·FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, 1908. CHAPTER 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE JOHJIANDS AND THEIR COUNTRY. AT T the present day the Mohmands are primarily divided into two main branches,viz.:-The Independent Mohmands, who live across the Administrative border ; and those dwelling in and around Matanni and in the south-western corner of the Peshawar district. Mohmands of the Peshawar district have, however, long lost touch with those of the hills, and were in no way connected with the outbreak in the spring of 1908. The trans-border Mohmands may be considered as being subdivided into the following eight clans :-Baezai, Khwaizai, Tarakzai, Halimzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai, Isa Khel and Burhan Khel.* Of these the last six, known as the assured clans—together with the lusa Khel section of the Baezaimarc in receipt of allowances from the British Government, granted in lieu of those which, prior to the Durand agreement, certain of them had received from the Imirs of Kabul. The Baczai and Khwaizai clans receive no British allowances, and consider themselves subject to Afghan authority alone. They rc. sido largely on the Afghan side of the Durand line, which las, however, never yet been demarcated in Molmand territory and is still a subject of dispute. The total fighting strength of the Hohmands tas estimated in 1907 at 21,500 men with about 1,830 breech-loading rifles. Of the above about 11,000 meu and 750 rifles belong to the lighau clans. Since then many more breech-loaders are known to hare passed into the country:~$ result of the successful smuggling of firearms from Masqat in the Persian Gulf into Baluchistan, and thence to Strictly speaking this lia Klict and Barlina Khel aro Iranches cf tho Tarai zsich, but the base loogaco Lroken ausy from the latter and out furra dicct clas Ly tlicuscives B ·2 OPERATIONS JGAINST THE JOUVAXDS, 1908. Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier. Naturally, however, this estimate gives us no true idea of what strength the Molimands could actually put in the field. This can best he calculated from the numbers opposed to us in the actions at Matta and Shabkadar on the 24th April 1908, which were approximately as follows:- Den. Musa Khel Baezai 1,000 Koda Khel Baezai 120 Other Baczai 5,000 Rhwaizai 300 Kamali Halimzai 500 Dawezai 400 Utmanzai 300 Other Mohmands. 1,000 TOTAL 8,620 In addition to these the Mohmand lashkar was swelled by Men. Utman Khel of Ambahar 1,000 Ningraharis 3,000 Kandahari Safis 2,000 Alen from Kunar. 3,000 TOTAL 9,000 Dohmand country proper--i.e., omitting the affiliated clans of Shilmanis and Mullagoris, who live on the right bank of the Kabul river, and whose interests are entirely distinct from those of other Dlobmands--is bounded, roughly, on the north by the Ambahar valley and Utman Khel country, on the east by the Swat river and Utman Khe country, on the south-east by the administrative border of the Peshawar district, and on the south by the Kabul river; to tlic west it extends up to about the longitude of the Kunar river in Afghanistan, and there are also some large Nohmand villages south of the Kabul river in Ningrahar, The country (on our side of the Durand line) thus enclosed is, sith a few exceptions, exceedingly wild, rugged and desolate. The bills almost throughout are practically waterless, except, of course, during the autumn and winter rains, and the inbabitants depend ·DESCRIPTIO,Y OF TIIB JOHLAYDS AND THEIR COUNTRY. 3 largely for their water supply on artificial tanks, which catch and store rainwater and surface drainage. That the soil is fertile, however, and only needs a sufficient rainfall to produce excellent crops, is evident from the fact that the expeditinnary force of 1908 found large areas covered with standing wheat and barley. The principal valley in the country is the Bohai Dag, known in its lower portion as the Danish Kol. This valley runs roughly cast and west right across the Mohmand country, from the Silala Sar to the Swat river, which it joins about 13 miles above Abazai, and has a total length of 40 miles and an elevation varying from 3,000 to 1,500 feet. The upper part of the valley is broad and open, but for the last ten miles of its course the hills close in, and the valley becomes a narrow rocky gorge. No water was found in the bed of the nala much abovc Nulla Kalai, about 6 miles from its junction with the Swat, either in the expedition of 1897 or in 1908. In its upper portion thc Bohai Dag is inhabited by the Baezai and Khwaizai clans, lower down by the Halimzai and Isa Khel. About 7 miles above its junction with the Swat river, the Rchai Dag, or Danish Kol as it is here called, is joined by the Ynklı Dand Nala. This valley riscs to the north of the Bedmanni Pass under tho name of the Mita1 Nala, and flows south and then cist to join the Danisk Kol. No water was found flowing above this junction either in the expedition of 1897 or that of 1908. At its head it is inhabited by the Vusal Khel section of the Baezzi, and near its junction with the Danish Kol by the Halimzai and Utmanzai, while between tho two, in a very open portion of the valley, dwell the vassal clan of Safis. Bordering the territories of the Kandahari Safis on the north-cast and thic Utuianzai on the north, lic the Sarlara liills. At the foot of the northern slopes of this ringe flows tlic Pipal Xala-almost clue west to cast. In the upper portion of this valley live the Gurbaz Safis, and lower down the Dawezai. Running water appears in the large watercourse of the Pipal a short distance above its junction with the imbaliar stream, which ineets it flowing roughly north to south. The valley of the Ambalar bounds Johmand country on tho cast to its junction with the Danish Kol, shortly before that streain ·4 OPERATIONS AG.17XST THE JOHJANDS, 1903. itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Mohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, 'in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans--the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water.

·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS FITH JOLYANDS SUBSEQUEYT TO THE EXPEDITION OF 1897. . For some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, liad been in receipt of an allowance from the Ainir. Tlus had naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel muliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an alonance to tho code to their request. At the same time Nusa Khel Baezai of the Mitai the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to valley. relinquish his claim of suzerainty over the valley, which liad previously fornied part of the old Nawayai Khanate. This event was quickly scized upon by the mullas, most prominent of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Mohmands. Ill who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Faurtical preaching by mud with, tlic British werc denounced as lese, against those in rcccipt of 'Kafirs'; and the preaching of these men had such effect on thic Jitai Jus Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Their ex.simple was followed by the Dawezii, Utmanzıi, und Pandiali lohmands, and of all the assured clans 'the Halimzii and Tırakzai alone sarcıl to come regularly to Peshawar to receive their allowances. (3) allowances.

·4 OPERATIONS AGAINST THD NOHJANDS, 1903. itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Mohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes froin a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water.

·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS NYITH JOUJILVDS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXPEDITION OF 1897. For some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1807, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribc till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in ieceipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1803 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the lusa Khel Baezai, who inliabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This had naturally been witlıheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel maliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allowance to the cede to their request. At the same time Musa Khel Baezai of the Mital the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to valley, relinquish lis claim of suzerainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Nawagai Khanate, This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most promi. ncut of whom at the time were the Sufi Salib of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the volmands. Ill who were in reccipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Fanatical preaching by mulo with, the British were denounced as las, against thoso in receipt of 'Kafirs'; and the preaching of these men allowaneca had such cffect on the Mitai Musa Khel, that they did not come in to Pesliawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Their example was followed by the Dawezai, Utmanzıi, und Pandiali Jolmands, and of all the assured clans 'the lIalimzii und Tucakzai alonc dired to come regularly to Peshawar to receive their allowances.

·4 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHJANDS, 1903. itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Blohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water. 1 ·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS JITII JOHJANDS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXPEDITION OF 1897. I'on some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Blitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This had naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel muliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justicc of their claim was cvident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allowance to the cede to their request. At the same time Musa Khel Baezai of the Mito the Nawab of Navagai was induced to alloy relinquish his claim of suzerainty over the valley, which liad previously formed part of the old Nawagai Klanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most promu. ncut of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Volimands. lll who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Fanatical prenclung by mul with, the British were denounced as lite, ag unst those in receipt of 'Kafirs'; and the prcaching of these men had such effect on the Jitai Juss Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Tieir example was followed by the Drezzi, Utmanzii, wnd landiali Mohmands, and of all the assured clans 'the Halimzii and Turakzai alone darcil to come regularly to Peshawar to receive t their allowances. allunances.

·4 OPERATIONS AGAINST TUD MOHJANDS, 1903. itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Mohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway between the Sivat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lic the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but thc inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burlian Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water. 1 ·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS WITN JOHJANDS SUBSEQUEYT TO THE EIPEDITION OF 1897. Tor some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Hohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Khel Baezni, who inhabit the valley, liad been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This had naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel muliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in licu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allowance to the cede to their request. At the same time Musa Khel Baeza of the Mitai the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to valloy. relinquish his claim of suzerainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Nawagai Khanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most prominent of whom at the time were the Sufi Salub of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Jolimauds. All who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealingy Fanatical prcaclung by muda with, the British were denounced us lur, against thoso in receipt of Kafirs'; and the prcacluny of these men had such effect on thc Mitui Jusa Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Their example was followed by the Dawezai, Ctmanzsi, and Pandialı Jolimands, and of all the assured clins'the Halimzii ind Tarakzai alone dared to come regularly to Peshawar to receiic their allowances, (3) allowances, ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOUJIANDS, 1903 itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Mohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Alidway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, 'in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Sbabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Sırat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water. 1 ·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS WITH JOHJIAYDS SUBSEQUEYT TO THE EXPEDITIOY OF 1897. For some years after the severe punishment metel out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those alrcady receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley liad been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir, This had naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and thic Musa Khel maliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac. Grant of an allowanco to tho cede to their request, At the same time Musa Khel Baczai of tho Mitai the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to valley. relinquish his claim of suzcrainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Nawagan Khanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most promi. nent of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Mohands. 111 who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Fanatical preachung by mud with, the British were clenounced is lus, ngainst thoso ia roccipt of 'Kafirs'; and the preaching of these men allowances. luad such effect on the Viti Mus.. Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Their exsinple was followed by the Dawcz.si, Itnanzıi, wod Pandiali Johmands, and of all the assured clans 'the Halimzzi and T..rakzai alone daral to come regularly to Peshawar to receive their allowances, (5)

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·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS FITH JOIJ AV DS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXPEDITION OF 1897. For some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Kliel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This liad naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the usa Khel muliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allowance to the cede to their request. At the same timo Musa Kihel Baczai of the Mital the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to Valley. relinquish lus claim of suzerainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Nawagai Khanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most promineut of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulvi Sahib of Kama, is an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Holmands. .III who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Fanatical preachung by mud with, the British here cenounced as fus, against those in receipt of 'Kafirs'; and the preaching of these men allowances, had such clicct on the Jitai Jusa Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Their exainple was followed by the Datezal, Ctnuanzai, and Pandiali Holmands, and of all the assured clans 'the Halimzii and Tarakzai alone dareil to come regularly to Peshawar to receive their allowances, (j) ·OPDR.1TIONS AGAINST THE MOMJANDS, 1903. itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Dohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valloy, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water.

·CHAPTER II. DEALINGS WITH JOHJANDS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXPEDITIO OF 1897. For some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in zeceipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the In Government. Prior to this treaty the Musa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This had naturally been withheld since tlic transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel malıhs now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allonanco to the code to their request. It the same time Musa Khel Baczaı of tho Mital the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to valley. relinquish his claim of suzcrainty over the valley, which liad previously formed part of the old Nawagai Klanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the nullas, most promu. nent of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulvi Salib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Volimands. All who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Fanatical preaching by muda with, the British were denounced as in 8. against iloso in reecipt of 'Kafirs'; and the preaching of these men had such effect on the Jitu Jusu Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances so recently granted. Their example was followed by the Dawezii, l'tmanzai, uod Pandiali Mohmands, and of all the assured clans 'the Lalinzii nd Tarakzai alone dared to come regularly to Peshwar to receive their allowances, allowances, ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHJANDS, 1903. itself joins the Sirat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the Mohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway between the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Sbabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 feet. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centre of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from 1 depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as afford. ing a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans——the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water.

·CHAPTER II. DELINGS WITH JOHJIAYDS SUBSEQUENT TO TIE EXPEDITION OP 1897. - For some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the Mohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that year, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Mitai valley had been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty thc Musa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This had naturally been withheld since tlic transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel maliks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which thcy had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allonanco to the cede to their request. At the same time Musa Khel Baczai of tho Mtai the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to valley. relinquish his claim of suzcrainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Now.gai Khanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most promi. nent of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Maulyi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Holmands. All wlio were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings Fanatical preaching by mula with, the British were denounced as lar, ngriast those in receipt of 'Kafirs' ; and the preaching of these men allowances. had such effect on the Jitai Jſusa Khel, that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allow.inces so recently granted. Their example was followed by the Dutczii, titmanzii, und Pandiali Mohmands, and of all the assured clans 'the lIalimz.i.nd Tarakzai alone darcıl to come regularly to Peshawar to receive their allowances, ·4 OPERATIONS IG.INST TAL NOU.VANDS, 1903. itself joins the Swat river. It is extremely fertile ; running water is plentiful below the junction of the Pipal Nala, and large tracts are under irrigation. The inhabitants are Utman Khel who received their punishment with the llohmands for the part they took in the disturbances necessitating the despatch of the expedition of 1908. Midway bettyeen the Swat and Kabul rivers, and roughly parallel to both, runs the Gandao Valley, in which lie the principal settlements of the Halimzai. Its length from its head to the point where it enters British territory north-west of Shabkadar is about 16 miles, but the inhabited portion of the valley is confined to a stretch of about 5 miles above the Karappa Pass with an average elevation of 2,500 fect. Here both banks are thickly studded with villages, which obtain excellent crops by irrigation. Water does not appear on the surface of the nala-bed above Durba Khel, near the centro of this inhabited stretch, but above this point there are numerous Persian wells by which water is raised for irrigation purposes from a depth of 30 or 40 feet. Between the Gandao and the Swat river lies the Pandiali valley, a small tributary of the Swat. It is mainly of importance as affording a route to the Danish Kol, for the valley is narrow and rugged and inhabited by two unimportant clans—the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel. It contains, however, a good stream of running water. 1 ·CHAPTER II. DE.ILINGS IVITA JIOHJANDS SUBSEQUEYT TO TID EXPEDITIOY OF 1897. For some years after the severe punishment meted out to them in 1897, the liohmands remained quiet and our dealings with the tribe till the year 1902 were of no importance. In that ycar, another section was added to those already in receipt of allowances. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 the control of the Dlitai valley liad been allotted to the Indian Government. Prior to this treaty the Jusa Khel Baezai, who inhabit the valley, had been in receipt of an allowance from the Amir. This lad naturally been withheld since the transfer of territory had taken place, and the Musa Khel mulıks now petitioned the Indian Government for a grant in lieu of that which they had formerly received from Kabul. The justice of their claim was evident and the Indian Government accordingly decided to ac- Grant of an allowance to tho cede to their request. At the same time Vusa Khel Baezai of the Mitar the Nawab of Nawagai was induced to allcy. relinquishi his claim of suzerainty over the valley, which had previously formed part of the old Nawagai Khanate. This event was quickly seized upon by the mullas, most promi. nent of whom at the time were the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the Jaulvi Sahib of Kama, as an opportunity to play on the fanatical feelings of the Wolmands. Ill who were in receipt of allowances from, or had any dealings with, the British were denounced Fanatical preaching by mula tas, against thoso in receipt of 'Kafirs’; and the preaching of these mes had such effect on the Miti Vusa Khe! that they did not come in to Peshawar to claim the allowances a recently granted. Their example was followed by the Dawcz, Utmanzai, Panduali olmands, and of all the assured clans 'the Halimzzi- Tırakzai alonc dared to come regularly to Peshawar to receire allowances. (5) as allowances.

·OPERITIOYS 1GAINST THE 101.7.1.VDS, 1903 6 Shulman About this time also further ill-feeling was occasioned by the preparations for the construction of a railway through Shilman, Signs of unrest caused by the The Baezai and Khwaizai especially beconstruction of a railway through gan to show their hostility to the scheme, and threatened the villages of Smatzai and Shinpokh ou the right bank of the river, because they remained friendly to the British and were willing to assist in the work. In April 1903, a party of Afgban lohmands, many of whom were First outrage on Smatzai. kha sadars, actually crossed the river. filled up some wells in the villages and sl'cceeded in impeding irrigation, thereby doing much damage to the crops. The majority of the raiders appear to have been Morcha Khel Baczai. The Indian Government at oncc represented to the Amir the necessity for the demarcation of the frontier in this region, in order Proposals for a Boundary to put an end to outrages of this kind. A Commiss107 accepted by the Boundary Commission was asked for and Amir to this the Amir gave his consent. Accordi..gli: British Commissioner was nominated, Major Roog-Keppel, C.I.F., Political Agent in the Klaibar, being the officer selected, and on the 19th Deceniber 1903, the Amir was informed of the appointment and will further told that Jajor Roos-Keppel would be ready to meet the Afghan Commissioner at the Nawa Kotal on tlıc Ist February Monnichiile the Amir expressed a wish for the delimitation of the entire stretch of frontier from the Nawa Kotal to Paiwar Kotal. He also siowed that he intended to put forward again his father's claim to the whole of the Bohai Dag, without making any corresponding concessions in the Kabul river region. It soon became evident, however, from his continued failure to appoint a Comunissioner, and from the way in which he persistently delsyed nutters by verbal quibbles, that what he really clesired was the indefinite postponement of any demarcation whatever. Accordingly as, by the 1st April 1901, he had nominated Postymnement of ldia Com. no Afghan official to meet Jajor Roog. Keppel, who had not been waiting for mun.

