataiksata hantāham imās tisro devată anena Jivenātmanānupravisya nāmarûpe vyäkaravāni See BS with S, 1 1 2,5 Upāsanā literally means 'sitting near,' ie, 'sitting near one who is to be worshipped' In fact, upăsanā, as $ explains of, is a continuous of thought (ic, meditation), not disturbed by any other dissimilar thought upon an object supported by the scripture So says $ in his Introduction to ChU. I 1.1. upāsanam tu yathāśāstrasamarthitam kuicid ālambanam upādāya tasmin samānacittavșttisantānakararam tadvilaksanapratyayānantaritam See his Com. PU, 5, and BS, 1.111. Course 1 This phrase, prag utpatteh, 13 used not less than eight times by S in his comm. on the ChU, VI 2.1 ·III. 2] AGAMASASTRA 19 2 ato vaksyảmy akārpanyam ajátı samatām gatam ! yathā na jāyate kiñcij jāyamānam samantataḥ 1 'I shall, therefore, so speak of that state of non-miserableness in which there is no origination (jāti), and which (on that account) is the same throughout, as to show that the things which are (apparently) being born on all sides are none of them born at all.' The highest truth (paramārtha), according to our author and the Mādhyamikas as well, is that there is nothing that comes into being (jāyate. III 48) This ait or anulpāda (so frequently used in Buddhist texts) 'non-origination' is the main subject which the author takes up and discusses throughout the remaining portion of his book See II 32, III 20, 38, 48; IV 5,71. The word agāti occurs nine times in the work: III 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 21, 29, 42, 43 The sameness (samatām gala, samata, sămya) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (azoti). The following is from the Aryasatyadvay,catāra quoted in MV, P 374. paramārthatah sarvadharmānutpädasamatayā paramărthataḥ sarvadharmătyantājātisamataya paramārthatah samāh sarvadharmāh kasmad dhetoh paramnārthato nirvāṇā. (nānā)karană hi devaputra sarvadharmă atyantanirutpădatām upādāya. tad s athāpi näma devaputra yac ca midbhājanasyä. bhyantaram ákāšam yac ca ratnabhājanasyabhy antaram ákāšanı ākāšadhātur evaisah. tat paramārthato na kincin nānakaranam evam eva devaputra yah (sam] klesaſh sa] paramārthato 'ty antānutpădată yad api vyavadīnam tad api paramārthalo 'yantănutpădatā. samsăro 'pi paramārthato 'ty antānutpādatā Javan nirvānam api paramărthato 'tyantānu!pădatā nātra paramárthato nănākaranam hasmad dhetoh. paramárthato 'tyantān. utpidatvāt sarvadharmánām See SP, IV 63 lp 143): 1201B-7 tat tat ·50 AGAMASASTRA [ill.3 sarvadharmān santāñ śünyān nirnānākaranātmakān! na caitán preksate näpi kilicid dharmam vipaśyah 1 sarvadharmāh samāh sarve samāh samasamah sada i evam jñātvā vijānāti nirvāṇam amſtam sıvam 1 For b of the kārikā see Ill 38a, IV 93c-d, 95a, 1006. In the first kārikā of this chapter mention of origination (til of Brahman is made Non-origination lajātı) is, however, said in the second, and the author promises here to explain it Now from the following kārkā he proceeds to do so showing the real sense of origination and non-origination: 3 ātmā hy ākāśavaj jivair ghatākāśair ivoditah ! ghatādivac ca sanghātair jātāv etan nidarśanam 1 'Ātman has sprung up in the forms of Jivas 'individual selves,' just like the springing up of the akasal 'space' in the form of ghalakāšas 'spaces occupied by jars,' the conglomerations of different limbs, organs of sense, etc ) being like jars and others This is the illustration of origination' It is with ghatas that ghatākāśas are formed from the mahākāśa in the same way, it is with the conglomerations that Ātman is born in the form of Jivas On the origination of Atman see BU, | I 20. MuU, II 1.1: MnU, 1 4, BS, II 317 with S's Com It is evident from the kārıká that the origination in both of the cases is not real, but imaginary. See TJ, VIII 10, and of ghatasamvſtam ākāśam niyarnāne ghate yathā 1 ghato niyeta nākāćam tathā pivo nabhopamah TIU, V.3 | This is generally called mahākāta in Vedantic and other works ·III. 4-5) ÄGAMASĀSTRA 51 This is further explained in the following kārıkā : ghatādisu pralineșu ghaļākāśādayo yatha | akāśe sampraliyante tadvaj jivā ihātmani ! 'As the jars, etc., being destroyed the spaces of jars, etc.. are completely merged into space, so are (completely merged) the Jivas into Ātman This kārıkā is quoted by Santiraksita in his commen tary on MAK, 93, and it runs as follows in its Tibetan version: bum.pa la sogs shıg' pa ni! (bum. pahı. nam mkhah la sogs. pa ] ji ltar nam mkhah hdu.bgyur. ba! de.bshin srog kyan nes pa yın The second line of the verse is left out in Tib., and is reconstructed from Sanskrit by Vallesser Der alter Vedanta, P. 20. 1 Read bshig for shig The following kārika meets the objection that the Ātman that springs up as different fivas being one, if one jiva feels happiness or suffers pain all the Jivas should have the same state of mind But in fact it is not so . 5 yathaikasmin ghatākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute 1 na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jivāh sukhādibhih 'As one ghaļākāła 'space occupied by a jar' being connected with dust, smoke, etc., not all (ghatókāšas) are connected with them, so are the jivas with reference to happiness. etc.

·52 ĀGAMASASTRA (ili.6 The kārkā is quoted by Bhavya in his MHK, VIII, 13, the Tibetan version being as follows ji.Itar. bum.pahi.nam mkhah.gcig! Idul dan du bas bsgribs pa.na! thams cad de bshin.ma.yin ltar! Ide sogs.de bshin.bdag la.min si Literally reconstructed it would read in Sanskrit : yathaikasmın ghalākāse rajodhūmaih (sam)āvite na bhavanh tathā sarve na sukhādı tathātmani The present karikā is quoted with the reading na ca sarve prawuyante for c and is attributed to the VIP by Vijñānabhirsu in his comm. on the Sas, I 152, but it is not to be found there. See S's comm on the VSN, p. 16 6 rūpakāryasamakhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vail akāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jivesu nirnayah i 'Indeed forins, functions and names differ here and therc, but there is no difference of the space : similar is the conclusion with regard to jivas.' There are different things, earthen pots, cloths, etc, their forms, functions, and names all differing from one another, yet the ākāśa intercepted by them is in itself not different in fact In the same way though Jivas corresponding to ghatākāśas, etc, are different, Atman correspnnding to akása or mahakāša, etc, is not different. CE TJ, VIII. 12 ji.ltar.bum sogs tha dad kyan! sa la tha dad hgah yan med de bshin lus ni tha dad kyan! bdag la tha dad hgah.yan med:

·III. 7-8]
AGAMASASTRA
53
It
may
thus be translated into Sanskrit:
bhinneşv api ghatádyeşu midi bhedo na kascana
tathā dehesu bhinnesu na kaścid bheda ātmani n
7
nākāśasya ghațākāso vikārāvayavau yathā 1
naivātmanah sadā jivo vikārāvayavau tathā n
'As the ghatakasa is neither a transformation, for a
part of the ākāša, so is always a Jiva neither a transformation,
nor a limb of Ātman.'
8
yatha bhavatı bālānam gaganam malınam malaih
tatha bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malino malaiḥ 1
*As the sky appears to be soiled with dirt to the ignotant,
so appears Ātman, too, with impurities, to those who are not
enlightened.'
For a and b see Ś on BS, I 1.1: ākāse bālās talamalınatādy
adhyasyanti
This kūrikā is quoted by Santira kşit a. loc cit. The
Tib. version is as follows:
ji Itar byna pamams.la ni!
nam mkhah.dri mas dri can. hsyur :
de bshin mi mkhas.Inams la.yani
bdag.ni dri.mas dri.can hgyur 1
1 Such a dust, smoke, etc., See III, 5 rayodhúm3dib hih

·54 ĀGAMASASTRA MI, 9-11 9 marane sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api i sthitaḥ sarvasariresu ākāśenávilaksanah / in death and in bith, in moving forward and backward, (Ātman) in all bodies exists just like the space. In the origination and destruction of the ghatākāśa the mahakaśa is not affected. So is the case with Ātman in regard to death, birth, etc, which are connected only with the bodies. See ChU. VI. II. 3 : jivāpetam văva kiledam mriyate na jivo miiyate 1 This is found in only one MS, the reading which is generally known is sthitau 'in standing' 10 sanghätäh svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitah ! adhikye sarvasāmye vă nopapattir hi vidyate *All conglomerations (of limbs, etc) are like dream being projected by the illusion of Ātman As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground" The sanghātas, ie, the bodies, having which the Ātman is born in the form of Jivas, are lihe the ghałas of ghātākāsas These sanghatas have, however, no real existence, nor is there, therefore, any ground for thinking of their superiority or equality among them. in discussing what Jiva is the author says further: rasādayo hi ye kośâ vyākhyātās taittiriyake i tesām ātmā paro jivah sa-yathā' samprakāśitah The seaths such as consisting of the essence (of food) ·AGAMASASTRA 55 III. 12] or are described in the Taittiriyaka, i.e., Taittiriya Upanisad (II 1-6), the supreme soul of them is Jiva, as it is made there clear.' • There are five košas 'seaths,' viz., annarasamaya simply annamaya, prāņa", mano', vrjñāna', and ananda, i.e.. consisting of the essence of food, breath, mind, understanding. and bliss respectively. These are explained in the TU, II, 2 ff. According to the five divisions of kośas Atman is also divided into five and are called after them, the last of them i.c., ānandamaya, or in accordance with a different authority (see BS, I. 1. 12-19), the one on which rests the last of them is real Ātman. This is referred to in the present kārıkā by para atran. And the author says that this is Jiva. 1 With some MISS. I read sa yotha for kham yatha accepted by Sand found in other MISS In favour of the second reading compared of the next kārika, which is in fact identical The word sayatha. Pali seyyatha, in the sense of tad vatha, is often used in Brahmanas and Upanusads See PU, IV 7, Vi 5: MuU, III 2.8, SB, 1 2 5 24, 7 3 2. BU, 20 CF in this connexion sa-yadi (=tad yadi), PU, V 1, and Pall sa-ce for sacel (Ke P. 72, 12) in the same sense (Skt tac cet) 12 dvayor dvayor madhujñāne param brahma prakāsitam ! pithivyām udare caiva yathākāśaḥ prakāśitaḥ 'In the madhuvidya 1 1.c , the Madhubrahmana section of the BU, II.5) in cach of the pairs, (such as) the carth and the inside (of the body), the supreme Brahman is made manifest, as is made manifest the sky (III. 3 ff.) BU, 115, is called Madhubrāhmana owing to the fact of its dealing with a particular Brahmavidya which is named madhuvidyà or madhuiñana (as in our text) on account of the frequent use of the word madhu which is very important ·56 AGAMAŠASTRA III. 13 in this connexion Here there are some pairs of things, such as the carth and all beings (pithivi and sarvánı bhūtåni), and in these pairs it is shown that the person Outside the body in the carth, etc., and the person inside the body are identical with Atman, Brahman. Let the following passage be quoted here (BU, I1.5. 1): yam pithivi sarvevām madhv asyai p{thivyai sarvāṇi bhūtānı inadhu. yas cāyam asyām pithivyām tcjomayo 'mſtamayah puruko yas cāyam adhyatmam śārīras tejomayo 'mrtamaah puruso yam eva sa yo 'yam ātinedam amtam idarn brahmedam sarvam. • This carth is the honey (madhu, the effect) of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this earth Likewise this bright immortal person in this earth, and the bright immortal person incorporated in the body (both are madhu) He indeed is the same as the self, that immortal, that Brahman, that All" I T Max Muller, SBE 13 jivātmanor ananyalvam abhedena praśasyate 1 nānātvam nindyate yac ca tad evam hi samañjasam' *That the identity without any distinction of Jiva and Ātman 15 praised, and that their dislınchon is censured, this becomes reasonable only on this hypothesis' As regards the identity of Jiva and Atman see CHU. VI 87 (tat tvam assi, BU, 1, 4 10 faham brahmäsmı), 11.5 19 (ayam ātmā brahmal, MuU, III 29 (sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavat) As for the difference see BU, I + 2 (dvitiyad vai bhayam bhavatı), JV 4 19. KU. IV.10, 11 (mrtyoh sa mityum āpnoti ya uha nāneva paśyati); IU II 7 (yada hy evatsa etasmına u darain antaram kurute atha tasya bhayam bhavatu).

·III, 14) ÄGAMASĀSTRA 57 14 jivåtmanoh pithaktyam yat prāg utpatteh prakırttitam! bhavisyadvittyā gaunam tan mukhyatvam na hi yujyate ? *The difference of Jiva and Ātman before creation, which is declared (in texts?), is attributive with reference to the future state; its primary sense is certainly not reasonable.' It is only after creation that there is a distinction between Ātman and Jiva, but before it there is no distinction whatsoever. When there is no production of ghata 'jar,' and consequently no ghaļākáša, there is no distinction between mahākāśa and ghaläkāša. Yet, one sometimes speaks of that distinction at that time, simply anticipating what is going to happen in the near future, that is, thinking of the imminent production of the ghala. In his explanation of the kārikā 5 gives an apt example. He says that it is like the use of the following sentence which is very common odanam pacatt The word odana means 'cooked or boiled nice' Therefore literally the sentence meany 'one cooks cooked rice But the rice which was already cooked or boiled does not require to be cooked again. Yet, the people say. 'He cooks cooked rice Clearly here this use is attributive and has reference to the yuture state of the unboiled rice.The people assume the future state as present So is here the statement of difference of Arman and Jiva $ says that in passages of the Upanişads about evolution and dissolution it is the unity of Atman and Jiva, which is sought to be established. This unity will be demonstrated in the text. First there is shown difference and then unity which is the conclusion. It is, therefore, in view of this future Such as RV X 121.1 i didhire prthivio dyima utemid kamai deviya havia vidhems, 1201B-8 > ·58 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 15-16 sense or state that the difference is stated. Thus it is only in its secondary, and not in its primary sense. The author wanted (III. 2) to show that there is no orgina. tion (jāti), nor is there anything that comes into being vägate). Having done so to some extent he now meets, in the next kankā, the objection that may be raised against this view, showing thereby also that there is, in fact, no distinction between Ātman and Jiva : 15 millohavisphulingădyaih sựstir yä сoditânyathā i Upāyah so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ katbañcana ! The creation which is urged in different manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc , is only a means for an introduction (to the truth, There is in no way any distinction (between Ātman and Jiva)' For details see IV. 42 For the creation referred to see ChU, VI 1.4-5, BU, II. 1.20, VI 2 14. MuU, II 1-1, MU, VI 26 As to how that creation and consequently the distinction between Atman and Jiva, though unreal, are a means for introducing one to truth is explained in the next kārıkā 16 āśramās trividhā hınamadhyamotkystadſstayaḥ 1 upāsanopadisteyam tadartham anukampayā ! There are three spiritual stages, viz , of lower vision, of muddle vision, and of higher vision; and this upāsanā 'worship is laid down for them out of kindness.' In fact there is no distinction between Atman and Jiva, yet some distinction is attributed there, only to help people

·111, 17-18]
AGANAŚĀSTRA
59
in realizing the truth by prescribing different upāsanās according
to their respective powers of vision, See III. 1
"The word aſrama in the text is explained by Ś as ašramin
'one with asrama or religious state of life,' ie.. adhikrta
'an entitled one. In all probability the original word was
āšraya 'a recipient, a person or thing in which any quality
or article is inherent or retained or received,' i.e., an adhikarin
or adhikrta 'an entitled one.' See the use of the word in the
following line from MISA, XVI. 69 :
nikramadhyottamaviryam anyad
yānatraye yuktajanăśrayena:
atra āśrayabhedena viryabhedo nirdıcah
The author now mentions the opinions of the dualists, such
as the Vaišeşikas, the Sāökhyas, etc., and shows that the decision
arrived at by him, i.e., non-distinction (abheda), does not
conflict with the views held by them
17
svasiddhantavyavasthăsu dyastino niscitā ddham |
parasparam virudhyante tair ayam nx virudhyate :
The dualists are firmly fixed in their own distinctive
conclusions and contend with one another. but this lour viewi
does not confict with them
.
18
advaitam paramărtho hi dvaitam tadbheda ucyale !
teşám ubhayathā dvaitam tenayam na virudhyate
*The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said

·60 AGAMASĀSTRA IIII. 19-20 to be of it a particular state or effect of it,' while according to them (t.e., dualists) there is duality in both ways,: Therefore it does not conflict' So far as mere duality is concerned, it is not that we do not admit at all, as you do: we do accept it, Hence there is no conflict Between cause and effect there is, in fact, no difference (kūryakāranayor abhedoh), the effect being merely a particular state of its cause So there is no independent existence of the effect apart from that of its cause. In the same way duality is a particular state or effect of non-duality, being an llusion (10) The only difference between us is that according to you duality is in both ways, in reality and also in appearance, while we say that though there is duality, no doubt, it is not in reality, it exists only in appearance See next känkā. 1 Cf bheda with bhidyate in the following katika IS paramarthatas câparamarthatat ca in reality and not in cality, 19 māyayā bhidyate hy etan nânyathājam kathaiicana ! tattvato bhidyamane hi martyatām amrtam vrajet 1 "It ladvaitas becomes different only through illusion, as the unborn 'aja) can in no other way become different, for of it becomes in reality different the immortal vould beconie mortal' See (V.6 20 ajātasyaiva bhāvasya játım icchantı vadinah 1 ajalo hy amrto bhavo martyatām katham esyati ) The disputants seek to establish the birth of an unborn

·III, 21-231
AGAMASASTRA
61
thing. Now a thing which is unborn is immortal, and that
being the case, how can it become mortal ?
See IV.6.
21
na bhavaty amţtam martyam na martyam amặtam tathā 1
prakter anyathābhávo na kathañcid bhavisyati
The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the
mortal immortal, In no way can nature change.'
See IV.7, 29,
22
svabhāvenāmặto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām 1
kệtakenāmặtas tasya katham sthāsyati niścalah
How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally
immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing,
when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless ?
See IV.8.
23
bhūtato 'bhūtato vāpi srjyamáne sama śrutiḥ 1
niscitam yuktiyuktam ca yat tad bhavati netarat !
"As regards creation there are equal sacred texts ( stating

·62 ĀGAMASASTRA [III 24 creation to be) from the existent' or from the non-existent.' But that which is ascertained and reasonable is (acceptable), and not the other.' See IV 3. It says that in reality there is no jati'origination' either from the existent or the non-existent, though there are fruits supporting both the views equally. Therefore the author says that what is reasonable is to be accepted, as certain And what is reasonable is pointed out in the next hārikā According to Sankara bhutatah is paramnărthatah, and abhūlatah māyaya But in IV 3 he explains the same words saying 'bhūlasya vidyamănasyaº, abhūtasya avidyamānasya 1 sad eva bomyedam agra äsitº Chu, VI 21 2 asad va dam agra Isit tato vas sad ajāyata TU, II 7 1 24 neha nāneti cāmnāyād indro māyābhır ity api 1 ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu sah! From the sacred text' "there is no pluralty here's and also from "Indra through māyās, etc," : (it is to be known 3 1 in the original amnya means frutt 9 neha nānisti kiőcana BU, IV 4 19, KU, IV 11 rūpamrūpam pratiropo babhuva tad esya rupar praticaksanāya / indro mayabhih pururūpa iyale yukta hy asya harayah sata dasa 1 RV, VI. 47 18, BU, 11 5 19

·III, 251
AGAMASASTRA
63
that) it is through illusion that he is variously born, though
(in fact) he does not take birth.'s
It refers to Purusa, Prajapatı.
$ The sentence ajāy aming bahudhá jiyate sn the text is taken from the
VS XXXI. 191- TA, 13 ) which runs as follows
prapatas carah garbhe antar
az.yamina bahudhi vigate!
tasya yonia panpaſyantı dhiris
tasmin ha tasthur bhuvanini yuva I
The preceding stanza (18) 13:
vedsham etan purusam mahintam
Adityayamam tamasah parastat
tam ega viditstarrtyum eti
ninyah panthi vidyate 'yaniya I
25
sambhūter apavādāc ca sambhavaḥ pratışidhyate !
ko nv enam janayed it kāranam pratişidhyate
"By the denial of sambhūtt 'birth in the fruti) birth is
negatived, and (by the fruti) “who indeed would produce
him" the cause of burth is denied.'
Here for the first time we have the oldest interpretation
of the words sambhati or sambhava and asambhūtt or
asambhava in IU. 12, 13, 14. which are so differently explained
into bhua tre te tamo ya usambhagin ratah lu, 12 This ie the
Resond half of the verse the fout half being andhan lamah pravilantı ye
samt harm upisate
ja ere na jayate ko nv enem jarayel punsh, BU, II! 9 29

·III, 26-27] AGAMASASTRA 65 26 sa eșa neti netīti vyakhyātam nihnute yatah! sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājam prakāšate 1 (The fruti) "This is No, No" denies what is explained. Therefore by the reason of incomprehensibleness it is evident that all is unborn.' The sruti "This is No, No" refers to sa cșa neti nety ātmāgshyo na hi ghyate (BU, III 9. 26; IV.2.4, 4.22,5 15) -'That (Atman) is to be descnbed by) No. No. He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended. But it appears, as thinks also the commentator himself, it alludes to the following Sruti, too: athāta ādeso neti neti (BU, II. 3.6) "Now follows the teaching by No, No' For it is that fruti which denies both the forms of Brahman, viz., that which has form (mürla) and that which has not form lamurta). These two forms have already been described or explained in the text (BU, 11. 3. 1)' Things are either with or without a form, so when both of them are denied they cannot be comprehended. Thus it becomes evident that there is nothing that may have origination, in other words, all is 'unborn (aja 'without generation) 1 dve veva brahmano rupe mortarp civimürtam ca Now păti or origination may be either of the existent (sat) or of the non-existent (asat) But both the cases are impossible. The author shows it in the next kārkās: 27 sato hi máyaya janma jujyate na tu tattvataḥ I tattvato jāyate yasya jātam tasya hi jāyate I •The birth of that which exists can be reasonable only 1201B-

·66
AGAMAŠASTRA
(III, 28-29
through illusion, but not in reality. He who holds that one is
born in reality has to accept (the position) that what is born
had, indeed, been born
See IV.58 See also IV. 13 with its explanation. Cf. CS.
XI 10 (260) with the note
sambhavah kriyate yasya prah so'stiti na yujyate!
sato yadı bhave, janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavah.
28
asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate 1
vandhyāputro na lattvena māyayā vāp: jāyate !
The birth of that wh.ch does not exist 18 not reasonable
at all through illusion or in realty The son of a barren
woman is not born either through illusion or in reality,
The author now proceeds to show that the birth of the
existent is possible only through māyā as said before (III. 27) :
29
As owing
to
yathā svapne dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manah
tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manah I
māya the mind in dream moves with
appearance for image of the two (vrz , the percipient and
the perceptible, or in other words the subject and the object).
so owing to maya the mind in the waking state' moves with
the appearance of the two
See IV 61
1 See IV 40

·III. 30-32 AGAMAŠASTRA 67 30 advayam ca dvayābhāsam manah svapne na samsayah! advayam ca dvayābhāsam tathā jāgran na samsayah There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two; so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two See IV. 62. 31 manodęśyam idam dvaitam yat kiñcit sacarācaram i manaso hy amanibhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate ] **This duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable is perceived by the mind, but when the mind becomes non-mind (ie, when it loses its own function of thinking, manana) duality is not experienced See IV.47, 48, 72. It means that the appearance of duality is nothing but the vibration of the mind (citta- or vijñāna-spandita), and when this vibration is stopped there is no duality at all When the state of non-mind 19 reached is said in the following kārika : . 32 ātmasatyānubodhena na sankalpayate yada ! amanastām tada yati grāhyabhāve tadagrahāt! When by the knowledge of the truth of atman at the mind) ceases tram imagining it goes to the state of non-mind being non.cognizant in the absence of the things to be cognized." See IV. 72, 79, 99.

·68 ĀGAMASASTRA (1133 Mark here that d (grāhyabhāve tadagrahat) is identical with that of Tk, 28. See Vis, p. 584 : LA, p 169; and the note on Ill of our text. The next kărikā says that the mind which becomes non-mind 38 as described above, is, in fact, identical with Brahman. 33 mano mano akalpakam ajam jñānam jñeyābhinnam pracaksatel brahma jõeyam ajam nityam ajenājam vibudhyate li The jñana that does not imagine (t.e, indeterminate) and is (corlsequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one So the unborn Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn Iñana) Here jñāna which the commentator explains as piaptımātra is in reality viñana or citta'mind' as spoken of above See Vk, p 3 cittam mano vijñānam viñaptıś ceti paryāyāh, MV, XVII 1 (p 308) cittam 'tha vijñānamn iti tasyaiva (=cittasy aiva) paryāyāh, AK, II 34 cittam 'tha vijñānam ekārtham, DN, I 121, SN, I| 94 See III 38, IV 96 For ayam vibudhyate c I 16 advartam budhyate toda, III 26 ajam prakisat: For the whole thought see III 35, 46 ajenājam vibudhyate=ajena jñānena (= citfenal ajam jñeyam (Brahman) vibudhyate prakāśate The unborn knowable Brahman is manifest through the unborn knowledge ie. the mind when it ceases from its function), there being no difference between them. See III, 46, 47 akalpaka= nirvikalpa 11134) = esango IT 72) See LA. 157 asangalaksanam jnanam For jñeyabhinna 'not different from the knowable see IV The author now goes to speak about the state of the mind described above ·11. 31-35] AGAMASASTRA 69 34 nigrhitasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhimataḥ pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyaḥ suşupte 'nyo na tatsamah! "That state (pracēra) of the mind of a wise man which is suppressed and (thus) indeterminate is to be known; (the state of the mind in deep sleep is different from that, it is not like that.' It is said here that the state of the suppressed and indeterminate mind is different from that in susuptı. Why it is so is stated in the following kārikā (ill. 35). The word pracăra which is the same as vihāra or Bhūms, as the yoging and the Buddhists would express, means in such cases avastha 'state.' Our author uses (IV 80) for it also vişaya By nirvikalpa manas 'indeterminate mind' understand that it recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object, etc. In Buddhist works dhimat is a synonym for Bodhisattva (MSA, XIX, 73). The reason for what is said above is now offered as follows: we are to 35 liyate hi susupte tan nigțhitam na liyate ! tad eva nubhayam brahma jñānālokam samantatah , *For in deep sleep it Imanas) falls into a state of oblivion,' but it does not do so when suppressed. Indeed, that is 1 Or, into a sleeping state, laya, ace III 41, 42 ·10 ÄGAMASASIRA LUNI 36 on Brahman, free from fear and radiant as Jñana? all sides It is clear here that the mind when suppressed, i e, ceases from all of its activities, becomes Brahman See III 46 Ct. the following quoted by Jay a ratha in his commentary on sloka 30 of TA (Vol. III, p 23) presenting the views of the Vijñānavādins : prabhāsvaram idam cittam praktyāgantavo malāh! tesām apăye sarvārtham taj jyotir avınaśvaram 1 3 On pñinaloka Sankara whtes japtur lånam atmasvabhivacaitanyam tad eva spinar alokah prakaso yasya tad brahma jñānālokam For aloka see cbhala (Ill 36, IV 811, and jyota (III 37, Brahman referred to above is now further described in the following kārıkā 36 ajam andram asvapnam' anāmakam arūpakam 1 sakrdvibhatami sarvajñam' nopacárah kathancana : 'It is unborn and has no sleep, nor dream . nor has it name and form, it is illumined once for all and is all-knowing. And in no way is there access-concentration (upacara! The state ie the state of becoming Brahman as stated above is in fact the state of samadhi intense abstract medita. tion as ne shall see presents in the following two kărikas. wut the note Chl Vu 4 12 Seel 16 1 81 1 See Ill 37 11 BI hy ein brahmalokah 3 11! 47 makrd villusto ·III. 36) AGAMASASTRA Now, there are two kinds or stages of samadhi, upacara samadhi and arpanā" (Poli appanā). In the first the mind is concentrated on its object. but not uninturruptedly, for now it is so and the next moment it is not so simply moving near (upacarali) the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of its honey. In the second, the mind is firmly and uninturruptedly fixed on the object. Because this state of samadhi 'gives (arpayati)' the one pointed mind to the object it is called arpana, as Buddha ghosa explains in his As, P 142: ckaggam cittam ārammane appetiti appanā Cf. p. 143 : upagantva vicaranavasena upavicāro CF also vicara as explained in the Vibhavant Tikā on the AAS, I 17. santavuttı vicãro cittassa nātıpphandabhūto ākāse uppatitassa aakunassa pakkhapasāranam viya, padumassa uparibhāge paribbhamanam viya ca padumābhimukhapatitassa bhamarassa. The difference between upacara and appană is thus shown in VM, P 126 : duvidho hi samādhi upacārasamādhi ca appanäsamadhi ca. dvihákārehı cıttam samādhiyati upacārabhúmiyam (upacārāvatthāyam-Tika) vā partlábhabhūmyam (=jhānass& adhigamavatthayam-Tikā) º dvinnam pana samadhinam dam nānākaranamº yatha nāma daharo kumārako akkhıpıtvā shapiyamāno punappunam bhūmiyam patah evam kva upacăre uppanne cíttam kālena nimittam ārammanam karota kālena bhavangam otaratiyathā nama balavā puriso āsanā vutthāya divasam'pı tittheyya evam eva appanásamādhimhi uppanne cittam sakı bhavangavāram chinditvä kevalam'pi rattım kevalam'pı divasam tiyhati. The d of the kāriká may be explained in another way Brahman is desenbed here by such words as aja, anidra, etc, but berg beyond speech and mind it cannot be done so 71228 is said nopacārah kathañcana (But) in no way there is any figurative (or metaphorical) expression (upacara) See BSB.p 44.

·72 AGAMASĀSTRA (11) 37-38 sa punah pāramārthikah svabhavah sarvadharmānām nirvakalpasyaiva jñānasya pocaro vcditavyah sacet punar yathaiva. bhlāpu yesu dharinesu yasmin vastuni pravartate tadátınakás te dharınās tad vastu syāt. cvam sati bahuvidhā bahavah svabhāvā ekasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyuh. tat kasya hetoh tathāhy ekasmin Jhalına ckasmin vastuni bahuvidha bahavo bahubhır abhılápaih prajñaptaya upacārāh kriyantc. The following two kārkās say that this state of becoming Brahman is samadhi 37 sarvābhilāpavigatah sarvacintāsamutthitah ! supraśāntah sakrjjyotih samādhir acalo 'bhayahr "It is intense abstract concentration (samadhi) which is beyond all expression,' and above all thoughts,' very calm and full of light burning once for all," unwavering and without fear.' In Buddhism there is a particular samādht called acala (MVt, 580) See IV 24 2 anabhulāpyarakathya, AK, n 243 II 38 cinta yatra na vidyate Ili 36,1V 81 with note 3 38 graho na tatra notsargas cintā yatra na vidyate i atmasamstham tada jñānam ajāti samatām gatam u Where there is no thought there is neither apprehension or abandonment of any object) At that time the mind 1 III 37 ·III. 381 AGAMAŠASTRA 73 Gräna citta)* rests in itself, is unborn and attains to the state of sameness,'s In this state the mind does not apprehend or abandon any of its objects and as such rests in itself (álmasomstha), The word ātman in ārmasamstha here means itself' (suarūpal and not 'soul' (paramātman or Brahman) as distinct from the inind ljñāna) CH. BG, VI 25. atmasamstham manah kitvam na kiñcid api cintayet 'having made the mind resting in itself one should not think of anything' Nilakanth a writes here in his fikä on the word olmasamstha ātmani svarūpe samsthā sthitir yasya. This atmasamstha jñāna is, in fact, in other words, trjſuptimātra or unñānamātra of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins. The word Utiānamātra means 'simply viñana,' and the state of being so is vijñānamātrata, When the vilnāna does not apprehend any object whatsoever and as such rests only in itself this state is called orjñanamätrata. Says Vasubandhu (Tk. 28, ViS, p. 58-4); yadă tv alambanam jñānam naivopalabhate tadă sthitam vijñānamätratve grāhyabhāve tadagrahát } LA, p. 169 yada tv alambyam artham nopalathate jñānam tada vijiaptımátravyavasthānam bhavati viñapter grähyābhāvād grăhakasyābhāvah tadagrahanān na pravartate jñānam This is referred to in the following stanza of the KU.II. 3.10: yadā paſcavatışhante jñānānı manasă saha buddhis ca na vicesfate tăm khuh paramām gatim 3 See !!! 32, IV 96, with notes 1 See III 2, TV 77, 80, 93, 95, 100 It is ta be noted in these kātikās that ajūtt or anutpath and sama, or simys or semala are always used together Cf this with the quotation of MV in the note on ill 2 1201B-10 ·74 AGAMAŠĀSTRA [!11. 39 In the Upanisads it is well-known that Brahman is vijñana (BU, III 9. 28; TU, 11,5 1, III. 5. I., etc , vijnanamaya=vijñana) or jñāna (TU, II. 11) This viñana or jñāna is atmasamstha ñana or vijñanamåtra. For ātmasamstha jñāna see ChU. VII 24. 1-2: "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, under. stands nothing else, that is the Infinite (bhūman) *Sır, in what does the Infinite rest?' 'In its own greatness, or not even greatness I4 'It is to be noted that in the beginning of the present chapter (111 the author proposed 'ato vaksyāmy akārpanyam ajāti samatām gatam, here in the present kırıkā he concludes the subject + See my paper Evolution of Vejñānatāda in (HQ, X. 1934, pp 1 A That samadhi which is dirurkalpa is further described in the next kārıkā 39 asparśayogo nāmaisa durdarśah sarvayogibhih | yogino bibhyati hy asmăd abhaye bhayadarsinaḥ 12 This is what is called 'contactless concentration (asparsayoga). very difficult to be realızed by all yogins, the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where in fact) there is no fear' For asparśayoga see IV 2 The Commentator explains the second half of the kārtā saying that though there is no fear in this yoga yogins (of lower order) are afraid of it thinking it to be one's own destruction ·III. 40-41) AGAMASASTRA 75 (almanāšarüpa). These people have no discrimination (avivekin). and so they have fear though there is no fear, Vidyārany a quotes this kārkā in his PD. II. 29, introducing at (II. 28) thus : gaudācāryā nirvikalpe samādhāv anyayoginām! sākārabrahmanişthānăm atyantam bhayam ūcire u Now the author proceeds to say that for the yoga referred to the control of mind is absolutely necessary, on which depend the absence of fear, and such other things : 40 1 manaso nigrahāyattam abhayam sarvayogiņām 1 duhkhaksayaḥ prabodhaś cāpy aksayā śāntir eva ca ? "The absence of fear, the destruction of misery, the awaking, as well as the eternal peace of all yogins depend on the control of mind The next kārıkā shows how the mind can gradually be controlled without difficulty • 3 41 utseka udadher yadvat kuśāgrenaikabindună I manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparıkhedataḥ 11 'The control of mind without great pains is like the draining out of a sea by drops with the point of a kusa grass The first half of the kārıkā refers, according Madhusūdana Sarasvati VI. 23 ) and Rāma k}ņa, a commentator of PD (XI 109 ), where this to (BG, ·76 ĀGAMASASTRA [II] 12 kārıkā is quoted, to an old story, (cf. Tittbhopākhyāna, HU. pp. 78-79) which runs, as given by Madhusudana Sarasvati, as follows: Once upon a time the sea carried off with its waves the cggs of a bird which were laid on the beach The bird got angy and determined to dry it up He began to take out the water drop by drop with the tip of his beak and he could not be dissuaded from it by the birds related to him In the inean time the divine sage Nārada came there He, too, ashed hun to turn back, but in vain The bird said that any how he would dry up the sea either in this or in the future life Fortunately Nārada became very hind to him, and sent there Garudu the lord of birds, for his help Owing to the wind produced by the flapping of the wings of Garuda the sea began to dry up and thus being frightened gave back the eggs to the bird The substance of the hariha is that it is with determination and perseverance that mind is gradually controlled The author now suggests the means for controlling the mind 42 upayena nigrhnız ad vikiptam hamabhogay oh 1 suprasannam laye cana yatha Lamo layas tathai By the micane' one should control at mind when it is dzeracird deste and enjoyment and also when it remains At case in the sleeping state for the sleeping state je At badan desire is hthá lll 424 Arc quted and explained by Madl irsudana the commentary on the BG. . an $ See Ill (345 ·III. 43-44] AGAMASASTRA 77 VI. 26, and ill. 44-45 a-b by Sadananda in hrs Ves, $$32-33 According to the former kāma 'desire' is the state of thinking of, or longing for enjoyment cintyamánăvasthal, while bhoga 'enjoyment is the state of enjoying the desired things (bhujyamīnāvasthal, Laya 'sleeping state' is, in his opinion, deep sleep (sușupti). as supported by Gauda pāda himself (III. 35), but Sadananda explains it by 'sleep(nidrā). Laya causes mental inactivity, and corresponds to the state called mudha 'infatuated in the yoga philosophy See Vyās a on YS, 1 1 The means referred to above are as follows: 43 1 duḥkham sarvam anusmrtya kāmabhogān nivartayeti ajam sarvam anusmrtya jātam naiva tu paśyati | *Repeatedly remembering that all is inisery one should turn back (one's inind) from desires and enjoyments Indeed repeatedly remembering that all is unborn one does not see anything burn Bureano The second half of the kārıkā implies that when everything * is unborn and consequently has no existence in reality there is no object for one's desne and enjoyment as 1 Or we may write for 'one should, etc,' 'one should keep back from the mind desires and enjoyments Thus, says Madhurodana Sarasvati (BG, VI 26), kamal hogar in the kariká may be explained as &ccusative plural or sblatne singular 44 laye sambodhayec cittam vikşıptam samayet punaḥ { sakaşāyam vijāniyāc chamaprāplam na cāļayet ) 'One should awaken the mind when it is in the state of ·78 AGAMIASĀSIRA [111 44 We are sleep; when distracted one should pacify it again One should also investigate if it is with the evil passions (sukasāyul. And (finally) when it reaches the state of equanimity one should not cause it to move As regards the control of inind there are four impediments enumerated in our kārikás (III 42-45, of which viksepa . distraction' and laya 'sleep' have already been mentioned also in kārıkā 42. the other two being kasāya and sukha., or according to some (Ves, $33) rasa-āsvāda The last term will be explained in the next kārıkā (45) concerned here with kasāya It means here stabdhibhāva 'becoming stiffened' of mind Madhusu dana Sarasvati and Sadananda would explain (loc citi The primary meaning of kasaya is 'decoction,' so to say, of evil passions (väga, duesa, moha) Sankara explaining mirditakusāya in ChU. VII 26 2. writes vārksādır įva kasāyo rāgadvesādidosah It causes the stiffness of mind, owing to which it cannot be fixed on the object Thus the kasāya, ie, the evil passions, being the cause of stabdh bhāva, is explained by those authors to mean stabdhibhava We may, however, take the word in its actual sense, 1 e, the evil passions CF MISA, XIV 9cd--10a 6 as linam cittasyalgrhniyād uddhatam samay et punah u samaprāptam upekseta tasının nālambane punah See also XIV 11 For samaprapta in d which gives better sense 'cf samayer in d of the kārtkāl and is supported by Ves, with its Tikā Vidvonmanoranjani, 33 and MS4 quoted above the reading found in cditions and a very large number of MISS 15 samaprapta It ineans one that has reached the state of equilibrium Madhusudana Sarasvati takes the word sama in the sense of Brahman ·(III. 45-46 AGAMASASTRA 79 45 nāsvādayet sukham tatra nihsangaḥ prajñayā bhavet 1 niścalam nišcarac cittam ekikuryāt prayat nataḥ *There in practising yoga) he should not enjoy happiness By wisdom' he must be (then) free from all attachment. If the mind which is (thus) fixed goes out, by endeavour he should so do as to make it remain only in itself On ekikuryāt 'should make one' the Commentator says: citsvarūpasattāınātram evāpādayet CF ekibhavatt, BU, IV 4.2; ekibhuta, MáU. 5 1 There is a feeling of happiness from condition of mind in practising yoga, and it should be avoided as it is an impediment ? Or, discrimination The next kārıkā says that when the mind is thus completely controlled or suppressed (niruddha) and as such 18 free from all movements and does not perceive anything it becomes Brahman : 46 yadā na liyate cittar na ca viksipyate punaḥ aninganam anabhasam nispannam brahma tat tadā ! When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor distracted again, and as such has no movement nor any senses-image. then it becomes Brahman See all 35. The first half refers to two states laya corresponding to müdha nnd erksepa corresponding to viksipla in the Vyās a's commentary on YS, I 1. See II* 42 See also anidra and ·80 AGAMASASTRA [111. 46 ascapna in III, 36. The Commentator explains anabhosa saying that it does not appear in the form of any of its objects which are imaginary: (na kenacit kalpitena visayabhāvenāvabhāsate) Ābhāsa is praticchāyā 'reflection'. See BAP, V 36. Or it may be taken in the sense of 'appearance,' namely, the appearance of any object Ond the Commentator says . yadaivamlaksanam cittam tadā nispannam brahma brahmasvarūpena nispannam cittam bhavatity arthah Cf. IV 77 where he writes : cittasyeti yā moksäkhs ā. 'nutpattsh and on IV 80 cittasya nấcalā calanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthitır yaisā brahmasvarūpā sthitis cittasyädvayavijñånaikarasaghanalaksanā In this connexion the following may be quoted from the BA, IV 15 cittosya brahmatādıkam which BAP explains : cittasya phalam brahmabhūyādıkam It is said here that the aningana and anabhāsa citta becomes Brahman With this compare the following MU VI 24 (p 143) mănase ca viline tu yat sukham cātmasāksikam 1 tad brahma cāmitam śukram så gatir loka eva ca u Mirtyundbhattāraka as quoted in SV. p 99 nirābhāsam padam tat tu tat prāpya Vinivartate' LA IV 16 cittamātiam nuābhāsam vihāro baddhabhūmı ca 1 etad dhı bhāstam buddhair bhāsante bhāsayantı ca u X 105 (p 278) cittamātram atıkramya nırābhise sthitam phalam X 110 (p 279) cittamātram athramya pirābhāsam atikamet nuabhāsasthito yogi mahāyānam na paśyate X. 257 ir 2991.

