·dire
The Sujna Gohulji Zala Vedant Prize
Essay for 1915.
"Bisouss how far Sankaracharyo truly
veprosents the view of the author
of the Brahmasutras."
UNID
ONA
LIBRARY
C
BY
M. T, TELIVALA, B. Ars LL. Bxy
VA IL, HIG COURT.
Motto. 56
TET
सदा निरस्तकुहकं
परं धी हि."
AY,
NIRNAYA SAGAR PRESS.
1

·.:
6
15331
Printed by Ramchandra Yesu Shedge, at the 'Nirnaya-sagar' Press,
23, Kolbhat Lane, Bombay.
Published by Mulchandra Tulsidas Telivala, B. A., LL, B.,
Vakil, High Court, Girgaon, Bombay.
****
4. I

·PEFACE.
This is one of the two essays selected by the Bombay
University for the Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedant Prize 1915.
The essay was submitted in June 1915; and the result
W s declared in December 1917.
Except Appendix A
and a footnote on page 90, no new matter has been added
to the original, and no material change made. I have
to th nk Mr. Tribhuvandas Pitambardas Shah of Nadiad,
for defraying the expenses of printing this essay from the
Nadiad Pushti-m rgiya Library Funds, and Mr. D. V.
Sankalia, . A., LL. B., for revising it and reading the proofs.
Bo bay,
15-4-18.
M. T. TELIVALA.
UNIT
3
LIBRARY

·NDEX.
PAGE.
...
1-4
4- 7
7-31
.
SUBJECT.
(1) Adhikâra
(2) Veda
(3) Brahman
(4) Human Soul
(5) Jagat
(6) Liberation ...
(7) Conclusion
...
31-54
..
...
...
54-72
...
72-82
O
...
82-93

·$5 दा निरस्तकुह परं धी हि". *Discuss how far Sankaracharya truly represents the view of the author of Brahmasútras. The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedanta Prize Essay for the Year 1915. Before taking up the main subject, let u advert to some preliminary points, which are worked out by commentators of the Brahma-sútras. The first of these is:-who is the Adhikârin of this S'âstra? In the S'ugâdhikaraña ( 1–3-34-38, B. S.), the Sutrakâra declares that, among mortals, S'adras have no Adhikâra in this Vedic S'astra, though a god has. Among the member of the first three castes who is the Adhikarin? Of course the Traivarnika must be learned in the Vedas, he must be capable of undertaking Sravana, manana etc., he must be possessed of some desire for spiritual elevation. These requirements are necessary, they re suggested, arthakshipta, but beyond this, in the whole of the Brahma mimânså, the Sůtrakâra does not consider the question of Adhikâra. However, S'aņkara maintain that before one undertakes Brahma-Jijnâsâ, he ought to be possessed of the four requirements, viz. (1) fanatdargaaa, (2) TETSETS- भोगविराग, (3) शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत् , and (4) मुमुक्षुत्व. These four requirements are, according to S'aņk ra, sine qua non to the inquiry of Brahman, and these are, he think suggested by the Sætrakâra by the word eter in the starat ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'. This 'अथ' is used in the sense of आनन्तर्य, and ..

·2 presupposes the existence of the four requirements mentioned, above and not a miante. A knowledge of the Karma-mîmânsâ is no condition precedent to the study of Brahma-mîmânsâ. This is the view of S'aņkarâchârya as regards अधिकार. Bhaskarat and Râmânuja? both maintain thing, and reject the starter of the above-mentioned four requirements. It appears that the Satrakâra has in his mind neither of the two views. The e' suggests neither this nor that. 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' is the first Sutra of the Brahmamimansh introducing the reader to the Såstra. S'aņkarâchârya rejects धर्मानन्तर्य on the grounds that ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा may precede THEFTET of one who has studied Vedânta, and that there is nothing to establish the custom that ZhAiH must be studied before ब्र मीमांसा. By similar arguments, Vallabha also comes to the same conclusion. To add to this, Bâdarâyaņa and Jaimini are opposed in their views on this point, and as Prof. A. B. Dhruva remarked in his recent University lectures, a reader cannot be expected to study the works of the opponent before he studies his own, so a student of ब्रह्ममीमांसा does not necessarily need study TFHIHIRT before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. It is not disputed that some of the पूर्वमीमांसान्यायs are referred to here, but that does not compel us to come to the conclusion that a knowledge of Aniar is a condition precedent. Bhaskara accepts 1996HAFT4, and this is the view of Badarayana expressed in 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादि- 3 says that 1. 'नित्यानित्यविवेकादयः अन्तःकरणधर्माः पूर्वत्राप्रकृताः स्वशब्देन चानिर्दिष्टाः कथमिव सूत्रकारस्य विवक्षिता इति प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते' भा. भा. p. 4. 2. 'अपि च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादयः मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संपत्स्यन्ते, फलप्रकरणे ति र्तव्यताधिकारिविशेषनिश्चयादृते कर्मस्वरूपतत्फलतत्स्थिरत्वास्थिरत्वात्मनित्यत्वादीनां दुरव- बोधात्' श्रीभाष्य, p. 13. 3. 'न तावद्धर्मानन्तर्यम् , विपर्ययसंभवात्, न च पाठतो नियमः, तत्रापि तथा, न च आचाराद् व्यवस्था, तत्रापि अनियमसंभवात् , प्रत्यवायाश्रवणात्' A. B. pp. 26-27.

·3 versa. ydenta (3-4-26). Even accepting for a moment Bhâskara’s. suggestion of AFT, it does not in the least invalidate S'aņkara's argument_THEART: Erfa eficaciaen FESTTATTÀ:.' The Sûtra ( 3-4-26. ) only says that a knowledge of tratar is also recommended, but does not say it should necessarily precede the study of that. One may as well study JETTAIAT first, and then #HIAT, or vice There is no प्रत्यवाय prescribed whichever one begins first. Hence S'aņkaracharya, on this very argument alone, is right in rejecting that. But is he then right in prescribing the साधनचतुष्टयानन्तर्य ? It is undoubted that this view does not suggest itself from the words of the Satrakâra. Sankara's TACHTICHTETTÉORÊT is based on the passage of the Bțihadâraṇyaka 4-4-23, but that passage refers to the stage of a person who has known Brahman. Before one knows Brahman it is impossible for him to be possessed of THChifą, while according to Slankara's view शमदमादि must precede ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. This is rather placing the cart before the horse. One may never have THCHIRE, and then he will always he debarred from studying this ब्रह्ममीमांसा. The result would be शास्त्रोच्छेद. Vallabha- says that this view is opposed to our daily experience. The Ssútra ( 1-1-1) only introduces the reader to the study of Brahmamîmânsâ, and there neither appears any suggestion of धर्मानन्तर्य nor साधनचतुष्टयानन्तर्य. Both the views are not countenanced by the Sûtrakâra. Of course a know. ledge of the Upanishads seems to be necessary for the right understanding of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. This knowledge of the Veda and a sort of earnest desire for knowledge of 1. 'e fact HRAT FEUTRI XXX ga a 4-4-23. Br. Upa. 2. 'इदानीन्तनानामपि शमदमादिरहितानां निर्विचिकित्सितवेदार्थज्ञानोपलब्धे: A. B. B. S. S. p. 32. 3. अथातो ब्रह्म जिज्ञासा.

·4 Brahman seem to be sine gruci non to the study of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. A Nimbârka writer comes very near this view when he says:-'किं तद्वस् यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा विधीयते इत्यपेक्षायां मुमुक्षेति तत्सहकारीणि च श्रद्धोपपत्तिपूर्वकगुरूपसत्त्यादीनीति' (परपक्षगिरिवज्र p. 18). Hence if the sameiet is insisted upon, we cannot go further than the suggestion made above. Vallabha seems to be driving at the truth when he accepts sfertate after examining and rejecting the 277IT, saying that it is full of objections zal maglagatarefarget ga Ta' (87. Fr. B. S. S. p. 33. ). Th 7 d. The method of composition adopted by Badarâ yaņa leads one to suppose that the Sûtrakâra had a double object in view, viz, to remove doubts, and at the same time to summarise the teachings of the Upanishads. It is therefore necessary to consider in what light he views the Vedas. After undertaking n inquiry of Brahman in faterrata TAT' 1-1-1, and giving the definition of Brahman in 'SHTETET Ja:', he goes on to say that Brahman is revealed from the S'âstra i. e. Veda. He means thereby to sy that his conception of Brahman is based on Veda alone. S'ankara s ys in arealfacart 1-1-3, that this Sûtra has been written with a view to emphasize the omniscience of Brahman, which has been suggested in the definition of Brahman in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः'. This may be as S'aņkara says, or may not be as Jayatirtha says. It is clear that when once Brahman is defined to be one from which origination, existence and absorption take place, when it is said to be er the creator of the universe, its omniscience is established, and no further Satr is needed to repeat it. Whatever it may be, this Sûtra ʻzi sifatcara' gives us an opportunity ·5 to consider the attitude of the Sûtrakâra and Sankara towards the Veda. By declaring the lataca of Brahman, the Satrakâra declares that his conception of Brahman is entirely based on Veda. He further on declares that तर्क is अप्रतिष्ठ. Independent reasoning has nothing to do with his conception of Brahman. All contradictions are removed by taking shelter in the word of the gfa. S'ankara's attitude on the whole is undetermined. Once he says BTTTTTTTTF Ta Fatti, 9 I 2. 1. 6. B. S. but on good many occasions he departs from this rule. In "gated 27524EIT' 2-1-27, we have a very clear instance. Bâdarâ yaņa removes the difficulty raised by Sâņkhy in his usual way, viz. taking shelter in the text of the ytt, but S'aņkara goes further and says 'ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धः अर्थः प्रतिपत्तुम्'. Sankara's shelter is अविद्या, (अविद्याकल्पितभेदाभ्यु- TTAIT). Throughout the whole of the Brahma-mimânsa the Satrakâra never resorts to any other authority except wat and अनुमान which respectively mean श्रुति and स्मृति which is YA AIRot. Independent rationation has no place in his system. Sankara fails very badly in representing the view of the Sûtrakâra in not submitting himself to the ideal of the Sûtrakära. Even if S'ankara's attitude may be justified on philosophical grounds independent of già, the fact remains that that is not the way in which the Sû trakâra would look at it, and so long as he would not, it is useless • to discuss that question here. To the Satrakâra, any reasoning, not in strict harmony with the letter of the Veda, is useless (तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमपि अविमोक्षप्रसंगः 2-1-11). To the Satrakâra, Veda is eternal ( 577 5a et foredraw 1-3-29). From the words of the Sûtra we do not learn much further than this, but it is quite clear that the attitude of the Sûtrakâra is very devout. Like Sankara he has no courage to say:- अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, म, ·6 अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, न हि शास्त्रं इदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृ- a ICHCHT ta' 1-1-4. V. S. From the very undertaking of investigation and definition of Brahman by the Satrakâra, it is quite clear that S'aņkara is not justified in making the above remark. Bådarậyaņa’s whole system is entirely based on the words of gà, so the duty of his commentator is not to modify or correct his statements, but simply to put them in their true light. The aim of the S'astra is not 1 merely the removal of sharaf TTìbut the realisation of Brahman. Except get and CITIRELà, the Sutrakâra does not take the aid of any other art in support of his system, Sankara also does not say that he accepts any more TATUTS. The later S'ânkara writers accept six Pramânas, but with that we are not concerned. If S'ankara had maintained the position as declared ? by him in grado! (2-1-6) throughout, we should have seen him entirely at one with the Satrakâra. Looking at S'ankara's Bhashya as a whole, one sees a sort of contradiction running throughout, so far as his attitude to the S'âstra is concerned. While meeting the Mîmânsakas, he draws a distinction between पुरुषतन्त्रत्व and वस्तुतन्त्रत्व. धर्म is पुरुषतन्त्र, and as such does not admit of any reasoning independent of Veda, while Brahman is aegas, and as such, admits the claims of reasoning. But when the Sankhya opposes him, he declares, as is said above, that the conception of Brahman like a is based on Scripture alone, and does not admit of any Staru independent of Veda (2-1-6). If Sankara had 1. 'यत्तक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुरिति, तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्, रूपाद्यभावाद् हि नायं अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिंगाद्यभावाच नानुमानादीनाम्, आगममात्र- समधिगम्य एव तु अयमर्थों धर्मवत् xxx श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवांगत्वेन 37Taftad i 2-1-6. 2. अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतत्रा ब्रह्मविद्या, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवत् FECT 59 1 1-1-4-S. B. west ·7 avoided this contradiction, and adhered to the view expressed in 2-1-6, his faithfulness to the Sůtrakâra would have been greatly enhanced. Bådarâ yaņa's attitude towards his opponents, though queer, is justified on the ground that it is consistent. When difficulties are raised against his system by a Såņkhya or a Vais'eshika, he says his system is based on ga alone, and as such has nothing to do with reasoning, 2-1-29. But his opponents, as they accept at, cannot take advantage of this position. As they resort to it, he challenges their position by n*. Sankara fitly remarks on this point thus:--'अपि च आगमबलेन ब्रह्मवादी कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति नावश्यं तस्य यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्य मिति नियमोऽस्ति, परस्य तु दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणा- दिस्वरूपं निरूपयतो यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्यस्त्यतिशयः 2-2-38.' faithful way of expressing the Sûtrakâra's view, and had Slankara followed the same, he would not have embodied two contradictory interpretations as in 1-1-11-18, 2-1-27, 2-1-29, etc. etc. This is a very rh Brahman is the centre round which the whole philosophy and theology of the Upanishads turn. In the first Sûtra, 'terat Tatar', the Sûtrakâra undertakes an investigation of Brahman, and then immediately in the next Sûtra gives the definition of Brahman, 'TATET 7a:', as that in which the world has origination, existence and absorption. It is worthy of note that the Sutrakâra, instead of defining Brahman as 'सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म' 'सत्यं निं आनन्दं ब्रह्म, instead of giving स्वरूपलक्षण, gives कार्यलक्षण, by declaring that the Brahman of which he has undertaken investigation, is the creator of the Universe. In 'greenllacata', he declares further that his definition of Brahman is ·8 ntirely based on Scripture. Brahman is a fourt. The Sutra 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is Very important. S'aņkara also says that it gives the definition of Brahman. This yeur must be referred to the Brahman whose FFETTAT has been undertaken in the first Sûtra. Instead of defining Brahman as 'सच्चिदानन्द', Badarayana declares Brahman as that which creates, sustains and absorbs the universe, the reason for this being that the Satrakâra has not in his mind only the summary of the leading tenets of the Upanishads, but a desire to clear every Vedic passage of importance of any doubt or difficulty by giving its interpretation. To the mind of the Sůtrakâra, the tenets of the Sâņkhya's were most prominent. This fact can be inferred from the boundless zeal with which he refutes the principal dogmas of the Sânkhyas. On every occasion, he makes a polemic remark against the Sânkhya. Now these Sânkhyas attributed activity not to Brahman-or more correctly to Purusha, but to jada una, while the gat was chetana but far faza etc. Many of the Vedic thinkers themselves were under the spell of the Sânkhyas. Thus, this was the crucial point, on which it was essential for the Sutrakâra, interpreter as he was of the Upanishads, to pronounce a very definite opinion, and this the Sùtrakâra has done by declaring that Brahman is that which creates, sustains, and resolves the world in itself, thereby tacitly rejecting the Sânkhya doctrines of get's being factory and sofa's being 5. Similarly, by writing the Satra 'maalfcar', he boldly declares that his definition of Brahman is entirely based on scripture, meaning thereby that the S'âstra teaches the face of Brahman and not of sa. Thus it appears that the learned Sætrakåra at one stroke achieves two objects, viz. he sets aside the doubts of the Vedic passages, and then with it pronounces a definite view that, Brahina , the ·highest entity of the Upanishads, is possessed of activity, and therefore of knowledge also. Thus in 'SAFETT :,' Brahm n as sad is shown to be the cause. In ईक्षत्यधिकरण, Brahman, as chetana, is shown to be the cause of the universe. In STEGHITT UT, the same Brahman, as Anandamaya, is declared to be the cause. In FHITETU Brahman as sad, in facut as chetana, and in 371977@HOTO Tot as ananda, is declared to be the cause of the universe. Îkshati and káma being the attributes of chetana something, the causality of the non-intelligent prakriti etc., is out of question. Similarly Calgtrê:' sets aside the causality of the human soul, though he is chetana. Thus, the learned Sútrakâra, while setting aside the doubt as to faeca and parcurea of the universe, suggests and establishes that the same Kartri and Kârana Brahman is afge. In other words, सच्चिदानन्द Brahman as सत्, चित्-andआनन्द is the material nd efficient cause of the universe, and not jada Prakriti nor chetana jiva. Thus by showing the causality of Brahman alone, and suggesting thereby Brahman's unfettered ctivity, the Sætrakâra has established that the same Brahman is afectare. After After once declaring in brief his conception of Brahma the Satrakâra proceeds to show that, words bearing other senses elsewhere, refer to Brahman alone in the the Upanishads, and while doing so, he does bring ot essential characteristics of Brahm n. With this double end in view, he seems to arrange his latter portion of the first chapter. Hence, आनन्दमय, अन्तर आदित्य, आकाश, प्राण, परो दिवो ज्योतिः, प्राण, मनोमय प्राणशरीर, अत्ता, अन्तर, अन्तर्यामिन् अदृश्य, वैश्वानर, द्युभ्वाद्यायतन, भूमन् , अक्षर, दहर, अंगुष्ठमात्र, प्राण, ज्योतिः, आकाश and विज्ञानमय are all Brahman. 'गुहां प्रवि' refers to Brahman and jivâtman, Samprasada refers to Brahman. One clearly sees here that the aim of the Sätrakâra is not only to say that these words refer to Brahman, but that they do 2 3 even some ·10 individually bring out a certain attribute of Brahmari. The Sútrakâra, by following this method, develops, and perfects his conception of Brahman, the investigation of which he has proposed to undertake in erat a FETTET', and whose definition he has given in 'THETET 77:'. S'ankara in 'Taraft Fa:' 1-1-2. observes as follows: 'यत इति कारणनिर्देशः, अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभंग यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः'. From this it can be seen that Brahman which is being investigated by the Sûtrakâra is sarvajna, sarvashaktimat, and, therefore, kartri also according to his view as interpreted by Sankara here. The Satrakâra's jynásá thus refers to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत् , कर्तृ etc., and शा समन्वय, established in the following Sûtras, refers to the same Brahman; while according to Slankara, the faster and the water both refer to निर्विशेष Brahman. In 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' ( 1-1-4 ), Sankara observes:-'इदं तु पारमार्थिक कूटस्थं नित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं खयंज्योतिःखभावंxxx अतस्तदू ब्रह्म यस्य जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता.' In '797746THTHUTRECIFCRT:' ( 2-1-14 ), S'aņkara labours to show that, in adopting the ideal of 314 Flaila Brahman, he does not violate the pratijnão of the Sutrakâra expressed in TATORT Tai' 1-1-2. The fact that throughout the latter portion of the Brahmamîmânså, Brahman is described as possessed of some attributes, confirms the view that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind the FTAT and it haley that Sankara wants to impose upon him in the FETET, 1-1-4. Vallabha also says, 'न च येन रूपेण समन्वयो मतान्तरस्थैः विचारितः तथाग्रे सूत्रेषु निर्णयो स्ति', 1-1-4. p. 115. Kes'ava Bhatta Kâs'mirin, after showing the contradiction between the views of the Satrakâra and S'aņkara, observes that, according to the reasoning of S'aņkara, there can neither be anything like foştiera NI, nor even शास्त्रारंभ. 'परमते तु जि स्यो दुरुपपादःxxx परमते तु n ·11. - विषयस्य दुर्निरूपत्वेन शा रिंभोऽसंभव एव x x विकल्पासहत्वात् etc., 1-1-1. ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति, pp. 22. 23, निम्बार्कभाष्य. Thus the ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा of the Sutrakara, and that of Sankara are different. S'ankara's quaer does not refer to Sutrakâra's Brahman strictly speaking. S'aņkara tries to bridge over this difficulty by splitting the Sûtrakâra's conception of one Brahman into twofold. Sankara’s introduction to HTFGHATTU gives a very clear insight into his view of two Brahmans. According to S'aņkara's own statement, the first ten Sûtras of Bådarayaņa refer to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत् , ईश्वर and जन्मस्थितिलयकारण of जगत्, and that it is chetana, and not jada prakriti. The scope of the Vedânta sůtras then following is thus explained by him: 'द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते, नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टं, तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधि विव- र्जितं x x x एवमेकमपि ब्रह्म अपेक्षितोपाधिसंबन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसंबन्धं चोपास्य- त्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते इति प्रदर्शयितुं परो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते'. Again in the next adhikariana-'अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात्', he says:-'अपि च यत्र तु निरस्तसर्व विशेषं पारमेश्वरं रूपं उपदिश्यते, भवति तत्र शास्त्रम्', 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूप- मव्ययमित्यादि, सर्वकारणत्वात्तु विकारधभैरपि कैश्चिद्विशि : परमेश्वर उपास्यत्वेन निर्दिश्यते 'सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः' इत्यादिना'. This is how Sankara draws a distinction between निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् and सगुण ब्रह्मन्, So far as his atrasta ETI is concerned, the lakshaņa of Brâhman, given by the Sutrakara in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः,' has no bearing whatever. In BAITH TITTATT, S'ankara says that 'ATTRI यतः' etc., has been written by the Sutrakara to refute the Sâņkhyas and others, but that definition has only reference to the सगुण Brahman. Its ईश्वरत्व, सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व etc., are not to be attributed to Brahman in the highest sense (परमार्थतः). Brahman is called ईश्वर, सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत् , so far as there is अविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच द. 'तदेवं अविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वर- स्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च, न परमार्थतो विद्ययापास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यत' 2-1-14. Thus according to S'aņkara's view, the Brahman, whose definition is given by the Satrakara, refers only to the सगुण ब्रह्मन् , and the ·12 concluding Sutra, 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, would, by a parity of reasoning, refer to the lower or saguna Brahman, a creature of avidyd. We fail to trace this view to ny Sûtra, neither does Sankara support it by any Satra, hence, in the absence of any convincing proof, we cannot take this to be the view of the Sûtrakâra. Looking at the Vedânta Mîmânså as a whole, one sees that, in erat E', the Sûtrakâra undertakes the investigation of the Brahma , in 'ATUET TG:' etc., declares that gir- Charcotca is Brahman's SHTETTUTSETOT, in sûtras like haaat- शब्दम्', 'कामाच नानुमानापेक्षा', he removes the प्रकृतिकारणता of जगत् , nd in Sutras like 'नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः', he removes the Faca of jîvâtman, in the second chapter, the Sútrakâr declares that even though Brahman and Jivâtman are ananya, still Brahm n is adhika, this being the reason why unlike Brahman he does sometimes ahita to himself; that Jivâtman is the ans'a of Brahm n, that his Brahmanhood, omnipresence, etc., are through his relation with Brahman, that the Jivâtman is a kartri under the control and guidance of para Brahman; in the third chapter, the Sûtrakâra teaches how fas secure body fit for the acquirement of a ga, and in the fourth chapter, this Jivâtman, by the aid of HHTET TEIGT, reaches Brahman by fight from where he does not return; vide Anubhashya 2-3-29. Dr. Deussen, in his System of the Vedânta', on pp. 98–99, thus summarises the teachings of the Brahmasûtras:—The first part contains, in Adhyâya I, the theology, which, on the basis of seven times four passages of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its relation to the world as creator, ruler, destroyer, its relation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This is followed, in Adhyâya II, by cosmology which is concerned with the relation of the ·13 in any > world to the Brahman as cause, its gradual evolution from and reabsorption in it, and, from II-3-15 on, the psychology, in which are thoroughly discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation to God, to the body, nd to its own deeds. In Adhyaya III, comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a supplement to psychology (III, 2, 1-10), another to the theology (III, 2, 11-41 ); the rest of the Adhyâya contains a miscellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic in character, as the chief content of which we ca case, with S'aņkara, consider the teaching of the means ( Hats) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most part these discussions deal with the strange question whether certai passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one Vidyâ or to be separated, question which has me ni g only for the lower doctrine, with its im of worship. Fi ally, the conclusion of the work, Adhyâya IV cont ins eschatology; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers (faza) to new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, the worshippers of the Brahm n re led along the way of gods (acea) higher and higher upwards to the Brahma , whence there is no retur? ccording to the Upanishads. After thus summarisi on to say 'but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning of our (S'aņkara's ) system, for this Brahman i only the 'lower' Brahman, that is, as considered as possessing ttributes 'gun ', it is the object of worship, and no of “perfect knowledge' FUE '; o ly after this latter, th t is, the esoteric doctri e is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also liberated; until then, lthough he is in the wo ld of Brah an, nd a part ker of the syste he goe ·14 . Lordship 'Taiz' 'his darkness is not yet driven away', his ignorance not yet destroyed', that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine TTTT char', whose content consists of all that has hitherto been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the art laat or FFTEITA, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable.' Thus Dr. Deussen says that there is a contradiction between the system which is deduced from the express Sætras of Bâdarayaņa, and the esoteric doctrine of Sankara, and then proceeds thus to explain Sankara's esoteric doctrine:- In the department of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus or thus, but altogether without attributes yut', distinctions ja ta' and limitations 'fa', and therefore in no way capable of being defined or conceived. And this Brahman, devoid of all limitations, is only being, outside which nothing is; therefore in the department of cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different carar from the Brahm n, nor any plurality of things '97, and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent '30', is only a glamour APAT? which Brahman of course cayor', as master-magician 'मायाविन्', projects 'प्रसारयति', as the dreamer projects dreamforms. In the same way all further Psychology falls way after the saying at CTH STRA', 'that thou art' is com. prehended, according to which the soul of each human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows this, there is no more migration for the soul, nor even liberation; for he is already liberated; the cona.

