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·DATE LABEL
THE ASIATIC ,SOCIETY
1, Park Street, Calcutta-16
The Book is to be returned on the date last stamped :
Voucher
No.
Date
Voucher
No.
Date
121:1, 3 DEC 1: 1966
91657

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·THE
MUJADDID'S CONCEPTION
OF TAWHID

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·Imam-i-Rabban Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thani
Shaik Ahmad Sirhmdi's Conception of Tatchid
OR
THE MUJADDID'S
CONCEPTION OF TAWHID
By
BURHAN AHMAD FARUQI, M.A., Ph.D.
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh
With a foreword hy
SYED ZAFARUL HASAN
M.A. (Alig.), D. Phil. (Oxon), Dr. Phil. (Erl.)
SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
KASHMIRI BAZAR
LAHORE (INDIA)

·Copyright
First published
October 1940
Published by Sh. Muhainmad Ashraf
Kashmiri Bazar. Lahore
Printed at the Ripon Printing Pres., Bull Road, Lahore
hy Mirza Mohammad Sadiq

·Dedicated'
to
my revered teacher
Dr. Syed Zafarul Hasan
who watched my life with paternal concern
and
at whose feet I learnt to understand
the fundamental problems
in
Philosophy and Religion

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·FOREWORD N this treatise Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi has drawn our attention to å central point of religion, mysticism and philosophy.gostermano affirmed which thereby became a widely accepted وحدت وجود a doctrine amongst Islamic sufis. SL firmly and solemnly denied it, and persisted in his denial throughout his career; and he based his denial, not on extraneous considerations, but on mystic experience itself. Dr. Burhan has formulated and clarified the issue between these two great mystics with a care and perspicuity which deserves praise ; and he has brought religion and philosophy to bear on it. In this connection his discourse on the distinction of Religious Consciousness from mystic consciousness and speculative consciousness is indeed illuminating; while the logic of his contention and the cogency. of his arguments seem to leave little to desire. Now

·8
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhii
after the relapse of Islamic mysticism again into
it was high time that an earnest study ,وحدت وجود
of this kind should have been undertaken and
pursued with the thoroughness characteristic of
Dr. Burhan Ahmad's work.
Another conspicuous service of Dr. Burhan
Ahmad's book is that it has brought the great
Mujaddid and his far-reaching movement within
the purview of western orientalists. Certainly it
is most interesting to note how deeply has this
unique personality influenced the nerve of Islamic
thought, specially in India. throughout the last
three and a half centuries. The inquiry if pursued
further and still more in detail will, I believe,
repay the time and labour bestowed upon it.
It has been my privilege to watch the growth
of this valuable treatise at every stage of its
development. I can confidently recommend it to
all Muslim scholars and western orientalists for
sympathetic study and careful scrutiny.
S. Z. HASAN
Aligarh
30-9-40

·CONTENTS f vii xi 1 7 12 28 31 45 85 Foreword Abbreviations PRELIMINARY (a) Biographical sketch (b) His Times (c) His Achievements (d) His Influence INTRODUCTION.-- Unity of the World-Principle CHAPTER 1--The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 1.- Ibn Arabi's Wahdat-i-Wujud or Unityisni and the Mujaddid's Criticism of it 2.---The Mujaddid's Tawhid CHAPTER II ---The Reception of the Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 1.-Shah Wali-Ullah 2.-Khwaja Mir Nasir and Khwaja Mir Dard... 3.—Mawlwi Ghulam Yahya 4.--Shah Rafi-uddin 5.-Shah Sayyid Ahmad Baſelwi THE CONCLUSION INDEX 86 117 141 145 149 157 163 164 171 189 .

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·ABBREVIATIONS AM. At. DB. Ep. FH. FM. FW. HQ. Awn-ul-Ma'bud fi Sharḥ Abū Daud (Ar.), by Mawlwi Shamsul Haq of Patna, Anşārt Press, Delhi, 1323 A.H. 'Abaqāt (Ar.), by Mawlwi Shah Ismail Shahid, (undated). Damagh-ul-Bațil (Per.), by Shāh Rafl'-uddin, MS. No. 1699, Oriental Library, Bankipur. Epistle. Fuṣūş-ul-Hikam (Ar.), by Ibn 'Arabī, MS. Futuhät Makkiyya (A1.), by Ibn 'Arabi, Darul-Kutub al- 'Arabia, Egypt, 1329 A.H. Fayşalat-u-Wahadat-ul-wujud-wash-shuhūd (Ar.), by Shab Wali-Ullah, Ahmadi Press, Delhi, 1324 A.H. Urdu Translation of Khwāja Bade-uddin's Hadrat-ul-Quds, Islamia Steam Press, Lahore, 1341 A.H. 'Ilm-ul-Kitab (Per.), by Khwāja Mir Dard, Anşări Press Delhi, 1308 A.H. Kalimat-ul-Haqq (Per.), by Mawlwi Ghulam Yahyā, MS. Shefta Collection, Lytton Library, M.U., Aligarh. Khazīnat-ul-Aşfiya (Par.), by Ghulām Sarwar Lähawri, Thamar-i-Hind Press, Lucknow, 1290 A.H. Maktūbāt-i-Imām-i-Rabbani (Per.). by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, edited by M. Nür Ahmad, printed at Amritsar. 1334 A.H. Mabda-v-Ma'ad "(Per.), by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Mujaddidi Press, Smritsar, 1330 A.H. IK. KH. KhA. M. MM.

·xii Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid MT. MtM. NA Q. RQ SA. Muntalihab-ul-Tawārīkh (Per.), by Mullā 'Abdul Qadir Badāvūni, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1865 A.D. Maqāmät-i-Mazhari (Per.), by Shah Ghulam Ali, Mujtabai Press, Delhi, 1309 A.H. Nālia-i-'Andalsb (Per.), by Khwaja Mir Näşir 'Andalīb, Shahjahāni Press, Bhūpal, 1310 A.H. Qur-an. Anjuman-i-Himāyat-i-Islam edition, Lahore, 1354 A.H. Urdu Translation of Khwāja Kamal-uddin's Raudat-ul- Qisyyūmiyya, Civil Steam Press, Lahore (undated). Sawünih Ahmadi, by Ja'far 'Alī, Şüſi Publishing Co. Pindi Bahü-uddin, Steam Press, Lahore (undated). Şirāt-i-Mustaqim (Per.), by Mawlwi Shāh Ismail Shaliid. Mujtabăi Press, Delhi, 1322 A.H. Sharh Fuşūs-ul-Hikam (Ar.). by 'Abdur Razzaq al- Qashāni, Maymaniyya Press, Egypt, 1321 A.H. Tadhkirat-ul-Awliya (Per.), by Farid-uddīn Attár, Mujtabāi Pr Delhi, 1305 AH. Taşānif-i-Ahmadiyya (Urdu), by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Aligarh Institute Press, Aligarh, 1300 A.H. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri (Per.), by Mirzā Hādī. edited by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khăn, his private Press, Aligarh, 1281 A.H. Zubdat-ul-Maqāmāt (Per.), by Khwīja Muḥammad Hashim, Mahmud Press, Lucknow, 1310 A.H. SM. SHF TA TIA T). ZM.

·PRELIMINARY
THIS
THIS dissertation is an attempt to work
out the conception of Tawḥīd in the
thought of that great Islamic mystic, viz.,
Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, who is generally
called the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānit (the
as
* The word Mujaddid can be translated the Reformer,
the Regenerator, or the Renewer. I prefer Renewer.
The idea of Mujaddid has its origin in the ḥadīth:
ان الله يبعث في هذه الأمة على رأس كل مائة سنة من
يجدد لها اسردينها -
God will, on the eve of every century, raise a person in
this nation (Islam) who would renew the religion": Abü
Dāūd (202-275 A.H.). It is maintained that many persons
have accordingly been the Mujaddids of their centuries, e.g.,
"Umar b. 'Abdul 'Aziz (d. 101 A.H.)--First Century; Imam
Shafi'i Muḥammad b. Idrīs (d. 204 A.H.)-Second Century ;
Ibn Suraij (d. 306 A.H.)--Third Century; Inām Baqilläni
Muḥammad b. Tayyab (d.403 A.H.) or Imām Asfrāyyinī Aḥmad
b. Muḥammad (d. 406 A...)--Fourth Century; Imam Ghazzālī
(d. 505 A.H.)-Fifth Century; Imüm Fakhruddin Razi (d. 606
1

·2 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Rerewer of Islām on the Head of the second thousand of the Islamic Era). The Shaikh himself had the inspired belief that he was a Mujaddid. A.H.)-Sixth Century; Ibn Daqiq Alid Muhammad b. ‘Ali (d. 702 A.H.)-Seventh Century ; Imām Bulqini Sirăjuddin (d. 905 A.H.) --Eighth Century; Jalaluddin al-Suyūți (d. 911 A.H.)--Ninth Century, and others of the subsequent centuries. (Cf. AM., Vol. IV, p. 181). However, it is noteworthy that only Shaikh Ahmad has claimed the dignity of the Mujaddid-i- Alf-i-Thani for himself. Khwāja Kamaluddin Muhammad Ahsan has quoted two ḥadīthes in drogëll änogy: (1) يبعث رجل على احد عشر مائة سنة هو نور عظيم اسمه اسمي بين السلاطين الجابربن يدخل الجنة بشفاعته رجال الوفا (جامع الدرر) "A man will arise at the beginning of the 11th century, who will be a great light and whose name will be the same as mine ; (he will arise) amidst tyrant kings; thousands of men will enter Paradise through his intercession." (۳) يكون رجلا في امتي يقال له صلة يدخل الجنة كذا (چع الجوامع) بشفاعت كذا 4 “There will be a man in my nation who will be called a conjoiner,' through whose intercession there will enter Paradise so-and-so." It is believed that these predictions were made about Shaikh Ahmad. (See RQ., Part I, pp. 37-38.; · The Mujaddid keenly realises the need of a great Reformer ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 3 It was Mullā 'Abdul Hakim of Sialkot (d. 1067 A.H.), the most illustrious scholar of the day and the Shaikh-al-Islām of India, who was the first to apply to Shaikh Ahmad the epithet of Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thāni.' Indeed all the divines and mystics of eminence have acknowledged him him as such. For example, Shāh Wali-Ullah” and his son Shāh 'Abdul in a letter to his son Khwaja Muhammad Sadiq (1000-1025 A.H.). See M., Vol. I, Ep. 237. Further he expressly claims for himself the dignity of Mujaddid-i-Alf-:--Thāni. See M., Vol. II, Ep. 4. Again writing to his son. Khwaja Muhammad Ma'şüm (1009-1079 A.H.) he sayse بين البكرين و مصداعا بين الحمد لله الذي جعلنى صلة بين البحرين و الفیئنين “ Praise be to Allah who created me a conjoiner between two oceans and a pacifier between two parties. (See M., Vol. II. Ep. 6.). The reference is perhaps to the last Hadith in the preceding note. "KA., Vol. I, p. 614. * Shah Wali-Ullah (1114-1176 A.H.). He was the most entinent divine of his age, and'a mystic too. He belonged to the Mujaddidī Naqshbandi School. He acquired mystic discipline from his father, Shāh Abdur Rahim, and is said to be the 'Mujaddid' of his time. He is the founder of a school in Hadith and Tafsir. He translated the Qur-un into Persian and is the author of mary famous works on Hadith, Theology, and Mysticism.

·4 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 'Azīz,' among a host of others, always speak of him aş Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī. The latter is also reported to have said that amongst the mystics of Islām, Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir Jilānī (470-560 A.H.) and Shaikh Ahmad'Sirhindi are the two greatest, only he could not decide which was the greater of the two. Shaikh Ahmad is the first and the greatest among the mystics of Islām who expressly and strenuously opposed the Pantheistic conception of Tawhid known as Wahdat-i..Wujūdº or Tawhid-i-Wujūdī. This conception had become almost universal amongst Muslim i Shah 'Abdul Aziz (1159-12-18 A.H.) was the eldest son of Shah Wali-Ullah. He was the most celebrated scholar of his day and universally respected like his father. He taught Hadith to the famous mystic Shāh Sayyid Ahmad Barelwī, and also initiated hiin into the Naqshbandī School. He wrote many works on Kalām and Hadith. * Wahdat-i-Wujud (>gang üllag) or Tawḥīd-i-Wujūdī is unity of Being . It is the doctrine of ( توحید وجودی ) very many mystics in Islam. The exact equivalent would be Unityism-that is, existent is one. This soon becomes Identyism--that it is identical with everytling else, which in the end passes on to pantheism,--that it is God and God is all. *it ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 5 mystics, specially since Ibn 'Arabīl who wrote on it extensively and has had enormous influence on the subsequent thought of Islām, and gave it a strenuous push forward. Now the opposition of Shaikh Ahmad to Wahdat-i-Wujūd is based not on theological dogma ora philosophical argument, but on Kashf? or direct religious experience. Conis also called Wujūliyyat. Hence Wujūdiyyin or Sufiya-i- Wujādiyya or Mawahidin are those who believe in Unityism. *Ibn 'Arabi, Muhayyuddin (560-638 A.H.) was a mystic of great eminence. He is generally styled as Shaikh-i-Akbar, the Greatest Shikh. He was born at Murcia in Spain, but he shifted to Seville which he made his home for thirty years. In 598 A.H. he set out for the East from where he never returned home. He visited Mecca and Mosul. His fame went with him everywhere. Finally he settled down in Damascus where he died in 638 A.H. Fie belonged to the Zanirī School, but rejected Taqlid in doctrinal matters. Ibn 'Arabī's sole guide was inner light with which he believed hiniself illuminated in a special way. He is said to be the author of as many as 400 books. The most famous of hiş works are Futūhat-i-Makkiyya and Fuşuş-ul-Hikam. In the latter he has discussed the pantheistic conception of Tawḥid ut length. He was denounced as Zindiq in Egypt, and there was a move to assassinate him. Ibn Taimiyya (661-728 A.H.), one of the greatest divines in Islam, criticised Ibn 'Arabī unreservedly. • Kashf (linis): Lite sally means unveiling : it is apprehen-' ·6 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid sequently it gave rise to burning controversies among mystics. Many scholars and mystics of eminence took exception to his position while others emphatically affirmed it. It is worth while to go into the matter at length and try to determine its exact position as best as we can. sion of facts and events as well as truths, mundane and celestial, by inner sight or light: generally it is symbolic. --Shulūd (9) is direct apprehension of the being and attributes of God.--Thăm (PL) is inspiration; technically it is confined to mystics; it is reception of guidance or inspiration from above. The guidance thus received is not absolutely infallible, hence it is not binding on all but only on the recipient of it, provided it is not contrary to any injunction received through the Prophet.---Wahi (cm) is literally communication or command; technically it is communication imparted by God to a prophet, its highest form being communication through the agency of an angel. Guidance received through it is absolutely sure and binding on all. Generally Revelation may be regarded as an equivalent term to Waḥī, but the exact significance of the term is as described above.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
Biographical Sketch
A BRIEF biographical sketch of Shaikh Ahmad,
with special reference to his times, would not
be out of place here.
Shaikh Ahmad is a descendant of 'Umar,
the Great. He was born in Sirhind in 971
A.H. Sirhind is really Sahrand, which means
the forest of tigers. it is related that in the
days of Feroz Shāh Tughlaq (752-790 A.H.)
once the royal treasury was passing through
this forest under the imperial guard. A saint,
Şahib-i-Kashf' was travelling along with the
treasury. When the caravan reached the
spot where Sirhind is now situated, the saint
had the inspiration that a very great saint
will be born at the place. The news reached
the King. He ordered the construction of a
Sāḥib-i-Kashf (cinis Teslo) is saint, rather a person
who has spiritual illumination.
1

·8 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid town there and entrusted the work to Imām Rafi'uddin,' the ancestor of Shaikh Ahmad. While the construction was in progress, Shāh Bū ‘Ali Qalandar came and helped in it, and informed Imām Rafi' that the great saint of the prophecy would be his descendant." Shaikh Ahmad received his early education at home. He learnt the Qur-ān" by heart Imām Rafiuddin is the sixth ancestor of the Mujaddid. He was the brother of Khwaja Fateh-Ullah the prime minister of Feroz Shāh Tughlaq and disciple of the famous saint Sayyid Jalil Bukhari (707-750 A.H.) known as Muklıdūm-i- Jahānian. Imam Rafi was entrusted with the management of the town of Sirhind where he settled down after its construction. ? Sharfuddin Bu Ali Shah Qalandar of Panipat was saint of very great eminence. He came from 'Iraq to Panipat, where he died in 724 A.H. It is related that he helped in the construction of the town of Sirhind. However the dates do not tally. For Feroz Shūh in whose time Sirhind was constructed began his reign in 752 A.H., i.e., 28 years after the death of the Qalandar. .RQ., Part I, pp. 22-23. 'The Qur-an is the book revealed to Muhammad word by word and letter by letter. It is the source of all the teachings of Islann. All other sources must be in harmony with it. It is also called Kitab (UC)--the, Book. Hudīth (us) is the second source. It embodies the sayings and doings of Muhammad, ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 9 very early. Then he took to the study of Hadith, Tafsīr or Exegesis and Ma'qul (Jgäsen) or Philosophy and went to renowned scholars at various places. When he was at Agra, studying Hadith and Tafsir, Abul Fadl and Faidi, Emperor Akbar's right hand men, hearing of his brilliance, tried to draw him into their circle. However, this friendship did not last very long, because the Shaikh took serious offence to Abul Fadl's anti-Islamic attitude. It is said that a portion of Faidi's celebrated Sawāți-al-Ilhām' was written by and as a source of Islam it is next in authority to the Qur-än. Ijma' (chaal) is the third source of Islām; it means the consensus of the faithful on a point which is not to be found explicitly in the Qur-ān and the Hadith. Qivūs (ww his) means inference. By some it is regarded as the fourth source of Islam. In order to be valid it should be based on the Qur-an and Hadith (and on ljmā). "Sawāți'-al-Ilhām ( piebigaw) known as “ Tafsīr-i-bi nuqat" (büs a gues) is a commentary on the Qur-an in Arabic written by Abul Faid Faidi, the poet-laureate of Akbar, which has the very difficult peculiarity of containing no letter with a dot. It is noteworthy that the Arabic alphabet has 15 dotted letters.

·10 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid the Shaikh." After finishing his education at an early age the Shaikh took to mystic discipline under the guidance of his father who was aņeminent mystic and received Khilafatfrom him in the Chishtiya and Suhrawardiya orders.? When he was 28 he went to Delhi and joined the Naqshbandiya order, and soon received its Khilafat from Khwāja Bāqi-Billah (972- 1012 A.H.). The Khwāja is the person from whom this order begins in India. It is said that he was directed in a vision to leave his home, Afghanistan, and go to India, where he had to initiate a very great man into the order. This great man was Shaikh Ahmad .. 'RQ., Part I, pp. 60, 62, 63 ; Cf. HQ., Vol. II, pp. 9-10. * Khilafat (Bill): In mystic terminology it is generally the recognition of the spiritual leader that the disciple has completed the mystic journey and has reached such a high stage of development that he can be authorised to guide others on the way. *RQ., Part I, pp. 69-70. *Ibid., pp. 76-81. pp. 72-73. Ibid.,

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
11
who quickly went through all thz stages of
the mystic journey, and became so great at
it that even the Khwāja used to sit before
hiniwas a disciple, and confessed that it was
through Shaikh Ahmad's spiritual help that
he got out of the mazes of Wahdat-i-Wujūd?
"RQ., Part I,
p. 113.
2ZM.,
p. 155.

·12 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid HIS TIMES 1.--Mystics WHEN the great Mujaddid came to his task of reform, he found that Tasawwuf? had taken complete possession of the Muslim soul. A Pantheistic Deity had been substituted for the Monotheistic, Personal, Transcendent God of Islām. Excessive belief in Karāmāt or miracles of saints was commonly cherished. Many un-Islamic means of the development of occult powers had been introduced into Tasawwuf itself. The mystics had gone to the extent of denying the commandments of Shari'ator the Law of Islām * Taşawwuf (usguaj) or Islamic mysticism is an attempt to have the direct experience of what the Prophet of Islam himself is supposed to have experienced. * MT., Vol. II, p. 258. * Shari'at (üveg) Low, the Code of Islam which prescribes various modes of action and practice. -Tariqat (;b) ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 13 as universally binding, and to regard Shari'at itself as something external and superficial; indulgence in Simā'l or music hearing had becotie the order of the day. They were indifferént to the Sunnat or the example of the Prophet. They extolled Sukr. or ecstasy above Şahw, or sane rationality. The diais the way towards God through purification of soul, for which some extra ascetic means are adopted by the mystic. Ma'rifat legges) is the knowledge of God acquired through spiritual development, inner purification and illumination:Haqiqat (ääs) is the truth underlying the Shari'at as grasped through spiritual illurination. According to the Mujaddid the Shari'at is the Code of Islám. Tariqat is the attempt to remove the conflict and a sense of revolt against the injunctions of Shari'at. Mi'rifat is the realisation that man cannot know God directly; and Haqiqat is the perfect faith in the truth of the actions prescribed by Shari'at. * Simā (slow) means music hearing for the sake of bringing about ecstasy, prevalent in mystic orders. * Sukr(w) is intoxicatian. It is that state of a mystic's mind in which he is overpowered by the love or vision or realisation of God, and more or less loses control of his self and reason.--Şaħw ( gostino ) is opposed to Sukr, i.e., sobriety. It is the state of mind in which man has full control of his self and his reason and is not overpo.vered by emotion. Saḥw is regarded as a state higher than Sukr.

·14 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid logue ? 1 between Maḥmūd of Ghazni and Shaikh Abul Hasan Kharqāni is a pertinent example showing clearly that since long the mystics had practically severed their connection with Islam and the Prophet. 2.--The Theologians FURTHER, the 'Ulama' or theologians had 1 Sultan Mahmūd (d. 421 A.H.) was once Sassing by Kharqān. He had heard the fame of Shaikh Abul Hasan Kharqāni (d. 419 A.H.). He wished to see the Shaikh. So he sent his messenger to the Shaikh asking his permission to visit him. The Sultan instructed the messenger that if the Shaikh were not willing to grant him an interview he should recite the Quranic verse: Ons -Sie · Obey Allah, obey the Prophet and obey the sovereign from amongst you." The Shaikh did not attend to the Sultan's message. The messenger accordingly recited the verse. The Shaikh said : اطیعوا الله واطيعوا الرسول و اولی الامر 66 < 6 من در اطیعوا الله چنان مشغول که در اطيعوا الرسول خجالتها دارم تا به اولی الامر چی می رسد "I am so busy with 'obey Allah 'that I am ashamed to neglect i obey the Prophet' how can I obey the sovereign. (See TA.. P. 352.)