·111. 47] AGAMASASTRA 81 tada yogi hy anābhāsaņ prajñayā paśyate jagat nimitiam vastu vijñaplır manovispanditam ca yat! atikramya tu putra me nirvikalpāſ carantı te X. 94 (p. 277) etad vibhāvayan yogi nirābhāse pratişthate ! X. 235 (p. 296). ālambālambayvigatam yadā paśyati samskrtam niſcitam cittamātram hi cittamātram vadāmy aham mātrāsvabhāvasamsthānam pratyayair bhāvavarjitam i nişthābhāvah param brahma etâm mātrām vadāmy aham x 111. 25,26. See also LA, P126. matpravacane punar mahārnate vikalpakasya manovijñānasya vyāvęttir nirvānam, Sankara on BU, IV.3.7 (p. 587) : vijñānasya nirvāṇam puruşārthah - See III, 35. IV. 29 (comm ajātam yac cittam brahmaiva jāyate), 48, 77, 80 The citta that becomes Brahınan is described in the next kārika. 47 svastham santam saniyānam akathyam slikham vilamamı ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñam paricakşate They say it rests in itself and is calm having nirvôņa ; it is unspeakable and the highest bliss, unborn, and (identical) with the knowable, which is also unborn, and is all-knowing See III. 33, IV I. The word nirvāna has different meanings, such as 'delight', 'extinction', 'cessation, disappearance', 'calmed', 'quieted'. 1 Here avastha is aimesamastha, 111 38 1201B-11 ·82 AGAMASĀSTRA (lll. 48 We may take it here in the sense of 'extinction'. The extinction of mind means the disappearance of its function of thinking (manana or cintana), in other words, the amanibhava of monas referred to above (JI, 31). and in MU, VI. 34. or viloya of monas in MBU p. 12. This is also called unmanibhāva (BBU, 4). urttikaya of citla (MU, VI. 34. p 178), and the nurodha of vijñāna (=nirvāna) in DN, I. 223 (viññānassa nirodhena). CE YV, III. 67 8 spandād bhavati citsargo nihspandad brahma šāśvatar See also MU, VJ 24 (p 143). mānase ca viline tu yat sukham câtmasāksikami tad brahma cămĮtam śukram sā gatir loka eva ca For sarvajña see III 36. The author proposed in the beginning of this chapter (III.2) to speak of non-ongination (azātı), Now having done 80 mainly with regard to Jiva and partly also to other things he concludes thus 48 na kaści) jāyate jivah sambhavo 'sya na vidyate 1 etat tad uttansam satyam yatra kincin na jāyate 11 iti gaudapādiya āgamaśāstre 'dvaitākhyam trtiyam prakaranam samāptam. No individual soul is born, nor is there any possibility of This is that highest reality where nothing is born it Here ends, in the Agamaśāstra of Gauda pada Bank Thee called 'Aircrahy. 1 See IV 71 ·BOOK IV The proposition was enunciated (III. 2), discussed (III). and finally established in the last line of the last kárskā of the last Book, and it will further be affirmed later on (IV 71) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. In order to further elucidate this view the author now beging the present Book of his Agamaśāstra. Its first two karikás form what is known in later Sanskrit works as mangalūcarana 'salutation, benediction, or prayer for success' The first kārikā is as follows. • jñānenākāšakalpena' dharmãn yo gaganapamān?, jñeyābhinnena' sambuddhas tam vande dvipadām varam 0 *Who has perfectly understood the elements of existence (dharma) that are like the sky, through the knowledge Grana) which is not different from its object (jipya) and is also like the sky, to him, to the greatest of men, I pay my homage The author here pays his homage to durpadam vara 'the greatest of men.' Who is this dvipadām vara ? The word dvipad (RV, X. 165,1: sam no astu dvipade sam catuspade) or doipada literally 'biped' means in such cases Words such as doipadām vara or dvipadanām uttama (or ogra) or dvipadottama (Pali dvipad'uttama) in compound are all synonymous. They are used both as adjectives and nouns > IV 96 with $ IV.91. IN 33, IV.88 ·84 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (IV. 1 vara) مبا As an adjective durpadam vasa is found in MB. Vanaparvan, 5145 (.narsadho durpadām varah) and also in Adiparvan, 220.36 (with reference to Dhita rástra: abhisļaust ca yat ksalluḥ samipe dvipadām In Buddhist literature, both Sanskrit and Pali, duipadottamo or dvipad'uttama in Pali or any one of the synonyms mentioned above is used to mean the Buddha (AP, 1; MSt, p 60, 1 25; SNt, 83, 995, 998. MV+*, $ 267; SS. p 8, 57, here in the last place not less than thirteen times Narottama (Pali nar’uttama) and purusollama (Pal puris'uttama) are also used specially for the Buddha [SNt, 544 (see DP, 78) 1021, MVt,2 $ 1,40, MVu. Vol II. ppa 194, 199, 232, 266). On the other hand $ takes doipadām vara to mean purusottama in the sense of Nārāyana 5 Now, which of them, the Buddha or Nārāyana, C is really meant by the author himself can be decided if we consider the subject matter of the kırıkā There are mainly two points to be discussed here First, jñāna 'knowledge' is said to be ākāšakalpa 'hke the sky,' and again it is not different from the preya 'the knowable,' ie, the object of knowledge And second, the dharmas, elements of existence' or 'things or objects are also gaganopama 'like the sky, What are we o understand by the statement that nana is like the sky) One characteristic of jñana, according to both our author and the Vijñānavādıns, 13 that it is asanga IV 72, 96) 'having no attachment, contact, or relation.' C L But + Such instances are there many See 1 50 27 5 It may be noted that so far as I know no word compounded with dorped or dorpada « found in Brahmanic literature to mean Narayana thanks to a frend who points out that derpadám uanstha which, in fact, 18 the same as dorpadīm vara is applied at least once to Nārāyana (VB Santiparban, 343 But it is to be noted that though here it refers to NiTEYRDA, no doubt this Narayana is not God (ilDura). but a sage (ru) and hence a mon, though an incarnation of the former ·ĀGAMASASTRA 85 soever. P. ie., it does not relate itself to its object, it does not cognize any object (agraha, III. 32), there being no object what. See IV. 26, 27, 72, 96, 99, and the following from LA, 157. asangalaksanam jñânam 6 Now jñāna being asanga is compared here with the sky which is also asanga See BAP, p 359: evamº nisprapancatvād ākāšavad asangam anāspadam? alesam viſam utpaśyāmah. As regards the absence of difference between jñāna and "ięya it is a well-known fact that this view is maintained by Tänavādins According to them there is no reality in aternal things. Knowable is, in fact, inside being the transformation of vijñāna, and only appears to be outside. (Dinnāga says in his Ālambanaparīksă, 6 (quoted by Sankara in his commentary on BS. II 2.28 and by Kamala sila in bis Panyikā on TS, p. 582 : yad ontarjñeya-e rüpam tad bahivad ababhāsate And Dharmak ixtti formulates it in his PV," fol 274a, 1. 7 in the following 6 Sometimes there is made a difference between jñāna and rhñäna as the following passages of the same work (LA) will show saying that pñána 18 asanga: P 157 tatrolpannapradhvame), vijanam asutpannapradhvams jäänami asangalaksanam jānam visayavaicitryasangalakkanam ca vijñānam. asangasvabhavalaksanam jūānam; aprăptılaksanam jñānam, ASP. P 399 avangalaksant subhūte prajñāpāramitā See also my.p 533, nimittaſambanam vijñānam, jñanera hi fünyatālambanena bhavitávyam, faccinufpadarūpam eveli Sce IV 96, notes ? As the editor, Poussin, kas pointed out, this reading 19 supported by the Tibetan version where we have. Thag pa.med.palasargo) gnas med (anāspada) See also BA with BAP, IX 155. The other half runs as follows so'rtho vijiinarūpat vit tatpratyayalayip See also TS,P 582 nilapitadı yaj ne bahirvad ababhisate tatra satyam ato năsta vijãeyam tatt vato bahih || * The book in an original Satiska n not yo ipond, wat there > Tibetan translation called Tsad ma them par nes pa Promānaviniscaya) in Tanjur, Mdo, G, fols 2506 6-329b 1. Cordier, 111, p 437. ca ·IV. 1) AGAMASASTRA 87 > etc. And from this it follows that in reality there is no external object as the foolish imagine," it being nothing but the trang. formation of the mind (vijñānapariņāmal owing to vāsanā," in this kārikā jñeya 'object of knowledge' is to be taken in its ordinary sense and not in its particular significations, as in }]].33, and IV.90. We are now to discuss the second point, i e., the dharmas elements of existence' are gaganopama. From the absolute point of view (paramarthatah) the external things appear only in their imposed forms having no reality at all. They have not their intrinsic existence (nihsvabhava) and as such are void (sūnya) like the son of a barten woman Hence they are gaganopama." ." śāntideva says in his BA, IX,155 : . sarvam ākāśasankāśam parigshnantu madvidhāh. *Let those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like the sky.' Why is it like the sky? Praji akaramati explains. because it is imposed and devoid of reality (samáropitatattvafünyatvāt) We read the following in ASP. P 297. cvam eva subhūte sarvadharma ākāsagatıkā ānāgatıkā agatikā ākāsasamāh yathākāśam anagatam agatam akstam avikrtam anabhısamskrtam asthitam avyavasthitam anutpannam aniruddham evam eva subhūte sarvadharma anāçatā agatā akttā avikſtā 18 LA.P 265 bahyo na vidyate by artho gatha bilar nikalpyste v&sanair luditam cittam arthabhásam pravartate | 16 Tk, 1 Atmadharmopaciro hi vividho yah pravartate! vijopaparināmo'nou ! Sthira mati writes here in his bhásya dharmantm Atmanas ca vijkinaparınmad bahurabhāvāt, 17 BAP. P 503 (with regard to ano) sto 'bhınıskpyamăpo nshavabhiyatayo Skifam fünyam eva See pp. 504-505, ·88 AGAMASASTRA [IV. 1 18 anabhısamsk tā asthitā asarnsthitā avyavasthitā anutpannā aniruddha akasakalpatvād avikalpah, See BAP. p 395, quoted above, and specially our text, IV. 93, Or because the dharmas are beyond enumeration (gananāsamatikrinta), they are gaganopama Or, it may be that as jñāna is asanga and is thus like the sky, so are asanga the dharmas, and as such they are like the sky. See IV, 96 That the sky is asanga needs no explanation One of the grounds on which this theory is based is that the things are nthsvabhava, i e , without their own nature and condition or state of being (svabhāva) And that which has not ats own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (akāía, $ūnya)." Or again, as in fact the things have naturally neither origination nor suppression, they are like the sky See LA. X. 172. aniruddhāh anutpannāh prakrtya gaganopamāhi S does not explain here as to how jñāna is akášakalpa and the dharmas are gaganopama He would, however, explain the non-difference of jñāna and jñeya saying that jñeya refers to ātman (or strictly Smansl, and jūčna is not different from atman 1! ASP, PP 278-279 sarvadharma api subhūte 'cintya atulya aprameyi asamkhyeya asamasamah sarvadharmi ana subhate 'samkhyeyå gananāsamatı kräntayāt rûpam api subhūte 'samasamam evam vedanā sambia ramek&18 vijñanam api subhote samasaman etam sarvadharmā api cubhute amacama akalasamatsāt subhute arsadharmanam BA, V 12 durjanan gaganopamās on which BAP wotes fatravo bi gaganasampalvād aparyantah 19 See BAP p 503 ato bhiniskisyamăno nabovabhavataya akaiam dünyam eva, pp 504 505 tat ko 'tra kāyah tasya pratyaveksamānasya bhavalı-skila samo 'yam kiyah sarvam etad akibam iti pafyat ·IV. 1) AGAMASASTRA 89 Now the word dharma used here in this kārikā and not less than twenty-two times in this Book," requires some *explanation. It is very widely used in such cases as the present one throughout Buddhist literature in Sanskrit and also in Pali." Figuratively it means a thing or object, a thing of which the senses or mind takes cognition and as such, it is synonym of such Sanskrit words as artha or padartha or visaya or prameya Literally it has ainong others the sense of nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, in Sanskrit svobhava or svalaksana. It is derived from v dhr 'to hold, maintain, preserve, keep' Because a thing in whatever form it may be maintains its own characteristics or essential quality (svalaksana or soabhava), it is called dharma. So we road in 6. laksanadhāranad dharmah fran.gr matshan. fiid.hdzin pahı.phyir chos te). See 304, 457 Buddhaghoşa (AS. $94, p. 391 explains the term in the following words : (i) attano pana sabhavam dhārantiti dhamma, fit) dhāriyanti vă paccayehi, (:) dhāriyanti vā yathasabhāyato'ti dhammā.** According to it rasa, sparta, etc, are dharmas, Only these are there and not also dharmins 'those endowed with or having a dharma.' as the Buddhists hold unlike such non-Buddhist philosophers 18 Naiyāzikas and Varseikas, according to whom earth, or jars, etc , are dharmans, while their qualities, i c., hardness küthinya), etc are dharmas In Buddhist philosophy it is only the quality of tangibility called "hardness' (köthinya. sporta) that is regarded as existent, but AKB, P MV. pp 18 IV. I, 6, 8, 10, 21. 33, 41, 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 96, 9, 99 It 10 used also in 11 25 and III 1. but evidently in meaning diferent from that in Boot IV 11 For instance, ASP, D 39 taryadharmi api deraputri miyopamih trapnopamih; DP, 279 (Maggavagga, 71 sabbe dhammi anata'ti * It is thus translated in Es, p53 "Dharmes may be defined as those ble, which bear their own intrinsic Datures, of which are bome by caunchin elation, of which are borne according to their own characteristico" 12010.-13 1 ·90 ĀGAMTASĀSTRA IV. 1 there is no entity excepting it that we call earth, or the element of carth. As ya deva says in his CS, 309. kathinā dréyate bhūmih să ca kāyena gihyate I tena hi kevalam sparso bhūmir ese tr kathyale " 'It is seen that the carth is hard and that is perceived with one's body. Thercfore it is said that the earth is only the quality of tangibility Thus, as says Stcherbatsky in his Central Conception of Buddhism, p 26, 'If we say "earth has odour, etc.." it is only an inadequate expression, we ought to say "earth 15 odour, etc," since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to "" It is also to be borne in mind in this connexion that in the absolute truth there is nothing as avayacın 'one having portions as in other systems It is owing to this fact that expressions like the following are found in Buddhist works năstiha sattva atmā vā dharmāstv ete sahetukah 1 ºs This theory of dharma seems to be exactly the same as that of the tattua of the Sankhyas The word tattoa (tat-tua) literally h sa 23 This 19 a reconstructed verse from Tibetan which runs ni brtan shes bya bar mthon de yani lus.kyi, hdzin par hgyur des ne reg pa hbah shig hds 1 HR ho shes ni , bya bar brjod | See V, 82 AK and AKVI I 33 (p 69) 'prthvidhatuh katarak khakkhalatvam i vetarsh, MV pp 66-67 tha tu kathinyadivyatırıktaprthivyady asambhave sati na yukto višesyavisesanabhävahevam prthivyi dinam yady apı kāthinyädıvyatırktam vicăryamānam laksyam nästi, laksyavyatı rekena ca laksanam hirfrayam tathāpi samyitir cveti YB, 16. khalkhatatvam. katamat, prthivi This view is found also in the Garbhopanised, I tatra yat kathanam să prthivi # He quotes here the following from AKV, IX 717 putbyi gandhavatīty ukte rūpa gandha sparíebhyo ninyad darsayttum sakyatc CI Soul Theory, p 742 * Quoted in MV, P 355 as a təying of the Bhagavat ·IV.1) AGAMASASTRA 91 means 'thatness,' i.e., 'the state of that (referring to a thing) and hence it signifies 'nature (svabhāva)' or 'true nature.' Thus, in fact, tattva is a guna, yet each of the twenty-five categories in the system is considered as a tativa (pañcaviñati tattva), and not tattvavat 'having tattoo. When the threc gunas, viz., saltva, rajas, and tamas, are in cqual condition (såmyāvasthā), they ase collectively called prakti. 11 is itself a taftua, it has no lattua." It consists in the three guņos, it has no guna, though sometimes even in authontative works it is loosely said that it has three gunas Thus it is a well-known fact that teachers belonging to other systemu say that in Sāmkhya there is no difference between a guna and a gunin or dravya" (gunadravyayos tādātmyam), or between a dharma and a dharmın (dharma-dharmiņoz abhedah)," Says Ašvaghosa (BCK, XN 76) : gunino hi gunặnăm ca vyatreko na vidyate | rūpoşnabhyām virahito na by agır upalabhyate ! * Sce Tattvayātharthyadipani included in the Samkhyasamgraha (Chenkhamba Sansknt Sesses), pp. 72 93 tattyänits tantrıki wom;&. tadarthal citmintmarrekagratıyogyanuyoginas 2a!la!padinhah test bhovah tete tatpadanimittäni putusalveprakstitvadını pascavimhatjátayah dharmadharmy. abhedad vyaktayo 'pi tattvinity veyale ?? Vasuvandhu gives (AK, IX 290, the following definition of dratya rejecting that of the Vastekas vidyaminan dravyan isi Yalomits. adds yat svalakisnata vidyamīnam tad draryan He doce not accept the portion that smrti, samskära, recha, etc, are gunas vs held by Vulepikus (bid) See AK, III 100 - But V18 nabhik su who is undoubtedly much in Ruenced by the Nyiya agd Vailesika systems writes the following in bis commentary on SS, 1.6) was a padcavitatiko Bano drayyarpa en. dharmadharayabhedal tu gunakarmasminyidinim strajintarbhiynh / 167, dharmadharmyıbhedad draryin to epi tanmirateru # See Vilan.bhiksu on SS, 11 5 where the following is quoted: faktitaktiraator bhedan paſyanti Dataminhatah abhedaro daupatyanu yoginse taltvacintolth ·92 ĀGAMASASTRA (IV. 1 It may be noted in this connexion that Vasubandhu in his Vijñānamātasiddhi applies the term dharma to the tatlvas of the Sankhyas (O Rosenberg) " It is not that in Brahmanical works the word dharma is not used in the above sense. For instance, see KU, I. 1.21. anur esa dharmah 30 Yāsk a (Nt, I. 20) writes sāksātkrtadharmanah Here the word dharman differs from dharma only in form and not also in sense, as the former, too, means artha or padartha 'a thing' Vācas pati explains in his Talparyatikā the word saksātkstadharman used by Vätsyāyana (NS, I 1.7), saying sudrdhena pramānenāvadhārıtā arthā yena sa sāksātkrtadharmā Evidently he takes here dharman in the sense of artha, Vyãos a in his commentary on YS, I 17, explains drbya by buddhisattvopārūdhāh sarve dharmāh In our present Book here and in other places $ tahes dharma to mean atman But this seems be forced To imply atman author every case atman Why should he employ in this chapter dharma for it? Undoubtedly these two terms are well-known in their meanings So there is no ground for giving preference to such a word as dharma in the sense of alman In all the twenty-two cases in the present Book dharma is casily construed in the sense of a thing.' literally an element of existence' Buddhist literature But while of them s takes the word to mean atman, others he could not do so In some cases he did not explain the word at all, and certainly the meaning atman cannot be accepted to L Our uses in 31 or jiva as in in some in * Stcherbateky The Central Conception of Buddhiom. p. 27, n 2 # The commentator, $ explains the word dharma here saying atmakhya dharma Undoubtedly atman is a dharma as we have seen But certainly it 1. not the actual meaning of the word though it may be implied with reference to the context See also KU, III Nevam dharman prthat paiyan 11 Sec for a man I 12 11 12, 17, III 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, forsical 16, 111 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 43, IV 63, 68, 69, 70 ·IV. 1] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 93 in them. For instance, in the text sarve dhammā mrsā svapne (IV. 33) the word dharma can in no way mean átman. In two cases he explains it saying hastyadin bāhyadharmin (IV, 41), and bāhyadharmāh (IV, 54). Once he writes ātmāno 'nye ca Jharmaḥ (IV.58). In one case (IV. 82), however, he gives the actual sense, i.e., vastu 'thing" It can further be shown from the words of the author himself that in meaning dharma and bhāva (=vastu - padartha) are identical, See the following passages : (1) ajátasyaiva bhāvasya (III. 20%) and ayātasy aiva dharmasya (IV.6"). (ii) ajáto hy amita bhāvaḥ (III. 20") and ajấto hy.ampto dharmaḥ (IV.6"). (rit) svabhāvenārrto yasya bhāvah (!!! 22nd) and svabhāve. nāmsto yasya dharmah (IV. 70-). It is to be noted that while bhāva is used only in the second and third Books" of the work, dharma in the above sense is used 'only in Book IV, and this is very significant indicating the Buddhist relationship of the subject dealt with in it There is one thing more It is said in the kārikā that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly understood the dharmas Here if he is meant to be Nārāyana one would naturally ask · What is the authorsty for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that Nārāyaṇa is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first kankā, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, 18 in favour of the Buddha. 11 The text is. yasya kasya ca dharmasya, and S explains yanya karyacid yaxtanah. This reading is in the MS ca of Anandashrama ed, the other readings add duaya- before cartanah » Kirkas II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 33, end 1] 20, 22.

·94 AGAMASĀSTRA (IV.2 2 In the second kārikā the author salutes the teacher of the asparśayoga: asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitah avivādo viruddhaś ca desitas taſ namāmy aham I salute him (who has) taught the asparśayoga which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition I'construe the kankā taking yena 'by whom' as understood. thus Giffenng a little from the commentator, S, who says that it is the asparíayoga that is saluted here In the kānkā avivada refers to the fact that our theory is not contradicted by theories of other schools, and auruddha implies that it involves no self-contradiction or is not against any other position held by us Now what is the asparśayoga, by whom and where has it been taught) The word does not occur in the Upanisads, though $ says on III 39. where also it is described, that it is well-known in the Upanrads (prasiddham uparisatsu! See also 111 37, 39 The following is found in kl. 18 3 10 yada pañcavatısthante jäänāni manasa saba buddhisca na vicesiate tām ahuh paramām gatimi When the five finstruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind and when the intellect does not move. that is called the highest state' Similar storements are met with in other l'panisads But though they in fact may point to what as will presently be explained it is not termed aspariayoga 1 called asparsayoga For instance, BBW, 46, WU, VI 34 See kirikz. 111 38 ·IV.2) AGAMASASTRA 95 The word aspartayoga literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch. The author himself says (II1, 37) it is a samadhi 'profound or abstract concentration,' it is very difficult to realize. It points to what is asamprajñita samadhi (YS, I. 2, 18, 51 with the scholiast Vyasa).' or nervikalpa samadhi (PD, II. 28) of yogins. But nowhere in their systems, so far as my information goes, it is called asparfayoga.' Why is it that the word asparsa is used here? I am inclined to think that it refers to the ninth or the last of the nine dhyinas or meditations called anupūrvavihára (Palı anupubbavihära) or the successive states of dhyāna which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts.' They are as follows: 1. Four sūpa dhyānas or the meditations of which rupa *matter is the object, viz (1) prathama dhyāna or the first stage of meditation (i) dvitiya dhyāne or the second stage of meditation. (in) titiya dhyāna or the third stage of meditation (iv) caturtha dhyāna or the fourth stage of meditation. 11. The four arūpa dhyānas or the meditations of which the object is not matter, vi — (1) akášānantyāyatana (Palı akâsânacqyalana) or the place of infinity of space > Vyksi erplans YS, I, 21 na lalra kracit empraz yata ity esampranatab 'as nothing is known there it is called esampratta' # Casparsasamutprapt used in explaining sclerüpalabha in the fallowing line of the VV. P 42 svarūpalsbhah amalakalpanotimafyad aktakaniravaksta nurutlara nistaranga-huravadhi nimiketispatjasamvitpríptit bhavant This is kindly pointed out to me by Dr S N Sen Cupra of the Lucknow University The following occurs in the same work ip 4) in the course of the explanation of mahafênyatiprocela, kulskulasıkalpadorojhito'ryapadely. mahtnirivarana niratyava vedyavedaka-niryukto vartvamanirramottirna sparks parda pisthopenvarjita upacio paramiliudyabhidhinair abhidhyade, AN. Vol IV, pp 410-419 navs fime bhikkhave Anupubben. GAVE yime bhikkhave anupubbavsharauam patito desissimi, tam sunarha, ·96 AGAMAŠASTRA [IV.2 (ii) vijnanānantyāyatana (Pali viññanancãº) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness. fil) akıncanāyatana (Pali akiñcañña") or the place of nothingness. (iv) noivasamiña-năsamjñāyatana (Pali nevasaññānāsañña) or the place neither of consciousness nor of unconsciousness, And the ninth is samjñāveditanirodha (Palı saññāvedayıtanitrodha) or the cessation or complete suppression of conscious. ness and sensation As in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation not only sensation or consciousness, but also all the mental properties or 'mentals (cartta or caitasika dharmas), headed by sparsa (Pal phassa) contact,'s are restricted or suppressed with the citta or mind itself, it is called asparśayoga It is to be noted that the word sparsa employed here implics also the other mentals of which it is the first The cessation of vedana is possible only when sparsa ceases, as is clearly shown in the SN. IV. p 220 (XXXVI 154) phassasamudayā vedanāsamudayo phassanırodhā vedanānirodho It means that sparsa is the cause of vedaná, so when there is sparsa there is vedana. and when there is no sparsa there is no vedanā The fact that in this state of nurodha (which is the same as asampranata or nurbiya or nurvikalpa samadhi) the mind and its properties (citta and caifta or cartasika) completely cease to work is clearly described by Buddha ghosa in his VM1, p 552' It is said II 39) that asparśayoga is very difficult to realize From this very fact the word asparśayoga may be explained 5 AAS, 11 2 phasto vedanā saññā catana' cetas,kā sabbacittacadharani năma For vs explanation see Subarnmation Tk. p 20, 1l 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, p 29, ? 18 ka nurodhacamāpat its vă anupubbanurodhavasena cittacelasikinom dhammānan appavati See also SN, Vol I. p 217 (2XXXVI 11 51 saknāvedayıtanırodham samāpannasa safía ca vedană ca niruddha hontı ·IV.2) AGAMASASTRA 97 quite in a different way. In Buddhist Sanskrit works there is frequent use of such words as sparsaothāra (Afvt', 8349, 8351; Tk, p. 28, II. 18). sparśavihārată (MVP, 6288), and asparsarihara (AAA, p. 326 : Tk. p. 28. 11. 17, 19; p. 30, 11. 15. 20). Sthira mati explains the last word in his commentary on Tk, p. 28. 1. 18. saying: sparsah sukham tena sahito vihāraḥ sparsavihărah, na sparsavihāro 'sparśavihãrah. He says that sparsa means sukha 'joy, content, ease, comfort'; sparšavihara is a state with it; and asparsavihāra is its opposite. In Tibetan sparsaoihāra is translated by bde gnas pa, literally the Sanskrit equivalent to which is sukhasthil lor sukhavasthitt) 'pleasant state.' In Pali sparsavihāra is phäsuvihara in the same meaning in this light asparśayoga in sense is nothing but asukhayoga (a-sukhayoga) meaning thereby 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease. This explanation is fully supported by what we know of it in II. 39. It is very difficult to realize and yogins shrink from it secing fear though in fact there is no fear, We read in the present kánkä that this yoga conduces to happiness of all beings (sarvasattvasukha). This is found also in Buddhist works where it is said (SN, Vol IV.p 228=XXXIV 19 20)" that the highest bliss is felt in the saññāvedayitanirodha lor sammāvedayita' according to the Chinese version samma= samyg) $ It is, however, to be noted that, strictly speaking, Pali phase is not from Sanaknt sparsa the Pali form of which is phassa. In Northern Sansknt Buddhist works Pali phasa is wrongly translated into Sanskrit by #parla Sec the Pali Dictionary of Childers, p 932 Sometimes in Buddhist Sanskrit Bokhasparlac hara is found for phasanhārg It clearly indicates that the writers of the former did not think that mere sparsacthara could imply the sense of phagocthara . idhinanda bhikkhu sabbaso nevaraikinisabafyatanam kamatikkamma sababvedayitaniodham upasampazja viharatı idam kho Ananda cumha sukha atlam sukham abhikkantataram ca panitataram ta. See also the next paragraph 21) for the reply to question thised here. CAN, Vol IV. pp 414 418 1:01B-13 ·IV.21 AGAMAŠASTRA 99 . rising up We know from it that in the stage of mirodhasamāpatti the citta or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever, But in the stage called vyutthāna one has three kinds of sparsa 'experience,' known as aniñjya, akiñcanya, and animitta. The word sparsa in such cases means 'experience' or 'that which is experienced', V5073 meaning here to experience.'' Now, because in the yoga called nirodhasamāpatti there is no sparta of anything, it is rightly named osparsayoga. It is said (III 39c-d) of the asparsayoga that yogins or rather untrained ones shrink back from it. imagınıng fear where in reality there is no fear yogino bibhyali hy asmad abhaye bhayadarsingh. But what is the cause of their fear? $ tightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self " Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, 1e. saññavedayıtanirodha before his parinirvana. Ananda took him to be dead But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one only having entered the stage of the dhyana called saññāvedayttanırodha, After a short time, however, He passed away " It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death. Yet there is a real difference between death and asparsayoga or sannävedayitanirodha, and Buddhaghosa has explained it in his VM. P 558, quoting a passage from the Suttapitaka It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same excepting this that in the latter the heat of the body is not 12 Sec KnUI, IV-2: te hy enan nediştham paspríuh (te hy enat prathama vidācicakára-thie portion it grammatically defective and not in the Jominiya Brāhmana, Chapter X which forms the KnU). 3 sa hy enları nedisthan pasparsa. sa hy chał prathamo vdašcakāpe 13 Emaniküpam iman yogam manyamāna bhayam kurvantı 14 Mahapartnibbängtutta, VI, 8 9 (DN, VO! !). pp 156 158) ·IV.3.4] ACAMASASTRA 101 There are two classes of teachers: one (i.e., the followers of the systerns of the Sankhya and the Vedānta') holding the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause (satkāryavada), and the other (i e., the Naiyāyikas and the Vaisesikas“) maintaining the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause (asatkāryavida). The author refers to these two views in the third kārika which runs as follows: 3 . . bhūtasya jấtim icchanti vadinah kecid eva hii abhūtasyāpare dhirā vivadantah parasparam 1 "There are only certain disputants who maintain that jāti 'origination is of a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is of a thing which is non-existent: Thus they dispute with each other' 1 See SK, IX; BS. 1 14 18 with $, Son BU, I 2 2. (p 20 karyasya hi sato jiyamanasya karane saty utpaftidartangt Among the Buddhists the Vaibhaskas maintain sotkāryarada Sec CS, 1X 15 and our tex., IV. !!, note? I See NK, PP 143 ff Among the Buddhists Saufrântikas and Yogécāras hold agatkóryavāda CS, X 15 The interpretation of the words bhūta and abhäta by $ in the text here is quite diferent from that in ]]] 23, and it is very remarkable The Ācārya now proceeds to niention in the next kārıkā the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute 'non-becoming' (ajātı) of things: bhūtam na jāyate kiőcid abhūtam naiva jāyate vivadanto 'dvayā hy eyam ajătim khyāpayanti te } This "That which is already existent does not come into being and that which is non-existent does not also come into being:

·102 AGAMAŠASTRA (IV.4 3 disputing thus the followers of the doctrine of advaya assert absolute non-becoming (ajāti) Before discussing the meaning of the kārikā it is to be noted that the reading that can reasonably be accepted in c is not vivadanto draya as in many editions, but vivadanto'dvaya with our MS. M', and some editions It is supported also by the commentary in those editions, as well as by the MIS. Ka used in the Anandasram edition of 1900 The word adoaya in the kārıkā is, in fact, identical in meaning with Advayavādın, which is well-known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit as one of the names for the Buddha ? Some of the commentators of Amk explain advaya in advayavādın as adparta : But there is a marked chifference between the two terms advartavada and advayavāda, while the former literally means the theory of non-difference, 1 e., the nondifference between, or identity of (according to the school of $) Jiva and Brahman, the latter means the theory of 'nontwo', re, neither of the two extreine views The two (dvaya) or the two extreme views are as follows: The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist He rejects both of these two extreme views and propounds his view taking a middle path (mahumā patipadā or madhyamna protipod) So according to 1 Such as of Mahesacandra Pila, Calcutta, Saka 1806 Durg carana Sankhyavedániaturtha Calculta. 1331. BS and Gita Press, Gorakhpur 1993 VS Amk, 1 1 14, MV 33. DA p 95 buddhānam bhagavatām mahakanu Rikanām advayasadınām in the index of words to the last work, the word adcartavadın 19 wrongly written 3 For instance, Bhinuvidiksita advayam advastam vadanty avasyam, Kira s vam advayam viöönádsaltam vadaty arafyam Advayavādın, the cxact Tibetan equivalent of which is gfiis su med. pa gsun ba, and Chinese push yu, both literally meaning one who says trisunderstood in the Sanskrit Tibeton English Vocabulary (lemoirs of the Agrabic Society of Bengal Vol IV. 1913, p 2. for the word can no way mean 'not doutful in his command as it is explained there not two 15 ·IV. 4) AGAMASĀSTRA 103 him nothing is existent, nor is anything non-existent; nothing comes into being (anutpada), nor does anything disappear anirodha): nothing is eternal (atàsvata), nor has anything an end (anuccheda); nothing is identical (eka), nor anything differentiated (aneka); nothing moves hither (anogama), and nothing moves thither (anırgana). This advoyavāda is found throughout the Buddhist sacred hterature both in Sanskrit and Palı." That the reading in c of the kārkā must be with the word advayāḥ and not doayah will . So says Nagarjuna, NIV. p. 11 annadham anutpidam anucchedam allvala! anekartham an Inditham andgamam anirgamam yah pratſtyasamutpidam prepafcopafamam sivam i defayamisa sambuddhastam vande vadatim varam astîu ksiyapa ayam eko'nto nixtity ayam dvitiyo'ntah yad adayor dvayor antayor madhyam uyam ucyate kalyapa madhyami pratipad dharmioim bhūtapratyaveksi KP, $60 (p 90) See MV. 270. yad bhoyasi katyayangyan loko 'statim vibhinivisto nistuia cu tena na parmucyale Katydyanacolada quoted in MV, p 269 So writes Nagarjuna katyayaniversde cisti(t) nIstiti cobhayan pratusiddham bhagavalt bhavibhivavibh vina ; MK, XV 7 aslitvam ye tu palyanti nistatyam cilpabuddhayah bhavinim te na patyanti drastavyopaliman divam MK, V 8 ummidichi sammidirhita bhante vuccati kittivati ou kho bhante sammidhi hotili. dvayanissito khu fyam kaceſyana loko yebhuyyena atthitam ceva na'tthitam C SN, (1, p 17 (XII 15) lokasamudayam kho kacciyana yathabhatam sammappabliya passato ya loke na'tthu A na hot lokanirodham kho kacetyana yatha bhatam vammappaiya paralo ya loke atthus af na holi' sabban athri kho kacc yana ayam eko anto rabbam natthili ayam dutivo ento. cte te kacelyans ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathipato dhammam deseta SN, II, 17 XIJ 151 nityam itiktiyspa ayam eko 'plah anatyam it kilyapa ayap dvilyo niah yad elapor duas or pilysnitynyor madhyam tad arups andarlanan! Imetl kalyapa ayam ekonal narratmyam } #yo'na yod 573894375myayor madhyam tad, samkleta ste kalyapa ayan eko intal pinadinam Hy syam kiyape dico'ntak go'sylatadvagasy Enaperums Text onarmat but see ·104 AGAMASASTRA [IV.4 further be perfectly clear to anyone when one considers that in the preceding kārkā two classes of teachers are referred to, who hold the theory of origination (jātivida). According to one of them the origination is of the existent, while in accordance with the other, it is of the non-existent These teachers are duartins 'advocates of dualism', riz.. the Samkhyas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vase kas The teachers alluded to in the present kārkā are, however, quite of a different view. They do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the non-existent, but assert that there is no origination at all (ajátım khyāpayanti te) Thus the teachers alluded to in kärıkās 3 and 4 are different, though Ś takes them to be idential As is evident, the main subject of this chapter is the theory of non-origination (ayatıvada) In different systems of Indian philosophy it is held that things around us have their origination, in other words, they are produced, they have their causes, they themselves being their effect But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different view emphatically denying the origination of anything in the world. Thus the first sentence of Nāgārjuna's V1K begins with anirodham "Tib version khas mincinº nudahāro pravs ahāra lyam ucyale kasy apa madhyamā praspad dharmádam bhūtapratyavelsa KP. PP 86-89 astiti năstit) ubhe pi antă suddhi afuddhita ume piantā tasmad ubhe anta siva'jayitvā madhye pisthanam na karoti panditah astiti năstiti visada csa suddhi asuddhiti ayam nädah! visadaprāptyá na dukham prasāmyate ayt adaprāpts a ca dukham nirudhyate SR p 30, quoted in MV pp 135, 270 bhāvābhāvadarśanadvayaprasango yávat tavat samsāra ty Avetya surnuksubhas etaddarśanadvayanıt.sena sadbhur madhyamnă pratipad bhivadiya yathavad u MV, p 276 Sec the whole of chap.er XV ·IV.41 AGAMASASTRA 105 anutpidan 'having neither origination nor suppression. This anutpada is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let here be quoted only a few lines in translation from that book together with the commentary of Candrakirtti (MK, 1. 1 with MV, p. 12): 'Now the Ācārya, thinking the facility in refuting nirodha, after ulpāda is refuted, begins first with the refutation of the latter. Utpada of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself, or something other than it, or both, or again, from one which is no cause at all. But in no way it can be justified So he (the Ācārya) says : "Nowhere and never are such things as are produced cüher from themselves, or from some other things, or from both, or from what is no cause at all." 17. This non origination is asserted again and again in the same work and sometimes in identical words. na svato jāyate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate na svataḥ parataí caiva yāyate jāyate kutah MK, XXI 13, See XXIII 20. 'Athing does not come into being from itself, nor from other (=not-itself), nor from both, itself and other How can it come into being?' CA For the order of these two words see Candrukirito (IV. p 12) nurodhasya pirvamo praisedha utpada zırodhayoh pour paryk. vasthyth siddhyabhavam dyotayitam aksyarı b (MK. XI 3, MV, P 221) pūrva pur yadı bhaves jarimacangin attarm Our Author, Gaudapeda, too, bas lollowed the sam: order on hit widely qusled kirika <!!! 32) au grodho nu cotpatih idinim upidapratiedhina nirodhspratiedhassukaryon manyamina Idiryah prathamam evolpidaprafixedham Irabhale utpido hi paraih talpy minah svalo ve pankalpyeta parata ubhayalo 'hetuto vi pankalpyeta harvatha cu nopepadyata iti nikity tha na svato nip, parato na dvibhyim nipy ahetutab 1 utpenni flu vidyante bhiyah krscana kecanay MK, I. 1: AV, p. 12 12018.-14 ·106 AGAMASASTRA [IV.4 Compare this with the following line from our kārikā, IV. 22 which speaks for itself: svato vā parato văpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate 1 "Nothing is produced either from itself or from other." For further details one may be referred to MK, 1 and XXIII with MV; CŚ. XV. See also our kārkā, IV. 22. That there is no jālı or utpada 'origination is thus maintained also in a short line of the BA, IX. 106: evam ca sarvadharmănăm utpattır nāvasiyate," *Thus the ongination of all things is not known' The first half of the present kārkā is undoubtedly based on such statement as the following of Nāgārjuna (MK, I. 6). naivāsato naiva satah pratyo'rt'hasya yujyate asatah pratyayah kasya satas ca pratyayena kım a' For the wording in b of the kārıkā (abhūtam naiva jāyate) see CS, 373* (XV 23) nābhūto nāma jāyate See here also Candrakirtti on CŚ, 366 (XV 16) atraha pălo na jāyate ajāto 'pi na jāyate It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of non-origination is fully discussed S explains the first half of the present kārıkā as follows bhūtam vidyàmānam vastu na jāj ate vidyamānatvād evaº. tathā abhūtam avidyamānam avidyamānatvãn naiva jāyate ſaíayısānavat. 'The thing which is already existent does not (again) come into being owing to its very existence And the thing that is 10 na ТВАР tuns here evam eva yathoditanyāyena sarvadharmidim sarvabhāvanām utpattır utpado nāvasiyate na pratīyate See the same work. pp 355 € ca svaparobhayahetunibandhanem aheturbandhanam và bhavasys janmitupefalam upapadyate Here the subject is discussed to a great extent See MA, VI 58 MV. pp 82-83 10 Reconstructed from the Tibetan version hdır ras. pa skyen pa 1 skye la ma olyes. pa. yan mi, skye ste!

·IV.5) ACANASĀSTRA 107 not existent does not come into being on account of its being non-existent, as, for instance, the horn of a hare." Gauda pada refers to the doctrine of gāti in the present kärikä, and accepts it in the next which runs as follows: 5 khyāpyamānām ajătim tair anumodămahe vayam 1 vivadāmo na taiḥ sārdham avivādam mbodhata "We cipress our approval of ajīti which they declare;, we do not dispute with them, and Jasten how there cannot be, any dispute k is to be noted here that Gauda påders Vedantist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-ongination of the Advayavădins or Buddhists expressing his approval He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his Vedantist followers to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed Like the Sankhyas, the Nalyāyikas, and the Varseşikas, etc. the Vedantists. are originally believers in the doctrine of origination, as is evident from the BS, 1 1 2 ( janmādy asya yatah. 'From whom are the origination, etc of this', which is based on such statements of the Upanrads as TL', DI 1. : yato vă imani bhūtāni jātániº tad Brahma, 'That is Brahman from whom these beings are originated' The reality of this origination or creation is denied later on in the school of $ in the absolute truth. This due to the doctrine of Gauda pada who invites here his followers to listen as to how IS 11 Buddhapilit. quoted in MV. p 14 na svata dipadywle bhivah, Jadupadaviyar hyd slipasargoderic <, pa bryltmans vidyumininin pedantisip pararutpade preronna 21 atha wan apliyeta na kadica pa treta

·110
AGAMASASTRA
[IV.8
birth, or the immortal becomes mortal, evidently it undergoes
a change. But no change of nature is possible. The kārıkā
runs :
8
svabhāvenāmịto yasya dharmo gacchati martyatāmi
krtakenāmrtas tasya katha sthāsyati niſcalah ?
'Hoy can he, accoding to whom a thing which is naturally
inmortal becomes mortal', maintain that an immortal thing,
when it becomes artificial', will remain changeless?'
The following may here be quoted from Nāgārjuna's
MK, XV 1-2 in which one should note the word krtaka.
na sambhavah svabhāvasya yuktah pratyayahetubhıh i
hetupratyayasambhūtah svabhāvah krtako bhavet
svabhāvah krtako nāma bhavisyati punah katham
akrtrimah svabhāyo hu nirapeksab paratra ca i
I Sec III 22
? That is, taken birth See note 2 on IV 6
The word krtaka in the kinki 'a) is to be explained taking it as noun,
1c, ktokatva just as the word onāde in IV 14 15 evidently for anaditiva
Anandagin lends hts support wasting (11122) krtakeheti krtakatvanya,
yat krtakam tad anityam itu ci Siyan who explains manasaapat
TA, VII 6) as 'palitoa
. Itssems that our author had these kinkis of Nagarjuna to his mind
while waiting his own and he has unconsciously written bertuka instead of
bertolatria » »requued

·V.9) ĀCAMASASTRA in order to explain as to how nature (oraksti or svabhāva) cannot change Gaudapáda proceeds to define it in the next karika 9 sārņsiddhikr svābhāviki sahajapy akſtā ca ya l prakrtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvam na jahāti yā i 'That is to be known nature (prakrti) which is self-ezistent,' natural, innate. not artificial and one that does not give up its own being.' As regards suabhāva Candrakirtti explains it follow. ing Nāgarjuna in his MV, pp. 264-265, that it is nothing but always non-origination (sarvadānutpăda eva). He says that by svabhāva we are to understand that which 19 independent of other (paranirapeksa) and as such not arbficial lakstrima). and thus having no existence before it does not come into being Inot abhülvā bhavah). Therefore the soabhāva of fire is nothing but its non-origination (anutpăda), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having no existence at forst'. 1 The word simuddhika may also mean that whkh comes into being olmultaneously (nahe ziponnel as solated by Gaudopide and Milhar. Cheuthamba Sanskrit Series, No 256) in theu commentanter on SK, XLIII of Ifratakan? Tatra vitsiddhika yalha bhagavatah tapılasyldıwarge utpady.. minanya catviro bhivah sehotpannih The explanation of Sin ** Follow umyal siddhili usmsiddhis tatrs bhavi simuddhiki yathi yog'nım animidyelivuryapilptih praksa + MV, p 2651 satyadonutpide eva hy pyidinim parentrepekpatid akştrimetvit tabhiya ity veyale, ·112 ĀGAMASASTRA (IV. 10-11 Now having shown that there is no origination of anything the author proceeds to say in the next kānika that there is also neither decay nor passing away: 10 jarāmarananirmuktāh sarve dharmāḥ svabhāvatah | jarāmaranam icchantaś cyavante tanmanisayā || 'All things are by nature free from old age' (decay) and death' (passing away). So the persons who believe in old age' and death' are reborn owing to their that very thought.' That there can be neither jarā nor marana is very elaborately established by Nagarjuna in his MK, XI 3ff, from which we cull the following two couplets ( 3 and 4): pūrvam jātır yadı bhavej jarāmaranam uttaram! nirjarārnarana jātır bhavej jāyeta cāmrtah u paścā, jātır yadı bhave, jarāmaranam ādıtahi ahetukam ajătasya syāj jarāmaranam katham For further details readers are referred to the original text of Nāgarjuna with MV The author attacks the doctrine of jāte from different points of view and refutes it in the following way referring first to the followers of the Sāmkhya system who hold the theory of actual existence of an effect in its cause (satkaryavada) 11 kāranam yasya vai kāryam kāranam tasya Jayate i jayamānam katham ajam bhinnam nityam katham ca tat Charot '(lt is to be admitted by him) according to whom the cause itself is the effect, that it is the cause that takes birth (ie., is See notes on IV 3 and SK, IX ·IV. 11] AGAMASASTRA 113 produced). And in that case how is it that the thing which takes birth and is thus different (from the effect) can be regarded as unborn (aya) and how it can be permanent ?" In the Sankhya system prakrti or pradhana is held to be the first or original cause (mula karana). It is ‘unborn' (aja) and permanent (nitya). From it other things are gradually produced This view is criticized in this and the following kārikās by our author. The point is that there must be some difference between that which is produced and thiat which is not produced (sāyamana and aya) Sexplain the word bhinna in a different way paying that it means 'ren asander", "divided into paris' or 'opened' (endirna, sphufita) implying thereby 'subject to some change' And that which admits of any kind of change cannot be permanen". can The Identity of cause and effect may be wewed from two different points, viz., the cause is not other than the effect (küryäbhinnan karanam). or the effect is not other than the cause (kūraņābhinnam käryam) But in neither case the Sāmkhya system be defended. The object of the first viewpoint is shown in the present kanka 'which says. If the cause is not different from the effect then it is to be admitted that it is the cause (and not the cffect) that 'takes birth' Gayate) and thus, if you accept it, the cause cannot be regarded as unborn. (aya), as you hold it to be Now, in order to avoid this difficulty one may follow the second point of view saying that the effect being not different from the cause the former is as aja as the latter; and thus one cannot say that the cause is not aya The author, however. says in the next kārika that this arguinent, too, cannot be accepted : 1201B-15 ·114 AGAMAŠASTRA {IV. 12-13 12 käranäd yad' ananyatvam atah kāryam ajam yadi jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇam te katham dhruvam If you hold that the effect is also unborn' (aya), for there is no difference of it from the cause (which is aja), then, how is it, in your opinion, that the cause is permanent when the effect is produced "'? 1 The reading should be here yad and not yadı as discussed elsewhere ? S explains c saying that how it is that the cause being not different from the effect, that_13, being produced, can be permanent jấyamānād dhı vai kāryāt karanar1 ananyan nityam dhruvam ca The author offers further grounds : 13 ajās vai jāyate yasya dỊstāntas tasya nāsti vai 1 Jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate 11 'There is no illustration to give) for him who holds that a thing is produced from what is unborn (On the other hand, if it is maintained that a thing is born from what is born, then there follows no finality, it leads to an endless series of causes (anavastha)' with Here in the text in d na is to be taken with vyavastha (as na tyarosthu - ovyotasthi = orauastha) and not Prasadyate $ explains na vyavastha prasajyate anavasthānam syad ity arthah The second half of the kārıkā means that if As produced from which you take as produced (jāta), by the very fact that it is produced it must have been produced 1 That 13, existing from all eternity ·IV. 13-14) ÄGAMASASTRA 115 from one C. and C, too, in the same way must have been produced from one D, and so on. Thus it is impossible to ascertain the ultimate cause of a thing.' . Cf. Candrakirkti ( MV, p 15): na ca vidyamdaasya punar titpattau prayojanam palyimah, anavas!hau ca patysmah; AKV (quoled an MV. p 13) utpannasya punar ulpaltau kalpyaminiyim anayasthaprasangah, MA (quoted In MV. p. 13). Salasya janma purar eva ca naiva juktam; SS, p 262 (from ASP). kim punar yusman subhate utpanno dharma utpatsyata utānutpannah. subhūtir tha näham Syusman sniputra utpannasya dhartaasyolpattim icchimu na canutpannayyeti, Cs, 260: sambhaval kriyate yarga prak so'stiti na yugate! salo yad: bhave) jarma jātasyžpı bhaved bhavah ! In support of this ajalıvāda the author offers further arguments : 14 hetor ādth phalam yeşām ādır hetuh phalasya ca i hetoh phalasya cānādih katham tair upavarnyate ! *How can those who hold that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, describe that there is no beginning of the cause and the effect?' In c anādi means 'absence of beginning' (ader abhacah). $ explains it by anādilea. Cj. krtaka in IV &c Let u9 take here an crample (IV 20) As regards a secd (bija) and its sprout forkuro ! is said that they have no beginning, for it cannot be ascertained as to whether the sccd was first and then the sprout, or the sprout was first and then the seed, cach of them being dependent on the other for ·116 AGAMAŠĀSTRA [IV. 14-15 their existence, Yet, they say that the antecedent of the sprout is the seed and that of the seed is sprout. This cannot be justified. The point is further dealt with in the following kārikás 15 cal hetor adih phalam yesām ădir hetuh phalasya tatha janma bhavet tesām putrāj janma pitur yathā i "To those who maintain that the antecedent of a cause is ats effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, the production of a thing would be just after the manner of the birth of a father from the son.' The point is that if it is held that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and vice-versa, then it would follow from it that as a cause produces its effect, so an effect, too, produces ats cause, and if one accepts it one would also accept that a son begets his father But it is absurd CH Nāgārsuna in his V.V. 50 pitră yady utpēdy ah putro yadı tena caiva putrena utpădyab sa yadı pitä vada tatrotpadayatı kah kam !! Here in the second half yadı, though supported by the Tibetan text, seerns to be redundant See NS. II 1 41, IV 1 39, BA, IX 114 pitä сen na vinā putrāt kutah putrasya sambhavah putrābhāve pıtā nāsti tathāsattvam tayor dvayoh || As regards the relationship between hetu 'cause' and phala 'effect' see MIK, XX, specially XX 20 ekatve phalahetvoh syad akyam janakajanyayoh! prthaktve phalahetoh syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā !!