·15 SO tinued existence of the world and of his own body appear to him only as an illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remove, but which cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others, but remains where he is and what he is and eternally was, the first principle of all things, 'the originally eternal, pure, free, Brahman.' This is a very fairly accurate view of S'aņkara as laid down by Dr. Deussen. S'aņkara's views about cosmology, psychology and eschatology are examined in the sections of Jagat, Jîvâtman and moksha respectively, and have been shown not to flow naturally from the Sûtras of Bådaråyaņa as they stand at present. Here we are concerned with the consideration of Brahma we shall examine here his view as to whether S'ankara's distinction of higher and lower Br hman can nat rally be worked out from the Sútras of Bådarầyaņa. It has been suggested above that so far as our casual survey of the Brahmasútras is concerned, Slankara's distinctio between the higher निर्विशेष, निर्गुण, निरुपाधि, and the lower, Maria, IoT, itafet Brahman, is not found to be countenanced by the sůtras of Bådara yaņa. The most important Sûtras, on this point, are to be found in the second pâda of the third Adhyâya. The adhikarana, beginning with 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्य उभयलिंग सर्वत्र हिं', and ending with the sutra 'दर्शनाच्च' 3-2-11-21 ), deals with the question, whether Brahman is alasto or alattie or both. The next adhikaraņa, beginning with'sadarara entradafa aat ब्रवीति च भूयः', and ending with the sutra 'प्रतिषेधाच' (8-2-23-30), deals with the question of goat which refers to the of Brahman, and not to Brahman itself, or in the words of Deussen, deals with the question of the possibility of knowing the argeta Brahman or esoteric Brahman. This is the scope of these sůtras as stated by Sankara. > Writerien we are .

·16 WE At the outset, it may be remarked that it is r the somewhat stra ge to find these Sutras ( 3-2, 11-30.) in the third chapter, which, as its very name suggests, purports to deal with the question of sådhanas. But as none of the Vedanta doctors have questioned their legitimacy, we shall deal with them as they are to be seen at present. These Sùtras seem to be rather obscure, and this seems to account for the vast divergence to be noticed in the existing Bhâshyas regarding the sense of these Sútras, s well as the arrangement of them into the adhikaraņas. From the first adhikarņa ( 3-2-11-21 ), S'aņkara thus works out the past9 of his Brahman. According to Slankara, the human soul,when freed from all 39ès, becomes identical with Brahman in stages like dreamless sleep. In his Bhåshya on the Chhậndogy also, S'aņkara says that by the word 'n' the gfè suggests the identity of the jivâtman and Brahman. The Swarûpa of this Brahman is being investigated in this section by the aid of the Vedic passages. Concerning Brahm n, says S'aņkar , there are Vedic passages of two kinds. One set of Vedic passages like 'सर्वकर्मा, सर्वकामः, सर्वगन्धः, सर्वरसः' teaches that Brahm n is pretty, while another set of Vedic passages like 'अस्थूर मनण्वह्रखमदीर्घम्' teache the निर्विशेषत of Brahma Now the Brahman in itself, continues S'ankara, cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same thing in itself should be सविशेष and निर्विशेष. It is true that we ight think that Brahman in itself is afasta, and becomes सविशेष by उपाधिs. e thing cannot become nother by the fact that it appears to be connected with limitations (Entfers ); the crystal remains clear even when it has Stashleyti antar; s it is an error to take it red in itself, so in case of Brahman also, the fat ca is due to limit tions etc., nd rests only on Ignorance ( 59 Taftar haar faqacart). Therefore Sankara concludes that Brahman is free from 3 But one his T ·11 ...17 all differences and perfectly unchangeable, and not the contrary, अतश्चान्यतरलिंगपरिग्रहेऽपि समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम् ,' the reason being that in all the passages like '37215C# ' etc., where the swarûpa of Brahman is taught, it is declared to be devoid of all limitations etc., 'अपास्तसमस्तविशेष.' Having worked out the acataca of Brahman thus, in the next sûtra, T Helle a 2a pag- Ala' 3–2-12, Sankara further elaborates the same by declaring that Brahman is feler TT. How does it happen then that in many passages of scripture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman? Should we not admit that by such passages a difference of form is actually brought out ? 'तस्मात् सविशेषत्वमपि ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यम् .' For otherwise what is the purpose of the passages of scripture which attribute a differentiation to Brahman? To this it is replied that in every passage where limitations appear, it is further said that Brahman is not affected by them, legt- पाधिभेदं ह्यभेदमेव ब्रह्मणः बोधयति शास्त्रम्'. Having thus emphasized the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman,Sankara remarks, 'अतश्च न भिन्नाकारयोगो ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रीय इति शक्यते वक्तुम् , भेदस्योपासनार्थत्वादभेदे तात्पर्यात्'. The next Sûtra, effu qə, has been written to teach the cognition of abheda which is preceded by a censure of the perception of bheda. How is it that only the 37714TT Brahman is insisted upon when the Vedic passages describe Brahman as both ? To this question, an answer is furnished by teaaa Fe CTETTCTTT' 3-2-14. Brahman is not giht, because Vedic passages like 34FYSH etc.,expressly declare that AQST Brahman is TT. Then what about the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as 3taa? To this an answer is given in '5177eaua Tezia' 2-3-15. As the light of the sun and the moon, when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, and in conformity with it, seems crooked, when it is crooked, straight, when it is straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with geografer 3 494 ·18 WWW. assumes its forms. Such an 'आकारविशेषोपदेश' is not विरुद्ध, for it is taught for the purpose of उपासना. It is therefore by no means purposeless. All the words of the Upanishads have a purpose, and are authoritative, but this does not prevent this view of Brahman's variaca etc., from resting on Ignorance all the same, for on inborn Ignorance depends worldly action as well as those prescribed by the I Veda. The Sätra, ele T TEHLTA 3–2–16, also teaches the I hiežtaca of Brahman. The Sutra 'दर्शयति चाथोऽपि स्मयते 3-2-17, emphasises the atrašaca of Brahman by quotations from श्रुति and स्मृति. After explaining the Sûtras, et ça "चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्', and 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् 3-2-18-19, X the same strain, S'ankara remarks in 'TGETAHEATH- वादुभयसामंजस्यादेवम् 3–2-20 :-Just as the FTTxistêfêra increases with the increase of water, moves with its motion, is latitanfèt, in the same way, the one stanga Brahman assumes the #s of J. In the last sútra, I FRITTE 3-2–21, Sankara concludes again emphasising the same view on the authority of certain passages of the Veda. In the end, Sankara gives it as his opinion that Brahman is निर्विकल्पक. 'तस्मात् निर्विकल्पकैकलिंगमेव ब्रह्म न उभयलिंगं, न विपरीतलिंग चेति सिद्धम् 3-2-21. inz > . The interpretation of these Sûtras by S'aņkara cannot be taken to be convincing, because it is not consistent with what the Sutrakâra has said before, and even if we do not mind this inconsistency with the previous Sûtras, the interpretation of the Sûtras and Vedic passages cannot be denied to be very forced. In 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिंगं सर्वत्र हि', Sankara explains the words 'सर्वत्र हि' by 'ब्रह्मस्वरूप- प्रतिपादनपरेषु अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादिषु निर्विशेषस्यैवोपदेशात्'. The wording of the Sûtra does not in the least suggest this meaning, nor is it to be found in this third chapter, nor in whole of th Mîmânsâ S'astra. The word Sarvatra is ·19 once found before in '&z fata garran' 1-2-1, and there also, no suggestion is to be found in favour of Sankara's interpretation. Hence that explanation owes its existence to ! S'âņkara's zeal for the Nirvis'esha Brahman. Even the latter halves of the sentences, quoted by S'aņkara in support of Nirvis'esha Brahman, do not support his view, but go against him. The first sentence quoted is this:- 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् । अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते' कठ० 3-15. passage the same Brahman which is As'abdam etc., is described to be Anadyananta, mahatah para and dhruva, which, in their turn, imply the savis'eshatva of Brahman. Moreover, when it is established here, that Brahman is Nirvis'esha, the following Sûtra, '376497 TELETACETET', becomes redundant. To consider that this doctrine, which is to be proved there, is proved here, is also rather incongruous. Again, the interpretation of the Sutra, 3769952 TETA778917', does not appear to be supported by the very texts, which S'ankara, quotes in his support. The first text, quoted by Slankara, is PSTERSHAU' etc., q° 3-8-8. This sentence has been spoken by the sage Yajnavalkya to explain to Gârgi the nature of Brahman, so first he says Asthalam etc., and then at once 4 teaches the pras'âsitritva, ambarântadharakatva, beginning with crashțritva, and ending with akas'opádánatva. ! Hence to lay unnecessary stress on the negative words like asthulam etc., and to say that the nirvis'esha Brahman alone is taught, and to disregard completely the context teaching divine attributes of Brahman like pras'asitritva etc., is not fair. Asthúilam etc., can be reconciled by saying that the nishedha, there referred to, is only the negation of what is to be found in the world of prakriti, it is only a nishedha of prâkrita or laukika things, and not a wholesale negation of everything including even attributes divine like pras'asitritva etc. The second kathakce ·20 it sentence toch etc., does not, as already shown above, support Sankara’s contention that Brahman is absolutely devoid of any attributes, #fara'. The third quotation is firom the Chhandogya, 'आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निर्घहिता यदन्तरातब्रह्म', 8-14-1. This sentence is very clear. It distinctly teaches that the revelation of names and fornis is an (FAETATIETECT) attribute of Brahman. It teaches Brahman as possessed of attributes, savis'esha, and it is rather strange to find S'ankara quoting it in his support. The fourth is quoted from Mundaka. 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः 7 artha ATT TF: ( 2-1-12). That also cannot be taken to teach the out and out nirvis'eshatva of Brahman. By calling the purusha amurta, it does not deny murti abso- Jutely, it may be iyatta-parinâma, for it, at the same time, says that purusha Brahman is divine-divya, at ACTIE or and=77264. But the passage quoted goes further, and declares that the purusha is greater than the great akshara Brahman, '3TATTIETOST: 97:'. Thus this passage also goes against the nirvis'eshatva of Brahman. The last sentence, quoted by S'aņkara, is from the Brihadâraṇyaka 'nangan अपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म High: 2-5-19. Even when we consider this sentence without any reference to the context, the very word sarvdnubhůh suggests an inference against S'aņkara's absolute negation of any attributes in Brahman. If there was no sarva, how was Brahman to be sarvânubhuh? ata 52 aigua caufhara. Taken with the context it further goes against Sankara's view. This quotation is at the end of the Madhu-Brahmand. In the beginning of the Madhu-vidya 'ata a TS- यमात्मेदममृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम्' is repeated fourteen times in order to teach the sarvatva of Brahman. Then is further taught the 'सर्वभूताधिपतित्व, then as an explanation to 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव' is added. 'अयं हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि च बहूनि च ·2.1 अनन्तानि' which directly declares not the absolute negation in S'aņkara’s sense, but the anantarúpatá or sarvatva of Brahman. Hence the so-called prominence-praddhanatd of nirvis'esha Brahman, according to S'aņkara, cannot be fairly worked out here. S'aņkara’s very appropriate remark 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वा विशेषातू' loses much of its force, when he says that the आकारविशेषोपदेश of Brahman is due to उपाधि, because according to him, what is due to strie, cannot be said to belong to the thing itself, and also because all the FITTS are आविद्यक, 'उपाधिनिमित्तस्य वस्तुधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः' 'उपाधीनामाविद्यकत्वात्.' Even Vedic passages like 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन' at best teach the वाङ्मनसातीतत्व and Brahmavid's भयाभाव and not its अत्यन्तनिर्विशेषत्व. The quotation from Geeta 'ज्ञेयं यत् तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते, अनादि- मत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तनासदुच्यते' 13-12, refers to व्याकृत and अव्याकृत stages of Brahman on the authority of 2-1-17-B..S. Moreover this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Geeta further describes Brahman as सर्वतः पाणिपादान्तम् etc. Attributes like 'सर्वतःपाणिपादान्तत्व' etc., cannot be prodleritc. laukika, heya. The illustrations given in the ICETA' sutra. 3-2-20, can be explained by the fact that there is no difference in the safaa either in less or more water भाष्यप्रकाश. pp. 945-946. B. S. S. Thus it has been shown that so far as the sutras and the texts of the Upanishads are concerned, S'ankara's effort to work out the absolute Aracataca of Brahman in this अधिकरण ( 3-2-11-21 ) cannot be justified. Now in the next अधिकरण (3-2-22-30) he works out his interpretation in the same strain, and concludes: 'तस्माद् ब्रह्मावसानोऽयं प्रतिषेधः, न I अभावावसान इत्यध्यवस्यामः' ( 3-2-22 ). The sutra. 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि तिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः' 3-2-22 is thus explained by Sankara. The विषयवाक्य 'नेति नेति' etc., here chosen, is from the बृहदारण्यक, ·of his 22 In the passage in question, af ta' follows a statement of the two rupas of Brahman viz., मूर्त and अमूर्त. Both these fornis according to S'aņkara, are denied of Brahman by that fit. It is by the aid of this Sûtra that Sankara establishes his strict अद्वैतवाद. By denying everything except Brahmán which is nos ara,' he distinguishes his system from the are of the Bauddhas. Everything except the Brahman is to be denied, and the Brahman itself is to be, if at all, discribed by all negations. This is the essence of the Vedanta according to him. Thus his system should be very aptly called, not the faara', * the doctrine of non-duality, butóguara' or 'singularism'in the words of Sir Ramkrishņa Bhandarkar. Thus there are two sorts of passages to be found in the Upanishads, one teaching the Brahman as parte, and the other teaching it as afasta. S'aņkara subordinates, nay rejects, the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as Hazt, as shown above, calling them useful only in EYTATS, which in their turn, are products of alfaat, according to him. On what authority Sankara bases this theory can with certainty be taken as an authority for drawing this distinction. In doing so, he, it appears, departs from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. In ( 3-2-15), he remarks sa fie बेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात्.' Thus according to the principle laid down by S'ankara himself (and this seems to be the view of the Sûtrakâra, who, as a true Vaidika, has undertaken to set aside faster, and to work out harmony of the conflicting Vedic passages) the factors would not be set aside, if some passages are subordinated or deprived, as is done by him, of their primary importance and significance. Being passages of the Veda, their authoritativeness is equal, and ·28 they deserve to be equally respected. The difficulty of contradiction should have been set aside on the principle laid down by Badarayana in 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्', 2-1-27. This seems to be a very strong piece of argument to refute Sankara's theory of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman. The argument that, because the 'एकवाक्यता' is to be worked out, S'ankara is justified in subordinating, or rather rejecting, सविशेष Vedic passages to निर्विशेष ones, and thereby removing the race between them, would not stand a moment's consideration; the hollowness of this argument is not difficult to be seen. The laeta as such, can rightly be said to be reconciled, when both sorts of Vedic passages deserving of equal weight as they are, are given their due and equal weight and scope. Sankara's way of looking at. the श्रुतिs, one must admit, not only subordinates the सविशेष श्रुतिs, but renders them meaningless ultimately. What prevented S'aņkara from an unqualified submission to the letter of the Veda, in complete disregard of the so-called युक्तिविरोध, as was done by the learned Sutrakāra. in 2-1-26-27, is a question, which cannot be satisfactorily solved. Saņkara ought to have accepted the principle, which he himself expresses so very tersely in 2-1-27. 'शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म, शब्दप्रमाणकं, नेन्द्रियप्रमाणकं, तद् यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् , शब्दश्च उभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति, अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च, लौकिकानामपि मणिम औषधि- प्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशात् शक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्यविषया दृश्यन्ते, ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते, अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनश्चा शक्तय इति, किमुताचिन्त्यखभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत, तथा चाहुः पौराणिकाः 'अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् , प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्' इति, तस्मात् शब्दमूल एव अतीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः' Thus Brahman's स्वरूप being अचिन्त्यस्वभावयुक्त there is no विरोध. What seems impossible to us becomes possible in the case of Brahman. Thus has the Sætrakâra set aside Rei Tulaster', 0, follow- .

·24 th 1.41 ing the same reasoning he removes in 3-2-11-30, ÊTIT, which appears to exist in the various attributes of Brahman. The Sûtra façoxTATE RE 3-2-23, declares that Brahman is zouth-that which cannot be comprehended. But this want of comprehension or aia is not due to Brahman's being devoid of any att; En etc., can be seen from the next sutra 'अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ' 3-2-24, where it is taught that Brahman is seen in संराधनकाल. Now if Brahman is absolutely faláta, what is to be seen or realised in the ücreta ? Again, it would not be fair to say that what is seen in Étran is a product of nescience, for as Sankara remarks, this game is 1938, and hence, it should be accepted as STATŪ. Thus the Sûtrakâra seems to accept that Brahman is '31217 without THIC or भक्ति, while it is 'व्यक्त' when there is भक्ति and ज्ञानप्रसाद, and as such, the latter a would be gratūra. S'aņkara's absolute negation of festes in Brahman, is a view, which to have occurred to the mind of the Sûtrakâra. This view is strengthened by the answers given by the Satrakâra to the objection raised by the Såņkhya, where the Sûtrakâra distinctly says that Brahman is सर्वशक्त्युपेता and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. 'सर्वोपेता च तदर्शनात्' 'सर्वधर्मो- TYTTA 2-1-30 and 2-1-37 respectively. M. seems never IZ melewin Bar Wor Again, the Sutra 'उभयव्यपदेशात् अहिकुण्डलवत्' 3-2-27, seems to answer the view, put forth above. It does not appear to be a HTFCTV sútra, but a facra sútra. Nimbarka and Vallabha take it to be such. In Fira TRT 3Tfait par 3-2-11, it is declared that Brahman's 5HTfurca cannot be due to strus, for it is described everywhere as such ( Sheffura ). ( Vide Nimbarka's Bhâshya on thi sútra ). To this question, this Sutra seems to furnish an answer by saying that just as it is natural in a serpent to assume Es and 156 forms, so Brahman at will assumes GSM wie ·clear tha, PA 25 forms of all sorts. This view is not singular. Vall bha also says the same thing when he observes tett #Q: Fast- कारः कुण्ड श्च भवति, तथा ब्रह्मस्वरूपं सर्वप्रकारं भक्तेच या तथा स्फुरति xx तस्मात् सकलविरुद्धधर्मा भगवत्येव वर्तन्त इति न कापि श्रुतिरुपचरितार्थेति सिद्धम्' 3-2-27. The above view is again supported by the Upanishads which frequently describe Brahman by contrariega. Vallabha gives another explanation of the negative pfàs. 'प्रतीतं च निषेध्यम्, न अप्रतीतं, न श्रुतिप्रतीतं, सत्यत्वादयश्च लौकिकाः, ततः सर्व- Aght ag haaAnubhâshya B. S. S. p. 57. The Alle should have reference to what one sees, and not to the attributes of Brahman, which have been spoken of in the Veda. The Sûtra 'sadarasa la saqaf ant gata 2 47: 3-2-22, does not deny 64, etc., in Brahman, but simply EFT. ( Vide Nimbarka-Bhashya and Aņu-Bhashya on this Sutra). Hence in the absence of any Sůtra directly ceptance of the negative gâts alone is not sanctioned by the Sûtrakåra. The Sûtrakâra seems to ccept that Brahman is possessed of all us, (FTTTTTTT 2-1-37.), and also those that appear to be contrary. It is possessed of all wonderful powers, (aliat 7 TETETT 2-1-30, STREHA fafararen 2-1-28). The negation of negative glas refers not to the divine attributes described of Brahman in the Upanishads, but to the लौकिक or प्रा त or इयत्तावाचक ones. This seems to be the’yiti to explain to those who cannot see their way to accept Brahman as possessed of even contrary attributes on the authority of the Vedic texts and the TTT of Brahman, for in that case there is no atte, but a father- भास, an अलंकार, resulting in suggesting the glory of the great Brahman, and sowing the seed of devotion to it. 1 अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः । श्वेताश्वतर० 3-19. BUTTUTETT HETT HETTTTT STEHT TETIT festset frat: 120 3-20 To 2-10, तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वदन्तिके । ईश० 5-1. आसीनो दूरं ब्रजति, शयानो याति सर्वतः। 4 qoco 2-20. 4 ·26 This view, thus it appears, is in perfect harmony with the Sutras of Bâdarâ yaņa. Nimbârka nd Râmânuja also favour this view. Sankara's Ararat does not seem to have any connection with the Satras of Bådarâ yaņa. This view is supported by the fact that none of the Vedânta writers accept S'aņkara's view of afatte Brahman to be the view of the Sûtrakâra. Thus, according to Bådarầyaņa, the same Brahman is both निर्विशेष and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. Sankara's theory of निर्गुण पर and ago 3947 Brahman is further shaken of by Bådarayaņa in 3-2-21, and the Sûtras following: There the question is raised whether there is any qo greater Brahman than which has been described before. The answer given to this question in the following Sůtras is in the negative. Not only is this Brahman the highest, but another its equal is prohibited. Thus the same Brahman which is HypoT is the highest. 'परमतः सेतून्मानसम्बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः' xx' मान्यात्तु'xx 'उपपत्तेश्च' 'तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्.' 3-2-31,32,33,34, 35,36. Dr. Thibauti agrees with the view that Sankara's theory of Saguna and Nirguna Brahmans is not recognized by the Sutrakâra, but he thinks that S'ankara by recognizing Saguna and Nirguna Brahmans gives scope to all sorts of divergently conflicting sa texts. But this sounds rather strange. To say that S'aņkara understood or harmonised the Upanishads better than Bâdarayaņa is placing the cart before the horse. S'ankara's lower Brahman being a creature of nescience, à non-entity in the highest sense, the scope given to gazta elas is also illusive. Bådarayaņa does not even dream of such a method, a fact evidenced by the absence of any Satra quoted by Sankara in support of this theory. If in WA 1. Vide Vedanta Sû tra I. Introduction p. 128. Sacred Books of the East.