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 15 taken exclusively to Fiqh or Jurisprudence as the whole of religious learning; they had ceased to refer to the Qur-ān and Hadith--- the genuine sources of Islām. Consequently only the juristic view of Islam was alive, the spirit of Islām had died. Many a theologian was of the type of Makhdūm-ul-Mulk who, in order to avoid the payment of Zakāt? or tax on wealth, transferred his property at the end of the year to his wife and had it retransferred to himself before the time of the payment next year. They were busy in the hairsplitting discussions of the problems of Fiqh ; minutest differences sufficed to cause perennial quarrels among them. They were generally full of ambition, always hunting after worldly success. They could be induced to give Fatwā ('s yü) or decision of the sacred law, Zakat (ös;): Tax on wealth prescribed by Islam which is io of one's yearly savings. It is one of the five injunctions of Islām. MT., Vol. II, p. 203.

·16
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
permitting the Harām (lx) or the prohibited
and prohibiting the Halal (ude) or the
permitted. Makhdūm-ul-Mulk is said to have
given a Fatwa that the ordinance of Hajj or
Pilgrimage was no longer binding, that it had
rather become injurious. )
3.--Akbar's Policy
THE policy of reconciliation which the
Mughal Emperor Akbar persistently followed
throughout his long reign (963-1013 A.H.)
was naturally calculated to hurt and weaken
the religious consciousness of Musalmāns.
In certain of its phases it outraged their
feelings. They felt that Islām was undone
in India. Mullā 'Abdul Qadir Badāyānī,
'It is binding on every Muslim to go on pilgrimage to
Mecca at lcast once in his life, provided he can afford the
expenses of the journey.
'MT., Vol. II, pp. 203, 259.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 17 a contemporary historian and do zealous Musalmān, describes the state of things prevailing in Akbar's time, and his description mirrors the sore uneasiness ‘under which every religious Musalmān of the day was suffering. Mullā Badāyānī says that the Emperor wanted to:win over his Hindu subjects. He, therefore, turned his face against Islām. He started encouraging 'Ulamā'-i-Sū (su clandes), i.e., the worldly divines, who would do everything to win his favour. He managed to surround himself with people who really did not believe in revelation and the religious code. To believe in revelation was considered as Taqlīd” or following authority blindlya low kind of mentality and fit only for the *MT., Vol. II, p. 255. Taqlid (de) literally means to follow ; technically it means acknowledging Ijma' (Elena) and Qiyās (whis) of a competent divine as the sources of Islām besides the Qur-an and the Hadith. Muqallid (ulär) is one who believes in Ijma and Qiyās of some divine us the sources of Islam as regards the poinë not explicitly found in the Qur-an or the Hadith.--Guair 2 ·18 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid uneducated and the illiterate. Nay, 'the Emperor went further. He openly opposed Islām. He regarded the injunctions of Islām as temporary and irrational. “In these days, when reproach began to be cast upon the doctrines of Islām and all questions relating thereto, and ever so many wretches of Hindus and Hinduised Musalmāns brought unmitigated revilings on the Prophet; and the villainously irreligious 'Ulamā' in their works pronounced the Emperor to be infallible and contenting themselves with mentioning the unity of God, they next mentioned the various titles of the Emperor, and did not have the courage to mention the name of the Prophet (God be gracious to him and his followers, and give them peace in defiance of the liars); this was the state of things which became the cause of general disgrace, and the seeds of depravity and disturbance Muqallid (wlis yus) is cne who denies Ijma' and Qiyās as the sources of Islam and sticks to the Qur-an and the Hadīth.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 19 began to sprout out in the empire. Besides this the mean people of the higher and lower classes, having put the collar of spiritual obedience'to the Emperor upon their necks, professed themselves to be his disciples."1 The Emperor had ceased to believe in the Qur-an; he did not believe in life after death, nor in the Day of Judgment. He had gone further. He had determined publicly to use the for- There is no god ‘‘ لا اله الا الله اکبر خليفة الله mula but Allah, and Akbar is God's Representative.” But as this led to commotions, he thought it wiser to restrict the use of this formula to a few people within the precincts of the Haram. Sajda* or the form of prostration reserved by Islām for God alone, was 3 Ibid., *MT., Vol. II, p. 269. P. 273. . Ibid. *Sajda (ouston) is a form of prostration reserved by Islām exclusively for Allah and forbidden anyone else. A distinction was made, viz., Sajda to Allah is Sajda'-1--Ibadat to and the same act if performed before kings is (ساجده عبادت) Sajda'-i-Ta'zīmi (comes ou Shaw ·20 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid made compulsory before the Emperor.' Wine was declared lawful, and bacon was made an ingredient of wine ;3 Jizya' or the military tax was abolished" and beef was declared unlawful.6 Pigs and dogs were specially reared and regarded as manifestations of God.' The Salāt (ölgho) or the prescribed prayers, the Șaum (egas) or the prescribed fasts and the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca were abolished. The Islamic calendar was replaced by the new-fangled Ilāhi months and years. Indeed Islām after a thousand was considered to have played itself out; the study of Arabic was looked upon as if it 1 MT., Vol. II, p. 259. * Thid., p. 301. . Ibid., p. 302. *Jizya (m2;) is the military. tax collected from the unbelievers to maintain the Army for their protection. • MT., Vol. II, p. 276. • Ibid., p. 305. * Ibid. 8 Ibid., P. 306. 9 Ibid.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 21 1 were something unlawful; the Law of Islām or Fiqh, Tafsir or the exegesis of the Qur-an and Hadith or the traditions of the Prophet were ridiculed; and those who prosecuted these studies were looked down as deserving of contempt. The Adhān (l) or call to the prayers, and the Namāz-i-Jamā'at (üislaz jlaj) or congregational prayers which used to be, as prescribed by Islān, offered five times a day in the state hall were stopped.” Such names as Ahmad, Muḥammad and Mustafā, the various names of the Prophet of God, had become offensive to the Emperor, and to utter them was a crime. Mosques and prayer rooms were changed into store-rooms and into Hindu guardrooms. Islām was in great distress. Unbelievers could openly ridicule.and condemn Islām and the Musalmāns. The rites of Hinduism were 3 *MT., Vol. II, pp. 306-307. * Ibid., p. 314. * Ibid. * Ibid., p. 322.

·22 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid celebrated in every street and corner, while Musalmāns were not permitted to carry out the injunctions of Islām. The Hindus when they observed fast could compel the Musalmāns not to eat and drink in public, while they themselves cquld eat and drink publicly during Ramadan. At several places Niusalmāns had to pay with their lives for sacrificing the cow on 'Id-al-Adhā. A number of mosques were destroyed by Hindus and temples erected in their place. Thus the times cried for the appearance of a great reformer. Shaikh Ahmad was a spiritual man and at the age of forty, i.e., in the year 1011 A.H., he felt the call. He had the inspiration that he was the Renewer of the second millennium of the Islamic era. But the task before him was stupendous. Long he worked, and strenuous and constant were the efforts he made to turn the tide. Some . *M., Vol. II, Ep. 92. .See foot-note 1, p. 2, supra.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 23 of the means he adopted for this purpose were the following: Firstly, he prepared a number of his disciples for the work and sent them in all directions to preach the true Islām, to emphasise the Ittibā*-i-Sunnat (üiw chl) or following the example of the Holy Prophet, and to bring the people back to the folds of the Shari'at. This work was effectively done, not only in India but even beyond its borders in the neighbouring Muslim countries. Secondly, he started a vast correspondence with men of eminence in various parts of these countries. These epistles were widely circulated. They expounded religious truths, and laid the greatest emphasis on Ittibā--i-Sunnat.* Thirdly, he enlisted the great nobles of the Imperial Court as his disciples and used them to bring about a change in the life of those 'RQ., Part I, pp. 166-67. For example M., Vol. I, Eps. 25. 36. 41, 42. 44. 75. 79. 114. 152. 165, 195. 249, 254, 255, 272. 3

·24
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
1
circles, and to influence the Emperor towards
a change of heart.
Fourthly, when Akbar died and Jahāngir
succeeded, the Shaikh started a campaign.
People had to take a vow that they will not
obey any orders contradictory to Islām. This
campaign was extended also to army.?
Āşaf Jāh, the prime minister, advised
Jahāngir to take care of Shaikh Ahmad whose
influence was spreading widely in India, Iran,
Turān and Badakhshān. He advised him
further to stop the soldiers of the
army
from
visiting the disciples of the Shaikh and taking
the vow, and still further to imprison the
Shaikh. Jahāngir issued the orders and Shaikh
Ahmad became a political suspect. Jahāngir
also decided to send the Shaikh to prison. But
it was not easy to lay hands on him. The great
nobles revered him and were devoted to him.
*M., Vol., I, Eps. 23, 25, 43-54. 65-72. 119-21, 191, 194, 195,
198, 209, 214, 228, 231, 238, etc.
*RQ.. Part I. pp. 170-74.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 25 So Jahāngir sent them one by one to distant places-Khān-i-Khānan to Deccarf, Şadr-i- Jahān to the East, Khān-i-Jahān to Malwa, Khān-i-Āʻzam to Gujrat, and Mahābat Khān to Kabül. Having done this he sent for Shaikh Ahmad from Sirhind and accused him of publishing certain un-Islamic ideas in his Epistles. But the Shaikh met the accusations squarely. Jahāngîr had now to find some other excuse. He demanded Sajda (ous) or prostration of the Shaikh. The Shaikh would not agree to it, because Sajda is exclusively due to God and to 'no one else. Thereupon Jahāngir imprisoned the Shaikh and sent him to the Gwalior Fort, where he remained a prisoner for two years. This imprisonment of the Shaikh greatly annoyed Mahābat Khān in Kabul and he expunged the name of Jahāngir from the Khutba (nebsi) or Friday sermon and the coin in Kabul, and invaded India with his chosen army. It is narrated that 'RQ., Part I. pp. 175-186. Cf. TJ., p. 273.

·26 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid he virtually took Jahāngir a prisoner at Jhelum. 'Mahābat might have gone further. But the Shaikh sent him instructions to obey the King and to cause no disturbance in the realm. Thereupon Mahābat set Jahāngir free. Soon after followed the release of the Shaikh from Gwalior (1028 A.H.). . The Emperor wished the Shaikh to see him. The Shaikh would not come unless certain conditions were accepted. Firstly, that the Emperor would abolish Sajda-i-Ta'zīmi or prostration; secondly, that all the mosques that had been erased should be erected; thirdly, that all orders prohibiting cow-slaughter should be cancelled; fourthly, that Qadīs, Muftis and censors should be appointed to enforce the Islamic code; fifthly, that Jizya or military tax should be re-introduced ; sixthly, that all bid'āt (@lews) or irinovations should be stopped and injunctions of the Shari'at or Law be enforced; and seventhly, that all prisoners who had been; sent to prison ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 27 in contravention of the above should be released." The Emperor accepted these conditions. When the Shaikh came to him, the Emperor received him with great honour, giving him a Nadhr () or monetary offering as well as a Khil'at' (hala) or robe of honour. Henceforth the Shaikh, for the remaining six years of his life, became the special Adviser of the Emperor. 1 5 'RQ., Part I, pp. 186-95. » Ibid., p. 193. * TJ., p. 273. Mirzä Hädī, the writer of Tuzuk-2--Jahāngiri is annoyingly brief and curt about this whole episode, and the so-called histories too are silent. One has to depend for the details on RQ., which Ahsan-Ullah 'Abbasī also follows in his “Life of the Mujaddid". *Cf. M., Vol. III, Eps. 43, 44: RQ., Part I, pp. 199-209.

·28 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid HIS ACHIEVEMENTS THUS, in the first place, the Mujaddid brought the Islamic kingdom of India back to Islām. In the second place, he induced the divines of Islam to the study of Qur-an and Hadith, which they had neglected so long. In Taşawwuf or mysticism, he revolutionised the doctrine of Islamic mystics, questioned their pantheism, and brought them round to Ittibā - i-Sunnat (following the example of the Prophet). Moreover, he widened the'bounds of religious experience, by realising and describing a large number of higher stages yet untraversed and unknown to his predecessors. Further he made a fundamental departure from the accepted mystic doctrine inasmuch as he propounded that Wilāyat or sainthood is essentially different from M., Vol. II, Eps. 4, 6.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 29 Nabuwwat ' or Prophethood and not in one line with it-indeed qualitatively different.” Connected with this is the position which the Shaikh established and which had long been perverted, viz., the Din or Religion and not Sulūk-wa-Tasawwuf ' or mysticism is the }Nabuwwat (@gus) means prophecy from which comes the word Prophet.) But in Islam it means the stage where a man becomes, in contradistinction to Wilāyat by sheer grace of God, the subject of special divine favour and messages for the guidance of man are sent to him by God. Wilāyat (Y) is that stage of spiritual development in which the mystic realises that he has attained to nearness or proximity to God.) Everyone can get to it by dint of his continued effort and struggle, though not without the grace of God. ?M., Vol. I, Ep. 260. ĽSulūk (ughaw) is the method of spiritual development. The thing has been conceived as a journey or pilgrimage to God, similarly Sair (yo) which means rambling. When Sulūk is attained at a certain stage the mystic begins to experience the adumbrations of Asma'-o-Shuyūn (ugyalow!) i.e. divine names and phases. This is called Sair-ila-'llah ( aïl Cor) i.e. journey towards Allah. Then he surpasses this stage and enters into the experience of the Being of Allah. This is called Sair-Fi'llah ( aül 3 grow), journey inside Allah. After chat the mystic returns back in his journey and this is called Sair-an-Allah ( awl us grow) journey away from Allah. Then · ·30 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid indispensable thing for a Muslim.' It is for these great reforms that he was called Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī--the Reformer of the second millennium. Henceforth we shall speak of him in the text as the Mujaddid. he resumes his duties as an ordinary human being in consonance with the teachings of Shari'at and directs his energies like the Prophets to the reformation of his fellow beings *M., Vol. I, Ep. 48.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 31 HIS INFLUENCE, 'It may be added here that the Mujaddid's influence on subsequent development too has been very great. His was really the call “Back to Muḥammad"; and it had had far-reaching consequences. Besides his conception of Tawḥid which shall be considered in the following pages, this call inherently affected the Islamic mind and gave it a new turn in mysticism as well as in theology,-- Ilm-i-Bāțin and 'Ilm-i-Zāhir. Firstly, with regard to mysticism, there arose a new yearning-a yearning to purify **Ilm-i-Zahir (gelbode) is knowledge in general, such as Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqh and 'Ilm-i-Kalām. 'Ilm-i-Bățin (bels) is cognition attained through mystic efforts. Hence the distinction of Ulama'-i-Zahir, those well versed in learning, theologians and jurists, who are guided by the word of the Qur-an, etc., and not the spirit as the initiated or the mystits who are therefore called 'Ulama'-;-Bāțin, who try to have the direct experience of God and etesnity.

·32 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid ; mysticism from extraneous elements and draw it exclusively from that pure and perennial fountain-head from which Islām had arisen ; in other words, a yearning to learn it directly from the Prophet of God. Accord.' ingly it happened that Khwāja Mir Nāşir? who belonged to the Mujaddid's school of mysticism got into a trance which lasted for a full week, and Imām Hasan, the grandson of the Prophet himself, appeared to him in his cell and initiated him into a new mystic method, insisting that the method shall be called after the Prophet Muhammadī,' because that was the genuine method of the Prophet * Khwaja Mir Nāşir 'Andalib (d. 1172 A.H.) was a lineal descendant of the celebrated saint Khwaja Baltāuddin, the founder of Naqshbandia order. In the beginning Khwāja Mir Nāşir was a soldier in the Mughal Army. All of a sudden he left the army and took to seclusion. He became a celebrated mystic. Indeed he founded a new order of mysticisni called the Țariqa-i-Muḥammadi lavasta végb) or the method of Muhammad. He wrote a voluminous book Nāla'--'Andalib (wuis viJG ) in 1153 [..H. in the form of a story in which "he discussed most of the mystic doctiines.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 33 of God. When the trance was over the Khwāja came out of his cell, and the first person whom he initiated in the new method was his son Khwāja Mīr Dard? who met him on the threshold 2 The father and son have written voluminous books on the method which they believe to have been the work of inspiration. The essence of the method is : “Break away from everyone and attend only to your master (Muhammad) and continue to attend on him incessantly." ' It is, say they, the want of this principle that has created dissensions amongst Khwaja Mir Dard (1131-1190 A.H.) was the second son of Khwaja Mir Näşir. At the age of fifteen he wrote a treatise A srār-us-Salāt (ölghall lul). He is the author of several works on mysticism, e.g., Wūridāt-i-Dard ( > ülsyg), 'Ilmul-Kitāb ( Visul oods ), etc. He was held in rcat esteem and even the Mughal Emperor Shāh 'Alam used to visit his Majlis loudshes) or gathering every month. Khwāja Dard was also a famous poet of Urdu and has a recognised position in the history of Urdu literature. PIK., p. 85. : Ibid., pp. 91, 95. 4 lóid.. P. 87. 3 ·34 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Musalmās. Go back to Kitāb-o-Sunnat, the Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet, and attach yourself exclusively to the Prophet. That is the right course. Similar is it with Shāh Sayyid ' Ahmad' Barelwi. He belonged He belonged to the school of Kitāb (wlis ) literally means 'book.' Technically it means the Qur-an and the injunction of the Qur-an. Sunnat literally mcans habit;technically it means the Prophet's mode of habitual actions, or the Prophet's csample. Hence Kitüb-0)-Sunnat means the injunctions of the Qur-ur and the example of the Prophet. IK. p. 87. Shäh Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1201-1246 A.H..). From carly childhood he was mystically minded and felt in hiirself a strong propensity to follow only the Prophet. After some education at Lucknow, he went to Delhi, where he became a discizof Shāh 'Abdul 'Aziz. However, he broke away from Shah 'Abdul Aziz on the practice of Tasawwur-i-Shaikh (Elna goas), picturing the Shaikh in imagination, which he regarded as idolatry, and pursued his spiritual development single-handed. The progress he made was immense--indeed Shah Abdul Aziz himself wished to become his disciple in the end. Soon his reputation spread far and wire. Mawlwi Abdul Hayy and Shāh Isma'il, two eminent relations of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz joined him. Thousands of Muslims adopted his views, and he was everywhere hailed as the true Khalifa. One of his biographers, Mawlwi Abdul Ahad, asserts that more than 40,000 Hindus and unbelievers became converts to Islāmn through his preachings. In 1232 A.H. Shāh Sayyid Alimad set out from his native ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 35 the Mujaddid and has a very high place amongst the mystics of Islām. The, Sayyid believed that he had a special affinity to the Prophet and that he got spiritual guidance 'directly from him or from God. He turns round and sets up a new method, which he city on a pilgrimage to Mecca, staying a few months at Calcutta on the way. Two ycars later, on his return co India, he started making active preparation for Jihäd or religious war on the Sikhs of the Punjab to rescue the Musalmāns of that province from their tyranny. He made campaigi. after campaign against the Sikhs and died a martyr fighting at the battle of Balakot in the year 1246 A.H. 'In mystic terminology to get guidance direct from the spirituality of the Prophet is called Uwaisīyyat (@dgl. The term comes from Uwais. It is believed that Uwais got spiritual guidance direct from the Holy Proplict, that he could never meet him. The Mujaddid regards himself to be an Uwaisī (gadgl), and it is remarkable that after him a large number of mystics have claimed theniselves to be Uwaisīs. In our times too there was a mystic of great eminence, Häji Sayyid Wūrith 'Ali Shāh (c. 1321 A. H.), about whom it is said that he received spiritual guidance directly from, a'imma'-i-ahl-i-bait (as clol viabl), the grandsons of the Prophet. Prof. F. Krenkow doubts the mysterious personality of Uwais-al-Qarani, which is supposed and claimed as the origination of Sufism, and is convinced that such person never existed in reality. Imām Mālik b. Anas (d. 179 A.H.) is the fiøst • ·36 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid calls, Tarīqa-i-Nabuwwat' or the Prophetical Method. Other methods are according to him only Tariqahā-i-Wilayat or mystical methods.2 The peculiarity of the new method is that the mystic should first make all his actions conform strictly to the law given by the Prophet;3 and only then take to 'Dhikr and Fikr', remembrance and contemplation. The dhikr 1 4 who heard of him and doubted his real existence. The biographies of Uwais are not convincing at all. *Țarīqa-i-Nabuwwat (@guj vës gb) is that method of spiritual development which aims at developing only those values which the the Holy Prophet aimed at. Tariqa-i-Wilayat (*Yg vägb ) is the method of mystic development, used by mystics of Islam, and aimed at cultivating mystical mode of life. The difference is that of being according to Shari'at or indifferent to it. *SM., p. 8. 3 Ibid., P. 144. * Dhikr (s) is commemoration. In it Asma-o-șitāt, the names and attributes of God, are recited, which is a help in the progress of the mystic. Shughl is the practicing of dhikr. Shughl-i-Nafi (ses Jew) is the dhikr of way. denial of everything other than God, and Shughl-i-Ithbat (öll lei) is the dhikr of awIyl, 'the affirmộtion of God. Fikr 65) is distinguished from Murāgiba (vivölywoo). It is in general the ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 37 of the method consists in reading the Qur-an and reciting the prayers which the Prophet used to recite ;' while the fikr of the method consists in contemplation on the Goodness and Grace of God which is so profusely spread about us, and in making our will wholly subordinate to His Will, and in realising His omnipresence at every moment, etc. The most beneficial aid to all this, according to this method, is that the mystic should take to the service of his fellow-beings. Shāh Sayyid Ahmad denies pantheism and believes in theism. He puts Şaḥw or sobriety above Sukr or spiritual intoxication. He preaches Jihād or fighting in the way of God in place of Simā (slow) or music-hearing for the sake of ecstasy, and demands social service instead contemplation of the Şifāt-i-Iläbi luul ülis), attributes of Allah. Murāqiba is the concentrated contemplation. *SM., pp. 148-149. pp. 154-157. * Ibid., pp. 20-24. 2 Ibid., 4 Ibid., pp. 45-46.