·DEALINGS T|I MOUN ANDS, CTC. 7 Occur. two whole months with all necessary transport in readiness, he was informed that owing to the lateness of the season the matter would have to be deferred till the following autumn. Till May 1905 nothing further happened, but in that month a second outrage was committed at Smatzai. Second incident at Smatzai. Thc Sarhang of Dakka, Muhammad Husain Khan, demanded the return of some wood which had floated down to Smatzai from the boat-bridge at Lalpura, recently broken in a flood. The villagers refused, saying that without an order from the Political Agent in the Khaibar they would not give up what they considered theirs by ancient custom. Thereupon the Sarhang, incensed at the obstinacy of the villagers, decided to seize the wocd by a display of force sufficient in his estimation to overate the villagers, though without apparently desiring that any armed collision should With this object in view he despatched 120 khasudars from Kam Dakka to Smatzni, followed by 180 more from Lalpura. A third and smaller party of kha sadars, mostly Morcha Khel Baezai, though ostensibly acting against thc Sarlang's orders, crossed the river on rafts and male a sudden and unexpected attack on the village, opening fire at close range. During the diversion thus caused the larger party of klasadars floated off the wood. On receipt of news of thus incident the Indian Government protested to thc Amir against the conduct of Muhammad Husain Khan, the Viceroy suggesting that this disturber of the peace slould be removed from his post of Saihang of Dakka. The Amir emphatically declined to call the Sarhang to account, and even forwarded and endorsed a decidedly impertinent letter from Muhammad Husain Khan laying claim to Smatza as biglan territory. The Indian Government then sent a further communication, in which it was pointed out that the demarcation of the boundary in that part of the frontier was a matter of urgent neressity, und that Rencne proposals consequently the Indian Government were Boundary Commission. prepared to arrange for a Boundary Com. mission to take place in the autumn. It the simo time the Amir was informed that his claim to Smatzai could not possibly be entertained. Nothing, however, came of this renewed proposal. for a ·8 OPERATIONS 16.11NST THE JOH.VANDS, 1908. the raid. into distnct. Throughout this period of unrest the Tarakzai clan remained steadfastly loyal to Government, and even made it clear that they were quite prepared to defend the Shilman railway throughout its length within their own clan boundaries. Accordingly, in December 1905, an agreement was entered into Grant of an additional al with them, by which, in consideration of lowance to the Tarakzai for the an additional allowance of Rs. 5,000 per protection of the railway, etc. annum, the tribe undertook full responsibility for the protection of the railway and all works concerned, also of the river itself if used for transport, etc., from Warsak up to the extrepic limit of Tarakzai territory. The Halimzai agreed to assist the Tarakzai in performing this duty and also undertook the same responsibility as the Tarakzai, with regard to any portion of the railway which might at any future date be carried through their limits. In spite, however, of the attitude of the Tarakzai and Halimzai, Commencement of a series of disaffection continued to increase, and the Sbabkadar Utman Khel of Ambahar werc also in. fected. In 1906 a series of raids into the Peshawar district about Shabkadar commenced, the moving spirits being the Koda Khel Baezai, under Jahasil, and the Ambalar Utman Kliel under Blir Baz, of Gunbatai, and Hakim Khan. The first serious violation of British territory took place on the 21st Inrch 1900, when a gang consisting mainly of Afghan Johmands, assisted by outlaws from Ilazar- Raid on Jogiai, 21st March nao in Ningrahar, raided the village of Jogini, near Michni. In this raid some Tarakzai were also implicated, but the maliks of the clan acted fully up to their responsibility and handed over the ofienders to the civil authorities in Peshawar for trial. A second and more serious raid occurred on thc 9th April. The village of Tangi, near Abazni, was attacked, four British subjects killed, Raid oa Tangi, 9th .pril 1000 the chicf constable wounded and property valued at Rs. 30,000 carried off by the gang, which appears on this occasion to have been composed mainly of Koda Khel Baczai and Imbiliar Utman Khel, The success of these raius caused a considerable panic amongst the large llindu population of Shankargarh and its neighbourhood 1.

·DEALINGS WITH VOIVANDS, ETC. 9 and a rumour gained currency among them that a hostile lashkar was gathering across the border. To allay their anxiety, and to prevent any further violation of Despatch of cavalry to Shan. British territory, a Squadron Guides Caval. kargarh and Abazai. ry and a Squadron 21st Cavalry F. F. werc sent to the Forts at Abazai and Shankargarh, icspectively. The cavalry on their arrival soon discovered that the Tangi affair had been notling more than an ordinary frontier raid, and that there was no truth in the rumour of a hostile gathering. Accordingly, as there seemed to be no necessity to keep the cavalry tlıcre, they were withdrawn, but from that me it has been considered advisable to garrison Shankargarh and Abazai with small detachments of regular troops. The result of these measures was that throughout the remainder of 1906 and the whole of 1907, only one small raid on the village of Hasanzai nenr Shabkadar was committed. Stopped in one direction, the Hohmands still found it possible to give vent to their hostile feelings in the Kabul river region. In Captain Lubbock, R E., fired January 1907 Captain Lubbock, R.E., in on on the Kabul rncr, January charge of the construction of the Shilman railway, was fired upon while moving down the river in a boat. Later, in November of the same year, on the arri. val near Smatzai of a survey party to decide on the merits of the two alternative routes for the railway, through Third Smatzai incident. Loc Shilman valley or along the Kabul river to Smatzai, a party of somc 200 Koda Khel Baczai and Khwaizai collected on the left bank of the river. The camp of Jr. Johns, conducting the survey, was fired on at Bar Ugda, and the villages of Smatzai and Shinpokli were sub. jected to constant sniping from the left bank of the river. This small lashkar took up a sangre position along the left bank, is for down as Palosi, thus efíectually preventing any detailed examination of the right bank in that direction. Mr. Johns succeeded, however, in effecting all that he considered necessary, and on the 1st December the party withdrer. On their departure the lashhur returned to their homes. During the period in which they had been in position on the bank of the 1007.

·10 OPERATIONS 4G.17X'ST THE JONVAYDS, .373. river these Johmands liad been supplied with provisions by the Hakim of Lalpura, who for a long time past had been very hostile to the British. The new Sarhang of Dakka, however, acting contrary, to the procedure of his father Juhammad Husain Khan, who had died in February 1907, seems to have been averso to the wholo affair.

·1 CHAPTER III. BEHAVIOUR OF THE JOH JANDS DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO TILE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION IN 1906 and 1907 many raids were made into the Peshawar and Kohat districts by the Zakka Khel Afridis. During the first few wecks of 1908, the situation became so • Expedition against Zakka serious that Government sanctioned a Khel. punitive expedition into the Bazar valleythe principal winter home of the Zakka Khel. On the advance of this force into Bazar in February, several fanatical mullas attempted to raise help for the Zakka Khel, and signs of unrest were apparent among most of the tribes living north of the Kabul river, more especially amongst the Molmands, the majority of whom were already in a state of discontent through the construction of the Shilman railway. When some cmissaries from the Zakka Khel actually made their appearance in the Mohmand country they fountl many of the young Gathering of a Mohmand bloods willing to assist them, and a small lashhur. lushkar quickly collected under the fanntical Gud Mulla of Inzari. By tlus time, however, the resistance of the Zakka Khel was weakening, and before the Mohmand lashkar had decided whether to move into Bazar itself, or crcate a diversion by an attack on Shankargarh, the Zakka Khel accepted the terms imposed on them. Tliere was, therefore, no further opportunity for the Hohmands to eliect anything on their behalf and the majorty of the lashkar Dispersal of lashlar on close returned to their livmes, laving accomof operatwns in Dizar valley plished nothing but a paltry rud on the village of Batagram near Shankargarh, on the 3rd Jarch. Immediately on receipt of news of this rising amongst the Joh. mands, in which the strength of the lashhur was much exaggerated, Desguatch of cavalry to the two Squadrons 21st Cavalry were undered to proceed from Youslera Cusalry Cune tomment to the Mohmand border. They reached Shabkadar on the ith Jarch, a few days before the dispersal of the lashlur, but us, oluand under ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHVANDS, 335. 10 river these Mohmands had been supplied with provisions by the Hakim of Lalpura, who for a long time past had been very hostile to the British. The new Sarhang of Dakka, however, acting contrary, to the procedure of his father Muhammad Husain Khan, who had died in February 1907, seems to have been averse to the whole affair.

·- CHAPTER III. BEILAVIOUR OP TIL JIONIANDS DURING AND SUBSCQUE.VT TO THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION lashkar. IN 1906 and 1907 many raids were made into the Peshawar and Kohat districts by the Zakka Khel Afridis. During the first few wecks of 1908, the situation became so • Expedition against Zakha serious that Government sanctioned a Khel. punitive expedition into the Bazar valleythe principal winter home of the Zakka Khel. On the advance of this force into Bazar in February, several fanatical mullas attempted to raise help for the Zakka Khel, and signs of unrest were apparent among most of the tribes living north of the Kabul river, more especially amongst the Mohmands, thic majority of whom were already in a state of discontent through the construction of the Shulman railway. When some enussaries from the Zakka Khel actually made their appearance in the Mohinand country they fountl many of the young Gatliering of a Mohmand bloods willing to assist them, and a small lashkar quickly collected under the fanatical Gud Mulla of Inzari. By this time, however, the resistance of the Zakka Khel was weakening, and before the Johmand lushhar had decided whether to move into Bazar itself, or create a diversion by an attack on Shankargarh, the Zakka Khcl accepted the terins imposed on them. There was, therefore, no further opportunity for the Johmands to effect anything on their behalf and the majority of thic Inshlar Dincrsal of lashlar on close returned to their liomes, lasing accomof operatwns in Bazar salles plished nothing but it paltry raid on the village of Batagram near Shankargarh, on the 3rd March. Immediately on receipt of news of this rising anongst the Molquands, in which the strength of the lushkur was much exaggerated, Despatlı of Casalry to the two Squadrons 21st Cavalry were onlered Tohmand bonkr. to proceed from Yowslien Cuvalry Cun. tonment to the Johmand border. They reached Shabkad.r on the 4th March, a few days before the dispersal of the lushlur, but 35, ·12 OPERATIONS AGAINST THD 10HJANDS, 1908. of 1908. shortly after their arrival, the crisis seemed to have passed away they were soon withdrawn. In reality, however, trouble was by no means at an end. When the majority of the gathering had gone to their homes, a few wild spicits, disappointed of fighting and unwilling to return to their villages without having accomplished anything, had hung together under the leadership of Jahasil, Mir Baz and Hakım Khan. This gang took the departure of the cavalry as the signal for the commencement of a series of raids into the Doaba, i.e., the tract of land lying between the Swat and Kabul rivers. Three times in quick succession they plundered the Hindu shops of villages near Shabkadar. The first violation of British territory Raids by llohmands in spring occurred on the 24th March, when Marozai, a village six miles north-east of Shankargarh, was attacked, two Hindus killed and a large quantity of property carried off. One day later the village of Mirzadher, two miles from Marozai, suffered the same fate, and this time a bania was carried off. This dacoity was not, however, an unqualified success, for on their return journey the gang were unexpectedly attacked by an Isa Khel Malik, Ghulam Khan of Dag, who has always been friendly to Government. A fight ensued in which the raiders were worsted and had to make a hurried retreat, leaving one of their number, i Koda Khel, and the Hindu in the hands of Ghulam Khan, who sent them in to the Deputy Commissioner a few days later under an escort. This check did not stop the raiding, however, for on the 30th March, less than a week later, the gang carried out their third serious outrage. The Hindu shops in Chikkar, a village nine miles southeast of Shabkadar, were robbed, and the raiders made good their escape with the booty, These rapid and successful movements naturally caused a panic amongst the Hindus of the district, who were invariably selected as the victims. Accordingly the regular garrisons of the posts at Shabkadar and Increase of troops on Abazai were strengthened, with & view to setting free the Border Military Police for patrolling. By the 1st April the the border, ·BEHAVIOUR OF THE MOIN AYDS, ETC. 13 + troops on the border had been reinforced and were disposed as follows :- Cavalry. Infantry. Shabkıdar 30 1.50 Matta Mughal Khel 120 150 Abazai 30 150 The police were also strengthened by the despatch of 100 Border Military Police and 40 District Police from Peshawar, and the com. mand of the entire force, which was further reinforced on the 4th by 80 Scouts Royal Warwickshire Regiment, was given to Lieutenant-Colonel V. B. Fane, 21st Cavalry F. F. When the increase of troops became known to the tribesmen across the border an expedition seemed to them the object in view. The Koda Khel and Ambahar Utman Khel, who had furnished the majority of the raiders, at once sounded their neighbours for help should a British force enter their territories. Mahasil, the Kodit Khel leader, first appealed to the Musa Khel of Mitai, but owing to the influence of Ghairat Khan, a malik friendly to Government, he received only very lukewarm promises of support. Vir Baz, Utman Khel, had mean while been trying to raise a lashkar in 1mbahar and the surrounding country, with which to attack Ghulam Khan for his action after the Mirzadher raid. In this he had met with little success, and both lie and Maliasil made a further appeal, this time to the Afghan mullas. Their success this occasion was immediate. The two notorious mullas, Gathering of a lashlar the Sufi Sahib of Batikot and the IIazrat Sahib of Butkhak, both championed their cause, and raised the cry jchad' in Ningradar, at the same time proclaiming Ghulam Khan an infidel. Tribesmen began at once to flock to their standards and in a few days a regular stream of men, amongst whom were many Afghan Wasadars, began to pour into the Bohai Dag and Kamali from Afghau territory. On the 12th April the lIazrat Sahib himself arrived in Koda Khel and the Sufi Sahib's son appaired to represent his father, who was ill. llero they were joined by the famous Shakar of Ilazimao with a considerable following, wlule Jashasil, who had been on the paying the fine imposed on the Kod Khel for their share in the recent raids, again plucked up courige and joined the rapidly increasing lashkar. point of ·14 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VOHLANDS, 1908. By the 17th April the gathering had assumed such large proportions that a reinforcement of one squadron cavalry, 2 guns, and 550 infantry was sent out to Lieutenant-Colonel Fane, and General Sir James Willcocks himself left Peshawar to arrange the disposal of the force. The fort at Michni was taken over by a garrison of 50 cavalry and 100 infantry from the Border Military Police, and a post was established at "Garhi Sadar, between Matta and Abazai, Meanwhile the lashkar had commenced to move in the direction of British territory, and on the 17th was in the Kandahari valley. On the 18th the main body was in Kamali, and here the Hazrat Sahih announced his intention to destroy Ghulam Khan's village on the following day. On the 19th April their advance was continued by two routes, one column, to which was assigned the destruction of Dag, moving down the Pandiali-valley, and the other, under the Hazrat Salub, by the Gandao valley. As previously arranged, the Pandiali column, with which were the Gud Mulla, Shakar, Destruction of Ghulam Khan's village, Dag. Mahasil, and Mir Boz, burnt Dag on the igth, and then marched to the foot of the Burjina Pass, where they bivouacked for the night. On the gathering of the lashkar Ghulam Khan had tried to win over the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel to his cause, but these two clans refused to assist him against such enormous odde. He then sent his brother to ask for the assistance of troops, but it was considered impolitic to help him, and he accordingly decided on flight. He delayed rather long, however, and it was only with difficulty that he escaped at the last moment with his family to Abazai. Here he was offered a portion of the fort for the accommodation of his family and followers, but owing to some disagreement about the necessary space he decided to stay in a village close by. In the evening of the same day a patrol within our border, West of Dlatta, was fired on by the advanced British patrol fired on. guard of the Pandiali Column, and later a desultory long-range fue was opened on the post at Matti. Ners was then received that an attack on Garhi Sadar during the night was contemplated. As the garrisons in both Garhi Sadar and platta were weak, Lieutenant-Colonel Fave decided to

·BEHAVIOUR OF THE VOIXANDS, ETC.
15
withdraw the troops in Garhi Sadar to Matta, and orders were
issued to that effect, but owing to various causes the movement
could not be immediately carried out, and darkness came on
while the party were still on the way. When about one mile from
Matta a hot fire was opened on them from both sides of the road,
and they had to fight the remainder of the way in, suffering the
following casualties :-
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment
I Private killed.
28th Punjabis
1 Sepoy woundcd.
19th Lancers
i Syce wounded.
After the arrival of the party at Matta the enemy drew off, and
contented themselves with firing a few shots during the remainder
of the night into Matta Camp.