·IV. 15-16] AGAMAŠASTRA 117 MV writes here na cānayor ekatvam pitāputrayoś cakşuscakşurvijñānayor bijānkurayoś ca aiky-prasargāt. The next kārikā says that there must be an order (krama) of a cause and its effect as to whether the cause or the effect precedes, otherwise there cannot be any relationship between them, and consequently nothing can be produced: 16 . sambhave hetuphalayor eşitavyah kramas tvayā i yugapat sambhave yasmad asambandho visānavato *As regards production (sambhava, 1.e, jäti) you must determine an order of the cause and the effect, for, of they are simultaneous they cannot be related (to each other ), as the homs (of an animal).' This argument is found in Buddhist works as shown below As regards the production of an effect by its cause only three orders are possible, and not more For, it may be said that first there is the cause and then the effect (pärva-krama 'prior order"); or it may may be said that first there is the effect and then the cause (apara-krama ' posterior order "); or, again, it may be said that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (schakrama 'the order of simultaneity') But it is clearly shown that none of them can be justified, Says Nagarjuna. MK, XI 2: tasmān nātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāh| 1 Candrokortti Introduces a (11) maying ata eva samsārabhivi) jarámaianidinām pūrviparasahakrami api na santityiha The following may be quoted here from AIK, XI 3-5 purvam jitur yada bhaye) jarimaanam ultatam nirja EmaspStu bhayey jayeta cimrah ! pasakytte yadı bharej patimaranam adicah! ähetuksm ajátasya syi) jarimatanam katham na jarimaranenaiva sihica raha yugyate! mriyeta jayaminai ca sic eshetukatobhaych | ·118 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 16 Op. cit XI.6: yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramäh! For details the reader is referred to the whole of the chapters XI and XII. In the kārıkā under discussion Gauda pada referring to the krama of cause and effect refutes their simultaneity saying exactly what is said by Nāgārjuna (MIK, XX. 7) and his commentator Candrakirtti. phalam sahaiva sāmagryā yadı prādurbhayet punah | ekakālau prasajy ete Janako yaś ca jāyate !! 'Should an effect come into existence just with its cause in its entirety then that which produces and that which is produced become simultaneous Here Candrahertti adds na caikakalayoh savyetaragovreānay or yanyajanahatvam drstam vāmadaksinakarayos Caranayor vä But it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any such relation as between the producer (anaka) and the produced tyanya! just like between the right and left hands or feet'? This order of cause and effect has again been referred to later on (IV 191 by the word kromakopa 'incompatibility of order, Sometimes the female breasta are cited an example in such cases See Condiakurtl, MV XI 78 fora yadı Purzam kärstami pak St karyam mad skinakam karnam nitheluhom ssit alha pūrvat kirsam patent keranam evam apa kiranåt purnam käryum nithetukom eva esat atha yupapat liryakitane eyatim esam ubhayam apy a(helu kam aylt ·IV. 16-17) AGANASASTRA 119 Now, according to these three orders (krama) of cause and effect there may be three propositions respectively, viz , (i) the cause produces its effect, (i) the effect produces its cause; and (iii) the cause and its effect produce each other.' Of these three propositions the second? is taken up in the following karika 17 phalád utpadyamānah san na te hetuh prasidhyati aprasiddhaḥ katha hetuh phalam ufpādayisyati 1* *• 'Your cause coming into being from the effect cannot come into existence; how will, therefore, the cause that has not come into existence produce the effect ?' The argument of our author seems to have been based on what Nagarjuna has said (NIK, X 10). yo 'pekşya sidhyate bhāvas tam evšpeksa sıdhyati | yadi yo 'pekstavy ah sa sidhyatām kam apchsya kah 11 See here Nigissue with Candrakittet, NX. XX 57, and specially the following lise , p 395, 561 yady evam phalasya helor urpattau dove eram Ball nahotgraira smart phalosys manikiu fod yotis pradipaprabhayth, It appears that a kinks dealing with the first preposition is new lout between kinkis 16 and 17 Fot, as the xrond and third proportions are dixused IV, 17, 181, one may naturally expect to have the discusion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found Can we think that the Author hinal! has ornitted ut?

·120 ĀGAMASASTRA [IV. 17-18 Candrakirtti explains it thus (N1V, p. 208) : tatra yadı yo 'gnyākhyo bhāvo yam indhanākhyam bhāvam apeksya sidhyatı, indhanākhyaś ca bhāvo yo 'gninātmasiddhyartham apeksitavyah, sa yadı tam evägnyākhyam padārtham apeksya sidhyati, kathyatām idānım sidhyatām kam apeksya ka iti yadă căgnyabhāve satindhanasya siddhireva nāsti tadakāranasyendhanasyābhāvāt kutas taddhetuko 'gnih prasetsyati It says that if the fire is effected having regard to its fuel and the fuel is effected having regard to the fire, neither of them can be effected See also the next kārkā (AIK, X 11). yo 'peksya sidhyate bhāvah so 'siddho 'peksate katham 1 athāpy apeksate siddhas tv apeksāsya na yujyate || Mark here the use of the root vsidh with or without the prehx pra- by Gauda pāda, Nāgārjuna and Candrakırttı This point is further discussed in the following kārıkā : 18 yadı hetoh phalat siddhıh phalasıddhıś ca hetutah ! katarat pūrvam utpannam yasya sıddhir apekṣayā ? If the coming into being of the cause is from the effect and that of the effect is from the cause, which (of the two) has first come into being--the coming into being of which is dependent Read here the following quoted from Nagarjuna's ML,8 yadındhanam apeleagnu apeks agnin yadındhanan hatarat purvanı pannam yadapeksy agnir indhanam il ·IV.18-19) AGAMAŠASTRA 12 MV (p. 207) runs here as follows: asyendhanasyâyam agnir dahakah hartety evam yadindhanam apeksyāgnir vyavasthăpyate, asyāgner idam indhanam kasmety. evam agnim apeksya yadindhanam, tat katarad anayoh pūrvanispannam. kim indhanam yad apeksyägnih syāt, utāgnir yam apeksyendhanam syāt. Mark the wording of c in both the kāríkās quoted above.' ? See Poussin. JRAS, 1913. p 139 The author proceeds to show very clearly in the next kārıkā as to how the Buddhas have explained the theory of ajāti 'non-origination'. 19 aśaktir aparijīlånam kramakopo 'tha va punaḥ evam hi sarvathā buddhair ajātıh paridipită ( "As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance, or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddhas elucidated (the theory of) absolute non-origination (ajāti Against the theory of xéts there are given three reasons in the present kātikā, viz. (i) asaktı 'absence of capability, (ii) aparijñāna 'complete ignorance", and (tre) kramakopa 'incompatibility of orders'. Of these three the third, ie, kramakopa has already been discussed in kánkă 16' But what do the other two terms asakti and aparijñāra signify? The answer will be found in Buddhist works In regard to afekt at 1 On that as well as on eball toximarthya) one may be selerred to the kranabhanga zūda in the Buddhist restion of the SDS. 12018-16 ·IV. 191 ĀGAMASASTRA 123 The point here is this that in the coming into being of any thing there must be some faktı 'energy', otherwise everything is possible from everything, or nothing is possible from anything. But the existence of such a faktı cannot be established for, as discussed by Candrakirtti in his MA, VI. 57, it cannot be said that the saktı belongs to a thing that has into being (jatal, or to one that has not yet come into being (ajata).8 come I think this asakti is referred to here by Cauda pāda in his present kārikā. Now apanjñāna in the kārikā seems to me to be nothing but pūrväparaparijñāna 'absolute ignorance of the first and last (points) in kārıka IV.21 And this pîrvāparāparāna is in reality purvāparakoţi-aparijñāna, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, 1 e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it To this theme a whole chapter (XI) is devoted in the MK, owing to which it is called pūrvāparakostpariksăthe Examination of the First and the Last Points' Let here be quoted the first kārika of it (XI, 1). pūrvă prajñāyate koţir nety uvāca malāmunih samsāro 'navarāgro hi năsyādır nāpı pascimam || The great sage said that the first point (of the world) is not known, for it is without the first and last points owing to the fact that it has neither the beginning nor the end.' Candrakirtti comments : koţir bhāgo desa iti paryāyā). purvā kojih pūrvo desa ity arthah, yad, hi saņsāro nãma kalcit 3 skyes la nus pa arid. pa yod ma, yin ma skyes, no bo lahan nus yod mu ni The Sansknt rendering in prose may be, játe takut na sumbhayati, *jdlasvabhive' pi taktir nās!.

·124 AGAMASASTRA LIV. 19 syāt niyatam tasya pūrvam api syāt paścimam api ghațādinām iva uktam ca bhagavata anavarāgro hi bhiksavo jātijarā. maranasamsāra iti tasmān nasti samsārah pūrvāparakotyanupalambhād alātacakravad iti sthitam It is to be noted here that pūrvāparokoļyoporijñāna lor kotyanupalambha) is not only of the world, but also of every. thing So says Nägarjuna (MK XI. 8): pūrvá na vidyate kotzh samsārasya na kevalam sarvesām api bhāvānām pūrvā košir na vidyatel! .' It is not only of the world, but also of every thing that there is no existence of the first point.' Nāgārjuna proceeds to say (MK, XI 2): naivágtam nāvaram yasya tasya madhyam kuto bhavet • How is it that that which has no beginning nor the end should have the middle ) And the very thing is said also by our author (II, 6, IV. 31): adāv ante ca yan nästa vartamāne 'pi tat tathā " That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, is so also in the present See IV, 31 See DA, P 197,1 5 SN, Vol II pp 178, 193 Vol 111, pp 149, 1:1. MP. II 3 2 (pp 51.51) KV II 159 Idávante ca yan niet madhye 'p: tat tatha Navopadella, 14 japsa n atthu pură baccha majham tarsa kuo siya AS, 4413. It in totalso in the middle, as says S tlan madhye 'pi hatilu) ·i IV. 19-20) ĀGAMASASTRA 125 It has been shown before that causation (hetuphalabhāva) in cases of origination is not possible. But one may meet the objection offering the example of seed and sprout (bija and ankura). For it is evident that a sprout comes into being from a seed and a seed from a sprout. There is an endless series of it yet the fact cannot be denied Thus by dint of the example'causation is established The author, however, says that the example does not establish any causation, though it may appear to do so, according to you. Therefore until it is established to the satisfaction of both the parties this example cannot be cited. Thus he says : 20 bijāňkurākhyo dỊsțāntah sadā sādhyasamo hi nah 1 na ca sādhyasamo hetuh siddhau sādhyasya yujyate To us the illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (sādhyasama) And a reason (hetu) which is like one that is yet to be proved (sādhyasama) cannot be used for establishing a thing, in question Nägārjuna has discussed (MK, X) the point thoroughly taking the example of fire and fuel (agnt-indhana) and has arrived at the conclusion that there cannot be any causation (hetuphalabhāva) of anything Let us cite here only the following few hnes from this work. yad indhanam sa ced agnir ekatvam kartkarmanah | anyaś ced indhanad agnit indhanād apy ſte bhavet || nityapradipta eva syād apradipanahetukah punar ārambhavaiyarthyam evam cāk» makaḥ satıll X 1-2.

·126 AGAMASASTRA [IV. 20-21 agnindhanabhyām vyākhyāta ātmopādanayoh kramah | sarvo miravalesena sārdham ghaļapalādıbhih | X. 15. Candrakiriti says on CS. IX.8: tasmad evam hetuphalabhāvavyavasthābhāvād dvayam api (hetu and phala) svarūpena na sidhyatı sādhyasama hetu is one of the fallacies of a reason (hctva. bhasa) It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved, pelstio principii. See NS, I, 2. 4, 8; V. J. 4. The word hetu has been used here in the kārika in the sense of drstänta, as says S 1 The Sanskrit text has not yet been discovered hence it 19 reconstructed (sce my edition) from the Tibetan version which runs dehi phyir de Itar na rgyu dan hbra, bu dnos po mnam par gnas pa med pahı phyır gâr ga rangi. no bos grub pas yod pa ma yın no See also the kārika and MA, p 150. The opponent says referring to kārıka IV 19: 21 purvāparāparijñānam ajäteh paridipakam! jāyamānād dhr vai dharmāt katham pūrvam na gļhyate " The absolute ignorance of the first and the last (points of a thing) is elucidator of non-origination, but how is it that the first (point) is not known (of a thing) which actually comes into being ? The word purvāparāpanjñana has already (IV 19) been explained To the question raised above the author gives his reply in the following kârıkā actually in the words of Nagarjuna and his followers

·IV 221
AGAMAŠĀSTRA
127
22
svato vä parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate i
sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiācid vastu jāyate !
Nothing is produced either from itself or from other than
itself, nor is anything produced which is existent, non-existent,
or both existent and non-existent'
The author wants to say here that should there be a thing
that originates (jāyate) one may say that it has its first point
(pūrva koți), i e., the state of its becoming or being produced,
but in reality there is nothing of the kind For the first half of
the kárikā see Nagarjuna.
na syato jāyate bhāvah parato narva jāyate |
na svatah parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutah | 2
MK, XXI 13, see also XXIII 20.
A thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from
another, nor from both, itself and another, and that being the
case, how can it come into being at all
na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpyahetutah
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāh kvacana kecana||
Op cit, I. 1.
There are nowhere and never such things as are produced
either from themselves or from others, or from both, or from
one that is no cause at all
1 Here the point not existeat-and-non-existent (na sad osad)' may also be
added. See IV 83.
? Quoted in BAP, P 339, and SS p 18

·128 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (IV. 22-23 For the second half of the kārkā the reader is referred to the following line of Nagarjuna (NIK, 1.7): na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yada | katham nirvartako hetur evam satı hi yujyate li* When nothing existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, comes into being, how is it reasonable to say that a cause brings about a thing?' See na san nācan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayatmakam 1 catuskotivinimuktan tattvam madhyamika viduh" This couplet is attributed to Sarahapada in SS, p 15 and found in a book Jáānasarasamuccaya, 28 The original Sanskrit of this work is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan version (Tanjur, Mdo, Tsh, Cordır III, p 29) Here the authorship of the original book is attributed to Āryadeva In Tibetan it is called Ye fes sõin po kun las btus pa The present kaukā as quoted in BAP. P 359, and many other books both Buddhist and non Buddhist In this connection see IV 83 84, and alas tattsam sadasadubhayānubhayātmakacatuskotsvinimuktam fünyam eva in SDS (Buddhism section) Bib Ind , 1858, P 14 The next kārikā is a reply to those who maintain the theory of origination (jātırāda) on the ground of the rule of cause and effect (hetuphalavyavastha) saying that both of them are without a bezinning and as such cannot come into existence : 23 hetur na jāyate 'nādıh phalam vāpi svabhāvatah 1 adır na vidyate yasya tasya jātir na vidyate ' 1 All the MSS utilized for the Anandaszem editions as well as those (not less than sixteent collected from different prosinces and examined by myself including different extant editions tead nädch for nādih in a and hy ader for atur in duh these ongina! readings the karika hardly gives any appreciable sense What does the second hall with that reading adir na vidyat asy & tasya hy adu na vidyale) mean? With the reading jätur for hyadır suggested by me the sense is quite clear and it is in one wry supported by the explanation given by the commentator S who has twisted the text with the reading hy aduh saying ·IV. 23-24] ĀGAMASASTRA 129 'A cause as well as an effect having no beginning does not naturally come into being, for that which has no beginning has no origination.' Compare BC, IX. 123 : hetor ādır na ced asti phalasyādıh kuto bhavet! 'Should there be no beginning of a cause how could an effect have a beginning?' yasmsdadih karanam na vidyate yasya loke tasya adih pinoku pārır na vidyate The reason for suggesting 'nādth for 'nadeh is this that by doing so the meaning becomey quite clear and only such 1% supported by the second half of the karika 24 'tree Now, a few words are necessary to introduce the words prajñapti and samklesa in the next kärikä. We say 'It is a tree', and by saying so we affirm the existence of the tree. We know thereby that in reality there is a thing which is called But some thinkers including a class of Buddhists would utterly deny the existence of such a thing According to them there is nothing that can be called a tree. That which is known to us as a tree is nothing but a mere understanding (samkhyā), a designation (samjñā), it is only making known to others (prajñaptı), that is, the practical denomination, simply a common use {vyavahāra), it is merely a name (nāman) and nothing else. And it is only on account of its having the branches, the leaves etc, that it comes under the generally understood term of 'tree.' Similarly there is nothing in fact like a branch, a leaf, and so on, it being merely a current term, an enumeration, a designation, an expression or a distinctive mark of discourse 1 DS, $ 1308 (see Buddhtet Psychology, PP 340 341): katame dhamma Pembali yi lesan tesso dhammānato sapkhi saatsi pafiottı yobaro nom nämakammata Dimadheyan ni vya jaram abhilapo Compare here the theory against that of what is known as Acayalıcāda, BA with BAP, IX 79 Beq and ASP, P 97 There is also a small separste treatise entitled Avovaur. 1201B-17 ·130 ACAMASASTRA (IV. 24 The true literal significance of the word prajnapti, practical denomination', is 'making known' (bhāvasādhana); or that by which a thing is made known' (karanasādhana), i.e. name or term Or, again, it may mean what is made known (karmasadhana)? In the present case the word is used in either of the first two senses On the use of the word praiñaptı in Buddhist works Kumārıla's observation (TV, I 3 12, p 234) is interesting: ſākyādıgranthesu punar yadapı kiñcit sādhuéabdābhiprāyenāvinastabuddhyā prayukram tatrāpı prajāaptı-vijñaptı-paśyata. tisthatādiprāyaprayogāt kıñcid evāvıplutam labhyate. kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhrastadeśabhāṣābhyo py apabhraştatarán, bhikkhave ityevarādini See here its Tıkā Nyāyasudha. As regards samkleśa it has also a special sense in Buddhist works It is well-known in Buddhist literature along with its opposite term u'yavadana They mean 'impurity and purification respectively See BA with BAP. IX 28 By impurity the mind (citta) becomes impure and by purification it becomes pure This samkleša is threefold (1 klesa passion' Gre, rāga, duesa and mohal that can be avoided by right view (darśanal and meditation (bhāvanā), (2) karman 'act. bad (akusala), and good-impure kusalāstaca'. and 13. janman 'birth' (or phala "fruiti recompense_thatprojects the existence! See Vis. pp 214 ff Let the following be quoted here from Th, p 28 tatra klesakarmajanmātmakas trividhah samklebah PP 78 A nerakarana by Pandita Aroka in the Sıx Buddhist \yāya Tracts, Bib Ind. The well known Chariot Sumile in the Malındapanha, pp 27 ff l I muy also be teicned to here The Acayat reada is established arrong others in the folloning works of Brahmanic authonty NS III 33 A, PB with A on VS pp 418 + ASL 107 panga'lı patia pannāpis atta Ski prajñapyafuati patlatt, pantipenato Ski praznepanatahi i pafhaftılı ca duvidha hoti Thus the first 1x karmasidhana and the second bhārasidhana, ·IV 241 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 131 The following occurs in MSBT, pp. 34-35 : (klesa eva samklesa iti klesa]samkleſah evam karma- (samklesol janmasamkleśah klešo hi pravartamănah syaparātmanor vyābādhakatvāt samklesah yathoktam sūtre' rakto hi rāgaparita atmavyābādhāyāpi cetayate paravyābādhāyāpi cetayata ubhayavyābādhāyāpi cetayate evam dveșamohayor api jñātavyam iti. karma janma ca samkleśapravartanad api samklesah, This is, as pointed out by S Yamaguch, from AN, III 54 Now, the opponent having his hold on the meaning of the word pražñaptı as well as samkleša well-known among, and accepted by. Vijñānavādıns, who maintain that there is, in fact, only vijñāna and the external word has no reality at all, proceeds to refute their views, the purpose thereof being that if the existence of external things is established one will have to accept their jāte, too once The kārikā runs thus prajñapteh sanimittatvam anyathā dvayanāšataḥ samkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstită matā 11 "The practical denomination (prajñaplı) has its (objective) Cause (nimitta).' for otherwise there is the disappearance of the two, (owing to this fact) as well as the experience of 1 For nimitta sce IV 25, 27, 75, 77,78, LA, Pp 225 226 tatra nimittam portar umante ja saksyñnesāb hisia tashati nanyakan evam trotraghrānajihvākāyamanovijiānanăm tabdagandharasasprastavyadhatma. samjakam, etam nimtam iti vadāmi, p. 228 tatra mahāmate numattam yat samsthankstivisesakararūpādilaksanam drsate lan tumittam.

·132 AGAMAŠĀSTRA IV. 24 impurities (samkleśa-upalabdhi) (their existence is regarded as dependent (paratantra)." say: It says that it must be admitted that praññapti must have its nimitla ; ne., the objective cause ; for otherwise there will be no notion of the (dvaya)', 1.e, gråhyd and gråhaka 'the percipient and the perceptible,' in other words, the subject and the object,ma fact that cannot be denied And. again, owing to samkleśa-upalabdh it is also to be admitted that there must be some things (for example, as the Buddhists would škandhas, dhatus, oyatanasi that are the causes of these sam. klešas. Thus the things to which the prajñaplı and the samklesa-upalabdhı owe their existence are external and have their ingination (hati) The argument advanced here has two parts: first, owing to the existence of prajapt the existence of its cause, too, is to be admited, and second, as there is the experience of samklešas there must be also their cause Both the parts of the argument are taken from Buddhist works Is regards the first let us quote here a few lines from the LA, p 104 punar aparam mahāmatı aha nanu bhagavann abhilapasadbhavăt santı sarvabhivāh yadı punar bhagavan bhāvā abhilapo na pravartale pravortate tasmad abhilapasadbhavăd bhagavan santı sari abhävāh bhagavān aha agatam api mahamate bhayānam abhilapah hujate sad uta a avisanakurmaromabandhyaputradın im loke drsto 'bhilapak to ca mahamate na bhavs nabhava abh:laps ante ca tad yad avocas tham mahamate abhlapasadbhayat sand sarvabhira ito sa hi dah pahinah בח gyuj ca ! For the writu paratantra se l 24 73 74 1 for duaya set !!! 155 N 0, IV 24 61, 72 75, 70, 87 The printed text readę drtfa which evidently wrong ·IV. 24] ĀĢAMAŠĀSTRA 133 . “Mahā mati says again: 'Is it not, O Blessed One, that all beings exist, for they all have their expressions (abhilapa). If. O Blessed One, there exist no beings there cannot be their expressions. Therefore, all beings exist on account of their expressions' Says the Blessed One : There are, O Ma há mati, expressions also for those which are non-existent, for example, the hom of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a barren woman, and so on. These are O Ma há mati, neither beings, nor non-beings, yet they are expressed Therefore, O Mahamati, the theory, as you say, that owing to expressions all beings exist, is lost""* 105) The following couplet from the same work (LA. supplies the gist of the above. ākāśam saſasigam ca bandhyāyāh putra eva cal asanto hy abhilapyante tathā bhāyesu kalpanā || It is quoted in MV, p 528, where occurs the following · tatrāpi bhāvakalpanāpratitedhamātram nābhāvakalpanā bhāvatvāsiddher eveti vijñeyam bandhyāputra itı sabdamātram evastat. nāsyārtha upalabhyate yasyārthasya bhāvatvain abhāvatvam vă syād iti kuto 'nupalabhyamânaswabhāvasya bhāvā. bhāvakalpanā yoksyate. The following is taken also from LA, P 319 X 430). asatsu sarvadharmesu prajāaptiḥ knyate mayā abhılãpo vyavaharaś ca bālānám tattvavarjitah || It is to be noted that abhilopo and praiſapti are synonymous with each other See DSA, S 1308, quoted above, p 129. 5 See III 37 sårvabhilapavigatah ·134 AGAMAŠASTRA (IV. 24 Now, as regards the second part we should like to quote a few lines also from a Buddhist work Candra kirtti introduces the sixth chapter of the MK thus ( MV, p. 137) : atrāha vidyata eva skandhālyatana) dhātavah kutah tadāśrayasamklesopalabdheh iha yan nästa na tada [śrayalsamklesopalabdhir astı bandhyāduhitur iva bandhyāsūnoh santi ca rāgādayah klešāh samklesanibandhanam 'Here (the opponent) says: “Verily there are the skandhas, ayatanas,' and dhātus Why? Because there is experience of samklešas arising from them, and because, on the other hand, there is no experience of samklešas arising from that which has no existence, as of a barren woman's daughter from a barren woman's son And there are attachment and other passions, the cause of samhleša With regard to pražupt the following may also be quoted in this connexion prajaptır namamātreyam laksmanena na vidyate 1 LA, X. 23 (p. 267). prajñaptimātram trbhavarn násti vastu svabhāvarah prajñaptım vastubhavena kalpayıyanti tārkikāb Op cit, X 86 (p 275). Now the author proceeds to give his reply to the above prima facie case Five tūpa, vedaná, samtñia, samskáty and vajñāns 1 Twelve six organs of sense and their objects, ruz, sıx internal eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind and six extemał form, sound, odour, taste, contact and ideas Eighteen $1x Organis ol sense Their si chjects, and as kinds of consciousness arising from them • Calcutta ed has prarapinamamatsdam N ·IV. 25-26] AGAMASASTRA 135 25 prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam isyate yuktidarśanāt! nimittasyānimittatvam işyate bhūtadarśanāt 0 Seeing the reason (advanced above) one wants (to say) that the prajiaptı has its nimitta , but seeing the reality (we) want (to say) that the nimitta is no nimitta at all.' The opponent says, as we have seen, prajapti must have its objective cause, but the argument drawn from the real nature of things points to the conclusion that what is called by hin a nimitta (cause) is in realty no nimitta at all The reason bereaf is advanced in the following kärikā. 26 cittam na samspršatyartham nārthābhāsam tathaiva ca i abhūto hi yataś cărtho nárthabhāsas tatah pěthak , 'The mind does not touch (1 e relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance (arthabhāsa), for the object is unreal and its appearance is not different from it The mind has no contact with its object owing to the absence of the object itself For in this theory (of the Viñānavādıns) there is nothing but the mind (citta) Now it goes with out saying that the mind having no contact with its object has in fact no contact also with its appearance (arthābhāsa) The second half of the kanha offers the reason hereof It means that the object is unreal and it being so its appearance which depends on it is also unreal, and thus both of them being unreal the latter is in this respect not different from the former This being the case the mind can in no way be related either to its object or its appearance Therefore it cannot be said, ·136 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 26 - na hy as done in the first half of the preceding kõrıkā, that prajñapti has its nimitta One must remember here that according to the Vijñānavādıns there is no reality of external things Let us read here the following from the MIVBT, p. 10: ['athavā cittacaitasıkā rūpato dravyata ca santiti yeşām drstis tesām pratisedhārtham uktam) abhūtapankalpo['stiti). (tasmād] astı dravyatah nāsti rūpam tadvyatinktam (năsti] dravyata iti kim kāranam yasmad dvayam tatra na vidyate. abhūtaparıkalpah kasyacıd grahako napi kenacid ghyate. kim tarhı grāhyagrāhakatva (rahıtam vastumátram tatha hi vijñānād bahir na rūpādı gıhyate svapnādıvat vijñānam hi rūpădyā]bhāsam utpadyate tasmān nırabalambanam eva svapnādāv ivany atrāpı svabijaparpākād arthābhāsam vijñānam utpadyata ity eva jõeyam, grāhyā[bhāve grāhako na bhavatita grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāro na yujyate ato rūpam abhūtaparıkalpān na prthagbhūtam). The opponent may argue here Well, according to you there are no external things But you cannot deny that there is an appearance of things round us It may be a false one in your opinion Yet it must have some cause What is it? It is nothing but the contact of the mind with an object Thus even for a false notion or impression (tiporyasa) the existence of an object must be postulated The author rejoins that is quite true that even false impressions are possible only when there is a contact of the mind with an object, but when that contact itself is never and no way possible these no possibility also of them How to explain then the false impressions? He would reply that it is the nature of the mind stself that even in the absence of any object it transforms into various objects under the infuence of Lusands for its the seed of all (cart'abija) having possessed the roups of juoducing exers thing Says Sthuramal 36.17 on kätiha 17 sarvabijam hi t'ununam) tatra sarvadharmotpadana-altyanugamat sarvabijam

·IV. 27-28]
AGAMASASTRA
137
LA, X. 49 (p. 271):
cittam vicitram bijākhyam khyāyate cittagocaram |
khyātau kalpenti utpattim balah kalpadvaye ratā!!!
Proceeds our author :
27
nimittam na sadā cittam samspěšaty adhvasu trişu !
animitto viparyāsah katham tasya bhavisyati o
Never in the three divisions of time (ie, the past, the
present, and the future) the mind touches any cause (object;,
how is it then that a false impression would arise without
any cause thereof ?'
See IV.41, 77, 78, LA, X 123.
viparyāsasya vastutvād yad yad evopalabhyate |
nihsvabhāvam bhavet tad dhi sarvathāpi na vidyateil
That in the above kātikäs (25-27) the doctrine of the
-Vijñānavādıns is supported by our author is clearly admitted by
$ in the following words introducing the next kārkā (28) :
prajšapteh sanimittatvam ityādy etadantam vijñānavādino
bauddhasya vacanam bāhyārthavādipaksapratışedhaparam
ācāryenānumoditam
Now the Acārya draws his conclusion from what is said
above in this connexion
28
fasman na jāyate citfam cittadęśyam na jāyate 1
tasya paśyanti ye jātim khe vai paśyanti te padam
1201B---18

·138 ĀGAMASASTRA (IV.28 Hence neither the mind (citta), nor that which is cognizable by it (cittadrsya) is originated. Those who see its (i e., of the citta and cittadęśya) origination see the (foot-) mark (of birds) in the sky. 'Hence (tasmāt)' refers to the reason advanced above in 26 and 27. because there is no contact of the mind with any object. / The belief in the origination of things is as absurd as the seeing of foot-marks of birds flying in the sky For this simile compare DP, 93 (=TG, 92). ākāse va sakuntānam padam tassa durannayam | This simile in our kărikā can be better explained by what Buddhaghosa has said in his DPA on the above line padam tassa durannayan'ti yathā ākāse gacchantānam sakuntānam imassim țhāne pādehı akkamıtvā gată idam thānam udarena pahānitvā gatā dam sisena idam pakkhehiti na sakka nātum evam eva It says with reference to an Arhat that as in the case of birds Aying in the sky it cannot be ascertained that they have gone away stepping on this spot with the legs and striking this spot with the wings. just so A similar verse is quoted by S in IV 91 It runs sakunānām uvākāśe gatir naivopalabhy ate ! CH DP. 92: ākāse va sakuntānam gati tesam durannaya | The following is quoted by $ in his commentary on MU. III 2 6 sakunināmıvākāśe jale varicarasya ca | padam yathā na dryeta tathā jñānavatām gatih ·IV.28] AGAMAŠASTR 139 On such texts is based the following observation of $ in his commentary on the BU, IV. 4. 6 (p. 637) ; ta utsahante khe' pi sākunam padam drasțuin. For further details see IV. 91. As regards the main proposition here the following lines from Āryaratnacūdaparıprccha (quoted in BAP, IX. 18, p. 392 ; MV, p. 62: SS, p. 235) deserve to be cited : sa citta parigaveşamāno nādhyatmam cittam samanupaśyati na bahirdhā cittam samanuśyati º sa cittamasamanupriyan cittadhārām paryesate kutaś cattasyotpattır iti tasyevam bhavatı. alantbane sah cittani otpady ate cat kim anyad klambanam anyac cittam. tada dvicittată bhavisyatı atha yadevălambana tad eva cittam, tat katham cittena cittam samanupaśyati na ca cittam cíttam samanupaśyatı tad yathāpi nāma tayaivā. sidhārayā saiyāsıdhārā na sakyate chettum na tenaivāngulyagrena tad evāngulyagram šākyate sprastum evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam sakyam drastum And the following is from KP, 149 (5102) tan na cittam hi kāsyapa parigaveşyamāsam na labhyate. yan na labhyate tan nopalabhyate nåtitām. Dānāgatam, pratyutpannam yan nātītam nānāgatam na pratyutpannam tat tryadhyasamatikrāntam. yat tryadhvasarnatkrāntam tan naivāsts naiva nāsti. yan naivāsti na năsti tad ajātam. yad ajātam tasya násti svabhāvah yasya nāsti svabhāvah tasya nāsty utpādah yasya năsty utpădah tasya násti nurodhah 2 SS, p 233, BAP. IX 106 See MV, P 45 (KP-Ratnakūtasūtra) (p. 338) 1 On citta see the work, pp 142 150 ·140 AGAMAŠĀSTRA IV. 29 Having shown that the citta does not originate the Ācārya comes to his main thesis, the theory of aāti 'non-ongination.' Says he : 29 ajāłam jāyate yasmādajātıh prakịtis tataḥ i prakrter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhavisyati tl As it is one unborn (azătal that is bom Gūta), non-birth (ajātı) is its very essence (prakrti). And there can be in no way any change of essence.' For a see jāta eva na jāyate, BU, III. 9, 25; and ante ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātım icchantı vādınah, M20, IV.6; and note on IV. 13 If a man is born it must be said that before his birth he was unborn, and this state of being unborn before the birth is his essence Now, if it is accepted, and it must be accepted, as his essence, there cannot be his birth which is a change for essence can in no way change, as essence and change are two contradictory terms Similarly before a citta is produced it must be considered as unproduced, and that being its essence which can never change it cannot be produced at all This law holds good wherever there is the question of jatt. For the wording of the second half of the hārıkā which is found also in III 21 see MK. XV 8 prakſter anyathābhāvo nahi jātupapadyate On this point one may be referred to also kasya syād anyathābhāvah svabhāso yadı vidyate || tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo napy any asy aiva yujyate | yuva na jiry ate yasmād yasmā) jirno na jiryate! Op cit., XIII. 4, 5.

·IV.301 AGAMAŠASTRA 141 In the next kärikā the author says that an advocate of the theory of jāti cannot account for his two propositions : first, samsara 'continued existence!! is without a beginning, but has an end ; and the second, liberation is with a beginning, but has no end. He says : 30 anäder antavattvam ca samsārasya na setsyati anantatä сādimato mokşasya na bhavisyati 11 *It would not be established that samsāra is without a beginning, but has an end, nor would it be possible that liberation which has a beginning has no end' An advocate of the theory of origination has to admit that samsāra has its origination, and if it 19 so, it must have a beginning And that being so, the tenet that samsára has no beginning cannot be maintained Similarly according to him liberation also has its origination, and as such it must be with a beginning, and consequently must have an end, and in that case one cannot say that it has no end The point discussed in the next few kārıkās is this that it is only when there is the existence of samsora that there arises the question as to whether it has or has not a beginning i khandhinan patipuți ca dhatu Syatinina ca abbhocchinnan valtamānam samsiro ti pavaccata !! 1 That samsāra ir anodt is admitted on all hands. Al for Buddhists see NIK, XI 1 with its vitti pura prajályate koļu nety urica mahimunih! samstro 'navarigro hi n syidu n5pi paktmam) ·142 AGAMASASTRA [IV.31 or an end, but in fact it has no existence at all the Ācārya Says 31 1 ādāv ante ca yan năsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā | vitathaih sadrśah santo 'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ || "That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present, (i e, in the middle ), being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal' Compare here what Nāgār ju na says in his MK, XI 2 : naivāgram nāvaram yasya madhyam tasya kuto bhavet. 'How should that which has neither the anterior point, nor the postenor one, have the middle?' - Candrakurtti comments : agram ityādih pūrvam prathamam ucyate avaram ty avasānam vyavaccheda ucyate. yasya samsārasya adır antas ca pratısıddhah tasya madhyam kuto bhavisyatı samjñārnātrakam eva viparyāsaparavašamānasānām samsāra adımadhyāvasınavırabitatvād ākāśavad alātacakravad ta bhavah. tataś ca The following may also be quoted here yassa n'atthi purā pacchā majham tassa kuo siya ĀS, I. 4 4 3 adāv ante ca yan nästs madhye'pi ca na tat tatha | Nayopadesa, 14 1 Sce Il 6 yad idāv ante ca nisti vastu mrgatisnikâdı tan madhye pi nistita nikitam loke Son 11 6 3 $ ci adiv eva hı yanı nastı karanasambhayet svayam 1 vastamātie p tan nasto nisah syit tatra kidriah YV III 11 13.

·IV.31-32] ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 143 an na yat purastād uta yan na paścăn madhye ca tan na vyapadeśamātram bhūtam prasiddham ca pareņa yad yat tad eya tat syād iti me manisa ! BP, XI. 28 21. That samsāra has neither a beginning nor end is fully discussed in MK with MV, XI. Now, there are two kinds of things, one kind experienced in dream (svapna), and the other in wakefulness (jāgrat); and it has been thoroughly established in Book II (Vaitathya Prakarana) that there is no difference between the states of dream and wakefulness, and so the things experienced in the latter are as false as those in the former The author here puts forth the same argument in the same language with a view to show that the thing which is as false as that in one's dream cannot come into being in reality, and so the jättvåda cannot stand. He says 32 saprayojanatā tesām svapne pi pratipadyate ! tasmad ādyantavattvena mithyaiya khalu te smrtāh That the things have some purpose in dream also is known; hence owing to their beginning and end, indeed, they are regarded as false .' One may object to the falsity of the phenomena of waking experience on the ground that they really serve some purpose; as for instance, water, when it 15 drunk, quenches one's thirst. while the phenomena in dream are not such To this the author replies in the above kārikā. His point is this that the phenomena of dream are linked with one another by some purpose no less than those of waking experience. In dicam. also one drinks water to quench one's thirst. So the

·144
ĀGAMASASTRA
(IV. 32-34
phenomena like those in dream having a beginning and an end
have no reality at all, for that which has a beginning and an end
cannot be real, as the mirage.
This kārika is identical with Il 7. See the note on it for a
different reading
It is said that the things seen in the waking state are false,
because, as regards nature, they have no difference from those
seen in dreams which are evidently false. But why the latter are
so the author says in the next few karikās as in II. 1-10:
33
sarve dharmā mrşā svapne kāyasyāntar' nidarśanat i
samvște- 'smin pradese vai bhūtānām darśanam kutah i
"All things in dream are false as they are seen within
the body, for how can objects be seen in this confined space
(of the body?
1 For a see II 1'
34
na yuktam darśanam gatvā kālasyânıyamād' gatau i
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin dese na vidyater?
'(in dream) the seeing of a thing at a distance) having gone
(up to it) is not reasonable, for there is no fixed rule of time for
the act of going (there), and no persons being awake exist in
the place (where they dream theraselves to be!
| Cladirghatvac ca kālasy a, ll 2a
1 Identical with II 2 -

·IV. 35-37)
AGAMAŠĀSTRA
145
35
mitrādyaiḥ saha sammantrya prabuddho' na prapadyate !
ghitam câpi yat kiñcit pratibuddho na paśyati »
When awake, he does not find his friends and others
with whom he had deliberated, nor does he see all that which
he had (then in dream) grasped
1 With a large number of MSS. I read this for sambuddha in printed
editions
36
svapne cāvastukah kāyaḥ pıthag anyasya darśanati
yatha kāyas tathā sarvam cittadrśyam avastukam n
'In dream the (active) body is unreal, for (quite) a different
body is seen (in the place where one dreams), and as the body
so all the things which are cognizable by the mind are unreal.'
37
grahaņāj jāgaritavat taddhetuh svapna isyate !
taddhetutvāc ca tasyaiva saj jāgaritam isyate !
The experience (of dream) being like (that of) wakefulness,
it (wakefulness) is considered to be the cause of dream, and
that being so it is (also considered that wakefulness is real only
to him (i e., the dreamer)
It is a fact that cause and its effect must be of the same
nature. Accordingly wakefulness and dream being the cause
and the effect respectively must be of the same nature
So if a dream is false wakefulness is also false. And as
12018-19

·146
AGAMAŠASTRA
(IV.37-39
dream appears to be real only to the dreamer, so wakefulness,
too, is real only to an ordinary unenlightened man."
1 I think the logical order of the following four kānkās, ciz, 38-41
should be as follows 39, 41, 33 and 40 For the kárıkās 39 and 41 with
32-37 form the same subject of discussion, ie, the equality of the states of
dream and wakefulness, while the kānkās 38 and 40 are mcant for showing the
impossibility of ongination directly. The traditional order is shown in the
present edition by the figures in parenthesis
38 (39)
asaj jāgarite dęstvā svapne paśyati tanmayah /
asat svapne 'pi dľstvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati .'
in the waking state one sees an unreal thing and being
absorbed in it sees it (also) in a dream
And in a dream, too,
one sees an unreal thing, but does not see it when one
awakes
To see the unreal is common to both the states, dream and
wakefulness, the only difference between them is, however
as stated in the hårıkā itself.
1 yathaiva kimin supinanti sevis a
pratibuddhasetuhi?) puruso da pasyalı! SR, IX, p 29
39 (41)
viparyāsād yathā jāgrad acıntyān bhūtavat spršet !!
tathā svapne viparyāsad dharmāms tatraiva paśyati
2
for the use of 'sprd in such case sce IV 27

·IV.39.41) AGAMASASTRA 147 "As in the waking state through mistake one may see unthinkable things as real, so in dream it is owing to mistake that one sees things only in that (state).' 1 The word jāgrad is taken here in the locative sense See III, 29 together with S's commentary thereon and on IV 40 (11) jūgraj ságarite, Cf. IV 65 and BU, IV 3 14 with the comm jāgraj jāgaritadefe See also IV. 61, note 3. 3 Such as raja-sarpaatring serpent,' etc --$ Having established above that a thing which are as false as that in a dream cannot come into being the author shows his conclusion of the apātivoda by some other arguments. 40 (38) + . utpādasyāprasiddhatvad ajam sarvam udāhſtam / na ca bhūtād abhūtasya sambhavo 'sti kathañcana ! *As origination is not established all are said to be without ongination. There is in no way origination of the non-existent from the existent." The origination of the non-existent, such as the horns of a hare, etc. is in no way seen -S In the next kárika the author says with regard to causation referred to just now that it itself is not reasonable. 41 (40) nāsty asaddhetukam asat sad asaddhetukam tathā 1 sac ca saddhetukam nāsti saddhetukam asat kutah ! There is no non-existent ansing from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent, again there is no existent arising from the existent and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?

·148
AGAMASASIRA
(IV.41
Here are four points :
11) An untcal thing cannot have an unreal cause,
nor can a real thing have an unreal cause; again,
(n) a real thing cannot have a real cause,
liv) nor can an unreal thing have a real cause.
Let us read here the following from MIK, XXI. 12.
(tr) na bhava) jayate bhavo
(1) bhãyo 'bhávän na jayate 1
(1) (nabhāvā, jāyate 'bhāvo
Hun "blivo bhiván na jayate ! )'
This is fully explained in MV.See the following from MIK:
sadbhūtah kārakah karma sadbhūtam na karoty ayam
kārako năpy asadbhūtah karmāsadbhūtam ihate . VIII. 1.
satā ca kriyate näsan nasata kriyate ca sat!
hartrā sarve prasajyante dosās tatra ta eva ha
VIII. 8
nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtam sadasadbhūtam eva vă i
karoti kārakah karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhih , VII 10
These last two lines of the kariká missing is Sanskrit are rightly
reconstructed by Poussin from the Tibetan which runs as follows
dnos med dnos med mi skye ste
dnos med dros las mt skyeho
Thua katika is identical with C$, 364 (XV 14) of Aryadeva
Having thus refuted the jātrvāda and established thereby
the ajātrvāda of the Buddhists the author goes on to reconcile
some statements made by the Buddhas themselves, which
appear to be irreconc:lable with the ajattuāda doctrine.