·38 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid of solitude. He punctiliously follows Kitāb-o- Sunnat,· Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet, and, strenuously and emphatically denounces bid'at or innovations. Thåt is why, he rose, organised the Musalmāns and raised the standard of Jihād or the holy war against the Sikhs who were subjecting Musalmāns in the Punjab to religious persecution. He fought long and fought valiantly and was himself killed in Jihad (1246 A.H.); and with him was killed also Shāh Ismā'il Shahid who was his chief lieutenant.2 Secondly, the call of the Mujaddid indkeed theologians, those learned in the religious lore, to turn to the Hadith. Before the Mujaddid religious learning consisted wholly of jurisprudence or Figh. But the Mujaddid turned the tide to the Kitub-o-Sunnat or Qur-ān and the Prophet. People started learning the Hadīth or Tradition, and Shāh Wali-Ullah '*SA. SM., pp. 45-46. PP. 142-150.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 39 established the first school of Hadith in India. With Shāh Sayyid Ahmad Barelwr the school turned into Ahl-i-Hadith or Traditionists which yet had room for mystic element in it. Later the emphasis fell against Taqlid or blind following of the authority of the jurists and there arose Ghair Muqallidīn or pure and simple Ahl-i-Hadith or strict traditionists. In this connection we may also speak of the reform and High Criticism inaugurated by Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khān. Sir Sayyid emphasised the criticism of the Hadith and forcibly directed attention to the Kitāb or the Qur-an as the * Ahl-z-Hadith (no lol): Those who follow only the Hadith or sayings and doings of the Prophet and not the school of Islamic jurists. All great collectors of Hadith really belong to this school of thought. But it became a sect in the hands of ‘Abdul Wahhab of Nejd (d. 1201 A.H.) and took its root in India with the followers of Shāh Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (d. 1246 A.H.) and his chief lieutenant Shāh Ismū'il Shahid (d. 1246 A.H.). Ahl-z-Qur-an: Those who follow only the Qur-an and discard the Hadith also along with Fiqh or jurists. * Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1232.1315 A.H.) came of a family connected with the Delhi Court. The fall of the Mughal ·40 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid real source of Islām. This in the long run gave rise to the sect of the Ahl-i-Qur-an or Quranists instituted by Mawlwi 'Abdullah. Sir Sayyid was brought up in the school of the Mujaddid. His conception of Tawḥid or divine unity is theistic;? and with reference to mysticism he went further and clearly announced that mysticism is nothing more than a way of purifying the soul and the morals 3_ something which was implicit in the teachings of the Mujaddid, but which had not come Empire in 1857 A.D. set him thinking; and he took to the work of the reform of the Musalmāns of India. At last in 1875 A.D. he founded the present Aligarh Muslim University. Sir Sayyid, as he is generally called, has exerted a great formative influence; indeed there is hardly any movement of importance-religious, political, social, educational and literary-amongst the Musalmāns of India which is not directly or indirectly traceable to him. * Mawlwi 'Abdullah Chakrālwi (d. 1334 A.H.). He was a great scholar of the Qur-an, and in the beginning of the present century of the Christian era founded the sect of Ahl-i-Qur-an. He maintains that Qur-un and Qur-an alone is the genuine source for all Islamic dogmatics; and that neither Qiyas nor Ijmāk nor evin Hadith has any authority. 2TfA., Vol. I, p. 156. 3 Juid., pp. 78-91.

·Majaddid's Conception of Tawhid 41 to clear consciousness. Later Sir Muḥammad Iqbālº also protested against Wahdat-i-Wujūd of the mystics, gave Islamic morality a new spirit and preached life of Effort and Activity. Now, Tawḥīd is the Problem on which the Mujaddid has deservingly laid the greatest emphasis and made great and original contri- M., Vol. I, Eps. 207, 217. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1294-1357 A.H.) was a great poet, philosopher and scholar. Since he wrote his Asrār-i-Khudi about 1333 A.H., he became a force which modified the trend of Muslim thought in politics and morals. He attacked mysticism for its doctrines of Fanā' or self-annihilation, and substituted Khudī' or self-affirmation in its place. He also objected to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. *Cf. Iqbal's poems Astūr-i-Khudi (sogni bwl) and .( رموز بیخودی ) Rumuz - i- Bikhudi Asrar-z-Khudi (Secrets of Self): In this Dr. Iqbal denounces mysticism as un-Islamic in its origin and injurious to the national and political life of Musalmāns. Rumūz--Bikhudi (Secrets of Selflessness): In it he lays emphasis on the life according to the Qur-an and the Sunnat, and preaches such morals a's are more positive.

·42 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid . butions. Thereby he has undermined the whole structure of mysticism in its very foundations, viz., its pantheism. It is this conception in the Mujaddid which I have chosen as the theme of this Dissertation. The Dissertation is divided into four parts: Introduction develops the abstract forms of the Unity of the World-Principle asconceived by the Speculative and the Religious Consciousnesses in their distinctions; and shows how these distinctions tend to be obliterated in Mystic Consciousness. Chapter I describes the Mujaddid's conception of Tawḥīd in contrast to and criticism of Ibn 'Arabī's Pantheistic conception. Chapter II traces how the conception of the Mujaddid was received amongst the mystics of Islām. The Conclusion brings out that the pantheistic conception of Tawḥīd is a case of the 'transformation of the religious unity into the ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 43 speculative unity, or rather the case of the identification of the two unities; that the Mujaddid's conception of Tawhid is in consonance with the religious consciousness, and that the attempts made by the successors of the Mujaddid to re-affirm the pantheistic conception of Tawḥīd are neither based on direct experience nor are they conclusive as rational arguments.

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·INTRODUCTION Unity of the World-Principle MAN takes different attitudes towards the objects of his experience. These attitudes are called different forms of consciousness. Theoretic consciousness is the attitude which he takes towards the world of objects in order to acquire its knowledge; and epistemology or logic is the science that studies the nature and implications of this consciousness. Moral consciousness is another attitude that man takes-he takes it towards mankind; and ethics or moral philosophy is the science that deals with the laws that arise in this field and the implications thereof. Similarly religious consciousness is the attitude that man takes towards ultimate reality; and “theistici or ·46 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid philosophy of religion is the branch of knowledge that studies the nature and implications of this consciousness. These various forms of consciousnecs have definite limits, and they are valid only within such limits. But there are cases in which the various forms of consciousness seem to overlap or conflict with each other. It is for philosophy to consider the limits of these various forms with a view to avoid their overlapping and conflict, and to trace the error lying therein. Further it has to determine the exact sense in which each is valid. The unity of the world-principle is a case of this' kind. The theoretical and the religious consciousnesses seem to overlap on this point. The theoretical or the speculative consciousness is, as said above, the knowledge-attitude of man. It has an ideal of knowledge. It yearns to realise that ideal. This ideal consists in having a unified picture of the universe. It consists in finding out a uniiary principle, out ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 47 of which could spring all the multiplicity of the world--from which the multiplicity could be deduced. Such unity has been hovering before the gaze of every metaphysician. The yearning for it is so intense that the speculative consciousness is strongly inclined to go forward and assert the existence of this unity; indeed it would go still further and grasp the essence of it also. The efforts made in this direction have different forms resulting from the different tendencies of the thinkers who have aried to determine this unity.-The empirically-minded start from the side of the objects of experience, i.e., the multiplicity. They want to seek some empirical object which may be used as a principle of unity forming the basis of all existence. Thales seeks this concrete unity in 'water', which he finds to be the principle of all things; Anaximander finds it in 'matter undetermined'; Anaximenes in air. Democritus finds such a unity in particles of physical things, i.e., 'atoms 1 ·48 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid and void'. The British school of empiricists finds it in ideas and sensations!. Each of them tries to show that the essence of things consists in these entities. Now, these entities, when taken to serve as principles of unity, are really concepts. Each of these attempts is, therefore, an attempt to conceive the unity as a concept from which the multiplicity is deduced. For the unity in each case is not something which exints over and above and beside the multiplicity that is deduced from it, but only as a general idea or concept:--The rationalistically-minded thinkers held that thought and being are essentially one ;'or that thought is the essence of being. They seek the principle of unity expressly in a concept or a system of concepts from which everything could be deduced logically. Parmanides finds that such a concept is ‘Being '; Plato finds it in 'Ideas' or 'Idea of the Good '; Aristotle in pure ‘Form '. Spinoza regards Substance to be such a concept, and Hegel ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 49 6 * Absolute Idea' which absorbs the whole system of categories in itself. Both these tendencies agree in the assumption that there is some such principle of unity and that things can be deduced from such a principle. But critical philosophy denies that. Kant comes to the conclusion that Unity is only a Regulative Idea'. We cannot affirm its objectivity--we cannot maintain that the principle of the world is one. As a 'Regulative Idea', it is only helpful in our attempt to construct a unified system of knowledge; and as such it consists in this that we should go on making attempt after attempt to discover a law from which all other laws could be deduced or expressed as its modes ;-though we know that we can never fully succeed in this attempt. On the other hand a unitary principle is the very mainstay of the religious consciousness. The religious consciousness is that attitude of man which he takes towards the 4 ·50 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Ultimate. Reality. But how does religious consciousness conceive this principle? Now, what is the religious situation? Man finds himself confronted in his course with insurmountable obstacles. On the one side stands he with his innate yearning after harmony with reality, after moral perfection and happiness, after knowledge and after beauty. On the other stands the universe, stupendous, dark and brutal, full of sin and ugliness, unamenable to harmony with his moral and spiritual yearnings, and unwilling to accede-to the demands of his soul. He finds himself helpless—forlorn. There must be a Being who has the power, as well as the will, to help him, if he is to be rescued. Hence it is that religious consciousness affirms the existence of such a Being. He can help him in his natural wants and can guide him to the right path. He is Rabb or the Providence, and Razzaq or the Sustainer; and He is Rahmān or the Beneficent, for He accedes ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 51 to his natural wants. He is Hādī or the Guide, for He guides him to the right course; and He is Ghafur-ur-Raḥīm or the Pardoner and the Merciful, Who can give him relief-relief from the unbearable burden of his sins and sinful nature. But He can truly help him only if He knows all facts open or hidden, past or future. Therefore He is Samī'- um-Baṣir or the Hearer and the Seer, and 'Alim-ul-ghaib wash-shahāda or the Omniscient. Further He must have power to do all He likes ;-He is Qadir or the Powerful and Fa“āl-ul limā-yurīd the Accomplisher of all He might wish: the Omnipotent. But such power He can have only if He is the Creator 1 of the world and man. Therefore He is Because if things exist or have come into existence independently of His Will, a limit is set thereby to His Power by their nature; His control over them and over the events of the universe does not remain complete. He thereby ceases to perform the function for the sake of which His existence was rostulated. That is, He cannot satisfy the religious consciousness unless He is also the Creator, Khaliq (üle) and Bari (s)..

·- 52 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Khāliq and Bārī or the Creator. Moreover He must have the supreme will to lead him to perfection ;--He is Dhul-fadl il-'azīm, the most Gracious. He must consequentiy Himself be perfectly Good,-He is Quddūs or the Holy. His help is grace. Man cannot claim it as his right. When man realises his own helplessness and the power of this Being, he is filled with awe and devotion, and beseeches Him for he'p and guidance. He is Ma'büd or the Object of worship, and Mujibud-da'wāt or the Answerer of human prayers. The further implication that dawns on Religious Consciousness, in view of the supremacy of this Being and the exclusiveness of the right of devotion to Him, is that He is One,--He is Ahad or the One, and Şamad or the Self-sufficient who needs nothing and to whom recourse is had in every need. These are the attributes of the Unity which religious consciousness affirms in relation to us, and which we understand and know. But in Him- ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 53 self-in His entirety and His essence, we do by cognition--ما يحيطون به علما :not know Him they cannot comprehend Him; nor can we comprehend Him by analogy, for in His essence nothing is like unto Him: come alors wurde there is nothing like unto Him. With this much of positive and negative knowledge of Him the religious consciousness is satisfied. Now, it is of paramount importance to realise the inherent differences between these two unities—the speculative and the religious. In the nature of the case it would appear that: Firstly, the speculative unity is unqualitative, while the religious unity must necessarily be qualitative, i.e., of a certain nature. The empirically-minded thinkers sought the principle of unity in "water", in "matter undetermined", in "air", in "atoms", in “ideas ", in “sensations ", --in some existent entity. The rationalists found it in “Being ", inº" Idea of the Good”, in "Form", in “Substance ". in ·4 54 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Absolute Idea"-in some concept. The critical philosopher sought it in ‘Abstract Law! This shows that the speculative consciousness is really indifferent to the nature of the unity. It is satisfied if the ideal of unified knowledge is realised. It is all the same to it whether the unity is water or air, atom or idea, matter or mind, conscious or unconscious, mechanical or teleological. It may be of any quality whatsoever, or it may be even qualitiless. The only quality it should possess is that it should be such that from it the multiplicity could be logically deduced, - The speculative consciousness is not even keen that it should be numerically one. It may be one in number or it may be many. But the religious consciousness is in dead earnest exactly with regard to the nature of the unity. The unity must be Rabb and Razzaq,-Providence and Sustainer, and it must be Raḥmān or Beneficent; further it 'must be Ghafür-ur-Rahini or the Pardoner ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 55 and the Merciful, and it must be Hadi or Guide. Moreover, it must be 'Alim-ulghaib wash-shahāda or the Knower of the Open and the Hidden, and it must be Fa'āl-ul limā-yurid or the Doer of whatever He chooses to do. It must further be Khāliq and Bārī or the Creator of the Universe,' and Quddus or the Holy, and Dhul Fadl or the Gracious. And more, it must have the exclusive right of devotion to itself from man, i.e., it must be the only Ma'būd or the Object of worship; and it must be one--numerically one or Aḥad. Indeed, the religious consciousness is so keen Creation means bringing something into being out of complete nothing. This conception, however, is a stumbling block for the speculative consciousness, because such a coming into being is absolutely inconceivable. The speculative consciousness, therefore, must stop in its logical regress at some being or Wujūd, from which it could, by modification, deduce the actual world order. It cannot conceive that a substance can come into being ab novo. About accidents or equalities of the substance it does not seem to be so sceptical,-new qualities do come into being as a matter of fact. But in its purityin its rigour, the speculative consciousness does yearn to deduce even qualities from the primordial essence of the substance (cf. Scientific Materialism).

·56 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid . on the nature of the unity that it yearns even for the oneness of the unity only because of its attributes. It is rather the attributes that demand that the unity in question should be numerically one, for then and then alone can it give the satisfaction for which it has been postulated. Secondly, the speculative unity must naturally be immanent while on the contrary the religious unity must be transcendent. That the speculative unity is immanent means that it does not exist over and above the mưitiplicity but only in multiplicity--which indeed is only a form and modification of it. Empirically conceived, the unity is some existential being, e.g., 'water', 'air ', matter undetermined', 'atom'. The unity here is really only of concept. It does not exist over and above existing things. It is wholly exhausted in its denotation. Rationalistically conceived, it is evidently an abstract concept, e.g., the * Being 'of Parmenides. It has only conceptual 6 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 57 being: it has no existence of its, own. It becomes fact only in things, because.they are conceived as its instances. Even critically conceived, the unity is only a conceptual principle, a law. As such it is abstract; it has no being of its own, and it exists only in its applications. Thus the speculative form of unity in all its three kinds is such that it is nothing other than the unity of an abstract concept ;-in no case it is the unity of an existent being. The concept however either has no being at all, i.e., in the sense of existence; or if it has one, it is exhausted in the being of the instances to which it applies. Thus the speculative unity, if it exists at all, is necessarily immanent. On the contrary the religious unity must be transcendent. It must necessarily be over and above the world and man. It must be wholly an other. Because the despair of man amidst the obstacles that originate in his own nature and those that originate in the nature ·58 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid of the world around him, demands that help should come from a source which is other than the sources of his troubles, and which has full control over the whole world of men and things. Indeed this succour from the source over and above the world is the very purpose for which religious consciousness postulates the existence of such a Being. That is why religious unity is necessarily transcendent. Thirdly, the speculative unity is necessarily monistic, while the religious unity is dualistic. In connection with immanence and transcendence it has in general been brought out above that the speculative unity has no being over and above the multiplicity. This is monism; for it means that the one and the many have no separate existences. But it means more; it means that only the one exists, and that the many have no existence by the side of the one. Now the speculative unity, is of this nature ; for speculative consciousness is out to con- ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 59 ceive the world as one or as differentiation of the one. So far it is qualitative monism. But at a certain stage speculative consciousness is not satisfied with mere qualitative monism ; it will also be quantitative monism, -the Real is one, single, individual ;-it is numerically one. At that stage the unity is conceived either as a whole, or as a substance or as a spirit. But the whole, one single, individual, does not exist over and above the parts,-it is only the organisation of the parts and is incapable of existing in its own right. The position remains that of mere immanence. The unity is consequently raised to the dignity of a substance. Now the many become only modes of the substance, its manifestations, its adjectives; they have no being of their own. When the unity is conceived, not merely as substance but as spirit, it is an Infinite Spirit; and finite spirits are conceived as numerically identical with it. They have no being of their own ; while the material ·60 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid world is conceived either as expressly unreal, or together with the finite spirits as a reproduction or re-realisation of the Infinite Spirit itself. But the religious unity must needs be dualistic. For the situation, that has given rise to the postulating of the existence of a Divine Being, is that man is disappointed with his own self and the nature of the world. Neither of them is capable of according any help to him in his distress. He postulates the existence of a spiritual Being. To be in harmony with Him alone would enable him to realise his yearnings. This implies that God on the one side, and the universe and man on the other, must be fundamentally different in nature. One is perfect, the other imperfect. "It may, by the way, be remarked here that in putting the emphasis on the reality of the one-on its self existence and its supreme value, already the influence of the religious consciousness is present; and where it leads further to the apparent affirmation of the many as existent, as in Plato or Green, the affirmation is made most grudgingly and the point is left obscure.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
61
Both exist-they exist side by side. One is
other than the other. On the contrary, if
religious unity were a whole, it would only be
an aspect or relation of the manifold; it would
not exist in its own right,-only the manifold
would ; and if it were substance or spirit, the
world and man would only be immanent
expressions of and hence essentially, identical
with it, there would be no room for man as
a separate existent and Mence for the specific
religious yearnings; for its object would be
already a realised fact or will necessarily be
realised without any ado and any kind of
external help. In that case there need indeed
be no religion or religious yearning. That is
why the religious consciousness cannot afford
to be monistic; it must be dualistic, -it must
assert the existence of, the imperfect on one
side and that of the Perfect on the other. It
cannot permit the evaporation of the one, or
of the other.
Fourthly, the religious unity must be

·62 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Personal, while speculative unity need not be personal-indeed it tends to be Impersonal. Personality implies consciousness; nay it implies more, it implies self-conscivusness, consciousness of itself as over and above-as other than something else, i.e. as transcending them. But we can conceive a being who is self-conscious, and yet it will hardly deserve the name of personality unless it can determine its own action according to the principies of morality, i.e., unless it is free. Again, such a being may be just--absolutely just; it nifay be holy. But that is not enough; it would then be only the doctrine of “Karma" hypostatised. We want more. It should be capable not only of justice but also of grace. which forms the distinctive feature of personality. A man who always gives you but your deserts, neither more nor less, will be regarded by you as lacking in personal elements. Now, the religious consciousness seeks a unity which is eminently personal. It seeks that It is grace ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 63 the 'Divine Being should be aware of my actual condition ; and that it should be aware of my yearnings; more, it should have grace-- it should be capable of satisfying my yearnings in spite of my shortcomings--in spite of my failure to deserve what I yearn for. That is to say, the religious unity must be fully personal. Not so the speculative consciousness. It is not interested in personality. It wants only a unity; whether it is personal or impersonal is immaterial to it. As brought out above in discussing immanence and transcendence, as well as monism and dualism, speculative consciousness has conceived its unity pre-eminently as impersonal. So long as the unity is only a qualitative one, the issue is clear. But when it becomes a quantitative unity—the whole, the substance, the spirit, even there the speculative consciousness is not inclined to conceive the unity as personal. As a whole, it may be any kind of whole as a substance again it may ·64 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid be any kind of substance. Indeed, as such, it is, as in Spinoza and Schelling, something other than self-conscious. Only as spirit it looks like a person. Here it is the religious interest that is at work. However, the attributing of a kind of transcendence to that spirit turns out to be nominal ; it loses itself in the demand, inherent in speculative consciousness, for immanence. The spirit is not other than anything else, or no being is other than the spirit. This makes self-consciousness doubtful; hence the idealist is strongly inclined to refuse personality to it. Moreover the speculative consciousness is loath to ascribe freedom to it, or it would interpret freedom as identical with necessity; for necessity alone satisfies the demand of the speculative consciousness ;--indeed it yearns for unity and necessity. With necessity there hardly remains any room for grace. Thus all the elements of personality are jeopardised by the requireinents of the speculative consciousness.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 65 Fifthly, the religious unity must be Freeabsolutely free, and it must admit of moral freedom for man ; while the speculative unity need neither be itself free nor need it admit of the freedom of man. Freedom means, positively, the possession of inherent independence in the object called free to determine the mode of its activity ; and negatively, the absence of any kind of external restraint or internal constraint on its action.-Religious consciousness conceives the unity as a perfect Being. It must therefore be morally perfect, have grace, and be self-sufficient. Now, morality necessarily involves freedom; the Divine Being, if He is morally perfect, must be fully free. Further if He is to have grace, which is so inevitably demanded by religious,consciousness, He must have freedom; otherwise, if grace in its various forms, viz., beneficence, sustenance, guidance, mercy, forgiveness and reward, is a necessity of His rature, then it will come to 5 ·66 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid us without yearning for it;--and more, it will hardly deserve the name of grace, for it will be from the moral standpoint of a lower kind than the grace which even man is capable of showing. Moreover, freedom is a requirement of His Şamadiyyat or Self-sufficiency. He does not need anything ; not even the exhibition of any kind of attitude or action towards other beings. What He does for man is, therefore, avsolutely unselfish, and hence absolutely free. And there is room for the freedom of man also, for man must be free, if he is created by Him to yearn for moral perfection and to seek His grace. The speculative consciousness, on the contrary, yearns exactly for necessity,-it would have a unity from which all multiplicity could be deduced rigorously. Hence there can be no freedom in its unity, nor in the multiplicity which proceeds from it. When the speculative consciousness conceived the unity &S existent object, e.g., in materialism, etc., the