·CHAPTER IV. EVENTS DURING THE LATTER PART OF APRIL 1908 mores to Shabkadar with rein. forcernents from Peshawar. THE daring incursion into British territory and the attack on British troops, mentioned in the last chapter, clearly showed that the Mohmands were not content with the destruction of Ghulam Khan's village, but were spoiling for a fight. The situation was decidedly serious as the troops then on the frontier were totally inadequate to prevent so large a lashkar from raiding the villages within the border. Moreover, Lieutenant- Colonel Fane's command consisted of a collection of small detachments from different corps, and consequently lacked the strength of a force, equal in number, but composod of complete units. Sir James Willcocks therefore decided to send out reinforcements and gave orders for a force composed Brigadier General Anderson of 2 guns and 1,300 infantry under Brigadier-General Anderson to move out from Peshawar on the 20th April. There was great delay in starting, however, and it was not till 10-40 A.M. that the advance guard left Peshawar ; consequently the troops had to carry out the long march of 18 miles to Shabkadar under a burning sun, and suffered considerably. In the meanwhile orders were issued for the move of a force composed of s guns and 1,300 infantry to Peshawar from Nowshera, and for the 21st Cavalry to march direct from Nowshera Cavalry Cantonment to Shabkadar, viâ Charsada. Fortunately, while these moves were being carried out the Mohmands, who were also awaiting reinforcements, remained comparatively inactive. With the exception of some firing at Matta on the night of 20th April, nothing further occurred till s 4.21. on the 21st, when a party of Mohmands opened fire on a cavalry standing patrol, 800 yards west of Jfatta. This patrol had been ordered to avoid a collision if possible, and accordingly withdrew, but General Willcocks who was in Matta at the time ordered the Field guns to disperse the enemy. Three shells were fired, which had the ( 16 ) ·EVENT'S DURING THE LATTER PART OF APRIL 1908. 17 desired effect, and no further aggressive movements took place during the day. On his arrival the previous evening Brigadier-General Anderson had taken over the command of all the troops on the border from Licutenant-Colonel Fane ; he now moved his Headquarters, together with certain of the troops which he had brought out from Peshawar, to Matta, while Sir James Willcocks left Matta to return to Peshawar. Whilst en route to Peshawar General Willcocks intervicwed a number of Halimza; maliks, who had come into Slakkadar. These maliks stated that the Hazrat Sahib and the Sufi Sahib's son were at Ghalanai in the Gandao valley, and that they themselves had been summoned hy the Hazrat Sahib to a general jirga of all the Mohmand clans. They asked permission to attend this zirga, and at the same time declared that withont active support they would be unable to prevent many of their own men from joining the lashkar, much less check its advance. General Willcocks advised then to attend the jirga, and inform the Hazrat Salib that no invasion of Hohmand territory was at present conteinplated, but that ans attack on a British post would meet with immediate reprisals. On their way these maliks vere met and turned back by the advanced party of the lashkar, composed of some 800 to 1,000 Baezai, who had already reached Shahbaz Kor, a village about 1} miles from Shabkadar. On their return they reported that the Hazrat Sahib was considering terms, which he would announce to Government. These were supposed to include such impossible clauses as-- (1) the evacuation of the Jalakand; (2) the surrender of Ghulam Khan and the outlaw who had been given up by him; (3) the imicdiate dispersal of the troops ; and others equally ridiculous, but they never took shape. Reports were also received that vir Sahib Jan Badshah, a wellknown mulla of Islampur in Kunar, had joined the enemy assemblea at the foot of the Burjina Pass. In the counc of the day General Willcocks received instructions from Irmy Headquarters at Siml.ı, in which he was informed by to the composition of the force to be used for offensive operatioris ·18 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, 1908. against the Mohmands, should such a course be decided on by Gov. ernment.* He was also directed to modify as far as possible, the disposition of troops on the border, with a view to facilituting the concentration of the selected force, whilst maintaining a sufficient garrison at Peshawar and complete units for the Malakand Moveable Column. Shortly after dark on the same day the enemy cut the telephone wire between Shabkadar and Matta, carrying off some 400 yards of wire, and later on small parties fired into the posts at Shabkadar and Matta, but without effect. The following morning signs of great activity amongst the enemy were apparent, and bodies of men, varying from 30 to 60 in number, were visible making sangars on the line of foothills, guarding the entrances to the Gandao and Pandıalı valleys. Whilst the majority were thus employed, other small parties kept up an intermittent long-range fire all day on Matta itself, wounding a lavildar 53rd * COMPOSITION OF THE MONNAND FIELD FORCE. 1st Brigade. 1st Northumberland Fusiliers 53rd Sikhs F. F. 57th Rifles F. F. 55th Rifles FF Sections A and B, No. 1 British Field Hospital. No. 101 Native Freld Hospital. 2nd Brigade. 1st Seaforth Highlanders Guidca Infantry 28th Punjabis 55th Riflcs F F. Sections C and D, No. 1 British Feld Hospital, No. 102 Native Field Hospital. 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers 21st Punjabi 22nd Punjabis. 3rd (Reserre) Brigade 40th Pathans. Sections A and B, N. 7 British Field Hospital. NO 112 Native Field Hospital Sections A and B, No. 113 Native Field Hospital. Divisional Troops 21st Cavalry F. F. No 1 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners. No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. G, A. No. 6 Company, Ist Sappers and Slincrs. 23rd Mountain Battery 31th Pioneers. 28th Mountain Battery No. 103 Native Field Hospital.

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·20 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, 1908. and several so badly injured by the wire that they had to be shot.* A few men were hurt by the stampede, but no casualties occurred from the enemy's fire. These were not the only attacks, however, for shortly after the affair at Matta shots were fired into the camp at Shabkadar, and here also the enemy succeeded in drawing our fire. Another party even penetrated into British territory as far as the bridge over the branch of the Kabul river at Hajizai, and attacked the police post there, wounding one sowar of the Border Military Police. The general demeanour of the enemy was now bolder owing to our inaction, and on the 23rd they showed standards at various points on the foothills. They still continued to fire at all patrols near Matta, and in the afternoon a large number were observed moving in the direction of Garhi Sadar with standards. These men quickly dispersed, however, when a few shells were fired at them by the field guns in Matta. Altogether they seemed more inclined to risk a fight, and in fact rumours were afloat that the Hazrat Sahib intended to make a general attack on our whole line on Friday, the 24th April. As further inaction in face of such a fanatical gathering would have in all probability led to very serious trouble along the entire frontier-reports of unrest in Bajaur and attempts to raise rebellion in Upper Swat had already come to hand-General Willcocks decided to forestall any move by the Hazrat Sahib and attack the enemy in position on the following day. With this intention he issued verbal orders for all the available Orders for an attack on the troops to make a simultaneous attack cnemy's position on 24th April. in two columns, shortly after dawn on the 24th April. Brigadier-General Anderson, to whom the command of the right column was assigned, was directed to concentrate at Matta the * Casualties amongst horses on night of 221d-23rd April 19th LCD PETE 8 6 21st Cavaly + 0 Killed by bullets Wounde l by bullets lojured by wire Missing (up to 7 PM. 23rd) 1 12 ·EVENTS DURING THE L.ITTER PART OF APNIL 1908. 21 garrisons of Ahazai, Garhi Sadar, and Matta, and attack the enemy's left flank, which lay on the foothills covering the Burjina Pass. The left column under Colonel Unwin, 21st Cavalry, received orders to move out of Shabkadar at dawn in the direction of Shahbaz Kor, and carry out a reconnaissance in force of the enemy's right flank, which covered the entrance to the Gandao valley. During the night the Mohmands were very active and the posts at Shabkadar, Matta, and Garbi Sadar were again fired into, the last named being vigorously attacked, but only one casualty occurred, one sepoy, 57th Rifles, being killed. Besides these attacks the villages of Batagram, Suriklı, Katozai, and thrce other smaller villages were raided. In accordance with the orders received from General Willcocks Actions of 24th April. on tlic previous day, the two columns moved out to the attack shortly after dawn on the 24th April. The left column, under Colonel Unwin, operating from Shabkadar, Composition of Left Column. advanced to within 2,000 yards of Shahbaz 18th Battery, R. F A Kor, with the cavalry forming the advanced 2 guns, 22nd Mountain Bat. guard, covered by the fire of the 18th i squadron, 21st Cavalry. Battery, R. F. A. Owing to the weakness of 100 Seaforth Highlanders. 100 Royal Warwickshuuro Re. the force, however, General Willcocks had giment. given instructions that an advance into 150—281h Panjabis. tlie hills should on no account bo made. Therefore as the onciny's numbers had been ascertained and the limit of the low foothills had been almost reached, Colonel Unwin gave orders for the retirement to commence about 11-30 1.2. During this movement, which was first covered by the cavalry and later by the Seaforth Highlanders, Lieutenant Gray und one Private, both of the Seaforth Ilighlanders, were severely wounded. This reconnaissance in force, though it could not be pressed home as an attack, was nevertheless of great service to the strocger column operating from Jatta against the enemy's left flank, as it eflectually prevented the enemy from noring up reinforcements from Shalibaz Kor to meet General Induson's attack. Simult.incously with the action of the column from Shabkadar, the troops from Matta, Garli Sidas, aod luzzi attacked the enemy tery ·22 OPERATIO.VS AGAINST THE JOHVANDS, 1908. in front of Matta. At 6-30 A.M, the force, strength as per margin, Composition of Right Co’umn, commenced to assemble on the road half- From Abaza way between Matta and Garhi Sadar. 250-53rd Sikhs. From Garhi Sadar- During this movement the guns were 220457th Tilde's Rifles. concealed by the cavalry marching in half Fron atta- 100—21st Cavalry. sections on their outer flank. By 7 A.11. 130-19th Lancers. the concentration was complete and 4 guns, S0th Battery R.FA. 301—Ist Northumberland Brigadier-General Anderson gave orders Fusibers. for the advance to commence, placing 200--1st Royal Warnick. shire Regiment. Colonel Biddulph, 19th Lancers, in com- 150-M9th Scinde Rifles. mand of the cavalry, and Lieutenant- Colonel Carruthers, 59th Scinde Rifles, in command of the infantry. At this time the enemy, at least 4,000 strong, were holding the line of sangars, which they had prepared and held, through not in such great numbers, during the two previous days. This line covered a front of about 1} miles and blocked the road to the Burjina Pass down which reinforcements could be seen approaching. The first line in the advance which now commenced was composed of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and the 59th Scinde Rifles. Of these the Warwickshires received special orders to capture the dominating feature of the enemy's position, a large hill on the rig centre of their line. The advance was supported by the guns, and the 53rd Sikhs and 57th Rifles, as a general reserve, were ordered to keep in advance of but close to the guns, conforming to their movements. The two squadrons cavalry, with the exception of small patrols on the fanks for observation, were kept in hand throughout the fight. The action soon became general along the line and at 9 A.1. Brigadier-General Anderson advanced the guns 1,000 yards nearer to the enemy, in order to support the attack of the Warwickshire Regiment on the principal objective. Ten minutes later the Warwickshires, with a few scouts of the Northumberland Fusiliers, carried this point in fine style, and inflicted severe loss from it on a party of the enemy retiring through a narrow gorge. The capture of this hill enabled the advance of the centre and right of the line to be pushed home against the sangars on the lower foothills in front of the Burjina Pass road. As the fighting ·UPEVTS DURING THE LATTER PART OF APRIL 1908 23 1 during this stage of the advance was severe, Brigarlicr-General Anderson ordered the 57th Rifles to move up in support of the 59th, Rifles and at 9.30 A.M. the guns-covered by the 53rd Sikhs--were still further advanced to a position some 800 yards acarer the enemy. The effect of this was at once apparent, for the enemy's centre and right sangars were quickly carried by the Northumberland Fusiliers, 57th Rifles and 59th Rifles, though not without many casualties ; on the right especially there was much close fighting, onc of the enemy's sangars on this flank being carried by the 57th Rifles and 59th Rifles at the point of the bavonet. As the force under Bri. gadier-General Anderson was ohviously too reak, especially in guns, to advance into the high hills, orders had heen issued that no advance should be made beyond certain definite points. These points had now been reached, and all efforts were accordingly turned to inflicting severe punishment on the retreating enemy hy hovy fire; and with good cficct, for the enemy's losses during the day were later reported to have been as heavy as 800 killed and wounded. By 10-20 A.M. the majority of the enemy had retired to the higher hills over which the track to the Burjina Pass runs, and as tlicy haul evidently had a severe lesson Brigadier-General Anderson decided to break off the action. The withdrawal was steadily carried out in spite of the fire of small bodies of the enemy who, adopting the usual Pathan tactics, followed up the force in its retirement to the plain. Ill efforts to draw them on, however, in sufficient numbers for the massed cavalry to charge proved umavalmg. Some detached parties of the cremy made an attempt to get round the right flank, but were lield off by the cuvalry. By 12 noon the whole force had reached the Matta- Garhi Sadar road, with the cavalry out in the plain between the road and the hills to observe any move the enemy night nake. The various detachments which had composed the force then returned to the posts from which they had been drawn; the 33rd Sikls to Ibazi, 67th Rities to Garlu Sidas, and the remainder to Jatt.. The casualties, which were hevy for the size of the force (Lsagel, were as follows:- Batush - Killed? I'rvates, Xorthumberland Fusiliers Wounded otticers and 16 rank an Gle. Yalite.-killed-1 rank and file. Wounda-otlicer and so rink and file.

·2.2 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHUANDS, 1908. in front of Matta. At 6-30 A.M. the force, strength as per margin, Composition of Right Column. commenced to assemble on the road half- From Abazaiway between Matta and Garhi Sadar. 250-53rd Sikhs. From Garhi Sadar- During this movement the guns were 22457th Wilde's Ruiles. concealed by the cavalry marching in half From Matta- 100—21st Cavalry. sections on their outer flank. By 7 A.M. 130—19th Lancers. the concentration was complete and 4 guns, 80th Battery R.FA. 301) – Ist Northumberland Brigadier-General Anderson gave orders Fusiliers. for the advance to commence, placing 200—1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Colonel Biddulph, 19th Lancers, in com- 150-Toth Scindo Rifles. mand of the cavalry, and Lieutenant- Colonel Carruthers, 59th Scinde Rifles, in command of the infantry. At this time the enemy, at least 4,000 strong, were holding the line of sangars, which they had prepared and held, through not in such great numbers, during the two previous days. This line covered a front of about 1} miles and blocked the road to the Burjina Pass down which reinforcements could be seen approaching, The first line in the advance which now commenced was composed of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and the 59th Scinde Rifles. Of these the Warwickshires received special orders to capture the dominating feature of the enemy's position, a large hill on the ght centre of their line. The advance was supported by the guns, and the 53rd Sikhs and 57th Rifles, as a general reserve, were ordered to keep in advance of but close to the guns, conforming to their movements. The two squadrons cavalry, with the exception of small patrols on the flanks for observation, were kept in hand throughout the fight. The action soon became general along the line and at 9 A.M. Brigadier-General Anderson advanced the guns 1,000 yards nearer to the enemy, in order to support the attack of the Warwickshire Regiment on the principal objective. Ten minutes later the Warwickshires, with a fey scouts of the Northumberland Fusiliers, carried this point in fine style, and inflicted severe loss from it on a party of the enemy retiring through a narrow gorge. The capture of this hill enabled the advance of the centre and right of the line to be pushed home against the sangars on the lower foothills in front of the Burjina Pass road. As the fighting ·EVC.VTS DURING THE LATTER PART OF APRIL 1308. 23 during this stage of the advance was severe, Brigarlier-General Anderson ordered the 57th Rifles to move up in support of the 59th Rifles and at 9:30 A.M. the guns covered by the 53rd Sikhs—ivero still further advanced to a position some 800 yards ncarer the enemy. The effect of this was at once apparent, for the enemy's centre and right sangars were quickly carried by the Northumberland Fusi. liers, 57th Rifles and 59th Rifles, though not without many casualties ; on the right especially there was much closc fighting, one of the enemy's sangars on this flank being carried by the 57th Rifles and 59th Rifles at the point of the bavonet. As the force under Brigadier-General Anderson was ohviously too weak, especially m guns, to advance into the high hills, orders had heen issued that no advance should he made beyond certain definite points. These points had now been reachail, and all efforts were accordingly turned to inflicting severe punishment on the retreating enemy hy heavy fire; and with good effect, for the enemy's losses during the day were later reported to have been as heavy as 800 killed and wounded. By 10-20 A.M. the majority of the enemy bad retired to the higher hills over which the track to the Burjina Pass runs, and as they haul evidently had a severe lesson Brigadier-General Anderson decided to break off the action. The withdrawal was stearlıly carried out in spite of thc fire of small bodies of the enemy wlio, adopting the usual Pathan tactics, followed up the force in its retirement to the plain. Ull efforts to dr.w them on, lowever, in sufficient numbers for the massed cavalry to charge proved unvalmy. Some detached parties of the enemy made an attempt to get round the right flank, but were held off by the cavalry. By 12 noon the whole force had reached the Jlatta-Garli Sudar rond, with the cavalry out in the plain between the road and the hills to observe any move the enemy might make. The various detachments which had composed the force then returned to the posts from which they had been drawn; the 5:3rd Sikhs to Ibazar, 67th Ritles to Garhi Sudar, and the remainder to Jatta, The casualties, which were hevy for the size of the force ougaged, were as follows:- British - Killed? Privates, Worthumberland Fucilien Wounded otticers and lo tank and file. Value-Kille-i rank and tile. Wounde- officer and 30 rank and sle.

·24 OPBRATIONS AGAINST THE VORNANDS, 1908. During the morning the Guides Infantry reached Shabkadar by a splendid forced march from Mardan; too late, however, to be utilized for the fighting.* After these two actions the enemy, who had evidently had enough of it, retired up the Gandao and Pandiali valleys, and no attack was Retirement of the enemy. made on any post that night; and on the following day, when all the available troops were again sent out in two columns to attack the enemy, none were seen in the mouth of the Gandao valley and only a small piquet of six men in the Burjina Pass. On the 26th April, orders were received constituting the Mohmand Field Force, as previously detailed, Constitution of the Mohmand with retrospective effect from the 24th April inclusive, and nominating General Sir James Willcocks to command, with supreme military and political control of the operations. Field Force. * This march deserves a somewhat detailed description. At 4 P.M. on 23rd April a telegram was received in Mardan ordering the Guides Infantry to proceed as strong as possible with Field Service scale of ammunition and kits on lightest possible scalo to Shabbadar, where their services were urgently needed. The Regiment (9 British Officers, 9 Native Officers and 488 rank and file, under Colonel G. J. Younghusband, C.B.) marched at 6.30 p.m., having had to a wait the arrival of their camels which were out grazing, and soon after midnight passed through Charsada (18 miles). On arriving at the bank of the Khiali branch of the Swat River at 2-15 A. on 24th, it was found that the bridge-of-boats had been carried away by floods and that a ferry of two boats was plying in its place. The Regiment was employed till 6 A.M. in getting the 1st Line transport, Jaxim gun mules and horses across, and the march was resumed at 6-15 A.M., one British Oficer being left behind with two companies to get the camels across and bring them on to Shabkadar. The Regiment arrived at Shabkadar at 11 4. M., having accomplished the march of 35 miles from Blardan in 16) hourg, of which 4 hours were occupied in ferrying across the Khiali Rirer. No men fell out during the murche The firing ceased immediately after the arrival of the Regiment at Shabkadar, and the remainder of the day was spent in entrenching.