·IV.41-42) AGAMAŠASTRA 149 These statements, some of which are quoted in the foot-note,' are in support of jāti. Besides, the Buddhas are found to have instructed their followers on causation, as their wellknown pratīłyosomutpada 'dependent origination itself shows very clearly.* It must, therefore, be admitted that the Buddhas have not denied jutt altogether. The Ācārya takes up the point and gives his reply in the following two kārıkās, the first of which runs thus : 42 upalambhāt samācărād astivastutvavadinām 1 jātis tu dešitā buddhair ajātes trasatām sada ile. But jütt is taught by the Buddhas for those who from their perception and common practice hold that things exist (in reality) and are afraid of (the doctrine of) agāti' These people who are intent upon the reality of things around them are of a lower order and are consequently frightened when they hear of the doctrine of apāti and nairatmya (absence of ātman, ie, suabhava nature") as taught by the Buddhas The Buddhas are, however, 1 PSP, P 9 buddhi bhagavanta utpannah, p 79 paicendnyIn utpatayante, p 91 arlantah samyak sambuddha loka utpatsyanto, SN, IV, p. 14 yo bhikkhave cakkhusea uppådo thith abhimbbatt påtubhivo; MV, p145 uktam bi bhagavata trinimānı bhiksavah samskrtasya samskrtaleksanānu samskrtasya bhiksava otpadopi pralnāyafe vyayo'p sthityanyathavam apiti na ca avidyamana ya kbaravisānasyeva jätyädılaksanam asts See also AN,1,P 169 ? SY, IV. P 33 cakkhuri ca paficca rūpe ca uppayatı cakkhuvidhanam advitiyam fivadvāram kudrstinām bhayankaran visayah sarvabuddhānim sta narttmyam ucpale !! asya dharmasya nimno'pa bhayam utpadyate 'satah balayan nama ko drsiah parasya na bhayankarah ) CS, 288 289 On the word narratmye Candrakinti writes here tatrátmi alma yo 'parāyatt asiatūpah syabhāvah (tadabhávo nauratmyam] Tibetan de med pa bi bdag med paho 3 ·150 AGANASASTRA [IV.42 very kind-hearted and so in order to lead them easily and gradually to the truth (talfcatatāra)' followed the disposition of their minds and preached to them of jāti, though in fact there is nothing of the kind. The author himself says elsewhere (III. 15) that the creation described differently in the Upaniads with allustrations of carth, iron, sparks of fire and such other things is meant only as a means devised for making one descend to', 1.0., realize, truth (upāyaḥ so'vatārāya) This act is called avatāranasandhı 'intention of making one descend' of the Buddha. It has found its expression in Buddhist worhs from which some passages are quoted here in the foot-note." 6 See MV, P 340 5 MS, XI! 16 17 taträvatásarabhısandhih frāvakesu drastavya, sāsanāvatāranärtham anuttrāsāya rūpādyastitvadesanāt The word sandhi is here in the sense of abhisandh lokävatāranāttham ca bhāvā nathena deſitäh trāso närabhyate drste drste 'pati sa sarsasah niyamendiva Licajjee tena trăso vidhiyate Cs, 283 Candrakortti on CS, 183 tattvāvalārasopanabhūtatıāt pravattyupadeso'p, kartavyah lokavatārupāyatvāt sadasadadıdebanānam Opct, 196 dharmadhātor asambhedad yānabhedo sti na prabho | yanatrıtayam ākhyātam tvayā sattvāvatāratah, N'St, 21 nănasadhārya yathartham Sünyatām kalcic chaktah samsāre sangam avadhūya nirvănasprhām utpādayılum sa ca sūnyatartho Jagatām ativottiåsakarat ad apriyavedananipunapurusena lajeah phyabhāryānaranaksamavedana sauma: nasyotpadanavat kayapı yuktyā vidusās atăryah CS, ap 514 astitvanāsty adrstipatitānām tesām utträsah syādu utitāsyamānā mahämate dure bhavantı mahāyānāt LA. P 167 etani kašyapı paica bhiksusatănı drstıpraskandhăn.mām gambhitām dharmadesanām nävatarantı näsagāhante rädhmucyanta uttrasy antı samtrasyanti santrāsam Spads ante KP(-Reinekela) in NIV, pp 337 338 ·IV.42) AGAMASASTRA 151 As regards the different modes of teaching of the Buddhas he following couplet may be quoted : desanā lokanāthánām sattvāíayavaſinuga ! bhidyate bahudhā loka upāyair bahubhiḥ kilai? The teachings of the Lords of the worlds (ie.. the Buddhas) following th: disposition of the people differ in the world in many ways according to the diversity of methods ** That was their 'skilfulness in method (upayakaušalya) by which all discrepancies in their teachings are explained. tatra tathāgato mahaktrumko lokatzāsapadapanharitthem vyavahiravessd uklavin utpadyante hurudhsante ca na cātra kasyacıd dharmasy otpado na nirodha 16 BAP. p. 569 cvam ukte bhagasin Tyusmantam £riputram etad avocat, alam Ariputra efenarthena bhástena tat kasya hetoh uttrasisyati (npurSyam sade oko Joko 'aminn arthe vyakrıyamāne SP. II, p 36 Tha yad etad uktam bhagavatá samskota dharma utpadyante nirudhyante cely asya tathāgalabhantasya ko 'bhiprīyah tha utpidannodhsbhinivista kulaputra lokasamnivelah tatra tathsgato mahakaruniko lokaryotapadapariharitham vyavaharavasid uktavin ulpadyante nirudhyante ca na citra kayyacıd dharmasyotpado na nirodha itu SS, 263 See also MIN, I 136 137, SR. pp 7071 1 Bodhicitacicarana Tıb version) 97 ca I 38 quoted in the Buddhist section of SSD See The Basic Conception of Baddhism, ep 7ff Sometimes there is in d of the kinka Punah for kila • Sce kęty dharmev avasthinam talt vam desemi yoginim! tattvin prałyflmagatsham kļpyakalpena arjitam! defemi jinaputrinam neya. Walana delanth Sicura'hi yathi máyi dilyate na ca vidyate delsnapi tatha citta detyate vyabhicarunt Jebana hiyadanyasya tad aryasylpy adeland Iture Iture vadvad bhuay drariam prayıcchau LA pp 48 49 See also Op of, X. 611 613 pp 340 341), SP. pp 44f Ss. pp 14-15, MV, pp 359 340, 359 372 ·152 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (IV. 42.44 Now, when there is in fact no jāli it is certainly no good to teach it and consequently some evil would result from such teaching The author, however, says that in reality there would arise no evil, or if it actually does, it would be very small which can easily be overcome (by following the path of the truth) 13 ajātes trasatām tesām upalambhād viyanti ye 1 Jātidosā na setsyantı doso'py alpo bhavisyati Those who being instructed of ast) so asunder owing to the perception (of things) and are afraid of (thinking) asāti, are not affected with the evils resulting from the perception of) jäte, (or if there be any evil) the evil will be a small one on For an The reality of a thing cannot be proved the eudence of mere perception and common practice elephant called up by illusion (māyihastın) cannot exist in fact though we all may see it moving or carrying men Thus the author says that it is only on account of perception and common practice that it is said of a thing that it exists, but in reality it does not upalambhāt samācāran may áhast, yathocyate ! upalambhāt samácárid asti vastu tathocyate o As an elephant called up bo illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice so on the same grounds it 11 said of a thing that it cuts ! For mastin e 1.6 inihati sa citam putiharalisat's cathed him the stoc tte alInasiute ·IV. 44-45) AGAMASASTRA 153 TSN, 27-28 : mayakran mantrayalāt khyārı hastyalranå sathā! akāramatram latrasta hati 1&sta tu saratha || svabhāvah kalpito hasti paratantras ladakrtıb 1 yas latra hastyabharo 'sau parnispanra isyate In the next kārikā the author says, as a Vijñānavādın can say, that there is only vijñāna (=citta) 'mind', and nothing else, yet it appears variously! 45 jātyābhāsam calabhāsam vastvābhāsam lathaiva ca l. ajăcalam avastulvam vijñānam śāntam advayam b. * There is only vijnana without the two (advaya),' which is quiescent (free from all sorts of disturbances', it has no ongin (aja 'unborn"), it does not move 'acala), nor is it an object (acasłutva),' yet it appears to have an origin (zālyábharal, it appears to admit movements (calabhāsa), and it also appears to be an object It is to be noted here that vijñāna,' cifle and manas synonyms See LA X. 459. ciltam vakalpo vijñaptır mano vijñanam eva ca/ alayas tribhavai cetă ete cittasya paryayah ore 1 The word diaya telers to gâhya and grâhaka the percipient and the perceptible respectively . But truly speaking according to the Buddhist theory it cannot be described even as oja Sec IV 74 5 Literally, one that has to quality ch an object 4 Here in the karika uader discurs on the word rano does not teler to Alman or Batman of the Vedintist The following kar.kz 46 USR culla which alludes 1o luang in the present kinka clearly tebyg it out States here upadna as trapu, but in the peut links IV 46) be interprel it in the sense of alman evam eva yathoktart vijnana tysd.rahutam advayam Stmatattvan vijinantahi 1201B-20

·154
AGAMASĀSTRA
[IV. 45-46
Ak, 11. 34:
cittam mano'tha vijñánam ekārtham,
C). SN, I. 94.
What follows from this discussion is shown in the next
karikā -
46
evam na jāyate cittam' evam dharmā ajāh smộtāh |
evam eva vijānanto na patanti viparyaye 19
Thus the mind is not originated, and thus the objects' are
declared to be without origination Those who know it in this
way do not fall into error
1 CH YV, JII 13 15 evam na jāyate kubcut
1 See IV, 58
3 $ takes bere the word to imply aimons, but in IV 54 to
incan external
things thahyadharmähl, and in IV 58 he wntes ātmano nye ca dharmah
This truth is profusely illustrated in the next kırıkās (47-52)
by the simile of a fire brand (alūta)
The author says, that
as the different appearances of
a fire brand in motion, such
as a circle or a straight line, do not come into existence from
a thing other than itself, nor do they go out to a place other
than itself when it is at rest, and at the same time they do not
enter into itself. even so when the mind vibrates its appearances
in the form of different objects they do not
come into

·IV. 46-481 AGAMAŠASTRA 155 being from any thing other than itself, and when it does not vibrate they do not go out anywhere, nor do they enter into it: 47 pjuvaltădikābhāsam alātam spanditam yathā 1 grahaņagrāhakābhāsam vijñānam spanditam tathā u As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as the perceiver (ic, subject) and the perceptible (i.e., objeca).' i Comparing and considering all the readings in kankās 47.51 in connection with the use of tizāna and the derivatives of the root spand I think in the present karika one may epeline to read alatam spanditam and pot alataspandilom, a compound word, though the former is not supported by any MS consulted by me In either case the import of the kanka is the same ? Cl. cittaspanditam (with the vanant cittam spandalı xat sari'am) in tv. 72, with winan spanditam (or enhānaspanditan) in d of the present kärka 48 aspandamānam ălatam anābhāsam ajam yatha ! aspandamānam vijñānam anābhāsam ayam tathā *As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, crooked, etc.), and is (thus) 'unborn', even so when the mind does not move it has no appearance (of any subject or object), and is (thus) 'unborn For anābhāsa in the text of arūpaka, II. 36 In the text alata supported by many MSS, is, according to lexicons, another form of alata.

·156 AGAMASASIRA [IV. 49.51 49 aláte spandamane vai nubhāsā anyatobhuvah i na tato 'nyatra nispandān nalātam pravisanti te !! "The appearances in a moving fire-brand are not produced from anything other than it, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the fire-brand), nor do they enter into it 50 na nirgata alātăt te dravyatvābhāvayogatah ' Grjītāne 'pi tathaiva syur ābhāsasyāviſesatahi "They're.. the appearances) do not go out from the fire brand, for they have no qualities of a substance (dravya), ans with reference to the mind, too, they must be the same, for there is no difference in appearances It is a substance, dravya, that can move from one place to another, but appearances are not substances, and hence they The second half of the kärtkı says that as an appearance there is no difference whatsoever in cases, that is, the case of a fire-brand and that of the mind cannot move the two I See IV 524-5 51 vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvah i na tato 'nyatra vijñānăn na vijñānam visanti te Il . When the mind vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than it and when it is at rest they are not in a piace other than it (the mind), nor do they enter into the mind ·IV. 52), ACAMASASTRA 157 52 na nirgatās te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogatahi kāryakáranatābhāvād yato 'cintyāh sadaiva te Il *They do not go out from the mind, for they have no qualities of a substance, and as there is no state of cause and effect they are always unthinkable" 1 . All this is Buddhistic, and so are also arguments and the words as the following quotations will show: sa mahārāja tāvān abdhātur utpadyamāno na kutåścid āgacchati niruddhyamáno na kvacid gacchati. Petāputrasamāgamasútra quoted in SS, pp 247. evam eva kulaputra tesām tathāgatānām kāyaparinispattir na kutaścid dala drá lokād agată nāpı kvacid dała drá loke gacchati. tad yathápi nāma kulaputra Vināyah sabda utpadyamano na kutaścid agacchati nirudhyamâno 'pi na kvacid gacchati na kvacıt samkrāmatiº ASP, pp 515-516. anyato näpi cāyātam na tisthati na gacchati) māyātah ko viseso 'sya yan mudhah satyatah kịtam || māyayā nirmitam yacca hetubhir yac ca nymitam āyāti tat kutah kutra yātı ceti nirupy atām BA, IX 143-144 Cf. agacchaty anyato năgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate MK, X. 13. atha panditu kaś ci mārgate kuta 'yam agatu kutra yāta vā vidiśo diśa sarvi märgato nāgatir nāsya gatiś ca labhyatı || quoted in MV. p 216; BAP, p 533, SS. P 240 1 See IV 50 ·158 ĀGAMASASTRA (IV.52.53 utpannasyagatır nästi niruddhasya gatis tatha | evam sati katham naiva bhavo māyopamo bhavet 1/2 CS, 360 ? This is reconstructed by the present author from the Tibetan test which tuns skyes pa la ni hon ba dan de bzın hgags 1. hato ba med / de Itni yin na a Ita bur! and pa gyu ma hdra ma yın ! It is shown (IV 14-18, 52) that there is no causation (heluphajābhīva or karyakaranatábhāva) This is further explained in the following kārtka 53 dravyam dravyasya hetuh syād anyad anyasya caiva hi 1 dravyatvam anyabhāvo vă dharmānām nopapadyate 11 A substance can be a cause of another substance, and a thing can be the cause of a different thing only, but it is unreasonable to hold that things can have substantiality or mutual difference A substance just have three qualities, (1) ongination (utpăda,. () change (vyaya), and (11) continuance (sth) But in fact there is no such thing called substance, as the Buddhists hold See MK with MV, VII, AN, I 152 Again it is wellknown that from one thing a different thing is produced, and not the same thing from the same thing, for instance, from a seed there is the sprout Thus there is a difference between a cause and its effect But in reality this difference, too, cannot be maintained See MK, X 1 and 15 yad indhanam sa ced agnir ekatvam kartıkarmanoh anyas ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy tte bhavet i agnindhanābhyam vyākhyāta ātmopādanayoh kramah 1 sarvo nirava esena sārdham ghatapatadıbhah !

·IV. 54-55] ĀGAMASASTRA 159 The author arrives at the conclusion: 54 evam na cittajā dharmāſ cittam vāpi na dharmajam ! evam hetuphalājātim pravišantı manīşina) 1 "Thus the things are not produced from the mind (citta= vijñāna), nor the mind from the things. And thus the wise enter into the doctrine of) the non-origination of cause and effect." CJ. IV 46. 55 yāvad dhetuphaláveſas tāvad dhetuphalodbhavaḥ ksime hetuphalāvese nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ 11 As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect there is the origination of cause and effect, but when the strong adherence to cause and effect is lost there is no existence of cause and effect' Here and in the next kārika (56) the word avesa in the text is the same as abhinivesa (IV 75, 79) 'strong adherence. These are synonyms (to which graha and grāha, may be added). The latter is frequently used in Buddhist works in which it is clearly shown that not only cause and effect but everything round us owes its existence to one's stong adherence to it. The following may be cited here tad yathäpi nāma mahārāja puru-ab suptah svapnāntare pišācena paritāpyamāno bhitah sammoham ăpadyate sa śayıtavibuddhas tapt piśācam tam ca moham anusmaret. tạp k manyase mahārāja samvidyate svapne préācah sammoho vā.

·160 ĀGAMAŠASTRA IV 55-56 yāvad evam eva mahārāja bālo erutavan prihagjanas cakşusā rūpāņi dıştvā upeksāsthāniyuny abhiniviếatc ''bhinivkļah can muhyatı mūho mohajam karmābhisamskaroti. SS. 254, " P bālo manjuśtir afrutavan pythagyano 'tyantapariniryptân saiva. dharmān aprajānāna ātmānam param copalabhate, upalabhy (abhinivitate abhinivıstah san rajy ate dusyate muhyale dustamūdhah san] trividham .armābhisamskaroti. MV, p. 296 sa rakta yas lu bhavasvarūpam adhyāropya tadvigamāvigamata etā drepir tpadyābhiniviſate tasyām abhiniveso nirvanapuragăminam panthānam virunaddhi, samsārıkeçu ca duhkhesu niyojayatiti vijneyam Op cit, p. 537 56 yāvad dhetuphalāveśah samsāras tāvad āyatah | ksine hetuphalāvese samsāro nopapadyate !! 'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect the world is extended, but when that strong adherence to cause and effect is lost the world is not possible Thus having propounded to some extent the vijfánavada our author proceeds incidentally lo show also with the Buddhists that neither of the two theones, täslatau ada 'the theory that everything 15 eternal and ucchi dalada the theory that every thing has annihilatıcn can be maintained 1 These two views are specially with regard to soul and world nstance, DN, I 13, 39, MIK XXVII See, for ·IV 57] AGAMASASTRA 161 57 → samvrtya 'jayate sarvam saſvatam tena nastı vai! svabhavena* hy ajam sarvam ucchedas tena nastı vai 11 In the practical truth (samoyti) everything comes into being hence there is nothing eternal On the other hand) everything is naturally without origination hence there is no annihilation It says that in the practical truth we say that thing comes into being in that case we cannot hold so far as the practical truth is concerned that there is any eternal thing For that which has ongination cannot be eternal as an earthen jar Again as we have seen above nothing has naturally any ongination and one that has no ongination can have no annihilation also It is a fact that a sprout comes out only if there is a seed and not otherwise Now the sprout is neither identical with nor different from the seed When there is a sprout the seed 18 not completely destroyed nor is it absolutely in the same state as before Hence it can be said that there is neither eternality nor annihilation 1 1 See IV 73 } AX MSS and ed tans eram ned by me tead sadbhacena for adabhadend in c yet I think the latter to be the actual read ng Everywhere n smlar cases the author employs syabheta (22 IV 8 10 23 81) and not sad bhava in the same sense he uses also the word prakrti (ill 21 IV 9 29 91 92 93 94) If one accepts the read ng sadbhacena the mean ng wll be accord ng to s n transcendental truth (pa amirthasad bhadena pāramarth kasattaya} That the reading is soabhivena is supported also by IV 29 in which we read ayath prakrt k 3b jasya sato yathankuro na ca yo bija sa caiva ankuro - Ovnutrivstod exam anurcherlatyadharma mudrāt pralumudra d rate mudrasankrant na copalabhyate | na ca tatra na ca va sfnyato evan sanskara nucchedašziyatsh 1 LV 210 1201B-21 ·162 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (IV. 57 Some of the teachers hold either of these two theories, the fasvatavada 'the theory of eternality,' and ucchedavāda 'the theory of annihilation.' But in the teachings of the Buddhas who maintain the Middle Path (madhyamā pratipad), there is no room for any one of them So his doctrine is said to be free from both the theories (anuccheda aśāśvata). This view of the Buddhists is too well-known to require here any particular treatment. The Buddhists also proclaim that there are two truths (satya) which they call samerti satya 'practical or empirical truth' and paramārtha satya ‘absolute or supreme transcendental truth,' corresponding to vyacahāranaya and paramarthanaya of the Jainas, and vyāvahartke satya and pāramarthika satya of $ respectively s Or Sünyata ca na cocchedab samsaraf ca na kasvatam karmaro vipranitas ca dharmo buddhena desitah MK, XVII 20 yasmåt pravartate bhsvas tenocchedo na syate | yasmin nivartate bhavas tena niyo na yate! CS, X 25 ulpadabhadgarahito lokah khapurpasannbhah radasan nopalabdho 'yam prajiaya kpry a ca te 43Svatocchedavarjal ca lokah sapnasamah sada LV. X 1-2 anekartham ananantham anucchedam afhvatam ctat tal lokansthanim buddhanim fan&mrtım MIK Vill 11 For the occhedarsda and fifcatac da in Brahmatical literature CO Vya on YS, IL 15, and M3 VII 22? ucchedanisha netxe bhavanısthi na udsale '6 esam kadi ka uschedah kisaro va katham haset 5 dre Astve samupsuita huddhanim dharmadeland loknumitatam ca mai am ca pitsmärthatah yo nayor na venant sibhagam antvayor duasch te lattsam na nanti gambhiram huddhallcane "Yashiram anitntva pomirtbo na detyate | paramirtham anaya nina nadhozamgale MK, XXIV 8 10 duse maccins atkhan buddho vadatam vsto sammutim paramettham en tatıram .upalabhhoti' qunted hy Buddhaghore in the Althakatha on KV, P 30: Sumangalamland (DV Polihapidavuttal, p 231 ·IV 57-58] AGAMAŠĀSTRA 163 It may be observed here that these two truths are not specified in the Upanışads and I an inchned to think that S has accepted them in his systern from the Buddhists through Gauda pada, salya Ime duvi lokavıdunām d sta svayam afruntva pares to Sabbypti ya ca tathā paramărtho satgu na sidhyatı kim ca trefyu ! Putuputrasamagama quoted in BAP pp 361 362 samvịtih poramarthaí ca satyadvayam idam matami BA IX 2. On the explanation of samurto see BAP pp 352 ff samvriyata Avruyato yathabhataparianam svabhavavaranad avtaprakāšanic cinayeti samytıb. aridy moho viparyas iti pary@yah MV pp 492 3 samantad varam samuth mpiinam hi samantat sarvapadarthatattvacchädanit samplity ucyate atha vá samvštih samketo lokavyavahāra ityarthah sa cabhidhanabhi dheyajõānajley&dilaksanah loke samviti, lokasamyftih See MA, VI 28 mohah svabhävivaransd dhi samutih satyam tay, khyadi yad eva kritimam jagada tał samvſtusatyam ity asu munih padartham krtakap ca samvfli quoted in BAP. 353 58 dharma ya iti Jayante samvrtya te na tåttvatah 12 janma mayopamam tesam să ca maya na vidyate 11 The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact Their generation is like ıllusion, and that illusion too does not exist The phrase generation is like illusion may be explained saying that generation is like illusion but itself is not illusion The true sense is however not so It says that generation is 1 See Hi 27 ·164; AGAMAŚĀSTRA (IV.58-60 identical with illusion, there being no difference whatsoever between them (adcayam aduaidhikaram). As regards the non-existence of illusion see yāyat pratyayasāmagri tavan māyāpi vartate BC, IX, 10. See also 27, 28. . See ASP, PP 39-40: kım punar Erya subtite miyopams. te sitDa te misă. rubhubh' avocatnis opamās te sattā ia misi ca attral cidvayera etad advadhikāram itu According to this !Edhyamıka theory even the Buddha and nircina, and, if there is anything higher than nurtuna, that, too, arc allusion, ie, those things and it alon are one and the same thing 59 yatha māyāmayād bijā, jāyate tanmayo 'nikurahi năsau nityo na cocchedi tadvad dharmesu yojanā From an illusive seed comes torth an alluene sprout, and that (sprout) is neither eternal nor is attended with destruction The same applies to all things' C Jatha hu krtakād bijāj jāsate tanmayo nhurah ! CS X. 23. This is the recont'rlicted text from ite Tibetan which run, I l'ar - but bas pa las mru gu brat pa skye tu ba 60 nije«u sarıadharmceu cassatàíåívatsbhidha ! yatra varná na vastante vn ckas latra nocyate !

·IV. 60-61] AGAMAŠASTRA 165 When all things are without generation, there is no room for the appellations 'eternal' and 'non-eternal'; for where words fail discrimination cannot be expressed The following may be cited here: yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate yasmản nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyatel! CS, XI. 25. Now the Ācārya takes up again the vijñānavada of the Buddhists showing that there is nothing but the citla which is the same as vijñāna or manas 'mind that is transformed into the external world And in doing so he shows that there is no difference whatsoever between the experiences in the waking state and those in dream, as has already been shown (II. 1-10): 61 yathā svapne dvayābhāsam cittam calati māyayā ! tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam cittam calati māyayā ??? As owing to illusion the mind in dream moves with the appearance of the two (ie, the subject and the object, or, in other words, the percipient and the perceived)'. even so owing to illusion the mind in waking condition nioves with the appearance of the two.' 1 Thua as well as the next kånks is the same as III 29 and 30 respectively with a few variants . See IV, 72 grāhyagtahakavad dyayam, IV 75, $ on til 29, 30: grðhyagrahakarlpena dvayābhasam. In Buddhast works in such cases the word dvaya is frequently used in the same meaning For instance, advayarthena palyatı, MS, XIV. 32, dvayagrahavisamyuktam grahyagrahagrihakagahavisam yogát, adyayarthenita agrshyagrāhaka thens, ibid, p. 94. See II, 14, III 29, 30; IV. 62, 72, 75, 87 1 The word jagrad is to be taken here in the locative case. See IV. 39, note and 62.

·166
AGAMASASTRA
(IV. 62-64
62
advayam ca dvayābhāsam cittam svapne na samśayah 1
advayam ca dvayābhāsam cittam jágran na samsayaḥ||
There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without
the two has the appearance of the two, even so there is no
doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without
the two has the appearance of the two."
See III 30.
I See IV. 61, notes.
63, 64
svapnaděk pracaran svapne dikṣu vai daśasu sthitāni
aņdajān svedaján vāpi jivān paśyati yān sadā
svapnadrkcittadrśyās te na vidyante tataḥ prthak i
tathā taddrśyam' evedam svapnadỊkcittam işyate 112
The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture,
which a dreamer inoying in dream sees at any time in any of
the ten directions, are visible (only) to the mind of the dreamer,
and do not exist apart from it lie, mind), and this which is
visible only to it ite, the mind) is to be accepted (ht wished)
as the mind of the dreamer
1 Seo IV 77
See IV. 65, 66.

·IV. 65-66]
AGAMAŠASTRA
167
65, 66
caran jāgarite jägrad dikşu vai daśasu sthitan 1
andajān svedaján vāpi jivān paśyati yān sada o
jāgraccittekşaniyās te na vidyante tataḥ pịthak 1
tathā taddıśyam evedam jāgrataś cittam işyate n?
"The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and
moisture, which a waking one moving about in the state of
wakefulness sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are
vişıble (only) by the mind of the waking one and do not exist
apart from it (i.e., the mind of the waking one); and this which
is visible only to it lie, the mind of the wakıng one) is to be
accepted as the mind of the waking one
In these four kārıkās (IV 63-66) it is said that whatever one
sees in the waking state is nothing but one's citta'mind', just
as the things in one's dream This view has repeatedly been
expressed among others in LA, and specially in its Chapter X
where the Buddha is reported to have sad again and again
that all the phenomena are citta (X. 483, 484,692) : cittamātram
vadámy aham 'I say (all this is) only citta's
The word cittadrsya here (IV 64) and elsewhere (IV 28.
36, 77) of which the equivalent 15 citteksaſiya (IV. 66) is
found in frequent use in LA, pp. 56 (four times), 79, 84
(twice), 93, 94, 186 (twice), 338 (twice), etc
1 See IV. 63, 64.
+ See also X 101.
svacıttabhinivelena cittam yal sampravartate!
bahırdha nisi vai driyam ato vai cittamátrakara

·168 ĀGAMAŠASTRA [IV. 67 67 ubhe hy anyonyadęśye te kim tad astiti cocyate ! lakşaņāsūnyam ubhayam tanmatenaiva gļhyate u You say that the cognition of both of them is dependent on each other, but you do not say what remains then Both of them have no characteristics, yet they are cognized owing to their (previous) thought.' In the text ubha and ubhaya refer to 'mind' (citta) and jiuas or objects in general referred to in the preceding kārıkās Ther. cognition depends on each other ; for no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object' So they are interdependent in this respect Owing to this interdependence neither of them is establıshed as a real thing. and as such they have no characteristics and yet they are cognized oning to our previously existing thoughts of them The following may be quoted on this point atītam subhūte cittam nopalabhyate anāgatam cittam nopalabhyate pratyutpannam cittam nopalabhyate VC, 39. uktam ca lokanāthena cittam cittam na paśyati na cchinattı yathātmānam asıdhārā tathā manah !! BA, IX. 17-18. sa cittam gavesayamāno nädhyātmam cittam samanupaśyati na bahirdhă cittam samanupaśyat skandheşu cittam samanupaśyatı na dhātusu cittam samanupaśyatı nãy ataneju cittam samanupaśyatı sa cittam asamanupaśyamś cittadhārām paryesate kutak cittasyotpattır it cittam utpadyate tat kım anyat cittam anyad alambanam 1 S writes na hi ghatamatım pratyakhyāya ghato ghyate napi ghatam pratyakhyaya ghagamath tanmatenavva taccittataya va na alambane sati atha yad ·IV. 67-68] AGAMASASTRA 169 evālambanam tad eva cittam. yadi tāvad anyad ālambanam anyac cittarn tad dvicittatā bhavisyati. atha yad evālambanam tad eva cittam, tat katham cittam cittam paśyati. na hi cittam cittam samanupaśyati. tad yathā no tayevăsidhārayā saivasidhārā Sakyate chettum. na tenaivāngulyagrena tad cvāngulyagram sprașjum sakyate. eva tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam draştum iti vistarah. Aryaratnacūdasūtra quoted in BAP, pp 392-393 : AIV, pp. 62-63 : $s. p. 235. evam LA, For laksanāšūnya which is the same as laksana º in meaning see the following: yad dhi cittam mahāmate na nityam nānityam na kūry'ám na kāraram na samskītam nāsamskrtamº na lakşyam na lakzanam tad Vänmātramº tad anutpannam yad anutpannam tad aniruddhamakasasamamº tatredam ucyate pramanendriyanirmuktam na kāryam nāpi kāranam buddhiboddhavyarahitam lakyyalaksanavaritam il PP 189-190 tasmān na vidyate lahşyam laksanam naiva vidyate | lakşyalaksananımukto bhāvo 'pi naiva vidyale » MK, V 5. upāyadeśanā mahyam nāham desemi laksanan bālā ghianti bhāvena lakşanam laksyam eva ca 11 LA, X 21. lakşyalaksanavarjitam. Op cit, X-224. 68-70 yatha svapnamayo jivo jáyatc mriyate 'pi ca tatha jivă ami sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ! 12011-22 ·170 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 69-70 yathā māyāmayo jivo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca | tathā jivā ami sarve bhavanti na bhavanti can yathā nirmitako jivo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca l. tathā jivā ami sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca !! 'As a creature formed of dream, or made of allusion or supernatural power (nirmitaka') takes birth and dies, even so all those creatures exist and do not exist 1 The ord nirmita or nirmitaka in the above sense is frequently used mainly in Buddhist works. Among many others the following may be quoted here : nirmitopamāh pratıbimbopamāh sarvadharmāh jñāt ayyah. SR, P 27. acintiyan nirmita nirminotyā. deseti dharmam bahu prānakolinam Ibid. p. 23. yathā nirmitakam sāstā numimitardhısampada ] nirmito nirmimitānyam sa ca nirmitakah punah 112 tathā numitakākārah kartā yat karma tat krtam | tad yathā nurmitenānyo numito nirmitas tatha || MK, XVII. 31-32. ekasmim bhāsamānasmim sabte bhāsanti mimmita | ekasmim tunhim ăsine sabbe tunhi bhavanti ca|| DN, II. 212. by 1 says nirmitako mantrausadhyadıbhir abhinspaditah 'created incantation, herb., etc 1 Cf Sänyatosaptats as quoted by Poussin in a note on MV, P 330.

·IV. 70-71] AGAMASASTRA 171 The following is the Sanskrit version : ekasya bhāsamănasya sarve bhāşantı numitāh ! ekasya tūsņīmbhūtasya sarve tūçnim bhavanti call Quoted as in Āgoma in MV, p. 331; DA, p. 166; AKV, p. 27. See Aryaratnakūtasūtra quoted in MV, pp. 336 ff.; Āryogaganaganjasūtra quoted in SS, p. 270 ; BA, V.57. CF. the nimāraköya of a Buddha. Poussin: The Three Bodies of a Buddha, JRAS, 1906, (Oct.); JA, 1913, pp. 581 &; ERE, Vol. 9, pp. 852-853. The use of such words as nirmāņa, nirmanakāya, and nirmāņacıtta occurs also in the Yoga system (YS, IV. 4, with scholiasts). The use of the word nirmāņa in almost the same sense can, however, be traced back to Upanişadıc texts sa yatra prasvapity asya lokasya sarvāyato māträm vpādāya svayaq vihatya svayam nirmāya prasvapıtı. BU, IV.3, 9. ya eşa supteşu jägartı kämam kāmam puruso nirmımāņah KU, V.8. It appears, however, that it is the Buddhists who first used the word in that definite sense. Now having thus established his thesis the author asserts his conclusion in the following kārıkā, which is already found once more (Ul. 48) : 71 na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ sambhayo 'sya na vidyate 1 etat tad uttaman satyam yatra kiicin na jāyate 1 1 CSR quoted in MV, p 109 na hr kalci jyad na ca mtiyatt. + For the wording st. etat tu patsman satyap, AIV, p. 120.

·172 AGAMAŠASTRA [IV.71-72 "No Jiva of any kind takes birth, nor is there any possibility of it. It is that highest truth in which nothing originates.' See III. 48. Now it is affirmed in the next kārikā that the world consisting of the subject and the object has no reality at all, it being the creation of the movement of mind which in fact has no object at all, and as such it is held to be always free from any sort of attachment or relationship to an object (asanga) : 72 cittaspanditam evedam grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam | cittam nirvişayam nityam asangam tena kīrttitam A *This duality which consists of the subject and the object (fit the perceiver and the perceptible) is only the vibration of the citta'mind' citta has no object, therefore it is said to be always asanga 'having no attachment (or relation to an object) See IV. 79 (nthsanga), CH anābhāsa (=nırābhāsa), III 46; IV. 48 As regards asanga see LA, P 157 : asangalakşanam jñānam visayavaicitryasangalaksanam vijñānamº, asangasvabhāvalaksanam jānamº, aprāptilaksanam jñānam. The following lines also from the LA may be cited here : cittamātram da sarvam dvidhā cittam pravartate! grāhyagrāhakabhavena ātmātmiyam na vidyate | brahmadisthanal'iparyantam cittamâtram vadāmy aham cittamātravınırmuktam brahmadır nopalabhyate || III. 121-122.

·IV 72] AGAMAŠASTRA 173 cittamatram na disyo'sti dvidha cittam h drsyate grahyagrahakabhavena saivatocchedavarjitam || III 65 grahyagrahakabhavena cittam pamatı dehinam! dſsyasya laksanam nastı yatha balair vikalpyate !! X 58 taranga hy udadher yadvat payanapratyentah nţty amanah pravartante vyucchedas ca na vıdyate ! alayaughas tatha nityam vısayapavanentah i citrais tarangavijnanair nityamanah pravartate ll- II 99 100 X 56 57 CJ (1) spandaspandasvabhayam hi cinmatram ha vidyate") khe vata iva tat spandat sollasam santam anyatha ) cittvam (?) cittam bhavitam sat spanda ity ucyate budhaih 1 dysyatvabhavitam caitad aspandanam at $mytam || spandat sphuratı citsargo nihspandad brahma sasvatam Jivakaranakarmadya citspandasyabhtcha smaçta || YV III 67 68 (ul) svabhavad vyatırıhtam tu na cittasyastı cetanam spandad ste yatha vayor antah kım nama cetyate ! Op cit III 66 16 Having shown that the duality consisting of the subject and the object is the creation of mind'the author says in the next kanika that its existence is only in empirical (samırli) and not in absolute (poromortha) truth For a thing which is ·176 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (IV. 74 varanāl) and it is regarded as truth because it brings to light what is covered fäcrtaprakāšanāt) See IV. 57, and BAP on IX. 2 (p 352). The following may be quoted here from MA, VI. 23 as cited in BAP, P 361 samy agmsādarsanalabdhabhāvam rūpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhāvah 1 samyagdịšām yo visayah sa tattvam mşşādršām samvítisatyam uktam 1: Now as regards paralantra *dependent' it has a special significance as evident from Buddhist sources In Buddhism there are three characteristics (laksana) or natures (svabhāva) of a thing, uiz, (i) pankalpita 'imagined', (ii) paratantra dependent', and (1) parini panna 'perfect'' Sometimes they are briefly called (o) kalpıla_(it) tantra, and (ni) nispanna respectively? Any object, for instance, an elephant, according to Mādhyamikas or Yogācāras is sūnya or merely a creation of mind, yet we know it as a particular object This characteristic of it is an imagined one (pankalpita) Now the notion or imagination of the object depends for its being on its cause (or cause and conditions, hetu-pratyaya), and so the characteristic is called paratantra (=prafityasamutpanna That the object is in fact always devoid of the imagined characteristics referred to above is partnıspanna. It is so also because there 1 MV!!, LXXXVII; T2, 39, TSN, ! kalpitah paratantraś ca parınıspanna eva ca 1 trayah svabhāvā dhirānārs gambhirajbez am isyate, MVST, 16 Lalpitah paratantraś ca parin panna eva ca| LA, X 374 buddhyā vivecyemānam ho na tartram nāp, kalpitam | nispanno hästi va bhāvah katham buddhya prakalpyate || ·IV. 741 ĀGAMASASTRA 177 is perfect invariation or because it is free from any change They are called 'nature' (svabhava; owing to such practice of the people though in fact they do not exist." Vasubandhu gives here an example in his TSN, 27, 28: Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one's spell. There the elephant appears, but there is only the form of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the elephant is parkalpita, the form of the elephant is paratantra, and the absence of the clephant is parinişpanna" Of these three laksanas or suabhāvas the first, pankalpita, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedānta of $ 3 Tk. 40. avskärapanınispaltyd sa parinuspannah, MVBT, p 19: tanys Samskrtatvan nirvikäratsena parin spannat at Writes Sthuramatz in MVBT, p 19 sa punar dravyato 'sann api Vyavahārato 'stiti svabhiva ucyate & mayakrtam mantravasāt khyāls hasty Etmani yatha akstamatram tattāsta hasti nästi tu sarvatha || svabhivah kalpito hastī paratentras tadákrtchi yas tatra hastyabhavo 'sau parinkpanna nyate / C MSA, XI, 19 tadakit ca tatrasti tadbhavasca na vidyate . For eary reference the following may be quoted here Tk p 39 yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate! parikalpita ev sau svabhavo na sa vidyate 20 This is based on LA, P 163 yut punar uktam bhagavatl yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāvā vikalpyante na hi sa tesim svabhãyo bharah pankapua evan) Sthiramati dhystmikatabyavkalpyavastubhedena vikalpinim Inantyam pradartayaon ata yenayena vikalpeneti yad yad vastu vikalpyale dhytmikam bahyam Salafo vivad buddhadhari upi parikalpita evdeau svabhava Hy otra karanam sha na vidyata a yad rastu vikalsas,sayas ad 385āt seitszh: in na ndyol lasmid, lad vastu pankalpitassabhasam era na hetupratyayapralıbaddha avabhavam pankalpitinantaram paratantrasiabhavo vaklavya ity ata dha paratanttasvabhāvas tu yıkalpah pratyayodbhavah ! 12011-23 ·178 AGAMASASTRA [IV. 74 with prātıbhāsika salya 'the truth that exists only in appearance'; as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string; paratantra with Lyāvahárika satya 'the practical truth' (this is called by the Buddhists sămusta 'pertaining 10 samuri or uyau ahāra satya), the phenomena in the waking state ale its examples, and Fanni fara with păramorthika satya 'supreme or tanscendental truth', eg, Brahman of the Vedāntins' Sthuramati atja vikalpa ti paratantrasvat havem üha pratyod bhava ity antngpi paratantrabhidhanap savrttinimittam sha' patair he' upratyayas (antryal utpadyata at paratantia aty anthah (A. the sense, requires the order of the last four words is slightly changed See MVBT, P 19 giáhyem githakam ca ssabtálalunyat ad abhatam apy astītı panlalpyata iti pankalpita sty ucyale sa purar dravyata 'sann api vyavaharato 'stati svabha ucyste para'antrah paravata hetupratyay epratibaddhajanmakatsāt P 20 parait helupratyayais tantıyale anyato svay am bhavatit paratantrah ) stata nyabetupratyayaprattaddha tmalabha aty uktam bhavati uktah paratantrah parin pannah kattam aty nia ata tha nuspannas tasya pūrvena sada rahitată tu ya 21 ( MVBT, p 19 kalpitena erabhāvena tasya yatyantaſünyata svabhavah parinpanno vikalpajöănagacarah Vaubandhu says or the point, Op et P20 grahyagrahalrbhivah parinıspannah lp TSA, 3 sada rahttata of Tk 21 and atyantasinyata of MVBT seferred to above are expressed by soda ndyamānala Sihiramati avikārspannı-pattyä si parinıpannah tosyeti para. tantrasya porveneti panikalpitena laemin skalpe gráhyagrahakabharah parikalplah tatls hi ta'min vihalpe gishy agrātakatvam avidya mānam eva pankalpy ata it? pankalpitam uyate tera prahy agiatakera paratantrasya sada sarvabilam atvanta rahito tiya sa parin pannasvabhasah According to Buddhiots nirodho nireira, and ökā'a Bre the example of partni panna ? For detailed discussion and biblic graphy and sources, ancient and modern, see V.S. PP 514 561 TSN LA, pp 126 127, 169, 170 176, etc: VSA VI 1, XI 13, 38-41 XI 51 78, 79 SNS V1 ·IV. 741 AGAMASASTRA 179 can са It is to be noted that samet consists in pankalpita and paratantra scabhūcas and paramartha in parinispanha Thus it is rightly said in the kārika 73 that paralantra exist only in practical truth (someti) and not in any way in absolute truth This is fully explained by Prajñakaramati lin his BAP, pp 354-355) saying that whatever comes into existence layale) does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions Thetupratyayasamagril, and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in realits, like a shadow on a looking glass Let the following te quoted here : api tu hetupratyayasāmagrim pratitja mājāsad utpady ate. tadvaikalyato nirudhy ate hetupratyayasāmagtım pratitya jātassa parāy attālmalıbhass a pratibimtasy eva kutah satova. bhāvatā. na ca kasyacıd padarthasya paramžıthato hetu praly aj asāmagritah samutpattih sambhavati. Let us quole also the following few lines māyaya nirmitarp yac ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam! àyāti tat kutah kutra yati celi nirüpyatām yad anyasannidhanena desam na tadabhāvatah! prabbimbasamc tasm.n kitme satyata kutah BA IX 144, 145. yah pratyayair jāyatı sa hy ajalo na tasya utpādu sabhāvato'sti y ah praty ayadhinu sa sünya ukto yah sünyatām janatı so 'pramattah Anvaralaptahradāpasamkramanasüfra quoted in BAP, 1oc cit and MV.P 239 The subject under discussion is that nothing originates (etat lad uttamam saty am yatra kincin na jayate, IIJ. 48. JV 21) It has been shown in establishing it that the notion of origination is only in empirical reality and not in absolute reality in which we cannot assert the existence of even a thing that is without origination The author now says in the next länkā ·180 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 75 that the notion of origination is due to a strong adherence (abhınivela) to the unrcal (abhūta) referring hereby to the two (dvaya), 1.c., the percipient and the perceptible (grāhya and (grahaka). 75 abhülābhiniveso 'sti dvayam tatia na vidyate ! dvayābhāvam sa buddhvaiva niinimitto na jāyate II When one * There is a strong adherence to what has not been (abhūta':. for the two are not there Just when he understands the non-existence of the two it goes beyond the range of its cause and does not come into being' The cause of origination is abhūtābhınwcía clearly understands the true nature of the two which have no existence at all that abhinesa goes away and consequently the notion of origination does not arise S explains the word he (sah) in the original (c) in the following way dvayābhāvam buddhvā nirnimitto nivșttamithyādvayā. bhınıveso yah sa na jayate-'He who having understood the absence of the two is beyond the cause and (thus) whose strong adherence to the two which are false has turned back, is not born This explanation does not appear to be proper when ore reads the larkā urcer discussion with the hārika IV 79, where the same phrase dvajāt havan sa tudchranya, 75) occurs once more with a slight variation icstlabhatam for drayabhātam , there being no difference of meaning (vastuabhàtar duayabhava -$) Let the kārkā be quoted here abhūtābhınıvećād uhi sadrée tat pravartate vastvabhāvam sa buddhvarva nihsangam vinivartate I. 1 That , 'unteal,' referring to the two dooyal that follows ? Te percipient and the perceptible (grahya gahaka), see TV 72 I See IV 79 ·182 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 75 a woman (it) pains a gambler' (RV, X. 34. 11). Similar uses are found also in the Brāhmanas. The following is from the Satapatha Brahmana te pašava osadhir jagdhvā apalı pıtvā tata eşa rasah sam bhavati 'the beasts having eaten the plants and drunk water--then the vital sap arises. Following this the line under discussion (IV 79) would be explained by a grammarian thus sa (yadā) vastvabhāvam buddhvaiva (bhavat tadā) tan niḥsargam v.nivartete, - 'just when he understands the absence of things it mind, turns back being free from relation' Now in the kauka (79) the word sa'h) must refer to one (understood) whose abhūtābhiniveía is stated In the same way. I think, the hānkä 75, too, should be explained It is the abhūtabhinwesa itself and not the person whose abhūtābhınıvesa is alluded to that does not arise (ayate). Naturally one has a persistent bchef in the abhūta or unreal things, ie, the percipient and the perceptıble which have, in fact, no existence at all So when one clearly understands their non-existence there is no room for that persistent belief to come into being Now, as regards abhūtabhiruesa compare abhūtaparıkalpa of the Buddhists We read the following in the LA, pp 149-150 abhūtaparıkalpa 'bhūtaparıkalpa iti bhagavatn ucyate. katamasyaitad bhagavan dharmasyadhivacanatı yad utabhitaparikalpa it kim vā prativshalpayann abhūtaparıkalpo bhavatı bhagavān aha sādhu sādhu mahāmate“ nrnām grāhy agrābakābhinivesābhinivistānām ca bahyavicitrārthopalambhābhinivelac ciltacattakalāpo vikalpasamsabditah pravarlamānah pravartata ātmātmiyābhinivesāt Or one may take here neimitto na yate with reference to you kalpita IV 731 and it may be explained saying that which is cr originates in the empiraal truth does not do so when one has no notion of the two Igrāhya and grahaka there being nu cause inirnimitta) for origination ·IV, 75-76) AGAMAŠĀSTRA 183 The abhūtab hinivesa in our work (IV. 75, 79) 13, in fact, abhūta-parikalpa of the Yogācāras. See the following line in the Madhyāntavibhanga (I. 24-6) of Maitreyanātha: abhūtaparıkalpo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyatei? From this it is perfectly clear that the first half of our kārıkā under discussion is in reality taken from Maitreya nătha. The word nimitta in nirnimitta 'devoid of nimitta' has a special sense in Buddhist literature. There is a very common phrase : na nimittagrāhi bhavatı, Palı Oggāhi hoti, DSņ. $$ 1345-6. It means that when a nemitta 'specific appearance of a thing is grasped in the way such as a male, a female, pleasant, etc., a man 18 entangled in various worldly troubles, and so it is advised that he should not be a nimitlagrūhin grasper of nimittas' As the speciħc appearances are the causes of attachment, aversion, and delusion (rāga, ducsa, and moha) they are called nimittas See AS, p. 400 This special meaning seems not to have been intended in the present case, We may take the word here as well as in IV. 77 and 78 in the sense of 'objective cause which is expressed by the word artha in JV 24. Having said as to how that persistent belief disappears, the author proceeds to discuss in the following kankās how the non-origination (anutpatti) of mind is effected which is to be realized * MVBT, PP 9 A On b of the karıká Sthuramalı writes svátmany avidyamanera grahyagıāhakākárena prakhyāte (na vyaktam bhrántirupatvan) # AKV as quoted in DS. p 41 nimittam vastuno 'vasthavesero nilatvadih, Trip 21,1 3 nimittam tad. (referring to onaya) vifeso pilapitadyalembanavyavasthakaranam See AS, pp 291, 308 : AS, p. 400 itthipunsanimittam vă subhanmittadikam va kilesavatthubhatam nimittan ·184 ĀGAMASASTRA [IV. 76-77 76 yadā na labhate hetūn utlamadhamamadhyamāni tadă na jāyate cittam hetvabhāve phalam kutah 'When the mind does not have any cause, superior, inferior, or middle, it does not originate, for how is there the effect in the absence of the cause?' Here hetu is nothing but nimitta in the preceding kārkā Sec IV. 77-78 77 anımıttasya cittasya yānulpattiḥ samādvayā | ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadiśyam hı tad yatabo This kārıkā seems to have been handed down defectively. For, evidently in the first half the sentence is not complete, as the conjunctive pronoun yad tan feminine yā) requires the pronoun tad in feminine (in any case-ending). but it is not to be found in either of the two halves Nor is there the antecedent of tad in the second half which clearly shows to have supported something stated before But what is it? The explanation of 's appears to be far-fetched and far from satisfactory nor has he explained the word tad which has altogether been overlooked It seems to me, therefore, that the above two lines are taken by mistake from two different karikās which the other two lines are lo't Heave the present Kārkā, as it is before us, untranslated, as it does not give any complete so far as I can understand The first half may, however, be explained thus Che non origination anutpattı, of the cause.ess (animitta)' mind (erttal is the same unconditioned-always in the same condition) and free from the two {advaya, i e., sense samu. IC See IV 75 ·IV. 77-78) AGAMASASTRA 185 . i free from the notion of the grāhya 'receptible, and the grāhaka *recipient') Sec kārika IV 80. For the word sama or samya see III. 2,38; IV 80, 93, 95, 100 with the author's explanation ; and MuU, II. 1.3. cf. BG, V. 19: nirdosam hi samam brahma See MV, pp. 374.75 : manjuśtir aha. pardmărtkatah sarvadharmānutpādasamatayā parmărthatah sarvadharmayantāgātisamatayā para. märthatah samāh sarvadharmah For cittadrsya in the second half see }}l 31, IV. 28, 36. 78 buddhvă 'nimittatām satyam hetum pịthag anápnuvat!! vitaśokam tada 'kımam abhayam padam aśnute | When one understands its? true state of causelessness it (citta) does not have any other cause, and as such reaches then a position which is free from sorrow, desire, and fear' I read with MS D’ anapnuvat for anūpnuvan in editions and other MSS., construing it with citta referred to in the preceding kārikā (77). It is to be noted that it is cilta that is referred to in karikás IV 76-60 In kārıkā 79 the pronoun tad refers to citta, as says $, too, expressly One may naturally expect to have its mention or reference also in the present karikā. To introduce a person who reaches the position is rather abrupt It is also to be considered that it is cifta and not the person that is concerned with the cause or causes (IV 76) in this case the grammatical difficulty is to be removed as in IV. 75 1 See the Varian's 1 That is, of the citta 'mind. See IV 25, 26, 27, 75, 77 7 That is, the state nf bring without the obiective snur # See ]V. 76 pada=sthati, IV 80 12011-24 ·186 AGAMAŠASTRA (IV 78-80 Accepting the reading anapnuvan the kārika may be translated thus : Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear.' 79 abhūlābhiniveſād dhi sadỊśe tat pravartate i vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiva nihsangam vinivartate *Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity' The word sadrţa means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief nihsanga means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object. For c one is referred to IV 75 See III 45, IV. 72. 75. 96, 99 80 nivettasyāpravrttasya niscalā hi tadā sthitih i visayah sa hı, buddhānām tat sămyam ajam advayam *At that time when the citta) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to fits object), its position is fimm fre, unwavering in the least. That is the field of activity of the Buddhas,' and that is the same,? unborn, and free from the two 1 CJ III 34 pracārah sa tu vijfieyah ? See Ill 2. 38 See also Vch, p 41 api tu khalu punah subhate samah sa d'harmo na tatra kasçıd visamah tenocyale nuttarasamnyaksambedhin nurāmatvena Dihsatts atvena nirjivatvena Riepudgalatvena samă sănuttara samyakcambodhib 3 The perceptible and the percipient (grahyo and grahaka).