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
67
unity is conceived as a cause, from which the
whole world process originates and proceeds
on the principle of mechanical causality.
When it conceives the unity as a rational
concept, e.g., the monism of Spinoza, the
principle on which it acts and on which the
multiplicity is derived from it is the principle
of logical ground-consequence. When the
speculative consciousness seems to go further
and conceive the unity as a spirit, it has then
the appearance of affirming freedom in the
unity as well as in man. But then what is
really meant is only the want of external
constraint; and freedom is identified with
internal necessity,----which in truth is no
freedom.
Sixthly, Immortality is another point which
is bound up for the religious consciousness
with its unity, but which is ‘hardly of any
consequence from the standpoint of the
speculative unity.
The religious consciousness yearns for per--

·68 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid fection-perfection which is wanting in man, and which to all appearances cannot be attained by him in this short span of life ; nor by his own endeavours, unless the whole system of reality is somehow transformed into a new order. It is for this reason that immortality as wefi as the existence of Divine Being is postulated by it. The two are really two phases of one and the same postulate,-- the former is the súbjective condition and the latter the objective condition of one and the same requirement. But for the speculative consciousness both these conditions are unnecessary. It neither cares for a definite qualitative nature of the unity, nor consequently for the survival of human soul after death, This because it is not the interest of the, speculative consciousness that the multiplicity, or indeed that the unity, should have a particular nature. Its problem is to find out the unity from which *the multiplicity as such could necessarily be ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 69 deduced. Hence it is that all the attempts to determine the speculative unity and trace the growth of multiplicity from it are indifferent as to the immortality of the human soul. They are not only indifferent as to the immortality of the human soul, they rather strongly tend to deny it. If the unity is only qualitative one, then too the soul is a transitory mode of the substance. Its being is in every case adjectival. Even when it seems to attain to self-subsistence, as in idealism, its survival after death is the survival of its memory (or idea) in God or the survival of the element common to all the souls, i.e., their general idea ;-in every case it is re-absorbed in God. Seventhly, the speculative unity must be absolutely knowable, while the religious unity need not be knowable at all. The speculative unity has its origin in the yearning to know reality. The speculative consciousness is knowledge consciousness. It ·70 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid by us. assumes that reality is essentially knowable Hence when the empirically-minded comes to the task of metaphysics, he grasps reality as fundamentally matter, material, physical,--as the direct object of immediate perception; or as sensations and ideas, psychical, mental,--again as something which is directly apprehended in introspection. The world-picture that is thereby constructed is materialism or subjective idealism. While if the task is undertaken by the rationalistically-minded, the world is grasped as a system of concepts or categories --of that which is the proper object of thought and can be grasped by the intellect without remainder. The world-picture thus produced is idealism, But if the attempt were to be made critically, i.e., on the principle of Kant, the unity shall have to be conceived as that of a Law from which all other laws could be rigorously derived,-law which is again an abstract object and is fully grasped by thought. However, etc.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 71 for Kant it is only a regulative idea and has no objectivity. Thus we see that it.makes no difference what kind of unity is taken as the unity of the world by the speculative consciousness, it is through and through known and knowable. But the religious unity need be only partly knowable; it need not be wholly knowable,- indeed it is not wholly knowable, because the demand for it arises in the need of man for a being who could protect and guide and help him in the world-situation in which he finds himself. The unity must therefore have the attributes requisite for the purpose. But they constitute the nature of the unity with regard to-in relation with him. They are neither all the attributes, nor need they necessarily define the absolute nature of the unity. And the humility incident to the attitude towards the unity and the immense grandeur of the unity.necessarily lead maņ to maintain that it surpasses the grasp of his tiny faculties and is ·لا يعلمه لا هو to confess that 72 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid essentially incomprehensible by him. He has -no one knows him but He Himself and lands as wgbrosu -by cognition they cannot comprehend him. Indeed the religious consciousness in its highest form, viz., revelation seems to hold that the unity is not knowable, even in relation to us, at all, that it is knowable neither in its existence, nor even with regard to its attributes in relation to us; for its existence and its attributes are beyond experience, only it is convinced of and hence believes in the existence of the unity, and in such attributes of it as necessitated the postulate of its existence; there is no question of knowledge. Eighthly, each of these unities engenders a different mode of life. The speculative consciousness breeds contemplation, meditation, quietude; while the religious consciousness arouses yearning, struggle, activity. The speculative unity, once grasped, brings all activity to end. For if the unity is grasped ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 73 as perfect, the highest activity becomes the timeless activity of thought which is dialectic" for Plato, and “theoria” for Aristotle : and human beings become perfect with the perfection of God-the unity of which they are modes (Spinoza); and hence there remains no room for activity. Bút if the unity is conceived as imperfect, there arise two alternatives. In one case, it would be once for all imperfect and determined by its inner necessity; and hence all exertion to make it perfect would be futile. In the other, that is if the unity involves progress towards perfection, it would of necessity grow perfect and no activity on the part of us human beings is required for its perfection.-In its very nature the speculative consciousness in knowledgeconsciousness. And knowledge in itself produces contemplation and not activity. But it is quite the other way about with the religious unity. The need of the religious unity has arisen in man from the situation that ·74 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid there are many yearnings in his soul, and the world around him as well as his own nature raises insuperable obstacles in his way to their realisation. The help and guidance from the religious unity, i.e., God, require and inspire him to active struggle against these obstacles. The struggle aims at bringing his own nature in harmony with the Divine Will, and in bringing the whole order of the world too in harmony with His Will. This struggle to create the subjective and objective harmony is not the means to the realisation of these yearnings; rather the struggle itself is the gradual realisation of them. The task is so gigantic that it must continue till the end of the world, and requires enormous and incessant work.-Indeed the religious consciousness is yearning-it is yearning to become something, to get to something, to bring about something; it is practical consciousness and must needs generate activity. These distinctions between the speculative ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 75 and the religious unities are of paramount importance. They must not be obliterated. Now pantheism, the doctrine of Islamic mystics called Wahdat-i-Wujūd, seems exactly to do this;-it obliterates these distinctions. It seems to identify the religious unity with the speculative unity. The confusion of these two very distinct unities is not confined to mystics only; it is found also in philosophers. There seems to be an urge in human nature to make of these two one unity. What happens is this. The two unities lie latent in the consciousness of the subject, the thinker or the mystic. Both are descriptions of ultimate reality. The primary approach to it is either through the medium of thought or that of intuition,--to the speculative unity or to the religious unity: If to the former, the attributes of the religious unity are unawares attached to it, if to the latter, those of the speculative unity.. Thus are the 'Substance' of Spinoza and the• ' Idea' of Hegel endowed ·76 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid with Divine attributes; and thus are the Deity of Plotinus and God of Jāmī deduced from the conception of pure Being. More particularly what seems to happen in the case of a Muslim mystic is this. To begin with, he is a Muslim. He believes in God, he believes in His åttributes, and he believes in his own responsibility and in life-afterdeath ;-indeed he believes in all that has been given to him by the religious consciousness as it manifested itself in Muhammad. Then there happens to arise a yearning in his soul,--the transcendental yearning of Kant, to know God. Ordinary experience palpably has no place here. He is led to believe that there is a new kind of experience,-a transcendental experience which can be acquired. That is, there is something called "Kashf-o- Shuhüd” by which one can know God. He takes to it. He now knows;-he realises God and he realises His nature. The reason that he now uses in this connection too is Kashf- ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 77 0-Shuhud; it is spiritual reason. Thus both the elements of knowledge, viz., experience and reason get to their rights; only they are transcendental. In this way the Islamic mystic passes over to the speculative consciousness-to knowledge consciousness. All the inherent requirements of the speculative consciousness must now be fulfilled; God must be grasped now as the speculative unity. The mystic knows that He is knowable, that He is immanent, that He is the only existent, etc. “The attributes, which he formerly believed in, remain confusedly tacked on to his newly-attained knowledge. Sometimes the mystic himself remains unaware of the confusion; sometimes he becomes aware of it, and either throws such attributes overboard in favour of the speculative attributes, or permits the confusion to remain for fear of dire consequences to himself or to the vulgar who would lose all if they were told what the truth is.

·78 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid But what the Islamic mystics consciously held is this: Mysticism is an attempt to have a firsthand experience of what the Prophet of Islam is supposed to have experienced. The Islamic mystic believes that the Prophet experienced God and Eternity. The mystic is out to experience them himself. He adopts certain practices called “Mujāhida” or spiritual exercises. On his way he believes he acquires certain occuit powers to work Karāmāt, miracles. With these we are not concerned. However it must be borne in mind that in all this he tries to keep to Islam and its spirit. What interests us is the third element of mysticism, viz. Kashf-o-Ilhām" or intuition of God and Eternity. The mystic believes that he comes to apprehend eternal verities and God directly. This is what is also known as religious experience. The subject comes, so to say, in direct contact with Divine Being. He has immediate wisjon of God. The result is “Haqq-ul- ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 79 Yaqin"- the infallible certainty of His existence and His essence. The competence and validity of Kashf-o-Ilhām as the faculty cognisant of Divine Being is assumed without question; and it is maintained that Kashf is qualitatively different from reason. It is the direct apprehension of ultimate Reality. Now it must be borne in mind that on the principles of Islamic mysticism the reliability of Kashf is to be measured by the criterion of the spiritual experience of the Prophet of God; for that was the highest and the truest experience. This gives us a standard, so to say,-an internal evidence of the truth or 1 Haqq-ul-Yaqin (ändi öz ): Literally absolute certainty. Yaqin or certainty according to mystics has three stages;- ilm-ulyaqin', 'ain-ul-yaqin', haqq-ul-yaqin'. Onc finds smoke and is certain that there is fire, this is ilm-ul-yaqin', one sees fire with his own eyes, he is more sure than the first person of the existence of fire, this is 'ain-ul-yaqin' one puts his hand in fire and gets a burn, he realises the existence of fire, this is haqq-ulyaqin. With reference to the Being of Allāh, the mystics believe that one passes through similar stages of certainty and realisation. But on the principle of the Mujaddid none of these kinds of y'aqīn is possible irá case of the Being of God.

·80 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid otherwise of the findings of a mystic. Throwing a glance on the history and development of pantheism or Wahdat-i-Wujūd in Islamic mysticism, we find that before Ibn *Arabi and Hakim-i-Ishrāq, there are to be found only accidental utterances of sundry mystics purporting to pantheism. For example Bāyazid Bustāmī (d. 261 A.H.) is said to Holy am--سبحانی ماأعظم شانی ,have exclaimed I, how great is my Glory; and Manşūr (d. 309 A.H.) ösuji blomI am the Truth; the implication thereof being that the relation between me and Him is that of identity. It was Ibn 'Arabī who seems to have been the first to interpret his own mystic experience of Tawḥīd, or unity in such a way as to be intelligible to others, and to have strenuously maintained that Wahdat-i- Wujūd is the very essence of Islam. And Ibn 'Arabī tried to support his interpretation with verses of the Qur-an and the sayings of the 3 1 Shaikh Shahab'uddia Suharwardī, the author or lat-ul- Ishrāg, (d. 578 A.H.).

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 81 1 6 Holy Prophet. Ibn 'Arabī has had enormous influence on mystic thought in Islani. Consequently Ibn Taimiyya had to write a treatise, >aglötag Jlbils”-Refutation of Pantheism-in which he strongly criticised Ibn 'Arabi's conception of Tawḥīd and its implications. But perhaps Ibn Taimiyya's criticism was too early. At least it had little influence in the Islamic East. Ibn 'Arabî had not yet come to sway the Islamic soul. It was later that his sway became complete. Practically everyone accepted Wahdat-i-Wujud and held it on the basis of mystic experience. It was at this stage that the Mujaddid appeared. He found Wahdat-i-Wujūd ram- 1 * Ibn Taimiyya (661-728 A.H.) and Imām Dhahabi (d. 748 A.H.) as theologians strongly opposed Ibn 'Arabi. Dr. F. Krenkow has kindly enlightenei me on the point. He writes: " In Syria and Egypt was a similar struggle against sufi Pantheism waged by Ibn Taimiyya and the historian and Muhaddith Dhahabi. In the eighth century the adherents of Sufism were found in Egypt and Sy.ia only among emigrants from Persia and Indica airt. I fear they had a bad time. A Khāngāh in Cairo, Sa'id-as-Su'ada', generally harboured them." 13 6 ·82 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid pant. He himself went through it in his mystic development. And the real point of interest is that he throws it overboard as a mystic, i.e., exactly on the ground of his own advanced mystic experience; and he seems to have liberated the religious unity from its complication with” the speculative unity on that very ground. And his findings apparently bear the test, the criterion of the reliability of mystic experience, namely, it coalesces with the findings of the religious experience of the Prophet as generally formulated by Muslim divines! Describing his internal history, the Mujaddid writes that at first he only believed in Wahdat-i-Wujūd; for from early childhood he knew it on rational grounds and was thoroughly convinced of its truth. But when he entered mysticism, it was then that he first realised Wahdat-i-Wujūd as a spiritual experience and came to know it first-hand. Long did he remain in the maqām or stage;

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 83 and all knowledge that is incident to that stage was granted to him.' Afterwards a new kind of spiritual experience took hold of his soul, and he found that he could hold Wahdat-i-Wujūd no longer. Yet he hesitated to give expression to his new experience, because he had cherished Wahdat-i-Wujūd so long. At last he had to reject it definitely, and it was revealed to him that Wahdat-i-Wujūd was a lower stage and that he had arrived at a higher stage, viz., Zilliyyat or adumberation. His rejection was now something which he could no longer help, though he was really unwilling to reject it because of the respect for the great leaders of mysticism who all had held it. However, he yearned to continue at the stage of Zilliyyat or adumberation for Zilliyyat or adumberation has a' kinship with Wahdat-i-Wujūd. In it he experienced himself and the world, as the zill or shadow of * M., Vol. I. Ep. 31.

·84
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
God. But the grace of God took him higher
up to the highest stage, viz. 'Abdiyyat or
servitude. Then did he realise that 'Abdiyyat
or servitude is very high above all other
stages; and he repented having yearned to
stick to Wahdat-i-Wujūd and Zilliyyat" or
adumberation.
Naturally enough, one expects that those
of the Muslim mystics who have chosen to
differ with the Mujaddid and have gone back
to Ibn 'Arabī and his Wahdat-i-Wujūd, for
example Shāh Wali-Ullah, should primarily
contest the position of the Mujaddid on the
basis of mystic experience, and not merely on
rationalistic or logical grounds,-that they
should base their case on the religious
consciousness and not on the speculative
consciousness.
With these introductory remarks, let us
proceed to discuss the position of the
Mujaddið in detail.
M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

·CHAPTER I The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawḥīd literally means oneness. But in Islam, the term denotes the religious unity. As we have seen, the religious unity must be numerically one, and unique in the possession of all the attributes of perfection. This is Tawḥīd. The conception of Tawḥid as developed by the Mujaddid has historically arisen in his mind in close contrast with-indeed as a protest against Wahdat-i-Wujūd or the unityism. He takes Ibn 'Arabī in particular for criticism, because Ibn 'Arabī is the great mystic who, for the depth, of his insight and comprehensiveness of his argumentation, may well be called the 'Imām' or the Leader of pan- ·86 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid ; theistic mystics in Islam; indeed he is actually called Shaikh-i-Akbar or the greatest Shaikh. It is consequently necessary to give a brief exposition of Ibn 'Arabī's conception of Tawḥīd and the Mujaddid's criticism. 1.-Ibn 'Arabī's Wahdat-2-Wujūd or Unityism and the Mujaddid's Criticism of it IBN 'ARABI'S position with regard to Tawhid is that Being is one, it is that which exists. This Being is Allah. Everything else is His manifestation. Hence the world is identical with Allah. The identity of the world and Allah is conceived on the basis of the identity of His Dhāt-o-Şifāt? or existence and 1 is very (صفات) and Sifat (ذات) The distinction of phat nearly the distinction of substance and attributes. At times it looks like that of existence and essence. Jt can be rendered as the distinction of Being and Nature, or I and Its Qualities. Asma' (olawl) plural of Ism, ineans Divine Names with reference to pafticular Şifat or Dhat as they occur in the Qur-an, e.g., .

·Majaddid's Conception of Tawhid 87 essence-substance and attribute; the world being only a Tajalli' or manifestation of His Şifāt? or attributes. In other words, the creation of the world is a form of emanation. The theory of emanation as held by Ibn 'Arabī and especially as elaborated by his followers as well as the later mysties, e.g., Jāmī, is this. 1 Rahim (ay), the Merciful, as they are the names of Allah in virtue of His qualities or activities, i.e., an Ism combines Dhāt and Sifāt. 1 Tajalli (3) is really shining forth. The conception underlying it is that God is Light and this Light shines forth as if bodily in many forms. Hence it may be translated as eradiation, effluence, emanation, manifestation and in philosophical terminology is equivalent to Mode. When the Light shines forth on itself it is Tajalli-bi-nafsihi (amsis slsij). As the Light shines forth in various grades to the mystic it is Tajalli'-i-Dhāti or Şifātī, etc. ; with reference to the mystic it means the vision of the Light or illumination by it. If this vision is that of the attributes of God it is Tajalli*-i-Sifati (wileo sis), if it is the vision of the Being or Dhät of Allah it is Tajalli'-i-Dhāti csüli szj). 2 ShF., p. 8, lines 15-21, and p. 9, lines 6, 11, 15, 16, 21. * The act of creation by the words (“ Be ") is nothing but the descent of the Creator Himself into the being of things. See ShF., p. 178, līnes 25 27 : p. 183, lines 10, 11; p. 213, lines 11-12; p. 152, lines 11-16; p. 253, line 22.

·88 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid The Being is indeterminate; it is the stage of Lā-ta'ayyun or Indeterminateness of the unity. In its Descent or Determination it passes through five stages. The first two are 'Ilmi or Cognitive and the last three are Khāriji or Existential. In the first descent, the unity becomes conscious of itself as pure being, and the consciousness of Şifāt is only Ijmālī, i.e., general,----it is implicit. In the second descent, the unity becomes conscious of itself as possessing the attributes; that is the stage of Şifāt-i-tafsili, i.e., attributes in detail, --it is explicit. These two descents seem conceived as conceptual or logical rather than actual; for they are out of time, and the distinction of Dhāt and Şifāt or its attributes is only Dhahnī or logical.—Then begin the real actual descents. . The third descent therefore is Taayyun-i-rūḥī or the determination as spirit or spirits; the unity has broken itself up irto so many spirits, elles, angels. The fơurth of its descents is Taayyun-i-mithālī or to be

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
89
ideal determination, thereby the world of Ideas
comes into being. And the fifth descent is
Ta'ayyun-i-jasadi or physical determination;
it yields the phenomenal or physical beings.
These stages are only gradual realisations of
the capacities that were already latent in the
attributes.
This brings out that for Ibn 'Arabī Dhāt
or Being is identical with Șifāt or atributes,
and Şifāt express themselves in tajalliyyāt, i.e.
manifestations or modes which are the world
and its objects. This same identity of divine
modes with His attributes, and of attributes
with his Being, is brought out in another way.
Ibn 'Arabī maintains that Asma'-i-Ilāhī or
Divine Names are identical with the Musammā
or the Named, and the Musammā is the very
being of Allah ;and that the Divine Names,
although they are many, denote the same
M., Vol. II, E.: 1.
* ShF., p. 143-text of FH.

·90 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 41 entity;1 and that whatever is denoted by each names separately is denoted by all of them together.. God can be praised with any name or with all the names together, Because all the names denote the same being. Just as He is manifold as regards His Names, and One as regards His being, so He is Ahadiyyati-Ma'qūla? like Hayūlā or or 'matter' or a conceptual unity as regards His being, and manifold as regards His existence, because the created beings are nothing but He himself in self-emanation. Now this identification of Asma' or names and Musammā the named is only another name for the identification of Dhāt and Şifāt, i.e., Being and Attributes, ShF., p. 223-text of FH. Ibid., pp. 226-227. * Ahadiyyat (dualis the quality of being one; it is a stage in mystic journey where the mystic turns away from multiplicity and sees only unity. Ahadiyyat-i-Ma'qula (adgäso sl) means conceptual unity--unity which is conceptually grasped. * Hayūlā Ligo) is 'Matter' in the Aristotelean sense, which haş Sürat (yo) or 'Form'as its correlative. * ShF., p. 253-text of FH.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 91 because 'Ism' or name is nothing but the description of the object in virtue of an attribute of the being. As to the relation between the world and God, Ibn 'Arabī holds that it is one of identity. In bringing out this identification he proceeds either from the negation of the world or from the affirmation of God. Proceeding from the negation of the world, Ibn 'Arabī holds that the world as such is merely nominal, unreal, imaginary, objectively nonexistent, and that God alone exists. The world or multiplicity exists only as the modes of the unity-as His modes; it has no existence of its own: Jgg woäsiblyüngüloolis – 1 ShF., p. 117, lines 3-5-text of FH. 2 Ã'yān (hal) is plural of 'Ain (s). It means essence in the terminology of Ibn 'Arabi. But essence can be conceived in two ways; either as the concept of the nature of a thing or as the nature of a thing itself. The latter is something which exists, and may rightly be called the existent nature of the thing. It is in this sense that Ibn Pscabi uses the term A'yān. Ibn 'Arabi calls it Ä'yān-uth-Thabita (nädal hel). They are Thabita because they are posited as existent; they are therefore existent essences.