·27 numerous places the Upanishads describe Brahman by contrary attributes, Bådarayaņa like a true, Vaidic with the great regard that he had for the letter of the Veda, without subjecting one set to another, or accepting one set and rejecting another, refers both the sets to the same Brahman, and says that it is the highest. When the factor is pressed against him, he falls back on the letter of the Veda as in 2-1-27, ata 7774291,' saying that Brahman is to be learnt only from scriptures, and that independent reasoning as such has nothing to do with it. Thus it will be seen that Dr. Thebaut's claim for Slankara that he gives scope to all the sfàs is very weak. Bådarâ yaņa decidedly has done better justice to all the gas by referring them to one and the same Brahman, while S'aņkara's insistence on the fräste gas alone has rendered his conception of Brahman open to the charge that it owes its origin not to Veda or Sûtras of Bâdarâyaņa but to Buddhism. (Vide Bhaskara’s 716577 p. 124.). Thus it will be seen that the investigation of the Sutrakara refers to Brahman which is सर्वधर्मयुक्त and सर्व- त्युपेत and therefore कर्तृ, but not to निर्विशेष Brahman as S'aņkar repeatedly says. Except Bhaskara, all the Bhashyakâras are almost agreed with the view expressed above, and even Bhâskara's fajátne 45197 is very mild as compared to that of S'aņkara. Vallabha's commentator truly remarks:-'अतो न्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स स ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्निवेश्येतरं faqatla, e a Te Zaciat TATTTE', pp. 953. Aņu-Bhâshya Prakâs'a B. S. S. - Bådarayana has established that Brahman whose investigation he has undertaken, and whose definition he has given in 'FHraf:' is possessed of wonderful powers, creates universe etc., for its sport, is nie. S'aņkara wants to refer the car not to Brahman but to star, the ·8 reasons for this being विषमता and निघृणता. Here also he departs from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. The Satrakår considers this question in 'वैषम्यनैघृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति' 2-1-34. Bâdarâ yaņa says that Brahman is not to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for it allots fruits ccording to धर्माधर्म; Brahman is कर्मसापेक्ष, Veda teaches 80. Though here the Sûtrakâra gives thITAITO2ch as the reason why Brahman is neither faqa nor Agut, he feels conscious of the difficulty that if Brahman were to allot fruits according to धर्माधर्म, its वातन्त्र्य would to that extent be controlled by it, and so far its marca, Feet TV, FOFIRMAT:', etc., would be limited. Hence, to avoid this objection he says in HT 544TTE' that Brahman alone allots fruits and not धर्माधर्म. Giving fruits according to This Brahman is not controlled by them. This seems to be the reasoning of Bâdarâyaņa. Of course he says जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, and hence it is possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to his, but then the difficulty arisesif the जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, how is Brahman to create it? To this his reply is that yra and fuld teach both. After removing this doubt, he cuts short the argument by the Sutra 'सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च' meaning thereby that Brahman is possessed of all ths, and that is in fitness of things. gê word is Badarayaņa's shelter in case of difficulty, while S'aņkara’s is sfaat. S'aņkara's interpretation of these Sûtras is correct, though according to the reasoning of S'aņkara's system the answer would be different. According to S'aņkara’s reasoning there is no question of aqft and agvel. Brahman's कर्तृत्व is आविद्यक, hence its फलदातृत्व much more so, happiness and misery are stay", and the human soul is also a creature of nescience. How does Brahman become joined with अविद्या? अविद्या? Of this the Sutras give no trace. Even Sankara does not give any reason for this, as is remarked by Dr. Deussen;"In reality ( 97Area:, ) there is ·29 nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (laaste) of Him into the world, division (AT) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on saar. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahmani alone is? On this question our authors give us no information.” System of Vedanta pp. 302. Bådarâ yaņa does not give ny information on this point, because as shown above, he does not hold this view, and Sankara does not give any reason because it is not possible to do so. Hence Dr. Deussen's remark: ‘But the system gives no real ground for this assumption' (S. V. p. 303) can be applicable only to S'aņkara's reasoning. When Jiva's era is due to Brahman (FTTT I na ga:), when Brahman is itself the source from which all activities flow, how can Brahman be eas? Since Brahman is unfettered by anything like अविद्या, माया, ad etc., at will it becomes he or shet. Hence Bâdarayaņa’ system is not to be charged with AT&TTİNT; neither his Brahman is to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for Brahman's creation is आत्मसृष्टि, आत्मकृति or ली सृष्टि. One cannot be unjust to one's self, one cannot be said to be unjust or cruel, if one were to do anything for the sake of fun, stot, similarly Brahman cannot be said to be unjust or cruel towards its own creation created for the sake of mist only. **!, Thus the Brahman whose investigation Bâdarayaņa has undertaken is--possessed of all râs, all wonderful powers, it is independent doer, attâ;- it is untouched by the short-comings of the Jivâtman; it resides in the heart;º 1. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च 2-1-37. 2. सर्वोपेता च तदर्शनात् 2-1-30. 3. जन्मा- यस्य यतः 1-1-2. 4. अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् 1-2-9. 5. संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् 1-2-21. 6. TTİ ET atzarit negatira 1-2-11.

·0 11 it is 3 pacarlegur ; it is पवत् ; it is अन्तर्यामिन्; it is भूमन् : it is अंगुष्ठमात्र; it is वैश्वानर; it is प्रादे मात्र' and व्यापक; it is दहर; it is सत् चिद् ,10 आनन्द. It is everything.18 It is23 beyond प्रकृति, या, अविद्या, शरीर, शक्ति, etc.,Gunas of प्रकृति", etc., have no सम्बन्ध with it, hence it is निर्गुण. It is जगत्कंपनकर्तृ it is 31777444,17 it is the support16 of heaven and earth; these attributes are divine. The subject14 of negative xas has reference to attributes of etc. The negative श्रुतिs do not deny the divine attributes of Brahman spoken of in other Vedic passages. This Brahman whose investigation Bâdarayana has undertaken, and in whom harmony of all the Vedic passages (समन्वय") has been worked out by him, for its own sportas, develops itself into Jadajîvâtmaka universe, without undergoing the least change, 20 and without ceasing to be निर यव. It alone shapes, and names the Jadajîvâtmaka universe making it Nâmarupâtmaka also. Just as Brahman, by its mysterious powers, makes सदंश and C perceptible, while agit imperceptible, thus developing itself into 7 STATHIYA, similarly by making 1. अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः 1-2-21, 2. रूपोपन्यासाच्य 1-2-23. 3. अन्तर्या- म्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् 1-2-18. 4. भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् 1-3-8. 5. शब्दा- देव प्रमितः 1-3-24. 6. श्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् 1-2-24. 7. आमनन्ति चैनमसिन् 1-2-32. 8. दहर उत्तरेभ्यः 1-3-14. 9. जन्माद्यस्य यतः 1-1-2. 10. ईक्ष- ते शब्दम् 1-1-5. 11. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात 1-1-11. 12. सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् 1-2-1. 13. गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् 1-1-7. 14. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः 3-2-22. 15. कम्पनात् 1-3-39. 16. शुभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् 1-3-1. In वैश्वानराधिकरण, वैश्वानर is described as प्रादेशमात्र and अभिविमान according to scripture 1-2-32. This also goes to show that there is no fatte in Brahman if the contradictions are sanctioned by Veda, because the FET of Brahman is शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्य. Sankara's interpretation of these two words is forced, and consequently is rejected by Ra anuja, Bhaskara, Vallabha, Madhva, Deussen and others. 17 a 24-2911 1-1-4. 18. लो वत्त लीला कैवल्यम् 2-1-33. 19. आत्म तेः परिणामात् 1-4. 26. 20. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् -1-27. 21. संज्ञामूर्ति प्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् 2-4, 20. ReypINDIVImamrphomema MMMRDITORIA ·1 1 i perceptible the सर्वरूपत्व and सर्वनामत्व, develop एकरूपत्व d garica producing thus an infinite beautiful variety. Giving fruits to Jivas according to their aphs, Brahman is not controlled by them. In becoming seat, it does not become partial or cruel. Brahman is शब्दमूल. Ratiocination has nothing to do with it. On the strength of the letter of the Veda, this Brahman, all-pervading? as it is, is to be reached from whence there is no return. It is one nd infinite. It is everything. S'aņkara's theory negativing everything in Brahman cannot be supported by any of the sůtras of Bådarayaņa. Bådarayan 's view seems to be to affirm that Brahman is everything, rather than to deny everything of Brahman. HU AN It has been shown that so far as the Sutras of Bådarâyaņa are concerned, one fails to find any trace of the theory of 'Anaht' higher Brahman and sento lower #TUT Brahman, that all the passages of the Upanishads describing Brahman as fara afa' or 'ai', etc., refer to the same Brahman; and the fatta between these two sets of Vedic passages, transforms itself into a aztetare the moment cell as such is dismissed from our consideration, and the letter of the Veda is with implicit faith (ET) followed, without the least attempt to better or modify its natural significance, and thereby accepting Brahman to be possessed of wonderful powers fan Titis and all attributes 'सर्वधर्म's; or if one fails to see his way to अचिन्त्यैश्वर्य- युक्त ब्रह्मन् , then he may set aside the विरोध by referri g the negative Vedic passages to 'प्रा त' or 'किक' पदार्थs nd the ffirmative to eat divine ones, as is suggested by Râmânuja, Nimbârka, or even by V llabha in sanat FOR agafa gat setia a 72: 3-2-22. V. S., thus givi g equal 1. greff: Tara 269f: Taala 4-4-22.

·32 scope to both sets of Vedic pass ges without following S'aņkâra's method of subordinating the affirmative to the negative ones, a method which on its face is not justified by the fact that the Vaidikas like Bådarayaņa are alw ys anxious to revere all the Vedic passages whether like afat नेति' or like 'सर्वज्ञः' with the same reverence. Now let us take up the consideration of the human soul-Jîvâtman. The whole body of the Vedânta Sûtras dealing with the nature of the Jivâtman, is to be found in the third pâda of the second chapter of the Brahmamimânsâ ( 2-3-16-53). Bådarâyaņa begins thus: In T- TTTET TE normaat 37TTT: Jagutacara 2-3-16, it is said that birth, death, etc., refer to the body of the human soul. In 'नात्माऽश्रुतेः नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः, it is taught that Jivatman has ! no scuſet, Vedic passages deny the cuſt' of Jîvâtman, they on the contrary teach the नित्यत्व of Jiva. In 'जोऽत एवं' 2-3-18, it is taught that Jiva, though by nature #na, is a' tar,' on the authority of the Veda. S'ankara's insistence that Jiva is only afters and not a knower goes directly against the wording of the Sutra. In Satras 2-3-19-2 , it is taught that Jivâtman is of the size of an atom, because (3) 'उत्क्रान्ति, गति and आगति' are spoken of him in the Veda; even if illa be otherwise explained, the sta and sta do refer to Jîvâtman as such; that sfat passages describing Jivâtman as non-Aņu describe him as such in his capacity of Brahman; where Jîvâtman's Brahmanhood is to be em- (1) phasized, there only he is described as non-aņu-ay; Vedic passages do teach Aņutva of Jîvâtman as well as suggest it; the objection that the way of Jivâtman as he is atomic cannot be 'waar iconifa' pervading the whole body, does not stand. Just as ren though applied to one part produces coolness in the whole body, similarly the art of Jîvatman, atomic as he is, spreads over the whole body; like chandan Jivâtman has his abode in the heart, the Vedic p tewide 32 > ges 6) ·33 teach the same thing. On the analogy of the diamond or the lamp, also the Jivåtman's no spreads over the whole body. These latter instances seem to be given because some one might urge that minute particles produce coolness in the case of chandana, and that the Jîvâtman has no particles, hence just as the light of a diamond spreads over a wider space than is occupied by the diamond, in the same way even though the Jivâtman resides in the heart, his chaitanya spreads over the whole body. 'yor cannot exist without @T, hence if the Jîvâtman resides in the heart, and is of the size of an atom, his chaitanya would not be weathTatia; this objection is set aside by Bådarayaņa on the analogy of 777. Vedic passages also teach the anutva of the Jîvâtman, The ya passage, HERLIT TË TET', teaches that by a gu the Jîvâtman pervades the whole body. Hence the conclusion is that the Jivâtman is of the size of an tom. Why is the Jîvâtman then said to be fãy, etc., if it is really aņu? If the Jivâtman is really different from Brahman, why is face ca etc., taught by the Vedic passages? These questions the author of the sůtras answers in SUTTITETIT T 1879@RT: ITAT 2-3-29. The Jîvâtman is described as far Brahman, etc., because he derives these attributes from Brahman on the analogy of the sit. Just as the , though a heinafaa, is, in Bșihadâranyaka, described as possessing the attributes like segura, etc., which are Brahman's BTTTTTTUTETÉS, similarly when the serca of the Jîvâtman is to be emphasised, he is described as fay, etc. This is the interpretation favoured by Nimbârka and Vallabha, and it is strengthened by the preceding sutra falucargarra àacifera Tra" 2-3.23, where fatea, etc., are said 1. Modern science may detect a flaw in this reasoning, but Bâdarâ yaşa's view is clear. He wants to say that the Jîvât an's residence in the heart, his anutya, and his Fartura dar ' are all possible. 5 Pasida ·34 s to be attributed to the Jivâtman to declare his Brahmanhood. Hence, according to Bådarayaņa, the Jivâtman is aņu, when in Brahmabhäva he experiences auch, etc., on account of his Brahmanhood. Râmânuja, Madhva, Nimbârka and S'reekantha all accept the Jivâtman to be anu. S'ankara interprets the sutras 2-3-19-28 as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष, and 2-3-29-'तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्यपदेशः प्रा वत्' as. FCInta refuting and rejecting the Jîvâtman's anutva and accepting his face. With some reservation, Bhaskara follows Sankara, and Vijnana Bhikshu, though breaking the adhikaraṇa from 'qaytara', says that Jiva's anutva is due to Eater. Sankara explains the sútra thus:--the first at of the sutra 2-3-29 refers to 'The Sqrfa', etc., and the secondap' to euca, etc., that the Jîvâtman through the adjuncts of gre 5911, etc., is described as aņu, just as the 'a', the supreme soul, though devoid of any fazas, is described possessed of all धर्मs, and called सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत् , etc., which are alsTS. S'ankara’s interpretation has one advantage over that of Råmânuja, Madhva, and S'reekantha in the fact that he explains the instance of 'somehow, while the other writers fail to make out much of it. In fact, they seem to have lost sight of its importance. Dr. Thibaut has also neglected to consider its importance. But Vallabha manages to interpret it, in an exactly way, by showing the appropriateness of the instance. He says, just He says, just as ist who is merely a gyfarfar, who is not Brahman, is attributed as on account of his Brahmanhood, so the Jîvâtman on account of his Brahmanhood is described as day, etc., though he is stu. Vallabha's explanation has this advantage that he has not to add words like बुद्धि or उपाधि which re never suggested in any of the sůtras. of Bådarâ yaņa either preceding or followi this sutra. Bh sk ra? reference to 'विज्ञानमनसी' 2 opposite 3 ...

·2-3-15, in support of his reference of first aid to gift, does not improve the case by the absence of any reason for tr nslating 'विज्ञानमनसी' not as इन्द्रियs but बुद्धि and उपाधि. The distance between the two sûtras suggests an inference against Bhaskara. But Sankara's arguments in favour of fauca deserve to be considered independently. He observes in 2-3-29, aasfeer अणुरात्मेति, उत्पत्त्यश्रवणात् , परस्यैव तु ब्रह्मणः प्रवेशश्रवणात् , तादात्म्योपदेशाच परमेव ब्रह्म जीव इत्युक्तम् , परमेव चेद् ब्रह्म जीवस्तस्माद् यावत्परं ब्रह्म, तावानेव जीवो भवितुमर्हति, परस्य च ब्रह्मण: विभुत्वमान्नातम्, तस्माद् विभुः जीवः'. S'aņkara thus advances three arguments in favour of the Jivatman's विभुत्व, viz., (1) उत्पत्त्यश्रवण, (2 ) परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रवेश, (3) archite&t. It is worthy of note that none of these arguments find any support from the sûtras of Bådarâyaņa. The first rgument, which Sankara gives, in favour of the larga of the Jîvâtman, has been used by Bådarayaņa to establish the eternity of the human soul, hence it cannot be taken to be conclusive. The denial of Jinh does not conclusively prove that the Jivâtman is gay. It cannot be said because Jiva's file has been denied, it is Brahman, and hence fèy. The very argument goes against S'aņkara's view of Street, which he accepts to be without stuff---- 3fc. It cannot be said because staat has no JETíh it is al. To this, it may be urged on behalf of S'aņkara that the acceptanc of any duality being opposed to the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्व- विज्ञानम्', the नित्यत्व suggested by the denial of उत्पत्ति, results in अभेद-ब्रह्मन्, while अनादित्व alone त्व alone suggests मिथ्यात्व as in the cse of Blair, that is, there cannot be two things eternal, he ce the frience of Jiva, taught by the Sûtrakâra, teaches th t Jiva is Brahman, and hence ày, while then though अनादि has an end, hence it is मिथ्या. To this argument, an answer is furnished from the ûtras of Bådarầyaņa. Even accepting the Jîvâtman to .....

·be नित्य and अणु, there is no विरोध of the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्व विज्ञानम् This प्रतिज्ञा can be fulfilled by accepting the Jivâtman to be an sist of Brahman, as taught by Badarayana later on in 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्', etc., or by taking the human soul to be a stiti of Brahman as done by Nimbârka, or 4#10 or farticur by Râmânuja, and by taking the sit jiva to be 347740 with Brahman on the principle laid down by the Sutrakara in 'तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दा- fert:' 2-1-14. The stat, according to Bådarayaņa, is at with sifta Brahman, the timi is 377774 with thai Brahman, the fateor is 377747 with faitset Brahman; hence the knowledge of siffra Brahman includes the knowledge of siz? Jivâtman. The stagit on the other hand goes radically gainst Sankara's view, because it can be possible of fulfilment only when there is 'one' and 'all, and that 'one' is 'all. The difficulty arising from the Vedic passages teaching the frayaca of Brahman can well be answered on the principle laid down by Bâdarayaņa in 'ydes 2-1-27. Thus the denial of the off of the human soul cannot be worked out to prove that jiva is Brahman A. It cannot be taken to be the view of the author of the Sutras. The second argument of Sankara is based on passage from the छान्दोग्य (VI), 'अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य ATHEW 2497a1o. Para Brahman's entrance is taught in this fd, hence says Sankara, that the Jîvâtman is the same as Para Brahman. विभु. According to the reasoning of S'ankara, in the first place, there can be no sazt, the TECEI being व्यापक. Nor can we interpret प्रवेश in the sense of संयोग, for Brahma being 04144 inside and outside the tie, even without the declaration of star Brahman could have developed names and forms. With this af if we read a TOTT" stà teaching co-existence of Brahman and Jiva, the sense rare ·ones. that can be made out is this, that the supreme enters with the Jivâtman, and then develops names and forms. The difficulties, presented by the sayfas and 4094ayas, can be answered by Bådarâ yaņa on the authority of gate 21694ecara' 2-1-27. Hence the argument of Para Brahman's atqut is not conclusive on the point of Jiva's विभुत्व. The third argument of Sankara is a great. This argument is based on the passage of the grain which runs thus: 'स एष अणिमा, ऐतदात्म्यं इदं सर्व, तत् सत्य, स आत्मा, तत् त्वम् Spfe'. It is taught by Uddalaka to his son S'vetaketu. This argument is on the whole stronger than the two preceding But even here one cannot say that this aigF714 CRT is in the sense of S'aņkara. The ac' of 'TEL CHF", asRanga Râmânuja remarks, refers to ga@rcct. The Vedic passage has been spoken with a view to teach arang 'the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one'. With this end in view Uddalaka teaches his son that is the this whole visible, universe is ऐतदात्म्य-a प्रकार of सद्, it is सत्य because #is its BICHT, Ag, thou art that sagitt- $1978 of 7 Ta being a pronoun refers to the noun gagreit. But apart from this, the fact remains that Jiva as such is not Brahman; then why does grà say so? To the Vaidika the letter of the Veda is all in all. Its authoritativeness cannot be questioned by him. According to Sankara, face an eft' is possible thus. Ta refers to Brahman, freed from far and its products, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, etc., while त्वम् refers to the human soul, fireed from अविद्या and its adjuncts अल्पज्ञत्व, अणुत्व, अंशत्व, कर्तृत्व, etc. Thus in both तत् and त्वम् a. लाक्षणिक secondary sense is to be preferred in perfect disregard of the E-primary sense. S'aņkara's preference for secondary v 1 छान्दोग्यटीका. आनन्दाश्रम Series.