·IV 801 AGAMAŠĀSTRA 187 In c visaya may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge. See lil. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the summum bonum of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call nurodha or nirvāṇa and brahman respectively. The Vedāntist commentator. $, writes here very clearly that this state of mind is brahman cittasya niſcala calanavaritā brahmasvarūpalva tada sthitur yarsi brahmasvarīpā sthitiś cittasyādvayavijñānaikarasaghanalakşanā. And again on IV. 77 he says animittasya cittasyeti yā moksākhyānutpattih That this state of crtta is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works. cittamātram nitābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmı ca| etad dhi bhāṣitam buddhair bhâșante bhāsayantı ca 11 LA, X 105. arthābhāse ca vijñāne jñānam tathatāgocaram parāvrttam nitabhāsam āryānām gocaro hy asau il Op. Cit. X 148 This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works viñaptımātratāyam cittam avasthitam bhavatı Tk .p 43 For the wording of c (vişayah sa hi buddhānām sce CS. p 497. Visayah sa hı buddhānăm, Vk. p 6 yo buddhänām visayah, p. l: buddhagocarah, SSP, p 120. *5a yatpramăno buddhavisayah, MSA, XX.XXI 26 buddhănām visayad api; LA, SII. BO, âryânâm gocaro yathā + See cittam pravartate citram cittam esa mucyate cittam bulyate ngnyac cittam eva nirudhyate! Op Cit. X. 145 ·186 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 78-80 Accepting the reading anapnuvan the kārikā may be translated thus : *Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear 79 abhotābhiniveśād dhi sadrśe tat pravartate! vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiva nihsangam vinivartate i Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity' The word sadrśa means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief nihsanga means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object For c one is referred to IV 75 Sec III 45, IV 72, 75. 96. 99 80 nivrttasyāpravrttasya niscalā hi tada sthitih visayah sa hı, buddhānam tat sâmyam ajam advayam *At that time when the citta) has turned back from and does not go again) onwards to fits object), its position is firm Ge, unwavering in the least, That is the field of activity of the Buddhas,' and that is the same.? unborn, and free from the two 1 Cf lll 34 pracãrah sa tu vijfieyah : See II] 2 38 See also Vch, p 41 api tu khalu punah subhate samah sa dhamo na tatra kascid usamah tenocyate nuttarasamyaksambodhi nurāmatvena nuhsattvatvena nirjivalvena niepudgalatrena sami sānuttara samyaksambodhih 3 The percepible and the percipient igrahya and grahaka} ·IV.80] AGAMASASTRA 187 In c vişaya may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge Sce ill. 46 and IV 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the summum bonum of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call nurodha or nircana and brahman respectively. The Vedintist commentator. $, writes here very clearly that this state of mind is brahman cittasya niſcală calanavárjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tada sthitir yaiçi brahmasvarūpa sthitis cittasyadvayavijñānaikarasaghana. laksanā. And again on IV. 77 he says. animittasya cittasyeti yā mokzākhyānutpattih That this of citta is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works cittamatram nirâbhâsam vihāro buddhabhumical ctad dha bhasitam buddhair bhāvante bhă'ayantı ca 1 LA, X. 105. arthābhāse ca vigtiáne griānam tathatagocarar parăvitiam firābhāsam äryänām socaro hy asau Op. C. 148. Tk :P This state is the same as what we knox from such lines as the following from Buddhist works ynnaplumätratāyām ciltam avasthitam bhavate 43 For the wording of c vişayah sa hi buddhānāmi sce Cs, p. 497 viçay ah sa hi buddhınām, ''k p 6 yo buddhänām viſayahi p. Il buddhagocara!, SSP p 120. 5. yatpramāņo buddhavigayah : MISA, XX-XXI 26 buddhinām viçayad api; LA, 111 80. Iryinām gocaro yathi, Ser cita pravarlale estran citlar esa mucsele 1 Cattam hislyate ninyxc ciltam a pirudhyater Op Cut, X 145.

·188 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 81 This state of inind to which the Buddhas aspire is further described in the following kārıka : 81 ajam anidram asvapnam prabhātam bhavati svayam saked vibhātı hy evaisa dharmo dhātuh svabhāvatah . See Ill. 36 "It shines forth itself having no ongination, nor sleep, nor dream Indeed, this object Idharma), the fundamental element (dhatu), is naturally illumined once for all.' The word dharma in the second half of the hankā may be taken in its general sense, an element of existence, an object, thing But considering the views of the Yogācāras, and specially what Vasu bandhu and his commentator Sthurama to have said in descubing this state of mind? it is to be taken in the sense of a special kind of dharma, ic, aśrayaparāortti 'revolution or change of the recipient lic., älayavijnana which is the sced of all, sarabijakal'? A few words are here required with regard to the reading dharmo dhatuh suabharatah This reading is found in some of 1 See Tk Pp 43 44 yadaivam vijāaptımâtratāyām cittam avasthitam thavai tada katham yapadisyata ity aha acitto nupalambho sau jfázam lokostaram ca tal áfrayasya parassiti dvadha dauethulyahānitah 29 sa evänāsiaro dhātur anity ah kusalo dhruvah 1 sukho imukukāyo sau dharmakho yam matamunch 30 For paraurth in aśrayoparaurtt we have sometines pariurift or paricarlana Tib gnas gyur pa or ghas yons gyur pa, or gshan du gyur pa See Tib translation of Tk Tanjur Mdo, Si, Fo190a) For asrayaparācrth sec among others Tk, loc cut MSA. XIX 54, LA,P 338 DB, App p 27.pp 1908 tasya tathā panbhāvitam tal laukikam parisuddham dhyanam apžyıkaklesapakıyam ducthulyam áravad apakatsatt acirena lasya pratānād ásrayo sya bodhisattvasya patīvarlate pāpakasyāpayskasz a harmano tyantam akaran alāya, apāyāgamana- Foruts different explanation sre V.S. pp 609 612 tāyal ca ·IV 811 ACAMASASTRA 169 the MSS of the Anandashram edition and in some others, too, examined by me, while others read dharma Dhātusva Ś accepts the latter and Anandagiti supports it sayın dhātusvabhāvata ity ekam padam gļhitvá vyācaste This implies that the reading dhatuh sua" was also known to him But neither of them seems to be very satisfactory and this leads the present wnter to amend the reading as dharmadhātuḥ svabhāvatah The reading dharma dhatuh appears to be due to the unfamiliarity of the commentators with the significance of the word dharmadhatu which is quite appropriate here. Let us therefore explain the kārıkā in this light In accordance with this eading the second half may be translated thus. 'Indeed the essence of reality (dharmadhatul is naturally illumined once for all' See 1. 14, 16, III. 36, 37 For c see Chu, Vill 4. 1-2 which is the same See also NUU, 9. Mku, 2-23 We take the next three kārikás together The kánika 82 is incomplete and as such should be construed with 83 3 The word dharmadhato may be translated by the essence of reality It is devoid of the characteristics of subject and object (oryukto grõhyogrāhoko laksanenal or undifferentiated into subject and object grāhyogrähakarohita) It 18 a synonym for paramärtha or paramarthatatten, MV, $ XCIX 8; Tk, p 41. 1 26. BAP. P 354 parama utlamo 'rthah, akrtrimam vastutūpan yadadhigamat sarsāstsāsanānusandhiklefaprahānam bhalata sarvadharmanăm nahsvabhávatā būnyata tathata bhūtakotih dharmadhatur yadiparyayah Again, P 421 bodhir buddhatsam ekānekasvabhāvavıvıktam anutpanna. niruddham anucchedam aśāśvatam sarvaprapaſcavinimuktam akā'apratisamam dharmakayakhyam parathārthalaltsam ucyate ca praji&paramitatūnyata tathalt brotalon dharmadhāti Idifabelená zamurtim upādāyabludhisate Writes Maitreyanathe MVBT, P4) tathatā bhūtakoti cāmmtah pa[ramätthakah) dharmadhālus ra parvāyāh šūnyatayih samisalah ananyathāvipatyasatannitodhāryayocarah het tvắc cănYadha mãnăm nayKyiriho yathakramam 1 15 16 As regards dharmadhatu Vasu bandhu cays here pp 41-42) Iryadharmahetulvad dharmadhatuh iryadhatmārām tadslambansprabhavatsad hetvartho hy atra dhatvarhah 'sce Tk. p 44,1 20, ZU On the last words ctad eva ·190 AGAMASĀSTRA (IV. 82-84 82 sukham avriyate nityam duhkham vivriyate sadā ! yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheņa bhagavān asau : 83 asti năsty asti nāstiti nāsti nästiti vă punah 1 calasthirobhayābhāvair āvinoty eva bāliśaḥ ! 84 kotyaś catasra etās tu grahair yásām sadāvýtah | bhagavan ábhur asprsio yena drstah sa sarvad;k n "It is the adherence to an idea of) a thing whatsoever at may be,' by which bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one (dharmadhatu) (1) as, (11) is not, (111) is and is not 'ie, both), or (1) neither is nor is not lie, not both)- with these (notions) the childish obscure it (respectively in accordance with their own ideas of its being, (1) steady,' (u) unsteady, (mm) both,' and (iv) the absence (of both) mcans Sthramat commenta syalaksanopadayarūpadharano ру ayam dhátusabdo vartara ity aha betvartho The word dhita also means one that supports its own particulanty (slalaksana; and the secondary qualities of matter (upādāya or bhauhka rupa), including evidently. as observes Sicherbatsky (MVD, P050) also the primary quahties of matter (mahābhūta Dharmadhatu also the mental state considered as element (dhātu) owing to its ultimate reality See Pal. Text Society's Dictionary, # v dhamma, Compendium of Philosophy, pp 254-255 1 This adherence is mainly four-fold as shown in the next kārka 2 In explaining calasthura' in c of 83 sthita is to be taken forst as required by the sense larthakromo) even discarding the order of reading (pathakrama) 3 That is, permanent 1 That is, steady and unsteady 5 That 18, nether steady nor unsteady ·IV.84) AGAMAŠASTRA 191 These are the four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered, but in fact) it is not touched by them. One who realizes it is omniscient.' In nästi nästiti va in c of karikā 83 take the first na with both asti and năsti, as na aste and na nāstí, These four points are maintained by four classes of disputants according to their ideas of the Absolute, as it is permanent. not permanent, both, or not bath. But some of the Buddhists (Vajñanavādıns and Madhyamikas) do not subscribe to any one of these views, their point is quite free from all of them, while in the Vedānta the first point is avowedly held: e..., KU, VI. 12 and 13: astiti bruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate astity evopalabdhavyah | TU, II. 6.1: asti brahmeti ced veda santam enam tato viduh MU, IV. 4: asti brahmeti brahmavidyāvid abravit As regards the position of the Buddhists it is also very clear na san nāsan na sadasan na capy anubhayātmakam | catuskotivınırmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduh II Sara ha in SS, fol. 17. kāranaih pratyayais căpi yesām lokah pravartale cātusko kaya yukta na te mannayakovidāh || LA, III. 20 punar aparam mahāmate bālaprthaganā arādıkālaprapancadauşhulyasvapratīvikalpanā nāļake nftyantah svasiddhāntanayadesanāyām akuialäh svacittadęśy abāhyabhāvalakşaņābhinivia • Sec Aloleon, 1903, IV. p. 389 This kārıka is widely quoted JS, 28, SDS. Bauddhadorlana, SSS, M 7 (with the reading no cobhākhyām Orlaksanam in c). caturkotivinimuktam sünyam tattvam i sthitam-Ibid, 9, BAP. 359; SaS. 1. 44 (Vujainabhiksu), CJ, BJS, II. 27 (-DNI, 27).

·192 AGAMASASTRA [IV. 84 na ca ha san ca upāyadeśanāpātham abhinivisante syasıddhāntanayam cātuskotikanayavisuddham prativibhāvayantı. LA, p 171. yac ca mahāmaté na kāryam na karanam tan na san nāsad yac nãsat tac cãtuskotikabāhyam cātuskotham mahāmate lokavyavahārah Op. cit, p. 188.' CA punar aparam mahámale catustayavinırmuktă tathāgatānām dharmadesana yad utaikatvānyatv obhayanubhayavivarjitā nāstyastısamāropāpavādavınırmuktā satyapratity asamutpādanırodhamárgavimoksapravithpūrvaka mahāmate tathagatănām dharmadesanā. Op cit., p 96 It is to be noted here that according to the word bhagavat 'the glorious one' in 62d and 84c refers to ātman. On the .. following grounds, however, I think, it is the dharmadhātu in 81c, which is alluded to The subject matter here in Mārkās 60-8-4 is the unwavering or the firm state of the mind which has turned back from and does not go onwards again to its object--the state which is dharmadhatu and to which aspire the Buddhas This is further dealt with in the following two kārıkās (85-86) There is, therefore no room for álmart to which the word bhagavat may refer An objection may be raised here that the word bhagavat is used with reference to a conscious or sentient being, and as such it cannot refer to dharmadhatu which is nothing but the miscala sthit of the mind Onc can, however, meet itin the following way Such common phrases as bhaçatati sruth. bhasa dah bhaçalats bhavitacyata etc. will show that the word under discussion is employed also to non sentient Sometimer instead of the four point. ratu ket) refrired to there are only first thier excluding the last Ser Mh. 1 7. V11 20 CS \V1 25. LA. 156 Sometimes only the first two are mentioned Ser my paper Catullor. in the the commemorat on l'olume, 1937 pp 85 $ where similar passanes are qunted from Toslintie text ·IV 841 AGAMAŠASTRA 193 + beings It is found that any thing rrespective of its being senbent or otherwise that is powerful or commands respect regard faith confidence or reverence may be referred to by bhagavat It is also to be taken into consideration that this dharmadhatu. is in fact Brahman of the Vedantists as shown in the clearest possible words by the author himself in III 46 which we have already discussed Again the dharmadhatu is the same as what we understand by the word prajnaparamita' And it is very well known that prajnaparamita is reverently mentioned with the epithet bhagavatt Besides this dharmadhatu which is the same as prajnaparamita is nothing but advaya jnana 16. the , ana which is free from the subject and the object and this is identified with Tathagata as is evident from the following couplet from the PAS of Dinnaga as quoted by Haribhadra in his AAA p 28 prajnaparamita jnanam advayam sa tathagatah | sadhya tadarthyayogena tảcchabdyam granthamargayoh U The first half of this harha is based on such old texts as the following cittamatravatarena prajna talhagat mata | LA III 43 See lbid pp 187 190 ending with yat saryaprapancatitam sa tathagatah See also pp 191 ff. 2 See BAP p 421 clad eva ca prajiapărama ta sungată ta hata' ad fabdena abh dh yate Th s passage is quoted once more See IV 81 note 3 p 189 & Sec E. Obermilier DPP pp 7 45 59 p · Let uy quote here another passage which is very s ga fitant though a lule lengthy from the samewok te LA pp 191 193 nah mabamate abhāvas ta hagatagatok ntu abāmate manomayadharma kayasya tathagatasyaitad adh vacanam yatra yat? sdtvat rthakarairāvaka pralyekabuddhasaptabhîm prat st! Inām av sayah so yo2 nutpidas tathagata syaitan mahamalc paryayavácanam tad yaha mahama e ndrah Lakrah purandarah haslab karah pans tanur deham faliran p ih v bhum i vasundhara kham Ikasam gaganam aty clamadyanam bhavinas eka karya bhāvasya bahayah 1201B-27 ·191 AGAMAŠASTRA [IV. 84-85 tathatākārena tathāgatam paśyāmy avkalpākārenānupalambhayogena, evam anutpâdakārena tathāgatam paśyāmi, yāvad abhāvākārena tathāgatam paśyām • SSP, p 119 For Tathāgata see also NK, XXII No objection can therefore be raised here with regard to the use of the word bhagavat. paryāyavācakah sabdā bhavanlı vikalpitā na ca săm nămabahutsad bhārabahutsar vihalpyale na ca svabhavo na bhavati, evam mahimate aham apa sahāyām lokadhatau tribhir nāmāsamkhyeyaŝatasahasrair balānam fravanāvabhacam agacchim: taz cābhulapantı mām na ca prajánanti tathāgata-yaste nāmaparyaya at, tatra kecon mahāmste tathāgatam iti mām prajānantı "kecit svayambhuvam sli nāyakam vināyakam parirayakam buddham isim vesabham brahmanam (v] brāhmanam, brahmānam?) vishum svaram pradhānam kapılam bhūtāntam aristam nem nam (aristaneminam ?, somam bhāskaram rămam vyāsan fukam indiam balam Varunam its cake samjānantı apare 'nırodhănutpādam Sunyatāsn tathalam bhuta tn bhūtakot e dharmadhulum nuvānam nitam eatnatam advayan ansrodham anımıtlam pratyayam buddhahetūpaderam vimoksam mārgasatyanı sarvajnam jinam manomayam it cake samjāna to evamadıbhir mahamate mam janah samjānanta udakacandra napravi tanırgatam na ca tālā avabudhyante dvayāntapatitay a santalya It is said in the preceding hankā that one who realizes that truth becomes omniscient The present häriha tells us that omniscience being realized there is nothing that can be desired, for every desire is fulfilled thereby 85 prāpya sarvajñatam krtsnam brāhmanyam padam advayam! anapannadımadhy antam kimʻalah param íhate ! 'Having realized the full omniscience and thereby) that state which is behiding a Brāhniana' and free from the € 1 In Buddhist late alute a Brahmana is held in as much respect as a Samana, and this pident from the well known thrase fromena brahmara which is so frequently used See DP, XVI Sometimes a true Brahmana 13 regarded as on identified with a Buddha ·IV 85 86) AGAMAŠĀSTRA 195 two and has no beginning, middle and end, what may one desire beyond it?' It is to be noted that the final aim is described here to be the realization of omniscience (sarvajnata ci sarlakarajiała or bodhr) which can be asserted more preferably from the Buddhist point of view than from the Vedantist U usabham pavaram v ram mahes) vij tavinam anejam nahatakam buddham lan aham bruto brahmanan! Op cit. XXVI 40 It may be noted that according to Buddhists 4 Brahmana 18 so called because he is ech.lapapa one whose sin us removed (Op cit XXVI 6) This 19 however far fetched The following may be quoted here ye sa vabatapăpatvad brahmanah paramazshkah! abhyast&malapatra myas te muner eva fasane thaiva framanas tena caturdhā parik rttyale funyah parapravadā hı śramanair brāhmanals tatha | TS 3589 3590 Kamalaiila writes on it in his Pan ka ata eva bhagavatoktam sharva framanah haiva brahmanah sūny ah parapravadab framahaur brahmanair atı 3 The subject and the ob,ect The following kanka says that this realization of omniscience 18 the object of vinaya discipline and real sama quescence and dama 'introversion of the senses 86 + vipranām vinayo hy esa śamah prakrta ucyate i damah prakıtıdantatvad evam vidvan samam.vrajet ? This is indeed the discipline of the wise and is said to be the natural quiescence and the introversion (of the senses) owing to (their) being naturally introverted Knowing thus one should become quiescent The reality set forth in the preceding karikas (IV 80-86) is further descnbed in the next three karikas showing that that is the lokottara supra mundane knowledge through the realiza tion of which one becomes omniscient ·196 AGAM SASTRA (IV.87-83 87, 88 savastu sopalambham ca dvayam laukikam isyate ! avastu sopalambham ca śuddham laukikam isyate a avastv anupalambham ca lokottaram iti smīlam! jñānam jñeyam ca vijñeyam sadā buddhaih prakirttitam : * That which consists of the two, the object and (its) percep. tron, is regarded as mundane ; one without the object, but with the perception is regarded as pure mundane, while one without the object and the perception is said to be supra-mundane - This is to be understood to be the knowledge and the knowable' as is always declared by the Buddhas.' In our ordinary experience when one perceives a jar there are both the object, the jar, and its perception This knowledge is called laukika-'mundane', ic. belonging to or occurring in ordinary life When one, however, in a higher grade of wisdom, with the clear knowledge of unreality or the imagined or imposed form of the jar, perceives it, that knowledge is with perception, but not with the object This is called 'pure mundane te it belongs to ordinary life and is covered (avrta), it is pure,-'pure' because it is not so obscure as the mundane, its obscurity having been removed to a great extent Finally when the reality is perfectly realized, when the Thund rests on itself being completely suppressed (nruddha) there is neither the jar, nor the perception, and as such this knowledge is regarded as lokottara 'supra-mundane,' surpassing the ordinary life Of these three kinds of Iñana. Diz, () laukika, (11) fuddha laukika, and (ui) lokottara, the first is well known to all and 1 and jñeya We have already IV 1) seen that there 19 no difference between fiana Or it may mean that whatever we may know by the terns King and ñeya is only the three things mentioned in the känkās ·IV. 88] ĀGAMASASTRA 197 + Tk, P. is met with in every system, and the last two are to be found in Yogācāra texts. For instance, MVT', p. 19 paratantrasvabhāvo hi śuddhalaukikagocarah | 40 nirvikalpalokottarajiānadrsye pannispanne svabhāve adiste apratividdhe asăkşátkıte tatprsthalabdhasuddhalaukıkajñānagamyatvāt paratantro ‘nyena jñānena na ghyate, na punar lokottarajñānaprşthalabdhenāpı jñănena na drsyate. In LA, p. 156, these jñānas are found as (1) laukika, (11) lokottara, and (iv) lokottaratama respectively. The difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important, The LA, p 157, describes them very clearly in the following words which deserve here to be considered carefully. (1) tatra laukikam tānam sadasatpaksābhini vistānām sarvatirthakarabālapſthagjanānām ca (11) tatra lokottaram nānam sarvašrāvakapratyekabuddhänām svasārnānyalaksanapatitäsayābhınıvışçãnām). (11) tatra lokottaratamam jānam buddhabodhisattvānām nirăbhāsadharmapravicayād anirodhānutpādadarsanāt sadasatpakşavigatam tathāgalabhūminairātmyadhigamāt pravartate This reality with which we are concerned here is described by Vaubandhu in his Tk, verse 29 in the following words which may be quoted here . acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānam lokottaram ca tati Sthiramati comments tad anena slokadvayena darśanamärgam ārabhyottaravišesagatyā phalasampattir udbhảvitā vijõaptımătrapravistayoginah tatra grāhakacıttābhāvad grāhyārthānupalambhāc ca acitto > Generally in Buddhist works things are doided into two całegones, 4, laukika, and (11) lokottera (see MV, p501), as for instance, all mentalitates are laukika excepung only nine, viz, four paths (maggas), four fructs (maggaphalas), and one incompounded element (asemkhafadhātu). ic, mbbana, these are lokottard, Sn, $ 1093, 1094.

·198 ĀGAMASASTRA (IV. 88-89 'nupalainbho 'sau. aparicitatvā! loke samudācārābhāvāt nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttimam iti jūānam lokottaram ca tat. So far as goes my information, such division of jñana or jñeya is not to be found in Upanisads S explains the above three kinds of jñāna as the conditions of (1) waking, (1) dream, and (11) sleep respectively (jāgrat, suapna, susupti) 3 The printed text reads anucitattāt, but it does not give any appropriate We should, therefore, read here aparıcıtatt at with the Tibetan version which has hdus par ma byas pa sense 89 jñāne ca trivıdhe jõeye krameņa vidite svayam 1 sarvajñatā hı sarvatra bhavatiha mahādhiyah || The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect" That the iñāna is therdha 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two härikäs According to its function, too, at is trrudha We read in the LA, p. 157 tatra trivdham janam svasāmāny alaksanāvadhărakam cotpadavyayāvadharanakain canutpādānırodhavadharakam ca ? The omniscience (sarl'ajnata) referred to is Buddhahood (buddhatva) . 1 The word mahadhi is nothung but dhimat which is a name for a Bodhisattva Sce MISA, VI\ 73 MV+, 627 As regards the nature of jñana the following may be cited from LA. P 157 asargalaksanan Jnanam asangassabhavalaksanam Janam aprăptılaksanam nānam svapratyātmāryajianagatigocaram apravedanurgamalsad udakacandrava) jale 3 See BAP, PP 447 8. ASP, P2 42-3 Buddhatia - sarafalva consisting in sarvakārajāutā. :) märgajnata, and int) cestujážna ·IV. 89-90) AGAMASASTRA 199 $ explains sarua nola ag sarvas cāsau jñaś ceti sarvajñah. tasya bhāvah sarvajiatā. In the next kārikā the author tells his followers to understand certain things. 90 heyajñeyāpyapákyāni vijñeyāny agrayanatah'ı teşám anyatra vijñeyad upalambhas trișu smrtah "That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the Agrayana It is said that anyong them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known The Agraying in the text is nothing but the Mahāyāna as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for Mahāyāna' Now, what are we to understand by heya, etc ? As regards heya and reya, if we follow kere Asanga they are paratantra and purkalpita svabhāvas (see IV. 74-75) respectively,' Āpya (=präpya) 'attainable' implies dharma 1 All the editions and MSS examined have and instead of jāna as expected 3 MSA. P 53 pitekatrayon põtravinayabhidharmth tad eva trayan hinayanágrayanabhedena dvayan bhavati See SP.IN !, V 67. MSA, 83; SRS (Rajendral. Mita's Buddhist Monuscripts from Nepal, P229, LV, 408, VCB., pp 30,33 Sometimes it is also called Sre;fhayana, Vch, 30 3 Let us Quote bere the following from the MSA XI 13 lp 58) where heya and jreya are explained, taltam, xalalar duayena tahslam bhrāniei ca sampiravah akyam naiva ca sarvathabhilapitum yac ciprapancátmakam! jseyam heyam atho visodhyam amalam yac ca prakttyāmalam yanyskasaguyatnayirisadusi klešād vibuddhir mata 11 ·198 AGAMASASTRA [IV. 88-89 'nupalambho 'sau. aparicitatvät loke samudācārābhāvāt nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttimam iti jūānam lokottaram ca tat. So far as goes my information, such division of jñāna or jñeya is not to be found in Upanişads. $ explains the above three kinds of jñāna as the conditions of (1) waking. (1) dream, and (11) sleep respectively băgrat, st'apna, susupti) The printed text reads anucrtaträt. but it does not give any appropriate We should, therefore, read here aparıcıtaitāl with the Tibetan version which has hdus par ma byas pa sense 89 jñāne ca trividhe jñeye kramena vidite svayam 1 sarvajñatā hı sarvatra bhavatiha mahadhiyah 1 * The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evol cs here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect " That the ñana is trurdha 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two härikas According to its function, too, it is Incidha We read in the Lap 157 tatra trividham jianam svasāmāns alaksanāvadhāraham cotpada. vyayāvadhāranakaın canutpādānırodhāvadhārakam ca The omniscience (sartajñola) referred to is Buddhahood (buddhatua) 2 P 1 The word mahadhi is nothing but dhimat which us a name for a Bodhisativa See AISA XIX 73, MV+ 1 627 ? As regards the nature of jñand the following may be cited from LA, 157 asangalaksanam asangasvabhävalaksanan apraptilaksanan zinam sapraty tsäryajāsagat.gocaram apravefamigamabad udakacandrasa) jale 3 Sec BAP pp 4478, ASP, P2 42-3 Buddhatta = sarcinatoa consisting in sarpekarajnuts, mārgoñata, and (122) Cestuñana Jdānam jñānam ·IV. 89-90) ĀGAMASASTRA 199 Ś explains sarvajñatā as sarvaš cāsau jñaś ceti sarvajñaḥ, tasya bhāvah sarvajāata. In the next kārika the author tells his followers to understand certain things 90 heyajõeyapyapákyâni vijñeyāny agrayānatah' ! tesām anyatra vijñeyad upalambhas trisu smstahl "That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the Agrayāna It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which 18 to be known The Agrayāna in the text is nothing but the Mahāyāna as is evident from a number of Buddhret works in which the word occurs as a synonym for Mahāyāna Now, what are we to understand by heya, etc.? As regards heya and jñeya, if we follow here Asanga, they are paratantra and purikalpita svabhāvas (see IV. 74-75) respectively. Apya (= präpya) 'attainable' implies dharma 3 1 All the editions and MSS examined have 'yang instead of yāna as expected • MSA, p. 53. pitakatrayan sútravinayabhidharmah tad eva trayem hinayandgrayanabhedena dvayam bhavat See SP, INI, V 61, MSA. P 83: SRS Rajendrala! Mitra's Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal), p 229, LV, P 408, VCh, pp 30,33 Sometimes it is also called Sreşthayāna, Vch.p. 30. 1 Let us quote here the following from the MSA XI 13 (p 58). where heya and jõeya are explained tattvam yut salatam dvayena rahitam bhrantes ca sansayah Sakyan nalva ca sarvatbabhijapitum yac cấprapancatmakam jåeyam heyam acho visodhyam amalan yac ca praktyämalam ya yakatasuvamavansadrsi Sletad viſuddhir mata ·200 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (IV 90 dhātu or dharmadhātu already alluded to (IV. 81), which is parintspanna, and pakya 'to be matured' refers to the act of maturing by disciplíne for the attainment of the Absolute. The last is not only for others, but also for one's own self." The second half of the kārkā says that among these four things only three, re., heya, õpya, and pākya, can be perceived, but not the jñeya or viñeya For it is parkalpita 'imagined,' and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it sałatam dvayena rahitam tattsam pankalpitah svabhāvo gráhyagrahakalaksanenālyantam asattvät bhrānteh samnifrayah paratantras tena tatpatikalpanāt anabhılāpyam aprapaicātmakam ca parispanrah svabhāvah, tatra prathamam tattvam paruñeyam dvitiyam praheyam trtiyam visodhyam cagantukamalād všuddham ca praktyä ya ya prakrtyä vasuddhasyakssasuvarnavansadrsi klesad visuddhih na hy akasadını prakrtyä asuddhanı na cāgantukamalapajamād esām vasuddhir nesyate + MSA XIX 56 prapyam dharmadhātuh 5 MSA, XXXX $2 sattrapanipakacarya dvayor eva paripacanã tham paupācanam hy atra sinayanam, XVII 3, 22, 36, XIX 56, DA, P 125. BBh, p 22 As regards the maturation of one's own self (atmaparipäkal the following may be quoted from MISA, VII 1 rucih prasādah prasamo nukampatia ksamatha medhā prabalatvam eva ca aharyalāngarh samypetatā bhrsam Jinātmaje tat panipakalaksanara" ruci mabayānadesanadhame prasadas taddesike prasamah klesanām anukampa medhä grahanadharahapratsbedhesu prabalatvam adhigame ahāryala marapravādıbhin prāhānikāngaih samantāzatalvam bhrfam ia cyadınam adhinalatyam darfayalı esa samasena naraprakara atmaparipiko vedita'y ah See also, VIII 11 iti navavidhavastupācıtalmā paraparipăcanayogi alam upetah subhamay asatatapravardh:1šimā bhavatı sadā jagato grabandhubhūtah!' KP, 31 tad y athā kāśvapa tejodhāluh sarvasasyānı parspār ayali evam era kāšyapa bodhisattvasya pajiä sarvasaltsānam xarvaſukladharman par:- păcayatı. See also the slanza which follows at In BBh, a whole chapter named Paripäkapatala Vliis devoted to it giving particulars Ci lokopakti 'maturation of the world in the $B. XI 371 sattvesu 1 ·IV. 90-92) AGAMAŠASTRA 201 has no existence, it is merely an imagination, simply a word. only a name: it is not perceived, and hence there is no perception & It may be noted that sometimes five yeyos are found (BAP. 447. jõeyam pašcavidham), as says Sthiramats in MVTI, p 6, wyz, 11) the. world. Ilokadhāta). {n} the living bengs Isaltea), lite the elements of existence (dhorma). (xv) the disciplme fornuya), and for the meana (upāya) These seem to have no connexion herewith In the next few kärkās the author gives some leading thoughts of the Agrayāna alluded to above. 91 prakıtyākāšavaj jõeyāh sarve dharmā anādayah ? vidyate na hi nānātvam tesām kvacana kiñcana 11 *All the elements of existence are without beginning, and by nature they are to be known like the sky Verily they have nowhere any variety For the first half of the katika see IV 1, where we have already seen that things are just like the sky as said in such texts as the ASP, p 297 yathākāśamº already quoted there For the second half where it is said that there is no variety of things see the well-known Upanısadıc texts neha nānasti kiñcana, BU, IV. 4. 19. KU, IV. il, KtU, M 8, NS, IV. I. 34 # (with Vats yāya na) See also our own text, 11. 34, IV 94, 100. 92 adibuddhah' prakrtyaiva' sarve dharmāh suniścitāḥ 1 yasyaivam bhavati kşantıḥ so 'mrtavāya kalpate il 1 See adau baddhah, IV. 98, ct od fanfa, IV 93, Tib gzod ma nas she bar from this one is to take adi bere for adifah meaning from the outset' 1 Sce IV. 93 1201B-26 ·202 AGAMASASTRA (IV. 92 "By the very nature all elements of existence are well ascertained as originally knowledge. One who has such acquiescence is fit for immortality.' • The word buddha in adibuddha means here bodha knowledge,'' ie, advaya ſana which is called Tathāgata as we have already seen (IV 82-84). See also SSP, p tathāgatam bhadanta saradvatiputra paryesitukameraira paryesitavyah ātmeti bhadanta sāradvatiputra kuddtasyaitad adhivacanam 124 : All phenomena are only in their imposed or imagined forms, they being buddha, or bodha or jñāna Cf. where the well known phrase in later Vedāntic works. nityasuddhabuddhamuktasatyasvabhāva for Brahman As regards the meaning of the word kanlı a few words are required here Generally. kranti means 'patience' In Buddhism there are different ksäntis of which the following three are often mentioned :) duhkhadhitasončk inti 'palierce accepting miseries '(n) dharmanıdhyānaº 'patience by meditat. ing upon the elements of existence,' and (u parāpakära. marsanaº 'patience bearing injunes done by others Besides, in Buddhism it has other meanings In explaining kranto (Pal khantı) in AN, I C4, the commentary, Manorathapūroni, writes klamatit adhitasorakhanti It says that khant adhivāsana 'acquiescence. 'consent.' acceptance' Again we read in the AN III 118 iniesam āvuso tinnam puggalānam hatamo te puggalo khamati abhikt antataro ca pantataro ca means OI 3 Sexpluns adibuddhah aurabodhae asipah + Such a. Ves. pp 38 39 281 $ S bodhakastavy atănurapeksala € As described in BA and BAP, VI tap 172 ffi, SS. IX ipp 179f} CH DS, CVII ·IV.921 AGAMAŠASTRA 203 3 The commentary explains khamali saying khamalite ruccati Accordingly the passage quoted above may be translated thus "Which of these three persons is, o friend. agreeable to you as the most excellent and exalted?' Here evidently kanttis rucı 'pleasure, ling' This is quite clear also from a passage of the SNt, 897,' where the commentator in his MNs explains khanti (ksônti) in the text by pemo (preman) 'londness. predilection,' chanda 'desie,' and räga 'lust,' which are in fact, the same as ruci Again in Buddhist texts (CN. p lót, see Vbh, p 245) ksante is described as synonymous with the following words. fu) drste (Pale ditthi) 'view, 'belief.' 'theory,' (.1) rucs pleasure,' "laking. (ru) labdhı (Pali laddhi) 'view,' 'belief.' 'theory': (10) adhyasaya (Palı ayhasaya) 'intention,' 'thought,' and (v) abhipraya (Pali adhippaya) 'intention, opinion. It is therefore quite clear from the above that ksanti sometimes means desto view And so far as I can understand in the present case it is used in this sense Sec SP, P 136, MSA, XI 52, SRS vil. DS. P 63, Poussin MV, pp 362f , and AK VI, pp 165 ff , as well as the works quoted herein, St LA p 390 - » kte imi sammutiyo puthujā sabbi va eti na upeti vidva! anupayo *o upayam kım eyya dinthe sute khantimn akubbamino 1 ! See SV IV 348 bhutapubbam bhante cattvaro santharo nandithika nanikhantika nānārucika VN I 487, 1! 43 See also the Samangalapulasini on DN, 11 213 khantit tattha katamt khantı ya khamanats adhı Isanat: acandıkkam anazuropo attamanata cittass/?i evan valli adhryšsanathantı : It may be noted that in Sansknt, too, Vkum » not always used in the sense of to be patient or to endure,' etc C/ UC, I 14 tan no rad ukiant aditam na hi ist ksamen te Here ksama has nothing to do with *patience' or 'forbearance 'ete in Pal (DhA. l 401 khoma is said to menn "to be fit,''to scem good 'specially in such cases as watha te khameyya 'as may kem good to you ·204 AGAMAŠĀSTRA [IV. 92.93 It is well-known in Prajñāpāramıtāsūtras and the works based thereon that all elements of existence are devoid of the characteristics of their own (nhscabhāva). they neither orginate (anutpanna), nor disappear (aniruddha), and as such they are quiescent from the outset lādréānta=prakrtıšānta). and by the very nature they are merged in'nirvana (praktiniresta). This point is mainly described in the following karikā. 93 ādiśāntā' hy anutpannāḥ prakſtyaiva sunirvitāh i sarve dharmāh samābhinnā ajam sāmyam viśāradam *All elements of existence are quiescent from the outset, non-originated and by the very nature perfectly merged in nirvana ; they are all equal and not different (The absolute) is unborn, equal and fearless' Let us quote here the following from MSA, XI 51 : nihsvabhāvatayā sıddhā uttarottaranıśrayat 1 anutpannaniruddhādısāntaprakıtınıtvitah Here follows the commentary nihsvabhāvatay anutpādadayah so hi nihsvabhāvah so 'nulpanno yo 'nutpannah so 'nmuddho yo 'niruddhah sa ādilānto ya adısāntah sa prakrtinirytah 4 1 Tib gzod ma uas shs ba kit adetah saniah See III 2, 38, IV 77. 80, 95, 100 3 See the note on Larsaradya in the next karika C nu bhaya ini 25. III 35 and abhaya in IV 78, and Upanısads, Chu, 1 4 4,5, IV 15.1. etc + This is as reconstructed by Levi according to the Chinese version The ongual Sanskrit s los! The scube has, honeser, gren here a corrupted katika ard it's as follows nusvabhavatai siddha ut'arottaraniherayah anutpādo diruddhas cādusānth patınıyttah! See MISA, Tomell (French Translation, p 122 - ·IV 93] AGAMAŠASTRA 20 Owing to he absence of nature there arc do origination etc That which is devoid of nature is not originated that which is not originated is not suppressed destroy ed) that wh ch is not suppressed is qu escent from the outset and that which is quiescent from the outset is naturally merged in perfect nuăra In the text $nft (connected with ad fanta) and niretti or nirvana (connected with sunıfla=parinirusta) are actually nothing but apraurtti meaning not coming forth not arising not originating Elements of existence are adılanta and su (=pari ) nurusta it implies that originally they do not originate and so to speak they are in santr and nirvara ror the above explanation of the two words see AIV P 529 ya'pravtrs tan nirvanam iti vyavasthapyate p 538 ya upalamo prav stis tan nirvanam Poussin abserves (CRE Vol 9 p 851) From an absolute point of view (paramarthatas there is no difference (nanabhaval' among things and the characters of things Thirge are sold (sunya) like the daughter of a barten woman characters are void like the beauty of this unreal daughter Things are void because there is no rcal ongination of the - no ongination ng destruction an eternal non-castero There is no difference between existence (samsöra) ander Mot being produced (onulponno) not being destroyed as a from the beg nning quiescent (aditontal they are reur et (prakrtya) in nirvana (parınırırla) For the wording and thought of the Erk.of time setti the following passages besides MSA Vachen (p 201) may be quoted (1) adısanta hy anutpannah prakyti ata catre dharmas te vivſta natha dharmacakapan $ See our text v dyate pahi Distrin tesisirxaliT. also ! 34 17 21 IV 93 94 Quoted in AIV p 2 and Sus, Abron fyt. Poussin RAS 1910 PP 135-39 Siraix Levi Shese 11 (French trp 122 ·206 AGAMAŠÁSTRA [IV. 93-94 lat) atah sattvāh prakſtyā parinivſtāh | BA, IX 104. (1) tasmāt sarvadharmă anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatayā adıśāntah prakſłınırvstāh. BAP, p 589. (iv) paramārthasatyatah prakrtinirvanatayādıšantatvāt. prakrtiniryrtatvat sarvadharmánām iti. Ibid, p 385. (u) ādıpraśāntā imi sarvadharmāh | SP, II. 68. The next kārıkā is in support of what is said in the preceding one 94 „vaisaradyam lu vai nāstı bhede vicaratám sadā i bhedanimnāh prthagvādās tasmāt te kịpaņāh smrtāh *But verily those who always move following difference have no intrepidits Those who maintain that a thing is diverse (prthak = nănāl ure prone to difference, and are, therefore, regarded as pitsable The word visarada in IV 93 of which the noun, vaiſäradya, - is used here requires some explanation According to s they mean 'pure' (visuddha) and 'purity' fuisuddhi) respectively, It is supported by Bhojarāja saying in his vetti on YS. I. 47 that vatsåradya means 'clearness' inarmalya) This exposition is based on that of Vyās a on the saine YS? The idea behind it may be explained in another way 3 1 See IV 91 and note 5 on I 93 ? asuddhyararanamuläpetasya Prakasalmano buddhisattvasya rajaslamobhyam anabhibhūtah svacchah sthatıpravaho sailăradyam Wood translatcs at thus "When freed from obstruction by impunity the salta of thinking substance the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not overwhelmed by rajas and tamas As in India the season Sarad 'autumn ' particularly clear, anything in that season faredo autumnal, such as the mcon or water, is also clear Thus farada with the prefix er *hich here simply emphasizes the idea might have gradually been employed in the sense of 'clear, its noun vaifāradya meaning 'clearness ·IV 94] ĀGAMASASTRA 207 + The word visārada is, however, of doubtful derivation. The prefix vt only intensifies the meaning of särada one of the meanings of which is 'mature,' i.e., 'rich in years' (tarad 'a year"). old.' Accordingly the secondary meaning with the prefix vlc is pravina 'clever.' As boldness (pragalbhata) generally depends on one's maturity viſārada also means 'bold' (pragalbha). In both Sanskrit and Pali the word sāreda (Pali sõrada) means apratibha or apragalbha 'timid,' 'not bold,'' and evitārada (Pali visårada) is used to inean 'scholar' (pandita) and 'bold' (pragalbha). In Buddhist writings caišāradya (Pali vesāraja) is explained as opposite to *fāradya (Palı săraja)' which means 'timidity." That railāradya is 'intrepidity' (nubhayatal is very clearly' said in AKV, p 646 In Buddhism vaiāradya is four-fold, ciz.. the vaišāradya regarding () the highest knowledge of all things (sarcadharmabhisambodhrvaitāradgal. (v) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions (sarvūsravaksayajñana"), (iii) rightly describing the impediments (antarāyıkadharmananyathātuaniſcıtavyākarana"). and (iv) the rightness of the way leading to salvation (narryānikapratıpallathātu.")" V ** It is read in the group of drdhad (Panini, V 1 1231. and Vardha. mina explains it in bis Gl. p 221, takıng it in the sense of prouina stilful 'clever': saradasabdah pratyagraváci yatha tajjuſtadam udakam, drsaccharadas saktavah sadyo hi rajuoddhrtam udakam pratyagram anopahatam rajolaradam ucy ałe sady al ca drada pistak saklavo drsaccharaceh taradaha'ro pralagratiam abhinavalvam tad galam asya viradah prasirah. prarico laksejä. He himself is, however, not talisfied with it and goes on lo say. hasi vyutpatitiyal Pravinavāc viſiradafabdah $.See AmK, til 3 95 dvau lu fãradau pratyagrapratıblau tidvatsofra-- falbhau vifaraday" AP, 984 sărado saradubbhüte appagabthe mato tisu. & AP, 229, 959: yutto visārado tisu sappagabbhe ca pand.ta 1 veskrajiniti ettha särajapatipakkho recanjšo. MP < AN, II. 8 ff : nirbhay all hi vaicāradyam The Tib term furre bred'se is milyeste which means nirbhaya or nurb hayola $ MIVIT, 8 in the same work (231 there is a different kind of raitāradyo which is also four fold. Again, the following four-feld coitaroda is entirerated ·IV. 95-97] AGAMIASĀS TRA 209 Until and unless the knowledge becomes completely free from any relation to its object the highest cannot be attained. Therefore the knowledge must be asanga, i.e, detached from its objects. This state of its detachment is described in the following two kánikās (96, 97), the first of which runs : 16 padam. quoted from Aryaratnakarasdtre in MV, 90, tad ya hapināmakase Sakunipadam. SSP. P 137: yarhantark se lakuneh padam budhau, Yaktum na Cakyam na ca dartanopagam, quoted by Poussip in his French tr. of MIA, p 12 in Le Muséon, 1907. p. 261 .96 ajesy ajam asamkrāntam dharmesu jñānam isyate.. yato na kramate jiānam asangam tena kirtitam 1 'It is accepted that knowledge which is unborn does not go (res, relate itself) to the elements of existence, which are (also) unborn As the knowledge does not go to the elements of existence) it is declared to be free from attachment (asanga, i.e., free from any relation to its object) See (V. 72. 79 (nihsanga). 97, 99. cf agraha, III.32 See also IV. 72: cittam nirvisayam nityam asangam tena kirtitam! See IV. J, note 5 where passages are quoted to show that mina is asarga 1 Lit. desired Posgatel 97 aņumātre'pi vaidharmye jāyamáne 'vipaścıtah 1 asangalā sadā nāsti kim utávaranacyutih If there be even the least difference (of elements of existence in the mind) of an unwise man, there is no state of ? It is to be remembered that s}} elements of csutence are in fact non-different prve dharmak amabhindkh (IV 93), as we hase already sen, 12018-27 ·210 AGAMAŠĀSTRA [IV.97 (its) being always free from attachment (asangotā), not to speak of the disappearance of the covering. The state of being always asanga of ñània or citła is referred to in the preceding kārıkā (96) As regards avarana 'covering' or 'obstruction', it is two-fold, (1) klesa-avarana and (1) cya-avarara’. kleša literally means that which troubles one by the strokes of various kinds of misery, as Vācas pati la śr a would explain it (YS. I 24) Accordingly, as sinful desires. vices, or passions are for misery they are termed kleša For the same reason it also means 'impurity', 'stain' Sometimes the word stands for 'lust' or 'sensuality' (rāga). “aversion' (dvcsa), and 'bewilderment' (moha) There are also ten klesas, lobha, duesa, moha, mana, etc. (DSn. $1545)' For further details see Pali-English Dictionary, PTS. sv kilesa, and J. p. 361 Klesa-acarara thus means the alarana 'covering' or 'obstruction' in the form of kickas. Until and unless they are destroyed (kleiaprahāra) the truth is not mamfested nor can one attain to the highest bliss Kleias are regarded as the mother of all misones Similarly jeya is also an acarana The word fcya means 'knowable,' re.. the dharmas elements of existence which are not substantial and thus they have no reality Yet one percenes them vñcyopalabdhı) And as long as one continues to do so one is far from the goal I hus veya is regarded as an avarana.' DS CIV MISA I 3 12 \\.XXI, 44 BA IX 55 3 In YS !! 359 there are fe kind of klela 12, alidya, asmut, räga. dacsa al d abhintacta See MV p539 kiranim apraut:prapance palamah 84P PP 417 kley estah jeyam civitat araranam Jeyam eso sami mpitari patrad avath Sometimes reyāl orana ?explained a peso aaranam Tk p 15 inesasaranan api sarkasmin piese panapra'standhshharm klis am ajranam the whstacle tegarring the knowstle,' re, the reality or the thogs in their true nature See TSP. pp 869-899 Sometimes (AN, IL 436, AX IV p201) there are tree et aranas, in klasăvarana, (u) karmic orang 15 anantarver and 1 okulala karmapashos, and 1732 tipökalurana 18 ckrarat ·IV 97 98] AGAMAŠASTRA 211 nilang and it must be reinoved Gneyanupalabdhı) for the realization of freyavarana disappears by one s realizing the unrealty of the elements of existence as separate entities (dharma narralmya) while klesolaranu goes away by the realization of the unreality of the individual ego (pudgalanairatmya)' Or both the goaranas can be removed by the meditation on Sunyata (BA IY 55) # LA VII p 211 jnej ivaranam punar mahsmate dharmana ritmya darfanı sad vfudhyat kleh ataan * podgalana rampada tanabhyasa purvakam prah yate See Sthuramation Tk p 15 The removal of overara is referred to in the preceding karla but in the next harika it is said that in fact there is no Avarong at all 98 alabdhavaranah sarve dharmah prahalınırmalah 1 adau buddhas tatha muhta budhyanta iti nayahah 1 All the elements of existence have always been without any covering and unsullied in their nature From the beginning they are knowledge as well as in nirvana (mukta)--this the Buddhas understand For adau buddhah see IV 92 93 Because the elements of existence do not ong nate they are said as mukta i e in fandt On this see IV 93 p 20 For prakrtırırmala see IV 91 AIV p 539 avaca nahşarah san a sunyah santadınırmalah ya evam janah dharman Lumaro buddha socyate 444 prakçtıprabhasyarah sarvadharmab LA X 750 753 754 prahrt prabhåsyaram citiam ASP p 47 adı Suddhatvad ad parisuddhati at satts asya CVP 28 adisuddham anutpannam nihsvabhavam anavılam! Jagad bhavena sampaiyan na baddho ra ca mucyale!" in the hanka the word nuyaka is a name for the Buddha MIVE $1 20 AP 4 722 BA | 31 66 $S p 518 ? Set Pous in RAS 1910 p 139 or nirvana NIV P ·212 AGAMAŠASTRA [IV. 99.99 Let us remember here that at the very beginning of the present Chapter (IV. 1) the author has told us, that in the opinion of the greatest of men' (dvipadām vara), i e. the Buddha, jñāna and neya are identical He has also repeatedly shown above' and specially in IV, 96, that jnana is asanga as it does not relate itself to the dharmas or objects which have no reality. The author refers now to this fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that according to the Buddha there is in reality neither the jñāna nor the jñeya or dharmas as he has said neither of them 99 kramate na hi buddhasya jñānam dharmeşu tāyinah 1 sarvadharmās tathā jñānam naitad buddhena bhāşitam ! *According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him tayın), jñāna does not approach the dharmas (e c., it does not relate itself to the objects) But all dharmas as well as pāng-this has not been said by the Buddha' ► See IV 72, 77 96 Cf Ul 32 The word tāyin is thus interpreted in BAP, P 75 täynnäm svadhgatamärgadesakānam yad uktam tāyah sadrstamargoktih (PV, 2 145) See my paper, Pramanavărttıka of Dharmakirtti, IHQ. Vol XIII, 1937 This explanation is partly followed by Ud a y a nācārya in his Tātpar yalikāparisuddhr. Bıb Ind, p 8 in explaining tayin in Vacaspati Misra's Talparyafika, 2 taksapādāya tayinei tāyi tattvādhyavasāyasamraksanaksamasampradās apravartakah Prajā ka ramats in his RAP, P 75. offers another explanation athava tāyah santānārthah ásamsātam apratisthitanirvanataya avasthayinām This word is widely used both in Buddhist (LV, p 421, BA, 112, SP, pp 25, 57, 67, etc.) and Jaina YS, Vol 1, pp 1. 47. DV, p. 115) works and is misunderstood Sometimes it 19 read as trayın 'protector. and tāpın tas in the present case, see Variants The word täyın as a name for Buddha is translated into Tibetan by sky b pa (A1V1, $1 151 which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent trayin a protectos' See JRAS, 1910. p 140, JPTS, 1891 1893, p 53. JA, 1912. p 243 Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Onental Conference, Calcutta, 1922, pp 450-1 3 Sec IV 96 ·IV.99] AGAMIASĀSTRA 213 What is the significance of the second fulf of the kārkā. all dharmas as well as prina- this has not been said by the Buddha?' Let us quote here a few passages showing that the Buddha has never said a word, (1) Nāgārjuda in his MK, XX. 25 : sarvopalambhopaśamah prapancopašamah Sivah 1 na kvacit kasyacit kalcid dharmo buddhena destah ) (.) Tathāgaloguhyasūtra quoted in MV on the above : yam ca şātrim tathāgato 'nuttaràm samyaksambodhim abhisambuddho yăm ca råtrim upādāya parinirvasyati atrantare tathāgatena ekam apy akşaram nodāhitam na vyah tam vāpi pravyäharat näpi pravyäharisyatı (iu) LA. pp. 142.3: yām ca rātrim tathāgato 'bhısambuddho yam ca rătrum parinirvāsyalı aträntare ckam apy alçaram tathāgatena nodihịtam na pravyahatsyati avacanam buddhavacanam. (iv) Nagarjuna on his NSt. 17. nodāhitam tvayā kinçid ekam apy akşaram vibho! kitsnaí ca vainey ajano dharmavarjena tarpitah" (o) Bhagavat quoted in MV, p 26+ and BAP. p. 365 (with a slight vanation) anaksarasya dharmasya srutih kā deśani ca hal śrűyate desyate căpi samiropad anaksarah. (01) LA. p 137 na me yānam mahāyānam na ghoso na ca ak arah' I (vi) LA, p. 48: (a) tattvam hy ak aravarjitam .p 194 (b) nirakşaratvād dharmasya (uni) Vch, pp. 24. (a) tat kim manyase subhûte astı sa kaleid dharmo yas tathigatena desitah evoin ukla aj veman subhútur bhagayanlam evam avocat. yathāham bhagavan bhagavato bhāşitasyārtham « CA IV. 61. yatra vanne na teriaate.