·92 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid the essences which are existent nature of things have not got the slightest touch of reality about them. Proceeding from the side of God, Ibn 'Arabī maintains that the world is God; it is the modes in which the unity has differentiated itself; these modes exhaust the unity wholly; the unity has no existence over there مابعد هذا لا لعدم الحكم :and above them is absolute nothingness beyond these modes; and the mystic should not take the trouble of seeking God beyond this world.? But this experience of identity is not a permanent experience. Hence Ibn 'Arabi comes to speak of a new experience called Farq-bad-al-jam" (difference-after-Identity).* * ShF., p. 63, lines 14-15. * Ibid., p. 33, line 17. Fara ( ö ) literally means difference; in mystic terminology it signifies the state of mind in which the mystic feels the sense of being other than God and saparate from Him.- Jan () means coming together; in mystic terminology it signifies the state of mind in which the mystic feels one with God. Farq-ba'dal-Jam (Evler öpi) means separateness after unification; in mystic terminology it is the state of mind in which the mystic has outgrown the stage otsam' and feels hie: !f other than God. ShF., p. 91, line 24.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 93 One may call that which really exists God, or one may call it the world, or one may express his inability to differentiate between the two. It remains one and the same. Again, Ibn 'Arabī denies transcendence, and he denies immanence, because these conceptions imply duality of existent. He puts it thus : if God is posited either as transcendent or as inimanent His infinitude would be lost. Hence Tawhid should be affirmed with Tanzīh' and *Tashbih '?, i.e., with transcendence and immanence both. Again, according to Ibn 'Arabī Allah is Asl or the Thing and the world is His Zill4 or adumberation. But zill or adumbera- 'ShF.. p. 134. lines 22-23: p. 147, lines 10-11. * Tashbih (na) literally means likeness. In theology it means attributing likeness of Creatures, i.l., the qualities of the creatures to the Creator. Ibn 'Arabī takes likeness to be identity and hence Tashbih conics to mean immanence.-Tanzih (oz. ) literally means to purify. In theology it signifies that the attributes of creatures cannot be ascribed to God. In Ibn 'Arabi it comes to mean transcendence. 3 ShF., p. 45, line 12-text of FH. ; p. 48, line 31. * Așl-o-?:(glod) means the Thing and 'ts Adumberation or shadow. In Ibn 'Arabī zill seems to be used as equivalent

·94
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
1
tion is the appearance of așl or the thing; it
is asl appearing, manifesting itself. Hence
the world is identical with Allah.
As to the relation between Man and God,
Ibn 'Arabi maintains that the relation
between God and man is that of identity, of
immanence," of Qurb or nearness. Really
qurb or nearness as affirmed in the verse,
ب اليه من حبل الورید
اقرب
We are nearer---- ذاكن
unto him than his life-artery, means nothing
other than the fact that God Himself is the
very essence of the limbs and parts of man.3
Again, man is said to be created after the
to appearance; it is conceived as In'ikoslu Bejl) or Reflection,
which is well-nigh equivalent to Tajalli or Emanation. But
in the Mujaddid zill in the beginning means shadow which
signifies resemblance with Thing. But as advances,
* zill' becomes more and more of a mere shadow and indicates
insignificance and unreality. In the end it comes to mean only
an effect.
1
Shf., p. 113, line 12, and p. 116, lines 10, 11, 13, 14.
Ibid., p. 77 lines 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and p. 79, lines 9, 13.
3 Ibid., p. 128, lines 2-5-text of FP.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 95 He created--خلق لادم على صورته :image of Allah man after His own Image. That means that man possesses all the attributes of God. “In fact it is His attributes that are manifested in man ; they are bodily there in man. That is one- من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه :why , it is said who comes to cognise his own self comes to cognise his God. That is, knowledge of self is knowledge of God. Ibn 'Arabi's Wahdat-i-Wujud comes out also in connection with his theory of the Purpose of Creation. The purpose of creation, according to him, is the yearning on the کنت کنزا مخفية : part of Allah to know Himself cölal üäisis slulöndali-I was a hidden Treasure; I wished that I should be known, so created the creatures. The yearning to know Himself is the yearning for self-perfection. This perfection consists in expression or realisation of His own self through the 11 ShF., p. 252-**xt of FH. * Ibid., p. 185, lines 1-5-text of FH.

·96 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid temporal and eternal qualities that manifest themselves in the world-process; in other words in actualising all the qualities that were potentially there in Him. Thus from whatever side we start, Ibn 'Arabi unambiguously leads to Wahdat-i-Wujūd. Now turning to the Mujaddid we find that his mystic progress in general has had three stages,' viz., wujūdiyyat or pantheism, zilliyyat or adumberation and 'abdiyyat or servitude. At the first stage he has the spiritual experience of Wahdat-i-Wujud. The object of mysticism at this stage is to turn the belief based on faith or reason into sure and certain knowledge based on direct experience with regard to God and His relation to man and the world,--that God exists, that He is immanent in man and the world, and that His relation with the world is that of identity. This stage lasts for a long interval and the .:M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 97 Mujaddid realises it in all its detail and in all its depth. Then he passes over tq the stage of zilliyyat or adumberation. This is a transitional stage. At it he finds that the world has a being of its own, though it is only the zill or a shadow, semblance of reality. Allah is the Asl or the Real. A sense of duality arises; he seriously begins to doubt Wahdati-Wujud; but he does not yet possess the clarity and the conviction to deny it forthwith. Indeed he yearns to stay on in this stage because it has affinity with Wujūdiyyat,--the world is seen as zill or adumberation of the Asl or the Real, i.e., of Allah. He finds himself reluctant to outgrow this stage, In course of time, however, he outgrows this stage also, and passes over to the stage of 'abdiyyat or servitude the highest stage. Duality of God and the world now becomes clear to him like the light of the day. The 'M. Vol. I, Ep. 31 ; Vol. II, Ep. 42. 7 ·98 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid world and God are two. He is thoroughly convinced of this; and he must promulgate their duality whatever odds there be against him. At this stage he realises that all his previous mystic experiences were really subjective and unreliable ;--they did not ccrrespond to objective "reality. No room is left now for the identity of God and man. His confidence in the objective validity of mystic experience is gardually being undermined. In the end he comes to realise that to speak of an experience of God, which the mystics do, is blasphemy. God is far and far above the grasp of our faculty of reason and of kashf : Polyglelyg asalygdlelyg aül of Allah is beyond the Beyond, and again beyond the Beyond. Neither His being nor His attributes are directly knowable. The only justification for mystic discipline that remains to him now is not the possibility of the experience M., Vol. II, Ep. 42. Ibid., Ep. 1. 2 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 99 of the Divine, but its trend towards the purification of morals. The Mujaddid expressly realises here that Imān-bil-ghaib or the farth in the Unseen alone is the truth.” With these stages of the development of his mystic experience in view, we may now turn to the Mujaddid's criticism of Ibn 'Arabi's Wahdat-i-Wujūd. Let it be remembered that the Mujaddid contests it exactly on the basis on which Ibn 'Arabī held it, viz., mystic experience ;3 though in the exposition of them both rational argument is mixed up with the description of mystic experience. That in God dhät-o-sifat or existence and essence, being and attributes are identical, "Imän-bil-ghaib (kilo olol): Faith in the Unseen,-- Ghaib (s) is opposed to Shahāda, i.e.. to that which can be seen and observed, faith in entities which cannot be seen and observed, c.8., God, Angels, Heaven, Hall, etc., is Iinän-bilghaib. The term is used in this dissertation with particular reference to the Being of God. ? Cf. M., Vol. I. Eps. 207 and 217. * Ibid., Ep. 31: Cf. Ibn 'Arabi. Shf., p. 12, line 24.

·100 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid and that the world is the tajalli or emanation, or mode of şifāt or attributes; these two premises necessarily involve Wahdat-i- Wujūd. The Mujaddid must therefore meet each of these premises. Consequently he holds that each of these premises is invalid. „The şifāt or attributes are not identical with the dhāt or being; but they are over and above the dhät. This is a truth directly apprehended by kashf-i-şahiḥ or veridical intuition, i.e., by genuine mystic experience. Moreover it is also in harmony with Revelation, because the Qur-an says: verily God is wholly sufficient unto Himself, He needs none of the worlds ; (29:5)--the worlds or the creation being but only the Şifāt, in their actuality or realisation according to Ibn 'Arabi. He is perfect in Himself. The attributes, by which He turns to the world and creates it, are other than His Self. Indeed right reason also demands that the attributes *M., Vol. III, Eps. 26, 100, 110., 1 العالمين سان الله لغنی عن ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 101 must be other than His being.–Nor is the world the tajallā or emanation of the șifāt or attributes. For if the world were the tajallī of God's șifāt, it would have been identical with them; but the șifāt are perfect while the world is full of imperfections. For example, human knowledge has no resemblance with God's knowledge, so that one may be called the tajalli of the other. Further Kashf-i-Şahiḥ or true mystic intuition bears testimony to it that the world is not the tajalli or emanation of şifāt or attributes. Moreover when we turn to waḥīor Revelation, which is the criterion of the truth of mystic experience, it bears us out. Ogiva: los ☺jell, els ulsław ----thy Lord is holier than the qualities which they ascribe It says: 1 1 M., Vol. III, Eps. 113-114. * Ibid., Ep. 100. · Wahi (cong) is revelation in general but in Islam it is a revelation of specific nature. It is informatior. or guidance communicated to a Nabi (s) by A'llah through the agency of an angel or directly.

·102 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid to Him (37: 180). That is, there is no likeness. whatsoever between the Divine and the human attributes. Now where Ibn 'Arabi starts from the denial of the world as such and maintains that 'A'yān-uth-thābita' the existent essences of the world have not had the slightest touch of reality, and that it is God alone that exists, the Mujaddid observes that Ibn 'Arabî is talking at the stage of Fanā" or annihilation. It is after the mystic passes over to the higher stages, that he realises the error involved in this stage. It is then alone that he understands the reason of having formerly regarded the world as non-existent. At the stage of Fanā or annihilation the mystic was absorbed in the being of God and utter "M., Vol. II, Ep. 1. * Fanā (lis) literally means self-annihilation. In mystic terminology it means the stage at which the mystic turns his face away from everything other than Allah and forgets it totally. The obliviousness leads in certain cases to the denial of everything other than Allah.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 103 forgetfulness with regard to mā-siwā--things other than God had taken hold of him. Hence he could perceive nothing but God.' Consequently he began to deny the existence of everything else and affirm the being of Allah alone. Just as when the sun shines the stars disappear in its light and cannot be observed, although they are actually present in the sky and have not ceased to exist; in the same manner the mystic was so much occupied with the being of God that he was unable to apprehend and affirm other things in spite of the fact that the things were actually there.” In fact Ibn 'Arabi does not seem to have realised Fanā or annihilation adequately, for he is still aware of the world; that is how he could identify it with God." Secondly, Ibn 'Arabi's position does not satisfy the criterion of kashf-i-sahih or veridical in- M. Vol. I, Eps. 122, 291. * Ibid., Ep. 43 * Ibid., Ep. 272 ; Vol. II, Ep. 35.

·104 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid tuition, viz., it is not in accordance with 'Waḥi'. It is against revelation. We have been taught by develation that God is wholly other than the world, and that the world exists. Had it not been so, awāmir-o-nawāhī or the commandments of commission and omission, and the actions in accordance with those commandments, should have become meaningless. The imperatires and the actions according to them can have meaning only if the world really exists. Otherwise reward and punishment cannot rightly follow on them and the Hereafter becomes meaningless." Thirdly, it is scepticism to deny the objective reality and external existence of the world and call it unreal and non-existent; indeed it is a denial of God's attribute of Ibdā' or creation and of the fact that He really created a world. Moreover to call it mawhüm will not do. For mawhüm may mean a . *M., Vol. III, Ep. 67. Ibid., Vol. II, Ep. 44.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
105
number of things. In one sense mawhūm
means that the world is simply the invention
of our imagination; it is nothing but our
own ideas. In this case it would disappear
if our imagination were to disappear. This
is downright scepticism and denial of God's
attribute of Ibda' or creation, as said above;
and it is wholly untenable. In the other sense,
mawhüm means that she world does exist
objectively, though its existence as compared
to God's is as insignificant as the existence
of a mere imaginary thing. In this sense it
would be wrong to hold that it is identical
with God. For the world is contingent,
while God is necessary; they can never be
identical with one another. The former is
temporal, the latter is eternal. One is subject
to 'How and Why', and the other is above
it. Consequently from both the points of
view, religious and rational, it is impossible
to hold that the world does not exist, or that
*M., Vol. III, Ep. 58.

·106 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid it is identical with God.! Further where Ibn 'Arabī starts with the solo reality of God, the Mujaddid points out that Ibn 'Arabī is speaking at the stage of Tajalli'-i-dhātī or vision of Being, i.e., the stage at which the mystic feels that he is directly apprehending the being of God. But the mystic discovers the error involved therein only when he outgrows that stage. Then and then alone he realises that God is wholly other and beyond this world, and that he cannot approach Him, and that the identity of the world and God was a fabrication of his own mind. Ibn 'Arabi took the world as identical with God because he did not pass beyond this stage. It was the highest stage of his mystic progress. Had he advanced further, he would have realised that God is beyond all kashf-o-shuhud or intuition and experience. Indeed had Ibn 'Arabî realised * M., Vol. 1, Ep. 31. "Ibid., Vol. III, Ep. 75 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 107 Tajalli'-i-dhātī or vision-of-being fully, he should have talked only of God, and not at all of the world and its idertification with God. Further, this mystic intuition of Ibn *Arabí, unless interpreted otherwise, is absolutely opposed to Revelation. According to Revelation it is a heresy of the worst kind." Another aspect in Ibn 'Arabī's exposition of Wahdat-i-Wujud is his doctrine of Farqbad-al-jam' or difference after identity. The objection that the Mujaddid raises in this connection is this: If it is true to say that Ä'yān-i-khāriji or existent essences have not had the slightest touch of existence, how is it possible that affirmation of God only bit-tanzīh, i.e., as a transcendent Being, can change His infinitude into finitude ? God is existent and the world is non-existent and imaginary, having no objective being. How can an imaginary being set limits to the 1 M., VOI. III, Ep. 32. 'Ibid., Ep. 89.

·108
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
existentially real? It is equivalent to saying
that the mere idea of God's equal can destroy
the quality of His uniqueness !! Secondly, if
tashbih or immanence must be joined with
tanzīh or transcendence, the mā-siwă-llah
or things other than God cease to bę. Hence
it is why that Ibn 'Arabī maintained that
worship of any object whatsoever is the
worship of Allah ;_which is diametrically
opposed to waħi or Revelation. The Qur-ān
قل يا أهل الكتاب تعالوا الى كلمة سواء : teaches
بیننا و بینکم الا نعبدو لا الله ولا نشرك به شيأ ولا يتخذ
بعضنا بعضا اربابا من دون الله فان تولوا فقولوا اشهدوا
9
h
Oggolaw lill--Say:“O followers of the Book!
Come to an equitable proposition between us
and you that we shall not worship any but
Allah and (that) we shall not associate aught
with Him, and (that) some of us shall not take
others for lords. besides Allah; but if they
turn back, then
say:
• Bear witness that we are
M., Vol. 111, Ep. 74.
- Cf. ShF., p. 55, lines 4, 9, 10, 11. '

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 109 Muslims'l". That means that 'Ahl-i-Kitāb' or the people of the scriptures worshipped some things other than Allah, and that things and beings other than Allah there are. Thirdly, those who combine immanence with transcendence do not know that God is beyond the reach of our reason and.comprehension, and that what they regard as immanent are mere fabrications of their own imagination, whom they have raised to the dignity of God. God is high above our kashf-o-shuhūd'or intuition and experience. Fourthly, the stage which Ibn 'Arabî calls the stage of Farq-ba'd-al-jam“, i.c., difference-after-identity, is not the stage of Farq-bad-al-jam'. That stage is attained only when the world and God are realised as different from one another, while Ibn 'Arabī did not realise them as separate and distinct. In fact Ibn 'Arabi did not reach this stage; "Q., 3: 6-1, 2 M., Vol 1, Ep. 272. 3 Ibid., Ep. 9.

·110 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid that is why he proposes that one may call the 'real' God, or he may call it the world, or he may, express his perplexity on account of their indistinguishability. The stage of Farq-badal-jam' is realised only when the mystic differentiates between the world and God; and it is a higher stage than that reached by Ibn 'Arabi.? Again where Ibn Arabî has based Wahdat-i-Wujūd on the identity of așl and zill, i.e., the thing and its adumberation, the Mujaddid contends that the zill or adumberation of a thing can never be identical with the asl or being, the zill is only a copy or a likeness of the asl. In case of God the zill is contingent, and the așl Necessary. The essence of the contingent is non-being and that of the necessary being. Hence asl and zill can never be identical.? For example, if the shadow of a M., Vol. III, Ep. 71; Cf. Ibid., Vol. I. Ep. 285. * Ibid., Vol. I, Ep. 290. ..!bid., Vol. II, Ep. 1.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
111
person is prolonged, it can never be said that
the person is prolonged. Now, firstly, the
world is not the zill of God; and secondly,
even if it may be taken as the zill of God, the
identity of the two is not proved.
As to man and his identity with God, Ibn
‘Arabi is not right in basing it on the verse :
tell his vero dall! ust-- We are nearer
unto him than his own life-artery. Certainly
God is nearer to us than our life-artery; but
the nature of His Qurb or Nearness is beyond
our comprehension.' Nor is he right in his
God خلق لا ادم على صورته interpretation of
created man after His own image. This does
not mean that man is the embodiment of the
attributes of the Creator. It only means that
both God and the human soul are non-spatial,
and that they resemble each other in this
respect.” Otherwise there is a vast difference
M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.
2 Ibid., Vol. II, Ep. 46.
3 Ibid., Vol. I, Ep. 287.

·112 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid between man and God, as there is, for example, between the spider that warily spins its web and a being who by a single breath can wipe out the whole structure of heaven and earth. God and man simply cannot be identical." Again Ibn 'Arabī is not right in his interone-من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه pretation of to who comes to cognise his self comes cognise God. That knowledge of the self is the knowledge of God, does not mean that therefore the self and God are identical. No. It only means that one who has fully become conscious of the defects and imperfections in his own nature realises that values and perfections are possible only through God; and that God is the source and embodiment of all values and perfections." As to the Purpose of Creation, the Mujaddid observes that Ibn 'Arabi's position implies that God was not perfect in Himself; and 1 M., Vol. I. Ep. 310. hid.. Vol. I, Ep. 234.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 113 that He had to depend on the world for His perfections. But, firstly, this is against religion and against Revelation. According to Revelation God is absolutely independent of verily Allah-سان الله الغني عن العالمين .the world is sufficient unto Himself and needs no worlds. Secondly, accortling to Revelation the purpose of creation is not knowledge at all but 'Ibādat, service: The Qur-ān says: Ugute Howidlig utläätsloo I have not created man and jinn but exclusively for 'Ibādat (51:56). However, one may say that 'Ibadat means Ma'rifat, i.e., knowledge of God. All the same, in the knowledge of God consists 1 M., Vol. III, Ep. 110. 2 *Ibadat (ürlus) may generally be called worship but is not exactly that. It is rather the consciousness of one's own insignificance and humility in relation to a being whose qualities are incommensurable, and not the consciousness of the qualities of that being. Hence *Ibadat' is any action performed with a will to be in harmony with Him. According to Islam Allah is exclusively the Ma'büd (gw), object of worship. Ma'budiyyat is the muality of being Ma'büd. 'Abd (uns) is the person who performs 'Ibädat.

·114 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid the perfection of man and not the perfection of God, who is perfect in Himself and is not affected by the creation of the world. He is لان كما كان ,as He was before the creation -He is now just as He was, i.e., Perfect. Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is not true, wujūd or Being is not one, insists the Mujaddid.The experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or identity of being is not objective ; it is subjective, it is merely Wahdat-i-Shuhūd?-apparent identity--the mystic only feels or sees One. And the Mujaddid traces the origin of this mistake in mystic experience. How does *M., Vol. I, Ep. 266. 2 Wahdat-i-Shuhud (gpuan üg) or Tawhid-i-Shuhudi (syg friggi) means unity of appearance. It is the Mujaddid's interpretation of Wahdat-i-Wujūd. The exact translation is difficult. It may be translated as apparentism. According to him the experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd is only appearance. It appears to be so but is not really so; it is mere Shuhud or seeming. So Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or Tawhid-i-Shuhūdi may be apparentism: however it is generally taken to mean the theory of creation propounded by the Mujaddid (pp. 149, 158, infra) which apparently a mistake. Şufiya'-i-Shuhūdiyya are the mystics who believe in this theory.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 115 men. لا اله الا الله this subjective experience arise ? The Mujaddid points out that the source of the experience is different with different classes of With some it originates in cognition; with others in feeling. The former begin with excessive meditation on the Unity of Allah, and come to interpret (there is no object of worship but Allah) as equivalent to al stongaguo 8 (none exists but Allah). The dawn of this kind of Tawḥīd on the consciousness of the mystic is due to the dominant cognitive aspect consequent on persistent thinking and meditation on the Unity; by constant repetition it becomes impressed on his mind and he begins to imagine that he directly apprehends Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unity and identity. With others the experience, originates in excessive love of the Divine Being. The mystic is lost in the object of his love to such an extent that he loses sight of everything else. He beholds nothing but the object of his love ·116 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid and finds nothing other than Him. Consequently he, comes to believe that none but the Divine Being exists. When he turns to the world he perceives the object of his love in every particle of it, and he comes to regard multiplicity only as a mirror or reflector of the beauty of the 'Beloved. Some of these mystics who are perfectly lost in the contemplation of the object of their love pray to remain always absorbed in it and yearn that their own existence may never be brought to their consciousness. They regard any reference to their own self as heresy. Their ideal is annihilation. They have no rest. Rest requires oblivion--forgetfulness which is impossible when the fire of love is constantly consuming them. Yet oblivion is necessary. Hence they must occupy themselves with such pursuits as suit their capacities, keep their attention diverted and conduce to forgetfulness. So some of them take to music and dancing, and others to writing books and ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 117 giving expositions of the implications of their love-consciousness, viz., Wahdat-i-Wujūd. But there are others who in course of time go forward in their mystic experience and outgrow this stage. In their case the experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unity and identity disappears once for all, and they never get it again. Then they repent of the pantheistic beliefs to which their former experience had misled them.' 2.-The Mujaddid's Tawhid or THE conception of Tawḥīd as advanced by the Mujaddid himself is this. We cannot know God through kashf-o-shuhüd intuition and mystic experience. Hence we should revert to ,Revelation and to 'Ulamai-zāhir or divines, because their conception *M., Vol. I. Ep. 291.