·sense cannot be supported by any sûtr of Bâdarayaņa. In addition to this, the result is that all 591FTETS of Brahman become the products of fact, the greys and sis of Brahman become theat, and yfè passages and sûtras, teaching कारणत्व and अंशित्व of Brahman, become 37776 अर्थवादs. The result is that one arrives at a point where the demarcation line between Sankara's aråsigar-absolutely negative system, singularism, and yang of Madhyamika becomes a problem of doubt and difficulty. One cannot seriously dispute that there is Buddhistic influence working here some where in one form or another. But if we take Jiva as sint of Brahman following the letter of Bådarâ yaņa, then there is geur only of faq,' and this too is not असत्पर्यवसायिनी, but as Vallabha says, just as the crown-prince becomes king, so Jiva becomes Brahman, and he experiences ब्रह्मभाव, he experiences विभुत्व, etc., the धर्मs of ब्रह्मन् , side by side with his अणुत्व. The result here is सत्पर्यवसान. The Vedic passage, 'स आनन्याय कल्पते', also favours this view; besides the theories of Saguņa Nirguņa Brahmans, H227769, etc., resulting from S'aņkara's reasoning, have not to be resorted to. On the acceptance of atta' of 'अंशिन्' Brahman and अंश Jiva on the principle taught by Bådarầyaņa in the sûtra, 'C7FCTARHURTOGif+:' 2-1-14, the argirea can well be explained. The 917Fyfa teaches that just as water, coming in contact with pure water, becomes ales, so the soul of the muni, knowing Brahman, becomes तादृक्. The word is ताक् If Jiva were परमार्थतः Brahman, then this illustration cannot be explained. 'वास्तवयत्किञ्चिद्भावे अस्य दृष्टान्तस्य सर्वथानुपपत्तेः'. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that the Satrakâra's long list of sūtras confirms the view that Jiva is 37, his fauca is spoken in the state of ETHTT to establish his Brahmanhood. Dr. Thibaut also remarks that it is strange that geta could be so very lengthy. and not तत्.

·- If the reasoning above adopted is correct, then Sankara's remark, 'तस्माद् दुनित्वाभिप्रायमिदमणुत्ववचनमुपाध्यभिप्रायं ar feadh', has no bearing whatever so far as the sûtras of Bådaråyaņa are concerned. It also follows from what has been said above that S'aņkara's interpretation of the next three sutras 2-3-30-31-32 does not seem to bring out the view of the Sætrakâra. The Sutrakâra nowhere suggests this बुद्धिसंयोग or उपाधिसंयोग. The sutra, 'यावदात्मभा- facare a sta: ac E', is not very clear. The objection why low fta-Jiva is said to be the highest Brahman is set aside by saying that once the Brahmanhood of the Jivâtman becomes manifest, he continues for ever to experience Brahmatva and with it arra also. It is well said:- 'व्यापकत्वश्रुतिस्तस्य भगवत्त्वेन युज्यते । 877-CİRTTITOUTTI तत्र ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः। तीयेरन् परिच्छेदो व्यापकत्वं च तस्य तत् ॥' Aņu Bhas'ya. 2-3-30. The Brahmanhood-aca, etc., before the Jivâtman experiences etHTT, is latent in him; in the state of ea, वि- pa, etc., develop in him on the analogy that yta which is latent in a child develops in him when he attains puberty. gerarcat T RT uniSofthedra? 2-3-31. The next sûtra confirms this view. Hence the Jivatman according to Bâdarâyaņa is tu, and not a27199 or hy as S'aņkara says; the Jivâtman is spoken of as Brahman in secondary sense so long as he is in ÅETTEETT, but when he is in मुक्तिदशा, when his ब्रह्मत्व becomes प्रकट-his ब्रह्मत्वव्यपदेश is मुख्य- -in primary sense. Thus it appears that S'aņkara has clearly misunderstood the sûtra 2-3-29. Regarding this Dr. Thibaut also observes:Now, in the first place, nothing in context warrants the explanation of the first 'tať by Buddhi. And—which is more important in the second place, it is more th doubtful whether ccording Typ News *** AYRICA ·40. to Slank ra's own system the qualities of the Buddhi such pleasure, pain x x etc., can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the samsara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to S'aņkara’s system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is nonessential or, more strictly, unreal, false'. (Vedanta Sutra 1-page 55.) Hence S'aņkara is not right in turning the जीवा त्वबोधक sutras s belonging to पूर्वपक्ष. UP ra The next adhikaraña, consisting of sûtras 33 to 39, establishes that the Jîvâtman is a kartâ. In support of the I Jivâtman's kartritva, the Sätrakâra gives the following reasons:-(1) शास्त्रार्थवत्त्व, (2) वि रोपदेश, (3) करणोपादान' and ( 4 ) Float. The 'z' in the sûtra 2-3-36, Taller क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः' ends the list of reasons given by the Sûtrakâra in support of the Jîvâtman's kartriiva. The next three sû tras deal with the question how it is that Jiv who is a kartâ does sometimes good or bad to himself. The sûtra says just as the eye sees pleasant as well as unpleasant objects, so the Jivâtman does actions which are sometimes beneficial or harmful to himself, because his powers are crippled, and he has no air which helps one to perceive what is हित or अहित. 'उपलब्धिपदनियमः', 'शक्तिविप- 217, 21717, 2-3-37-38-39. The ??? in the last sûtra, 'समाध्यभावाच' ends the list of reasons given for हिताहितकरण. After once referring the sutra 'उपलब्धिवदनियमः' to हिताहितकर-1 utalo, Sankara’s referring the next sûtra tithridato refute Buddhi's Kartritva, and then again the last sutra ATTHITTY' to show that the Jîvâtman is a kartà, is rather forced. The propriety of comes in the way, and Badarayana's reading 'समाध्यभावाच' instead of 'समाधिभावाच' is also difficulty to meet which we have to strain ourselves to make out the se SCHE AB e. 533 ·.. pain, but when it enters caming nd waking, and feels 41 The next sûtra is. "TT ATTET 2-3-40. It is very important. The diversity in the interpretations of this sûtra by different Bhâshyakâras has enhanced our interest in it. S'aņkara in this sûtra puts forth the view that the kartritvå of the Jîvâtman, established by Bådarayâņa in the previous adhikaraņa, is not Jivâtman's emaila kartyitvaa but उपाधिनिमित्त. the Jîvâtman's kartritva is a product of nescience, as a matter of fact, the human soul is saf. With this end in view, S'aņkara proceeds to interpret the sätra thus: The si in the sûtra is used in the sense of I', and thereby it refutes the view, put forth in the previous adhikâraņa that Jivâtman is a natal. The Jîvâtm n’s gra, according to S'aņkara, is not enter in the sense that heat is entitatea in fire; on the contrary as in the case of Te who busies himself with the axe and other tools in his hands, and feels pain, but afterwards home, lays aside his axe and other tools, and in his n tural state rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul s long as it is affected by the duality founded on ignorance, into the highest self, it is freed from the complexity of the organs of work, is not an agent and feels pleasure in the state of deep sleep; it is the same in the state of liberation where it is anos, reposes, and is happy after gloom of Ignorance is driven away by the torch of knowledge. The simile of the c rpenter is to be taken s follows: the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such s fitting, etc., and with regard to certain tools s ch as his axe, etc., an agent, but not an agent so fir as his body goes, so too the soul in its exertions with regard to the org ns, manas, etc., is n gent, but not an agent with regard to his own self. The soul, as opposed to the carpenter, b s not lik hi limbs with which it could t k D. 1 TY WO. 2. W ·4 up the org ns, m nas, etc., or l y them side, as the c rpenter with his hands takes up, and l ys aside his tools. Though this interpretation ppears to have been worked out very ingeniously, it is nevertheless a forced one. How can it be for a moment supposed that Bådarayaņa uses the 'a' in the sense of '? How can one convince the opponent that 'z' is used in the sense of I'? It is more than probable that S'aņkara is trying here to put forward a view that seems to have bee never thought of by the Sûtrakâra. It is certain that this is not the view of the Satrakâra, and one cannot seriously dispute that S'aņkara here is reading his own individual opinion into the sutra of Bådarayaņa. This opinion is strengthened by Dr. Deussen who, in his "System of Vedanta' page 319, referring to S'aņkara's taking in the sense of 'a', says thus: 'a remark which possibly hints at fund ental differences between Bâdarayaņa and S'aņkara'. It is better to take the sůtra a Râmânuia does, as s pplement to what has been said before. If the human soul were ETHIÊ #al, as is taught in the preceding adhik raņa, then, says the opponent, he would lways remain as such-tai-and hence he would never be free from action. To such an objection this sætra furnishes an answer: -Just as a game even h ving with him an axe, etc., works or does not work at will, so the Jîvâtman even though possessed of organs of speech, etc., (artife port4a ), t will works or does not work. Hence no BTTTTTT. Vallabha also considers this sûtra to be a supple ent to the theory of the Jivâtman's ca propounded in the preceding sûtras. According to him, the Jîvâtman is not only a Kartă but a Bhoktà also. It is not necessary, s ys Vallabha, th t Kartâ and Bhoktà ought to be separ te; just s Tenth ying m de the ch riot rides in it, so the Jivåtm ·4 90 does somethi g', and enjoys it. V llabh further says that Foreca by its Very nature is not दुःखरूप nple sant; drinking milk, etc., is yes pleasant. In either case the view that the Jivâtman's sode is औपाधिक or आविद्यक, and that he is परमार्थतः an अकर्ता is not accepted. Whether one accepts Râmânuja's or Vallabha's rendering, it does not matter much; both seem to be more natural than that of S'aņkara. It has been shown that Sankara's rendering of the sůtr , TAT e Tether 2-3-40, is forced. The sûtra does not seem to consider the question whether the Jîvâtman's tancat is स्वाभावि or औपाधिक, but as Ramanuja remarks, this sutra teaches the कर्तृत्व or अकर्तृत्व of the Jivatman at will, just as a carpenter works or takes rest at will. Sankara cannot quote any sútra to prove the र्तृत्व of the Jivatman to be औपाधिक or आविद्यक. This sutra cannot help him much. If the Jivâtman's en Maeca is to be questioned at all, it can be referred to be due to TCETE on the authority of the next sutra, 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः' 2-3-41, rather than to बुद्धि or उपाधि. S'aņkara has, however, independently of the Satrakâra, advanced the following arguments against the Jivâtman's खाभाविक कर्तृत्व. (1) If Jiva's कर्तृत्व is खाभाविक, then as अग्नि cannot be free from heat, so Jiva cannot be free from theica, hence अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग. (2) कर्तृत्व is दुःखरूप. (3) मोक्षसिद्धि is referred to AVE IT soul. (4) Some già passages teach Jiva's Helica to be strane. For these reasons, says S'aņkar , the Jivatman is an अकर्ता. The first objection c n be met by taking the interpretation of the sûtra like Râmânuja. On the other hand, if बुद्धि's कर्तृत्व is insisted upon, then as grace is अचेतन, there can be no motive for भोगवाञ्छा, etc., hence कर्तृत्व would be an. Vallabha also advances the same arguvents in different words. He observes: -77 sodra w Wich ·44. अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंगः, पराधीनकर्तृत्वे एवैतदिति, सांख्य तन्मतानुसारिणो वान्यस्य भ्रम एव कर्तृत्वे न मुक्तिः, नपुंसक एवमुच्येत, बा वत् , निरिन्द्रियस्यैव समाधिरित्यपि, करणत्वेन बुद्धिवन केनापि दूष्यते, तस्मात् जीवस्य : खाभाविकं कर्तृत्वम्, ध्यायतीव लेलायतीवेत्यपि परधर्मा करणम्। अयमप्येको धर्मः, खाप्ययसं- पत्त्योब्रह्मव्यपदेशं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वविप्लवं वदन् उपेक्ष्यः'. Again one fails to understand why S'aņkara calls any sort of storica to be : 264. It depends on how one takes it. Considering कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप, imagining the existence of दुःख in आनन्दमय-all these go to suggest that Sankara is influenced by deeply pessimistic leanings. When the car is taken in the light of the ब्रह्मविद्, when individual soul's कर्तृत्व is declared to be Brahman's, then there seems to be no valid objection. With great force does Vallabha observe in 1-1-1:-'न च ब्रह्मरूपात्मविज्ञाने देहाध्यासाभावेन कर्तृत्वाभावात् कर्मानधिकार इति वाच्यम् , निरध्यस्तैरेव देहादिभिः कर्मकरणसंभवात् , अत एव जीवन्मुक्तानां सर्वे व्यापाराः, तथाच स्मृतिः, नैव किंञ्चित् करोम्यहमिति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित्, पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्पृशन् जिघ्रन् अश्नन् गच् न् वपन् श्वसन्, प्रलपन् विसृजन् गृह्णन् उन्मिषन् निमिषन् अपि, इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन् , ब्रह्मण्याधाय कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः, लिप्यते न स पापेन पद्मपत्रमिवांभसा'. 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं, ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्र कर्मसमा ना.' These quotations from Geeta show how wfs are to be performed. They do not say that Jiva is an अकर्ता, but th t he has to be a fal with a by his side. The misery is due to अभिमान and not to कर्तृत्व. Hence Bâdarayaņa teaches that Jiva's कर्तृत्व is due to पर-ब्र न्. The gfa passages can be explained otherwise. The quotation from this does not teach mencarura, but that andra is due to आत्मन्-ब्रह्मन्-(7th प्रपाठक ). Badarayana teaches the same in परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः 2-3-41. To add to all this, the Sutra.kara never suggests any of Sankara's arguments, but boldly goes on declaring Jiva's कर्तृत्व. Hence the most skilful advocate of S'aņkara would fail on this point. Thus the Jivatman's कर्तृत्व is खाभाविक.

·. 4 < The ne t two sutras 2- -41-42, declare that though the Jivatman is कर्ता, he derives his कर्तृत्व from Brahman-पर, It is impossible for any balanced thinker to reconcile S'akara's reasoning with that of the Sutrakâra in 2-3-41-42 TIIT I ged:' 2-3-41. Bådarâyaņa says that yra teaches Jiva's कर्तृत्व to be derived from पर-ब्रह्मन् ; he does not say उपाधि. The next sutra is तप्रय पेिक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः 2-3-42. This sûtra seems to have been written by Bâdarâyaņa to refute the objection of & Ft and guy accruing to Brahman, by its being declared to be the final source of all activity and thence of happiness and misery prevailing in the world at large. If S'aņkara’s interpretation is taken by itself without any reference to his esoteric doctrine of faiana Brahman, it is quite in harmony with 2-1-34. All the Acharyas take कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष in the sense of जीवकृतप्रय- पेिक्ष, and say as प्रवाह is अनादि there is no वैषम्य, etc., because Brahman is जीव तप्रय पेिक्ष. In 3-2-38, 'फलमतः उपपत्तेः, it is taught that Brahman allots fruits, and Jaimini's view that for #allots fruits is refuted. Again in 3-2-5, 'UA- Traia y acred Tat Te Trefaqsai, bondage, etc., of the Jîvâtman are referred to परब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्यान. The Vedic passage, 'एष हि एव साधु कर्म कारयति यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति,' etc., teaches that the Supreme Lord makes a human soul do good or bad actions according to His will to raise or lower him. The sútra, 'Tia Tangga,' states that the human activity has its source in Brahma Hence it appears that when Brahman is the sole doer, He ought to be held liable for the misery and h ppiness of the Jivâtrans, and they should not be made to suffer or enjoy the fruits of actions which are not strictly their own. 1. S'aņkara renders the sutra thus:-He refers the 3TFUTT to जीवकर्तृकपराभिध्यान. तिरोहितम् is rendered in. the sense of अतिरोहितम्. This is far-fetched. It seems. better, with. Râmânuja, Madhva, Nimbậrka and Vallabha, to take it as परब्रह्मन्' अभिध्यान.. HOW pi ·4 If we follow S'a k r 's re soning, this apur of aqfthever goes away. But then we have to cast aside the purport of ll the sůtras. Hence Bâdara yaņ must have in his mind view, which refutes this objection of aqft, etc., d at the same time, is thoroughly consistent. The difficulty can be solved in two ways: viz., (1) by referring this contradiction to Brahman's parent and the letter of the Veda; the Veda teaches that Brahman gives fruits; it may be according to #søs, or may not be; though giving fruits according to #f, Brahman is independent of patt; when Brahman gives fruits according to His sweet will, even then He is not liable to aqft, etc., for Veda teaches so; (2) by taking the TPGIÀ not S जीवकृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष as all the आचार्यs have done, but as पर-(ब्र ) ST3289. The advantage of t king the sůtra this way is clear. We have not to bring in the word gta from the drift of the statut, but from the sůtr just preceding. According to this view, the whole सृष्टि becomes ब्र प्रयत्न. In 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' 1-4-26, it is taught that the सृष्टि is आत्मसृष्टि and आत्मकृति; in 2-1-33 'ठोकवत्तु ली । कैवल्यम्,' it is taught that this त्मिसृष्टि आत्मकृति is ली कैवल्यम् ; in 2-3-43, 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्,' etc., it is taught that the Jivâtman is niet of TENT; in 'TCUTZFIEL failed mature Tratamentit 3-2-5, it is taught that the Jîvâtman's Brahmanhood is a fer-has become late t-by the efeat of Brahman, and to Brahman are due bond ge, etc. Hence it appears that Brahman, for His own sport alone, out of His sweet will, develops Himself into Jada-Jiva, nd still remaining transcendent, determines that particlar Jivatman will do a particular action, and He will particular fruit. So according to 4AEST, Brahm n rules His siss, Jivas. As siets they are 377844 with an. The human soul's position can be compared to an ctor. He has to play the part allotted to him in give him ·fact, he as nd mise y are both creatures of Brahm 47 qastat; the happiness and misery trouble him so far as h forgets that his gaca is Brahman's and not his ow ; in and cannot be said to be the criterion of deciding Brahman's partiality and cruelty; the moment the human soul realises that Brahman for His sport guides him to do this or that, he ceases to be miserable; his limited ideas of fata | vanish; he experiences fregati agèa geta # Forgetting his own faca, and remembering Brahman's ara, the human soul ceases to be responsible for his so-called ctions; he feels buoyant. Like Brahman, he sees in the aq r of Brahman आनन्द. The कर्तृत्व becomes thus source of pleasure, 311976—and not a source of misery as Sankara says. Br_hman makes Jiva work according to His अभिध्यान and लीलार्थ- कृतप्रय otherwise His area and said would be purportless. The part allotted to Jiva by Brahman to pl y would be jeopardised. Thus this Jad -lívatmak –Nâm rapatmaka-Srishti bei g STTH TROTTA-3TTA , being Brahman' na stot, Brahman is not liable to the shortcomings of partiality nd cruelty. The wording of the sûtra, Area- प्रतिषिद्ध-i stead of विधिनिषेध-also helps us. also, we have to deny in Jiva his TT in faeca, and emphasise that he is a creature guided by Br 'hman's will in all his actions. This seems to be the view of Bådarayaņa suggested from the sůtras. With Saņk ra we can deny Jiv 's अभिमान in कर्तृत , but unlike him we prefer to refer all hum ctivity to Brahman ssource,and not to 39ègle,etc. The sectio consisting of sâtras 2-3-43-53, deals with the question of the relationship of the soul to Brahman. According to Båd rầyaņa, the Jivåtman is the siat of Brahman; Brahman is site, while the Jivâtman is ziet. Like master and servant, the human soul is not different from Brah ,but like sp rk and fire, h is try with Br h n. The In this way ·. 4 Vedic mantr , पादो स्य वा भूतानि, and the Gita passage, 'ममैवांशो जीव ठोके जीवभूतः सनातनः', teach that the Jivatman is the अंश of Brahman. This is the view of the Sûtrakâra. However, S'aņkara does not like to accept this view. Accordingly, Sankara changes 'अंशः' into 'अंश इव'. To take अंश in the sense of at ga' is clearly modifying the view of Bådarayana. Even though certain passages of the Upanishads declare Brahman to be निष्क -निरवयव, that does not justify us in rejecting the texts which teach the size of the Jivâtman. Adopting the reasoning which Bådarâ yaņa has worked out in 2-1-26-27 --'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्', the difficulty can be removed by accepting Brahman's swarúpa to be निरवयव, and at the same time having अंशs. In a शब्द माणशा like this, reasoning as such has very little scope. This view is not singular. In this view, Vallabha is with us when he obser ves: 'ननु ब्रह्मणो निरवयवत्वात् कथं जीवस्यांशत्वमिति- वाच्यम् , नहि ब्रह्म निरंशं वा सांशमिति वा क्वचित् शेके सिद्धम् , वेदैकसमधिगम्यत्वात्, सा च श्रुतिः यथोपपद्यते तथा तदनु धनेन वेदार्थवि निार्थ युक्तिः वक्तव्या,x x तत्रैषा युक्तिः विस्फुलिंगा इवाग्नेहि जडजीवा विनिर्गताः । सर्वतःपाणिपादान्तात् सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमु ात् ॥ निरिन्द्रियात् स्वरूपेण तादृशादिति निश्चयः । सदंशेन जडाः पूर्वं चिदंशेनेतरे अपि ॥ अन्यधर्मतिरोभावान्मूलेच्छातो स्वतंत्रिणः । ब्र वादे अंशपक्ष एव' 2-3-43. This seems to be very fair view of interpreting Bâdârayaņa's sûtras. But in spite of what Bâdarayaņa and Vallabha might say, the fact remains that this difficulty h s been fruitful in producing numerous theories as regards the relation of the human soul with Brahman. The very word siat, though clearly meaning n अवयव, has been subjected to yield senses which, if not wrong, cannot be accepted to b correct, or at least cannot be supposed to represent the true view of Bad ray .a.