·CHAPTER V. IXCURSION OF THE SUFI SLUIB'S LASHKAR LYTO THE KHZIBAR, .I.YD JESURES TAKEN TO REPEL THE SAJE, For some days after the action of the 24th April there was a lull in the operations. Reconnaissances were made up the mouths of the Gandao and Pandiali valleys, but these disclosed no signs of the enemy, and it was evident, both from this and from information brought to the Political officers, that the enemy had completely dispersed from the neighbourhood of British territory. During this period the redistribution of troops necessary for the concentration of the Mohmand Field Force was actively carried out. By the end of the month the three Brigades were nearly complete, and on the 30th April Major-General A. A. Barrett, C.B., in command of the 2nd Brigade, arrived and moved his headquarters to Jangli Burj, a village about half-way between Shabkadar and Matta, where a flying column under Colonel Younghusband of the Guides had been cstablished. The force was almost ready for an advance directly orders should be received, when a sudden diversion in the direction of the Khaibar made the immediate punishment of the Johmands of secondary importance for the moment. The Sufi Sahib, who had been prevented by illness, and by his jealousy of the Hazrat Sabil, from joining the Jobmand lashkar, had succeeded in raising a second lashkar in Ningrabar and the neighbouring districts of Afghanistan. This force, which was composed almost entirely of Afglian subjects, now advanced to the loud of tho Khaibar valley and threatened Landi Kotil. Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Political Agent in the Khaibar, Tho Sufi Sahib's lashdo wired on the ist Vay that the enemy caters tho Khaibur. had crossed the border in considerable numbers, and that the Sufi Sahib's cmissaries were attempting to bring about il general rising among the Lourgai Shinwaris and in Tirah, (23) ·24 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HOHNANDS, 1908. During the morning the Guides Infantry reached Shabkadar by a splendid forced march from Mardan; too late, however, to be utilized for the fighting.* After these two actions the enemy, who had evidently had enough of it, retired up the Gandao and Pandiali valleys, and no attack was Retirement of the enemy. made on any post that night; and on the following day, when all the available troops were again sent out in two columns to attack the enemy, none were seen in the mouth of the Gandao valley and only a small piquet of six men in the Burjina Pass. On the 26th April, orders were received constituting the Mohmand Field Force, as previously detailed, Constatution of the Mohmand with retrospective effect from the 24th April inclusive, and nominating General Sir James Willcocks to command, with supreme military and political control of the operations. Field Force. * This march deserves a somewhat detailed description. At 4 P.M. on 23rd April a telegram was received in Mardan ordermg the Guides Infantry to proceed as strong as possible with Field Service scalo of ammunition and kits on lightest possible scalo to Shabkadar, where their services were urgently necded. The Regiment (9 British Officers, 9 Native Officers and 488 rank and file, under Colonel G. J. Younghusband, C.B.) marched at 6-30 P.M., having had to a wait the arrival of their camels which were out grazing, and soon after midnight passed through Charsada (18 miles). On arriving at the bank of the Khialı branch of the Swat River at 2-15 A.M. on 24th, at was found that the bridge-of-boats had been carried away by floods and that a ferry of two boats was plymg in its place. The Regiment was employed till 6 4.M. in getting the 1st Line transport, Maxim gun mules and horses across, and the march was resumed at 6-15 A.M., one British Officer being left behind with two companies to get the camels across and bring them on to Shabkadar. The Regiment arrived at Shabkadar at II A.S., having accomplished the march of 35 miles from Dardan in 163 hours, of which 4 hours were occupied in ferrying across the Khiah River, No men fell out during the murch. The firing ceased immediately after the arrival of the Regiment at Shabkadar, and the remainder of the day was spent in entrenching. 2

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·26 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHUANDS, 1908. - This message was followed on the 2nd May by a request for regular troops to be sent as far as Regular troops despatched. Jamrud. This was received by General Willcocks at 9 A.J. on the 2nd May, and he at once issued orders for the following moves to take place :- (a) The Reserve Brigade, with 4 guns, 80th Battery R. F. A., 28th Mountain Battery, and i Squadron, 19th Lancers, under Brigadier-General Ramsay, C.B., from Peshawar to Jamrud. (6) Two guns, 18th Battery, R.F.A., from Shabkadar, and 23rd Mountain Battery, Seaforth Highlanders and Guides Infantry from Jangli Burj, under Major-General Barrett, C.B., to Peshawar, en route for the Khaibar. (c) The 54th Sikhs by rail from Nowshera to Peshawar. In order to keep the troops fresh and ready to continue their march on the following day, transport carts were provided for the conveyance of the British troops, as they naturally suffered consi. derably from the great heat then prevailing. General Willcocks himself moved vià Peshawar to Jamrud, where on his arrival at 6 P... he found Brigadier-General Ramsay with the 3rd Brigade, less the 22nd Punjabis and 2 guns, 28th Mountain Battery, which had marched straight through to Ali ülesjid. The situation at this time appeared so serious that orders were issued from Army Headquarters for the mobilization of two addi. tional brigades, designated the 4th and 5th Brigades. The cnemy, who were now estimated at from 13,000 to 20,000 strong, were reported to be advancing and the Political Agent wired that he expected an attack that night. The Sufi Sahib himself was reported at this time to be at Khwar at the head of the Bazar Valley with 8,000 men. During the night the fort and sarai at Landi Kotal were fired into, but the enemy put all their energy into an blockhouse at attack on an almost impregnable stone blockhouse at Michni Kandao. The vigour of their assault may be estimated from the fact that scalingladders were actually planted against the walls, one of which was captured by the garrison, The ack was easily beaten off by the Khaibar Rifles, who succeeded in inflicting some loss on the enemy, while only one of the garrison was wounded. Attack on Michni Kandao.

·APTAINS IN TUD KITAIBAR, 1ST-TI MAY. 27 At Jamrud a few shots were fired into the camp the same night from a village close by, wounding a Non-Commissioned Officer and a Private, both of the Royal Dunster Fusiliers, but this was evidently the work of local brdmashes. Next morning the tronps under Brigadier-General Ramsay pushed on to Landi Kotal, Jajor-General Barrett's force reached Ali Jasjid, and the 54th Sikhs arrived at Jamrud from Nowshicra by rail. General Willcocks left Jamrud and, pushing on with the cavalry after passing Ali Masjid, reached Landı Kotal at 2 P.3. Here he found that the enemy were still keeping up a desultory fire on the blocklouses west of Landi Kotal, and he decided to attack them on the following morning. These prompt measures on our part, and their own failure to cause an Afridi rising, disheartened the enemy, and the majority left during the night, only a few shots being fired at Landi Kotal after dark. Next morning, the 4th April, in accordance with orders issued over-night, the troops moved out of Land; Action at Khargali Kotal at 7 A.M. to attack the enemy in position m and around Bagh and Khargali villages. Two columns were formed ; the right column under Colonel Roos" Keppel receiving instructions to operate towards Landi Klana, in order to cut off the enemy's retreat in the direction of Tor Kham, ind at the some time guard the right flank of the loſt column under Bugadier-General Ramsay, which was to make a frontal attack. As the troops advanced, however, it was soon crident that with the exception of some :20) men, who kept up a long-range fire, retreat. ing is the troops advanced, the enemy did not intend to figlit, and in fact that the majority had already fted. The advance continued is far as a ridge beyond! East Khargali village. llere sume loss way inflicted on the enemy by rifle fire, and by the guns which fired several rounds at small parties of the enemy escaping over the Shamsha and Made Kand.1o.* By this time it was clejr that there Wis no chance of cutting off the few enemy who remained and the withdrawal to camp was commenced at about 11 l.. This retire. ment was not molested by the enemy to any appreciable extent ; . • The fuld-guns liad core into acting va the norte a Land Kuis! Kl. 10 : Laluw slini kwao Waidos ·28 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MORNANDS, 1903. as only a few men followed up cautiously, firing at about 1,000 yards range. The casualties during the day were few: Lieutenant Campbell and one Sepoy, 40th Pathans, were wounded in the ad. vance, and one Private, Royal Munster Fusiliers, was wounded by our own fire during the retirement. The enemy's losses were reported as 72 killed and wounded, and most of these are said to have occurred as they retired by the Made and Shamsha Kandao. During the greater part of the forenoon the weather was very unsettled, heavy showers alternating with a cold wind, and at times thick mist totally obscured the enemy's position. By next morning no enemy were in the vicinity, and as all danger seemed to be past the troops commenced to retire from the Khaibar on the 7th Day. On the 6th May an Afridi band successfully raided the camels of the 50th Camel Corps at Ali Masjid. The gang, who were led by the notorious Zakka Khel raider Multan, drove off some eight camels which were grazing outside the Raid at Al Masjid. piquet line. A party composed of one company, Guides Infantry, one company, Khaibar Rifles, and 24 sowars, 19th Lancers, at once set out in pursuit. Major Coape- Smith, 11th Lancers, commanding the 50th Camel Corps, accompanied the cavalry, who actually saw the camels being driven off in the direction of Chora. As it was by this time getting dark-the raid took place in the evening--the party decided to relinquish the pursuit and commenced the return journey to camp. When about 2 miles from Ali Masjid the cavalry were ambushed, Major Coape-Smith mortally wounded, and three horses and a rifle lost in the confusion. Two of these horses were recovered, however, on the following day by two companies of the 22nd Punjabis. The return of the troops from the Khaibar was spread over three days. On the 7th May the 2nd Brigade Return of troops from the moved to Jamrud, and the 3rd Brigade, Khabar to Peshawar. leaving one section 28th Mountain Battery at Landi Kotal, halted at Ali Masjid. On the 8th May the 2nd Brigade marched to Peshawar, and the 3rd Brigade reached Jamrud. On the 9th May the movement was completed by the arrival of the 3rd Brigade at Peshawar.

·AFFAIRS IN THE KHAIBAN, 187-7TH NAY.
29
About this time the cholera which had been prevalent for some
time in the Peshawar district began to
Outbreak of cholera,
affect the troops on the Mohmand border.
The fort at Shabkadar, which had for a long time now been much
overcrowded, was highly insanitary, and the troops were accord.
ingly moved out into camp about $ mile to the west of Shabkadar
village on the Shabkadar-Michni road, only a small garrison being
left in the fort.
The troops in the Khaibar were also affected and on their return
it was found necessary to segregate the 21st Punjabis at Kacha
Garhi and the Guides Infantry at Daudzai Tahsil.

·CHAPTER VI. ADVANCE OF THE NOHVAND FIELD FORCE TO VAHAKKI. On the return of the troops from the Khaibar to Peshawar sanc- Sanction for an immediate tion was granted, on the 9th May, for an advance into Mohmand country. immediate advance into the Mohmand country. Before, however, this advance could commence, it was first necessary to concentrate the two brigades detailed for the expedition at the mouth of the Gandao valley, and also to hand over all the posts on the border and on the lines of communications to the 3rd (Reserve) brigade. With this object the troops from the Khaibar were moved forward, as follows, on the 10th May :- (a) Major-General Barrett, with the 23rd Mountain Battery and Seaforth Highlanders, marched from Peshawar to Naguman, half-way between Peshawar and Shabkadar, where they were joined at 11 P.M. that night by the 54th Sikhs from Jamrud, who took the place of the Guides Infantry segregated for cholera at Daudzai. (6) Brigadier-General Ramsay's Brigade to Naguman, where they encamped alongside the 2nd Brigade. The 21st Punjabis, amongst whom no fresh cases of cholera had occurred, rejoined this brigade at 7 A.M. The following day the headquarters of the 3rd Brigade moved to a camp on the right bank of the Subhan Khwar, opposite the 1st Brigade camp on the Shabkadar-Michni road. The remainder of the brigade moved into some of the forts and posts on the line of com“ munication. Throughout the day the 2nd Brigade remained halted at Naguman. In the afternoon General Willcocks held a conference, at which he explained to his Brigade Commanders the general plan for the operations about to commence. On the 12th Day the concentration was completed ; the 2nd Brigade advanced to Hafiz Kor on the border, where they were joined in the course of the day by the various units of the brigade which had not becn moved to thc Khaibar; the 3rd Brigade took over the remaining posts on the line of communication. 30 ) ·ADVANCE OF TIE VOMMAND FIELD FORCE TO NABAKKI. 31 up During the day a reconnaissance was carried out by three squad. rons 21st Cavalry under Colonel Unwin, as far as Dand. No signs of the enemy were seen. Under cover of this reconnaissance the field telegraph wire was laid as far as Reg Mena, about half-way to Dand. Cholera, which had appeared during the absence of the troops Changes in the composition in the Khaibar, now sudelenly became of the force as a result of the virulent. The Ist Northumberland cholera outbreak. Fusiliers were the first to be seriously affected and finally, on the advice of the Principal Medical Officer, it was decided to eliminate them from the 1st Brigade. The Royal Munster Fusiliers of the 3rd Brigade, who were at the time in camp on the right bank of the Subhan Khwar, were also attackedfour cases and five suspected cases occurring in this regiment in one day. The vacancy in the 1st Brigade was filled by the 22nd Punjabis from the 3rd Brigade, and to fill the gaps thus caused the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment and the 1-4th Gurkhas were hastily moved from Nowshera. The latter regiment, however, succumbed almost immediately to the epidemic, and had to be replaced by the 19th Punjabis. On the 13th May, as all preparations were complete, the advance commenced, and the ist Brigade, COMMENCEMENT OF THE with attached troops as per margin, ciossed the border and marched to Dand. T'roops attached to the 1st Brigade As tlic Tarakzail, through whose territory 2. Squadrons, 21st Cavalry the road lay, had remained friendly No. 8 Mountain Battery. 2 Sections, 28th Mountain throughout, no opposition was expected, Battery but as a precautionary measure the heights 31th Sihli l'oncers. Sith Sullis (from the 2nd on either side of the road were picquetted Brigado). NO. O'Company. Suppers and by troops from the 2nd Brigade, which remained at Hafiz Kor till the following day. Telepono section. As far as Hafiz Kor the road had been made 'Telegraph &xtion. passable for wheelnd traffic during the threc weeks which lind elapsed since the action at Jatta. Fron this point up to within one mile of Dand but little difficulty was experienced with the transport ; here, however, the trick falls sharply into the bed of the Gaudio stream and much time was spent before a sufliciently graded descent could be mde osir was ADVANCE Vinera, ·CHAPTER VI, ADVANCE OF THE MOHJAND FIELD FORCE TO VAHAKKI advance into Iohmand country. On the return of the troops from the Khaibar to Peshawar sanc. Sanction for an immediate tion was granted, on the 9th May, for an immediate advance into the Mohmand country. Before, however, this advance could commence, it was first necessary to concentrate the two brigades detailed for the expedition at the mouth of the Gandao valley, and also to hand over all the posts on the border and on the lines of communications to the 3rd (Reserve) brigade. With this object the troops from the Khaibar were moved forward, as follows, on the 10th May :- (a) Major-General Barrett, with the 23rd Mountain Battery and Seaforth Highlanders, marched from Peshawar to Naguman, half-way between Peshawar and Shabkadar, where they were joined at 11 P.M. that night by the 54th Sikhs from Jamrud, who took the place of the Guides Infantry segregated for cholera at Daudzai. (6) Brigadier-General Ramsay's Brigade to Naguman, where they encamped alongside the 2nd Brigade. The 21st Punjabis, amongst whom no fresh cases of cholera had occurred, rejoined this brigade at 7 A.M. The following day the headquarters of the 3rd Brigade moved to a camp on the right bank of the Subhan Khwar, opposite the 1st Brigade camp on the Shabkadar-Michni road. The remainder of the brigade moved into some of the forts and posts on the line of communication. Throughout the day the 2nd Brigade remained halted at Naguman. In the afternoon General Willcocks held a confer. ence, at which he explained to his Brigade Commanders the general plan for the operations about to commence. On the 12th Dlay the concentration was completed; the 2nd Brigade advanced to Hafiz Kor on the border, where they were joined in thic course of the day by the various units of the brigade which had not been moved to the Khaibar; the 3rd Brigade took over the remaining posts on the line of communication, (30) ·4DVANCE OF THE VOH VND FIELD FORCE TO NAHAKKI 31 During the day a reconnaissance was carried out by three squadrons 21st Cavalry under Colonel Unwin, as far as Dand. No signs of the enemy were seen, Under cover of this reconnaissance the field telegraph wire was laid as far as Reg Mena, about half-way to Dand. Cholera, which had appeared during the absence of the troops Changes in the composition in the Khabar, now suddenly became of the force as a result of the virulent. The 1st Northumberland cholera outbreak. Fusiliers were the first to be seriously affected and finally, on the advice of the Principal Medical Officer, it was decided to eliminate them from the 1st Brigade. The Royal Munster Fusiliers of the 3rd Brigade, who were at the time in camp on the right bank of the Subhan Khwar, were also attackedfour cases and five suspected cases occurring in this regiment in one day. The vacancy in the 1st Brigade was filled by the 22nd Punjabis from the 3rd Brigade, and to fill the gaps thus caused the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment and the 1-4th Gurkhas were hastily moved up from Nowshera. The latter regiment, however, succumbed almost immediately to the epidemic, and had to be replaced by the 19th Punjabis. On the 13th Jay, as all preparations were complete, the advance commenced, and the Ist Brigade, COMMENCEMENT OF THE with attached troops as per margin, crossed the border and marched to Dand. Troops attached to the 18t Brigade As the Tarakzai, through whose territory 2. Squadrons, 21st Cavalry. the road lay, had remained friendly 2 Sections, 28th Mountain throughout, no opposition was expected, Battery but as a precautionary measure the heights 54th Sikhs (from the 2nd on either side of the road were picquetted Brigade) No Company, Sappers and by troops from the 2nd Brigade," which remained at Hafiz Kor till the following day. Telephone section. As far as Hafiz Kor the road had been made Telegraph section passable for wheeled traffic during the three weeks which had elapsed since the action at Matta. From this point up to within one mile of Dand but little difficulty was esperienced with the transport; here, however, the track falls sharply into the bed of the Gandao stream and much time was spent before a sufficiently graded descent could be made over was ADVANCE No 31th Sukh Pioneers Miners ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, 1908. 32 the slippery rock. On arrival in camp large fatigue parties were sent out to improve the road to be covered on the following day in the direction of the Karappa Pass. These parties returned to camp at 6 P.M., after working up to within 3 miles of the pass itself. During the evening news was received that a gathering of the enemy, which had been in the neighbourhood of the Khapak and Nahakki Passes, had dispersed and that consequently no organised opposition would probably be met with. The camping ground at Dand was found far too small for so large a force, and the cavalry horses and transport animals were exceedingly cramped. Water, though plentiful from large pools in the Gandao stream, is brackish and decidedly indifferent in quality. Moreover, the camp is commanded on all sides, and a very large portion of the force was of necessity utilised for piquets. At dawn on the following day a flying column, strength as per margin, under Brigadier-General Ander- Flying Column 2 Squadron 21s avalry. son, pushed on as rapidly as possible to 4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Bat- Nahakki, in order to forestall any attempt tery, i Section, No. 6 Company the enemy might make to cut the band Sappers and Miners. of the water tank, which formed the main 22nd Punjabis. source of water supply at that place. General Willcocks himself accompanied this column. At starting much difficulty was experienced in getting clear of camp owing to the narrow exit, and later further delay was caused by the bad state of the road near the Karappa Pass which had not been improved on the previous day: A halt was made for water near Durba Khel in the territory of the Gandao Halimzai, the highest point at which the Gandao stream appears above ground—and the march was then resumed to the Nahakki Pass, where the road was also found to be in an execrable state, showing practically no signs of the work done on it in 1897. The village at the foot of the pass showed signs of a hasty flight by the enemy, and a group of the enemy was seen on the high hill overlooking Nabakki from the east, but these were dispersed by a few shells. Shortly after the arrival of the column, a squadron which had been detached at Kasai in the Gandao to reconnoitre the Khapak Pass reached Nahakki, and reported the Khapak Pass to be held by the cnemy 53rd Sikhs.