·118 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid is derived direct from Revelation Consequently the Mujaddid discusses dhāt-o-şifāt or thie being and the attributes of God on the principle of Muslim theologians; and there he follows not the Asharite school but the Maturidite. As mentioned above, the Mujaddid passed through wujūdiyyat or unityism and reached zilliyyat or adumberätion where the error involved in wujūdiyyat was revealed to him ; and after zilliyyat, adumberation, he attained the stage of ‘abdiyyator servitude. At this stage he is so thoroughly convinced of the error of wujūdiyyat or unityism that he feels himself compelled to denounce it emphatically. It is at this stage that he clearly realises that mystic experience has no objective validity with regurd to dhāt-o-şifāt or *M., Vol. I, Ep. 286. * Ibid., Ep. 266. b. Abdiyyat () is the attitude appropfiate to man that he takes towards God. 1 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 119 the being and attributes of God. Hence he confesses to the following negative attributes or peculiarity of the Divine Being; God is beyond all such asma'-o-şifāt or names and attributes as can be comprehended by us. He is beyond all shuyūn-o-i'tibárāt' or modes and relations, all zuhūr-o-buțūn or externalisation and internalisation, beyond all burūz-o-kumūn or projection and intıdjection, beyond all mawṣūl-o-mafşūl or realisable and explicable, beyond all kashf-o-shuhūd or mystic intuition and experience; nay even beyond all mahsūso-maqūl, empirical and rational, and beyond all 'mawhūm-o-mutakhayyal' or conceivable * Shuyūn is plural of Shan (ul), literally state, condition rather an exalted condition or state. The word occurs in a everyday He-كل يوم هو في شان verse of the Quran is a new exalted condition (57 : 29). Ibn 'Arabī and others seem to understand by it, Şifāt at a phase of theirs, a transverse section of the World-Process, the Universe or God at a certain point of time. But the.Mujaddid puts Shān between dhāt and şifat. According to him Shān is an aspect or phase of the dhāt, while şifāt are romething over and above dhāt and derivated from Shan. Cf. M., Vol. I, Ep. 286.

·120 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid and imaginable, olgalel yg asal yol olyg ajlsa yo He the Holy One is beyond the ثم وراء الوراء Beyond, again beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond. Whatever is known through mystic intuition is merely a subjective experience, without any objective, validity whatsoever. In short, God can never be apprehended through mystic experience, Consequently imān-bil-ghaib or faith in the Unseen is unavoidable. Such a faith is possible only when thought and imagination get tired in their futile efforts, and it becomes evident that God is unapproachable, inexperienceable, inexplicable and unknowable.3 Such a faith alone is valid in His case, because it is in keeping with our limitations and His unapproachableness or Beyondness. If it is possible for us to get to know anything besides this about God, that is through M., Vol. II, Ep. 1. * Ibid., Ep. 9.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 121 Revelation. Therefore we ought to follow the theologians as they derive their conception of the being and attributes of God exclusively from revelation. On that basis, the Mujaddid maintains that God is Khāliq or Creator of earths and heavens, mountains and oceans, vegetables and minerals as well as of human beings with all their potentialities. In short He is the Creator of adl things, and He has created them out of ‘adam-i-maḥad or pure nothing. He alone is the bestower of all blessings, the healer of all ills and the provider of all needs. He is the Sattār" or Conniver who overlooks our sins, He is Halim or Forbearing who does not take us hastily to account for our wrongs. He deserves all praise and gratitude for His innumerable benefec- *M., Vol. I, Ep. 287. * Sattar (li) literally means concealer. It is a name of God. Because He knows our sins and our secrets and neither divulges them nor takes us to task there and then, but covers at them and graciously tolerates our sinful being.

·122 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid tions. Man does not know even how to value His goodness and greatness. He is the Hādi or Guide, who through His Anbiyyā’ or Apostles' enlightens the ignorant mankind according to their capacity of His existence and essence; and who informs us of what He approves and wkat He disapproves, and of the useful and the injurious in this world and the Hereafter. He is the Āhad or One, the Wahdahū-lā-Sharik, has no equal. He is the only Divine Being; there is no one else who possesses the same şifāt or qualities, and He alone deserves 'ibādat or worship. He encompasses or comprehends everything, is everywhere with us, and is *Anbiyyā (elml) plural of Nabi (cat); neither the word prophet' nor the word 'apostle'is a correct equivalent of the term Nabi. It means a person to whom guidance and information is given through sheer grace of God for the good of mankind. * Wahdahu-la-Sharík' (). The term really means the one who has no co-sharer. The conception is that He alone is the master of the universe and the object of worship. No one else shares these qualities with Him. M., Vol. III, Ep. 17.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 123 nearer to us than our own life-artery or habl-al-warid. But the nature of His lḥāța or comprehension and Ma'iyyat' or co-presence, qurb or nearness is beyond our understanding. Hayāt or Life, 'Ilm or Knowledge, Qudrat * Ma'iyyat (yes) literally ntans togetherness. Mystics هو معكم اينما كنتم : have taken it from the Quranic verse : that He is with you wherever you are (57:4). From togetherness Ibn 'Arabî concludes identity of God and man. The Mujaddid takes exception to this conclusion and holds that we do not know the nature of Ma'iyyat (red). --Qurb (3) literally means nearness. Mystics have taken the term from the We are--ركن اقرب اليه من حبل الوريد : Quranic verse nearer to him than his life-artery (50:16). Ibn 'Arabī holds that Qurb of God is identity with God. The Mujaddid denies this and maintains that the nature of Qurb is not known.-ḥāta (ubbal is encompassment or comprehension, Mystics have taken the term from the Qur-an: Lbase S Kaal B - Allah comprehends everything (4 : 126). Ibn 'Arabi conceives it as inclusion and derives identity of God and man from it. The Mujaddid takes exception to it and holds that the nature of Ihāta is incomprehensible, though at a certain stage he was inclined to hold that Iḥāța is comprehension by knowledge.-Siryān (jo) literally means permeation. Ibn 'Arabi and others ascribe Siryan to Allah with reference to the world, i.e. iremanence. The Mujaddid rejects this.

·124
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
or Power, Irāda or Will, Sam-o-Başar or
Hearing and Seeing, Kalām or Speech, and
Takwin or Creation belong to His attributes,
which are like His being bì chūn-o-bi chigūn
i.e., incommensurable and uncomprehensible
for us.
Reflection on the Mujaddid's description of
Divine attributes shows that they are of two
kinds, negative and positive. The negative
attributes again are of two kinds; firstly those
which are meant to deny all imperfections in
God's Being, e.g., that He has no equal and no
rival, no parents and no children ;? secondly
those which indicate His beyondness, e.g., that
He is not body or physical, is neither substance
nor attribute, is not space or spatial, is not
limited or finite, has neither dimensions nor
relations, i.e., He is above the application of
our categories of thought. Again the positive
attributes are also of two kinds. Firstly,
*M., Vol. L Ep. 266.
Libid., Vol. III, Ep. 17.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 125 relative attributes which are relatively true of Him, e.g., Qidam or Self-Şubsistence, Azaliyyat or Eternity, Wujūb? or Necessity and Ulūhiyyator Worshipability. We affirm these attributes of Him only because the attfibuss opposite to them are signs of imperfections; and in comparison with these attributes denote perfection ;--and not because they adequately describe His nature. Otherwise the Divine essence has nothing to do with necessity and possibility, etc. But human thought is confined to the three fundamental categories of being, viz., necessity, possibility and impossibility: therefore it is proper to attribute necessity to Him. Secondly, essential attributes which adequately describe His * Note: According to Islamic thinkers being is of three .(واجب) Wajib ,(ممتنع) :Mumtana ,(ممکن) kinds : Mumkin Wājib is that of which the non-existence is inconceivable. Mumtana' is that of which the existence is inconceivable. Mumkin is that of which neither the existence nor the nonexistence is inconceivable. Wujūb ) is the quality of being Wajib and may well be translated as Necessity.

·126 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid on one nature and are absolutely true of Him. They form part of His essence, e.g. Hayāt or Life. 'Ilm or Knowledge, Qudrat or Power, Irāda or Will, Sam' or Hearing, Başar or Seeing, Kalām or Speech, and Takwin or Creation. As regards the relations between the dhāt or being and the şifāt or attributes of God hand and between dhāt-o-sifāt and the world on the other, the Mujaddid maintains that His şifat or attributes are other than and in addition to His dhāt or being, and that the world is the zill or effect of His şifāt or attributes. The problem really is a problem of theology. Hence the Mujaddid follows here the Maturidite school. However, he corroborates the conception on the basis of his mystic experience as well, and maintains that according to it too the attributes are not identical with the being and that the being of God is perfect by and in itself and does not stand in need of the attributes for its perfection. God is mawjūd, ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 127 has existence; but he exists by His own being, by His own self, and not in virtue of the quality of wajūd or existence which has been added to this being. In the same manner He is Hayi-He is Hayī or Living by His own being, He is 'Alim or Knowing by His own being ; He is Qadır or Powerful by His own being: He is Murid or voluntary Agent by His own being; He is.Sami' or Hearing by His own being; He is Başir or Seeing by His own being; He is Khāliq or Creator by His own being. His attributes, viz., existence, life, knowledge, power, etc., are the ta’yyanāt or determinations or the descents of His being. Indeed the Mujaddid would avoid the use of the term of tanazzul? or ta'yyun because it tends to signify identity. According to him the șifāt or attributes are the ažlāl or effects of the dhāt or being; and the world is 1 M., Vol. III, Ep. 25. The Being is conceived as coming down from the high pedestal of Pure-Being-down to determinate existence. Hence tanazzul means Descent of Determination.

·128 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid the zill or effect of the şifāt or attributes. The gradation or order of these tanazzulāt- 0-ta'yyunāt or the azlāl in the system of the Mujaddid is that the Perfect Being is the cause of the quality of wujūd of existence. Then follows the şifat-i-hayāt or the quality of life, because life is not conceivable without existence. After life comes the sifat-i-'ilm or the quality of knowledge ; after knowledge şifat-i-qudrat or the quality of power, and after power şifat-i-irāda or the quality of will; after will the şifat-i-sam' or the quality of hearing, after hearing the şifat-i-başar or the quality of seeing; after seeing the şifat-ikalām or the quality of speech, and after speech, the şifat-i-takwin or the quality of creation. The şifat-i-takwin or the quality of creation is the cause of the creation of the world; the world is its zill, i.e., its effect, and not its tajalli, i.e., its mode. These attributes of God are over and above the being of God, for the Perfect Being brings ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 129 them into existence one by one for the sake of creating the world; the gradation is logical. It is by means of these attributes which He adds to His being that the Perfect Being who is sufficient unto Himself and needs nothing, tums to the creation of the world and creates it. The Mujaddid's theory of creation is this: God is Wujūd-i-Kāmil or the Perfect Being, comprehending all șifāt-i-kāmila or attributes of perfection in His essence. He is sufficient 1 That the Şifāt or attributes are ülni se nalj, i.e., over and above the Jhāt or being of God and not identical with it is the doctrine of the Maturidites whom the Mujaddid follows. These are conceived as additional to the Siſāt or attributes which go to make the essence of God. They are Idätī or relative. They come to be in relation to the creation of the world and are produced by God in His own Self for that purpose. This is a mode of conceiving which avoids the pitfall of Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism of which one premise was that these Şifāt or attributes are identical with the Dhāt or being (M., Vol. III, Ep. 26)--that the Şifāt asc created and not part of the essence of God was also the doctrine of certain Mutazilites, but on a different ground. They held unity to be the essence of God, and consequently found the Şifāt, to be multiplicity incompatible. 9 :

·130 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid even or unto Himself, needing nothing whatsoever besides Himself;-not 'adam nothing as the opposite of His being. He decides to create the world. For the sake of this He creates the şifat-i-wujūd? or the quality of existence in His being; also He creates other şifāt or qualities, e.g., the şifati-ḥayāt or the quality of life, the şifat-i-ilm or the quality of knowledge, the şifat-i-qudrat or the quality of power, etc., in Himself. These qualities are forms of this sifat-i-wujūd. Now opposed to this wujūd or existence is ‘adam-i-maḥad or pure nothing, opposed to this Hayāt or life is a form of 'adam called or death; opposed to this 'Ilm or knowledge is a form of .adam called jihl or mawt 1 Thus the Mujaddid holds that Wujud or existence is an attribute which is produced by God and does not form part of the essence of God. He thereby seems to mean firstly that the being of God is of another kind, and we cannot call it Wujūd or existence of the kind we know; and secondly that Wujūd or existence of the things is like a quality inasmuch as it has been given to them by God.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
131
ignorance ; opposed to this Qudrat or power is
a form of 'adam called 'ijz or powerlessness,
etc. God casts an in'ikās or zilla_reflection
or shadow of this pure wujūd or existence of
His into its ‘adam-i-mutaqābila or opposed
nothing. i.e., into pure ''adam'or nothing and
there comes to be finite existence." He casts
a reflection or shadow of this Hayāt or life of
His into its 'adam-i-niutaqābila, viz., into
mawt or death and there comes to be finite
life. In the same manner He casts a reflection
or shadow of this 'Ilm or knowledge of His
into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila, viz., into jihl or
ignorance, and finite knowledge comes into
existence. Thus the existence, the life, the
knowledge, etc., of the finite being is the
result of the mixture of 'adam or nothing and
Wujud or existence, etc. The essence of the
* Note that this in'ikās kokeil) or zill of which the
Mujaddid speaks is not conceived by him in the sense of Ibn
'Arabī. By these expressions the Mujaddid really means that
the wujūd or being, etc., of the finite is produced by®this Wujüd.
etc., of God. js will come out later.

·132 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 1 finite in itself, however, is pure "adam' or nothing, the 'wujūd' or existence, the ‘hayāt' or life, the ilm'or knowledge, etc., which are found in it, are pure gifts of God. That is how the finite world has actually come to be,--has come into being out of nothing, and has acquired actual, real existence. So also the various qualities of the world and its objects. In truth God alone has real, actual independent being; and the world has an existence beside God only as a gift of God. In reality the being of the world is not more than appearance,-appearance without genuine reality. And yet the appearance is not such as to depend on our fancy or imagination; it exists independently of us. The reality or existence of the world is something like this. Suppose there is a stick of wood. One of its ends is put into fire and catches flame. The other end of the stick is held fast and quickly * M., Vol. II, Ep. 1; Ibid., Vol. III, Eps. 58, 60.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 133 moved round in a circle. This would produce the appearance of a circle of fire. · Suppose this appearance is somehow perpetuated, --it is made to exist by itself. A circle of fire shall have been produced thereby. The existence of the world is of the kind of the existence of such a circle. Or suppose a juggler by his magic produces the semblance of a garden ; the garden bears fruit. Forthwith the king who was watching the trick orders that the juggler be executed; for the king believed that if the juggler were killed instantaneously the garden will continue to exist as a real garden. The story says that the garden of magic still exists and bears fruit. Now the existence of the world is like the existence of that garden. It is not real in itself; reality has been somehow bestowed on it; and it is a very unsubstantial kind of reality. *M., Vol. II, Ep. 58. *M., VI. II, Ep. 44.

·134 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid The Mujaddid insists that there is absolutely no relation between the world and its unique Creator except that the world has been created by Him and is a sign that indicates His hidden attributes. All other assertions, viz., ittiḥād or union or identity, iḥāta or comprehension and ma'iyyat or co-existence are due to sukr or the ecstatic condition of mystics. Those who have reached the higher state of ṣaḥw or sobriety are free from such so-called ma'ārif or cognitions. True, they too came across such cognitions in the course of their mystic journey; but they have left them behind and they criticise them in the light of Revelation. Indeed, to speak of the relations of ittiḥād or union, 'ainiyyat or identity, etc., between God and the world is an awful misconception. It is a misconception of this sort. Suppose a highly accomplished man invents an alphabet and certain sounds to display his ingenuity and capacity. Someone comes forward and maintains What the ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 135 alphabet and the sounds are identical with the inventor. As to man, the Mujaddid holds that the essence of man is the soul, and that the soul is the creation of God. However, the soul does 'not belong to "ālam-i-khalq' or the universe of process, to which material things belong; it belongs to "ālam-i-amr' or the universe of instantaneous creation. It is bī-chūn-o-bi-chigūn or incomparable and inexplicable. It is something unique which cannot be explained by something else; that is, it cannot be derived from anything else. *M., Vol. I. Eps. 31, 287. "Alam-i-khala (ülalle) is Universe of process. The distinc- 2. say قل الروح من امر ربی : tion is based on the Quranic verse : that the soul is my Lord's command (17:85). This is interpreted to mean that the rūḥ (29) does not belong to ‘alam-i-khalq to which the material universe belongs, but to another 'ālam, viz., the 'alam-i-amr, the world of instantaneous creation. The universe of matter is clearly the world of process--things in it gradually come to be in course of time. The rūḥ is therefore not such. It belongs to the world of instantaneous creation. The distinction suggests a rationalistic background, in which the perceptual is.? c'mporal and the conceptual non-temporal. Cf, M., Vol.], Ep. 260.

·136 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Now the original inclination of the soul was to seek Divine approval. But the soul has been intertwined with the 'ālam-i-khalq --it has been given a body. This has aroused in it certain new tendencies, e.g., to sin, to disobey God. This state of things has given rise to the need of purifying the soul and encouraging and strengthening its original inclination. The tendency to disobey God is the fountain-head of all evils and vices." The soul begins to hate virtue and indulges in vice. The state is called nafs-i-ammāra or the Evil self. But in spite of sin and disobedience the soul preserves the capacity of overcoming vice. So through purification there begins gradually to arise in it a state of repentance. This is called nafs-i-lawwāma *MM., pp. 19-20. *The Mujaddid emphatically maintains moral freedom in man. (جبر) or heresy to believe in jabr (كفر) For it is kufr necessity (M., Vol. I, Ep. 289), firstly, because the Qur-an says perto Como y como de lucmagso let him who please believe, and let him who please disbelieve 08:29: Cf.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 137 or the Reproaching-self. Having progressed further, it attains to another stage where it achieves perfect harmony with the Divine Will. To act according to any commandments of commission or omission ceases to be unpleasant to it. This stage of spiritual development is called nafs-i-muțma'inna or the beatified self. This is the zenith of human perfection and the highest end for man; indeed it is the very purpose of the creation of man." -The attainment of nafs-imuțma'inna or beatified self is called the stage of 'abdiyyat or servitude. "Abdiyyat ? is attained when man becomes absolutely free from bondage to everything other than M., Vol. I, Ep. 289): secondly, because y me atliksy Le hag-Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the extent of its ability (2:286 ; Cf. M., Vol. I, Ep. 289); and thirdly, because Islam and reason conceive actions as subject to approval and disapproval and to consequent reward and punishment (M.. Vol. I, Ep. 260). He discusses the question fully on theologicorationalistic grounds in Epistle 289, M., Vol. I, 'M., V«. II, Ep. 50; Cf. Q. 89 : 28-30.

·138 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Allah. Mark that love of God is not the end-in-itself, it is only a means; it is a means to dissociate oneself from mā-siwā-'llah' or things other than Allah and to get to 'abdiyyat or servitude. The relation between man and God is according to the Mujaddid that of 'abd and ma'būd or the worshipper and the worshipped. 'Abdiyyat or servitude means that man should change his whole life according te the Divine will and should obey His commandments of commission and omission simply because they are His commands. There is also another relation between man and God, viz., ma'rifat or cognition. But true ma'rifat or cognition only means that man should realise that he is incapable of knowing God. العجز عن درك الادراك : As Abu Bakr - as - Siddiq said ادراك فهو سبحان من لم يجعل للخلق السسيه فن معرفته to realise one's --سبيلا لا بالعكبر : M., Vol. Î, Ep. 30. Cf. M., Vol. I, Eps. 30, 160. 2

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
139
inability to comprehend Him is the true
comprehension ; Holy is He Who has not kept
any road to Himself open to His creatures
except by way of realising their incapacity
to know Him.
1
*M., Vol. III, Ep. 122.

·No text on this page.