·-- 49 sys I S'aņkar h been honest in saying that he does not ccept the theory that the Jivâtman is siat of Brahman, when he that suit should be taken in the sense of it. But I other Acharyas have worked, from the word "siz', a sense uit bl to their views. It need not be remarked that, according to Bådarayaņa, siat means a 'part. The Vedic Mantra using the word are also sugggests the same thing. Let us see what Bhaskara says. He remarks, BizT6a: argutarat, I TORIET: grana', but this sense is not acceptable to him, and he remarks, Teta Foi a Hafa, किन्तूपाध्यवछिन्न निन्यभूतस्य वाचको यमंशशब्दः प्रयुक्तो यथाग्नेविस्फुलिंगस्य'. Thus, according to Bhaskara, अंश means उपाध्यवाहिन्न अनन्यभूत. निरवयव Brahman has अंश, the जीव, because the Vedic passage, 'यथाग्नेः क्षुद्राः विस्फुलिंगाः', teaches so. This अंश is भिन्नाभिन्न with Br hm his अभिन्नत्व is स्वाभाविक, while भिन्नत्व is औपाधि Bhaskara is right in remarking th t the Jivâtman is 3 of Br h aan as spark is of fire, and that he is fara, because spa and get support it, but he is wrong in saying that भिन्नत्व is औपाधिक, for theश्रुति passage quoted does not support it. Ramanuja takes the word अंश in the sense of विशि • या addet, nd so does Sreekantha. The relation between Brahman and the Jivatman is that of विशेष्य and विशेषण, Nimbârkatakes zit to mean 7thi. The Jivâtman is a TV aft of Brahma. Hence, according to him, the relation between the Jivåtman nd Brahman is that of th and for a. Sreekantha also accepts this view. According to Madhv İŞTS® are different like son V and others, or non-different like hands, feet, etc. To the 2 1. fait fe affinat a : 2-3-42. Graagt of Sreenivâ sa Ni bârka. 2. Sir R. Bhandarkar's Vaishṇavis . p. 161. 3. Vide Râ ânuja's and Sree Kantha's Bhashyas on this sûtr ad Madhva's Bh 'shya. 7 ·50 RA POP first class belongs human souls and to the second hand incarnations of Vishnu. Råmânuja, Sreekantha, Nimbarka, Madhva, and Vijnânabhikshu accept the between the Jîvâtman and Brahman to be ETHrar. Vijnânabhikshu like Bâdarâyaņa accepts are a starca of the Jîvâtman on the analogy of spark and fire or son and father. भेद and अभेद are both स्वाभाविक. Vallabha says that भेद is ऐच्छिक. One notices that all these writers are labouring under difficulties. They do not, like S'aņkara, say that siet means 'sit 57', but still, like Bådarayaņa Bhikshu and Vallabha, they are not prepared to take Biar in its natural significance of a 'part'. It is safe with Bådarâ yaņa to take the Jivâtman to be sièr—part of Brahman, on the analogy of spark and fire on the authority of the same Sruti passage, and to say that they are 347777 on the principle laid down by the Satrakâra in 'तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14, The next two sûtras 2-3-46-47 declare that even though the Jîvâtman is an Bit of Brahman, and hence 399547 with Brahman, Brahman does not suffer because the Jivâtman suffers, ratifeada TT, TT 7. These two sůtras are quite consistent with what Bådarậyaņa has said before in 2-1-21-22. 'इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः', and ‘अधिकं i nagra, 2-1-28-29. Though the Jivâtman is 24974 with Brahman, still Brahman is stre, greater than the Jivâtman. The same reasoning is followed here by Bådarayaņa. He says though the Jîvâtman is the sit of Brahman, and 3777747 with Brahman, still the qtaraT is not affected by the miseries, etc. of the Jivâtman because Brahman is 97-81fa greater than the Jivatman. This reasoning would be possible only when the Jivâtman's face and भोक्तृत्व were स्वाभाविक, and not औपाधिक. How can the Jivâtman, who is the sig of Brahman, and 3777747 with im ·ding to anúar in that life. Here it appears that Bâda-, 51 it, be different from Brahman so far as his suffirings, etc., are concerned ? How can the Jivâtman be thus FETTETET with Brahman, because he and the are contradictory and cannot be in the same place? To such questions Bhâskara has well replied in 2-1-22, 23 T Hana':- 'प्रमाणतश्चेत् प्रतीयेत को विरोधोयमुच्यते । विरोधे चाविरोधे च प्रमाणं कारणं मतम् ॥' The start is yî, and gra teaches so, therefore, there is no later. The Veda and the sûtras teach both. According to the reasoning of Sankara, these sûtras draw a distinction without difference, for happiness and misery are both creatures of nescience, staalt. The illustration given in the sûtra also goes against S'aņkara. The next two sútras refute a further objection that though the Jivatman is the sia of Brahman, and 397747 with Brahman, the karmas, enjoined in the Veda, have only an application to the Jîvâtman and not to Brahman, the reason for this being the Jîvâtman's chart. There is सन्तति of देहसंबन्ध in one life, hence one is known as Bra.hmaņa, etc., during the period of that life, and he has to perform karmas accordingly. The Fall does not extend to next life, hence Jiva has to perform karmas accorrâyaņa gives a dare to be the cause of karmakarana; so when one realises that his soul is different from the E, he would cease to have any connection with the karmas and their fruits. Then he has to perform karmas on the principle, laid down in 'qiy quya:', and argui qed- हविः ब्रह्मानौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना', गीता. From this it appears that S'aņkara is right in his rejection of देहाध्यासकर्तृत्व, but wrong in his absolute rejection of the Jivâtman's kartřitva. This accounts how देहाध्यासरहित starym sages, like Vaşishtha, Suka, Sanatkumâra per- ·52 formed this actions. To them the staffatur was neither ty nor : 64 nor afera, but a q-16H. They had a manifestation of ब्रह्म in कर्म. 'कर्मसु ब्रह्माभिव्यक्तिः'. This seems to be the proper view of looking at the connection between the two Mimấnsâs, and it appears that Sankara is perh ps driving at the same thing when he observes in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' 1-1-4, 'न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति, न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुए लित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति+++मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबन्धहेतुः'. So it follows, from what Bâdarâyaņa and Sankara say, that are maneca is a cause of misery, but then the कर्तृत्व without देहाध्यास-देहसंबन्ध is not to be referred to staten gic or Te as S'aņkara says, but to -Brahman-97 as Bâdarầyaņa says. Thus the performance of karmas, without देहाध्यास-देहाभिमान, as ब्रह्मकर्मs, produces in one ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in कर्मs, and ब्रह्मज्ञान produces ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in ज्ञान. The two Mîmânsâs thus help each other, and suggest the ideal of Brahman as ज्ञानक्रियाविशिष्ट, the क्रिया referring to सद्रूप, [न to चिद्रूप, and the two together to आनन्दरूप, thusgiving the full conception of afecrare TEL. This see is to be the view of Bâdarâ yaņa, and we are unable to reconcile Sankara's reasoing in at Hayrak', and the second interpretation of 37797CHAFU with the sûtras of Bådarâyan . According to . Bådarayaņa, the human soul can be free from misery, etc., only when he realises that he does not do anything, but Brahman Para does it or makes him do it. Avidya as such has no place in the system of Bâdarâyaņa. Then comes the sutra, 'आभास एव च'. This is read by Bhaskara as SHTAT ga ?'. He rejects the re ding of Sankara, with this remark: BHITRITA Fear YTTA1C7677: शशविषाणकल्पस्याचेतनस्य कुतो बन्धो मोक्षो वा कर्माधिकारो वा । न च परमात्मनः संसारित्वमस्तीत्युक्तं पुरस्तादतो नार्षः पाठ इति'. Ramanuj wants to favour Bhâskara's reading, and renders it by EITHIA. It matters little whether the sûtra is read as SHIF:' or STTHIAT:'. From what has been said above, it is not possi-i WWW.

·53 . ble th t Bºdar* y ņ could h ve nt to efe t.. the Jivatman's being a मिथ्या-आभा .. of Br hm. . .Vallabh drives at the same thing, when he observes, 'ननु सच्चिदानन्दस्य ब्रह्मणोंशः सच्चिदानन्द ए भवेदतः प्रवाहे वेशो ग तश्च र्वकार्याणि तत्राह, आभास एव' जीवः, आनन्दांशस्य तिरोहितत्वात् xx न 4. ति थ्यात्वं xx अतो न मिथ्यात्वरूप आ सोत्र विवक्षितः'. Before concluding the जीवविचारणा, the utr 1-4-22 may be considered. Sankar adopts the view of काशक :- 'दर्शितं तु पुरस्तात् काशकृत्स्नीयस्य पक्षस्य श्रुतिमत्त्वम् x x शिकृत्स्नस्याचार्य वि- तः परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति तम् , आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादन- न्यत्वमभिप्रेतं, तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति पेिक्षत्वाभिधानात् र्य रणभावः कियानपि अभिप्रेत इति गम्यते, औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स्प मेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ भेदाभेदौ गम्येते, तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं श्रुत्यनुसारीति गम्यते, प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्था रात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः'. Sankara interprets काश नमत thus- 'अस्यै पर.T मात्मनो नेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थानादुपपन्नमिदमभेदेनोपक्रमणम्'. Râa nuja also takes काशकृत्न's view as सिद्धान्त view, nd expl i thus: 'य आत्मनि ति न् आत्मनो न्तर' इत्यादिना जी त्मिनि पर स्मिन II आत्मतया अवस्थिते'. Vallabha explains it th_s:-'भगवत एवा- th वस्था जीवः', but he takes TFT a's view to be different from that of Bad rayana-'अवस्थया व्यवसायात् सिद्धान्ताद्विशे : Whitver may be said s reg rds the view of it i .certai that we c nnot say with perfect confid ce that it is the view of the Sutrakâra. disti cty says th t the Jiva is it, and henge to tak काशकृत 's view s that of Bådarâ yaņa,nd to t kit either in Sank ra's sense or Ra a i cert i ly strain on the sutra.. When the When the scope of the क्यान्वयाधि- करण is considered, one ees that after establishing th ब्रह्मवाक्यत्व of मैत्रेयीब्रा - ण, Badarayan quotes th opinion of these writers, viz., आश्मरथ्य, औडुलोमि and काशकृत्स्न, to show that according to their views lso the ब्रह्मर तिपादकत्व मैत्रेयी- राह्मण is not धित. Therefore it is ot proper to work out Bådarâ yaşa's view that विकृतब्रह्मन् is the s जीव freed from अविद्या, etc., from , शिकृत्स्न's view. काम ANANCERMAnem... 4594prior WARNIRE श १ Badar yan । यj' se e ·54 Hence the conclusion is that a stat oa: i not the view of the Sûtrakâra, neither is the human soul a aflara nor an spare of the in Sankara's sense. According to the Sûtrakâra, the Jivâtman is ziet of Brahman as a spark of fire, it is 34974 with Brahman, as it is with the sifart, still Brahman is 3f, greater than the Jivâtman, The Jîrâtman is a gat inheriting his eca from Brahman. He is at. He is ty, but in the stage of arra, he experiences face, etc., which ever remain permanent, on the analogy that the crown-prince becomes the king. It appears thus that Bådarayaņa accepts Hitzha'and not S'aņkara's absolute STARTOTTAC!. This conclusion is strengthened by the remark of Sir. R. Bhandarkar that S'aņkara's system should be more fitly called 'Singularism', rather than Monism or Adwaitism. Vide Vaishnavism. P. 1.59. JA AT. The second Sûtra of Bâdarayaņa gives the Futur of Brahman. From this definition of Brahman we know that according to Bådara yaņa this universe is Brahman's ga and TRUTH. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. It is important to note here that the definition of Brahman given by Bâdarayaņa must be of the same Brahman whose investigation he has proposed to undertake in the first sútra szetat afeger', that is, Brahman alone, pure and simple, whose investigation Bådara yaņa has undertaken, is the material as well as the efficient cause of this universe. Bådarayaņa again reverts to this question -in. 1-4-23-27. While refuting the Sankhya's naturale, he elaborates his doctrine which he has expressed in brief before. The sûtra 'It fler FAFIE FAIDATTATT 1-4-23 declares against the. Såņkhya that Brahman is 397677. as well as تم ·55 निमित्तकारण of the universe. The car and a tons of Uddalaka naturally yield the same sense. To support Brabman's कर्तृत्व and प्र तित्व, Badarayana cites ब्रह्मन्' अभिध्या. Brahman's ईक्षा, काम and बहुभवन support Brahman's उभयविधकारणत्व. The श्रुति and स्मृति both teach that the universe has its प्रभव and 984 in Brahman. This is also a reason why Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the uni- I verse. The next sûtra, 'THET: TROTHTR 1-4-26, throws much light on the system of Bâdarayaņa. Whether one takes 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' as one sutra, or 'आत्मकृतेः' and 'परिणामात्' as two distinct sûtras, the result is almost the same. The sutra is based on a passage from the तैत्तिरीय 2. 7. 'तदात्मानं #ed'. This passage suggests the statica and the set of Brahman, 'आत्मानमिति कर्मत्वं, स्वयमकुरुतेति कर्तृत्वम्'. How can the 'पूर्व सिद्ध' scat Brahman be कर्तृ and कर्म ? The answer to this objection is 'परिणामात्'. The पूर्व सिद्ध scut आत्मा-ब्रह्मन् developed itself into the universe. Brahman is Ih. Thus Brahman's प्रकृतित्व is प्रसिद्ध. rigo : straca sifush'. 1-4-27. Though Brahman is the material cause, it does not require a separate AÂT as in the case of an earthen pot and potter. In the world, one sees that the filet and an are always separate, but this rule has no bearing whatever here. The swarûpa of Brahman is to be learnt from Veda alone, and since Veda teaches that Brahman itself becomes the उपादान and निमित्त, it should be accepted as such. 'यत्पुनरिदमुक्त- मीक्षापूर्वकं कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेषु एव कुलालादिषु लोके दृ नोपादानेषि त्यादि, तत्प्रत्युच्यते, न लोकवदिह भवितव्यम् , न ह्ययमनुमानगम्योऽर्थः, शब्दगम्यत्वात्त्व- स्यार्थस्य यथाशब्दमिह भवितव्यम् , शब्दश्चेक्षितुरीश्वरस्य प्रकृतित्वं प्रतिपादयतीत्यवो- 17'. This is what Sankara observes on 1-4-27. The interpretation of Sankara here is exactly in the spirit of Bådarảyaņa. Brahman with its fer develops itself into the universe a d still remains transcendent. Though the interpretation of S'aņkara on these sůtras ( 1-4-23-27 ) is correct as it stands, the qualification which he has in hi ·56 प mind and which he suggests by the use of the word of the inste d of Brahman, cannot be justified as legitimate. A Nimbârka writer Kes' yabhatta Kashmîrin thus criticises Sankara: 'पर ते तत्त्वं दुर्घट, यस्य कल्पितत्वांगीकारेण कुला वदुपादान- गोचरप्रयत्नचिकीर्षादिमत्त्वासम्भवात् x x ६ न्तिासंभवादिति संक्षेपः. N. B. PP. 351-352. The same writer then criticises Râmânuja, AT AFFET a igrerar etc., pp. 352-353 N. B. Thus in order to emphasize face of Brahm Râmânuja and Sreekanth accepted चिदचिद्विशि ब्र न as उपादान, Bhaskar and Nimbarka ccepted ब्र न्' क्ति as उपादान, Madhv accepted प्रकृति to be the 391978, Vijnan bhikshu also accepted ति to be the उपादान, the difference being that his कृति is अविभक्त with Brahma , and that it become the sarera under the of Brahman, while a I is only साक्षिन्. Here it is quite clear th t all these writers, though modifying the ve ब्रह्मन्' 391&rwat, do ot reject it altogether. Now rem in the two writer S' ņkara and Vallabha. Their views re entirely opposed. S'aņkara by delegating Brahman's 3917 rat to the sphere of star rejects it, while Vallabha like Bâd râyaņa, following trictly the letter of the Ved accepts it out and out. In rejecting Brahman's paterfat, Sink rh s to subject the whole body of the Vedânta sůtras to a secondary sense. gfe teaches ETTROTH nd at the s me time its spargaret. Båd råyaņa does not care for the objectio s based on if the letter of the già is strictly followed. This view is followed by Vall bha, who, like Bad rây ņ , gives greater weight to the word of the un than to pure re son 94 a, when they appear opposed to é ch other. Other Acharyas have tried to follow Bådarawith slight changes to tisfy reaso. S kr who in rejecting against facta RETT:' has chalked out lines of reasoni g which run in an entirely opposite direction. Sir R makſishna Bhand rk r says the same in brece ti bo k Vi i hñ vism tc. pp. 15 -159, 160-161. PA It is only ·7 Drawing a distinction between Spinoza's Pantheism and Upanishad Pantheism he says:-Brahman is not exhausted in the world, but it exists separately also. But the objection to this view is that Brahman, being of the nature of spirit, is not like the body divisible into parts, so that one may become developed into the world and another remain outside; x x. This inconsistency is removed by Bådarayana in Brahmasûtras (2-1-26-27). The argument is that though the Upanishads state that the constituent cause of the world is Brahman, they at the same time affirm the existence of Brahman separately from the world. (Ch. U. III, 12, 6 and VI, 3, 2.). The two are inconsistent on the theory that Brahman is a spirit and not discerptible into parts. Though they are thus inconsistent, they must both be accepted on the authority of the sacred texts, since the true nature of Brahman and the world is beyond the reach of human intellect. This solution of the difficulty is inadmissible to non-believers in the sacred texts, but it shows that Bâdarâ yaņa does not agree with the latter part of Spinoza's definition of Pantheism, i. es, according to him the sacred texts do not affirm that "God exists only as realised in the cosmos: the cosmos exists only as a manifestation of God”. The inconsistency pointed out by him is based on the impossible conception of Brahman's being divisible into parts. But it will not arise if, instead of bringing in this conception, we suppose that in one aspect Brahman is the material or constituent cause of the world or realised in the world, and from another point of view it remains pure and becomes the object of contemplation and devotion. Whatever it may be, Bådarayaņa's view appears to me to be correct, and the Pantheism of the Upanishads is not exactly the same as that formulated by Spinoza. We have noticed above the m nner in which Badaх X 8 ·58 rayaņa removes the inconsistency between God's developing himself into the world, while at the same time he is transcendent, and his being a simple spirit without parts. Slankarâchârya fairly explains, I think, Bâdarầyaņa’s view. But raising a further objection he brings in his own doctrine eventually that the so-called development of Brahman into the world is fancied by ignorance and is not true, that is, the world is an illusion. There are two doctrines indicative of the relation of God to the world, the so-called Pariņâmavâda and the Vivartavada. The former implies real development, and the latter, an illusive development. This last is the doctrine of S'aņkârachârya, wherefore his system should be called Singularism rather than spiritual monism; while the first is that clearly held by the author of the Sûtras. This is evident from his very definition of Brahman as that from which everything originates, in which everything lives, and into which everything resolves itself in the end, and from the manner in which in the first Pada of the second chapter, he answers the objections based upon the theory that an intelligent being cannot develop into nonintelligent or insensate matter; and Sankaracharya himself acknowledges at the end of his comment on 2-1-14, that the author of the Sutras follows the Pariņâma doctrine, though to save his theory he imagines without any grounds that Bâdarậyaņa has in his view the ordinary or illusory condition of things in doing so. Sankarachârya's Vivarta våda it was which the later schools of Vaishṇavism and Saivism contended against; for according to him it leaves no scope for the relation of the ruler and the ruled, i. e. God and the devotee in the condition of reality when all illusion is dispelled and one spirit alone exists (2-1-14). Most of them adopted Båd råyana's Pari âm vậd , b t the distinctness of God, ·WWW. 59 man and the world, which was necessary for the validity of their doctrines of worship and devotion, they secured by qualifying the mode of development. By this qualification they also steered clear of the inconsistency pointed out by Bâdara yaņa in 2-1-26. So that his mode of satisfaction was not necessary for them'. After this, Sir R. Bhandarkar gives in brief the doctrines of Râmânuja, Nimbârka, Vallabha, Madhva, and S'rîkantha Sivacharya, shows how they have followed or qualified the Pariņâmavâda of Badarayaņa, and concludes thus:--"Thus most of these schools avoid the Pantheism of Spinoza, and the incompatibility between God's development into the world and his transcendency by holding that the rudiments of the material and the spiritual world associated with God as his characteristics or as his body or as his power, only undergo development, he himself remaining pure. Vishnusvamin and Vallabha, admitting as they do, the development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency, follow Bådarayaņa. The mysterious power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible, may be compared to the self-determining power of God involved in Spinoza's statement”. Thus it follows that Sankara in rejecting the gatuare of Bådara yaņa, has failed to represent the correct view of the Sutrakâra, that Brahman alone is the material cause of the world. Thus acccording to Bådara yaņa the universe is an आत्मकृति and आत्मपरिणाम, or if we substitute the word 'ब्रह्मन् for 'आत्मन्' then ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम; the same Brahman whose investigation Badarayana has undertaken, is itself both geta and AATT, causa materialis and causa efficiens met 4. 'आविर्भावतिरोभावी 1. Râmânuja. 2. Nimbârka. 3. Bhaskara. शक्ती ब्रह्मणः'.