·ADVANCE OF THE JOU VAND FIELD FORCE TO NAHAKKI. 33 Meanwhile the remainder of the Ist Brigade, Icss the 54th Sikhs left at Dand, marched to Ghalanai in Gandao, and encamped close to the stream. The rear-guard of this force, delayed by the diffi. cult exit from camp, did not get clear of Dand till 3-30 p.21., thereby keeping the 2nd Brigade, which had arrived from Hafiz Kor at 10A.D., waiting 55 hours on the road. To avoid the overcrowding at Dand, which had occurred on the previous night, 2 squadrons 21st Cavalry, Guides Infantry and 55th Rifles, marched straight through, under Colonel Younghusband of the Guides, to Ghalanai, where they joined the troops of the 1st Brigade encamped at that place. On the 15th May the remainder of the 1st Brigade, together with the 2 squadrons 21st Cavalry attached to the 2nd Brigade, joined the flying column at Nahakkı, leaving 4 Companies 34th Pioneers at Ghalanai to improve the road for the 2nd Brigade which moved up during the day to Ghalanai. Such delay occurred however in getting the camel transport of this brigade from Dand to the Karappa, in spite of the work of the Pioneers on the road, that it was midnight before the rear-guard got into camp at Ghalanai. During the day a second reconnaissance of the Khapak Pass, wasi carried out by one squadron 21st Cavalry. Reconnaissance of the Kha. Though information that the pass was pak Pass held had previously been received, 'no enemy were seen till the leading men reached a point about 1,000 yards from the pass and commenced to dismount. A hot fire was then suddenly opened on them, and in a short time three sowars and three horses were wounded, of which two of the latter had subsequently to be shot. The cavalry then retired, followed up for a short distance by the enemy. At the sound of the firing infantry were pushed up in support, but by this time the cavalry were out of danger. The enemy's numbers were estimated at from 500-1,000 men, The same day Brigadier-General Anderson moved out of Nahakki, 2 squadrons, 21st Cavalry. with force as per margin, and carried out 2 guns, No. a reconnaissance first to Lakai, thence to Battery. 53rd Sikhs. Haidar Kalai and back over the Darwaza- Reconnaissance into the Kan- gai Puss to camp at Nahakki. When dala.i plain from Nababli, the force debouched from the pass separato ing Lakai and Haidar Kalai, the cavalry turning to the right 8 Blountain D ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, 1808. 32 the slippery rock. On arrival in camp large fatigue parties were sent out to improve the road to be covered on the following day in the direction of the Karappa Pass. These parties returned to camp at 6 P.M., after working up to within 3 miles of the pass itself. During the evening news was received that a gathering of the enemy, which had been in the neighbourhood of the Khapak and Nahakki Passes, had dispersed and that consequently no organised opposition would probably be met with. The camping ground at Dand was found far too small for so large a force, and the cavalry horses and transport animals were exceedingly cramped. Water, though plentiful from large pools in the Gandao stream, is brackish and decidedly indifferent in quality. Moreover, the camp is commanded on all sides, and a very large portion of the force was of necessitv utilised for piquets. At dawn on the following day a flying column, strength as per margin, under Brigadier-General Ander- Flying Column. 2 Squadron 218 avalry son, pushed on as rapidly as possible to 4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Bat. Nahakki, in order to forestall any attempt i Section, No. 6 Company the enemy might make to cut the band Sappers and Miners. of the water tank, which formed the main 22nd Punjabis. source of water supply at that place. General Willcocks himself accompanied this column. At starting much difficulty was experienced in getting clear of camp owing to the narrow exit, and later further delay was caused by the bad state of the road near the Karappa Pass which had not been improved on the previous day. A halt was made for water near Durha Khel in the territory of the Gandao Halimzai,- the highest point at which the Gandao stream ground-and the march was then resumed to the Nahakki Pass, where the road was also found to be in an execrable state, showing practically no signs of the work done on it in 1897. The village at the foot of the pass showed signs of a hasty flight by the enemy, and a group of the chemy was seen on the high hill overlooking Nabakki from the east, but these were dispersed by a few shells. Shortly after the arrival of the column, i squadron which had been detached at Kasai in the Gandao to reconnoitre the Khapak Pass reached Nahakki, and reported the Khapak Pass to be held by the enemy tery. 53rd Sikhs. appears above ·ADVANCE OF THE NOH HAND FIELD FORCE TO NAHAKKI. 33 Meanwhile the remainder of the 1st Brigade, less the 54th Sikhs left at Dand, marched to Ghalanai in Gandao, and encamped close to the stream. The rear-guard of this force, delayed by the difficult exit from camp, did not get clear of Dand till 3-30 P.A., thereby keeping the 2nd Brigade, which had arrived from Hafiz Kor at 10A.M., waiting 5} hours on the road. To avoid the overcrowding at Dand, which had occurred on the previous night, 2 squadrons 21st Cavalry, Guides Infantry and 55th Rifles, marched straight through, under Colonel Younghusband of the Guides, to Ghalanai, where they joined the troops of the 1st Brigade encamped at that place. On the 15th May the remainder of the 1st Brigade, together with the 2 squadrons 21st Cavalry attached to the 2nd Brigade, joined the flying column at Nahakki, leaving 4 Companies 34th Pioneers at Ghalanai to improve the road for the 2nd Brigade which moved up during the day to Ghalanai. Such delay occurred however in getting the camel transport of this brigade from Dand to the Karappa, in spite of the work of the Pioneers on the road, that it was midnight before the rear-guard got into camp at Ghalanai. During the day a second reconnaissance of the Khapak Pass, was carried out by one squadron 21st Cavalry. Reconnaissance of the Kha. Though information that the pass was pak Pass. held had previously been received, 'no enemy were seen till the leading men reached a point about 1,000 yards from the pass and commenced to dismount. A hot fire was then suddenly opened on them, and in a short time three sowars and three horses were wounded, of which two of the latter had subsequently to be shot. The cavalry then retired, followed up for a short distance by the enemy. At the sound of the firing infantry were pushed up in support, but by this time the cavalry were out of danger. The enemy's numbers were estimated at from 500—1,000 men. The same day Brigadier-General Anderson moved out of Nahakki, 2 squadrons, 21st Cavalry. with force as per margin, and carried out 2 guns, No a reconnaissance first to Lakai, thence to Battery Haidar Kalai and back over the Darwaza- Reconnai-sinco into the Kan. gai Pass to camp at Nabakki. When daha plan from Nahakli, the force debouched from the pass separat ing Lakai and Haidar Kalai, the cavalry turning to the right 8 Mountain 53rd Sikhs. D ·36 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HOHMANDS, 1908. When this had been done, the advance was continued with this. double company as a pivot, as far as Ahad Kor. Here the column watered from a large tank known as Ata Jor, which is about 1) miles east of Khan Beg Kor on the left bank of a nala joining the Bohai Dag from the foot of the Khapak Pass. Meanwhile the cavalry had been kept on the right front with orders to advance towards the Khapak Pass. At this moment some of the enemy were observed close to the south-east end of Khan Beg Kor, but these were quickly dispersed by the guns, and the advance was then resumed as far as a spur lying to the south-east of Ahad Kor. This was occupied by a double company, with the cavalry in front in Khapak village. It was now seen that the pass itself was already held by the 55th Rifles from the 2nd Brigade; the column was accordingly halted, and the destruction of the surrounding villages was commenced. This was completed by 2. P.M., without molestation from the enemy, excep: for some shots fired at the cavalry ip Khapak village, and the retirement was then commenced with the 59th Rifles forming the rear-guard. As soon as the rear-guard reached the junction of the Khapak and Bohai Dag nalas, the enemy began to follow up the retirement with gradually increasing numbers and boldness; and as casualties. commenced to occur a double company 57th Rifles was placed in ambush, a short distance to the west of Ato Khel. This double company, allowing the rear-guard to pass through them in their retirement, were enabled to pour a heavy fire into the following enemy, hitting three of them. Then, as the retirement was continued, two guns were ordered into action just north of Ato Khel village to cover the final movement into camp at Kasai. During this withdrawal from the Khapak, the 69th Rifles, who formed the rear-guard suffered nine casualties, vit., one native officer killed and one native officer and seven men wounded, whilst the double company 57th Rifles, placed in ambush near Ato Khel, had one man wounded in retiring. On arrival in camp the occupation of the eight previously selected piquets was carried out, though not without some difficulty, as the chemy kept up a desultory fire on the piquets. while building sangars, by which one man 22nd Punjabis was wounded. 80753 ·OPERATIONS OF THE 16TH AND 17TH NAY. 37 In the meanwhile as the scouts of a half-company 59th Rifles were advancing to take possession of No. 8 Piquet, some 1,500 yards south of the camp, fire was suddenly opened on them from the low hill on which the piquet was to be placed ; two men were hit and the half-company forced to retire. Artillery fire was then brought to bear on the hill from camp, and the 59th Rifles received orders to take the hill, under cover of the guns. This was well and quickly done, with the further loss of one man. The digging of the perimeter was then resumed and completed durirg which time the piquets on the north side of camp reported that the enemy were collecting on the hills to the north-west, and in the valley to the north of camp, on the further side of the Darwazagai Pass. Other parties of the enemy were observed on both sides of the Bohai Dag, near Ato Khel village,- but it was too dark to take any offensive action. Before darkness had completely set in firing into camp commenced and large numbers of the enemy began to gather round Nos. 6 and 7 Piquets, on the west side of camp, held by the 22nd Punjabis, while others moved towards Nos. 1 and 2 Piquets on the north-east, held by the 57th Rifles. The centro piquets held by the 53rd Sikhs were almost entirely unmolested. The night which now commenced was extremely dark-thick clouds obscuring the moon-whilst later it became cold and sharp showers of rain began to fall. Firing round the above-mentioned piquets soon became heavy, and the enemy could be plainly heard shouting, blowing calls on a trumpet, and playing dols. Shortly after 9 P.M. Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler, commanding the 22nd Punjabis, reported to General Anderson that Nos, 6 and 7 Piquets had signalled asking for more ammunition, and saying that many casualties had already occurred, whilst the enemy, who were close all round the sangars, were rapidly increasing in num. bers. General Anderson, therefore, ordered a double lamp sig. nalling station to be cstablished in that part of the 22nd Punjabis' perimeter, which lay nearest to the two piquets. Both piquets then signalled down that they were hard pressed. Soon after this the lamp of N 6 Piquet was put out of action. Shortly after 10 P.M. two men of No. 6 Piquet managed to make their way into camp down the eastern slope of the hill, and reported that ammu.