·CHAPTER II The Reception of the Mujaddid's Conception of Tauhid TAWHID or unity of God is a characteristic tenet of Islam. In course of time the Islamic mystics gave it the form of Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism. The influence of mysticism gradually permeated Islamic society. Wahdat-i-Wujūd became an accepted dogma. It influenced the whole of Islamic society from top to bottom. It affected its religious attitude, it affected its moral attitude, it affected its deeds; it affected its æsthetic consciousness, it affected its literature and poetry; and it affected its' philosophy and outlook. It was the deepest truth to which man could have access, indeed it was the ·142 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid real meaning of Islam's teaching. It was revealed to the initiated, to great and holy souls, and was directly apprehended by kashi-o-shuhūd or intuition and mystic experience. So it was an epoch-making event that a great personality like that of the Mujaddid, great in religious learning and great in mystic experience, took Wahdat-i-Wujud up for criticism and evaluation, criticised it unsparingly and trenchantly, and exposed its errors in their very foundations and expressly and unremittingly denied the objective validity of the experience on which it was based; and further advanced a conception diametrically opposed to it, and insisted that his conception, and not Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism, was the genuine Islamic conception-the conception which alone is derivable from the revelation granted to the Prophet of God. Thereby the Mujaddid veritably gave a new turn to the Islamic mysticism and brought it riearer to the original teachings of ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 143 Islam. This was a revolution, and his ideas spread far and wide with such speed that the greater part of the Islamic world acknowledged him as the Renewer of Islam in his own life-time. Few had the courage to oppose the Mujaddid. No one in Naqshbandiya school contradicted him. Other schools of mysticism too kept silent, though they seem to have stuck to Wahdat-i-Wujūd. The first important personage who took up the cudgels seems to have been Shāh Wali-Ullah a divine of very great eminence and a mystic of the Naqshbandiya school. Shāh Wali-Ullah flourished about a century after the Mujaddid. About 1143 A.H. he wrote a small treatise überg Defindly goglüusg “Decision on the case of unityism and apparentism". The gist of his contention is that there is no substantial difference between the ideas of Ibn 'Arabî and the Mujaddid; that both mean really the same thing, viz., Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or 'unityism, ·144 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid that their differences are in reality only verbal. In his treatise Shāh Wali-Ullah begins with the claim that God almighty has granted to him the special gift of synthesis or reconciliation. Further he makes it clear that he was not discussing the problems on the basis of first-hand mystic experience, but simply as an arbiter, keeping the statements of both Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid in view and considering and evaluating them rationalistically. This attempt of Shāh Walī-Ullah at a synthesis of Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid led inside the mystic circles, and even outside them to a keen and prolonged controversy which lasted for over a century. In the following pages we shall try to follow it in its main outlines in important mystics. 'FW., p. 3, lines 9-15. ? Ibid., p. 5, lines 13-15 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 145 1.-Shāh Wali-Ullah SHAH WALI-ULLAH holds that Wujūd? or being is something qā'im-bi-nafsihi and muqawwim-li-ghairihſ, existent by itself, and support of the existence of everything other than itself; and that this is an unequivocal dictum of dhawq-i-şahiḥ or genuine intuition. Wujūd or being is wujūd-i-munbasit or selfunfolding being; it takes up the forms of things. It has its tanazzulāt or descents. These tanazzulāt or descents are of two kinds-- ‘ilmi and 'aini--conceptual and existential. The first tanazzul or descent of wujūd-i- Wujud (>,) is being or existence.-Wujūd-i-munbasit (budio 1979) is self-unfolding or self-emanating Being. It has had three stages of its descents. The first stage is Wujud la-bashart-ash-shai ( ilgi Y 799) indeterminate (concept of) pure Being. The second is Wujūd bashart la-shai lil byens 1999), pure concept, i.e., the concept of determinate Being. The third is Wujud barhart-ash-shai one determinate cxistent being , the being of ,(وجود بشرط الشی) a particular existent object. . 10 ·146 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid or munbasit is tajalli-bi-nafsihi-its becoming conscious of itself. As such it is all comprehensive and implicitly contains in itself all the details. The next tanazzul or descent is tafșili-the explicit or the detailed 'consciousness of itself. After tanazzulāt-i-'ilmi conceptual descents come tanazzulāt-i-aini or existential descents. They in their very nature cannot be implicit; explicitness or detail is necessary for them. Now according to mystics the essence of contingent beings are nothing but modes and differentiations of the wujūd-i-munbasit or self unfolding being. Consequently, when it is apprehended in its capacity as mutalabbas or dressed, it is the contingent being; and when it is apprehended in its capacity as mutalabbis or dresser, it is the necessary being.' For example, there is a piece of wax; it is moulded into various forms, e.g., man, horse, etc. All the same ic remains wax; it is wax which has 'FW., pp. 12, 13.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 147 taken these different forms. These forms are simply modes; their being is nothing but the wax. At another place Shāh Wali-Ullah says that the wujūd-i-munbasit or self unfolding being is the common element of the perceptual and the conceptual. As such it is wujūd-i-munbasit or indeterminate being and the opposite of 'adam or nonbeing and is the hayūla or matter of all beings. At the second stage it is wujūd basharț la-shai pure concept, i.e., the concept of determinate beings, e.g., man, horse; and at the third stage it is wujūd bashart-ash-shai or determinate or existent being, e.g., Aristotle, my horse. This is the doctrine of Wahdat-i-Wujūd. The doctrine which is called Wahdat-i- Shuhūd or apparentism is this. The asma'- 0-shuyūn or names and phases of the necessary being reflect themselves in their ādām-ior *FW., p. 6, lines 12-18. * Ibid., p.7 ·148 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid mutaqābila or opposite non-beings, thereby the contingent coming into existence. Now, contends Shāh Wali-Ullah, if we leave simile and metaphor aside, it is essentially the same doctrine as that of Wahdat-i-Wujūd. To say that the essence of the contingent' beings are the asma’-o-sifat or names and attributes of the necessary being differentiated in the conceptual stage, as Ibn 'Arabi holds, or to say that the contingent beings are the asma'- 0-șifāt of the necessary being reflected in their ā dām-i-mutaqābila or opposite nonbeings as the Mujaddid maintains, is practically the same thing. If there be any difference between the two positions, it is so insignificant that the critic need not take it into account. Consequently the assertion of the Mujaddid that Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Wahdat-i-Shuhūdor apparentism are different 3 *FW., p. 23. p. 7. "Ibid., p. 26. ? Ibid., ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 149 from one another is simply an error, -Ibn 'Arabi too means the same as the Mujaddid does; and the controversy of Wahdat-i-Wyjūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism is only a verbal rather than a real one.' By Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism all that is intended is to othrow emphasis on the perfection of the necessary and the imperfection and insignificance of the contingent being. But even in this respect Ibn 'Arabī meets the Mujaddid; he too holds that the contingent is insignificant and all perfection belongs to the necessary being. 2 2.-Khwaja Mîr Nāșir and Khwāja Mir Dard THIS synthesis or reconciliation, which really *FW. 29. p. ' Ibid., p. 7.

·150 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid ; amounts to a denial of the problem, was however not accepted by mystics who believed in the Mujaddid, e.g., Khwāja Mir Nāşir 'Andalib who maintained unequivocally in his voluminous book Nala'-:-'Andalīb that speaking objectively Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism is absolutely invalid; it is not the truth about reality. Objectively Wahdat-i- Shuhūd or apparentism alone is valid. But speaking subjectively, i.e., in their bearing on the sālik, mystic and his spiritual growth, both the doctrines are directed to the same end, viz., to dissociate him from mā-siwā' or things other than Allah. Khwāja Mir Dard discussed the problem first in his Waridat-z- Dard (1160 A.H.), and then at greater length in his 'Ilm-ul-Kitāb (1172 A.H.) which is intended to be a commentary on the Waridāt. It may be noted here that both the father and the son discuss the problem on the basis of kashf, or mystic experience. Indeed the 'NA., pp. 736-773; Cf. IK.. PP 1.83-186.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
151
0
latter holds that each and every word of
his Waridāt and 'Ilm-ul-Kitab is divinely
inspired.
Khwāja Mīr Dard holds that the doctrine
of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism in its correct
and valid' significance simply means that God
alone is the self-existent being. It does not
mean that the essence of the contingent is
identical with the necessary and that man and
God are identical with one another, or that
God, like a kulli’-i-tabi'i or natural universal,
is immanent in the individuals. For that
would be rank heresy, ilhād-o-zindiqa. To
take Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityisin in the
latter sense is due to sheer want of insight
into what eminent mystics meant by it. In
the sense that Wujūd or being is immanent
in multiplicity, Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism
is a doctrine which is of no significance in
religion whatsoever. For Wahdat-fi'l-kathrat
* IK..
P.
92.
2
IK.,
P. 183,

·152 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid or one-in-many which is on the lips of the common folk and of every Hindu Yogi is a doctrine for which no îmān or faith in God and His Prophet is required. It is a very common-place doctrine which everyone can be made to grasp easily. It cannot'be something for which prophets had specially to be sent by God with the mission of teaching it to humanity. The other doctrine is Wahdati-Shuhūd or apparentism. What it really means is this: The contingent being cannot exist without the necessary being ;' they exist only by the light of the necessary being. Ignorant people, who do not understand the meaning of what the Mujaddid meant, wrongly attribute to him the belief that the world is the zill or adumberation of God. This view was taken by him in the course of his progress towards his final position. Most of the immature mystics, who in their self-conceit PIK. p. 465. * Ibid., p. 184.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 153 regard themselves as having attained perfection, when they go through those works of the Mujaddid in which he has discussed the duality of man and God and the doctrine of hama-az-üst or 'all is from Him' think that he was ignorant of the truth of the matter; and that because Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is a difficult conception, he could not fully understand or realise it. But they do not $ كل من عند الله ,see that according to the verse -all is from Allah (4 : 78), the doctrine of hama-az-üst or 'all is from Him'' is corroborated by revelation. Consequently hama-az-üst alone is the truth, and hama-ūst or 'all-is- He’ is absolutely false. The net result is that objectively Waḥdat-i-Wujud or unityism is false, and subjectively Wahdat-i-Wajūd or unityism and Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism both bring about the same result, viz., liberation of the qalb or 'soul from the "IK., P. 187. * Ibid.. pp. 184-185.

·154 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid bondage of ma-siwa-'llah or things other than Allah. Hence if a mystic realises either of the two states, or both of them, that makes no difference.--Indeed neither of these doctrines descends from the Prophet;' both are products of later times. However, the doctrine of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism primarily abides by reason ; and only secondarily by the Qur-ān.and Hadith, which it turns and twists to make them fit in with the requirements of reason; while the doctrine of Wahdat-i-Shuhud or apparentism primarily abides by the Qur-ān and Hadith and only secondarily by reason. Says Khwāja Mir Dard: "Most of the sufīya'-i-wujūdiyya or pantheistic mystics follow their own reason and intuition, and they rely on the first instance on their own findings. Only in the second instance, they try by the way to follow the Holy Prophet also. They mould "IK., p. 184. i Ibid., pp. 609-610.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 155 the verses of the Qur-an and the sayings of the Prophet according to their own taste, as if they have nothing to do with the Shari'at or the law of Islam. That alone is valid 'which they come to know by their own reason and •intuition. It is not their real object to follow the religion of Muhammad. They have the conceit that they apprehend truth directly; their purpose really is to ascertain whether the contingent is identical with the necessary or different from it, or whether the created is identical with its Creator or different from Him. In this quest the reason is their only guide, and they go their way by its light alone; only they forcibly drag faith and religion along with them ... while most of the șufiya'-i-shuhūdiyya or apparentist mystics follow faith and religion in the first instance, They really believe in religion. Only in the second instance and under the guidance of faith do they permit their reason to act ... As if chey have nothirig to do.with

·"156
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
reason, but what God and His Prophet have
affirmed, that alone is the truth for then..
They believe in their hearts that the truth is
that which is taught by God and the Prophet,
and that their object is not to inquire whether
the necessary and the contingent are identical
or different from each pther. They steer their
course in the light of faith, and forcibly drag
reason along with them'
Consequently, urges Khwāja Mir Dard, we
should revert to Tawḥīd-i-Muḥmmadi or the
unitarianism of Muhammad. God is eternal
and self-existent; He is other than the world
of objects. He is not like kulli’-i-tabiʻī or
natural universal inside it. The truth is that
God exists by Himself with all His attributes
which are His qualities of perfection; and
the existence of the contingent beings makes
no addition in His being, nor does their
annihilation take 'away anything from it.
ei der ofte od all of God existed and
*IK., p. 610.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 157 ; nothing existed along with Him; and blosu ---He is even to-day exactly as He was before. 3.-Mawlwă Ghulām Yahyä THE discourses of Khwāja Mir Nāșir and Khwāja Mir Dard are not openly directed 'IK., P. 186. Note.--In 1162 A.H. Allāma Mir Muhammad Yūsuf Bil- The) الفرع الثابت من اصل الثابت grami wrote a treatise Growing Offshoot from a firm Roo), in which he cleals with the controversy without directly entering it. He bases liis contention exclusively on the Qur-un and Hadith and rejects Wahdat-i-Wujud, suggesting that the experience of God which unityistic mystics claim is, according to Islam, impossible in this life. His treatise is an exhaustive survey and review of the sources which the two schools claim for their doctrines in Qur-an and Hadith. However the treatise, though able and scholarly, does not seem to have been taken much notice of. There is extant only one copy of it which is in the handwriting of the author himself, in the Subhan-Allah Section of the Aligarh University Library ·158 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid against Shāh Walī-Ullah. Ghulām Yahyā,' a scholar of great eminence, expressly criticised Shāh Wali-Ullah in his Kalimat-ul-Haqq (The Announcement of Truth-1184 A.H.) which he wrote at the instance of Mirzā Mazhar, a spiritual descendant of the Mujaddid. Ghulām Yahyā emphatically maintains that Shāh Wali- Ullah is absolutely wrong in holding that both Wahdat-i-Wujud and 'Wahdat-i-Shuhud or apparentism hold the same views as to the essence of things and the relation between the temporal and the eternal, and that there is no * Mawlwi Ghulam Yahyä (d. 1195 A.H.) was a scholar of great fame in the philosophical and religious sciences. He used to give lectures (dars) to students at Lucknow. He has written commentaries on many books of philosophy. In the end he entered mysticism under the guidance of Mirzā Mazhar and gave up philosophy. 2 Mirzā Mazhar (1111-1195 A.H.), was the fourth spiritual descendant of the Mujaddid. He was the greatest mystic of his time in the Mujaddidi order.' Indeed it is in the line of Mirzā Mazhar alone that the complete Salūk-i-Mujaddidi is preserved. He was a devout follower of the Mujaddid. He was murdered by a fanatic Shi'a in the year 1195 AH, whom he forgave before expiring.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 159 difference between the two doctrines. Indeed, urges he, the two doctrines can in no way be even reconciled. For Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism is based on complete identity of the created and the Creator, while Wahdat-i- Shuhūd or apparentism is grounded in absolute difference between the two." In the first place, says Ghulām Yahyä, according to Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism the essence of contingent being are Ā'yān-i-thābita, i.e., the determinations of the Asma'-o-Şifāt or names and attributes of Allah.3 But according to Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism the essence of the contingent beings are the ağlāl or adumberations which Asma'-o-Şifät or names and attributes have cast in their ādām-i-mutaqabila or opposed not-beings. Now there is a world of difference between these two doc- 1 Ibid., * KH., p. 23. pp., 24-26. * Ibid., p. 25. * Ibid., p. 28.

·160 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid trines. According to the former the contingent beings are modes of Asma'-o-Şifāt or names and attributes and identical with them; according to the latter they are the ažlāl or adumberations of the Asma'-o-Șifāt or names and attributes and the zill or adumberation can never be identical with the asl. In the second place, Shāh Wali-Ullah is totally wrong in saying that it was a mere oversight on the part of the Mujaddid to oppos? the two doctrines. No, the Mujaddid does not do it by the way; he is emphatic on the opposition. He is absolutely clear on the point. He insists on the difference between the contingent and the necessary over and over again in his epistles, and holds that it is heresy and atheism to identify the two. His epistles are full of such emphatic assertions.? In the third place, according to Wahdat-i- Wujūd or unityism, change enters in the being *KH., pp. 28, 29. *Cf. H., pp. 26, 28.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 161 of God itself, for it is He who modifies Himself and becomes the contingent world;' while, according to Wahdat-i-Shuhud or apparentism, by creation of the world no change is wrought in the being of God, -He remains intact: Any one who would carefully study these two doctrines, urges Ghulām Yahyā, would realise that they are so different from one another that neither can we reduce one of them to the other, nor is any reconciliation possible between them. It may further be remarked that Ghulām Yahyā's discourse tends to suggest that he had one objection to Shāh Wali-Ullah, namely, that Shāh Walī-Ullah had no right to speak on the question and deny Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism, or identify it with Wahdat-i- Wujūd or unityism because he was not basing his contention on Kashf or mystic experience.” more *KH., pp. 25, 26. a Ibid., pp. 24-29. • Ibid., pp. 3, 29. 11 ·162 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid two Mirza Mazhar, the spiritual guide of Ghulām Yahyā, supports him on the point and wrote a Foreword' to Kalimat-ul-Haqq; and Shāh Ghulam Ali (d. 1290 A.H.) who was a great mystic, and who succeeded Mirzā Mazhar, expressly says in this connection thai Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Wahdat-i- Shuhūd or apparentism are different stages of the mystic journey; and for those who have been through both these stages, it is impossible to synthesise or reconcile the two experiences,--the implication thereof being that Shāh Wali-Ullah did not pass beyond the stage of Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism and get to the stage of Waḥdat-i- Shuhud' or apparentism. *MtM., p. 81.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 163 4.-Shāh Rafi-uddin SHAH RAFI-UDDIN, son of Shah Wali- Ullah, forthwith wrote a voluminous book called Damagh-ul-Bāțil or 'Crushing of the False. as an answer to Ghulām Yahyā in the same year (1184).. All that is relevant in this book to our argument is briefly this. Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism is the true doctrine." It is the truth of Islam. All eminent mystics have cherished it," while Wahdati-Shuhūd or apparentism is a new doctrine, advanced by the Mujaddid who had not grasped Shah Rafī-uddin (d. 1249 A.H.). He was a younger son of Shah Walī-Ullah, one of the very first translators of the Qur-an in Urdu, and a well-known scholar. He wrote Damagh-ul-Bātil (ulbuleos) against Mawlwi Ghulam Yahyā to vindicate his father's attempt to synthesise the doctrines of Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism and Wahdat-i-Shuhüd or apparentism. His argument is based on the commentary of Fuṣūṣ-ul-Hikam written by Shah Sharf-uddin, one of his f;ther's pupils. DB., p. 8 (6). • Ibid., pp. 10 (a)-15 (6), p. 4 (a). > * Ibid., ·164 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid the argument of Ibn 'Arabī and believed that Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism was, altogether different from Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism. The right course, therefore, is to take Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism as the basic doctrine and interpret Wahdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism in its light, as Shāh Wali- Ullah had done. Shāh Rafi'-uddin does not take the argument any further, and his attempt in this field is mainly a heated apology in favour of his great father. 5.--Shah Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi SHAH SAYYID AHMAD BARELWI too contributed to the controversy on Waḥdat-i-Wujūd * DB., p. 4 (a). Cf. ibid., pp. 3 (b), 4 (a). Note: Shah Ismail Shahid (1194-1247A.H.) was a grandson of Shah Wali-Ullah. He too wrote a book called 'Abagāt (üläns) or Perfumes on the reconciliation of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism' and Wahdat-i-Shuhud or apparentism. Shāh Ismail ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 165 or unityism. His whole discourse is based on Kashf-o-Shuhūd or direct mystic experience, and is to be found in Șirāț-i-Mustaqim (1233 A.H.)'. He says that when love dominates the mystic, the yearning for Taqarrub or nearness and communion with God grows more and more intense in his soul. This state gradually overpowers him. In this connection he attains to the stages of Fanā and Baqā, annihilation and resuscitation. Thus his condiexpressly acknowledges that his argument is not based on Kashf or direct mystic experience (At., p. 33). He holds that Ibu 'Arabī is right and the Mujaddid wrong. The difficulties, which are attributed to Wahdit-i-Wujūd or unityism can be, thinks Shāh Ismail, squarely mer on his own theory. His theory is very much the same as Berkeley's later position. It is this. When God chose to rule as an absolute monarch, He created the universe on the best design. The world is for us olijectively real; it is not imaginary or illusive. But in fact it is not outside the mind of God; it is in it. It exists only as an idea in the Divine Mind (At., näns 17, pp. 26, 27) .That is what Nicholson would call Panentheism, and distinguishes from pantheism. But afterwards Shah Ismail Shahid became a follower of Shah Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi. That means that Shah Isma'il changed his views and gave up Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism. Cf. SM., pp. 12-13. SM., 2. 95. 1 ·166 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid tion becomes that of a piece of iron, which is thrown into the furnace and fire permeates into its very being and to such an extent that it acquires all the characteristics of fire:- even its appearance becomes that of fire. One could affirm of it all that could be affirmed of fire. While in this condition, the piece of iron would, if it could speak, claim that it was fire itself. However the fact remains that it has not become fire; it is still iron as it was before. In the same manner when love of God takes hold of his being and he is completely overpowered by it, the mystic too begins to utter such phrases as ötl 61I am the Truth, and allow gina juny --there is none in my cloak but Allah. But afterwards if he rises to a higher stage, the mystic is blessed with another experience. He feels infinite expansion ; he finds that all the realities of the universe and the contingent beings are dissolved in the being of SM., pp. 12, 13. 3 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 167 Allah, and the relation of identity which he had, at the previous stage realised between himself and God, obtain between God and all other existents. At this stage he begins to He is the First-هولاول والاخر والظاهر والباطن utter and the Last, and the External and the Internal (57:3). But, firstly, to adopt the Shughl-inafi' or exercise of negation never means that really everything ceases to exist, the purpose of the shughl or exercise only is to do away with the consciousness of everything other than Allah, That everything else has thereby ceased to be is a mistaken notion ; indeed it is absurd." Secondly, if after Fanā or annihilation the mystic attains to the experience of Tawḥīd-i-Şifātī or unison in attributes, he feels that He is the source of all multiplicity, and that he has expanded to the extent that the whole of the universe is accommodated Shughl-i-nafi.--It is the 'Dhikr of.nl y-there is no god, the practice of which creates the state of negation in the mind of the mystic. 1 SM., p. 107.

·168 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid inside himself. Here again arises the tendency in favour of the doctrine of Wahdat-i- Wujūd ar unityism. But he should not be misguided. He should remember that the idea is contrary to the fact and that his condition is merely an indication of the stager of Tawḥīd-i-Şifātī;' and after this will come the stage of Sair-fi'llah-the journey inwards Allah. In short, accofding to Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad in whatever manner Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism is experienced, it is no objective experience ;-it is only a subjective experi- That is, thereby everything does not actually become God. --Indeed Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad is absolutely opposed to Wahdat-i- Wujud or unityism and regards it as one of the bid'āt or innovations of the pantheistic heretics and not worth discussing. However, as people talk of it frequently, one must know this much that the creatures are not ence. 1SM., pp. 109-110. * Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 46, 107.