·0 of the universe. Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma-sútras. Sir R. Bhandarkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his ( Brahman's ) being the material cause of the world. All the sutras of Bâdarâ yana which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way. Probably he would have set aside the Brahma-sútras altogether, but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time. He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahmasútras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner. Texts from the Upanishads, too, which do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly'. Vaishnavism S'aivism. p. 58. To a certain extent this remark of Sir R. Bhandarkar applies to Vijnâna-Bhikshu also. The difference between Madhva and Bhikshu is this:-Madhya wants to emphasize HFYSITES ESHTETEPT, while Bhikshu is anxious to work out an अविरोध between the सांख्य, वैशेषिक, योग and Vedanta etc., an effort though praiseworthy, cannot be justified. But the most important reason which led all the writers to modify the ब्रह्मकारणता of Badarayana, is the fear of विकृति. If Brahman were taken to be the material cause, it would undergo change, and consequently it would be flet and cease to be Brahman, Alugggh. To avoid this difficulty S'aņkara delegated Brahman's causality to staa. Saar- कल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वातत्त्वाभ्याम- Agata TE TROTHICHTETETEGS tatua' 2-1-27. Râmânuja for the same reason did not accept the ब्रह्मखरूपपरिणाम, and substituted ASAPERETETA instead of pure Brahman of Badarayana. 'मृत्सुवर्णादिवद् ब्रह्मखरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाभ्युपगम्यते, अविकारcagaracaifaya: 2-1-13. R. B. Anand Press. II. 23. Similar is the reasoning of Sreekantha. Nimbârka and Bhaskara ·1 for the same reason substitute atit instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म खशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं आत्मानं परिणामयति' N. B.347-57. 'परिणामो द्विविधः, स्वरूपपरिणामः शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणपरिणामश्च,x x श्रीपुरुषोत्तमः स्वात्मक- स्वाधिष्ठितनिजशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं खात्मानं परिणामयति' केशवभट्टकाश्मीरिन् & 'परिणामात् परिणामोऽत्र शक्तिविक्षेपरूपो, न तुखरूपपरिणामस्तस्मान्न विकारसंभावना- वकाश इति' परपक्षगिरिवज्र. p. 369. Thus according to Nimbarka writers, परिणाम is not Brahman's but its शक्ति's, the modification owing its existence to the fear of faire. Similarly Bhaskara writes 'शक्तिविक्षेपं कृतवान्'. 1-4-25, p. 85 Bhaskara- Bhashya. 'अप्रच्युतखरूपस्य शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणः । परिणामो यथा तन्तुनाभस्य पटतन्तुवत् ॥' 2-1-14. स हि खेच्छया खात्मानं लोकहितार्थ परिणामयन् खशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति'. भास्करभाष्य. 2-1-14. Thus Bhaskara also does not accept ब्रह्मपरिणाम. Vijnanabhikshu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman 'ब्रह्मणश्च खाविभक्तप्रकृत्याद्युपष्टंभकत्वं साक्षितामात्रेणेति जगत्कारणत्वे- ऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वं' भिक्षुभाष्य. p. 32. 1-1-2. Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता. Vallabha only is an exception to this rule. He accepts like Badarayana that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण, Thus he accepts ब्रह्मखरूपपरिणाम. In this he seems to be following Bâdarâ yaņa as remarked by Sir R. Bhandarkar on pp. 160-161. in Vaishnavism etc. It has been shown above that according to Bådarayaņa, Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. To this the Ill Sankhya raises an objection in 2-1-26. 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्व- शब्दकोपो वा'. If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति, and hence मूलोच्छेद, or the निरवयवत्वप्रति- पादक Vedic passages would have to be strained. To this the answer furnished by the Sù trakâra is very significant. TV The SutrakAra says 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. As श्रुति TANTumr.mithpramme ·following the express words of the Sutrakâra. teaches both, we accept both, that is, though Brahman the material cause, still it is transcendent, it remains that the reason being that the Swarûpa of Brahman is to I learnt from Veda alone, and as Veda teaches that Brahma is area and material cause without Taft one mu accept both. As Brahman is toys the difficulty of faza or arataca does not stand. Tarka as such has no place in ti system of the Sûtrakâra. Hence it appears to be clear the all the  châryas, except Vallabha, who have modified ti YETETTar have failed to realise the attitude of Badar yaņa to the letter of the Veda. But except S'aņkar none is bold to reject the 'Rohat of Bâdarayaņa. TH S'âņkara Bhashya on 2-1-27 is a prominent instance whei one sees S'aņkara trying to create imaginary difficultie and to superimpose his views on those of the Sûtrakâr. Explaining the Sútra in the strain of the Sûtrakârd S'aņkara rightly concludes TETT TOCHT galatasaTEBETTETERTE TH:'. But with this, he is not satisfied and he remark that even toc cannot set aside fattet. Here we feel the Sankara entirely misses the aim of the Sutrakâra. H conclusion that the whole world is sifaarfeqa owes it existence to an imaginary difficulty of कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति-विकार crea ed by himself which in its turn owes its origin to his failur to revere the text of the sê as infallible as the Sûtrakâr has done, and whatever we may say as to his philosophics merits, the undoubted fact remains that S'aņkara is no It has been shown above that Sankara does no follow the Sútrakâra when he rejects Brahman's Frutat; now we shall see how far he is correct in rejectin Brahman's निमित्तकारणता, On this question Râmânuję Nimbârka, Madhva, S'reekantha and Vallabha are unar imous. All of them follow Bâdarâ yaņa. If Brahman wer the efficient cause, kartri, it would be liable to the fault ·6 of partiality and cruelty says S'âņkara. To remove this difficulty he refers Brahman's activity to staat. But that is not what Bâdarayaņa has said. According to the Sûtrakâra Brahman is neither partial nor cruel, for it is FETÀ4. The 777491€ is beginningless, and Brahman is possessed of all धर्मs. 'वैषम्य पृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् , तथाहि दर्शयति, न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात् , सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च'. Though Sankara gains the advantage of removing Brahman's agrzagun by referring Brahman's कर्तृत्व to अविद्या, and thereby rejecting its manica, the other commentators do not accept it because it deals a terrible blow to all devotion and meditation, by delegating the Brahman's ATETET to the sphere of sceptic illusion. Before garaiaathanaTaT HTC p. 406. N. S. The first are of the second 3p gives us greater insight into the view of the Sûtrakâra regarding the universe. In the first Chapter, Bådarâ yaṇa has declared that Brahman alone is causa materialis and causa efficiens of the world. This proposition is laid down by Bådarayaņa in the first Adhyaya on the authority of the Vedic texts. Now the Sâņkhya opposes the Sûtrakâra by putting before him certain Smritis which teach the Sânkhya tenets. To this Bâdarâyaņa replies that when we meet two sorts of Smritis, those in harmony with the Veda are to be preferred to those not following it. Manu and others teach a cutat, hence they are to be preferred since they follow the Veda. This principle is also laid down by Jaimini in 'विरोधे तु अनपेक्ष्यं स्यादसति हि अनु- HTT# 1 1-3-3. Now when the Sânkhya loses both on the grounds of yê and fuâ, he opposes the Sûtrakâra on the platform of reason. The Satrakåra, though he meets the Såņkhya on purely rational grounds, distinctly says that reason as such has no place in his system ultimately. His reasoning must be the reasoning favoured by the Ved . Had this been borne in mind by Saņkara, w do ·64 not think, he would have proceeded to qualify the sense of the Sutras after once explaining them accurately. And where S'aņkara does not expressly qualifiy the sense of the Sutra, his commentator does so. See भामती and 'गोविन्दानन्द on प्रकृत्यधिकरण. The Sankhya begins by saying that as a rule cause and effect are similar, but since there is a dissimilarity between the cause Brahman which is at, and the effect jagat which is jada, Brahman cannot be the material cause of Jagat. To this Bâdarayaņa replies that we do see an effect dissimilar to the cause, hence the objection does not stand. But here too we notice Badarayana's tendency to reject independent reasoning and falling back upon the words of the श्रुति 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्' etc. 2-1-11. The Sûtra 2-1-13 also is important. It deals with the question that even though the cause Brahman is the . - 1. अत्र सूत्रे परिणामशब्दः कार्यमात्रपरः, न तु सत्यकार्यात्मकपरिणामपरः, 'तदनन्य- त्वम्' इति विवर्तवादस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । रत्नप्रभा. pp. 341. 342. N. S. edition. 2. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकाराभिप्रायेणापि तु यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुरेवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम् etc. भामती pp. 342-343. N. S. edition. 3. In 2. 1. 4. 'न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्' Sankara quotes a view of some one whom Govindanand calls एकदेशी thus:-'योऽपि कश्चि- दाचक्षीत श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्वलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि, प्रकृति- रूपस्य विकारे अन्वयदर्शनात्, अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद् भविष्यति, यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्थापन यवस्थानु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, एवं काष्ठलोष्ठादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते, एतस्मादेव च विभाविता विभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभा- वाभ्यां च कार्यकारणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते, तथा च पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात् परस्परोपकारित्वं भवत्ये- वमिहापि भविष्यति, प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्य इति । तेनापि कथंचिच्चेतनाचे- तनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिहियेत, शुद्धयशुद्धित्वलक्षणत्वं नैव परिहियते'. In the 2-1-6, 'दृश्यते तु' Sankara remarks on this view thus:-योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबले. नैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षते तस्यापि 'विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च' इति चेतनाचेतनविभाग- श्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम्'. Thus Sankara supports the view of the एकदेशि. Who is this एकदेशिन् ? Can this view be referred to Sir R. Bhandarkar's view about Vallabha, 'The mysterious power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible'. Vaishnavism etc., p. 161.

·5 s me, and the #1 r and 113 are free with Br hman, the Hisht does not become a nor Hire pht. This is fact evidenced by our everyday experience. फेन, वीची, तरंग etc., though अनन्य with the समुद्र, there is no इतरेतरभावापत्ति. A ring, a necklace, though as gold ornaments are 31977 with gold, the ring does not become the necklace, nor the necklace the ring. S'aņkara, after once explaining the sutra accurately, adds 'यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः, 'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' इति स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात् , तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्या- स्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाग्रुपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणो नन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरंगादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्'. The instance of an att is approved of by Bhaskara and others, but this latter addition is strongly criticised by Râmânuja. The wording of the sů tra does not favour Slāņkara's addition. Again, S'aņkara wants to refer this sûtra to 49 ETT, while the latter sûtra refers to the stage according to him. This distinction of TOE and ytaref is not accepted by any other Acharya, nor is it referred to by the Sätrakâra. The wording of the sđtra cannot unquestionably be taken to suggest S'aņkara's distinction. The words 'pleeta merely refer to the every day experience. The experience is so very common that the Sútrakâra does not consider it even desirable to point to any particular instance to support his view. The view expressed by S'aņkara that it Jivâtman is the same as Brahman, the difference being caused by sara, has been shown to be not countenanced by the sàtras of Bâdarâyaņa. In sense, the Jîvâtman is no facto of Brahman, but n अंश. But the Sutrakâra here wants to point out only this much, that the Jada Jagat and the Chetana Jivåtman, though both of them have their source in Brahman, still the Jada does not become Chetana, nor Chetana Jada. Hence the ब्र कारणता is notd open to any objection, 9 ·6 Then we come to the sutra 'तदनन्यत्वमार भण ब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14. This is one of the most important sūtras in the Brahmamimånsâ. - Except Madhva, all the Acharyas are unanimous in their referring this sûtra to a passage from the 6th prapâthaka of the Chhầndogya. Bhâskara says he has written a Bhâshya on the Chhậndogya, but it is not available, hence we shall have to satisfy ourselves with what he has observed on the question in his Brahmasútra-Bhashya 2-1-14. When we look at the sûtras of Badarayaņa as a whole, it appears clear that they fulfil a double function, viz., removing doubts that might arise through the aberrant genius of several Vedic thinkers, and at the same time summarising the principal teachings of the Upanishads. Thus the sůtra aqarTAREHURI-Cifry: 2-1-14 has been written to set aside the doubt caused by words like THT, ATÈT etc. Accordingly, the Sutrakâra says that these words mean that cause and effect are 397774. It is to be noticed that the Sutrakâra does not say that the effect is the same as the cause, but that they are 3-4. From the word “smartcah' one fails to work out the sense that विकार has no existence. 'नतु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति'. Neither the yra passage referred to, nor the wording of sútra lends support to what S'aņkara observes here:-TFITT घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वं, यथा च मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्यो नन्यत्वं दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात् , स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात् , एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्च- Fraen eta zumara ga za47' 2-1-14. This absolute negation of the existence of the sea as such, is very seriously criticised by Bhaskara, Råmânuja, Vijnanabhikshu, Kes'ava Bhatta Kashmirin and Vallabha. The text of the Chhândogya here referred to is this:--'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'. The meaning that naturally suggests itself from the text is this:-The knowledge of one ball of earth gives knowledge of all that is made of earth, though there is a different name and also form ·7 Cara-E4 ( as Rangarâmânuja takes it ), or though there is a difference of name and form, still all the things made of earth are earth, and as earth they are it. The passage cannot certainly be taken to mean that effects like pot etc., do not exist at all like the mirage, but that they exist in cause, they have no independent existence; the difference in name does not create a new object independent of the cause. Rightly does Vallabha observe:-attro fart नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति, तत्र विकारो वाङ्मात्रेणैवारभ्यते न वस्तुत इत्यर्थः प्रतिभाति, तथाच सति कस्य ब्रह्म कारणं भवेत् , अतः श्रुतिवाक्यस्यार्थमाह, आरंभण- शब्दादिभ्यः तदनन्यत्वं प्रतीयते, कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्वं, न मिथ्यात्वम् ।'. The sage Uddalaka wants to teach his son Slvetaketu (the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one'. Now the knowledge of all is possible only when 'all' has existence and is 397747 with one; then only the knowledge of 'one' can produce the knowledge of ‘all.' To explain this, the sage Uddalaka gave three instances, from all of which the relation of cause and effect is suggested that is-Uddalaka means to say that the relation between the world and Brahman is the same that exists between the earthen pot and earth, Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect, the knowledge of cause Brahman produces the knowledge of effect the world, the reason being that they are 3ay, as effect is 87aaf with the cause. From this it is impossible to concede that the cause Brahman exists while the world is non-existent, like mirage. The fact that the Upanishad gives three instances of earth, gold, and iron teaching the relation of cause and effect, and nowhere mentions any of the instances viz., , Tigheata etc., which S'ankara so very zealously puts side by side with the abovementioned ones, in his Bhâshya on the Chhandogya, as well as here, suggests a very strong inference against S'ankara that the Satrakara has in his mind not the doctrine of fear of S'ankara, b t the doctrine of afura of Brahman alone, ·................... ... kahaniy... and that the world is not an effect of illusion, but that of Brahman, the world is not a dream on a grand scale, but a real positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman. True that in the sûtra 'मायामानं कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्' 3-2-3, the Sutrakara, distinctly says that the स्वप्नसृष्टि is मायामात्र, and whether we take 'माया' in the Bhaskara's sense of अर्थप्रत्ययशून्यत्व, or in Nimbarka's and Râmânuja's sense of 3772ZTICHSCT, or in Vallabha's sense of सर्वभवनसामर्थ्य, or in Sankara's sense of दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्व or अनिर्वचनीयत्व, the fact remains that according to the Sutrakara, the world is विधर्मि, from स्वप्न. 'वैधयांच्च न खप्नादिवत्', that the स्वप्नसृष्टि may be मायामात्र, but the ब्रह्मसृष्टि is not so, it is not मायामात्र but ब्रह्मरूप and ब्रह्मानन्य. Bhaskara well observes in 3-2-3: 'ये पुनर्जागरितावस्थापि मायामात्रमित्याघोषयन्ति सूत्रकाराभिप्रायं नाशयन्तः श्रोत्रियजनं मोहयन्ति'. Again in 'वैधाच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्' 2-2-29_he observes to the same effect:- बौद्धमतावलंबिनो मायावादिनस्ते प्यनेन न्यायेन सूत्रकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः, यदि बाह्यो Y नाभिप्रेतः स्यात् किमर्थमिदं यतते सूत्रकारः' etc. The sutra 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः' (2-2-28) also suggests that according to the Sätrakar the world is not a nonentity. Thus though the world is not a nonentity, it does not follow that the Satrakåra takes it to be a separate entity from Brahman and independent of it. This is what he drives at, in the आरंभणाधिकरण. The श्रुति passage also reads 'मृत्तिका इति एव सत्यम्' and not 'मृत्तिकैव सत्या', and the Sutrakara also words the isutra as 'तदनन्यत्वं' and not 'तन्मिथ्यात्वं' or 'तदेकत्वं'. These facts also go against Sankara's view of जगन्मिथ्यात्व, or जगन्मायिकत्व. ये तु Emit From this, it follows that the view of the Satrakara is exactly similar to, if not actually the same, as Sankara tries to refute in 2-1-14:--'नन्वनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाखः एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म, अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा वृक्ष इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति नानात्वं, यथाच समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरंगाद्यात्मना नानात्वम् , यथाच मृदात्मनै त्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्, तत्रैकत्वांशेन निान्मोक्ष- ·.. व्यवहारः सेत्स्यति, नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयो लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति, एवं मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुरूपा भविष्यन्तीति' + + + ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्राभिमतमिति गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि मृदादयो C लोके समाधि- tai glà. The view expressed in these lines seems to be more in harmony with the sutras of Badarayana, than Sankara's own view given in refutation of the same. His objection 'न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं, स्थितिगतिवत्स्यात्' etc, is also groundless in face of 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्'. 2-1-27. His other objections are met at length by Bhaskara, Râmånuja, Kes'ava Bhatta and Nimbârka, but space at our disposal forbids us from entering into the full discussion of the same here. The श्रुति 'यत्र तु अस्य सर्वमात्मा एव अभूत् तत्केन किं पश्येत्' also teaches not 'सर्वाभावः' but 'आत्मनः सर्वभावः'. In the stage of ब्रह्मभाव the सर्व does not cease to exist, but the consciousness that we is a different entity from Brahman vanishes, and the consciousness that Brahman alone is he is generated. Against Sankara's 'जगन्मिथ्यात्व' Vijnana-Bhikshu advances a queer but not unreasonable argument thus:- 'प्रपञ्चस्यात्यन्त- मभावे यत्प्रमाणमारंभणशब्दादिकं तत् सन्न वा, आद्ये बाधः, अन्त्ये हेत्वसिद्धिः, तस्मात् सदसत्त्वविकल्पपराहतैरारंभणशब्दादिभिः प्रमाणैः प्रपंचात्यन्तमभावो न सूत्रकारेणा- नुन्मत्तेन साधयितुं शक्यते' p. 281. भि भाष्य. Ch. se. Bhaskara also observes in 2-1-14 thus 'न हि सूत्रकारः क्वचिन्मायाशब्दं प्रायुक्त, यत्र स्वप्नज्ञानान्मायामात्रं कात्स्न्येन अनभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वादिति हि यत्रोक्तं वैधाच्च न स्वप्नादिवदिति वैधर्म्यमुक्तम् , ईक्षते शब्दमिति चारभ्य प्रत्यधिकरणं स्मृतिमन्त- रेण नोपपद्यते सूत्रकारस्य, स्मृत्यनवकाशदोष इत्यारभ्य सांख्याधुद्भावितदूषणोद्धारार्थ प्रत्यधिकरणं प्रयासोनर्थकः स्यात् , मायामात्रत्वे 'न वियदश्रुते रिति चारभ्य भूतानामु- त्पत्त्यादिविचारोऽनर्थकः स्यात्' xxx अपि च मायाशब्दमात्रेण कृत्लो वेदः सुप्रमेयं स्वर्गापवर्गलक्षणं यथाभूतं प्रत्याययनप्रमाणमसत्यमिति वा कल्पयितुमिति ज्ञानेन प्रवर्तते वेदार्थ यथा वढेधूमशक्त्या यथा प्रवर्तन्तामिति' भा. भा. pp. 99-100. One cannot but concede that the above-mentioned arguments of Bhâskara have much force. Kes'ava Bhatta Kashmirin, Râmânuja and Purushottama have also said much against S'aņkara. All the writers on the Vedânta sûtras, in some form or other, ccept the परिणामवाद and जगत्सत्यत्व, and thi ·70 as fact by itself is an almost certain indication that the Satrakâra has neither in his mind the doctrine of laga nor 22/767 of the world. In his zeal for Tirare Slankara forgets to what he is being drifted when he remarks aa- मविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं, न परमार्थतः' etc. He himself feels conscious that Bådarâyana's ब्रह्मविचारप्रतिज्ञा and 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' are being put to a strain. The sûtras following in this featut also confirm the view expressed above. The sû tra 2-1-15, Sankara reads also Halalt:'. The explanation which follows this sútra reading, according to S'aņkara himself, confirms the view that the world is only an अवस्थान्तर of ब्रह्मन् as पट of तन्तुs, and as he is 3777t with gags so is the world with Brahman. From this it is quite clear that according to the view of the Satrakâra as interpreted by S'aņkara here, the '7777777 does not mean मिथ्यात्व of जगत् , but merely an अवस्थान्तरत्व. The next sütr 'सत्त्वाचावर · also teaching the 964 of Jagat, confirms the area existing between a cause and n effect. The sâtras 2-1-19 and 20 also confirm the view of aura expressed above. Difference in 69 and feat does not produce a new substance, qz may be in a different form from the TF S, sturs may perform different functions but still the पट is अनन्य with तन्तुs, and उदान, etc. are अनन्य with प्राणवायु. 'ज्ञानक्रियाभेदात्सूत्रद्वयम्'. A. B. The sutras 'उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि' and 'देवादिवदपि लोके' 2-1-24-25 deal with the question that Brahman does not need any external Freta. By its own natural gods it develops the universe out of itself. The sûtras 2-1-26- 27 declare that as Veda teaches the अस्तित्व of अविकृतब्रह्मन् and ब्र परिणाम, there is no कृत्नप्रसक्ति or निरवयवत्वशब्दकोप. The सृष्टि is in itself, its powers are wonderful. Teha ti fare. The sûtras 2-1-30-31 take up another similar question. 'सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्' 'वि रणरादिति चेत् तदुक्तम्'. Brahman is possesspowers like Ppt mit .

·SHIVA t.cat 71 on ed of all powers, and even though ith sno organs, it creates the universe etc., the Veda teaches so. S'ankara's remark this सूत्र 'प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवतीत्येतदप्यविद्या- 49775THPT tha is quite out of place. The Sutrakara declares the सर्वशक्तियोग of ब्रह्मन् as based on दर्शन, Veda, while Sankara wants to refer it to enlar. Why should self-satisfied Brahman create this world when it has no 2015 to fulfil ? To this question an answer is furnished by 1897 stot $777'. 2-1-33. S'aņkar very beautifully explains the sutra thus:- यद्यपि अस्माकमियं जगद्विम्बरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयं, अपरिमित- शक्तित्वात् । यदि नाम लोके लीलावपि किञ्चित्सूक्ष्म प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत, तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते, आप्तकामश्रुतेः, नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिा, सृष्टि- gai, vauda'. This is quite in the strain of the Satrakâra, and we cannot understand why after this beautiful explanation, he thinks it necessary, practically against the Sutrakara, to add 'न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः, अविद्याकल्पित- नामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात् , ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाचेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्'. The learned Sûtrakâra has dealt with the question that Brahman is the उपादान कारण, and though it is उपादान कारण it is without any sort of विकार, the विरोध being set aside by an implicit faith in the words of the texts of the Veda. Now in 2-1-34-35-36, he deals with the question that even though 'Brahman is the efficient cause, even though it is bed, it is not liable to the faults of partiality and cruelty as Brahman allots fruits according to the Karmas of the individual souls. The जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence this is possible. In the last sútra Bådarayaņa removes all contradictions by remarking that Brahman is waarigen. In the previous 35Tt, he said that staat is BAIE, hence it was possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to is of 1. This question is dealt at length in staatur.