·38 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHUANDS, 1908. nition was running low, that two non-commissioned officers had been'killed, several other men wounded, and that the enemy were so numerous and so close to the piquet, that unless reinforced there was great danger that the piquet might be rushed. At the same time a lamp message was received from No. 7 Piquet reporting that the native officer and a non-commissioned officer had been wounded,--the command devolving upon Naik Jehandad Khan, and that the enemy, who completely surrounded the sungar on three sides, were very numerous. As the camp would have at once become untenable had either of the piquets been carried by the enemy, besides the loss of life, rifles and ammunition entailed, General Anderson decided immediately to reinforce No. 6, where the pressure was greatest. About this time another sepoy arrived from No. 6 Piquet, shot through the arm, and confirmed the previous report. All arrangements were quickly made, officers were posted round the perimeter to prevent any fire from the perimeter during the advance of the reinforcing party, and all piquets were warned that No. 6 Piquet was about to be reinforced. Ammunition carriers with plenty of ammunition were got ready, and a pass word agreed on. About 11 P.M. the reinforcement consisting of 50 rifles 22nd Punjabis under command of Major Climo (24th Punjabis, attached to 22nd Punjabis), and Lieutenants Webb and Money, 22nd Punjabis, and accompanied by the company dol and sarnai players, moved out of the camp. As they approached the lower slopes of the hill on which No. 6 Piquet was situated, heavy fire was opened upon them by the enemy. The dols and sarnais struck up, and they advanced, driving the enemy down the further side of the ridge and reached the piquet. Major Climo then signalled that in his opinion the hill should be held for the remainder of the night by a double com. pany, and to this General Anderson agreed. Rain began to fall heavily and as it had now become very cold Major Climo again signalled down, this time requesting that a relief party might be gent with blankets, waterproof sheets, and filled water bottles for those remaining on the hill, and also blanket-stretchers to take down the dead and wounded, who occupied nea rly all the available space in the piquct. Arrangements were made for the two parties to meet at the bottom of the hill below the piquet, and a double ·OPERATIONS OF THE 16TH AND 17TH MAY. 39 company 22nd Punjabis, under Captain Cooke (24th Punjabis attached 22nd Punjabis), then started. Meanwhile the enemy, who had been to some extent driven away from No. 6 Piquet, commenced a most determined close attack on No. 7, which however managed to hold its own. The signaller in this piquet, Sepoy Ram Singh, 22nd Punjabis, in the endeavour to keep touch with Nahakki as well as with the camp at Kasai, porked his lamp outside the piquet, as something interfered with the line to Nahakki, until he was wounded. He then got into the sangar and took a rifle, but the enemy were so close to him that they captured his lamp. The relief party meanwhile reached No. 6 Piquet and at 2 A.N. the dead and wounded were brought in, followed shortly after by all the men not left on the hill, Throughout this time Nos. 1 and 2 Piquets held by the 57th Rifles had both been hotly engaged, but succeeded in repulsing the enemy without loss to themselves, though three rifles were cut through the barrel by bullets and completely destroyed. All the piquets engaged reported that they had seen many dead and wounded Johmands being carried down the hills, and the two men of No. 6 Piquet, who made their way into camp, stated that many dead bodies were passed on the way down the hill to camp. At 2-15 A.M, the enemy drew off and firing was subsequently slight. The total casualties during the night amounted to one native officer and seven men killed, and eleven men wounded, all of the 22nd Punjabis, and of these all, except one man shot in camp, and one of the reinforcing party, occurred in Nos. 6 and 7 Piquets. The following day was spent by both brigades in the destruction of villages within reach of the two camps, Kasai and Nahakki. From Kasai a column, strength as per margin, left camp at 8 A.M., and proceeding over the Dar. 1 Squadron, 21st Caralry. 3 section, No. 6 Company, azagai Pass advanced up the Kandahari Sappers and Miners. valley. The chemy showed little inclina- 4 guns, No. 8 Blountain Bat. tion to fight, and though large numbers 22nd Punjabis. were seen on the hills some fourteen b3rd Sikhs, villages were burt and two towers destroyed almost without opposition. At 1-30 P.X. the column cmmenced its retirement, and, though a few of the enemy ? tcry ·40 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NOHMANDS, 1908. attempted to follow up, reached camp at Kasai without a single casualty, the hills in this valley being well suited for a rear-guard action. From Nahakki the 2nd Brigade sent out two columns, strength 1st Column as per margin, which destroyed several 4 guns, 23rd Mountain Bat. tery. villages to the east and north-east of Seaforth Highlanders. Nahakki. Both columns left camp at 54th Sikhs. 3 sections, No. 1 Company, 8-30 A.M., the first, under General Bar- Sappers and Miners. rett in person, dealing with the village and Column I Squadron, 21st Cavalry. of Sro and the western hamlets of 2 guns, 23rd Mountain Bat. Gumbatai; and the second, under tery. 28th Punjabis. Colonel Phillips, 28th Punjabis, with 1 Company, 34th Pioneers : Khajak Shah, Khwaja Kuhai, and Chingai. Here also the enemy seemed disinclined to fight, and only some slight opposition was offered by a number of men on the heights above Sro and Gumbatai, but these were quickly dislodged by the guns, and both columns returned 'to camp without suffering any casualties. Near Sro a spring of excellent water was discovered. This was cleaned out, and from this date drinking water for the camp at Nahakki was drawn from this place. It had been intended that General Barrett's column, in addition to destroying the villages mentioned above, should carry out a reconnaissance of the Inzari Pass leading into the Pandiali valley. To this end the Officer Commanding 54th Sikhs was ordered to advance with his battalion along the high ground on the right flank of General Barrett's column, until he reached a position overlooking the pass, and covering the approach thereto from the northtrest. Owing, however, to some misunderstanding of the orders received by him, he halted his battalion far short of the position intended, and the project had therefore to be abandoned. As usual firing into camp was carried on for scyeral hours that night, but only one casualty resulted. - ·CHAPTER VIII. OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BRIGADE AGAINST THE KHI AIZAI; JAY 18th, 19th AVD 20th. - ALL the country within reach of Nahakki had now suffered severely, and Sir James Willcocks decided to send out a column to punish the Khwaizal still further, and, if possible, destroy the Koda Khel villages at the head of the Bohai Dag at the same time. For this purpose he gave orders for the 2nd Brigade, reinforced by the 57th Rifles from Kasai, to leave Nahakki next day, the 18th, and advance up the Bohai Dag, returning to Nahakki on the 3rd day. At 5.30 A.2. therefore on the 18th, the 2nd Brigade moved out from Nabakki, and passing close to the 1st brigade camp at Kasai, where they were joined by the 57th Rifles, commenced. to advance up the bed of the Bohai Deg nala. Meanwhile the piquets overlooking Nahakki were taken over by the 59th Rifles, the remainder of the 1st Brigade with all the baggage leaving Kasai for Nahakki at 12-30 P.M. Shortly after passing Halim zai limits the 2nd Brigade was fired on from both sides of the valley, and it quickly became evident that the enemy, who held a position extending for about 2 miles from the half ruined village of Sur Dag on the right, along the steep ridge north of the road to the high range above Mazrina, would have to be dislodged before any further advance could be made. In addition to this position the enemy also held the spurs overlooking Zanavar China on the south side of the road, and the village itself. The advance-guard, which was composed of two squadrons 21st Cavalry and the 55th Rifles under Colonel Nicholls, were soon hotly engaged, the cavalry leading the advancp dismounted. As it was advisable first to clear Zanawar China and the spurs above it the 28th Punjabis were sent to storm these heights, supported by two guns of the 28th Jountain Battery and the half battalion of the 34th Pioneers, the latter being ordered to moro straight on the village and destroy its defences. ( 41 ) ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHJANDS, 1908. Meanwhile the 23rd Mountain Battery had come into action against the heights to the north, which were strongly held by the enemy. As the attack of the 28th Punjabis on the heights to the south developed, orders were issued to the 57th Rifles to carry those to the north, covered by the fire of the guns and of the dismounted cavalry and the 55th Rifles, with the Seaforth Highlanders and 54th Sikhs in reserve. Diajor Gray, commanding the 57th Rifles, planned and conducted this attack with promptness and skill, and it was carried out with great spirit. No sooner were the lower slopes of the hill in our possession, than large numbers of the enemy, who had been holding the ravines below, commenced to climb the steep rocky face of the hill towards the left of theirposition, where they came under a brisk fire from guns, rifles and maxims, and suffered heavy loss, the survivors making good their escape over the high ridge towards Mazrina. Further to the left the 57th Rifles continued to force their way up, and after some hand to hand fighting gradually succeeded in dislodging the enemy. Many dead bodies were passed on the way up and five prisoners taken, four of whom were wounded. The action was now over ; to the left the 28th Punjabis had been equally successful in clearing the spurs above Zanawar China, whilst the Pioneers had quickly gained possession of th: village itself. Herc an unfortunate incident occurred, as, while the Pioneers were engaged in the destruction of the villaye, a party of 8. swordsmen, who had remained concealed in a cave in the hillside near by, made a sudden attack upon the Pioneers who, being taken at a disadvantage, lost 3 of their number killed and 2 wounded before the ghazis were disposed of. The 55th Rifles had meanwhile been occupied further west beyond Gudai Tangi, and the Sappers and Miners now received orders to destroy the defences of that village, and also those of Sur Dag. Our casualties in this action were as follows: 3 British officers wounded. * 3 Native ranks killed. 3 Native ranks died of wounds. 21 Natiyo ranks wounded. • Lieutenant liens, 6th Punjabis (attacbelo3th Rifles)--dangerously #oundal. Cajhala Finla,. 38th Rides (attached 57th Riflcs)- slightly wounded. Licutenant Sparung-57th Rifles, slightly pounded ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KIJA12AI. 43 Those of the enemy, whose numbers were estimated at from 500—1,000, were computed at 60. The enemy had nor completely disappeared, and, the road being clear, the advance was continued. The cavalry were ordered to more to Khan Beg Kor, covering the front and right flank of the infantry; the Seaforth Highlanders, 54th Sikhs and 23rd Mountain Battery were directed to march straight to the Ata Jor tank, which had been selected as the camping ground for the night, and the remaining troops were told to follow as soon as the destruction of the various towers and villages had been completed. On arrival at the tank detachments from each corps were left to dig the entrenchments, whilst the remainder advanced to Khan Beg Kor, and attacked the ridge behind the village, which had been reported to be strongly held by the enemy. In this attack the 54th Sikhs formed the right, and the Seaforth Highlanders the left, with the guns of the 23rd Mountain Battery covering the advance. Little opposition was met with, however, and, in spite of the diffi. cult ground, the ridge was quickly in our poss-ssion, and a squad. ron of cavalry advanced as far as the foot of the pass in rear of the village. Here there was another tank, and all the transport animals were sent for to get water and forage, while the Sappers and Pioneers blew up the numerous towers. The camp that night being on an open plain, no outlying piquets were posted, and though firing was continuous and fairly heavy throughout the night, very little damage was done. Next day at 5.30 A.M. the force advanced to Kung, the largest of the Khwaizai villages. The 54th Sikhs, who formed the advance-guard, piquetted the spurs of the range south-east and south of the village, while the Seaforth Highlanders and a double company 55th Rifles occupied a steep ridge to the north ; the cavalry meanwhile operated in the main valley in the direction of Koda Khel, thereby guarding the left fank and rear of the brigade. Very little opposition was offered, however, and, as soon as the crest of thc heights was in our possession, the Sappers and Pioneers were enabled to enter the village and commence the work of destruction, a few shots only being fired at them from the high crags in rear of the village.

·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NOEMANDS, 1903. It had been General Barrett's original intention to continue his advance to the Baezai village of Koda Khel and destroy that village the same day; but this could only have been done if the work of destruction of Kung had been completed by 10 A.M. at the latest. The opposition met with at Kung had, however, delayed matters and it was nearly midday before the village was finished with. Owing partly to this fact, and also to the difficult nature of the ground which would have had to be traversed in the retirement to Ata Jor camp from Koda Khel, the idea of visiting that village had to be abandoned. When all the towers of Kung therefore, had been blown up the main body of the force withdrew to the south-east towards Wucha Jawar, the 54th Sikhs remaining in position to cover the advance, whilst the 28th Punjabis crossed by a pass south-east of Kung to the heights overlooking Wacha Jawar from the north. The towers of this village were then destroyed, as also those of a smaller village further south called Shah Katol. The whole force then returned to camp, which had been held during the day by a half battalion, 28th Punjabis, and a company from each of the other regiments under the command of Colonel Phillips. Firing into camp that night resulted in one sepoy and one follower being wounded. Next day the entire baggage of the column, escorted by the 57th Rifles, 55th Rifles and 2 guns 28th Mountain Battery, under Colonel Nicholls, was sent back to Nahakki, leaving Ata Jor camp at 6 A.M. The remainder of the force marched at 5-30 A.2. to Jazrina. Covered by the cavalry the 54th Sikhs piquetted the hills to the west of Mazrina and the 28th Punjabis those to the east; the march was practically unopposed, and the village of Vazrina and the hills around were soon in our possession. The towers, etc., were then destroyed by thc Sappers and Pioncers, after which the column commenced its retirement froin the Mazrina valley. This movement was the occasion for desultory firc being opened on the piqucts in the hills, but the column itself is vithdrawn withcut incident. Meanwhile the cavalry had been cngaged all the morning with small parties of the chemy, who had come down to the deserted camping ground at Ata Jor soon after tho departure of the baggage. Throughout the retirement down the Bohui Dagtho / ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KITAIZAI. 45 rear-guard, composed of the 54th Sikhs, was freely engaged for a great part of the way in, and suffered 5 casualties whilst one man of the 21st Cavalry was also wounded. On arrival at Kasai the 57th Rifles-part of the baggage escort- rejoined the Ist Bri. gade, which had left Nahakki the same day to commence à tour, which should deal with the Utmanzai, Safis, Dawezai, and Ambahar Utman Khel in the order named.

·CHAPTER IX. tory. OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE FROJI 2017 TO 261h JAY. WHILST the 2nd brigade was engaged in the Bohai Dag, Sir James Willcocks and the 1st Brigade remained in camp at Nahakki. Here on both nights, 18th and 19th, the camp was heavily fired into the enemy, said to be Dawezai and Utmanzai, accompanying their fire with tom-toins and much shouting and abuse. On the 18th one man was killed and one wounded, and on the 19th three men were wounded and several animals hit. On the 19th Sir James Willcocks issued orders to Brigadier 2 Squadrone, 21st Cavalry. General Anderson to concentrate the forco No. 3 British Jountain Bat. detailed in margin at Lakai on the after- Yo. Company, Sappers and Miners, noon of the 20th for operations expected 22nd Punjabis. to extend over a peried of 5 days....5 57th Wilde's Rifles. 53rd Sikhs. days' rations for men and 2 days' grain 59th Sciode Rifles. for animals to be carried. On the same No. 101 Nativo Field Hospital... and B Section, No. 1 day the Battalion 34th Pioneers left British Field Hospital. at Ghalanai were ordered up to Nakakki, Telephone section. their place being taken by 1st Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, frcm Dand, In accordance with these instructions the troops in Nahakki, with the exception of 1 section No. 8 Mountain Battery and 6 companies, 22nd Punjabis, who were left to hold the camp till the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, marched out at 6-15 A.M. towards Kasai, where they entered the bed of the Bohai Dag and turned towards Lakai. This circuitous route was adopted both in order to effect å junction more easily with the 57th Rifles, and also owing to the broken nature of the ground between Nahakki and Lakai. As the advance-guard approached Kasai the hills on either side of the Darwazagai Pass were found to be held by small parties of the enemy, who, however, were easily driven off without loss. The hills were then piquetted, so as to cover the march of the main body down tho Bohai Dag to Lakai, whilst one section No. 8 Jountain Battery and companies, 59th Riflcs, under Lieutenant.Colonel Carruthers were left at Kasai to çnsure tlc junction of the 57th ( 16 ) ·OPERATIONS OF THD 1ST BRIGADE FRON 20TH TO 26TH MAY. 47 Rifles from the 2nd Brigade, and the detachment left in Nahakki. At 10-30 4.11, the 57th Rifles reached Kasai and passed on towards Lakai, where the main body was then halted and all transport animals unloaded and watered. After a short rest a cavalry. Teconnaissance was pushed on towards Yakh Dand with orders to report on the nature of the line of advance, and on the water supply at Umra Kalai, where native reports showed the existence of at least one good tank. About noon the cavalry reported that they had reached Umra Kalai after some slight opposition, but that their further advance was barred by a body of about 200 of the chemy, who were occupying a small village about 150 yards north-east of Umra Kalai and the band of the tank, which was situated about 300 yards north-east of the small village, whence they kept up a desultory but accurate fire. An infantry covering party was then sent over to the north bank of the Bohai Dag, whilst the Sappers and Pliners prepared two tracks out of the nala on to the table land to the north of it for the passage of the transport. When these were complete and the two detached forces had joined the main body at about 3 P.xl., two sections No. 8 Mountain Battery, 53rd Sikhs and 57th Rifles were moved across the nala on to the high table land on the north bank, while the transport was loaded up, and moved down the nala en masse and formed up on a broad front behind the troops. By 4 P.X. all was ready for an advance, and the troops moved forward towards Umra Kalai. The force was now disposed as follows:- Front line, 57th Rifles op right, 4 guns No. 8 Mountain Battery in centre, 53rd Sikhs on left, covering a front of about 300 yards on each side of the track to Umra Kalai ; right flank guard, 2 guns No. 8 Mountain Battery with an infantry escort and 1 squadron, 21st Cavalry; left flank guard 1 squadron, 21st Cavalry; general reserve, in rear of centre, 59th Rifles and No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners. The massed baggage and supply columns followed the general reserve under escort of the 22nd Punjabis, which regiment also formed the rear-guard. As the advance commenced the enemy fired a few shots from Umra Kalai village, rounding one of the brigade signallers, but made 10 serious attempt to hold the village,' withdrawing rapidly to the north as the infantry advanced and disappearing into very broken ground.