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 169 identical with the Creator, though He is undoubtedly their Qayyūm or Mainstay. The relation might be conceived on the'analogy of șifāt or attributes. The şifāt or attributes are not identical with the dhāt or being nor are chey apart from it; they depend on the dhāt. In the same manner, makhlūqāt or creatures are not identical with the Şifāt or attributes, nor independent of the Şifat or attributes; they are Mazāhir or phenomena of the Șifāt or attributes. The Șifāt or attributes are sufficient unto themselves; they need no Mazāhir. Yet in spite of their self-sufficiency, God has in His wisdom chosen to give them phenomenal expression in the forms of created beings called makhlūqāt. And that is really what great mystics meant.' It appears that after Shāh Sayyid Ahmad SM., p. 46. Note: About this time the controversy seems to be taken up also by Ulama-i-Zahir (obchols), the learned in general. Mawlwi Fadl-i-Haqq of Khairābād (1212-72 A.H.), who is regarded as the Imām-i-Falsafa or' chief of philosophers of ·170 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Barelwi no mystic of eminence wrote on this controversy; while the mystics who belonged to the Naqshbandiya order got into confusion on the point under the influence of Shāh Wali-Ullah. The present-day mystics generally have taken to silence on the problem. Some of them do make no difference whatsoever between the two doctrines; while others do not want to open their lips on the controversy because of their allegiance both to Ibn 'Arabi and the Mujaddid. They would give out that each doctrine is vaild in its own place, and that both Ibn 'Arabî and the Mujaddid are right. а the Khairābādī school of Philosophy in India, too wrote brief treatise called Mga EA 3 )2bl 39, in this connection. The argument wherein is purely philosophical and does not concern us here.

·THE CONCLUSION THE HE foregoing discussion brings out that those who contgadicted or vindicated the Mujaddid, assigned a meaning to the term Wahdat-i-Shuhūd as if it were the name given by the Mujaddid to his doctrine of the creation of the world and its relation to the Creator. But that is not correct. What the Mujaddid really meant by the expression was only this that the experience of Wahdat-i- Wujūd or unityism which the mystic acquires at a certain stage of his spiritual development is only subjective; that it is mere Shuhūd or appearance; that the Wahdat or unity which the mystic has experienced 'is only Waḥdat-i- Shuhüd or apparent unity. It is not the experience of objective fact; the experience ·172 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid is not objective ; objective reality is different from what the mystic has experienced. In fact the 'Mujaddid has given no name to his own theory of creation. If a name must be given to it, then Tathniyya-2-Wocjūd or the dualism of being, or perhaps Wahdat-2-Wujub or the unity of the nacessary, would be more appropriate terms. Another point worthy of notice is that the Mujaddid's denial of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or.unityism is not based on rationalistic argument; it is based solely on kashf-o-shulūd or direct mystic experience. The Mujaddid holds that the experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is a stage in a mystic's evolution. If the mystic outgrows this stage and attains to still higher stages, he comes to realise that the experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism was simply a subjective experience,-- that the Wahdat' or unity he experienced was merely Shuhūd or appearance; and that.Wahdat-i-Wujūd or yhityism is not an

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
173
objectively real fact. Consequently those
who.intended to contradict the Mujaddid
on the point, too, ought to have based their
case on kashf-o-shuhud, mystic intuition and
experience. In other words, Shāh Wali-Ullah
and his followers should have asserted either
that the Mujaddid's statement that there are
stages higher than the stage of the experience
of Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism, is wrong ;
or that there are still higher stages where
the conviction in the objective validity of
Wahdat-i-Wujud or unityism reinstates itself.
But they keep absolutely silent on the point.
Indeed they leave it alone and take recourse
to logic and reason.
Next, a review of the arguments advanced
by Shāh Wali-Ullah and others in favour of
Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism shows that all
such arguments are untenable ; and further
that the arguments suffer from a confusion
of the religious unity with the speculative
unity which is characteristic of the mystic

·174 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid consciousness, Now to start with, they are arguments for a metaphysics of reality, intending to prove that.it is one, single, individual, self-identical being. But after Kant, we know that unity of the world is only a “regulative idea." and not a proved fact, -and that any further description of reality as self-identical, etc., is absolutely beyond the competence of human reason. Taking the arguments in detail, we find that Shāh Wali-Ullah starts with the blank assertion that Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is a dictum of all sane rational consciousness. But plainly it is not that. Plain unsophisticated consciousness believes rather in pluralism than in monism. It must make a great effort of abstract thought to come even to dualism ; while monism is a requirement only of the speculative consciousness. And even the speculative consciousness does not come to monism so simply as that; and when it comes to it, it comes to it by a strained ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 175 effort of abstraction and has to affirm it dogmatically. In the case of Shāh Wali-Ullah himself let us see what is the Wujūd-j-Wāhid or unitary being? It is, in the first instance, Ahadiyyat-i-ma'qula, i.e., that which is common between the conceptual and the empirical, the universal and the particular. Now to conceive that there is something common between two such disparate entities as the universal and the particular, requires the most strenuous effort of abstract thought; indeed it is hardly possible to grasp what the common element is between validity and actuality. In the second instance, Shāh Wali-Ullah speaks of it as Dhāt-i-bahat or Wujūd-i-Munbasitbeing which is absolutely without determination. Again, such a being is nothing that can be experienced or imagined; it can only be conceived by highly abstract thought. And then Ahadiyyat-i-Ma'qūla and Dhāt-i-bahat both are objects of thought, -concepts universals. Whence is it that Wahdat or ·176 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid oneness or numerical unity, i.e., actual being, is ascribed to them? Indeed, one may ask, can it be ascribed to them ? Clearly it can not,---not so long as they are concepts. Only when the concept, the universal is, by a leap over an unbridgeable chasm, turned into a particular, can numerical unity be ascribed to it. But can a universal be turned into a particular? Or can we even say this much that the concept has but one individual as its denotation? Hardly: for taken strictly there is no individual being which it denotes; and taken loosely it denotes each and every being, actual or possible. What has actually happened is this. The speculative unity was only qualitative ; it did not require to be quantitative at all. But under the stress of religious consciousness it has been turned into a quantitative unity and has become the one,- a numerically single, individual existent. Then we must ask, how does Aḥadiyỹat-i- Ma'qula or conceptual unity, Dhāt-i-baħat or ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 177 pure being, Wujūd-i-Munbasit or being-unfolding itself which is somehow one Individual which is the really real, become Mustajma'-işifāt-i-Kamāl, comprehensive of all perfections? For in itself it is the barest shred of heing, how can we say that it has all perfections in itself? Undoubtedly it actually has no perfections in it. What can at best be said of it,--and said not as a necessity of thought but only as a requirement of explaining the empirical, is that it has all that potentially in itself which later actually came to be. But what has actually come to be are not perfections, but imperfections. We can therefore attribute only the potentiality of imperfections to it, and not of perfections !-Here again what has happened is this. The requirements of the religious consciousness have unconsciously pressed the thinker dogmatically to ascribe all that is good to this bare impersonal being and thereby turn it into Mustajma - i-sifāt-i-Kamāl, the, all-Perfect, i.e., into the 12 ·178 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid no personal Divine Being of religion. Now coming to the Tanazzulāt or descents by mearts of which this Perfect Being comes to be the world, reason whatsoever is advanced why the Tanazzulāt or descents do take place in this being. Taken strictly, i.e., as a concept which it is, it is devoid of all principle of movement. But even taken as an actual being which is the common element between the concept and the percept, or even between the mental and the material, it would be difficult to point out a principle of movement which is common to all these forms of being and which can therefore be ascribed to it. But what has happened is this. The speculative consciousness demands that the world-process must be explained as a manifestation of the assumed unity and hence a principle of movement be ascribed to it. This demand is met. 'A purpose is ascribed to it. It is affirmed that this being wants to, know itself. Now the grounds of this ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 179 teleology are at bottom religious. Further characterisation of the process as 'ilmſ or conceptual and then 'ainī or khārijī'or existential is again hardly speculative. If anything, the motif is religious. It is the religious motif that is at work and has modified the speculative motif. For the unity has been conceived as God; it must therefore be first self-conscious and then produce Wujūd-i-Khāriji or actual existence out of itself.-However the speculative motif reasserts itself, and that with a vengeance. The Wujūd-i-Khāriji or actual existence is a manifestation of Divine Being; it is that being itself in one of its modes; it is identical with it. Now begins express conflict with the religious consciousness. The speculative consciousness is monistic;'it will have the Primal Being finmanent in the world ; and it will have necessity as the principle of its progress. If ·180 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid . so, then evidently I am He and I am acting under. stringent necessity; mysticism would hardly deny that. The question therefore arisės: whence want and suffering in me, which are the very foundation of the religious consciousness; and whence duty and res-- ponsibility, or whence freedom without which no higher religion can survive for a moment? Moreover, the doctrine produces that attitude of mind which is characteristic of the speculative consciousness, viz., the contemplative one. The mystic aims at 'Irfān or knowledge, and passes his life in murāqiba- 0-mukāshifa-contemplation and apprehension, having for his ultimate goal Wasl or annihilation or absorption in the Primal Being. There is indeed no room left for immortality, though at times he speaks of it at the stress of the religious consciousness.---- It may be noted that although here and there important elements of religious unity enter the mystic consciousness, it is the speculative ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 181 1 consciousness which holds the sway.' Arld we must inquire further: Is Shāh Wali-Ullah right in saying that the position of the Mujaddid is substantially the same as that of Ibn 'Arabî, viz., that it is Wahdati-Wujūd or unityism and all that makes it look different is only simile and metaphor,- which indeed misled the Mujaddid himself to regard it as different? In justice to the Mujaddid, Shāh Wali-Ullah should have 'Attention may here be drawn to the fact that Taşawwuf or mysticism in its various aspects bears too much resemblance to Neo-Platonism to which historically it is indebted. Its doctrine of Wahdat-i-Wujūd and tanazzulāt --unity and its descents, its attitude towards life and society, rahbäniyyat-o-inziwa (19;lg Culoy) or asceticism and monasticism, its end of man as 'irlan (ul) or knowledge, and wasl (Joog) or unification and annihilation in the Primal Being, are to all intents and purposes the same as we find in Neo-Platonisin. And more, it is grounded in the same effort of making a religion out of the speculative consciousness in the same identification of the religious with the speculative unity, in which Neo-Platonism was grounded. It is further interesting to note that Neo-Platonism aimed at becoming a religion to save Hellenism from the onslaught of Christianity; and tasawwuf or mysticism too is acting as an inward religion running inside Islam and really supplanting Islam.

·182 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid shown in detail that the difference is only apparent and due to metaphorical language. But unfortunately he makes no such attempt. In truth the difference between the Mujaddid and Ibn 'Arabī is not of mere,simile and metaphor; it is a very real difference. It is as real and as great as that between the speculative unity and the religious unity. It appears that the use of the word zill or adumberation in this connection is at the bottom of Shāh Walī-Ullah's assertion. Zill or adumberation is certainly a metaphor. But so is ‘aks or reflection and tajalli or effluence and talabbus or dressing, etc., the terms which Shāh Wali-Ullah and Ibn 'Arabī use. Zillor adumberation, however, is a safer metaphor than tajalli or effluence, etc. It indicates otherwise from the asl or the thing, it indicates dependence on the asl or the thing, and it implies insignificance of the zill or adumberation, while tajalli or effluence indicates quite the reverse of it all ;-indeed it ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 183 is intended to indicate the reverse. These differences in the implications of. zill or adumberation and tajalli or affluence are undoubtedly of fundamental importance. And had the inquiry been carefully pursued, it would have become clear that the Mujaddid really meant by zill or adumberation not only something other, than the asl or the thing, but merely an effect of it,--indeed only, as an act of creation on the part of God.? Note: A brief note on Aşl-o-Zill or the Thing and Adumberation is to be found on page 93 above. But it seems necessary here to trace the meaning of the expression zill in the Mujaddid more closely, as nuisconception of the term has given rise to confusion. At the first glance, the Mujaddid looks like using the term ,.. ,(پرتو) ot partaw (عكس) ill very much in the sense of aks reflection; implying the suggestion that it is, so to say, somehow a part of the asl. --While at the stage of Zilliyyat, the Mujaddid tends to think of zill in this sense,--though even there zill indicates for him a lower reality than 'aks or partaw (M., Vol. II, Ep. 1). Later we find that he uses the aterm zill to indicate the Ghairiyyat (ünd gris) or otherness of the multiplicity from the aşl or God (Cf. M., Vol. I, Ep. 160); and that the purpose of employing it is to express the insignificance of the multiplisity in ·184 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid What the Mujaddid really means is this. The contingent's own essence is nothing but 'adam or non-being; that is, by itself the contingent has no being whatsoever. Only Divine grace gives it being and gives it qualities which bear a faint and distant resemblance to the being and attributes of God. In other words, God produces the world, not out of Himself as Wahdat-i- Wujūd or unityism would say, but out of nothing. Its being is due to creation,-creation out of nothing, which is something absolutely inconceivable for the speculative consciousness and its offshoot, viz., Wahdat-i-Wujud. And He gives it an existence of its own, which is not God's existence an act of contrast to the asl or God, as well as to slıow that the multipli. city can not cxist without the asl (sce M., Vol. II, Eps. 1, 11). However in the discussion of takwin (955) or creation the Mujaddid strongly tends to use the term only in the sense of an effect (M., Vol. II, Ep.4). In the end the Mujaddid realises the inadequacy of the term, discards it, and speaks, in its place, of the acts of creation which are incomprehensible to man (M., Vol. III, Ep. 122).

·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 185 but other than it. So also He gives it certain qualities, consciousness, freedom, etc., which are not God's qualities but ,its. Thus it becomes an agent in its own right and therefore responsible for its actions. Being a mixture of Wujud and ‘adam--of being and non-being, it is essentially finite and limited, though it has a yearning for improvement. Consequently, it needs religion; and it needs a religious unity with all the attributes of perfection. However, being limited it cannot comprehend the infinite; it can not see God. It can only believe in Him, --if God could be pleased to let it know that He exists and wants him to act in such and such a manner. Revelation performs this function and opens the way to the realisation of the human yearning to live in harmony with Him and in His presence. And revelation prescribes life of action, of struggle, «of endeavour, and indeed of Jihād or fighting in the way of God in order to achieve this end, to achieve ·186 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid the state of mind called Nafs-i-muțma'inna or beatified soul, and to attain to 'Abdiyyat or servitude. The 'Abd or servant remains the ''abd' in the end as he was in the beginning. He never becomes God. He is never re-absorbed into the being of God; he remains himself and survives ,death; he has immortality,--though of course God has the power to annihilate him. In life after death he will live, by sheer grace of God, in actual conscious presence of God, and see Him. This is, if anything, the reclamation of the religious consciousness from the bondage of the speculative consciousness into which mysticism had thrown it. The doctrine is clearly dualistic and not monistic; holds to a transcendent, qualitative and personal unity, and not to an immanent, unqualitative and impersonal one; its unity is free and does not act under compulsion. While the world and the human soul are according to this doctrine not identical with the Primal ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 187 Being ;-the souls bound in their action and gazing at it all the while and yearning to be re-absorbed in it. No, they have an existence of their own over against God, however meagre that existence be;-the souls being .free'agents, actively endeavouring to live the life prescribed by Him. Evidently this doctrine is as near to religion or Islam as Wahdati-Wujūd or unityism is away from it.-And the Mujaddid seems to have successfully brought about this reclamation ;--though he is not wholly out of the clutches of rationalistic thought in which his opponents are revelling, which probably is the reason why one had had the courage of questioning the value of his truly revolutionary achievement. However there can hardly be any doubt that the call of the Mujaddid to all Musalmans and Islamic mystics is Away from Plotinus and his host, and BACK TO MUHAMMAD.

·INDEX Bagā, 165 Bid'ūt, 26, 38 Contemplation, 72 Creation, 55, 105 Creator, 51, 55, 121 'Abdiyyat, 81, 96, 137, 138, 186 *Abdul Aziz, Shāh. 1 Absolute Idea, 49, 54 Abu Bakr-as-Şiduig, 138 Activity, 72, 74 'Adam-i-Mahad, 121, 130 *Adam-i-Mutaqäbila, 131, 148 Ahad, 122 Ahadiyyat-i-Muqula, 90, 175, 176 Ahl-i-Hadith, 39 Ahl-i-kitab, 109 Alam-i-Amr, 135 *Alam-i-Khalq, 135, 136 Anaximenes, 47 Anbiyya', 122 Asl-o-zil, 93, 183-184 Asmū', 86 Asma'-i-Ilūnii, 89 Asma-o-Silāt, 159, 160 Aristotle, 48, 73 A'yan-i-klūrijī, 107 Ā'yän-uth Thabita, meaning of. 91, 102. 159 Democritus, 47 Dhat-i-bahat, 175 Dhat-o-Sifat, 99, 118, 126 distinction of, 86 Dhikr, 36 Differences between the Speculative and the Religious unities, 53-74 Divine Being, 60, 63 Dualistic, 58, 61 Fană, 102, 103, 165 Farq..)2 ·Mujaddid's Canception of Tawhid 189 Farq ba'd-al-jam', 92, 109, 110 Fikr, 36 Forms of Consciousness, 45-46 Freedom, meaning of, 65 Implications of Speculative Consciousness, 46-49 Infinite Spirit, 59, 60 Iqhäl, Sir Muhainmad, 41 Isınā'īl Shahid, Shah, 161-165 Ittiba-i-Sunnat, 23, 28 Ghair Muqallid, 18 Ghulam Ali Shāh, 162 Ghulan Yahyā, Mawlwi, 158, 159, 161 Jam', 92 Jämi, 76, 87 Jizy:t, 20 Hadith, 8-9 Haqq-ul-Yaqin, 79 Hegel, 48, 75 Hayüla, 147 'lbädat, 113 Ibn 'Arabî,5, 80, 81, 81-89,91-96. 99, 100, 102, 103, 106-112, 1-13, 144, 1.18. 1-19, 181, 182 Ibn Taimiyya, 5, 8! Idea of the Good, 48, 53 Mäta, 123 Ijma', 9, 17 Ilham, 6 Ilm-j-Būtin, 31 Ilm-i-Zahir, 31 Irnān-bil-ghaib, 99, 120 Immsient, 56, 57, 109 Immortality, 67-69 Impersonal, 62, 63 Kant, 19, 70, 71, 174 Kashf, 5, 79, 98, 161 Kashi-o-]lhām, 78, 79 Kash-o-Shuhud, 76, 106, 109, 142, 165, 172 Khilafat, 10 Khwaja Baqi Billah. 10-11 Khwaja Mir Daril, 33, 149-151. 15-1, 156, 159 Khwaja Mîr Näşir, 32, 1:19, 150, 157 Kiräb-o-Sunnat, 3-1, 38 Kulli'-i-Tabi'i, 156 Lä-Ta‘yyun, stage of, 88 Ma'iyyat, 123 Makhluqāt. 169 ·190 Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid Personal, 62, 63 Plato, 48, 73 Plotinus, 76, 187 Purpose of creation according to Ibn 'Arabī, 95-96 Purpose of creation according to the Mujaddid, 112-114 Ma'rifat, meaning of, 13 Mazāhir, 169 Mirzā Mazhar, 158, 162 Plonism, qualitative, 59 quantitative, 5 Monistic, 58, 61 Muhammad, 31, 33, 76, 155, 187 Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thāni, 1, 2, 4, 12, 28, 29, 38, 40-43, 79, 81, 82. 84-86, 94, 96, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117- 119, 123, 124, 126-131, 134- 136, 138. 141-144, 148-150, 152, 153, 158, 163, 165, 170- 173, 181-184, 187 Mumtana', 125 Mumkin, 125 Muqallid, 17 Musammā, 89 Mustajma - i-Sifat-i-Kamal, 177 Mystic Consciousness, 42 Qayyūm, 169 Qiyās, 9, 17 Qur-an, 8, 39, 40 Qurb, 123 Refutation of Jabr in Mujaddid, 136, 137 Regulative idea, 49, 174 Religious consciousness, implications of, 49-53 Religious unity, 42 Nabuwwat, 29 Nafs-i-Ammāra, 136 Lawwama, 136 Mutma'inna, 137 Necessity, 66, 67 Sahw, 13, 37 Sair, 29 -an-Allah, 29 -fi'llah, 29 -ila-'llah, 29 Sajda, 19. 25 Setār, 121 Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, 34, 37, 164, 169 Schelling. 64 SL Pantheism, 42 Parmenides, 18. 56 Perfect Being, 129 ·Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid 191 Self-conscious, 62 Shaikh Ahmad, 1, 3, 4,5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 21 life of, 7-27 Shahāb-uddin Suharwardi, Shaikh, 80 Shaikh-i-Akbar, 86 Shari'at, meaning of, 12 Shuhud, 6 Shuyūn, meaning of, 119 Sifat-j-Wujud, 130 Sima', 13, 37 Sir Sayyid, 39 Siryan, 123 Speculative consciousness, 42 Speculative un , 43, 57, 58 Spinoza, 48, 64, 73, 75 Substance, 48, 53 Sukr, 13, 37 Sulūk, 29 Taqlid, 17, 39 Tariqa-i-Muhammadi, 32 Nabuwwilt, 36 Wiläyat, 36 Țariqat, meaning of, 13 Tasawwuf and Neo-Platonism compared, 181 definition of, 12 Taşawwur-i-Shaikh, 34 Tashbih, meaning of, 93 Tathniyya-i-Wujūd, 172 Tawhid-i-Şiſätī, 167, 168 -Wujudi, 4 Theory of creation, Mujaddid's. 129-133 Transcendent, 56-58 Uwaisī, 35 Uwaisiyyat, 35 Ta'ayyun-i-jasadi, 89 Mithālī, 88 Ruhi, 88 Tajallī, 87 kinds of, 87 Tajalli-i-Dhāti, 106, 107 Tanazzul, idea of, 127 Tanazzulāł, 178 Tanzīh, meaning of, 93 Wahdat-fil-Kathrat, 151 Wahdat-i-Shuhud, 114, 147-14% 152-154. 158, 159, 161-164, 171, Wahdat-i-Wujüb, 172 Wujud, 4,5, 11, 41, 75. 80-86, 95-97, 99, 100, 110, 114, 115, 117, 141-143. 147-149, 151, 153, 154, 157-165, 168, 171-174, 181, 184, 187

·192
Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid
Wujūd-i-Munbasit, 145-147, 175,
177
des, ents of,
145
Wujūdiyyat, 97, 118
Wahi, 6, 101, 104, 108
Wājib, 125
Wali-Ullah, Shah, 1, 84, 143-145,
147, 148, 158, 160-162, 170,
173-175, 180, 182
Wilāyat, 29
Wujūb, 125
Wujud, 130-132
Wujūd-i-Kārnil, 129
Khāriji, 179
Zakāt, definition of, 15
Zilliyyat, 96, 97, 118
stage of, 83
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