·72 the individual souls, but this directly goes against the yeapassage DIFCHE Breite which distinctly teaches the gara and fasterea of Brahman. To such a difficulty Bådarayaņa's answer is on the same principles which he has laid down in 2-1-27. The swarûpa of Brahman is such. The प्रवाह may be अनादि, still ब्रह्मन् is एक and अद्वितीय, Brahman though giving fruits according to as is independent of it. In short, it is possessed of all tås, there is no contradiction as such. According to the reasoning of S'aņkara, the explanation given by the Sûtrakâra in refutation of the art- नैधुण्य is quite out of place. According to him the विषमता and निघृणता, the कर्तृत्व of Jivaltman and Paramatman are all creatures of act and with the removal of sparent, they vanish into nothingness. To conclude, the Sûtrakara holds that this world is an effect of Brahman, is real. Brahman has, for its लीला केवल, without any other प्रयोजन, and without any organs or any external means, by the natural powers of itself, developed itself into the universe without itself undergoing ny change. The world is 37763 with Brahman in all its three stages. It has no existence independent of Brahman, but at the same time it is neither het nor an absolute non-entity. It is not a fan of Brahman, but a real wilful परिणाम of Brahman. It is आत्मकृति and आत्मपरिणाम or ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. शरीर, शक्ति, प्रकृति, परमाणु, अविद्या, माया and others, have nothing to do with it so far as its primary cause is being investigated. Lib r ti The fourth chapter of the Brahma-sûtras deals with the question of liberation. The first pâda deals with the question of startith or liberation in life of the Brahmavid. The knowledge of Brahman puts an end to as good ·7 -- and bad which have not begun to be enjoyed, 4-1-13-14-15. After the knowledge of Brahman is acquired, the pais, which are then performed, do not touch the fag. The body? of the galac continues to live so long as his 3177029Hs are not ended, 4-1-19. When the body falls away, he becomes joined with Brahman. Agnihotras etc., which are FÁS, are to be performed by the ac, for they are useful in the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान. This is the general reasoning of the Sûtrakâra, but this reasoning directly goes against that of S'aņkara. According to S'aņkara, art, arit, everything is the creature of nescience. By the ब्रह्मज्ञान, the अविद्या is destroyed, and when the other is destroyed, its effects viz., olar, rete etc., must also vanish, on the principle that effect and cause are 34777, and that in the absence of cause, the effect cannot exist. So there comes in the impossibility of जीवन्मुक्ति, for, with the rise of विद्या, the अविद्या with its effect TRT etc., is destroyed, and the meat becomes Brahman at once. If this position is not accepted as being contradicted by our experience, then two alternatives come in viz., either the pasta is not thoroughly obtained, in which case there is no ota-gfen, or if ata is obtained, then body etc., which continue to exist after the art of staat are not creatures of laar. From this it appears that the body etc., continue to exist even after the acquiremeut of 51, the difference being that, after FHEIN, FH and its products ETIT etc., do not touch him (Tah). The area performs कर्मs, but these कर्मs are ब्रह्मकर्मs, and not his own. It is worthy of note that the Sûtrakâra says ,' meaning thereby that fits do not touch the qua. He becomes HÉT. Thus though the geag is living and doing every- 1. तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाधयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तव्यपदेशात् 4-1-13. इतरस्याप्येवमश्लेषः पाते तु 4-1-14. अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः 4-1-15. 2. भोगेन वितरे क्षपयित्वाथ संपद्यते 4-1-19. 3. अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तदर्शनात् 4-1-16, 10 ·74 .. thing, he is untouched by good or bd ction. His i. tence is for the enjoyment of as begun to be enjoyed. This seems to be the view of the Satrakara bout जीवन्मुक्ति. Sankara himself remarks that this has reference to सगुण- विद्या, in निर्गुणविद्या there is no need of mentioning this. 'सगुणासु तावद्विद्या विद्यत एव विधानम् । तासु च वाक्यशेष ऐश्वर्यप्राप्तिः पाप- निवृत्तिश्च विद्यावत उच्यते। तयोश्चाविवक्षाकारणं नास्तीत्यतः पाप्मप्रहाणपूर्वकैश्वर्यप्राप्ति- स्तासां फलमिति निश्चीयते । निर्गुणायां तु विद्यायां यद्यपि विधानं नास्ति, तथाप्य- कात्मबोधात् कर्मप्रदाहसिद्धिः। 4-1-13. When the frogas are ended by enjoyment by the body, that body of the Brahmavid falls away. The second 96 describes the process by which the body is dissolved. The उत्क्रान्ति of विद्वान् and अविद्वान् is common to a certain extent, of नाडीप्रवेश. The विद्वान् then passes by शताधिका. 4-2-16. In 4-2-13, 'स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्' Sankara remarks:--'तस्मादविद्व- द्विषये प्राप्तयोः गत्युत्क्रान्त्योः विद्वद्विषये प्रतिषेध इत्येवमेव व्याख्येयं, व्यपदेशार्थ- वत्त्वाय । न च ब्रह्मविदः सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रक्षीणकामकर्मणः उत्क्रान्तिर्गतिवा- पपद्यते, निमित्ताभावात् । 'अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते' इति चैवं जातीयकाः श्रुतयो गत्युत्का- न्त्योरभावं सूचयन्ति ।'. The उत्क्रान्ति here spoken of by the Satrakâra is quite consistent with his arrangement. In the first qre the Sûtrakâra describes the state of qala in life, in the second se fear, in the third how and by which path he reaches Brahman (गति), and in the fourth the फल the ब्रह्मविद् enjoys after reaching Brahman. In this general arrangement the Sætrakâra nowhere expressly says that the उतान्ति and गति have no reference to the ब्रह्मविद्. The question of anlyft is altogether different, which is possible only through the singular grace of Brahman. In case of the favoured saag, there is no detention even for enjoying आरब्धकर्मs. His graphs are taken away by his sons, good is by his friends and bad ones by his enemies. 'तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्त: पापकृत्याम्'. Bad rayana suggests this in 'अतो न्यापि केषामुभयोः' 4-1-17. ANDAR ·7 Praw Thus, through the grace of Brahman, the wis are ended, and the gana at once enjoys Brahman. This is only suggestion which is not possible to carry further than this. All the sparis refer to Jaimini and Bâdarayan by the word उभय, and refer the श्रुति passage to काम्यकर्मs. But the objection to this view as is pointed out by Vallabha is that Jaimini is not spoken of either before or after in this पाद 4-1, and that पापकृत्या cannot be काम्यविषय. Whatever it may be, it seems almost impossible that Bâdarayana views the गतिश्रुति as belonging to अविद्वद्विषय. In the third pâda of the fourth chapter after describing the stations through which the soul of the glaç passes by the path of देवयान, Badarayana says that the ब्रह्मविद् reaches Brahman from where there is no return. In the s me pâda Bådarayaņa mentions two views of Badari who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid is said to reach is fare, and of 'Jaimini who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid reaches is qui, and not saft frei. Sankara accepts the view of Bådari and rejects that of Jaimini. In 7 Sprei sãYTETHETE:' 4-3-14, S'aņkar takes great pains to show that the stayas re not to be accepted in their primary sense, but as referring to lower Brahman, they are to be finally rejected. The principal reasons which led Sankara to reject the staglas in their primary sense are expressed by him thus:--- सत्यपि संभवे मुख्यस्यैवार्थस्य ग्रहणमिति कश्चिदाज्ञापयिता विद्यते । परविद्याप्रक- रणे पि च तत्स्तुत्यर्थ विद्यान्तराश्रयगत्यनुर्कीतनमुपपद्यते, 'विष्वड्डःन्या उ. मणे भवन्ति' तिवत् । 'प्रजापतेः सभां वेश्म प्रपद्ये' इति तु पूर्ववाक्यविच्छेदेन कार्ये पि प्रति त्यभिसंधि विरुध्यते । सगुणेऽपि च ब्रह्मणि सर्वात्मत्वसंकीर्तनं 'सर्वकर्मा सर्व- Ta'alaqahqa i narcia Elaqat tagas: 1 4-3-14. S. B. N. S. p. 497. From this o e sees th t S'aņkara's main difficulty consisted in the 'असंभव' or विरोध between the गति- ति nd the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. In the abse ce of संभव, 1. 4-3-7-11. 4--11-14.

·7 Х says he, there is no reason why the staghas should be accepted in their primary sense. His other explanations viz., 'कार्येऽपि प्रतिप्रत्यभिसंधि विरुध्यते' and 'सगुणेऽपि ब्रह्मणि x 842964à, are questions of plausibilities which stand or fail with the main argument. From what has been stated bove it is important to note that Sankara does not adduce any sutra of Bådarayaņa in support of his theory, and therefore the sustained reasoning that he has worked out for rejecting the staya loses all its force. Before We examine his arguments in favour of the rejection of the गतिश्रुतिs and insistence of the निर्विशेषश्रुतिs, let us advert to the question of the Briha. It is admitted on all hands, that the tagas, as they stand, do present a contradiction with the otaca of Brahman. But on this ground alone, it would not be proper to reject the fayfas. With this we have to bear in mind what the learned Sûtrakâra has said about Brahman and the letter of the Veda. As a faithful interpreter of the sûtras of Bådara yaņa, one has to abide by his reasoning and conclusion. The position of the learned Sûtrakâra with regard to this question would be the same which he assumed in 2-1-26-27, 'ydag 37644&ara i'. The difficulty put forth by Slankara arises only when unlike the Sûtrakâra one fails to put an implicit faith in the letter of the Veda. In the 375CAHIETTET as is written by the Sætrakâra, one is surprised, why S'aņkara tries to modify and correct not only the clear sense of the pràs, but that of the sûtras also. The résult of this is often unpleasant when one sees that S'aņkara’s modified interpretation not only goes against the wording of the sûtras, but directly contradicts what he himself has just said before. In this connection, Bhaskara rightly defines the position of the Satrakâra 1. Second interpretation of 3777&HETTEFITOT, Second interpretations in 2-1-27, 2-1-29, are instances out of many. ........

·77 Madhva, are in his Bhâshya on page 235, 4-3-13, thus:---THETIH arg ++न चास्माकमर्थवादत्वकल्पना, यथाश्रुतार्थग्रहणे किं नामानुपपन्नम्'. Thus Bhaskara sees no difficulty in accepting tràgfas in their primary sense and 6479469 of Brahman Vallabha's position is also similar. According to him the fayfa has no contradiction with the creaca of Brahman for both are taught by Veda, and that Brahman's swarûpa is such as would admit the possibility of both the alternatives. Vallabha's commentator also observes on page 1368:-"ffa, fafaetitor: शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेऽर्थे गौणी कल्पना न्याय्या।'. (अ. भा. प्रकाश B.S.S.). On the question of fayfa Râmânuja, Nimbârka, Vallabha, Sreekanth and Bhâskara all at one, and this seems to be a strong ground to hold that the Sûtrakâra had never in his mind the difficulty of 'असंभव' between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व. The Sutrakâra's attitude is the one declared by Vallabha in 1-1-4., 'faragnatec) T TELUIT Oure'. It follows therefore, that Sankara's interpretation of the farglas in the Greyfuræ sense is not viewed by any other commentator with favour, and we cannot but think that here also S'aņkara is not faithful to the Sûtrakâra. S'aņkara has however paid very serious attention to this question. The following are the arguments advanced by him in 4-3-14-S. B. N. S. pp. 497-502: (1) Brahman is 79197. |(2) Brahman is aasta. (3) Jiva is saturation. (4) गतिश्रुतिs refer to अपरब्रह्मन्. (5) No गति is spoken of in परविद्या. 1(6) The distinction between qt and 3147AHI is based on the gfa passages. (7) गमन is due to द्ध पाधि. (8) Jaimini's view is mentioned by the Sûtrakâra later for the development of intellect ( 5 TATTET).

·7 The first objection is met by Bhaskara nd Vallabh by showing the possibility of गमन as being due to भोगजनक रब्ध. 'ब्रह्म सर्वभोगनिमित्तं सर्वप्रपञ्चनिमित्तमिति निमित्तसप्तम्येवेत्यदोषः' says Bhaskara in 4-3-13. 'न च व्यापकत्वं गन्तव्यत्वे धिकं, प्रारब्धभोगं विना तत्प्राप्यसंभवात् , यदा यत्र तद्भोगसमाप्तिस्तदा तत्र तर प्तेिर्निष्प्रत्यूहत्वात्' says V llabha in 4-3-14. The second and third objections re answered by what has been said before in reference to Brahman nd the human Soul. It has been shown that the Sûtrakâra does not hold the distinction between me and BTTTTET, hence the fourth and sixth objections are answered. This question has been exhaustively treated by Vallabha's commentator on pages 136 to 1365. A. B. P. B. S. S., and by Bhâskara in 4-3-13; and but for want of space we should have quoted the same in full here. The fifth objection is dealt with by Bhaskara thus:- 'न चास्माभिरियं गतिः कल्पिता, श्रुतयोऽत्र प्रमाणम् , परविद्या गतयो दृश्यन्ते'. 4-3-13. Then he quotes from TEIST, 19, वल्ली, ऐतरेय, गीता, पुराण and वाजसनेय, to support his view that there is गमन in परविद्या. The tendency of the Satrakâra is to accept the gras alw ys in their primary sense, hence 7 is in the primary ense, and not in a secondary sense, as due to GATT. Thus the 7th objection is answered. The last objection is certainly very weak. One does not understand why the Sûtrakâra should put his doctrine in the mouth of Bådari, why he should place the fagra view first and gener view after it. Sankara says that it is done with a view to develop intellect 1. True, b t since this is solitary unusual circumstance, one must be thoroughly convinced before he accepts S'aņkar 's ce Appendix. A. 1.

·7 the moview. It ppe rs that S'pkar 's interpret tion tho gh fairly correct so far s the sûtras are concerned, become altogether opposed to the view of the sûtrakâr ment S'aņkara’s interpretation is viwed in the light of his Esoteric doctrine' in the words of Dr. Deussen. Once it is shown that there is real TT, the sûtras of Badarayaņa become quite consistent. The holy words 'AllFT: शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, cannot with justice be referred to a secondary hypothetical sense, for an ultimate rejection. That Bådarayaņa should begin and end with sutras which can on no account be reconciled with S' n. kara's reasoning, leads one to suppose that there is a flaw in S'aņkara's reasoning so far as his faithfulness to the Satrakâra is concerned. Râmânuja and Nimbârka hav clearly an advantage over Sankara in this, that their views evolve from the Sätras of Bâdarầyan with less difficulty. When the Satras and Sankara’s commentary dealing with his per lâat are compared, one cannot but honestly admit that there is a clear contradiction betwee the two. Satras, viewed in the light of Sankara's esoteric doctrine, lose all their force in their criticisms of Sânkhya, Kâņâda and other systems. Thus, it is not right with S'aņkura to deprive the sayfas of their primary signific nce, for it is a view not favoured by Bådarâyaņa, or at le st we are not in a position to s pport it from the sůtr s. Having established in the third qre that the Brahmavid re ches Brahman, or rather is 'led there, the fourth y describes the mode of his enjoyment there. After reaching Brahman, the Brahmavid gets Perawia, but all the same she is steh with Brahman. For the sake of enjoyment, he becomes manifest in a new form which, though slahi 1. अप्रतीकालंबनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथादोषात् तत्क्रतुश्च 4-3-15. 2. सम्प- याविर्भावः स्खे शब्दात् 4-4-1. BAHTa eratg 4-4-4.

·0 with Brahman, is dat according to Jaimini; Afy according to Audulomi, while 94454 according to Bådarayaņa; there is no hate between Jaimini's and Audulomi's views, as both are possible according to Bâdarayaņa. Being B7lène with Brahman the Brahmvid derives everything by Brahman's **989. Like Brahman he is 6377afe afa. There is a difference of opinion between the views of Bådari and Jaimini, the former believes in the absence of artc etc., of the are, while the latter believes in the presence of TAT etc., on the authority of Chh. U. 7-26-2, 8while Bâdarậyaņa believes in both the views, (3779). With these arit etc., the Brahmavid enjoys it. The absence of भोग spoken of in श्रुति has reference to खाप्यय, and श्रुतिs teaching Hit refer to infer. The last of the Brahmavid is limited to the extent that he cannot like Brahman create Jagat. His life is eternal. With Brahman the Brahmavid by any form enjoys eternally. He 13 does not eturn to Sansara. This seems to be the general outline of the mode in which the Brahmavid enjoys in the Brahmaloka. The Brahmaloka is eternal. In this there is a general agreement among Râmânuja, Nimbârka and Vallabha. The sů tras of Bådarâ yaņa stand naturally recouciled with the above view. There is no suggestion in these sûtras of the ideal of Moksha which Sankara mentions in 1-1.-4. : they were . . 1. ब्राह्मण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः 4-4-5. 2. चिति तन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः 4-4-6. 3. एवनुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः 4-4-7. 4. संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः 4-4-8. 5. 34 ga zarafa: 4-4-9. 6. TATÉ TIERTE 997 4-4-10. 7. Pre ga ajêcheYTATAITQ 4-4-11. 8. STETICACHTE atgriaunisa: 4–4–12. 9. स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि 4-4-16. 10. जगद्व्यापारवर्ज प्रकरणादसंनिहि- तत्वाच्च 4-4-17. 11. विकारावर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह 4-4-19. 12. भोगमात्रसाम्य- # 4-4-21. 13. 371gfe: TOTO 34710ft: शब्दात 4-4-22. .

·1 'इदं तु पारमार्थिक कूटस्थ नित्यं, व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि, सर्वविक्रियारहितं, नित्यतृप्त, निरवयवं, स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम् , यत्र धर्माधौं सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते,. तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्'. "As may be seen from this passage, the conception of Liberation contains the same characteristics as serve, as a rule, to define Brahman; and indeed, Brahman and the state of liberation are identical terms; for liberation is nothing else than the becoming one with Brahman, or rather, since the identity of the Soul with Brahman has always subsisted and has only been hidden from it by an illusion, liberation is nothing else but the awakening of the consciousness that our own self is identical with Brahman. Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming which does not already exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has existed from all eternity. It is because of this, that liberation is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through moral improvement, but by knowledge alone." System of Vecânta. p. 401. It is absolutely clear that this reasoning cannot be traced to any sútra of Bådarâ yaņa. S'aņkara's conception of Liberation has much in common with that of the Sâņkhya. The highest aim of the Sânkhya? is to free himself from the fat, so the greatest aim of S'âņkara is to free himself from the staar. With the destruction of statere, its creatures, viz., his Jivatva, his satania, everything vanishes, and he remains what he was, viz., Brahman, the subject of all negations except existence. That this view is foreign to the sútras of Bådara yaņa can be seen from the summary of the sůtras given above. S'aņkara's attempts to force up his doctrines in 15th and Bådari suggest his departure from the lines of the Satrakára. His attempt to reconcile Audulomi's view with that of Jaimini on the authority 1. Vide Sânkhya Kârika 62-68. and Vâchaspatimis'ra's Feelget. 11 ·2 of Bâdarayaņa in 4-4-7, gay9ztuYSaraiçatan aTETITUT:' results in a contradiction. He says: gaaf Great न्यमात्रखरूपाभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्यापि उपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य ब्राह्मै- श्वर्यरूपस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं बादरायण आचार्यों मन्यते'. The contradic. tion arises from the fact that there come in tari, etc., creatures of Ignorance after the Ignorance is destroyed. Govindânanda thus puts it 'अखण्डचिन्मात्रज्ञानान्मुक्तस्याज्ञानाभावात् कुत आज्ञानिकधर्मयोग इति'. Vide also अणुभाष्यप्रकाश pp. 1396-1401. The liberation in the sense of Bâdarâyaņa is not merely the end of miseries, but also the attainment of ever-lasting bliss. Co clu io From what has been said before, it follows that the Sutrakâra's conception of Brahman is at great variance with that of Sankara. As Dr. Thibaut observes:- They do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman, that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Is'wara in Slankara's sense.' Vedanta Sutras. I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the Brahman is possessed of all attributes, and all wonderful powers. By its very swarûpa, it is possessed of all contradictory attributes, The negative vedic passages like 'नेति नेति' deny in Brahman all the earthly attributes, while those like '%l: etc., affirm in Brahman all divine attributes. Thus Brahman is 3H21* ut as is accepted by Vallabha and Nimbârka. The absolute negation of all attributes, and describing Brahman as Aaraan, is a view which does not find any expression in the sûtras of Bådaråyaņa. The subject of negation in negative Vedic passages has reference to what is non-Brahman as is remarked by the author of Bhâshya- Prakâs'a. B. S. S. p. 953. statsraadata ada a tote FETTS- न्तर्निवेश्येतरं निषेधति, न सर्व मिथ्याकृत्येति सुधीभिरवधेयम्'. Neither is Brahm devoid of ll attributes. 'अतो विशेषाणां नास्तताऽपि तु LOW ·3 fara atq#777YTTETUÀzinafa aleH" Aņu. B. P. p. This Brahman which is spoken of in the Upanishads a 'नेति नेति' or as 'सर्वकाम' is n independent कर्तृ. It is Sad-Chid- Ânanda. For the sake of sport alone it develops itself into the universe, but unlike the Pantheism of Spinoza, s is shown by Sir Ramakțishna Bhandarkar, it is not exhausted into the universe, but remains transcendent. Residing in the heart, it becomes BTTÀL, and existing outside, though 'agamya', becomes 'gamya' by meditation and devotion, when it likes. It is the fountain-source from which all activity, all intelligence, all joy proceed. It is Brahman which evolves names and forms, and makes Set- FT ETTET. The universe with its immense diversity has its source in Brahman. The human souls have their source in Brahman. The Brahman of the sutras is not only a personal God, but it is one of its phases. Brahman is avyakta when one tries to find Him by means of intellect alone, but becomes all through meditation and devotion, The innermost soul of the human souls is Brahman, hence it is to be meditated upon as the STEHT. 4-1-3. The infinite variety is united in the Brahman. Sages like Vâmadeva, in the stage of Brahma-Bhava, have experienced this Sarvatva. Brahman is 30 Fia in the universe by Sad, Chid, and Ânanda. It follows from this, that the author of the sûtras follows a process quite opposite to that of S'aņkara's, in working out his Pantheism. He does not deny everything of Brahm n, but unlike S'ankara, affirms everything of Brahman. In the case of the human soul also, the view of the Sûtrakâra is opposed to that of S'aņkara. As Dr. Thibaut puts it, the sâtras 'do not, with S'aņkara, proclaim the abso- 1. आत्मेतितूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च । 2 तत्र सर्वेषां सर्वभावे सर्वानन्त्यप्रसंगात् सर्व- #afa aql | Aņu Bhashya B. S. S. p. 262, 1-1-29.

·4 lute identity of the individual and the highest Self.' Introduction to Vedânta Sätra I. p. 100. According to the Sutrakâra, the human soul springs out of Brahman as spark out of fire. It is atomic. It is part-sia of Brahman, and as the sig of sifat Brahman, it is 8977947 with it. It is Kartſi and Bhoktội, but its activity has its source in Brahman. In the stage of Brahmabhầva it experiences aga, etc., with its Aņutva. It is neither an 377 nor a safaa of Brahman. It is not a creature of nescience, nor is it the same as Brahman differentiated by staan. It is not a non-entity but a real entity. As regards the universe also, Bådarayaņa and S'ankara are opposed. As Dr. Thibaut puts it:~They do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world.' According to the Sûtrakâra, the universe has for its material and efficient cause Brahman alone. Though Brahman alone is the material cause, it does not undergo any change while developing itself into the universe. As efficient cause Brahman is neither cruel nor unjust. The world is 37754 with Brahman, in the sense that the effect is Start with the cause. As the effect exists in the cause in all the three stages of origination, existence and absorption, similarly the universe, in all its three stages, exists in Brahman, and is street with it. It is a real development of Avikrita Brahman. The Sûtrakâra does not, like S'aņkara maintain that the universe is a dream on a grand scale. He does not hold that the universe is a figment of nescience. The universe has for its cause Brahman, still there is an infinite variety in effects. The creation of the universe is a Keval Lilâ of Brahman and not a Mâyå. From the description given of the path leading to Brahman, and the mode of enjoyment of some in the ·systems. Sankara' 5 fourth Adhyâya, th conception of Moksha, according to the Sûtrakâra, is different from that of S'aņkara. It is a stage attained by a gradual course of spiritual development, and not a stage which has existed at all times, but which is concealed through faal, and which is revealed by the destruction of अविद्या. From the sutras of Badarayana like 'आत्मकृतेः परिणा- HTT', we distinctly understand that the Sûtrakâra favours the TÊThang and not the facadar of S'aņkara. In this respect, as is shown before by a quotation from Sir R. Bhândârkar's Vaishṇavism etc., Vallabha's TETRTIH is the one approved of by the Sûtrakâra. It should not be supposed that thereby either of them accepts the proposition that Brahman thereby undergoes any fort. According to both of them, Brahman's causality and transcendency are both possible. In all the instances given by the Sutrakâra, and in the older Upanishads, nowhere do we find any instance given, which S'ankara so very often quotes to support his doctrine of faasi. This fact suggests a very strong inference against him. Where the ya gives the instance of u and 72, S'ankara tries to incorporate शुक्ति and रजत. Vide आन्दोग्यभाष्य. VI. There is again a distinction to be drawn as to the attitude of the Satrakâra and Sankara towards other very hostile, while Râmânuja and Bhaskara look upon both the Mimânsås as forming one S'astra. Upavarsha, whose view, Bhâskara follows, is said to have written one Bhâshya on the two Mîmânsâs. Vide भास्करभाष्य p. 6. and BYUHTETIERT. p. 47. According to S'aņkara, nothing remains to be done in the stage of ब्रह्मत्वावगति. 'तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं Fair UPIT THITRITT ga atquad. S. B. 1-1-4. This absolute rejection of is cannot be traced to any + p. 18.