·18 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORHANDS, 1903. Midway between the villages of Umra Kalai and Yakh Dand, situated about 2 or 24 miles apart, is the large Yakh Dand Nala. The left bank of this nala, which runs west to east, lies close under the hills which divide the Utmanzai and Dawezai territory, whilst the right bank is joined by several very broken and precipitous tributary nalas, which with their network of innumerable feeders constitute an extremely broken and difficult piece of country, movement over which in formed, bodies was almost impossible. Into this ground the enemy evidently purposely sithdrew, for there he could be easily reinforced from Yakh Dand, and his local knowledge of tracks would be most valuable to him. As our advanced lines pushed on into this broken ground the action rapidly became hot, and casualties began to occur all along the line, but in spite of this the infantry forced their way up to the south bank of the main nala, and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, who withdrew up the northern bank into the hills and the broken ground round Yakh Dand: the guns meanwhile kept up a heavy fire and wcie most cffective. The cavalry both on the right and left were also cngaged with parties of the enemy nho kept creeping up the nalas, and attempting to turn the flanks. The extreme right flank was therefore reinforced by No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners and the front line were ordered not to advance beyond the south bank of the big nala, but to make all preparations for an orderly retire. ment on Umra Kalai and a hamlet close by, whero Sir James Willcocks had in the meantime decided to halt for the night. As the transport arrived the baggage was unloaded the sites decided on for the bivouac of the corps to which it belonged, and an attempt made to water the mulcs at the tank. For this purpose the 59th Rifles were thrown into the fight at this point, and the 22nd Punjabis as they came up took their place as general reserve. The enemy were able, however, to keep up 50 heavy a fire on the tank from the network of nalas close to it, that after some sis mulcs had been shot the attempt to water the animals was abandoned. It was now beginning to get dusk and cycıy available man not in the firing line was utilized in preparing the perimeters of the two villages, whilo orders were despatched to the 63rd Sikhs and 57th Rifics to withdraw on camp, their retirement being assisted by parts of the 22nd Punjabis and 59th Rifles ncar ·OPCRITIONS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE FROJ 20TH TO 26TH JAY. 49 respectively, while the guns, though much hampered by a blinding duststorm which made laying very difficult, rendered good support. As the withdrawal was carried out the enemy followed closely taking the fullest advantage of the intricate nature of the ground. Groups of ghazis could be seen suddenly appearing from nalas, and dashing snord in hand after our parties, only, however, to fall either by shell or rifle fire. Some very close fighting took place during this period of the fight : on the right where the 57th and 59th were hotly engaged, Lieutenant Archibald, 82nd Punjabis, attached to the 57th Rifles, was shot dead and the safe removal of his body only managed by the determined stand made by a small party of the regiment for the purpose. On the extreme left the 21st Cav. alry, holding a village covering the flank, were hotly engaged at close quarters, and lost Lieutenant Soole killed, the removal of whose body in safety was only accomplished by a fine piece of work under close fire. Darkness was now coming on, and as all the transport was in and the perimeters in a more or less forward condition the troops were withdrawn as quickly as circumstances permitted, and disposed in the two villages for the night, the enemy keeping up a hot but not very effective fire while the finishing touches were being put to the defences. The nature of the ground was such that had the troops not worked with great intelligence and made the fullest use of mutual support and covering fire ou losses must have been much heavier than they were. Those of the enemy were heavy, considering the nature of the ground and their kuowledge of all the available tracks. Our casualties between 6 A.J. on the 20th and 6 A.M. on the 21st were as follows: Wounded. British officers British soldiers Native officers Other native ranks 19 Horses Mulcs During the night a lamp message was sent to Nahakki asking for the despatch of a column to escort the sounded back to Nahakla in the morning, whilst the Seaforth Highlanders, ono section 22nd Killed. 1 2 0 2 ܝܝܙ 1 ܝܙ 2 3 5 4 E ·50 OPER.ITIOXS .IG.INST THE MOHJANDS, 1908. Dlountain Battery and an ammunition column were ordered to join the 1st Brigade in the morning. Owing to the state of the Highlanders' slioes however, which were worn out by their hard marching in the Khaibar and Bohai Dag, the 55th Coke's Rifles were substituted for the Seaforths. Early in the morning the wounded were sent to Lakai, where the 1st Brigade escort handed them over to the troops from the 2nd brigade. The brigade then moved out of Umra Kalai at 9:45 A.M. and effected a junction with the reinforcements from Nahakki near the village of Hashim Kor. Thc force then moved forward destroying some villages and towers en route, and although much delayed by the necessity for the construction of a track for the transport to cross a large nala which joins the main Yakh Dand Nala, arrived in camp at Habibzai (a hamlet of Kund Kubai) without any interference from the enemy who seemed to have had enough on the previous day and were content with merely observing the march of the column and making demonstrations at the right flank guard. On arrival at Habibzai, however, a few of the enemy occupied some hills to the north-east of the village, and fired on the cavalry and, later on, the covering party while the perimeter was under construction, following them up when they withdrew to camp. In the course of the evening jirgas from the various sections of the Safis and thc Mitai Blusa Khel came into camp to arrange terms of submission. The Blusa Khcl, influenced by their leading malik Ghairat Klan, accepted the terms imposed, but no agreement with the Safis was arrived at and their jirga left camp carly next morning. That night firing into camp was heavy, but though the cnemy appeared about to rush the camp at one time, accompanying their fire with much shouting, no attempt was made and very little damage donc. Next morning a column composed of squadron cavalry, 2 guns, ! company Sappers and Miners, 22nd Punjabis and 50th Scindc Ritles was despatched at 5 a.m. under Licutenant-Colonel Fowler with orders to burn the village of Bagh,—the summer residence of tlic Gud Julla. The rest of the force marched for Sakurai a quarter of an hour later. As Licutenant-Colonel Fowler's column advanced small parties of the enemy fired on thic leading troops, and ·OPERITIONS OF THE IST BRIGADE FROM 2017 TO 26TH MAI". 51 on the left there was some sharp fighting, Captain O'Grady, 59t Rifles, being wounded. On reaching the Lakarai Kandao in front of Lakarai the heights on either side were found to be occupied by large numbers of the enemy, and it appeared as if a sharp action would take place, but, after a little firing and the capture of the outer low hills of the kotal by the advanced guard of Lieutenant- Colonel Fon ler's force, the Safis held up the white flag, and decided to accept our terms, and the cease fire was accordingly sounded, though the other tribesmen continued to fire on our troops for some time, causing one or two casualties. They were, however, finally persuaded to retire by the two sections of Safis who had submitted, and the whole force then marched into Lakarai and settled down for the night. During the day's march a large number of villages and towers were destroyed. As pight fell, in spite of the fact that Lakarai was in the territory of the Safis who had just submitted, heavy firing into camp commenced, and was kept up for several hours causing 3 casualties amongst men and about 20 amongst the animals. On the 23rd a strong rear-guard was left under command of Lieutenant- Colonel Fuller, with orders to destroy Lakaiai prior to departure. This was carried out most judiciously, and the rear-guard got away successfully without giving the enemy a chance, though matters at one time looked threatening. The advanced guard left camp at 5-15 A.J. for Turu in the Dawezai country. During the march, which was unmolested, the village of Inzarı on the left bank of the large Pipal Nala, and the village of Shakar Ghundai on the right bank with several others were destroyed. At Shato Kbelone of a group of villages lying along the right bank of the Pipal Nala to the north of Turu—the column halted for the night. In the afternoon 4 small parties were sent out to destroy the villages in the immediate vicinity and in the execution of this duty tho or three casualties occurred. The force was separated up among several villages for the night, and there was as usual heavy firing into camp, especially at the most easterly village occupied. where some six mules were hit. On the 24th the force marched to Had in the Ambahar valley. Ordeis vero given for the various detachments to rendezvous in the main Pipal Nala close to a tank, where the animals were watere E2 ·52 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VOHVAYDS, 1903. before starting. Whilst moving to the point of assembly parties of the enemy followed up our troops, and subsequently engaged the rearguard throughout the entirc march to Kargha. Prior to departure some 5 or 6 more of the hamlets around Turu were destroyed. The Pipal Nala down which the force now commenced to advanc: is dominated on the right bank by the high Sarlara range, which runs roughly from west to cast, parallel to the stream, and throws out a spur to the north-east. This spur, which runs steeply down to tho nala-bed at a point about of a milo west of Kargha, commands both the Pipal and Ambahas valleys. Soon after the advance commenced information was gained by a cavalry reconnaissance that this spur was sangared and held by the enemy in considerable numbers, their position extending right across tho Pipal valley inmediately above its junction with the Ambahar, with their right and centre guarded by a network of nalas very similar to that in front of Yakh Dand. On receipt of this information Brigadier-Gencral Anderson ordered Licutenant-Colonel Fuller commanding the advance-guard to remain in observation of the enemy. Four companies of the 57th Rifles under Captain Ames, (52nd Sikhs, attached 57th Rifles), were then ordered to take 150) roupds per man on the person and filled water-bottles, and to ascend to the top of the Sarlara range, move along the ciest and in duo course down the big spur which formed the enemy's left. Meanwhile the rear-guard, composed of 1 field troop cavalry, 2 guns No. S Mountain Battery, and tho 55th Rifles were engaged with somo of the enemy who wero trying to get within range of the main body and baggage in the bed of the nala, while tho 22nd Punjabis, who had been bivouacked furthest from the main nala werc, with the assistance of 2 guns sent back to them, covering the watering of their baggage animals prior to the start, As Captain Ames' column climbed thic Sarlara it was opposci by some of the chemy, who hidden amongst the rocks near the crest were keeping up an ineffectire fire on the column. Two guns of No. 8. Jnuntain Battery were then brought into action which cleared out this opposition and at length after a tremendous climb the 67th wera seen on the crest lins. Jeanwhile the advancc-guard had been holted somo 2,000 yards in front of thc cnciny's position and had carefully refrained from opening the action, and the sections ·OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE FROJI 20TH TO 26TH HAY. 63 No. 6 Company Sappers and Diners had been busily employed in blowing up towers and villages. As soon, however, as Captain Ames' column was seen moving along the crest line the main body was ordered to move up and join the advanced guard, keeping the baggage close together on a broad front in the nala-bed. When the main body gained touch, the remaining 4 companies 57th Rifles were sent up to the lowell slopes of the big spur with orders to join hands with the column working down from the crest; the 22nd Punjabis were told to prolong this line as far as the right bank of the Pipal Nala ; 4 companies 59th Rifles to hold a kooll on the left bank of the nala opposite the left of the 22nd Punjabis, mainly with their maxims, the companies being concentrated as a reserve. The ground betwren this knoll and a small mud walled enclosure on the edge of the broken country was held by the 53rd Sikhs with 2 guns of the 22nd Mountain Battery, whilst the 4 guns of No.8 Mountain Battery were entrenched between the 53rd and 59th. In order to avoid becoming involved in the intricate mass of nalas in front of our left, orders were issued that the signal for the advance would be the opening of fire by the guns, which would not take place until the column on the high crest of the Sarlara began to work downwards, and that all troops on the left bank would hold their ground as a pivot while those on the right bank pushed forward against the enemy's left. The transport was massed under the high banks of the nala and the animals unloaded, and in due course the gups opened fire and the advance commenced. The enemy (who appeared for the most part to be armed with swords only) offered little resistance, and mostly retired either through the nalas towards their right, or back up the Ambahar valley. When the 57th Rifles and 22nd Punjabis reached the slopes overlooking Kargla they opened a heavy fire on the enemy, who were then in full flight, and the cavalry with the baggage column were ordered to push on down the nala and endeavour to get into the fugitives. This they successfully accomplished, sabreing some 20 to 30 of them in the open beyond Had village. Two guns from the rear-guard were also ordered up and came into action alongside the 22nd Punjabis on the right bank of the nala. Meanwhile the transport was again loaded up, and the troops on the left bank of the nala ere ordered to move forward carefully ·OPER.ITIOYS 1G.IIXST THE JOHANDS, 1903. over the broken country in front of the enemy's right, and as soon as they were in motion the transport was moved in solid mass down the bed of the nala. When nearing the bend of the nala round the big spur fire ras suddenly opened on the transport from a couple of small buildings, which had been passed by the infantry in the advance, and one native driver was killed. As soon as the 22nd Punjabis from above, and 4 companies 59th Rifles who were with the baggage, saw what had happened they made a combined attack on the buildings, and No. 8 Mountain Battery fired a couple of shells into them at 600 yards. The attack was most successful : the 22nd Punjabis killing one man, and the 59th Rifles led by Lieutenant- Colonel Carruthers, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Anderson surrounding the remainder. Lieutenant Anderson led the storming party, and was himself the first man into the buildings. All the enemy, 6 in number, were either shot or bayonetted with the loss of only onc sepoy, 59th Rifles, wounded. After this episode the advance of the 53rd Siklis on the left, and their capture of some of thic enemy's sangars on that flank, dislodged a body of some two or three hundred of the cnemy who were apparently lying in ambush in a nala. These filed up hill on which the enemy's right had been sangaral, where they came under the fire of all the guns and suffered heavy losses, whilst some of the 53rd Sikhs also started up the hill in pursuit. As all opposition from in front now ceased the troops moved on to the bivouac selected near Had village, and commenced to settle down and entrench the perimeter. When the rear-guard however had nearly reached the place where the 5 ghazis had opened fire from the two buildings, they were suddenly opened on from the left bank of the nala by some of the enemy, who must cither have remained hidden in the nalas and let the 53rd Siklis pass over them, or else have crept back unseen when the 53rd had passed on. Four casualties occurred quickly at onc spot, the removal of the wounded men being well carried out under the leadership of Captain I louston, 53tli Rifles, who hinself with one man went back for the lavildar first wounded. This was the last fighting that day, though the camp was is usual fired into at night, but without much result. Our casualties on the 21th ucru slight, being 11 native rank and file wounded, onc of whom subsequently dicd. the steep ·OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BRIGIDE FROY 2078 TO 2678 DAY. 55 At 5-30.1.31. the following morning the force left Had and formed up in the nala-bed, where time was given for the mules to water, after which the force marched unopposed to the Kota Taraf Pass. The rear-guard however, which left camp at 7-10 A.M. after burning Had village, was followed up for a short distance by a few of the enemy, and one man of the 53rd Sikhis was wounded. At 91.1. a column consisting of the 22nd Punjabis and 2 guns left the nala and proceeded to Gumbatai, the home of Mir Baz, which they destroyed. By 10 a.l. the force had arrived at the foot of the slope leading up to the Kota Taraf Pass, where the transport was split up into two columns, as there were two tracks leading to the pass itself. At 12 noon the Gumbatai column rejoined the main body and by 2-10 P 21. the entire transport had crossed the pass. The force then moved into camp near Mulla Kalai on the banks of the Danish Kol, where water was very good and plentiful. The force had now arrived in Isa Khel territory, and as this clan had already sent in their submission, together with the Burhan Khel, to the Political Officer at Nahakki, no opposition was offered, and for the first time since leaving Dand the camp was not fired into at night. Additional rest was, moreover, afforded to the troops by the Isa Khel undertaking the duty of furnishing the outlying piquets for the camp. Next day the brigade remained in camp at Mulla Kalai, where according to orders previously issued to General Barrett a convoy arrived from the 2nd Brigade at Nabakki, brivging provisions for the 1st Brigade during its return march viâ the Pandiali valley to Matta. The day was rendered very disagreeable by a bad dust-storm, which swept over the camp during the afternoon and lasted till late in the evening. The same day, as the jirgas of thc Utmanzai and Datezai had not yet complicd with Government terms, Sir James Willcocks issued orders for the following action to be taken: - The force at Nahakki, with the following troops from Mulla Kalai :-- 1 Squadrons 21st Cavalry 22nd Punjabis 2 Guns 28th Mountain Battery 55th Rifles ·56 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHJANDS, 1903. were to move against Yakh Dand, and thence, if necessary, over the Shatai Pass into Dawezai territory to ensure the full compliance on the part of the Utmanzai and Dawezai with Government terms. General Barrett was then to proceed to Koda Khel and, failing this section's submission, to inflict summary punishment on it, returning thence via the Khapak Pass to Ghalanai. Meanwhile the remainder of the 1st Brigade were to remain halted for another day at Dſulla Kalai, and then to return to Blatta by the Pandiali route, executing the terms of punislıment already agreed upon en route. On the following morning General Barrett moved out of Mulla Kalai, with troops as per margin, and 2 Squadrons, 21st Cavalry. marched along the Danish Kol towards 23rd Jountain Battery. 2 guns, 23th Mountain Bat. Yakh Dand. On reaching Yakh Dand tery. the force was met by a portion of the Seaforth Highlanders. 23th Punjabis. Utmanzai jirga, who stated that they 55th Rifles. were willing to pay the fine for the whole 4 Companies, 22nd Punjabis Telephone section. clan, and suggested that the houses of Joine I en route from Nghall those who had been unwilling to submit. 31th Pioneers. No. 1 Company, Sappers and should be destroyed. This was agreed to and carried out. The Dawezai jirga, who had apparently been observing the course of events from the neighbouring hill tops, arrived and begged to be allowed to make complete submission on the irreducible minimum of thic terms originally offered them. This Sir James Willcocks, who had accompanied the force, also agreed to, and as there was now no need to proceed beyond Yakh Dand thc force marched to Nalakki, and camped there for the night. A few shots were fired by tho Utmanzai, who had rcſused to submit, as the rear-guard left Yakh Dand, but without result. Meanwhile General Anderson with his force, now reduced to 3 battalions infantry, 1 Mountain Battery and 1 Company Sappers aud Jliners remained at Julla Kalai. Jliners.

·CHAPTER X. DESTRUCTION OF KODA KHEL BY 2ND BRIGADE, AYD RETURY OF 1$T- AND 2ND BRIGADES TO PESH.TAR tery, All the various clans who had risen against Government had: now either submitted or suffered heavy punishment, with the single exception of the Koda Khel Baezai. This clan, however, presuming on the fact that we had burnt Kung and yet not destroyed their own village, were now boasting that we did not dare to attack them. It was therefore necessary to make a second expedition up the Bohai Dag to chastise them after which the Mohmand Field Force could evacuate the enemy's country without any loss of prestige. Consequently on * 14 Squadrons, 21st Cavalry. the morning of the 28th May the troops 23rd Peshawar, Mountain at Nahakki* moved out at 5-30 A.M. for Bittery. 2 guns, 28th Mountain Bat. the old camp at Ata Jor, leaving only 1 Seaforth Highlanders a small detachment of cavalry and the Battalio, Guides Infantry 55th Rifles to hold Nahakki. No or- 22nd Punjabis. 28th Punjabas position was offered and camp was Battalon, 34th Pioneers. reached without incident, where half 54th Sikhs battalion Guides Infantry, from Ghalanai, and half battalion 34th Pioneers, joined the force. The latter, though starting from Nahakkı, had marched to Ata Jor viâ the Nahakki and Khapak Passes and had spent the day improying the road for the return of the force to Ghalanai viâ the Khapak Pass. On the 29th the force advanced to Koda Khel, leaving one company from each battalion and a half battalion, 22nd Punjabis, with two guns 23rd Mountain Battery to hold the camp, while a half battalion, 34th Pioneers, was also left to continue work on the track over the Klapak. As the force advanced the ridge to the left of the road south-east of the village of Kutai pas occupied without opposition by two companies, 28th Punjabis, which were left with orders to remain there for the day, and cover the retirement of the rest of the force in tlic evening. On arriving opposite the village of Kutaithe Seaforth Highlanders were detached from the column ( 57 ) 1