·214 ĀGAVASASIRA [IV.99 ajánāmi nisti sa haicid dharmo yas tathāgatenānuttar, sainyak sambodhir ity abhisarnbuddhah nästı dharmo yas tathāgatena desitah. (b) p 29: fat kim manyase subhūte api nv asti sa kascid dharmo jas tathāgatena bhasitah subhūtir aha, no hida bhagavan násti sa kacid dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāsıtah 1x) L. p. 147: yasyām ca sātryām dhigamo yasyām ca parınırvịtah | ctasminn antare násti maya kimcit prakāśitam ! (x) MIV. p 539 avāca 'nah'arāh sarva lūnz āb Let us now make an attempt to understand the significance of such passages as cited above saying that the Buddha said nothing This statement is on two grounds. (1) pratyalmadharmată, ie, the nature of the highest truth) which is realized in one's own self. and (n) paurinasthundharmata, ie, the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past This requires some explanation As regards the first it is held that the transcendental truth (paranıārtha) springs up only as an inward conviction (pratyatir aucdya). it cannot be attained through instruction from another (aparapratyaya = paropadeśā. gamya) for it cannot le expiessed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence This is weil-known also the Vedānta? Candrakurtti writes (MIV, p 493) sarva evāyam abhıdhanabhidhey ajñānajāeyādivyavahāro‘seso lokasamyrtisatyam ity ucy ate na hi paramārthata eva tat sambhavati kutas tatra paramarthe vācām pravrttih kuto vā jñānasya sa hi paramārtho parapratyayah sāntah pratyātmavedya āryānām sarvaprapañcătitab sa nopadıśy ate na capi jñāyate. 5 See IV 98 where the känká 18 entirely quoted & MV. P 56 paramartho hy āryānām tūnunbhāvah 7 TU, IN 4 1 yato vāco Divarlante aprāpya manasā saha, KU.II 3; BS, III 2 17, The Bonic Conception oj Buddhism, pp 19 A in 10 ·IV.99] AGAMASASTRA 215 Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, Tathagalaguhyasūtra, quoted in MV. p. 539, just after the passage (ot) cited above : atha ca yathābhimuksih sarvasaltvā nānādhātvāíayās tām vividham tathāgatavācam niſcatantim samjānanti. tesām evam prthak prthag bhavati. ayam bhagavăn asmabhyam imam dharmam desayati vayam ca tathāgalasya dhasmadelanām Synumah. tatra tathāgalo na kalpayati na vikalpayati sarvakalpavikalpajälavásan prapaſcavigato hi lāntamale tathāgata iti vistarah. Continues MV. yadı tarhy cvam [na] kvacıt kasyaciſt kalcild dharmo buddhena desitas tat katham ima etc vcitrāh pravacanavyavahārā jõāyante. ucyate Avidyāndrānugatănām dehinām svapnayamanānām iva svavkalpābhyudaya esah ayam bhagavān sakalatribhuvanasurāsuranaranātha imam asmabhyam defayatiti. The following may also be quolcd here from the LA, p 194. na ca mahāmate tathāgata ahşarapatiłam dharmam deſayanti punar mahămate yo 'ksarapatitam dharmam de ayat sa pralapati. nirakçaratvād Jharmasya ata etasmāt kāanān mahāmatę aktam delanapashe mayānyari ca buddhabodhisattvair yathaikam apy aksāram tathāgatā nodaharanti na vyäharantiti tat kasya hetor yad utánakşaratvād dharmánām na ca nārthopasamhatam udiharanti. udāharanty eva vikalpom upādāyānupadəyən mahămate sarvadharmânim füsanalopah syātº And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the sense and not on letters, for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot male others understand: arthapratisaranena mahāmale bodhisattvena mahāsattvera bliavitavyam na vyañjanapratisaranena. vyanjanānusiti mahimate kulaputro vă Kuladuhitá và svåtmånam ca nzóa; ati parărtherri ca niyabodhayati. Op. cit., pp. 194-195 # in Buddhist Sanskļil lenti ne have often 'larcra lor erana in tuch rares ·216 AGAVASASIRA (IV.99 . ca The second ground is this : The Buddha has said nothing. because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathigalas, the truc nature of elements of existence reinains always the same This is meant by the statemert that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (avacanam buddharacanam) Taking both the grounds together the LA, pp 143-144. says: yad dam uhtam bhagavatā jām rātrim tathāgato "bhisambuddho yām ca rātrim parınızvāsy ali atrāntara ekam apy aksaram tathāgatena nodahỉtam na pravyāhanı atı avacanam buddhavacanam itu kım idam sandhayohtam bhagavān cha. dharmadvayam mahāmate sandhāya mayaitad uhtam. katamad dharmadvayam yaduta pratyatmadharmatām ca paurānasthiti. dharmatām ca utpādad vă tathāgatanım anutpädad vā tathāgatānām sthitaivaram dharmānām dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmanızāmatā paurāranagaramahāpathavan mahāmate º tad yatha mahămate lascid eva pururo 'tavyzm pary alan paurānam nagararn anupasyed avhalapathapraveram sa tam nagaram anupraviset tatra pravisy a pratmiss a nagaram nagarakrisulham anubhavet tatlim manyase mahāmate apı nu tena purusena sa pantha utpädito yena pathā tam nagaram anupravisto nagaravaicitryam ca aha no bhagavan bhagavān sha mahămate yan masa tai ca tathāgatair adhgatam sthitaivarsā dharmată dharmasthitita dharman.yāmata tathata bhüfatā saty ată. ata ctasmāt kāranān mahāmale may cdam uktam im ca ātrm tathāgato bhisambuddho yām ca rātrim parınınvāsyatı atrāntara eham apy aksaram tathāgatena nodāhrtam nodāharı atı The following may also be quoted here from the VCh. p 243 just after the passage (2011) cited above tat kasya hetoh yo 'sau tathāgatena dhaimo bhısambuddho desito vā agrāhyah so 'nabhriāpy ah na sa dharmo nádharmah tat kasya hetoh asamskrtaprabhāvitā hy ary apudgalah It is thus quite reasonable that the author should declare at the end of his discussion the transcendental truth of jñāna evam e a ·IV.99-100] AGAMASASTRA 217 and pñeya or Jharms which he begins the chapter with and discusses it throughout. In the last kärikä of his work the author pays his homage to the highest truth to be realized, ie , nirvana of the Buddhists. and Brahman of the Vedantins ; 100 durdarśam atigambhiram aſam samyam viſāradam!' buddhva padam anánātvam namaskurmo yathabalam ! - iti gaudapādıya agamasastre 'látaśāntyakhyam caturtham prakaranam samāptam. 'Having understood that state which is difficult to be seen. very deep. unborn,' equal,' fearless.' and free from variety, we salute it according to our power Here ends, in the Agamatästra of Gauda pida, Book Four called the Cessation of the Fire-brand' The word padu state'Buddhist butciature is used also to mean nirvana But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature, for the word is employed in the similar sense, i.c., moka os Brahmon also in Brāhmanical works.' one is inclined to take it in the sense of nirvana considenng all that is arscussed in this chapter The two pithets durdoria and atigambhira sticngthen the view In Buddhist literature I See IV 93d which is the same as b of the present suska. 11 16. lll 1.19, 26, 33, 43, 47 IV 11, 12, 13, 38, 46, 48,57 (0.74. m. 93, 95, 96. $ 111 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95 • IV.93 cl abhaya, IV 78, aubhaga, til 35 I fil, 13; JV. 91, RU, IV, 419, AUIV 10 11 .AP.819: padamhane panttise nillinamhi culties I for ditance, KU, IT 15. 11! 7-9 12011-28 ·IV. 100 ACAMASASTRA 219 not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour On the other hand, here in our work. as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous - symbols of unreality. The following may be quoted here from CS, 325 : alātacakranitmiņasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaih I Jhomikānta pratistutkámaricyabhrash samo bhavah / Poussin observes (IRAS, 1910. 136) that the title of the fourth Chaptcr, alalažānit, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase clatafand has not been traced in Buddhist books, We cannot however, thinh sa for, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brāhmanic work older than the AS" Now, may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word clalo as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full,' is very wellknown. Gauda pada himself has used it as such in his AS not less than four times (IV 47.50) Ile has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible world comparing it with alsia, and &nding out the cause of 119 And if appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases it is so, we cannot say that the title of the chapter is not Buddhist. * Such as marumaricika, gondhost onoggia hheppepa Sre MIV/', 139 21 15 A simali phrase, mri oli melabhrantiinte accurs to YV 11 6 2 See among othen LA. pp 9. 96. PIC FINIS ·SO + IV. 100) AGAVASASTRA 219 not for showing any unicely of Brahinan but simply for indicating his splendour. On the cther hand, here in our work. as well as in Buddhist sorksreçuently, and in every case, far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality." The following may be quoted here from CS, 325 : alātacakranimirasvapnamājāmbucandrakaih 1 dhūmikāntahpratisrutkámaricyabhraiḥ samo bhavah : Poussin observes (RAS. 1910, p. 136) that the title of the fourth Chaptcr, elölasanti, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase clātašūnli has not been traced in Buddhist books. We cannot however, think so. For, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brāhmanic work older than the AS." Now, it may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word alata as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full," is very wellknown. Cauda pada himself has used it as such in his AS not less than four times (IV 47.59). He has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible norld comparing it with aláta and finding out the cause of its appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases. And if It is so, we cannot say that the title of the chapter is not Buddhist. 19 Such as maramaricika sandharcenegara, 1 hapapa See MIVE', 139.21. 11 Asimily phrase, miçangalabhrantuanb, o cons in YV. III 6.2 14 Sce among others LA, P? 9.9, eta FINIS.

·APPENDIXES

·MĀNDUKYA UPANISAD
A
TEXT
om ity clad aksarom idam saruam tasyopavyökhyānam!
bhūtam bhavad' bhavisyad' atı sarvan onkara eva
yac cănyat
trikälätitam tad apy onkāra eva
2
sarvam hy elad' brahmnāyam ātma brahma so'yam ātma
catuspad.
3
agaritasthāno bahsprajiah saptầngo ekonovimtaimukhah
sthulablug valivājarah prathamah padah.
4
svapnasthāna 'ntahprajiah saptānga ekonavimšatimukhah
Praviviktabhuk tarjaso" dvitiyal padah.
{ ChaƯ, I, om ity oktaram tagyopavyskhyānam, d TU,I 81
om bidam sarvam
1 Alumits it
• C} BU, li{ 8 3,1% ở ? yad bhatam cableac ca bhavayac ca
For hy elad AloJ
Aladd, hranyagarbho after it

·224 AGAMASASTRA [Append. I, A 5 yatra supto' na kañcana kāmam kámayalo na kancana svapnam pasyalı' tat susuptam susuptasthana ekibhūtah* prajñānaghana evā'nandamayo hyānandabhuk cetomukhah psājāas trtiyah pādah 6 eso 'ntary.my' esa yonih csa sarucśugra? csa sarvajña" sarvasya' prabhavapyayau' h: bhūtānām 7 nāntahprajñam na bahısprajiam nobhayalahprajitam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam trāprajñam adestam avyavahāryam agrahyam alaksanam acintvam avyapade(yam ekātmapratyayasāram? prapañcopaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam caturtham manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyah • A susupto for supto, adds tu before kañcans, and omits eva after ghona 7 BU. IV 319 $ C ekibhavant, PU, IV 2 BU, IV 4 2 9 BU, IV 5 13 atmananlaro 'bāhyah kitsnah prajñānaghana eva 10 BLI, IV 4 22 sa vă esa mahan aja álma yo yam vijñānamayah prancsu ya eso ntashrdaya salas 'asmin chete esa sat.exvarah 11 MuUI 9 yah sarvajšah, PU, IV 10 sa sarvajnah 11 BU. III 7 3 esa ta atmāntaryāmi 13 Cf bhutayoni, MuUI 16 yad bhutayonim paripalyant dhirah 14 A? prabhāvaº D' prabhason for prabhara KU 1 2 11 15 Al reads nantahprajam na bohısprañom aftet naprojíct and has no prajñam naprajnom na ghanom na ghanaprapnam ne prajñanaghanam for na projñana noprmham A omity na prajñānaghanam After alaktanam A' onigamano 17 al ngam) adding to it bahihpaziam (5 reads in his commentary alaksanam lingam ananumeyam stvarthah nantchprogram and reading cintyam for acintyam Dt and D2 dd al ngam before acintyam At ekāntam for ekālma-T and Vaikātmyapra for ekatmapre'

·Append. I, A MĀNDOKYA UPANISAD, TEXT
225
8.
so 'yam ātmā 'dhyaksaram onkáro 'dhimätram pādā mātrā
mitraś ca pidā akára ukāro makâra' iti.
9
jagaritasthāno vaisvānaro "kārah" prathamā mātrāpter"
adımattväd vāpnoti ha vai sarvăn kāmān adikca bhavalı ya evam
veda.
10
svapnasthānas taijasa ukāro dvitiya mātrotkarsad ubhayatvād
votkarşatiha vai jāānasantarım samānas ca bhavatı nāsyābrahmavit
kule bhavati ya evam veda.
sujuphasthẳnah prārāo makāras ttiya mặtra mitespiter vã
minoti ha vā idam sarvam apitis ca bhavati ya evam veda
12
amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapañcopafamah sivo 'dvaita
evam onkāra atmaiva, samyišaty ätmanālmānam"' ya evam veda.
iti māndukyopanişat samāptā.
At Alio'raf cett for 'ja iti,
11 Al omits 'karah
11 At prāpter>). 10 aptor (or apter
19 VS, XXXII, 11• Atmanim nam abhi sam viveka Aadds palyat, alles
*Imõnam. Ki Ch M repeat ya enam pede which follows
1201B-29

·B TRANSLATION Om, this syllable is all this Its further explanation is : the past, the present, the future-all this is verily om. And whatever else that is beyond the three tunes, that, too, is veily Om 2 Verly all this is Brahman, this self lātman) is Brahman. This same self has four fourths 3 The first fourth is the Vais vānara 'comnion-to-allmen,' re, universal, (active) in the waking state, cognitive outwardly, having seven limbs' and nineteen mouths? enjoying the gross According to $ who follows here ChiU, V 18 2. these seven limbs are described thus The sely bright one (sutejas 1 e. the Featen is the head. One with various forms (Lyśl arūpal, Je, he sun is the eye That which has various paths te the wind is the breath The extended space (behula) is the body Wealth re water is the bladder And the carlh is the feet Here in the ChaU the number is more than even ? le, the means for experience of objects Accord ng to these are the following The five organs of sense tuddhindrico the five orgars of action tkormendnya, the fire stal breathe priro, the mind (maras), the intellect buddhi, egoism chankāral ard thinking citta For an explarialicr of the last four one may be referred to the following mano buddhirahankätas catlan karanam anlaram samsayo Discayo garvah smaranam visaya ime These are regarded as 'mouths, because these are the instruments with which one experiences the objects ·Append i B] MANDOKYA UPANISAD TR 227 4 The second fourth is the Tanjas a brilliant (active) in the dreaming state cognitive inwardly having seven limbs and nineteen mouths enjoying the subtle 5 That is deep sleep in which one asleep desires no desire whatsacver nor does he see any dream The third fourth is Prajfia wise He is in the sphere of deep sleep and just unified a cognition mass consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss having the mind as mouth 6 This is the lard of all this is the knower of all this is the controller of all This is the source of all for this is the origin and end of beings 7 Not inwardly cognitive not outwardly cognitive not both wise cognitive not a cognition mass not cognitive not non cognitive not seen not to be dealt with not graspable having no distinctive marks not thinkable not to be defined the essence of the consciousness of the oneness of the self the cessation of the expression quiescent blissful without a second-such) they think is the fourth He is the self He is to be realized 3 8 The same self is om from the point of view of a syllable and from the point of view of its measure the fourths are measures and the measures are fourths and they are A Uand M 3 Or the expans on of the ut versc as expla ned general) ·228 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [Append. I.B 9 Vaisvānara 'common-to-all-men' who is active in) the waking state is the first measure, A, on account of its obtaining laptı), or on account of its being the first. Verily, indeed, he obtains all desires and becomes first, who knows thus. 10 Taljas a brilliant who is (active in the sleeping state is the second measure, U, on account of exaltation or intermediateness. Verily, indeed, he exalts the continuity of knowledge, becomes equal,' and none who does not know Brahman is born in the family of him who knows thus. 11 Prāj na 'wise' who is (active in) the state of deep sleep 18 the third measure. M, on account of measuring and timerging. Venly, indeed, he measures all this and becomes (ts) immerging-he who knows thus 12 The fourth is without any measure, with which there can be no dealing, it is cessation of expression, blissful, without the second Thus om is the self, indeed Enters he with his self into the self-he who knows thus Here ends the Upanisad called Manduky a. ( Or, petsading See the hole in Hume • translation

·VARIANTS
BOOK I
a
I a All excepting A bahshpra,no for bahisprajno d A*
PU' PU' smrtah N Th matah for sthitah
2 Q A' daksinagniº V daksınekstº for dakstnaksi°, D
mukho for mukhe b Te of ca for 's tu cand d are onytted
In A?
3 a and b excepting pravwiklabhuk are omitted in A d
Ad adds tan before nibodhala
4 6 A? ca for tu which is omitted in A' C A'A' KIO
anandata for anandas V. A' tu for ca 10 pramah for pranam
d A' frividha for tridha A’ trptam for trptım A' A' A'K*
Vijanata KN vijanatha for nabodhata
Ai dhamastu for dhamasub Kyos tu for yas ca
c D' V vastu for yas tu
6 a K3 bhutanam for bhavanam b D D2 sty eva niscayah
for ºrtt viniscayah D' sa niscayah for viniscayoh C D' sarve
for sarvam 'D'D' prana A' pranamº for prana Alºs cetostana
D' PUP's ceto msun for ºf celo msun
7 AD' vibhuti praº A' vibhutih praº for vibhutim pra®
KN prabhavam for prasavam K pravadanty anye for prasavam
CA Osarupet for 'svarupet d Vº vikalpyate 10
vikalpitah for vikalpita
8 6 A’ omits vi of oniscitah Vº systır vrº for srstau viº
c Kadds bhutom before bhutanam d A' matyante Kº mante
for manyante
9 At the end of the karıka 10 adds the first two slokas
of Śs commentary viz pray anamsu' and yo visvatma •
to anye

·230 ĀGAMIASĀSTRA (Append 11 a for ca 10. a. Al niorttih, T' nivrite for niotteh c. A ºbhūtānām for bhāvānām. IO omits the kārika here, but reads it just after kárıkā 12 1. a A' A’AD? buddhau for baddhau. d. A'M' V° D' V" AK dvau tau, PU? and the MISS ABCDF of NSi (pp. 194, 246) dvau lu, A'A'D' duarta, PU dvaitam, K* PU? duau tu for doc tu, while for this line Kreads duau turye na tu sidhyalah 12 Vº pararfor parămº b Vtánrº for cānr°, PU' capi nānrtam for napi cantam d K'A'A'A'A'D'D' V" turyam tat (c) S), KN turiyam for turiyah 13. d K 14 c svapnam tu for ca suapnam 15 a DPU' grahnatah for grhnalah c Al 'nayoh for tayoh. 16 6. A' sa buº, A? suabuº for prabuº. c D asuptam for asvapram cand d A' advartam asvapnam for asuapnom advaitam 17 a and b A vidyate vivartale for vidyeta nivarteta. c. Asarvam for duartam 18 a K na nivarteta for vinivarteta. K omits it b K vkalpito for kalpito 19 a A' syudiui for syātuaviº 20 a All excepting A IV. viiare for vniāna b A' A* A' sphulah for sphutam c AP sapraliº for sampratº d A' vidhim for pidham 21 6 D' PL" mānam så for manasa C Asapratiº for samprati'.d 4'layo sa D layah sa for layasa' All excepting PL' yet for yah supported by $ 6 D' IO PU? vet. K cctz for ucite A' tadı atah, Kniscitam, PU' niscittah for cilah c M' sampū" for sa pū". d M caisa for ºccivo 23 a Di nayatt for nayate d Mand KN 'golih for gatrh 24 a A onkaro for onkalam 25 a pranavo for pranai'e 22 a ·Books ] VARIANTS 231 26 a For this k pranguo brahmaparah brahma b ALA? A D D'M V: Vparah for param 10 parah smirlah for param smirigh 27 d Azºtarah for laram 28 a A omits he before istorom b A' A' Gh Ch )NV! hrdaye sthitam for hrdı samsthutam 29 b A smlah for śivah Colophon Amanduky opanısal samapta D' D' manduhyopanısadvyakhyane gaudapadabhagavatal Istau onkaranırņayah prathamala prakaranam 10 ti mandukyopansat samapta Kiti mandukyoparusadgaudapadavyahhyane gukarakhya prarhamam prakaranara samaptam Kiti mandukyopanışat samaptam (sici hare krsna hare krsna PU prathamiam prakaranam PU tu srigovindapujyapadalisyasya paramahamsaparıvrajala Caryasya sankarabhagavatah krtav agamasastravivarane prathama praharanc mandulyavyakhyanam sainaptam V mandukyopannat somapta V" st1 mandulyahhyam prathamam prakaranam . Ворк !! IaA bhutanam for bholanom C A A Conc bhcduram for bhavanam 2 b Vo Di dehan for deson c Vu probuddhas for pratibuddhas 3 Before this harika B* reads here the hanka - once inore 4 b A' A' B Oh M' PU* tasmat for tatha d All samurtatuena for samurtatcom na A'exdyate for bh dyale 5. A’ omits suabna" A ABDI DIOPU'V' V. rilasthane for 'rite sthane 7 b PU svapno for svapne Ve ca pratº all others viprati" for pr prati .

·232 AGAMASASTRA (Apper.d. 11 8. a. A’ A* B² apūrvasthanidharmo, A' B'D' D'M PU' PU? Vº Va apūrvam sthanidharmo for apūreāh :thanidharmah. c V" matvā for gantva. d k V* yadaive for yathaive." 9. a A' °urttāu ayam tv anta', A? Ovattāv artheşv änt", B' J JA V* Eorttāv apy antaº, Gh Cºurttāpy anta", 10°oritāv apy antaº for ferttāv api tu antaº; K svanta for tv antaº. b Vokalitam for kalpitom, B'D'D'Gh J Jh K' asat, A? 10 tad asat, Atad idam asat for tv asal. c A' A'B'CD'D10 Jh K'N PU? V" ºs cetasă for ºs cctoº, A' A' B' IO add hi and CJ Jh N add ca after grhitam. d V“ vaitathyum ubhayor api omitting dıştam. A' K sadasator vaitathyam omitting drstam, B'CD' D? 10 J Jh N sadasator vastathyam drs!am. A sadasator caliathyam yuktam 10 a A'D' Di anta", V" hy anta' for to anta' b. B'D' Dº Gh J Jh KV" asat, A'Aº tad dan asat for to asat, c. A' A' B' D' Di Gh j jh K PU' PV? V" Os celasă for ºf cetoº. A'A' B' 10 add hi, the last one omitting sat, CJ Jh N add ca omitting sad, A' A'B' Gh J Jh add hi after grhitam. d. A'A' sadasator tartathyam drstam, B' DI D? Gh J Jh V" sadasalor vartathyam yuktam, K satyadator vartathyam for yuktan va tathyam etayoh 10 and Pomit the kārıka entirely. 11 Q.6 A? adds tad after cartathyam V" bhedūnām vartathyam for vartathyam bhedanam c V" ckalan for ka ctăn 12 a Patmanı as a different read.ng for ātmānam 6 KM' atmadehah for átme decah c V' bhogan for bhedan 13 b All except Puyat asthitun for 'uyai asthitan c A'A' B'10 s cittam for ºs citta, Bfirst s cittam then the anusvāra is struck off B' las ca for 'le hı. K? yetas for yc'ntas b Dya for ye 15 d A’ lises manyahetus kah levidently for crścso nänya. helukah) for ubesas ti indriyantare After that reading the M1S reads asti tu indnyantar 18 d A' ABD'D PL'atmate for almovi A' A' B' M' V° s ca for 's tu b Du kalpota for 19 a ·Book ll] VARIANTS 233 kalpitah. d. A' A'B' B'IO K PU' sammo, Vº yan moº for 'yam moº supported by $. 20. a. A' A' B'D' K'10 PU' PU? Va prāņa for prānā b. D' bhūtā iti for bhutánili c B' guna for guņa d ki tadvivah for tadvidah. 21. 6. A' visaya i bhūtuniti ca, A bhüorsayāti ca for visaya its; PU' adds ce after si cd. A veda iti Ledavido yarī㺠lie. a and b of the next karikā for loká 1fr lokavido 22. c-b. A lokā ili lokaordo deva it ca tadurdah for the whole line. M'adds ca after it in a c A omits ca d.M' V "iya for jyam Komits c and d 23, d. V. emärta for 'murta ointing cu alter ti 24. a. 10 kālā for kala c V' pata iti våta for vādā itp cada d B' V" bhuvanant ca for bhuvanānıtı. 25 a V' ca tadoido, Gh C Ch mana for mano 27. a D'Di lokaloka", IO lokal loka for loka Iloka°. 6 10 adds ca after it c. D' De Onapumsakapumlingõk for pumnapumsakam launigah; PU' lingāt, PU lingo for langāḥ d D'D' parasparam for parāparam, B' athoº for athãº. 28. d A Mº V sarve for saruam, Va tehe tu samyatah for ceha tu sarvada. 29 a. K'yad for yam b. tad for lam, A² san for sa c A' vāvam vipra bhu for civalı sa bhū, vivah for civate 30. d. Voyed yo ojº for øyet so 'viº. 32. Before this kánkā A' B' and V" read tamah svapnanbham destam varsa budbudasamnibham! nāsaprāyam sukhāddhinam nāšottaram abhāvajam || (a. C nabhasy abhraº for tamah svopna', A fuabhra' for svapna'. d A' B' abhāvagem, V" abhāvatah for abhāvajam). It is quoted by $ in his commentary on the preceding Kārkā as from the Vyasasmiti. P takes it as one of the verses included in the text and comments upon t. b. Va baddho and sôdhyakah for tandha and sädhakah respectively. (2013--30 ·234 ĀGAMASASTRA [Append, I 33. c. Al atha dua, A? artha dva for upy advaº. dA' yasma for tasma'. stvah for stva. 34. a A2 nälmábhavena, all others nålmabhāvena lor nānyabhāvena, Jnabhedam for nâncdam, c. A’ prthaktvät pithak ki'. As pithaktvāt prthaktvam ca, D' prthan nāprthat kiº, D? prthaktvāprthak krº for prthan năprthak kiº, 36 b. B* yojayot for yojayet 37 a. PU' nihstutir for riistutır, A? "stuto for "skāro. 38 a, Kmātattuaº for tattua Colophon Bi iti frigovindabhagavatpūjyapada isyasya paramahamsaparivrājakācāryasya śnišankarabhagavatpādasya kịtāv agamaśāstravivarane dvitiyam prakaranam vaitathyakhyam samāptam. K' iti śrimândukyopanısadgaudapādavyākhyāne vetadhāsa (sic) dvitiyam prakaranam samāptam PU? iti śrigovindabhagavatpūjyapādası«yasya paramahamsa. parıvrājakācāryasya śrisankarabhagavatah krtāyāgamaśāstravivarane dvitiyam prakaranam vaitathyākhyam samāptam. Vägamasāstre vaitathyākhyam dvitiyam prakaranam samāptam V" "vaitathyākhyam dvitiyam praharanam BOOK III 1 a A upāsāśrtº for upāsanaśriº b A A' A' Gh N J jñāte for jāte 2 b Da sajāta for majāts, A' A' 10 yatha for gatam CA' A' tathā for yatha In D' the leaf containing kārılás 2-7 is missing 3 c K ghatārvahavac ca for ghatādiac ca d tav evan niº for lav etan nº 4 O V" "kabodaº for "kasada cand dare omitted in V?. DM pro for iro 6 a For it K' nuparagasamasmac ca Vuºs tu for ºs ca 7 c Vº naianmonch for nawatmanah d V' rāvayau for rāvayavau. c and d are omitted in V".

·Book !!] VARIANTS 235 8.6 Algagamanam for gaganam, A' malino for malinani 9, c. All sthitou for sthitah in V'. cd. Ve Jh arcsu hy aktº, A' V 'riresu akaa but on margin 'rireșu akā*) for Oriteşu akaº, d. A* vicaksanah for dilaksanah. 10 b Al A'B' (on margin visa 10 vrarjitūh for visarjítoh; Vº ätma for alma and Orjitah for 'nitáh. d. A' bhidyate for vidyate. 11 d. A' suayam yo, A' B' B* 10 PU' PU? Vº kham yotha for so-yatha, A'A' khan samprakirti'. D'D' V" kham prakási for samprakaśiº. 12. d. 10 kašapra for kasch praº; Vo prokátom for prakāfitah. 13 a. A' mano for Otmano, Alajanyatcam for ananualcam c. A* 10 bhidyatc for nindyale. d. A' B'CD'D' M* eca for euam. 14 c. Ch gaunatuom for gaunam tan.d A'A'B'B'D'D' TO IN PU' PU'V' Vhina for na ht 15. 0, A'A' lingais tu for longadyarh. b. A' vodita for codita. 17. a. A' susiº for svasi", A'sumiddhāvadāvasthāslu for a, 18. b. sad for lad. c 10 ubhayata for abhayatha 19. c. mano for 'mane 21. b.yatha for tatha See IV 70 22, d. A sthäsya vinstertom for sthesyat niscalah 23, c. K* bhato 'Bhulaº for bhutato 'Bhuta 24. a. A' A' cafriyat for cămnāyad 25. c. A'A' kas tv enam for ko nu enam 26 c and d are omitted in A' The examination of K* shows that the order of the Karikas Nos. 25. 26 and 27 is actually the same as in other MSS, but owing to a mistake of the schbe in copying the commentary that order has been changed, they being copied as Nos. 25, 27 and 26 respectively, 27. a and b ate omitted in A'. 28. c. A'CD'D'PV' 'sulo for "putro. 31. 4. A' A' mukha for drtua", B' sarvum for dvaitam. c. manasu for manaso; B* unmani for amani", ·236 AGANASĀSTRA [Append. II 32. c. A’ amanaskam for arnanastam d. D? gráhyabh㺠for grāhyabhãº. 33. b. A' A? jñeyam bhi' for jñeyābhiº; pracaksyate for pracaksate. 34. c A pravārah for pracārah. 35 a. Ch susuptau for susupte. b Vsusuptasya ni for susupte tan ni', A'A’ na niº for tan niº. 36. c-d K' sarvajñopacărah for sarvajñam nopacārah. 37. « A' A bhimanavimatah. 10 V* bhilāşavigatah for bhilapavigatah. b V° °muhitaḥ for "mutthitah, d. A' 'bharah for 'bhayah 38 b. B' citā for cintā c-d. A' jħayam ajñatih, A’jñāyanajñātih for jñānam ajāti. 39 a 10 Vº 'yogo namāyam. A' A 'yogi nămāyan, PD 'yogo nāmaisah for 'yogo vai nāma d. A' bhayadarśataḥ, A' tattuadaršinah for bhayadarsinah. 40 a Al 10 nigroho yaf tad, A migraho yat lam for nigrahayattam 43 b A' A? Obhogam for bhogān 44 b PU samayet for samayet d Bi samam praptam. all others samaprāptam for samoprāptam (=ºf sama') in Ves, 33 and supported by Midvanmanoranjani, C vicàlayet for calayet 45. a Ves with Subodhını and l'idvanmanoranjani, loc cit , rasam for sukham © Al Al nascitum ci, 10 niściłam ci°, B nescararrśct for niscaracciº 46 6 A' A' PU' manah for punah c Alanıngıtaº. A anangita. B'D? alıngana for aningana d KM tatha for tada 47 d A' A' sa sarvajnah panksite for sarvaram parıcaksate. 48 b B' sambhāvo for sadbhavo Colophon B' PU' itu śrgovindabhagavatpūjyapādasisyasya paramahamsaparıvıājakācāryasya sarıkarabhagavatah hſtāv agamaśāstravivarane advaitakhyam ttiyam prakaranam samāplam ·Books III, IV) VARIANTS 235 PU' iti frígaudapādācāryaviracitam advaítākhyam thiyam prakaranam. Vāgamasastre advaitākhyam tītiyaņ prakaranam samăptam, V* gaudapādiye advaitanırņayo nāma liti am pralaranam. Book IV 1. c. A' samuddha', A' sambhinnaº for sambuddha". d. PU* 'ntarom for Varam. 2. d. V° dostata' for desita' 3.a. Vº jätaº for jāti* b. B' first sarue then corrected to kecid as in the text. 4. a. All exccpling D GPM duayı for 'dcayah, d. A'A' na jatim ajałam for ajölım 6. d. A' martya nu for marfyatām, A'A' isyati for esyals. 7. a. Di marlue for martyamb D'D' matyurº for mortyaº; A'A' Jh Vyatha for tatha. See III. 21". 9. a. A nisvábhaviki for stabhiuiki 6 10 krta, B' B'K'GP Me Vakstā. A' A' amolā, Jh krtaki, Cpy äkta for "py alata; Jh yatha for ca yā. . A' Os celtA' sucho, A''s seti for sel. Kreads only d omitting other lsnes altogether. 10. 6. A'A' sarva for sarved. A'A' tanmaya opt for tanmanisaya It is to be noted that in D' körikās from 10 to 53 ale nanting. 11. d. B' nityam bhennam for bhinnon nityon, A' A' yat for lat 12. a. A'A'A'B' B'M DV yady ananyalvom, A' yayam ananyatram. Vº yad anyatvam for yad ananyatuam As the word gadt occurs to do here in a one should read yod as 'actually found in though it reads in b laua for yadi 13 c-d. A' mintas tasya uyarathi for manasya na Lyou'outh, d. V prajayate, PU' TU presajjale for prasajyale. 14.a. A'di samam for doh pholam 10 omits the kisika 15. 6. Vadihetuh for adir heluh, A' A'lo phalari ca yal for phalasya ca, d. Al pulra' for putia;'.