·> sůtra of Bådarảyaņa. In 4-1-16, the fathers like af ET etc., are to be performed by the Brahmavid. This would go to show that the Brahmavid has not to reject the performance of ##s, but the mode of performance is different. Again in 3-4-26, Wallan 7 ggfeyarciach,' the absolute disregard of * is not accepted. It cannot be taken that the two Mîmânsâs form one S'astra, but the mutual helpfulness cannot be denied. Vide Anu Bhashya p. 42. and pp. 110 to 114. Vide also 3-3-1-25 sûtras. While meeting the Sânkhyas, Kâņâdas, and the Bauddhas, S'aņkara follows the Sûtrakâra in maintaining the strict reality of the universe, and the causality of Brahman; but once that is done, he rejects the same view, consigning it to saarS'aņkara has been rightly and repeatedly charged with these contradictions by his opponents. From what has been said above, we come to the conclusion that Sankara's esoteric doctrine, viz., the Mâyâvâda is the development of the Sâņkhya and Buddhistic tenets, blended with misinterpretations of the passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, referring to the creation of the dreaming soul the lines of Gaudapâda, and it has nothing to do with the sůtras of Bådarayaņa. After showing numerous contradictions in the system of S'aņkara from his Bhâshya, Col. Jacob remarks:-"To me, therefore, it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the @fetzigarteris, or some similar school, were in possession of the field in S'aņkara's time, and that his own mind was so saturated with their doctrines as to be unable to shake them off even when propounding an antagonistic system.” Vedânta-Såra. Intro. p. 9. This suggestion of Col. Jacob is as original as it is true. If we take S'aņkara's Bhâshya, and do away with those portions which superimon ·7 pose his doctrine of splaat, from what is left of his cominentary, a general system, representing Bådarậyaņa's view, can fairly be worked out. Vallabha's Aņu Bhâshy seems to answer the above description. When we read Col. Jacob's remark with the observations of Sir R. Bhandarkar, pp. 160-161. Vaishṇavism etc., the inevitable conclusion one comes to is this, that Bâdarê yaņa represents in his sûtras a system which corresponds with one which Vallabha propounds in his Bhashya, viz., The development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency. p. 161. Vaishnavism. That Sankara himself was conscious of such a doctrine can be seen from his Bhashya in passages like 'ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्र- णयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतम्' 2. 1. 14, 'यत्तूक्तं स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्भवितुमर्हतीति, तदुरुक्तम्, स्थिरखभावानामेव सुवर्णादीनां प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां रुचकादिकार्यकारणभावदर्शनात्' 2. 2. 26. p. 246. Thus while dealing with Sânkhya, Bauddha and others, he puts forth Bâdarayana's doctrine, but that being done, he rejects Bådara yaņa's view, and puts forth his own. Hence the conclusion is that Bâdarayaņa and S'ankara both hold different, if not opposed, views. Rao Bahadur Rangacharya has published a book, called a REITETE of S'aņkarâchârya. This book is different from that of Madhava's. The noteworthy feature of Rangacharya's book is that fourteen matas are mentioned there, the last two of which refer to Vedavyâsa and Vedanta. And though this view of Vedavýåsa purports to be based on the Mahâbhârata, there is a significant fact that Slankarachårya, the author of the book, drew a distinction between the two views. Other writers also refer to two views of Vedânta which go to show that Bådarayaņa and S'ankara hold different views. In the Tâtparya Tika of the FTPTTS, 4-1-19, a reference to the two views thus m de:-'मा भूदयं नामरूपप्रपंचः शून्यतोपादानः, ·88 अपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति, ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणमते मृत्तिकेव घटशराबोदंच- नादिभावेन, न च एवं नित्यत्वव्याघातः, परिणामेऽपि तत्त्वानपायात् तल्लक्षणत्वाच्च नित्यतायाः, यदाह यस्मिन् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते, तदपि नित्यमित्येकं दर्शनम्,' 'अपरं च ब्रह्मैव अनाद्यविद्योपधानाभेदात् नामरूपप्रपंचभेदेन विवर्तते मुखमिव एकमनेकमणि- कृपाणादर्शभेदानकविधं प्रतिबिंबभेदेनेति,' तत् एतद् दर्शनद्वयम्'. It is quite clear from this quotation that even Naiyâyikas had to draw a distinction between the TRUTH of Bådarậyaņa and faqaare of Sankara. Moreover, Slankara's preference for the views of Bådari, Kås'akritsna and Audulomi, suggests the inference that S'ankara had in his mind a system different from that of the Sutrakâra. To add to this, S'ankara's own statement, at the close of the introduction of his 378419727764, suggests the same conclusion, as is pointed out by R. B. Rangacharya, that the aim of S'aņkarachârya was to try to evolve what he himself took to be the teachings of the Upanishads out of the Vedanta Sutras of Bådarâ yaņa-that is, to put into the sûtras what, he himself understood to be the teachings of the Upanishads, and not what Bâdarây iyaņa understood them to be. 'यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां STERI PUTH:1'. Even orthodox Advaitins seem to accept this view in a general sort of way, and there is a stanza attributed to Madhusûdana Sarasvati which gives a notably clever expression to it. The stanza is: न स्तौमि तं व्यासमशेषमर्थ सम्यङ्न सूत्रैरपि' यो बबन्ध । विनापि तैः संग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं शंकरं नौमि सुरेश्वरार्यम् ॥ It is evident from this that it is granted by some Advaitins themselves, that the Vedânta sætras of Vyasa are not responsible for the whole philosophy of Sankarâchârya: and one need not therefore be surprised when one sees them occasionally making a distinction between the Sátrakára mata and the Bhashyakára mata. The distinction between a Vyasa mata and a Vedanta mata as n .

·89 brought out in the Sarva-Siddhânta-Sangraha clearly confirms the position of Dr. Thibaut as to what kind of Vedânta it is, that is really represented by the Vedant Satras.' Introduction to S. S. of Rangacharya pp. 16-17. From this it appears that so far as the sûtras of Bâdarâyaņa are concerned, Sankara's claim to be the faithful expositor is very weak. The question as to whether Bådarâyaņa's or Sankara’s teachings stand nearer to the Upanishads, though to the orthodox appears at the first sight absurd, is rather very interesting. Gough, Deussen and Thibaut have declared in Sankara's favour. Our subject forbids us from entering into this question, but certainly we cannot concede that the question is settled. The views of Gough and Deussen are not entitled to as much weight as that of Thibaut, since the former two do not seem to have looked to anything except S'aņkara’s interpretations, while th latter had the advantage of being familiar with a powerful critic of S'aņkara viz., Râmânuja. Hence let us hear what he says on p. 124 of his Introduction to Vedânta Sætras I. S'ankara's method of higher and lower Brahman) thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical developments; to recognize clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems; but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of the other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by Sankara between Br hman and Isvara is known to the Up nish ds, but 12 ..

·90 . we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the ture of the highest being, a choice had to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgun and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, Slankar is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind. x x x The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little tress upon personal attributes of the highest being, and hence, S'aņkara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypos tatized personal Îsvara a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads.' x x 'If so, the philosophy of S'aņkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Satras of Bådarayaņa. p. 126. This may be or may not be, much can be said on both sides, but there is one thing which needs be pointed out here, and it is this. For the purpose of determining the highest Being, Bådarayaņa or any Vaidika Âchâry would not like to make choice between the two 1. Compare Jayagopala's introduction to his तैत्तिरीयभाष्यः-तत्र तावदुपनिषदोनेकविधाः, काश्चन केवलपूर्णपुरुषोत्तमतत्प्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, काश्चन केव पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा गोपालतापिनीकृष्णोपनिषदादयः। श्चन पूर्णपुरुषोत्तमस्व- रूपतत्प्राप्तियोग्यतासम्पादकाक्षरब्रह्मज्ञानविषयीभूताक्षरन स्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपस्य पुरुषो- त्तमेन सह सर्वकामभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिकाः, यथा तैत्तिरियोपनिषन्मुण्डकोपनिषदादयः। काश्चन केवलविभूतितत्प्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा वासुदेवोपनिषन्नारायणोपनिषदादयः। का- श्चन व क्षिरब्रह्मतत्प्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा बृहदारण्यक न्दिोग्योपनिषदादयः। काश्चन मुक्तिसाधनीभूतभक्तिज्ञानाङ्गसंन्यासवैराग्ययोगसांख्यादिप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा संन्यासोपनिषदारु- णेयोपनिषत्कण्ठश्रुत्युपनिषद्गर्भोपनिषदद्वैताख्योपनिषद तिशान्त्युपनिषदमृतबिन्दूपनिषत्तेजोबि- न्दूपनिषद्योगशिखोपनिषद्योगतत्त्वोपनिषदादयः। काश्चन भक्तिज्ञानसाधनश्रवणादितत्साधनशरी- रादीनामाधिभौतिकाध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकाद्युपद्रवनिवारकसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा गरुडोपनिष- : 1 Vide also Sir R. Bhandarkar's re ark:--The opinion oxpressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanishad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of the one soul only, is anifestly wrong, and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judg ent. As stated in the text, the Upanishads, from the very nature of the co pilations, cannot but be expected to teach one, but any syste ş of doctrine. Vaishnavis p. 2. note 2. १ not .

·91 sorts of Vedic passages, but he would refer them both to Brahm n, or, in the words of Vallabha, the Satrakâr position would be this: तथा चास्थूलादिगुणयुक्त एवावित्रि यमाण एवात्मानं करोतीति वेदान्तार्थः संगतो भवति, विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्वं ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय A. B. p. 121. If Bâdarayaņa were to accept a position like this, his Brahman would be capable of am Igamating more heterogeneous material than Saņkar 's higher and lower Brahman put together. Preference and giving prominence to one sort of Vedic passages results in rejection and ignoring of others, and to believers in the infallible wisdom and eternity of the Vedas, such a one-sided preference would be fatal to his claim to be called a Vaidika. The duty of the Vaidika is to interpret the sense of Ved and not to subordinate one to the other. 'आम्नातस्यार्थ प्रतिपत्तुं HarHT FAT TÅTT I 1. 4.3. p. 150. S. B. (text. N.S.P). 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, माणत्वा- faziara 1 3-2-15 p.p. 357. S. B. text. Thus according to S'aņkar Iso, the authoritativeness of Saguna and Nirguņ Vedic passages is equal, and so far as the learned Sutrakâra accepts both sorts of gas nd refers them both to his highest Being, Brahman, his interpretation must with justice be preferred to that of either S'aņkara who gives prominence to Nirguna yfas; or Råmânuja, Madhy ind others, who put forth only Saguņa yas. In this respect Bådarâ yaņa is followed by Vallabha alone. Hence, except in reference to Vall bh , Dr. Thibaut would not be quit wro g in saying that S'aņkara by accepting two Brahm n viz., Saguna and Nirguņa gives some scope to ll the fas, while other systematisers like Râmânuj and Madhy do c st into the background the Nirguņa ms; but Dr. Thibaut's claim that S'aņkara's system would stand nearer to the Upanishads than that of Bâdarâyaņa cannot be accepted as unchallenged, since Bâdarâ yaņa's mode of interpretation and harmonising the conflicting Vedic pass ges ·92 be ADA res TAR is better th n that of S'aņkara, since Bâdarayan Slankara bears in mind the Frutataca of differer passages as shown above, and does not prefer th the other, but accepts them all as carrying equal o and deserving equal prominence. Thus disagreeing with Thibaut in accepti S'aņkara is a better exponent of the Upanish; Bådarâyaņa, we must admit that Sankara's might have had its representatives in Bâdari, Kâs nd to a certain extent in Audulomi. If the personality of Bâdarậyaņa, with his irresist hitherto unquestioned authority were to from the field, then a chain of tradition of S system can be maintained from Bâdari to Ga Govinda and Sankara, and with this Gough's position would not be wrong. It ma. pointed out by Bhâskara?, that S'ankara’s syst independent of the søtras, and that by the forc powerful genius he attempted to superimpos his on the sûtras of Bâdarâ yaņa. No other comi has tried to correct or modify the sûtras of Bad while S'aņkara's commentatora actually lays do rule that where is conflict with the Veda, the be misinterpreted. This is possible only if s derstood that there was a difference in the in: tion of the Upanishads between Bådarayaņa and the The spirit of S'aņkara's system is certainly pes His imagining the existence of egin in the 3777777 declaring that 'activity is gist, and a preference 1. सूत्राभिप्रायसंवृत्या स्वाभिप्रायप्रकाशनात् । व्याख्यातं यैरिदं शास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निवृत्तये । भा. भा. P. 1. 2. वेदसूत्रयोर्विरोधे 'गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पने'ति सूत्राण्यन्यथा नेतव्यानि । भाम S. 1-1-19. P. P. 128. 129. 3. अपि च आनन्दप्रचुर इत्युक्ते दुःखास्तित्वमपि गम्यते etc., 1-1-19. 4. Orari Gia54c91a i 2-3-40. S. B. p. 292, ·93. egativ sfars, tend to the same conclusio , His rejection of 3777&#T's Brahmanhood, and imagining the existenc of misery in it have been the subject of an almost bitter remark of Vallabha's commentator. From the way which he defines his conception of Brahman, by negativing everything of it except its existence, and declaring Brahman to be stri, he makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish his system from Buddhism, and it appear that his system has evolved in a transition period when the Buddhistic doctrine of Void was being driven out of the field. " धान्ना खेन सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि ।" . 1. अत एवं सत्यपि यत् तदविचारेणानन्दमये दुःखास्तित्वकथनं तद् ग्रन्थकृतो महादुःख- Fieritet 91964ha Therita fase 1 37. H. 137. B. S. S. pp. 198. 199, ·Ap di A... तेन यत्तैः प्रश्नोपनिषद्वाक्यात् परापरे द्वे ब्रह्मणी अङ्गीकृत्य, यदविद्याकृतनामरू- पादिविशेषप्रतिषेधेनास्थूलादिशब्दैब्रह्मोपदिश्यते तत् परम् , यत्पुनर्नामरूपविशेषाणां केनचिद्विशिष्टमुपासनयोपदिश्यते 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीर' इत्यादिशब्दैस्तदपरमिति प्रति- पादितम् । तत्र किं मानम् ? न तावदस्थूलादिवाक्यम् , मनोमयवाक्यं च । तत्र परा- परशब्दयोरश्रवणात् । आये अक्षरशब्देनैव लक्ष्यनिर्देशात् । यदि च मुण्डके 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यत' इत्यक्षरविद्यायां परत्वश्रावणात् तद्वेद्यस्याक्षरस्य परत्वमि- ध्यते । बाढम् । तदा पुरुषस्य ततोऽपि परत्वमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः, अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः पर' इति तत्रैव श्रावणात् । न च तस्य यावद्विशेषशून्यत्वम् । तदने ‘एतस्माज्जायत प्राण' इति मन्त्रेण तत एव सृ: श्रावणात् । 'अग्निर्मूर्धे'त्यादिभिस्तद्रूपोपन्यासाच्च । नाप्यक्षरस्य तथात्वम् । अस्थू- लादिश्रावणोत्तरं प्रशासनस्य वेद्यत्वद्रष्टुत्वादीनां आकाशोपादानत्वस्य च श्रावणेन, मुण्डकेपि 'यत्तददृश्य मित्याद्युक्त्वा 'यद्भूतयोनि परिपश्यन्ती'त्यादिजगदुपादनत्वसर्वज्ञ- त्वादीनां श्रावणेन यावद्विशेषशून्यताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अत एव वाक्यान्तरेष्वपि द्र व्यम् । सर्वत्र एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यत्वात् । अत एव श्वेताश्वतरेपि 'प्रधानक्षेत्र- ज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः', 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्व मित्यादीन् नानाधर्मबोधकानेव मन्त्रानुक्त्वा 'निष्कलं निष्क्रिय' मित्युक्तम् । ‘स वा एष महानज आत्मे त्यत्रापि शारीरब्राह्मणे, 'अन्नादो वसुदान इति सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान' इत्यादयो धर्मा उक्ताः। 'स वा एष नेति नेती'त्युक्त्वा, 'अगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते, असङ्गोऽसितो न स ते न व्यथत इत्येवं निषेधो विवृतो, न तु यावद्धर्मपरत्वेनेति द्र व्यम् । अतो यत्रोत्कर्षस्य विश्रान्तिः, अक्षराद्वा यदुत्कृ तदेव परमिति मन्तव्यम् । उक्तमुण्डका श्रुतेः। 'अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः पुरुषान परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति' रिति काठक- श्रुतेः । 'अम्भस्यपार' इत्युपक्रम्य, 'अतः परं नान्यदणीयसं हि परात् परं यन्महतो महान्त मिति तैत्तिरीयश्रुतेश्च । पुरुषस्य च विरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वमेतास्वेव प्रतिपादितम् । एतदेव परत्वम् । गीतासु च 'अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तस्तमाहुः परमां गतिम्, यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम । पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्ययेति । 'द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते । उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः, यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः । यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः, अतोस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तम' इति तदुपबृंहणात् । अत एव, 'न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते' इत्यादिषु तस्य समाभ्यधि. कनिषेधोऽपि युज्यते । न च पुरुषोत्तमाक्षरयोः परापरभावाङ्गीकारे अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः । गणितागणितानन्दत्वधर्मभेदेपि वस्त्वभेदेन द्वैताभावे तदभावात् । अमित्रादिवदद्वैतवि- ८ ·95 रुद्धसम्पद्रूपत्वेनाभेदस्य तादात्म्यात्मकत्वात् । अथवा, शब्दब्रह्मवेद्यं परम्, शब्द झै- वापरम् । षष्ठस्कन्धे चित्रकेतुं प्रति 'शब्दब्रह्म परं ब्रह्म ममोभे शाश्वती तनू' इति भगवद्वाक्यस्य 'द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये शब्दब्रह्म परं च यत् । शब्दब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं ब्रह्माधिगच ती'त्यादि क्यस्य च स्वारस्यात् । 'एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं च ब्रह्मेति वाक्य- विचारेऽप्योङ्कारस्य, 'एतद्वै यजुस्त्रयीं विद्या प्रती ति श्रुतेः सर्ववेदमूलत्वेन वाच्याभि- नत्वेन चोभयरूपत्वं प्रति य तदभिध्यानफलकथने एकद्वित्रिमात्राध्यानेनयंजुःसाम- भिर्मनुष्यलोकसोमलोकसूर्यलोकेषु यथायथं महिमानुभवं फलमुक्त्वार्धचतुर्थमात्रेणोङ्का- रेण ध्याने, अथर्वभिर्ब्रह्मलोकप्राप्तिं चोक्त्वा, 'स एतस्माज्जीवधनात् परात् परं पुरि- शयं पुरुषमीक्षत' इति फलमुक्तम् । शङ्कराचार्यमतेत्र त्रिमात्र एवोङ्कारोङ्गीकृतः। सं पाठो यद्यपीदानींतनेभ्यः पुस्तकेभ्यः पाठिभिः पठ्यमानात् पाठाच्च विरुध्यते, तथापि त्रिमात्रध्यानेपि' 'अमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत स तेजसि परे सम्पन्नो यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्त' इत्येतावतो ग्रन्थस्य 'स एतस्माज्जीवधनात् परात् परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षत' इति ग्रन्थस्यानिमश्लोकद्वयस्य च वर्तमानत्वेन शब्दब्रह्म अपरं मृत्युमन्मात्राप्रतिपाद्यं वापरं जीवघनरूपो यो हिरण्यगर्भः क्षरः पुरुषस्तस्मात् परमक्षरं ब्रह्म । परं ततोपि यः परः पुरिशयोन्तर्यामी उक्तः, श्लो- केपि 'तमो गरेणैवायनेनान्वेति विद्वान् यत्तच न्तिमजरममृतमभयं परं परायणं चे' त्युक्तः स एव पर इति सिध्यति । तथा चात्र परायणे चेति चकारादक्षरात् परः पुरुषोपि परं परायणं यस्येति योगादक्षरधामवासी बोधितः । तेन मुण्डकवदेवात्राप्यर्थः । अपरं तु ब्रह्म वेदात्मकम् , हिरण्यगर्भस्य शब्दब्रह्मात्मकत्वात् ।xxx मुण्डके 'यथोर्ण- नाभिः सृजते गृह्णते चेत्यादिना अक्षरात् सृष्टिमुपक्रम्य 'तस्मादेतद् ब्र नामरूपमन्नं च जायते तदेतत्सत्य मिति निगमनात् । तदेतद् ऋषिः पश्यन् वामदेवः प्रतिपेद' इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्ताऽबाधितब्रह्मवित्प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात् । व्यावहारिको नामरूपप्रपञ्चः, खो- स्कृ सत्ताकतत्प्रपञ्चपूर्वकः, मायिकप्रपञ्चत्वादिन्द्रजालिकादिप्रपञ्चवदित्यत्र साध्यविशे- णत्वेनानुमितिविषयत्वा । अतो नामरूपादीनामपि न सर्वेषामाविद्यकत्वमिति सि- ध्यति । एवं सति 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः', 'अयमात्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यस ल्प' इत्यादिषु शाण्डिल्यदहर- भूमविद्याप्रभृतिवाक्येष्वपहतपाप्मसत्यकामादिशब्दैस्तत्तद्विशेषणविशिौं यदुपासनायोप- दिश्यते, तस्याविद्या तनामरूपविशेष विशि त्वं कुतोऽवधारितं येन तस्यापरब्रह्मत्वमु- च्यते । न तावदुपासनाविषयत्वात् । उपासनाविषये तथात्वनियमस्य वाप्यसिद्धत्वेन माणशून्यत्वात् । न च 'यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतं तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते' इत्यादितलवकारश्रुतेरिति युक्तम् । तत्र तथार्थाभावात् । नेदमित्यनेन मनोवागादिनिषेधोत्तरं 'इदं ब्रह्म विद्धि यदुपासते' इत्यर्थात् । अन्यथा, द्वितीयेद- कार योगवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादित्येवं प्रागेवोपपादितत्वात् । तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि' ति वि-