·239 AGAMASASTRA (Append. II + 16 b. V° eşitah, BP KP zsitavyah for ‘esitacyaḥ. d. A' cışayāvat for visānavat. 17 a. BP phalatanupaº for phalad utpaº. b A' Ato for te. 18. b. A heluḥ, Ahetusu for hetutah, C Jb phalásıddhih for phalasıddhih. 4. Ali param lat for katarat. B* gives the number of the kārikā as 16 instead of 18 and henceforth the scribe counts the following kārıkās accordingly. i.c., 17, 18, etc. 19 a Aatrokirº for asaktı', AA pacuñānam for parijñānam d. A' A jāte for atzh ; Al 'vāpità for dipitā. 20 b A' A? tamo for samo, A'A'A'A' B' B'D' IO PU' PUŁ V. Va sah for nah in CD?. c A' A' B'B? 10 PU' PU? Vº Vai for ca in A' A' supported by $ 21 a Gh paraparı' for parapari' b Vº dipikam for dipakam 22 a 10 omits l'a after svato 23 6 A' A'A'A'B' B' DI 10 M' PU' PU* câpr for väpi. d PL' on the margin sa for hy ādır 24 d 4 Ai paratam naste nama tù the former lah for "rā) for the line. I matám for malu 25 a 4' \ prajiapte for prapraptch b A' bhuktiº for yukur, 1? anyatha drayana atah for b, ki bhūta" for yuklia c and date omitted in K 26 all arthun for artham b 4 nabhasam l'arthabhāsas to" for narthabhasam tad 10 bhusam for bhasas, A' tata, (tathiu for tatah 27 0 sahu for sadu b pare asu for "ty adhuasu c. A' ciparvatsah for kipa: yusah 28 b citiam for sitta 1 ts yant for jatim d Vºfc toi thi and in for l. 20 a \tarmud for vasmud o A'D' tatha for tatah Ce myathu lor, unyatha anantabhovadinato anantatu audimate, CD' anantata adumato for anantata codonate 1 30+ ·Book IV1 VARIANTS 239 31.c-d. A' santyev, A'D' santo or in the latter hetkeen santo and via there is an avagraha mark above the line and it seems to have been struck off) for santo 'cy". A'D' lakatla for laksitāḥ, 32. b. All excepting D* cipratipadyate for po praticadyolc See 1.7. 33. a. All sarve dhaº lor saradha' in A', PUS mrsak for mışā. 6. A'V' karyasya º for kārjasyãº. c BBM Vsamtstte for saniyle 34. a. A' jñātvā for gaiva b. A' kálalaisya* for kälasyo. d. 10 darse for dese, 35, 6. A AB' B' MI' sambuddho for prabuddhoc A: D' vāpi for copr. 36. &. D' os ladarsanāt lor'sya dardanut 37. c. A'B' B' PU' V. ivät tu for atrac ca d A'A' D' sajiga for saj jāga 38(39). b. A' fonmoya for fanmar ah Al Al destac ca for dęsętă ca. 39(41). b. A? .cintyāt for cintyan c Gh yathā for tatha ; A' A' viparyāsam for t'paryāsat d A A Patra ca for tatraica, 41140). c. B' sa for sac. 42. a. Al upalambhut for upalambhát d A'A''s ca satam Blºs trasyalam for 's trasatām 43 a. Al s to osatyam, A' es tu satām, D' susclars, Bi's trasyatäm for 's trasalim b A'D' te for ye, V' first te then corrected to ge. 45. a. A'A' castrabhasam for tastrôbhasam d. A' Jantum, B* santam for fantam; D' avyayam, l' sademjam for adrayam 46. a.b. BP citocintam for citiem crom, c. V 'm gönanto. PU' jānano, C vijñāto na for Ujjananto. d. d' capati. A'A' taponti for potenti. 17, d. All excepting B'C Jh PU'voranaspaº for ciprūnom spo* 43. a. A' A'D' 10 NI' PU" PU' alalarn for datam. In 4' a and 6 ate omitted. c A' mina e for Ornänom L'yº ·240 AGAMASASTRA (Append. 11 A' reads c-d as a-b, and a-b as c-d with the following variants. c. Omāna viº for manam vi', and prajam for 'm ajam. Vis damaged here 49 b Di Bnäbhasa for nābhāsa; A' A' A' Kh Gh JN 'scanyato for anyalo. c.d A' rispandăm nàº, A' nispanda na, Gh nispandan nā' for nuspandān nie 50 a-b B? nirgatilata dra' for nirgală alálát te dra'. c-d, A' 'vīsya nābhāsasthaviº for ºva syur abhāsasyāvi'. 51 c A'A'A'nıspandam na for nispandun na. 52 a K Jhrgata vijñā for 'rgatás te vunā", K Jh M. Vo tā vrnänāt te, B! "tä osjñānas tc, Btā vurānā te, PU't te vijñānāt for "tas te vinad 6 A'A'A' dravyatoam bh㺠for drauya. tvabha cd A' yogādanourſtah, A’ yogād alo ciftah for "bhāvād yalo 'cintyah, A'cintya for 'cintyah, A' A hi for te. 53 c AP "m anyathābhā form anyabha 54 b A' B'D'V' capi for vapı, A' dharmajāh for dharmajam c AP jälıh for jāt m 55 a V" yad dhetu", PU' yava helu for yavad dhetuº.c D' Dahctuh for helu 56 d A' A' B' BY D' D M PU' V° V" samsaram na prapadyate, A’ samsāran nopapadyate for samsāro nopapadyate in A' and JO 57 G A A% svapnam for sarvam b AB' B M PU' PU* năsti var for tena nästa All sadbhāvena for svabhāvena d Aº nasmt for nästi. 58 6 All excepting V" jāyante for samortyā supported by Ś 59 a A’ ya jätaº for 'yad bijãº, CA A’ na sa for näsau ; Al bocche for cocche 60 a Al nädyesu, Ai nājyesu b Al sāśvata nastı dhiyate, Asaśvatāśāsvato'bhidhā for this line nyamudyante vartante for na variante. 62 V tu for ca b A 4* B D DP manah for cittam Ve tu for ca d A' jāgram na, A' zagrena for Jūgran na, tena l'ai. с for nājesu. с ·Book'ıvr VARIANTS 241 63 O ATA procalon C kvacaran for pracaran b A' disam uithalan, A' dišamarcchtan for dašasu sihitanc A' anjanan for andaan, 'B' gvapne for lapi 64 a D' svapne for svapna', A'A' kom na A'D' kuliaº for cria 6 A' A' bhidyante for vidyante c A' na disya for taddyšyeº Al®meledam før ºm evedam d Akm taº A kam laº A'D' killa for culta K' jugralaš ciº for slapnadrk cr" 65 a A' A' varam for caran ab Vs tasma dikse corrected to fac ca tyaksu for jagrad deksu -6 A' dasmulthitan for da asu sthutan c D'cepe for cap 66 a D' ksantyos, V* ºksanıyamº for ºk anyasº b, A' bhidyante A' bhdyanti for vidyate c A' dosyam idam vedom for tad drsyam evedam d B' jegrac for jagratas 67 ¢ C 'drsyeta for drsye te ó A'A'A'BB'CCh O'D* G JO KM PU PU' V° co for no After this harika D'adds - pramana unyam ubhayam cittam cautam duayam yatahi tanmatenaiva tac citam tas aiva ca tad sthyatc !! There are different readings for which see Śs commentars (A') from which it is taken Hered is defective of metre 68 d Kh Gh N Sh na bhavante fo bhavante na Al Al omit it In A' it is not in the body but on the margin by a second hand bh' mnyafe payate for nyata minyate dk C N na bhajanl for bhalant na 70 A*V* oint the harika a ARV nimiftako BB nimillako for nurutako b AD D'M' cd for ca 71 c A'ya elad u for etat tad uº A' V* sarlam k' patron for satyan. 72 . For this Al Al ciltam spandati me sartom 6 D'D' grahyam gra for grahyogru 73 c All paratantrabhiº for paratantro "bar" d For this V. paramurthena nasty asau Then again it has cand d 1201B-31 ·Book IV) VARIANTS 243 87 a Alavastu A? sucastu for sac asłu cand dare amitted in ? B8 V* *palam for 'palambham 89 Bi dorodhe for triudhe Di dindals D' urdate for vidite 90 a A' A? Oneyasga takyanı 10 Oneyaparakyanı for *sneyapyapakyan: d D' olambhoº for 'lambha 91 a A'A'A' 'urncyâh for ºla) neyik ab Ch reads saruc before jneych b All sarve dharma ercepting A' V which read sarvadharma c V' ca for hu 92 6 All sarve dharmah excepting V' which reads sarla dharmah 93 6 Aprakstau ia for prakrtyaila Ap / sun imitat" v suniściłah for sutireriah c A V' saradha' for sarut dhoº d A' A' syomom for sumyom A? Psadam for 'rodom Ford B* prakrtyawa sunırlitah repeating c and das in the text 94 « Al vedabhinnah A' vedabhinnoh Va bhedanistha for bhedanimnah 9 a A'A' cam for aje A'&umyam for åmye b A'A' pascitam 10 vincular for suniścijah 96 a Al ajetyojom Moje py azam for ajesu ojam Diajam kröntam for asamkrentam D and D'add here sariabhulalma bhutasya sarta bhutahıtasıya ca which is found in 6s com mentary on the preceding Lantha 97 a 10 vardharme for ta dharmye d Aiudaharane for ulacaranaº D taran㺠for carana 98 CA' budhus Al buddhes for buddhas A yul à A' yukta for mukta d A' budhyant: 10 budhyante for budhyanta 99 a Al budhasya for buddhasya b A no monoh A' first bodhinch then conected to vyapinah D D'R' M' PO' top nah A tapı(yi)nok for saytnah All excepling A' A' sorte de lor sarladha d Abudheng for buddhena 100 a V" durdatam for durdartom 6 A yamam for suns am A' Pradam for radam d A' manoh kurmo A' manaskurmo A'D'y namah kurno for namaskurmo ·244 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (Append. 11 . Colophon: A Aity upadeśagranthe 'lātaśāntyakhyam prakaranam Samāptam. Aadds to the above only caturtham alter prakaranam. B'B' iti sri govindabhagavatpūjyapādasisz asankarabhagavatah kſtav āgamaśāstravivarane alātaśāntākhyam caturtham prakaranam samāptam (B? sampūrņam). DD? it érigaudapādabhagavatah krtau agamagranthe upadeśagranthe vedāntamale gaudapādiyam caturtham prakaranam. IO ity alātākhyam caturtham prakaranam upanisat samāptam (sic) siva siva (17 times) Kiti māņdūkyopanisadgauda padavyākhyāne. PU, iti śrimadgaudapādācāryakıtau māndūkyavārttıke alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham praharaṇam samāptam. prakaranacatustayātmakam śāstram sampūrņam PU? uti śrigovindabhagavatpūyapādaśisyasya Śtifarkarabhagavatah krtáv āgamasāstravivarane - alātaśāntyakhyam caturtham prakaranam samāptam. Vºitı śrīgaudapāda āgamaśāstre alātaśāntyakhyam caturthaprakaranam samāptam iti srigaudapādis e upadesagranthe alataśānty akhyacaturthaprakararam.

·INDEX OF THE KARIKĀS . ahalpakam ajan jñānam, III. 33 alāte spandamāne var. IV. 49 akāro nayate višvam, I 23 avasty anupalambhamca, IV.89 ajah halpitasamyſtyà. IV 74 avyalts eva ye 'ntas tu. 11 15 ajam anidram asvapnam, ill. asaktır aparijñānam. IV. 19 36. IV.81 . asaj jāgarite dravā. IV.39. ajātam jāyate yasmāt, IV. 29 asato mājaya janma. III 28 ajātasyaiva dharmasya, IV 6 : astı nasty asti nāstīı, IV 83 ajatasyaiva bhāvasya, Ill. 20 aspåndamānam ālatam. IV: 48 ajātes trasatām tesām. IV 43 asparcayo o sa nama. III 39. ajād vai jayate yasya, IV 13. IV:2 ajev ajam asamkrāntam, 1V 9&ātmasatyānubodhena III 32 aje sämye tu ye kecit, IV 95 ātmā hy shaxavaj Jivair It 3 anumatre 'pi vaidharmye, IV 97 adav ante ca jan nästi II 6, ato vaksyāmy akārpanyam III 2 IV 31 adaghatvậc ca kalasya, II 2 adibuddhah prakrtyaiva. IV 92 advayam ca dvayābhāsam, III adıcanta hy anutpannah, IV. 93 30. IV. 62 asramas trividha hina Il 16 advaitam paramārtho hı,"III. 18 icchámătrarn prabhoh sajir, 1 8 anādımās ayā supto, I. 16 utpădasyāprasıddhatvāt IV 83 anader antaiattvam ca, il 30 utseha udadher jadvat, III. 41 animittasya cıttass a, IV.77 upalambhat samācărat, IV 42, aniscitā yathi rajjuh, il 17 44 antahsthānät tu bhedanăm, 11 4 upāyena nighniyat III. 42 anyatha gjhnatah svapno, I. 15 :| upisanāsnto dharmo. III ! apūrvam sthanidharmo hi. I 8. ubhay or åpi saitathyam, 11 11 abhával ca tathādınām. II 3 ubhe hy any ony adjiyete, IV 67 abhūtabhinivesād dhi, IV. 79 fjuvakradikābhāsam IV 47 abhūtabhiniveso 'sti, IV 75 ctair eso 'prthagbhivath. II. 30 amitro 'nantamátrai ca, 1, 29 csam na cittaja dharini, IV 54 alabdhāyaranih sarve, IV.98 evam najās ate attam. IV. 46 . 2 ·248 AGAMASĀSTRA (Append. III 1 sanghātāḥ svapnavat sarve, III. 10 svapnadıkcittadỊsz ās te, 1V.67 salo hi mayaya janina, III, 27 svapnadık pracaran svapne, saprayojanalā team, II.7; 1V.32 IV.63 sambhave hetuphalayor, IV.16 svapnan.drāyutāv ādy au. i 14 sambhūter apavadāc ca, III. 25 svapnamāye yatha dệste, 11. 31 sarvasya pranavo hy ādır, J. 27 svapnavſttāv api tv antai, II. 9 sarvabhilāpavigatah. III. 37 svapnc cāvastukah kāyah. sarve dharma mrsā syapne, IV. IV 36 33 svabhāvenārsto zasya. III. 22; savastu sopalarnbhamca, IV 87 IV.8 sāmsıddhhi svābhāviki. IV 9 svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu, IN 17 sukhain avriyate nityam, IV. 82 'svastham sāntam sanırvānam, sūksma iti sūksmayıdah, ll 23 III +7 srstir iti srstivido. Il 28 hetur na jāyate nădıb, IV. 23 sthulam larpayate viśvam. 1 4 hetor adıh phalam yesām. IV. svato vā parato vāpı, IV 22 14, 15 svapnajāgante sthāne, 11. 5 heyajñeyāpyapākyāni, IV.90 IV INDEX OF THE PASSAGES OF THE MĀNDUKYA UPANISAD amatraś caturtho, 12 Yatra supto na kañcana, 5 esa sarvesvara esa sarvajñab 6 sarvam hy etad brahma, 2 om aty etad aksaram, 1 susuptasthānah prājño 11 jāgaritasthāno bahrprajño, 3 so'yam ātrādhy akçaram, jāgantasthāno vaisvānaro, 9 svapnasthānas taijasa, 10 năntahprajāam na bah-prajñam 7 svapnasthāno ntahprajnah, 4 ·250 AGAMAŠĀSTRA -[Appendix V antar, 1. 2; II. 9, 10, 13, 14, amūrta, Il. 23 15; IV. 33.-prajña, l. 1; amịta. III. 19, 20, 21, 22; IV. sthāna, II. 1, 4. -6,7,8 --tva, IV. 92. anya. 1 7, 9; IV. 36, 53.- arūpaka, III. 36. bhāva, II. 34; IV. 53.- artha, IV. 26. hetuka, Il. 14. alabdhāvarana, IV. 98. anyathābhāva, I. 21; 1. 7. alāta, IV. 47, 49. 50. cl. alāta, 29. alpa, IV. 43. anyonyaděsya, IV. 67. Vav, avati, Il 29. apara, I 9, 26; II. 13, 26, 27 : avatāra, IN. 15. IV.3 avastu. IV. 87, 88.-ka, IV. 36. aparkheda, III 41 avitatha, II. 6. aparijñāna. IV 19 avipascit, IV 97. apavada. III. 25 | aviruddha, IV 2 apūrva, 1. 26. !! 8-sthani | avilaksana, III. 9 dharma, Il 8 avivāda, IV 2.5. apekşā, IV. 18. avisanksta, JJ, 30 apracyuta, II 38 avisesa, IV 50 apravrtta, IV. 80 avyakta, !! 15. aprasıddha, IV 17-tva, IV avyaya, 1 10.26 40 (38) | avyavasthita, II 13 abāhya, I. 26 Vas, aśnute, I. 15, IV. 78. abuddha UL 8 aśaktı, IV 19 abhaya, III 37, 39 40 IV 78 aśāśvata, IV 60 abhını pattı, IV 74 Vas, astı, II 6-tā. IV. 24 — abhinna, IV 1 năstı, IV 83_-vastutvavadın, abhılāpa. III 37 IV 42 abhisamvrtı, IV 73. asamkrānta, IV 96. abhūta, III 23, IV 3 4, 26 asanga, IV 72, 96 —tā, IV 97. 40 (38) -abhiniveśa. IV 75, asat, II 9. 10, IV 22, 38, 41 79 40) -hetuka, IV. 40. abheda, lji 13. asambandha, IV 16. amanastā, III. 32 aspandamāna, IV 48. amanbhāva, III 31 asparsayoga, ili 39; IV 2 amnātra 1 23, 29 aspreta, IV 84 ·251 Appendix V) INDEX OF WORDS IN KARIKAS asvapna, I. 16; IV. 81.-nidrā, utpattı, 11. 32; III. 1, 14; IV. I. 14. 18. ákāša, 1. 2; III. 6, 9, 12.-kalpa, utpāda, IV. 40 (38). IV.1.-vat, III 3. utsarga, Ill. 38. ātman, I. 12, 11, 12, 17; III 3, utseka, III 41. 7,8,11.-māyāvisarjita, III,10. udadhi, III. 41. -viniscaya, Il. 18.-samstha. udara, III. 12. III. 38.-satyānubodha, III. 32. udāhrta, IV.40 (38). ādi, I. 14, 19; II. 6; IV. 14. upacara, III. 36. 15, 23, 31, 98.-antavattva, upadeśa I. 18 11. 7; IV. 32.-buddha, IV. upapattı, Ill. 10. 92.-mat, IV. 30.-śānta, IV. upa: Vlabh, upalabhyate, til. 93. 31 adhyātmika, II. 16, 38 upalabdh IV. 24. ānanda. 1.4.-bhuj, 1. 3 upalarnbha, IV. 42, 43, 44, 90 äptakāma, I. 9. upăya, III 15, 42. āptisāmānya, 1. 19, upāsanā. III 16-frita, 1!!. 1, abhäsa, IV. 26, 49, 50, 51 ubhaya. I. 5. 13. II. 11; IV. āyata, IV. 56. 67-tva, I 20--thā, lll. 18 āyatta, III. 40. rjuvakrādıkābhāsa, IV. 47. alata, IV. 48. cl. alata. ekatrımsaka, 11 26 āvaranacyutı, IV.97. onkara, 1. 24. 28. 29. asrama, II. 27; III. 16 kalpita, 1, 18, 11, 9, 10, 14, 15. Jśraya, III. 16. -samviti. IV. 73, 74 icchămātra,'' 8. kama. III 42.--bhoga, III. 42 indra, 111. 24 kaya, IV. 33. 36 tsāna, 1. 10. kārana, III. 25, IV 11, 12.- isvara. 1. 28. baddha; 1 11. ukāra, 1. 23. kārya, IV. II, 12.-kāranats. uccheda, IV.57. bhāva. IV.52.--käraņabaddha, ucchedin, IV, 59. utkała. 1. 19, 21. kāla, 1 8; 11. 2. 24. IV. 34.- utkarşa, I. 20. cintaka, 1. 8-vid. 11. 24. uttama, III. 47, 48, IV.71, -kušágra, III. 41. adhamamadhyama, IV. 76. krtaka, III. 22. IV.8.

·252 AGAMAJĀSTRA [Appendix V kệtsna, IV 85 jarâmarana, IV. 10-nirmukta, krpana, III 1, IV.94. IV. 10. koti, IV.84 Vjà, jāyate, II 2. 24, 27, 28, kośa, IIT. 11 48; IV. 4, 11, 13, 21, 22, 23. V kram, kramate, IV. 96. 99. 28, 29, 46, 57, 59, 70, 71, 74. krama, IV. 16, 89.-kopa, IV 75, 76. 19. jāgarita, II. 4, IV, 37, 38, 65. krıdārtha, I 9 vat, IV. 37. ksāntı, IV 92 săgrat, III. 29,30; IV. 39, 61, 62. gagana, III 8.-upama, IV I 65, 66-cıttek saniya, IV.66. gandharvanagara, II 31 jāta, III. 1, 27, 43, IV. 13. gura, 11 20 -vid, II 20 jati, III. 20. IV, 3, 6, 23, 28, gauna, III. 14. 2-do'a, IV 13.ābhāsa. graha, III 38, IV 82. 84 15 grahana, IV 37 --grāhakābhāsa jiva, 1 16, I 16, III 3, 7, 11: IV 47 i 63, 65. 68. 69.70 -ātman, grāhyagrahakavat, 1\ 72 III 13, 14 grāhyābhāva. III 32 jñāna, III 33. 38. IV 1.88, 89, ghatikāsa, III 37-adı, III 4 96 99-aloka, III 35 ghanapraña, 1! jñeya III 33, +7, IV 1, 88, 89, catuskon (for kotyas catasrah 91-abhinna, DI, 33, IV. I V 8+ tattya, 1 15. I 20, 30, 38. cilta II 13 25, III 44 45, 46, III 19, 27, 28. IV. 56-vid, Il 26 27, 28 46 54 61, 62 Il 34 66 72 76. 77 --kaniya IV tatts bhūta Jl. 38. 66 --kala II 14--ja, l 54 tathasmrti, JL 16. drsya, i 28. 36 77 -vid. ll. tad--graha, II. 29-dys; a, IV. 25 spandita Il 72 67 66-bheda, III.18 -mata, calacalanketa, 11 37 67-maya, IV. 38, 59. calabhasa. IV 45 -vid, Il 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 cinta, III 37 38. 25. 27. 28 cetas, I 6.25, 11.9, 10 -amsu. tayin, IV 99. 16-ghita II 9 10 turya, I 10, 11, 13, 14. jan janay atı, 1 o turiya, 1 12, 15. janman, Ill 27, 28, l1 15. 58 taijasa, I. 1, 2, 3, 4, 23.

·254 AGAMAŠASTRA (Appendix V + - prajñaptı, IV. 24, 25. māyā, II 19. 31; III. 19, 24, 27, prajña III. 45. 28. 29, 1V. 58, 61 —-upama, pranava, 1 25, 26, 27, 28. IV. 59.-maya, IV. 59, 69. prapanca, 1. 17,-upalama II. -- mätra, I. 17.-hastin, IV. 35 44. pra v budh. prabudhyate, 1. yajña, II. 22. 16. Yatı, 11, 37 prabuddha, IV 35 yathāvidya, II. 16 prabhava, I 6. yugapad, IV, 16 prabhu, 1. 8, 10, 11, 13 yogin, III 39, 40 pralina, III 4 laya, II, 28 ; III. 42,44.—sânănya. pravivihta, I 4 1 21 pra-Vişanj, prasajyate, IV 13 TV'li, liyate, III 35. 46. prasava, 1 7 loha, II 21, 27, 36. IV 95 -- prasūti, 1 8 uttara, IV.88. prājña, 1 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, | laukika, IV 87 21, 23 vandhyāputra, III 28 prāpta, II 3 vara, IV 1 prāpya IV 85 vastu, IV 22, 44 -ābhāsa, IV. phala, IV. 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 45 76 VI-Vbr, vikaroti Il 13. bahis, Il 14, 15-citta, il 13 vikalpa, I 18; II 18 --cetas, II 9-prajña, 1 bija, I 13, IV 59.-nidrāyuta vikalpita I 7. II, 17, 19 1 13 - ankurakhya, IV 20 vi kup, vil sipyale, III 46 buddha, V vijñana IV 47, 48, 50, 51, 52. 19 42 80, 88, 99, vijñez a, (II 34, IV 9, 88, 90 99 vitatha, Il 6, IV 31 buddhi, Il 25,- (tad) vid, Il 25 brahman, I 25, 26. ill 1, 12, viniſcaya, I 6. 33, 35, 46 viparyaya, IV 46. bhāva, II. 1, 13, 16, 17 19, 29, viparyāsa, I 15. IV. 27, 41. 33, II. 20, 22 vipascit, IV.97 vipra, IV 86 bhūta, 1 8; III 23, IV 3 4. vibhu, I 1, 10 manas, 1.2, ]] 25, III 29, 30, vibhūt:, 1 7 31, 34, 40, 41. Viveka, IV. 60.

·Append x V) INDEX OF WORDS IN KARIKAS 20 Visarada IV 93 100 sama !!! 23 IV 77 93 Visesa 11 14 15 ta III 2 39-tra il 5 Visva 1 1 2 3 4 23 11 31 samacăra IV 42 44 -a jasa I 1) samadhi JIJ 37 visanavat IV 16 sambuddha lý } veda ] 22 30-Daraga 11 3) sambhava III b 48 IV -vid J 22 16 71 vedanta II 31-niscaya II 12 sarva; a 11 36 47-ta jy vaitathya il 1 3 9 10 11 82 89 va dharmya IV 97 sadhya IV 20-sama IV 20 va saradya IV 94 Samanya 1 19 22 vyavastha IV 13 Samya IV 80 93 9, 100. vyavasthita I 2 il 13 vs dh sidhyatah {ama IV 86 prapta !!! 44 setay at IV 30 43 santa NN 47 IV 3 siddh JV 18 20 ant II 40 sukha II} 45 47 IV 2 82 Sa vata IV 57-asasvatabhidha sun rypta IV 93 IV 60 susupta III 34 35 $va 1 29 11 33 sul ma 123 Srut. III 23 srl I 7 8 9 11 28 111 15 sadvimsa !I 26 -cintaka 12 samvita IV 33-tva 11 ) 4 sthana Il 11 samviti IV 57 58 74 sthanidharina II 8 samsas a I 17 24 III 30 IV sthula 1 + 123-bhuj 1 3 62 --(tad ) v d ll 23 sarasara IV 30 56 sangth ta l 28 v spand spandate III 29 spandamana IV 49 51 samklesa IV 24 spand ta IV 47 sanghata Ill 3 10 sambhava IV 40 (38 smrta i 10 26 147 111 IV 32 46 88 90 94 sat I 6 il 9 I 27 V 22 37 41 (40) asat IV 22 svapna [ 14 15 34 5 7 3 III 29 30 IV 32 Saltva IV 2 33 36 37 38 39 (41) 61 62 Satya 1 12 !!! 48 IV 71, 78 I saddhetuha IV 4 (40) 63-maya 68 --Inay:

·256 AGAMAŠĀSIRA (Appendix VI II. 31.—vat, III. 10-vítti, hetu, II, I, 5: II. 26; IV. 14, 11.9 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 37, 53, 76, svabhāva, I. 9. III. 22, IV 8, 78 ;-abhāva, IV. 76.-phala, 57. IV. 16-phalājātı, IV. 54,- svamäyā, 11 12 phalāvesa, IV. 55. 56,- svastha, III. 47 phalodbhava, IV.55. VI INDEX OF TEACHERS AND WORKS QUOTED OR REFERRED TO IN THE KARIKAS NB_Ilords with a hyphen indicate that they are not actually used, but reconstructed from the contexts, Buddhist works may be taken with discretion. Kathal panısad. 1. 28, 111. 13. Advayas, Ilu Anyas, I 7 24. Aparas, ll 26, 27, IV 3. Kālacintakas, 1 8 Abhidharmakosavy ahhyā, N. Kālavids, Il 24. 13 Gunavius, ll 20. Amūta vids, 11. 23 Catuhsataha, IV. 59. Astaşāhasrika Prajñāparamita, Cittavids, Il 25. IV 13,91 hāndogya L'panjsad, ul. 13, Āśrama-vids, II. 27. 15 īsā Upanısad. III. 25. I attvavids, II. 34. Ekas, II, 26. VTaittırıyaha (= TU'), III II.

·Appendix VI) INDEX OF TEACHERS AND WORKS 257 Trimsikā. III. 32. Molamadhyamakakānikā, ]]. -6. Deva-vids, fl. 21. 31. 32, 35, M1. ZI, IV. 7. Ių, Dvaitins, III. 17. 16 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 31, 41. Dharmadharma-vids, 11. 25. Yajna-vids, Il. 22. Padavids, 11. 21. Lakávatārasutra, 11. 31, 32; Prāņavids, II. 20. IV. 24. 44, 72. 82, 83. Laya vids, 11. 28. Bchadāranyaka Upanişad, 1.1, Loka-vids, }], 21, 27. 2, 9, 12:1). 3, 5; II. 12, 13, 15. 24, 25 26. Laingas, Il. 27. Vajasaneyı-sambitá, M. 24. Bhagavat, 11. 38; IV. 71. Vadavids, K, 24.- Bhuvana-vids 11. 24 Vädns, III. 20. IV.3.6. Bhokt vids, 11. 32. Vedapāraga, II. 35, Bhojya vids, 11. 22. Vedānta-vicakşanas, Madhyāntavibhangasūtra, IV. Vigrahavyāvartani, IV. 15. 75, 90, 92. Sūk mavids, II. 23. Manovids, ll. 25. Srsýnds, 11. 28 Mahāyānasūtrālaikāra, III 16, 44. Sthitivids, il 28. Mūrtavids, II. 23. Sthūla-yıds, II. 23. 31. 331201B ·VII INDEX OF WORDS IN THE KARIKĀS USED IN PARTICULAR SENSES ORIGINALLY OR MAINLY IN BUDDHIST WORKS' 35. agrayāna, IV. 90. paramărtha, IV.73, 74 adhvan, IV. 27 pandipaka, IV. 21. abhilapa. III 37 parid:pita, IV 19. abhisamvítı, IV 98 påcya, IV. 90. alabdhāvarana, IV.98 prak tinirmala. IV. 98. asparśayoga, III. 39, IV 2. prajñaptı, IV. 24, 25. adibuddha, IV 92 prapanca, 1 17 - upalama, II adısanta, IV 93 ksäntı, IV 92. buddha, IV. 19, 42, 80, 88, 98. catuskoti, (for kolyas catasrah), 99. IV. 84. māyāhastin IV 44 täyın, IV 99 lakottara, IV. 88 desıta, IV 2, 42 laukika, IV 87 dharma, IV 1,6 8.10 21, 33, viśărada, IV 93, 100. 39, (41) 46, 53, 54, 58, 59. vaisātadya, IV 94 60, 81. 82, 91-93 96, 98 99 samvita, IV 33 nāyaka, IV 99 samviti, IV. 57, 58, 74 nirmitaka, IV 70 samllesa, IV 24 paratantra, IV 24 73 74. sunirvrta, IV.93. . 1 See the Aanotation two or three are in Book IV It is to be noted that all the words excepting only ·VIII INDEX OF TIBETAN VERSES dnos med, dnos. med. mi, ji. Itar, mun, khun, ma. rtogs, skye, ste, 148. te, 28. js. Itar, thag. pa. nes, rtogs. na, gñis. min, yid, ni. Imi. lam, na, 29 304. ji Itar. bum. pahi, nam. mkhah bum.pa.la.sogs shig.pa ni, 51. cig. 52 srog. du, rg. pas, srog. ces. ji. ltar, bum, sogs. tha. dad. briod, 30. kyan, 52. - srog la.sogs pa mthal ji. Itar.byis, pa.rnams.la ni 53. 29. yas pahi, IX INDEX OF TEACHERS, SCHOLARS AND PLACES, ETC. N.B.-Teachers mentioned in Appendix V'I are not included here. Abhinanda, lavi Advayavādins (=Advayas ; Tib. gris, su med. pa. gsuis. Abhinavagupta. lxxix. Ixxx, pa. Chinese pu-erh yu), 102, lxxxii, lxxxiii. lxxxiv. 107, 108. Advaitist, cxxviii. Agamikas, 33. Advayas (= Advayavādins). Alsia KalimalaĀdaia Kalspa), Abhinava, or ÇXXXYÜ, Cxxxx11, 101, 102.

·263 INDEX OF TEACHERS, ETC. Appendix IX) Rāmatirtha, Ixix. Sarma, B N Krishnamurti, Rangarāmānuja, 64, xxxii-xxxv. Ray Govinchandji, 291. Sarvajña Sadasivabodha, Ixxü. Rosenberg, 0..92. Śästri, Kuppuswami, S., czii. Rudraka Rāmaputra (=P. Ud.--Raghuvara Mitthulal, xxxi daka Rāmaputta), 100. -S S. Suryanarayana, Ixxix, Sabarasvāmin, lxvi, 86. Ixxx, lxxxi, lxxxY Sadananda, Ixix, lxxii, 77, 78 Sāstan, Bhata Ramanatha, Sadaſivabrahmendra, lxxii. xxxvii. Samastamin, Satyavrata, XXXVI Sautrāntikas 10i. Sāmkſtyāyana, Rāhula, 98. Sāyana, lxi, 10, 110, 208 Sāņdılya, cvui. Senart, E., 208. Sankara, xxxiii xxxv, XXXVII, Sen Gupta, N. N , 95. .. xliv, xlviii, xlix, I, Ivii, lxıï- Sesa, lxxix, Ixxx, lxxxiit, lxxxv, Ixv. lxviii-lxx, lxxii, lxxi, Sharma, Y. Subrahmanya, Ixxviii, lxxxv, lxxxvii, Ixxxix, XXXIII Ixxxxiv-\xxxxix, ci, Silānka, 208 ciïi-cv, cviï, cxi, 19, 22, 45, Sridhara, lv 50, 52, 53, 62, 64, 70, 78. 85. Sridharasvāmın, 294 94, 107, 111, 115, 128, 139, Srinivāsadāsa, cix. 147, 153, 168, 170, 174, 177, Srinivasalitha, xxxi. 4. 180, 208, 291, 293, 295, 296, Stcherbatsky. Th.. 90. 92. 299, 300, 303. 301. Sankarānanda. xliv. Sthiramatı, CXXXIX, clx, 87. 96. Sänkhyas, lxxv, 35, 90, 104, 97, 136, 177, 178, 183, 188. 107. 190, 197, 201, 211. Sankhyavedāntatirtha, Durga-Suha, lxx. lxxi caraña. 102. Sundarapandya, exu Säntideva, 87. Sūnyavādins, 33 Säntirakşıta. Xxxvii. lxviis, Sureśvara, XXXIY, xxxv. Ixiy. Ixxvi, 28, 51,53. Ixv. Ixvın, lxxxxv-lxxxvii, c), Sarahapāda, 128, 191, Sarasvati, Balakršņānanda, lxıv. Suzuki, D. T., cxl. -Madhusudana, xxxiii. cx-cxil. Svāmin, Bhūmānanda, lxxxvij. -Nrsiha, Ixix. Taksasila (Taxıla), lui CY13, cali, ·264 AGAMASĀSTRA (Appendix IX Tāntrikas, 31. Venkata Subbiah, A., xxxm. Tathāgata, 202. xlvii. Udayana, or Udayanācārya, Vidyāranya, xlii, lxxii, 75 Ixxxv, 212. Vidyāsāgara, Anandapurna. Uddaka Rāmaputta (=S. Ixvii. Rudraka Rāmaputra), 100 Vijñānabhiksu, lxix, 52, 91, Upadhye, A N , cxl. 191. Upanısadısts, cxxxviii. Vijñānavädin or Vijñānavādıns, Uvata, 64. cxxm, cxxxi, cxxxii, cxxxvII, Vācaspati Mısra, Ixxxv, cxxxvi, cxli, cxlv, 34, 70, 73, 84-85, 26, 45. 92, 210, 308 135, 136, 137, 153, 191. Vaibhāsıkas, 30, 101 Vijñāneśvara, cix. Vaināsikas, xlix, lur, Jiv Vyāsa, lxix, cxi, cxxxvi, 77, 79, Vaiſeşikas. lxxv, 30 89, 91, 92, 95, 206, 208 101, 104, 107 Vyāsācāryasvămin, xxxiir. Vaisnavas, cxxxvui. Vyasatirtha, xxxı, xxxii. Vakyakāra, cx Všttıkāra, cix, 302 Vallabha, or Vallabhācārya, Wallesser, Max, xlvı, Ixv. Ixvii. Xxxviii, 33 Ixıx, lxx, lxxv Vardhamāna, 207 Watter, Th. Ixxy Värttıkakrt, 292. Winternitz, M., Ixxv. Ixxvu. Vasısıha, Ixxxvi, lxxxvin, lxxxix Woods. J H. 206. Vasubandhu, cxxxix, 73, 91, Yamaguci, S 131. 92, 178, 188, 189, 197, 218 Yamunācārya, cxi Vasumatra, lxxvi Yāska, 92, 298 Vätsyāyana, 31, 92, 201 Yašomtra, x, lxxviii. CXXXVII, Vedāntin, 39, 178. 217 91 Vedantists, cxxvII, cxxvm, cxxxi. Yatı, Kāśmiraka, lxix CXXXII, CXXXVII, cxlı, clxin, Yogācāras, CXXXVII, cxxxviti, clxiv, 3, 43, 47, 107, 153, 3, 34, 101, 176, 183 193, 195 ·X INDEX OF WORKS N.B-Abbreviated names are given here in full Abhidhammatthasamgaha. 71. Anavataptahradāpasamkramai.a 96 Sūtra, 179. Abhidhānacintamani, 43 Anguttara Nikāya, 95, 97, 131, Abhidhānappadipikā, cxl, 26. 149, 158, 202, 207, 210, 218 207, 211, 217. Annales du Musée Guimet, Abhidharınakośa, lxxviii, 1 208. cxxxvi, 26, 28, 68, 72. 90Annals of the Bhandarkar 91, 98, 154, 203, 210.218. 301 1 Oriental Research Institute, Abhidharmakośabhāşya, 89 Ixiv Abhidharmakośa vyakhyā. Āranyaka, Tantıriya. Ixı, lxiv, Ixxvui, cxxxviil, 90, 115. 171, cxx, 110, 208, 296 183, 207. Āry apancāsítı, Ixxıx Abhinavagupta, Isxx Astasāhasriha Prajñāpāramita, Abhisamayālankäraloka, 27.193 87, 88, 89, 115, 129, 157, 161, Icărāngasūtra, IxxxvII, 124, 142 198, 201, 211, 218 Advaitabrahmasiddhi, lxix. 86 Asutosh Sanskrit Series, 98 Advaitasırldhı, 291 Athakatha of Kathāvatthu, Agamagrantha (=Gaudapāda. 162. kārkā). lxi. Althasālıni, 71, 89, 130, 183. Agamaśāstra, xxxin, xlvur, liv, Aupapātika Sutra. 46. lv, Iviii-lx, lxu, lxx, Ixxvii, Basic Conception of Buddhism. 1xxx. lxxxiii, Ixxxxxii-Ixxxxiv, 'The, 26, 28, 31, 43, 151, 214 Ixxxxix, ci-ciii, cxiii, cxviii, Bauddha Gåna O Doha, 305 Bhadracari cxxxii, 14, 47, 82, 83 (=Bhadracarya). Ixvil Āgamaśāstravivarana, Ixi, lxvii. Bhadracarya (- Bhadracani), Alambanapatikṣā, 18. 85. Ixvii. Amarakośa, 102, 207. 34-1201B ·266 ĀGAMASASTRA (Appendix X (Tab ver- 1 Bhagavadgita, xxxvi, lxxxxli, Buddhist Psychology, 129 1xxxxlıx, cvill, cxvi, 10. 13, Cānakyanitadarpana, 46. 14, 22, 46, 73, 75-77, 181, 299. Catalogue of Sanskrit Manus- Bhāmati, lxxxv cripts, A, Adyar Library, Bodhicaryavatāra, lvi, 39, 46, xxxii 80, 85, 89, 106, 116, 130, 157, Catuhóataka, lxxvn. 40, 101, 163, 164, 168, 177 179, 202, 106, 109, 115, 126, 148-150, 210-212 158, 162, 164, 165, 167. Bodhicaryāvatāra-pankä, lv., 27, 192 80, 85, 87, 88 106. 127, 128, Central Conception of Bud- 130, 139, 151, 157, 163. 169, dhism. The, 90, 92 175, 176, 179, 189, 191, 193, Cittavisuddhiprakarana, 31, 198. 201, 202, 210. 212, 213 211 Bodhicittavivarana Compendium of Philosophy, sion), 151 190 Bodhisattvabhūmi, 71. 200 Conception of Buddhist Nur- Brhadāranyakabhāsyavārttıka väna. The, 43 xxxv. Ixxxxv-IxxxxvII Cullanıddesa, 203. Brahmajālasūtra, (P sutta), 191 Daśabhumikasūtra, 188 Brāhmanas Dasaya kalikasūtra 212 Altareya. civ. Devatakanda, cvm, 32 Jaiminiya, 99 Dhammapada, 84. 89, 138, 194. Satapatha xxx 200 208 Tattirya, civ Dhammapada-Authukatha, 136 Brahinamimāmsā, cvu Dhammasanganı, 27; 133, 183, Brahmasutras, XXXVII. 197, 210 1x11, Ixxxv Ixxxxu. Ixxxxvii. Dharmasamgraha, 45. 86, 183, CXI, cxu 2 4 33. 39, 202, 203, 210, 218 45.46 50 53, 55, 86, 101 127 Dhaimasăstra, cix 294, 299, 300, 302, 303. Digha Nikaya, 68, 82, 160, 162. Buddhacanta Kavya 91 100 170, 191, 203 Buddhisme d'après les sources Dinakan, Ixvu Brahmaniques Le 86 Divyavadāna, 124, 171 200 Buddhist Nyaya Tacts Six Durgasapta'atı lxxxix 130, Eastern Monachism 2C8 XXX11 CVI-CIX ·Appendix X] INDEX OF WORKS 267 Encyclopædia of Religion and Journal Asiatique. 28, 171, 175. Ethics, 171, 205. 212. Expositor, 89 Journal of the Asiatic Society Gaganaganjasūtra, Arya., 171. of Bengal, Ixıv. Gaņaratnamahodadhi, 207. Journal of the Pal Text Gaudapādahārika, xxxn, xxxiv, Society, 212 XXXV-Xxxviii, lxi, lxix, lxx, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Ixxvi, 1xxx-lxxxiv, lxxXVI Society of Great Britain and Ixxxviri. Ireland, lxxx, 47, 121, 171, Gaudapādi (=Gaudapāda 205, 211, 218, 219. kārıkā), Ixvii. Kalāpa vyakarana, 181. Gaudapādiya (=Gaudapāda. Kalpataru, cxil kārikā), lxi, lxviii. Kāmaśāstra, 31 Gaudapādıyakārikā, lxi. Karmamimāmsā, con Gaudapādiyoktaíruti, XXXV Kaśyapaparivarta (=Ratnaktia- Gaudapădollása, lxxii sutra). 103, 104, 139, 150, Gilgit Manuscripts, 306. 200 Gururatnamālā, lxxii, Kathāvatthu, 124, 162 Harivamsa, xxxii Kātyāyanavavāda, 103, Histoire du Bouddhisme dans Kävyamimāmsā, Ix., 43 l'Inde, 208 Khandanakhandah hãdya, Ixen History of Indian Literature, A, Kırātàrjuniya, 46 by M Winternitz, Ixxv, Krtakoţi, cix lxxvii. Laghuyogavāsığjha. Ixvs Indian Antiquary, xxxiii, Ixiv, Lalıtavistara. 100, 161, 162, cxii 199.218. Indian Historical Quarterly, Lankāvatărasūtra, cxxxii, cxxxi.. XXX), xlvii, lxxiv, 74, 86, 212 38-40, 44, 68. 73, 80, 81, 85. Jagadgururatnamālā-stava.lxxn 87, 131, 133, 134, 137, 150- Jaina works, 46 153. 167, 169, 172, 173, 176-178, 182, 187, 188, 192, Jha Commemoration Volume. 193, 197, 198, 203, 211, 213, 192. 219, 306 Jäänasārasamucca) a Ye.ses.ſin po kun las btus pa). Lotus = Le Lotus de la Bonnie Loil, 208. 1 (Tib. 128 ·268 NGAMASASTRA lAppendix X Madhyanakokankā, lxi, lxxvii. Muhāniddesa, 203. 27. 40, 42, 44. 103-106, 118. Vahăparinibbanasutta, 9. 110, 112. 116-120, 122-125. 'Mahárthamañjari, 35, 36 127, 128, 134, 140 143, 148, , Mahasaddaniti, 84 157, 158. 160. 162, 169, 170, Mahavagga. 218. 175, 192, 213. Mahāvastu, 84, 208. Madhyamakah daya kanha, Mahavyutpattı, 45, 84, 97, 102, Ixvin lxxv, 52 176, 189, 198, 211, 212, 219. Mladhyamalah dayavittılacha. Mahayanasūtsājankāra, Ixxvii. jvala, Ixxvin, Ixvui CXXXV111, 24, 40. 59, 69, 78, Madhyamahalankara kåriha, 150 163, 163, 177. 178. 187. Txvin, 1xxvı), 28, 51 188, 196 200,203.205.208.3C8 Aladkyainakāvatara 106. 115 Majima Nihəya, 27, ICO, 151. 122 123. 163 175. 170, 209, 203 210 Marasolasa. 295. 300. 301, 302 Madhyamahavittı lxu 8, 24. Mlandık yavártuka (=Gauda- 27, 38, 40, 42 44 +7 49, padakâriha), lu. 73, 83 89, 90 98 103 107. Mandukya Sakha, Ixı. UI, 112, 115, 117-121, 133, Mārdükyopaniad - Gaudapāda- 134, 139, 143, 148 151, 157. vyākhyāna I=Mlā ndah ya- 109-171, 179, 185 197 203. kārıka), Ixt 205, 209-211, 213-215 301 Nandukyopanı adv i varana- Madhyamahasastra, Ixu Gavdapädıyavarttika, XXXV Madhvamata-vidhy a msana. Manorathapurani, 124, 202. 207 xlva Mandukyopanıad and Gauda- Madhyāntavibhagauka, 197 201 pāda la paper). xxxin Madhyantavıbhanga, 183. Manual of Buddhism, 100 Madhyảntavıbhanga Discourse Memoirs of the Asiatic Society 190 of Bengal, 102 Madhyāntavibha nga s útra Materiaux pour l'etude du bhāsyafika, bau. 131 134. système Viñaptımātra, 86 176-178, 183, 189 Milindapanha, 130 Mahābhāxya tof Patanjali Mimāmsādarsana lxvi, 86 lxxix. cix, 46 Nimamsa, cyn Mahābhārala, CHI, 3, 84, 102,208 Mimāmsāslokavårttıha, 86 ·269 Appendix X] INDEX OF WORKS Mimāmsāļāstra, cviii, cs. Pancavimšatisāhasnkā Prajna- Slimārmsüsütras, cvi-cvi, cx. paramitā, 149 Alitakarā, cix. Pañjihā (on Bodh.caryāvatára) Mityujidbhaſtāraka, 80. Ivi. Mugdhabodha. 181. Panjikå (on Tattvasamgraha). Naiskarmyasiddhi, xxxiv, lxiv, lxxvi. 25 85, 195 Ixv, lxvii, Ixv. Ixxxii, cxi, 294, Paramarthasara Ixxix, xxx Nayopadeśa, 124, 142. Ixxxy. New Light on the Gaucapada. Patanjalicarita. Ixxn. kārika (a paper). xxxii Patanjalivijaya, lxxn. Nighantu, 32 Pandit la magazine), 308. Nirukta, xlı, 10, 32, 92 Panini, xxxvi, lxxix Nirupumastotra, 150, 213. Phanishaya (=Pat a f gºals Nirvana, cxxxtu. Mahābhāsya. Ixx1 Nyayakandali lv, 27. 86, 101, Pitāputrasamagamasútra, 157. 130. Poona Orientalist, XXXII Nyayakaniká, 368 Popular Scientific Recications, Nyāyakusumäñjali, lxvu, lxxxv 38. Nyās âmțlatarangini, xxxx. Porthapădasutta, 162 Nyāyanıņaya, Ixvill Prajñāparamitārthasangraha, 193 Nyāyaratnākara, cx. Prajwapärarnitásūtras, 20-4 Nyāyasudha, 130. Prajāpāramita Tlie Doctrine Nyayasūtra, 92, 116, 126, 130, of, 193, 307 201. Prajñāpradipasastra, Ixxı. On Yuan Chwang's Travels Prakasa, cv. in India, Ixxv. Pramanavaritiha, 27. 85, 86,212. Outlines of Mahayana Bud. Pramanayiniscaya (Tib Teaci. dhism, cxlii ma rnam paties pa). 65, Palaces of Fairy Morgan, 38 Prapancah day a, cix. CXI Pali-English Dictionary Prapancasara. Xxxu. (Childers). 97, 208. Prasastapidabh3:ya, lv, 130. Pravacanasita, cxl. Pali-English Dictionary (PTS). Proceedings and Transactions 190, 210 of the Second Onental Paticadasi, xli, Isiv, 73.95. Conference. 212 Parcástisaina; asita, cxl. .

·XXX11. 1 - 270 AGAJAŠĀSTRA (Appendix X --Third Oriental Conference, Samksepalăriraka, cx, cxi. xxxii. Samksıptasāra, 181. -Fifth Oriental Conference, Samyutta Nikāya, cxxxviu, cxl, 27, 68, 96, 97, 103, 124, 149, Punyaslokamañjari, lxxii. 154, 203 Punyaslokamañjaripariésta, lxxır. Sandhinirmocanesūtra, 178 Purānas, XXXVI, 32. Sankaravijaya of Anandagiri, Bhāgavata, 13, 143, 294, 302 Ixxii Harvamóa, xxxii. Sankaravijaya cf Cidsilasa, Kūrma, lxiv Ixxu Linga, lxiv Sankarābhyudaya, Ixxii Matsya, Ixiv Sankaradigvijaya of Madhavā. Padma, XXX11 carya, lxxit Visnu, 52. Šankaravijayas, Ixxi Rámabhadr, lxvii Sanhara's commentaries on the Rāmarudrı, Ixvu Upanıads (a paper), xxxii. Ratnacudapan.prcchā, Ārya Sankhyakärıkā lvm, 40, 101, 139 111, 112 Ratnacūdasūtra. 169 Sankhyasamgraha, 91 Ratnākarasūtra, Arya, 209 Sankhyasūtra, 28. 52, 91, 191 Ratnakūtasūtra Arya-, 40, 139. Sankhyapravacanabhāsya, Ixıx 171 Sañıvanı, lv Ratnaineghasūtra, Ārya 205 Sanmatitarha cx! Report of Sanskrit Manus. Sanskrit Tibetan English Vocacripts 11 Southern India by bulary, 102 [ Huitzsch, lxx Saptasatha Prajnapāramitā, 187, Review of Philosophy and 194, 202, 209 Religion, XXX11. xxxv, lut Sarvahabhasya Iviii, Sacred Books of the East 45, lxvui cxlv 208 Sarvadarsanasamgraha, 121, 128. Saddarsanasamuccaya 3 34 151 191 Saddharmapundanka 49 151 Sarvasiddhantasamgraha 191. 199, 203, 206 ?12 Śărırahamımāmsābhāryavārttiha, Samadhurajasutra 38. 104 146 lxv, lxv 304 170 171 203 Sarı arthasiddhi, cxi XXVII, ·Appendix X] INDEX OF WORKS 271 Satyadvayāvatāra, Ārya-, 49 Tattvaratnāvalı, 86 Siddhāntalesa, xxxü. Tattvasaṁgraha, lxxvi. 25. 85, Siddhitraya, cix. 193. Siksāsamuccaya, 27, 115, 139, Tattvasamgrahapanikā. lxxvi. 157, 160, 171, 202, 211. 210 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Tattvayatharthyadipani. 91. Jubilee Volumes, Orientalia, Theragăthā, 138 xxxii. Three Bodies of a Buddha. Sišupālavadha, 16. The, 171 Sivasūtravimarsini, 80, 294 Tibetan, 52, 53, 85, 86.90, 106. Slokavārttika, 86. 122, 126, 128, 148, 149, 158 Soul Theory. 90. 167, 188, 204, 212. Sribhāgya, xxxv, 302 Trayiparicaya, XXX91 Srinivāsiyavịtti, xxxii, xxxviii Trimikā, CXXXVII, 68, 73. 87, 96. Srividyāratnasūtra, lxxxx 97, 130. 136. 176, 177, 188, Srividyārņava, Ixxxx. 189, 197, 211. Studies in the Tantras, 306 Trisvabhāvanırdesa. CXXXVII. Subhagodaya, lxxxx 153, 176, 177 Subhāsıtasamgraha, 27, 84, 86. Two Vajrayāna Texts, cxlii. 128, 193 Upadesagrantha, lxı. Suşumā, lxxi. Llpadeśasāhasti. Ixiv, Ixv. 6. 7. Suttanipāta, 84, 203. 29+ Sumangalavilásini, 162, 203, Upanisads, xxx. cxxxi, 94, Sūnyatāsaptati, 170. 107. 150 Sūtrakttāngasūtra, 208. Advaitaprakarana. XTXVN Tanjur, 28. 85, 128, 188. Aitareya, cxxxii. Tantraloka, cxli, 70. Alatasıntıprakarana, xxxvii. Tantravārttika, cxii, 130. Asrama, lxxxxII. 45 Tarkajvalá, lxxv, 50, 52. Alma-, lxxxn, 41 Tathagataguhyasūtra, 215. Avadhuta. lxxxxii, 41, Tattvadipikā, cxl. Bhrguvalli, xxxvu. Tattyaprakāía, 35. 36 Brahma, lxxXXI. Tattvamuktākalapa, cxi. cxlvi Brahmabindu. Ixxxxlı, 41, B2, Tattvārthadhigamasútra, cxl. 94 Tattvärtharājavärttika, cxl. Brahmavalli, xxxvi ·273 Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS Vedantasāra, xli, lxıx, 78. Visuddhimagga, cxxxyin. 306 Vedārthasamgraha, cix. Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, 86. Vedas, 32 Ye ses sñin po kun las btus pa Atharva-, lxxi, 3, 34. (Jhānasārasamuccaya), 128. Rg. xli, lxxiii, Ixlxxx1, 1xxxxix, Yáñavalkyasmlı, cix. c, cxiii, cxxxvii, 31, 57, 62. Yatindramatadipikā, cir 63, 302. Yogācārabhūmi, 90. 98. Vájasancyisamhitā, cxxvm, 63 Yogašāstra, 212, 295. Vibhanga, 203. Yogasūtras, cxxxvii. 77, 79, 92, Vibhāvani, 71. 95, 171, 206, 210, 218. Vidyāsāgari, lxvii Yogavāsistha, Ixvi, Ixxxvi- Vidvanmanoranjani, 78 Ixxxix, cxxxvi, 8. 82, 142, Vigrahavyāvartani, 116. 154, 173, 219, 293 Vijñānavāda, Evolution of, 74 Yogavācistha andıts Philosophy, Viñaptımātratāsiddhi, 18. 73 Ixxxvi. 130, 178, 188 Yogavāsssihasāra, lev. Vimsikā, cxxxvu, €8. 187. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Mor- Vişnusahasranāmabhāss a. 295 ganlandischen Gesellschaft, Virnusahasranāman. 52. 26 - XI . INDEX OF SUBJECTS P = Pal, S =Sanskrit akalpaka, indeterminate, agra, first, 124, 141. Cxxxvi, 68, Agrayāna, same as Mahāyāna, akşara, imperishable, cxxxvi CXXVI, 199. aksipurusa, eye-person, Ixxxxvii, acittata, mindlessness, cxxxvi, acyuta, stable, cXXXVI not distracted. ajarjara, not decay ing. cxxxiiii. ajāta, unborn, 140, 35-1201B Ixxxxviii. ak ipta, cxxxvi.

·272 AGAVASASTRA (Appendix X CXIVxxxi. Bihadaran, aha, XXXIX. xli, Vinor, 45, 47. xiu. xxxi lxxxxix, C1-C111. Muktikā. cxxxvi, 189 CXVII, CXX. CXXVII, Vurdaha. Ixxv. 33, 55, 58. CXX1X, CXXX11, cxxxv, I. 185, 295, 302 4, 13, 29, 33, 50, 55, 58, Nādabindu, cxxxvi. 62. 63. 65, 74, 79, 81. Nrsimhapurvat a pani, xxxi, 101. 139, 140, 147, 171. xxxvii, xlı, xhi, lrxxxix, 201. 208, 217, 294. 43. 47, 300. Chindogya. *XXIX xl xlu. Vipsmhottaratāpani, xxxi, xlı. xlviii. lxxv. IxxxxVIC 1. 1. 43, 300. cu 31. 15. 48, 56 58 62. Pra'da, x!.. 22. 30. 48, 55. · 70 74, 78, 189, 204 29), 293, 299, 306 302 Rámoltaratápani, Garbha, 90 Ixlxxxix, 43, 360 īsā, 63 Śanlıly a, cxxxvI. Jābāla lxxxxi 45 Siksavallı, xxxvi Kaivalya 43 Svetăívatara, 3, 23, 34, 299, 302 Kasha xiv 1xxxx}s: CXVI Taittiriya, XXXVII, xxxix, xla. CXXXVII, 1+ 56, 62, 73 92 lym, cu, civ, cv, CXXXV. 94 171, 191, 201, 214 217. 3. 48, 55. 295 218, 294 299, 307 Tripurātāpani, Ixlxxxii, 41, 50 Kausitaki 1XXXXVI 1xxxxv.): L'panisads des Veda, xli. 1 201 Lpamrat śāstra, xxxsji. lxxvi. Kena, 99 Uttaragita, Ixxxix. Vahānāradit a 50 Uttaracarita 203 Mahănārāyana, 302 Vajracchedikā, 168, 186, 199. Martrayanabrahmana, 218 213. 216 autri xlı. Ixlxxxvi, cxxxv), Vaisestkasūtra, 130 CXXXVII, 1, 3, 4, 33, 36, 58. Vākyapadıya, cv, cix. 80 82 94 138, 218, 295, 299 Vátulasūtravíttı, Sri, 95 Mandalabrāhmana cxxxvin Värttika 'on Panini), 46. Mandukya xxx1-XXX111, xxxvi. Vedānta. Der alter, xlvi, 51. xls, xlu xlvi-xlız, Vedānta Philosophy (Sree- Ivi lxxxiii. lxxxv1, 1XXXXVII, gopal Basumallık Fellowship IxXXXIX C-cu 43 44,79.293 Lectures) xlvu XXXVII ·Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 273 Vedāntasāra, xhi, Ixix, 78. Visuddhımagga, cxxxvm, 306 Vedārthasamgraha, cix. Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, 86. Vedas, 32. Ye ses sõin po kun las btus pa Atharva., lxxiii, 3, 34 (jñānasārasamuccaya), 128 Rg. xli, lxxiii, Ixlxxxi, lxxxxix, | Yajñavalkyasmrtı, cıx c, cxiii, cxxxvii, 31, 57, 62. Yatindramatadipikā, cik 63, 302, Yogācārabhūmi, 90, 98. Vājasancyisamhitā, cxxvii, 63 | Yogašāstra, 212, 295. Vibhanga, 203. Yogasūtras, cxxxvu, 77, 79, 92, Vibhāsani, 71. 95, 171, 206, 210, 218 Vidyāsāgari, lxvii. Yogavāsıstha. Ixvi. IxxxV:- Vidvanmanoranjani, 78 Ixxxix, cxxxvi. 8, 82, 142, Vigrahavyāvartani, 116 154, 173. 219. 293 Vijñānavāda. Evolution of, 74 Yogavāíıştha andits Philosophy. Vijñaptımātratāsıddhi, 68, 73. 1xxxvi 130, 178, 188 Yogavāsisthasāra, lxvi Vimšikā, CXXXVII, 68. 187 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Mor- Vişnusahasranāmabhāsya, 295 ganlandischen Gesellschaft, Venusahasranāman, 52. 26 5 XI INDEX OF SUBJECTS cxxxvi, 68. P = Pal, S =Sanskrit akalpaka, indeterminate. agra, first, 124, 141. -Agtayāna, same as Mahāyāna. V aksara, imperishable, cxxxvii. cxxvi, 199. aksipuruşa, eye-person, lxxxxvi, acitatā, mindlessness, cxxxvi. acyuta, stable, cxxxviii distracted. 'ajarjara, not decaying, cxxxvill. ajāta, unborn, 140, 35-1201B. Ixxxxviii akşipta, Cxxxvi. not ·an with gunas not 278 AGAMASĀSTRA (Appendix XI küļasthanityată, eternity as unsaganorama, like the sky, 63, changeability, cxlı. 88. haivalya, the state of being not 'gandhar anagara. imaconnected with anything ginary town in the sky, cxix, else, cxXXVII 38 v koți, extreme, 141 gambhirajñeya, the knowable kośas, sheaths, cxxxiv. that is profound, 176. krama, order pūrva', prior, gunas, qualities, ingredients, 30. 177, para', posterior, 177, 3ú, identity with dravya, of, 91 saha". simultaneous 177 sunin, one -hopa incompatibility of different from guras, qua the order of cause and effect, lities, 91 121.6 grahaņagrāhakābhāsa, with klesa, passion (rāga, dvesa, and the appearance of the percemoha), 130 210, five-fold, pient and the perceptible, same as samklesa, 131 155 āvarana, klesas as covering grāhaka percipient, 24. 209, 210 grāhya perceptible, 24 ksanabhangavāda, the theory catuskou, four points, 191, 192. Y92. of momentariness of things calácala niketa, with 121 fixed home, 46 / ksanıka. momentary, ckli citta, mind. сxxx, hsants, P khantı acquiescence cxxxv, cxlu , it does not relate 201 202 , duhkhadhivāsana' itself to an object, 135, 137, patience accepting miseries 138, it is the seed of all, 137, 202 dharmandhyāna', at has no origination, 137, 154. patience by meditating upon it is not found, 139, 168 : the elements of existence duality is only it, 172: all parāpakāramarsana thisisit. 167, 172, without the patience bearing injuries objective cause it is moksa. done by others, 202. ruci 187, when without an objecliking, chanda, desire, tive cause it has no originalabdh, view 203 tion. 184, this non-origination hhandha T, S shandha is unconditioned and always the same and free from the an un- CXXX111, 202. 9. v., 141.

·279 INDEX OF SUBJECTS Appendix XI] по two, 183; nothing to be jagarita, wakefulness, 145-147. seen by it, 137, 138; jāgrat, wakefulness, 165, 167, Brahman (creator), etc., ex- jāti, birth, origination, 50, 108 ; cepting it,172; nothing visible dispute on, of the existent, excepting it, 173; it is in the and of the non-existent, 101 ; form of the subject and the neither of the existent nor of object, 173; it is with and the non-existent, 101, of without movement (spandita), different things, 149; teach- 173 ; the creation is owing to ing of and its significance. its movements, 173; cessa- 149 --vāda, theory of, 104 tion of its movements 15 128, 148, refutation of, 1058 Brahman. 79; asanga, with jiva, cxxx 50, neither a transforout relation, 172, ākāśasama, mation nor a part of Afman, like the sky, 169, nirvisaya, 7, nirmitaka, ie, made without the object, 172,-- by supernatural power. 170 ; abhinivesa, adherence to, 167, mäyāmaya, I. e., made of -iksaniya,-drsya, (cf mano illusion, 170, svapnamaya, dosya, 67) to be seen by, cxxiv, 1 e., made of dream, 169. 145, 166, 184;- dhārä, conti jñāna, knowledge, civ, cvi. nuity of, 139,- nāśa, dis cxxxv, cxxxviu, 68, 83-85, appearance of, cxxxi.-mātra, 88. akalpaka, 68. 83 ; aja, 68 209. anutpannaprapure. 186-187, 167,-spanda dhvamsı. 85. anutpädarüpa, (or citº) is expressed by such 85. ief anutpādalaksana terms as jiva, etc , 173 cinmātra, pure thought, cxxxvu, prajñāpäramatā, 85 ;) aprăptı. jaksana, 85, 198 : asanga. 68. chāyātman, ātman in the form 85. 209; asangalaksana, 68, of shadow, IxlxxxvH, 85. 172. asangasvabhāva. Ixlxxxviii. Jak ana, 85, 172. 198; akaja. chāyāpuruşa, a person in the halpa, 83. atmasanıstha, form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, 72 74, alambanam 1xlxxxviii. labhate, 73, alamby a m janmasamklesa, artham nopalabhate, 73; through the birth, 131. jñeyabhinna, 68, 83; trividha, ciz., and the producer, 118 nopaimpurity svasāmányalak sanāya. janya-janaka, to be produced ·283 Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 200; 20C. a nuvāna, apravịtti, pot coming | parinirvịta, perfectly merged in forth, not arising, cxxxviii, nirvana, 204, 205. See sucxlu, 50, 81, 205. niryrta. mirvisaya, objectless, cxxxvi. parınıspanna, perfect.-laksaņa, nirvihalpa, indeterminate, cxxi, characteristic, -svabhāva, cxxxvi. nature, 176-179, 197, 200 nişpanna, parınıspanna, paripāka, maturation, CXXXV. ātma", of one's own self, nairātmya, the state of being 200, sattva', of the people, without ātman, ie, syabhāva, nature, 149, A. panpācana, maturation, 200. Nyāya, 91 para', of others, 200. pañcavimšaka, a collection of pašu, a person in bondage, 35. twenty-five, 35. pakya, to be made matured, panjikā, commentary, 43 199, 200 paññatti (P.). S prajñaptı, 9 v Pasupata, philosophical pada, state, 194. system, 35. paratantra. dependent, 132, pāțhakrama, the order of 174.177, 179.-laksana, reading, 190. svabhāva, characteristic of. pāda, quarter, 9, 31. nature of, 176, 177, 199, 200 pudgalanairātmya, unreality of paranırapeksa, independent of the individual ego, 211. others, 111. purānasthatıdhannatā, the nature paramartha, absolute truth, 49. of the eleinents of existence, 87, 108, 205, 214 —naya, that remains from the past, view,-Sutya, truth, 162, 163, 214. 173. 189; as upesa, to be puruşa, person, 35 approached, 175. purvāparako ipariksä, examina. parikal pita, imagined.--lakșana, lion of the first and the last characteristic,--svabhāva, points of the world, 123. nature, 176-179, 199, 200. purvāparakoçyaparijñāna, abso. parini yana, 99. lute ignorance of the first and last points of the world and parinarna, transformation, things, 123. cxlxxxı, --Vída, theory of cr. i pithah. different, 41, CXIXXI.-nityata, eternity as, ·287 Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 206-208. + 1 vidyā, one of the tattvas in the vaisāradya, P. vesāraja, Paſupata system, 35.. intrepidity , derivation and viparyāsa, false notion, 136, meaning of : four-fold, 137. vipranāśa, disappearance, 162. Varſvånara, belonging to allsibhu ; all-pervading, 1.4 men, lxxxxy, Ixxxxvi, c, ci. vibntti, expansion, -3; mani vjaya, change. 158. festation, 35 vyavadana, purification, 103, vivacana, synonym, cxxxx. 129 Vivartavāda, the doctrine main vyavahāra, common use, 129 taining that the appearance --naya, practical point of of the universe is imposed view. 162,--satya, empirical on Brahman, cx. truth, 162, as upāya, means. viſārada, scholar, bold. 207 175 Visi rādvaitavāda, cis, cx vyāvahātika satya, empirical visva, the embodied self in the truth, 175, 178 waking state, 1xxxxiv. saktı, one of the tattvas in the Ixxyxvil, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, Pasupata system, 35; energy. 9. 11, 12, 31. 91, 121-123; cannot be estab. vişaj a. field of activities, 69.! lished in the coming into 187 ; object of senses, 31 being of anything 123.-mat. Whāra, field of activity, 69. No difference 187. between sahtı and saktimat, Viltihaya, loss of the action 91 of the mind, 82 sallesa, impurity, 129, 130, viddhasarnmati, approval of sama equanimity. 77.-prapla, the old teachers, lxix. one that has reached, 77. veda-päraga. 44. kānh, peace, 75 vedapära-ga, 44 sarad, autumn. 207. timid. sārada, not vevacana (P.), S. vivacana, 4.v 207 Vedánta, xlvi, Ixxxiv, 44, 101. 175.214. hrady a P sărajja, timidity.207, 308.. Sesārajja (P ).S. vaibāradya, q.v. vaitathya. unreality. cill. 15. Lrira átman, incorporated soul. Ixxxxil, Ixxxxvii, 16, 47. one with, 91 bold, ·a sat, existent, not arising from 288 AGAVASASTRA (Appendix XI śāstra, Chinese lun, Tib. sakkāyadıtthi(P.),S.satkāyadreti, bstan bcos, lxii. the theory of individuality, śāśvala, eternal, always existing, 26-27. ✓ CXXV, cxl, 160-aśāśvatábhi. samklesa, impurity, 129, 130, dhā, appellation of eternal 131.-upalabdhı, experience and non-eternal, 164 -vāda of, 131, 132. the theory of eternity, cyliv, samkhyā, understanding. 129. 162. sa-ce (P), in the sense of tac ava, one of the tattvas in cet See sa-yathā, sa-yadı 55 Pāšupata system. 35, calın, samjñā. consciousness, V96; 50 sadãº, one of the tattvas designation. 129.-veditain Pasupata system nirodha, samadhi in Suduhadvaitavāda, the theory Buddhism, 96, 99, 100 See of the Pure Monism, cx. saññāvedayitaº s samjñāº, cuddh-asuddhi, purity and q v., 96, 99, 100 Accord impurity, 104 ing to Chinese P.sammā", S. vünya 47 -tă, 47, 189, 211 samyakº for saññā. -praveśa, mahā-, 95 satı (P), S. smrti, meditation, sramana brāhmana 194 45 crutiprasthāna, the Course of Revelation, cal the existent or the existent, ✓ Siesthayāna as Nlaha cxxi, 147-148 satkāy adresi, P sakkāyaditthi. kadvimea consisting of twentyq.v sıx the philosophical system satkāryavāda, the theory of Patanjalı, 35 that the effect exists in its samvitt), consci usness 86 101, 102; Buddhist samvits covering, re, empin views on, 101. cal truth 161, 163, 173 175 saltva. one of the constituents -satya empirical truth of Praktı in the Sankhya 162 See kalpitasamyrtı, systein, 31, people -avatāra, saty a causing the descent of, or 141, 143 160. 162 leading the. 150paripāha, 205 the act of sahasıya. with passions. 77 200 same yana 199 cause samsara maturing the, ·289 INDEX OF SUBJECTS Appendix XI] or . santati, gy, 178 satya, truth, 162; vyavahāra", sa-yathā, in the sense of. tad practical; paramārthaº yathā. See sa-ce, sa-yadi. pāramărthika', transcenden 55. tal, 162, 175, 178; prátibhā- sa-yadı, Seesa-ce, sa-yathā sika', existingin appearance, 55. 178, vyāvahārıka", 162, 175, sarva, all.--jña, knower of, 178; samvſtiº, empirical, 162. omniscient, 70;-ta, tva, 194, sadbhāva, 161. 193, 198, 199, sarvajñatvasanimitta, with (objective) vāda, cxxxxv, sarvabija, seed cause, 131 of all, 136,--ka, 188 sanirvāna, extinct. cxxxvi, 81 sahaja, innate, III. continuance, cxli - samyrta, pertaining to sanıvıtı, nityatā, eternity as continuance, cxliv. sāmsıddhika, self-existent, sandhi,=abhisandhi, intention, 111 150. Sänkhya, 101, 102. sama, always in the same sādhyasama, that which is condition, 73, 184, 185.--tā, yet to be proved, 125. 49, 72, 73, 194,-prāpta. 78. sämānyadharma, quality, 9. intense abstract sāmya. = sana. 9 208. meditation, 70-72, 74 vajto- 217 pama'thunderbolt like. sukhasthiti or suh havasthiti, 307. pleasant state. 97 sambuddha, perfectly under sunirvita. perfectly merged in stood, 83. nirvăna, 204, 205 sambhava, origination, 63, 115, su«upta, refernng to Prajia, is not of the non-existent from 1xxxxvi, deep sleep. 34.- the existent, 147; possibility. stha, one in the state of deep 171. : sleep, Ixxxxvii. sambhūti, birth, 63: various sugupti, deep sleep. 34. sutrapiasthina, the Course of explanation of, 6+ Súras, av, sammuti (P.). S. general consent, 162.--atya. | orti, creation. 37. stabdhibhiva, stiffness, 78, truth by, 175. common Sze samaprapta samadhi, sammati, 31-1201B ·292 ĀGAMAŠĀSIRA (Intro. yatpâdabjarajoleśasamparkát sahasā sakt sarvasamsārahino 'ham tán nalo 'smi gurūn sadā || 2 tāpaniyarahasyārthaviviti[r] leíato maya | kriyate 'lpadhiyām tasmāt kşantavyam kşatam uttamaih || 3 iha pūrvasmin granthe nļsimhākārabrahmavisayā nirupādhikabrahmavidyāphalādhigatâ. tathā hy uktam vārttikakrdbhih nrsimhabrahmavidyaışa vyākıtā jñānasiddhaye And it ends thus. tāpanıyarahasyarthadıpıkā timirāpaha | gurvanugrahalabdhaisā satam astu sukhāptaye || saccidānandapurnāyaj pralyagekarasătmane | tejase mahale bhuyān namah pumsımharūpine || yasya samsmrtimătrena tarantı bhavasāgaram tam nato 'smi gurum bhaktyā dhijā vācā ca karmana li śrimatparamahamsaparıvrăjakācāryaśrımacchukamunındrašisya-srımadgaudapādamuniviracite uttaratāpaniyavivarane navansah khandah śubham astu. śrilaksminrsimho raksatu mām nrsimhārpanam astu. tārane vatsare ması śrāvane 'sitapaksage | pañcamirevatiyukte tithau kumbheśapattane !! nțsimhatāpanıyākhyatıkām gaudābhidhăm satım vyāseśvaro 'likhat svast[y]ai nisimhas tena nustha(tusya?)tām || it It is interesting to note that the following passage from this Vivarana (pp. 25-26) is identical with that in ·293 Întro.] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA a Sankara's commentary on the MāU, 11, excepting few unimportant variations as noted in the foot-notes : miyate iva hi viśvataijasau prājñena pralayotpattyoh praveśanirgamābhyām prastheneva yavāh. tathonkārasamāptau punaḥ punaḥ prayoge ca pravisya nirgatāv? ivākärokārau makāre ’ntye 'ksare ekibhūtāv iväkārokārau. tathā susupte prājñe viśvatayasauº.3 minoti jāgradādiyāthātmyam jānātity arthah.' apitis ca jagatkāraṇātmā ca 4 bhavati. P. cxxxv. Regarding the identity of citta and Brahman, see YV, III 64.31 : 65.3 ; 66: 14 ; 96. 56, 66, 73; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20. From these verses we can gather that șiva, cit, alman, brahman, sünya, nairātmya, etc., are the different expressions of citta. From the same authority (111. 122. 35) we also know that such names are made by the authors of ſõstras in order to supply some terms required by them. śāstrasamvyavahārārtham tasyāsya vitatākrteh | cidbrahmātmeti nămānı kalpitānı kļtātmabhih || . P. cxxxvi, note 8. For manahksaya there is manahpariksaya in YV, III. 116. 13 It has also manonāša (1}. 95. 35-36) and manahprasamana (Ill. 122. 27). 1 Somita It ? $ nirgacchata. For susupte "tajasau's hus nivalaijanu suruplakale prijke Śmipoti ha vidam mana ngad $$ omits it ·294 AGAMASASTRA [Book i BOOK I. 5. It is quoted in ŚV, p. 27. 6. On the creation from Prāņa see KU, II. 3 and BS, I. 1. 23, 28. Here in the karikā we have an Idealistic view (Vijñānavāda). 9. For āplakāma see BU, IV. 4. 6. For bhogārtham sps!th see Sridharas vā min on BP, III. 7. 4: avidyopādher Jivasya bhogārtham iśvarah sựstyādi karoti. 10. See BU, IV. 2.4; 4 22; 5. 15. 12. The word sarvadıś in sense is the same as sarvajña 'omniscient' (III. 36) His omniscience is, according to Sankara (BS, I. 1. 4), on account of his capacity for all knowledge (sarvajñānasaktimativenaiva sarvajñatvam abhyupagantavyam), or owing to the fact that he is never dissociated from his intelligence, 1.0, all-embracing knowledge (Op cit., l. 3. 42: sarvajñatvalaksanayā prajñayă niy atam asiyogāt). On this kárika as well as on 1. 15 see Upadeśasāhasnı, XVIII. 26. 13 In this and the following kârıkās nidra in sense is, in fact, sușupta Here nidra is said to be bija 'seed , 1.c, origin, because nidrā being non-realization of truth is the cause of both dream and waking. See Upadeśasāhasri, XVIII. 26 as quoted in NSi, IV. 43: susuptakhyam tamo jñanam bijam svapnaprabodhayoḥ| atmabodhagnidagdham syād bijam dagdham yathabhavam || This explanation of bra slightly differs from the one given before on p. 6 14. See 1.16 III. 35 36, IV.81. In the fourth state, Turya, there 18 no nidra ncr suapna. In such cases ·derived, as well-known to all, from upa-v/as literally to seat near at hand in order to honour or wait up, The first sentence quoted above does not meas Brahman, Da should worship the mind as understand from the second sentence 'He iboand figuratively 'to do homage, worship, be derita In both of the case, the name as Brahman.' 293 Book 1] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA state while nidra means the laya or müdha 'infatuated of the mind, svapna indicates the state called viksepa distraction'. This state of Turya is the state of Brahman. 15. For 6 of the kárikā cf. YS, I. 10: abhāvapratyayālambanā vịttir nidrā. This kārikā is quoted in NSi, IV. 42. 16. This karikā is quoted in MnU, I. 13, with the reading ajanmanidram for ajam anidram in c. 17. The following is quoted as from Gaudapådå in Sankara's Vişnusahasranāma-bhāsya, Mysore ed., p. 18: yad yad dvaitam prapañcasya tan nivartyam hi cetasă | manovịttimayam dvaitam advaitam paramārthatah li 19. The Praņava-upāsana referred to here is wellknown in Upanişads, older and later alike (ChU, 1. 1.1, 4. 1; PU, V. 1-2 ; TU, 1. 8. 1; MuU, II. 2.6; MU, IV. 4. 37). Here a few words are necessary for the real significance of upāsana (sometimes upāsanā), which is enjoined (yunjita prañave cetah, I. 25) and described to some extent here by our author. The word upasana is to', etc. But in such Upanisadic texts as mano upăsita (ChU, III. 18. 1), or, sa yo nama upaste (Op. cit., VII. 1. 5), it has some brabian brabec special moment ·296 AGANJASASTRA [Book 1 or upāsana gives the sense of meditation (dhyāna). It is in the words of Ś ankara a continuous flow of one and the same idea having an alambana support' recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas. (BS, IV. 1.7: upāsanam nāma samānapratyayapravāhakaranam. See ChU, I. 1. 1 and our text, p. 48). The best alambana for the upasana of Brahman, as in the present case, is Om. We read in the KU, I. 2. 17: etad ālambanam śrestham etad ālambanam param! etad ālambanam jñātvā brahmaloke mahiyate|| The meditation of Om as Brahman, just as the meditation of an image (pratimā) as Visnu 'the allpervading one', is the means for the realization of Brahman It is to be noted, according to Sankara's school, that while Brahmajñāna leads one immediately and directly to moksa, Brahma-upasana does not do so, it helps one in gradually attaining to it and to prosperity. Sankara says, it effects the purity of the mind and making the truth clear thereby helps us in acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. Besides, there being an alambana 'support' it is easy to make an upāşana. It is to be further noted that there are two kinds of upāsana, that involving the contemplation of the Self (ahamgrahopasana), and that which is symbolical or concerned with external symbols (pratikopăsana). In the former, the Self, the Paramātman, is contemplated in his conditioned form (saguna) with the idea that I am he', For instance, we read in the TA, VII. 6: sa ya eso 'ntarhrdaya akāšah, tasmin ayam purușo manomayo mrto hiranmayah.

·297 Book 1] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 'It is that space within the heart. Here is the Person, formed of thought, undying and golden'. Here the person (i.e., Paramātman) within the space of the heart with those qualities is to be meditated with the thought that I am the Person '. But where a worldly or external thing which is other than Brahman is contemplated being regarded as a higher god or Brahman himself that contemplation or upāsana is symbolical (pralikopăsana). For instance, in the case of the text, mano brahmety upăsita (quoted above), the mind is to be contemplated as Brahman. So here is another instance of pratikopāsana: For details see BS, III. 3 and IV, 1. Now with regard to our own case, Om is to be meditated as the Self, and so we have also here an instance of pratıkopāsana. The three measures (mātrās) of Om are to be meditated 'as Viśva, Taijasa and Prăjña respectively. And that Om which has no measure (amātra), l.e., the measures of which are not considered separately, and which is thus immeasurable or which, in other words, is with unlimited measure (anantamātra) is to be meditated as Turya. It is said that in an upasana one thing is to be viewed as another thing; for instance, here the first measure of Om, a, is to be regarded as Visva. It amounts to saying that these two things are identical. But how can this identity be possible? The answer is this that such identity is by no means actual, but owing lo some common quality (sāmānyadharma) of the two the identity of which is intended. This is a well-known (amätra); 38-12015 ·298 ĀGAMASASTRA (Book 1 practice among us. We say of a brave lad that he is a lion (simho māņavakah), though in fact he is not so. It is only on account of the common quality, bravery, of the lad and a lion that we identify them employing the phrase. Simply following this method of expression our teacher has shown some common qualities of the Puruşa and Om (I. 19 f.) owing to which their identity has been made possible. Let us remember here the following line of Yaska in his Nt, VII. 24 : bahubhaktivādini brāhmanänı bhavanti. It means that the Brāhmaṇas have a great deal of bhaktivāda. But what is bhaktivada? Dutóg ă cārya says in explaining the above line of Yaska: bhaktır nāma gunakalpana, tena kenacid guņena brāhmanam sarvam sarvathā varnayatı tatra tattvam anvesyam. It says that bhaktı means assumption or consideration of a quality by which a Brāhmana describes all things in all kinds of way. But the truth must be investigated there 1 20. Evidently the meaning subsequence' of the word utkarsa as given in the translation (p. 10) is farfetched. The explanation as offered in the Vivarana attributed to Gauda pā da on the NUTU, 2 (sec pp. 291 ff ) seems to be better. Besides excellence', the word utkarsa means attracting' or 'pulling upwards' Taking this last sense the Vivarana says that among the three components, a, u and m of Pranava a is guttural and u is labial. So while a is pronounced from the lower part (throat) of the mouth, u is done from the upper one (lips). Such being the case, in pronunciation u is, as it were, pulled upwards.

·299 Book 11) ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA Or it may be that u is higher than a, because the former is manifested on the lips filling completely or stepping beyond the throat, and because it is manifested with an effort more than that required for the latter. Let the passage be quoted here as it is in the transcription (p. 25) : ca akārād utkarsa ürdhyam akrsta iva hy ukāra [h] pranave drśyate. taijašaś ca viśvata(h). svapnādișu akārata. utkıştah. ultamo vã ukārah yaptyatisayād balātiśayāc ca. akārasthānam kantham vyāpya •atikram[y?]a oșthasthāne hi tasyābhivyaktiḥ. tenākõrādhikavyāptimattvenokta ukārah virāja iva hiranyagarbhaḥ. balātisayatvam kharaprayatnavyangyalvāt praņavasthokārasya mandaprayatnavyañgyam akāram apekşya. The utkarsa 'excellence' of Taijasa in this respect in relation to Visva is this that the former is nearer by one step than the latter to Turiya 26. See MU, VI. 5; PU, V. 2: etad vai satyakama param căparam ca brahma yad oņkāraḥ. 28. Note 1. Add SU, III, 13; IV. 17 Note 2. Read 21 for 22. BOOK 11 1. The phrase, āhur manişinaḥ, is often used not only in our text (11 5. IV. 54), but also in an Upanişad (KU, III.4) itself and the BG (XVIII.3). 4. It may be noted that samcyfalva is referred to by $ in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 3.

·CO AGAVASASTRA (Book 11 5. Cf. MnU, I. 8-11 : antar asminn ime lokā antar visvam idam jagat! bahirvan māyayı bhāti darpaņe pratıbimbitam || svapne svāntargatam viśvam yathā pıthag aveksyate tathaiva jágratkāle 'pi prapanco 'yaņ rivicy atām || gvapne svasattaivārthānām sattā nănyeli niścıta | ko jāgrati viseşo'sti jadānām āśunāśinām || svapne prakaso bhāvānám svaprakāśān na hitarah ! jagraty api tathaiveti niścinvanti vipascitah || - For prasıddha see Ś on BS, 1.1.22. 7. P 20. 1 1. Read 'That for 'thal. 9-10 Cf. Alnl', I 7-8 21 P31,1 17 For 6 , 8.3 read 6-8. 24 P 34,1 16 Read you or you 32 P 41,11 Read kanka for lanku 34 I or anyabhuca soe IV 53. A piece of assial buch is naturally wlute becomes red in contact with a red flowcr, you, il cannot be said that it is sed either in its own nature seabhara) or in the nature of other lanyabhuva). It is true that under the circumslunces : looks red, yet it is actually not aso, it only appers to be so, for its innale wuteness dies in no way change Scc Sankara no hi svachal san aphatiko lahtahadyu- Dillunsopad nstaceho bharatt. bhramamaraluad nblurnistana, upahinan casady apraty upisthapitakat. 33 P 13 15 Rend. ITU, NUTU and RUTU for VP'l'. I and RUL capitely, and Iparrahi for parci in! 10 on BS.

·tion (utpatti) and disappearance (laya). See Proceed. 301 Book 111) ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA one For the Prapancavilayavāda showing the relationship between the karma- and jñāna-kāndas in connexion with niyoga may be referred to Hiriyanna : Journal of Oriental Research, 1927, pp. 109 ff, and the original authorities ciled therein 36. The smrti quoted here is Vasisthasmộti or Vasistha-dharmaśāstra. $ quotes here also the following couplet which is not traced : yam na santam na cásantam nāśrulam na bahuśrutam | na suvịttam na durvịttam veda kaścit sa brāhmaṇaḥ || 38. . For the stanza, sūnyam adhyatmıkamº see 'AK, IX. 250. For paśya the reading is also paśyan. BOOK III 1. The upāsanā mentioned here may refer also to Pranava-upāsana in 1. 19 . See III. 16. For the true significance of upāsana or upāsanā see pp. 295 ff., and modify the Annotation here in accordance with it. 3. Şee MnU, III. 9: ghaļākāso mahākāso ghałopādhikrto yatha | dehopādhikyto bhedo jivălmaparamálmanoh II and II. 25-26: dehendriyamanobuddhiprăpāhamkarasamhatam || almasankalanăd ajñair ātmalvam pratipădyale / vahnidhiḥ kăsthalohādau vahnisamkalandd ivn || According to Brah madalta, one of the Samuccayavadin Vedantist, Brahman has both origina.

·302 AGAMAŠĀSTRA (Book III ings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Congress, pp. 188-89 ; Sribhâsya, 1.4.2 ; Mahānārāyanopanişad, 1.4 ; ViP, V1.40.39. 4. Cf. BP, XII, 5.5: ghałe bhinne ghatākāśa ākāśaḥ syäd yatha pura | evam dehe mrte jivo brahma sampadyate punah || 6. P 52, 1. 26. Read 11 for 12. 11. This kārikā supports Sankara's second interpretation (ıdam tv iha vaktavyamº) refuting that of the Vettikära in the Anandamayādhikarana of the BS, I 1.12-19. On this see MnU, III. 27-31 also: deham annamayam kośam āviśyātmā prakāśate | sthūlo bālah kršah krsno varņāśramavikalpavān || prānakose 'pi jivāmi ksudhito 'smi pipāsitah | sambito niścito manya atı kose manomaye || vijñānamayakośastho vijānāmīti tisthati | ānandamayakosākhye tv ahankāre purākṣtaiḥ || punyair upāsanābhıś ca sukhito 'smiti modate | evam kañcukitah kośaih kañcukair iva pañcabhiḥ || paricchinna vābhānı vyāpto 'pi parameśvarah 12. Cf. Chu, 1. 91, VIII. 14. 1 ; BS, 1. 1. 22, 3. 41 See RV, I 164. 20 ; SU, IV. 6-7; MuU. ul. 1. 1-3. 15. P. 58,1 18. Omit IV.2.14. 16. P. 59, 1. 14, Omit etc 17. See IV. 5. 23. Gauda pada says here that between the ·303 Book 111) ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA two statements in the scripture that which is with a reason is acceptable. Cf. 5 on BS, 11. 1.4: yathā ca śrutīnāſ parasparavirodhe saty ekavasenetatā niyante evam pramāņavirodhe 'pi tadvaśenaiva śrutir niyeta. dıştasāmyena cădựstam artham samarthayanti yuktir anubhavasya samnikrsyate, viprakrsyate tu śrutir aitihyamātreņa svārthābhidhānāt. On reasoning (tarka) see S on BS, II. 1.11. With regard to yuklı we may remember here what is said in YV, 11. 18. 2-4 about the two śästras, årşa derived from ſșis' and pauruşa 'derived from mnen'. The author says that a sastra, though it is a paurusa, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might • be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father : api pauruşam ādeyam śāstram ced yuktıbodhakam | - anyat tv ārsam api tyājyam bhāvyam nyāyaikasevină || yuktiyuktam upādeyam vacanam bālakād api | anyat tīņam iva tyäjyam apy uktam padmayoninā | yo'smaltātasya kūpo 'yam iti kaupam pibaty apah! tyaktvā gāngam purastham tam ko na śāsty atigarhitam ! 27. Read yujyate for jujyale. 29, P. 66. 1. 19. Add the after with, ·304 ĀGAMASASTRA [Book IV 30. Here is the Tibetan version: gñis. min. yid. ni. imi. lam. na gñis. su. snan ste. the. tshom med de. bshin, gñid kyis. ma. log. tshe gñis. min. gñis. san. the tshom. med ) P. 67, 1. 5. Read the two for second. 31. For manodrśyam see cittadıśyam, IV. 28, 36, 77. P 67, 1. 13. Read perceptible for perceived. 2. P. 68, 1, 2 Read Vis for Vis. and add 38 after, III. 35 Note 1. Add 44, 46 after 42. 36. Note 3 Add cf. sarvadrs, I. 12 ; IV. 84. P. 70, 1 6 Read T.4k for TA. 39 Read vai nama for namarsa. 46 P. 80, 1 24. Read buddha' for baddhaº. P. 81, 1 13 Ś shows here the Buddhist views. On . the next line read 549 for 587 BOOK IV 1 P 86, last line Read TA' for TA'. P 89, 1 6 Add a after is, and sva before laksanaº on I 14. P 91,1 29, 32. Read SaS for SS. P 92. note 30 On the word dharma quoted from KU see Glasenapp Buddhism in Kathopanısad in the lew Indien Intiquary. To I, No 2, pp 138 ff., and Stcherbatsky. Op cit, p t8ff, SMV, pp. 136-7, See also NIV p 355 · năstiha saliva âimā vā dharmās tv ete sahetuhah ·305 Book IVI ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 2. The word asparśayoga is found at least once in a Buddhist work. See Bauddha Gāna O Doha, Såhityaparisad Granthāvali 55, 1323 B.S., p. 19. Here the Sanskrit ţikā which is not edited critically and full of mistakes reads referring to a yoga asprśayogotväl for which the Tibetan version (Tanjur, Narthang, Rgyud, Tsi, 175'. 4) has mi. reg. pahi. sbyor baļi. phyir, te clearly suggesting its Sanskrit equivalent asparśayogāt. The only notable difference between the two versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, is this that while the former has asp?ša the suggested reading in the latter is asparsa. But considering the uncritical way in which the edition of the Sanskrit text is prepared and the well-known occurrence of the word sparśa it naturally occurs to one's mind that the reading asprśa for asparsa is a misprint or a mistake of the scribe of the MS used for that edition. Another difference is the use of -Iva in the Sanskrit text, which is not to be found in the According to the former the latter should have been written sbyor. bahi ñd kyi for sbyor. bahi. But it is often found in Tibetan versions of Sanskrit lexts that ñd for -tva- (or eva) is not used even when it is necessary; on the contrary, it is employed when it is not required at all. 4. P. 102, 1. 6. For our MIS Nfc and some read Me and some other. 11. P. 113, 1. 5. Read karana for karana. 12. Note 1. Here elsewhere' refers to l'ariants, p. 237. 20. P. 125, last line. Read cokramakoh. Tibetan one. . 39_1201B ·306 AGAVASASTRA [Book NV 23. Note 1. PU actually has jālir in the margin for hyadir in d. Read here edition for editions, P. 130, 1. 31. Read AS for ASh. 24. P. 132, note 3. Add 62 after 61 and omit 79. 28. P. 138, 1. 26. Read MuU for MU. 30. Note I. The couplet is from VN. Simon Hewavitarane Bequest ed. p. 407 with the variant hhandhānam ca patipāti in a as in Bhāratiya Vidyā Series ed., Part 1, p 282. 31. The first half of the kārikā is identical with thal of YV, IV. 45. 45. 33 In such cases (viz , IV 10, 91-93) one may be inclined to read with some of the NISS (i.c., A',A, V) sarvadharmah for saruc dharmıh agrecing with Buddhist works 38 Note 1 In b read pralibuddhacantah ns in Gilgir Vanuscripts. Vol II. p 100. 42 P 150, note 3 Read MISA for MS. 51 Read nispandát for tijñanat 58 For the first hall see IV, 57 For d see LA. vicitra ho jatha masa drsyale na ca vidy ate. See our tent, p 151, note 8 Read BA for BC on p. 104, 1 5. and hriako for fanmayo on I. 19. Scell 99 Note 2 It is a speech of Bhagaval. 72 Sce LA II 151 152 vjñánabljam spandaic". P 177, 1 to Road nastı for násle- Read bhato for cibhaft P 189, Tote 2 For the meaning of the word patouill! B n g h . Studies the Tanfras, (akutla L ORCIS!!). 1939. pp 87 ff pr 28.49 71 src ·"At the second moment we have the last Path cf Deliverance (cimukt. At that time the double representation free of subject and object) with the knowledge cognizing it like one particle of water uniting with another disappears, and the object of Concentralien (in its true aspect) becomes one (chu-la chu Eshay-pa-lar yale yalonikieferati la the aspect of this Intuition all the things cognizable in their tanelles become directly perdered like myrobalan (imelelal laut on the palm of the bard iteratalamalakarat, 307 Book IV ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 838h. Read Casti-nästifi násti-nästuliº for Casli nästiti nāsii năstittº 84. For sarvadřś cf. sarvajña (I. 12, III. 36) and saroajñata (IV. 85. 89). On this see E. Obermiller (The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, etc., p. 44): "When the Bodhisattva has attained the highest of the Unimpeded Paths in the Path of Concentrated Contemplation, he is considered to have terminated his course of training in the path.' This last moment of Concentrated trance called the thunderbolt-like' (vajropama samadhi) is characterized by the removal of the most subtle forms of defilement and of ignorance. It is simultaneous with the final momentary lllumination (ekakşaņa-abhisambodha), and the culmination of the Bodhisattva's intuition of the absolute. All the factors for the attainment of the Omniscience of the Buddha are now brought to accomplishment. Owing to this, the representation of the Absolute appears in its full light ; the differentiation to subject and object ceases to exist, the accidental obscurations which had hitherto separated the Germ of the •Absolute in the living being now completely vanish, and the Germ now coalesces with the Unique as the Cosmical Ultimate Essence which is personified body (dharmakāya) of the Buddha".! 1 märga) ·308 AGAMASASIRA (Book IV The special Omniscience which is peculiar only to the Buddha (sarva-akara-jñata) 13 the knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an independent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the Absolute". Op cit., p. 64. See Vācaspatimiśra's Nyayakanikā (Reprint from the Pandit), pp. 110, 147, 205. 90 See MSA, XIX, 56 pañcavıdham hı.vastu bodhisattvānām aprameyam paripācyam vastu sattvadhatur aviſeșena visodhyam lokadhatur bhajanalokasangrhitah prapyam dharmadhātuh. paripācanayogyam vineyadhatuh samyagdeśanavastu vineyopayadhatuh. 94 P 206, note 2 Read Il'oods for IV ood. P 207, 1 13 The word saradya actually occurs in Sanskrit as in parısaçchäradya It means sankoca shrinking' In Tibetan for it we have bskumps. pa from skum pa 'to contract See MV,'P 46; $S. p 296 99 P212, note 2, 1 31 Read «kyob pa for skyb pa 100 For durdaría see KU, I 2 12 For alata see MV, p 219 purvaparakoty anupalambhad (alata cakravat (mgal. meh hkhor lo bshin no); p 221 adımadhyāvasınavırahilalvād alatacahrar at