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·CHAPTER X. DESTRUCTION OF KODA KHEL BY 2ND BRIGADE, AND RETURY OF 1ST* AND 2ND BRIGADES TO PESHAFAR. tery ALL the various clans who had risen against Government had: now either submitted or suffered heavy punishment, with the single exception of the Koda Khel Baezai. This clan, however, presuming on the fact that we had burnt Kung and yet not destroyed their own village, were now boasting that we did not dare to attack them. It was therefore necessary to make a second expeditiou up the Bohai Dag to chastise them after which the Mohmand Field Force could evacuate the enemy's country without any loss of prestige. Consequently on * 14 Squadron, 21st Cavalry. the morning of the 28th Day the troops 23rd Peshawar, Mountain at Nalakki* moved out at 5-30 A.M. for Bittery. 2 guns, 28th Mountain Bat. the old camp at Ata Jor, leaving only a small detachment of cavalry and the 1 Seaforth Highlandera | Battalion), Guides Infantry 55th Rifles to hold Nahakki. No op- 32nd Punjabis. 28th Punjabi position was offered and camp was Battalon, 34th Pioneers. reached without incident, where half 54th Sikhs battalion Guides Infantry, from Ghalanai, and half battalion 34th Pioneers, joined the force. The latter, though starting from Nahakki, had marched to Ata Jor via the Nahakkı and Khapak Passes and had spent the day improv. ing the road for the return of the force to Ghalanai viâ thic Khapak Pass. On the 29th the force advanced to Koda Khel, leaving one company from each battalion and a lialf battalion, 22nd Punjabis, with two guns 23rd Mountain Battery to hold the camp, while a. half battalion, 34th Pioneers, was also left to continue work on the track over the Khapak. As the force advanced the ridge to the left of the road south-east of the village of Kutai was occupied without opposition by two companies, 28th Punjabis, which were left with orders to remain there for the day, and cover the retirement of the rest of the force in the evening. On arriving opposite the village of Kutaithe Seaforth Highlanders were detached from the pri ( 37 ) ·58 OPERATIONS AGAINST THD MOHJANDS, 1908. with orders to move over the low hills bayond the village and occupy the ridge east of Koda Khel, and the 4 guns of the 23rd Mountain Battery came into position on the right flank of the Highlanders. The rest of the column followed the nala-bed as far as the entrance to the Koda Khel valley, from which point the Guides crossed the valley and commenced to climb the commanding hills west of the village covered by the fire of tiro guns 28th Mountain Battery, whilst the 54th Sikhis advanced along the nala cast of the village and climbed the heights to the south. When this had been done the Pioneers and Sappers advanced direct on the village and commenced the work of destruction. Two companies 28th Punjabis meanwhile held a spur north of the ridge occupied by the Guides, and the reserves, consisting of a half battalion 22nd -Punjabis and three companies 28th Punjabis, remained under cover in the valley below. The cavalry held the open plain to the north. A few of the enemy - who tried to hold the village were quickly dislodged. Their main force however kept to the high ridges, where they opposed the advance of the Guides and the 54th, and finally withdrew to the watershed line near the Afghan boundary, from which they kept up a fire on our advanced posts throughout the day. At 12-30 p.u. when the villages had been completely destroyed, the force commenced to retire. As soon as our troops had left the villages, the 54th Sikhs began to withdraw from the heights above, with the enemy following closely. The Guides were the next to retire and were also followed up. The Seaforths were then ordered to hold on and form a pivot, until the rest of the force got clear of the Koda Khel valley, and then retire south-east through the low hills around Kutai. The enemy's fire soon slackened and the whole force reached camp at about 6 P.M. Our casualties during the day were Lieutenant W. Young, 67th Punjabis (attached 54th Sikhs), dangerously wounded, and 14 native rank and file wounded, the majority of these occurring during the withdrawal of the Guides and 54th Sikhs from the hills overlooking the village. During the night there was heavy firing into camp resulting in three casualties amongst the men, while nine mules and one camel were wounded. Next day the force returned to Ghalanai. Early in the morning the Guides, 22nd Punjabis and 2 guns 28th Mountain Battery, were ·DESTRUCTIOY OF KODA KHEL BY 2VD BRIGADE, ETC. 1 59 sent on to hold the Klapak Pass and piquet the heights to Ghalanai, and the main body left camp at 9-30 A.M. when the piquets had taken up their positions. The road over the pass was found to be very easy especially on the west side, where the ascent is very gradual, and no check occurred for, to avoid blocking the pass, the camels were sent on in advance, the mule transport following an hour later. On the withdrawal of the piquets from the pass after the column bad passed through, the enemy opened fire from the pass, and two sepoys of the Guides were slightly wounded, but no attempt at following up was made. The march was a long one, and in spite of the fact that there was little opposition, it was 7 P.M. before the rear-guard reached Ghalanai, where a new camp had been prepared for the brigade by the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication. During the day, when the rear-guard of General Barrett's column passed the Nahakki Pass, the troops under Colonel Nicholls which had been left to hold Nalakki moved down and joined the main force in their retirement to Ghalanai. Shortly after reaching camp Lieutenant Young succumbed to his wounds, and was buried at 7 P.M. the same evening. The objects of the expedition had now been accomplished and there only remained the retirement to Shabkadar to be carried out. The force under Brigadier-General Anderson, which had remained halted on the 27th May at Mulla Kalai, had already reached Garhi Sadar, after a three days' march down the Pandiali valley, during which they carried out the terms of punishment imposed on the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel, and agreed upon by them at Nahakki. On the 28th May the force left Mulla Kalni, and moving up the Garang Nala, crossed the Garang Pass, which had been reconnoitred and improved on the previous day. This pass thouglı very steep was in good order for mule transport and the entire baggage crossed in two hours, the force reaching camp at Lagham, 10 miles from Mulla Kalai, at 3-15 p.31. The next day was spent at Lagham, whilst a reconnaissance was carried out down the Baliu river towards the Swat, and the Sappers and Jliners improved the road over the Burjina Pass for the following day.

·60 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MORMANDS, 1908. Two demolition parties were also sent out, which destroyed four villages under the directions of the Political Officer with the force. On the 30th the final stage into Garhi Sadar was completed, and the troops moved into a camp which had been arranged and pitched by the 3rd Brigade. The march of 9 miles from Lagham proved very difficult, especially a distance of 4 miles from the top of the Burjina Kotal, and the track would have been impossible for any but mule transport. On the same day a portion of the 2nd Brigade marched to Hafiz Kor, the remainder, consisting of the Guides, 22nd Punjabis, 28th Punjabis, and 2 guns 28th Mountain Battery, following on the next day. This division of the force was carried out to avoid overcrowding the route. During the following days both brigades dispersed, units returning to their respective peace stations. The expedition now ended had been most successful. All the tribesmen through whose territory the force had passed had submitted and paid the fines imposed on them, with the exception of the Kandahari Safis and the Koda Khel, and both of these latter had suffered severely. Further, the jirgas of the assured clans, i.e., Pandiali Mohmands, Gandao Halimzai, and Kamali Halimzai and also of the Khwaizai, attended at Ghalanai before the force left that place, and informed the Political Officer of their intention to prevent any Baezai raiding party from passing through their territory. This promise was ratified in writing and signed by the leading maliks. Our casualties from the commencement of the rising till the force left independent territory amounted to 52 killed (or died of wounds) and 205 wounded of all ranks; whilst those of the enemy were estimated at about 150 killed. Besides these casualties among men our force sustained the loss of 185 horses killed and wounded, a large proportion of which were hit in camp at night giving an idea of the amount of night firing done by the enemy.

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·ii OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHKANDS, 1908. Second Brigade. (2) Major-General A. A. Barrett, C.B. Commanded his Brigade, and on several occasions mixed forces, with unqualified success. At Sur Dag on 18th May he drove the enemy from their positions without a check, and his retirement from Koda Khel was a fine sample of frontier warfare. I specially commend him to His Excellency's notice. (ii) Major H. MI. Allen, 25th Cavalry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. REGIMENTAL OFFICERS. :} 22nd Punjabis. : } 53rd Sikhs. 13 Ist Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel C A. Fowler Major S. H. Climo, D.3.0., 24th Punjabis Lieutenant W.F.R. Webb Major P. J. Miles JF Finnis Major F. W. B. Gray Captain C. G. Ames, 52nd Sikhs Lieutenant W.$ Trail . Captain and Adjutant R. S. Gordon Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Carruthers Lieutenant B. E Anderson Captain H. dec. O'Grady 57th Rifles. 3.50 59th Rifles. 2nd Brigade. • }26th Punjabis. Colonel W. E. Phillips Captain M R. Pocock Major RW. Falcon Captain A. Mr Houston 54th Sikhs. 55th Rifles . Divisional Troops. Colonel G B. Unwin Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel V. B Fane Captain F. A. Jackson Captain and Adjutant O. M. Dyke Major F. W. S. Stanton 21st Cavalry. Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel R. W Fuller, Captain J. R E. Charles, D 5.0, B E 8th British Mountant Battery 28th Mountam Battery. 6th Co, Sappers and Diners. 34th Pioneers. Roman Catholic Chaplain, Major G. E L Gulbert, Revd Father Looman. Medical Services, Major O. R. A. Julian, CMG, B.A.C.

·APPENDII I. 19 97 72 77 Supply and Transport. Major C.H.G Moore, D S.O. Supply and Transport Corps. Lieutenant E. H. Lancaster. Ist Mule Corps. 2nd-Lieutenant Kunwar Purthi Singh 51st Camel Corps. For distinguished service at Matta Major P. T. Westmoreland 1st Battalion, Royal 2nd Lieutenant A L. Hume-Spry (died of wounds). Major D. Sapte . Ist Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers. The undermentioned officers did exceptionally good work : Brigadier-General J G Ramsay, C.B Colonel H. R Thatchcad R.A.M.C. Lieutenant-Colonel ABC Williams Supply and Transport Corps. A. R Dick 22nd Cavalry. R G Strange Royal Field Artillery. GR Crawford 40th Pathans. Captain J Woods Indian Medical Service. JR Broun Khaibar Rifles, H Fawcus 80th Field Battery, R. A. Lieutenant L V. Bond Royal Engineers. The following non-commissioned officers and men specially distinguished themselves by gallantry in the field :- 9515 Private Edward Baines 1st Battalion, Northum- 8221 Joseph Peter Carruthers berland Fusiliers. 6307 Sergeant Joseph Milledge 1st Battalion, Royal 332 Lance Corporal Walter Moore Warwickshire Reg- 832 Private Albert Stone ment. I commend the undermentioned warrant and non-commissioned officers to His Excellency. They have been brought to notice for exceptionally good work- Conductor H G. Booth, Supply and Transport Corps. Staff-Sergeant G. H Sercombe, Telegraph Department. Sergeant J. Elder, Supply and Transport Corps. 1st class Assistant Surgeon J. Lee, Indian Subordinate Medical Department, My best thanks are due to Major Blakeray, Chief Political Officer with the Force, for his advice and assistance in all political matters. The valuable services rendered by him will be known to Government through the separate reports sent to the Foreign Department. Captain W. J. Keen, Indian Army, who was Political Officer on the border before the formation of the Field Force, and was present at the action of Jatta, did most useful work and much assisted us in our arrangements during those trying times. :} 27 ·iv OPERATIONS JGAINST THE JOHVANDS, 1908. I desire to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the following native officers for their gallantry and faithful service in the field. 'Seven thousand native troops were engaged in the fighting area and they have well upheld the high traditions of the Indian Army. The story of Jemadar llit Afzal Khan, 22nd Punjabis, who was killed at Kasai, is in itself alone an episode which will live in frontier history :- 21st Cavalry (Frontier Force). Risaldar-Wajor Janmeja Singh. Ressaldar Thakur Singh. 23rd Mountain Battery. Jemadar Fatta. 19th Punjabis. Jemadar Jalal Khan (attached to 22nd Punjabis). 20th Punjabis. Subadar Khwaja Muhammad. 22nd Punjabis. Subadar-Major Kartar Singh. Subadar Allah Nur. Jemnadar Mr Afzal Khan (killed). 28th Punjabis. Mihan Singh. Subadar Umraz Khan 34th Sikh Pioneers. Subadar-)[ajor Narayan Singh. Subadar Natha Singh. 53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force). Subadar Sayyid Ah. Jemadar Sarban Singh. Jemadar Arsla Khan. 54th Sikhs (Frontier Force). Subadai Dayal Singh. 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force). Subadar-\lajor Zargun Shah, Bahadur.

·Officers, 29 killed, 13 died of wounds, 177 wounded, nal APPENDIX I 57th Wilde's Rifles (Frontier Force). Subadar-Major Bisbn Single Subadar arsla Khan. Hospital Assistant Kehr Singh. 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force). Subadar-Major Ditt Singh Subadar Makhmad Jan. Jemadar Jahan Dad Khan. Khyber Rifles. Subadar-Major Jawas Khan. Subadar Tor Khan 50th Silladar Camel Corps. Risaldar Nazır Mahomed Attached is a return of casualties. I have, etc., JAMES WILLCOCKS, Major-General, Commanding, Alohmand Field Force. RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN ACTION, MOHMAND FIELD FORCE, FROM 19TH APRIL TO IST JUNE 1908. Summary. British officers --4 killed, 3 died of wounds, 9 wounded, nil missing. Native British and Native N.-C. O.'s and men missing. Followers.--2 killed, 1 died of wounds, 19 wounded, nil missing. } NOMINAL RETURN OF BRITISH OFFICERS KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS, WOUNDED AND MISSING 1.- Killed. Rank. Name. Nature of wound. Major N. Maclachlan, Ist Seaforth Gunshot wound, head, acci. Highlanders. dental. Major H. Coape-Smith, Ilth Lancers Ditto chest Lieutenant G.I. Soole, 21st Cavalry Ditto chest. Lieutenant Ditto bead. G. F. Archibald, Sepd Punjabis (attached 57th Rifles). 1 ·vi OPERATIONS AGAI.YST THE JOHISANDS, 1908. + II.- Died of wounds. Rank. Yame. Vature of wound, Lieutenant G. Đ. Vartin, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment. Gunshot wound, thigh. Lieutenant Ditto abdomen. W. Young, 67th Punjabis (attached 51th Sikhs). 2nd Lieutenant 'A. L. Hume-Spry, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment, Ditto ditto. III.-Wounded. Rank. Wame. Description of wound dangerous, severe or slight. Nature of wound. Captain E.T. Rich, Royal Engineers Slight Gunshot wound, left arm. Captain Ditto thigh. . C. W. Wreford-Brown, Serere D.9 O., 1st Northumber. land Fusiliers. Lieutenant. Ditto chest. C. O. V. Gray, Ist Seaforth Dangerous Highlanders. Lieutenant . Ditto do, H, T. C. Irens, 26th Pun Dangerous jabıs (attached 54th Sikhs) Lieutenant. Serere Ditto 1}, D. Campbell, 10th Pathans. left thigh. Lieutenant. . Ditto right arm. G. E. Bruce, 53rd Sikhs Slight S. J. B. Sparling, 57th Rides Slight Lieutenant. Ditto skull Captain Ditto left arm. R. F. Finlay, 58th Rifles Slight (attached 57th Rifles) Captain Serere Ditto - H. dec. O'Grady, 59th Rifles, left thigh and thumb. 80883 ·IPPEYDII I. vii IV.-Missing-Nil. NOMLAL RETURN OF XATIVE OFFICERS, BRITISH AND NATIVE N. C. Os. AND JIEX, KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS, WOUNDED AND MISSING. I.-Killed. Regimental No. Rank. Vame Natura of wound, British Troops. 9513 Prvate. SH Vorris, 1st Northumberland Fusiliers Gunshot wound, abdomen. 893 33 HG Rose, Ist Northumberland Fusiliers. Ditto chest. 4107 Corporal. Ditto J. Satchwell, Ist Royal Warwick Regiment, chest, acci dental 9138 Private. Ditto abdomen. W Adams, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment. 0546 J. White, Ist Seaforth Highlanders Ditto head, acci dental Nature Troops 2034 Sowar Raj Bal, 13th Lancers Gunshot wound, lead. 417 Sepoy Farid Khan, 19th Punjabis Ditto accidental. 387 Bugler Ditto ditto. Natha Singh, 21st Punjabis Mir Afzal Khan, 22nd Punjabi Jemadar Ditto and head chest. 3917 Lance-Haveldar Badan Singh ditto Ditto head. 3561 Naik Varain Singh detto Ditto peck 3874 ) Mansa Singh ditto Ditto head. 4389 39 Par Bakhsh datto Ditto do. 3966 Sepoy Kirpa Singh ditto Ditto do. 3361 Prem Singh ditto Ditto do. 37911 Fazal Bag dit to Ditto do. 110 Yatla Singh ditto Ditto do. 203 Shib Singh ditto Ditto cliest ·yili OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHJANDS, 1908. 1,-Killed-contd. Rogi. mental No. Rank. Name. Nature of yound. 565 Naik Nidhan Singh, 34th Proncers. Sword cuts, multiple. 1262 Sepoy Bhulla Singh datto Ditto ditto. 2329 Ganda Singh ditto Ditto 39 ditto. 2381 Sham Singh, 51th Sikhs, F. F. Gunshot wound, abdomen, Jemadar Ganda Singh, 57th Rifles, F. F. Ditto chest. 2110 Sepoy Amal Din ditto Ditto head 1553 Devi Singh ditto. Ditto chest. 9 2148 Suchet Singh ditto Ditto neck. 3021 Abdulla ditto. Ditto chest. 23711 Dost Muhammad ditto Ditto do. Subadar. Fateh Singh, 59th Rifles Ditto head. II.-Died of wounds. British Troops. Nul. Native Troops. 339 Lance-Naik 8th Mountain Shafuddin, Battery. Gunshot wound, chest 2725 Trumpeter Rur Singh, 21st Cavalry, F. F. Ditto head. 4713 Sepoy Jawala Singh, 22nd Punjabis Ditto abdomen 203 Nur Vuhammad, + ditto. Ditto chest. 3419 Nawab Ali, ditto Ditto back and abdomen, 4712 Punjab Singh, 28th Punjabis. Ditto head. 3801 Ditto do. Kashmir Singh, 53rd Sikhs, FF. Labh Smgh, 51th Sikhs, F. F. 2443 Ditto abdomen.

·APPENDII 1. ix 11.—Died of wounds-contd. Regimental No. Rank, Name Nature of wound. 1846 Sepoy Chand Khan, 55th Rifles, F. F. Gunshot wound, chest. 2364 Wazır Singh, 57th Rifles, F.F, Ditto abdomen. 2013 Kharku, ditto . Ditto ditto, 4127 Asghar Khan, 59th Rules, F. F. Ditto chest. 11 4277 Bahadur Singh, litto Ditto left thigh. III.-Wounded. Regi. mental No. Rank Name Description of wound dangerous, severe or slight. Nature of wound, British Troops 25889 Gunner Dangerous. Gunshot wound, leg. H Price, 8th Mountain Battery, R. G. A 21131 Ditto G. II Colenutt, 71st Sight Company, R GA. right fore-arm. 704 Sergeant Ditto H Morgan, 80th Severe Battery, R F.A. left shoulder. 5199 Ditto Colour-Sergeant A. Pearce, 1st Slight Northumberland Fusiliers. right arm, 9295 Sergeant Ditto chin. W. H. S Blades, Ist Northumberland Fusdiers. *** 7803 Private Ditto W. Dewse, Ist Screre Northumberland Fusiliers. both thighs and wrist Ditto abdomen. 332 | Lance Corporal. W. Moore, Ist Royal Dangerous. Iarwick Regiment.

·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHJANDS, 1908. III.--Wounded-contd. Regi. mental No. Rank Name. Description of wound dangerous, sesere or slight. Nature of round. 9134 Private Gunshot wound, arm. A. Pickard, Ist Slight Royal Warwick Regiment. 426 Ditto B. Wincup, 1st Serero Royal Warwick Regiment. left thigh. 6731 Ditto do. 21 C. Gould, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment 316 Ditto left foot. . 32 J. Gurney, lst Royal Warwick Regiment 9101 Ditto chest. H. Lloyd, Ist Royal Warpack Regiment. II Ditto left arm. > H. Nixon, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment. 1 34 Ditto G. West, Ist Royal TYarmick Regiment. right foot. 832 Fracture, right thigh. A. Stone, 1st Royal Warwick Regiment 277 D. Gregory, Ist Sught Royal Wartrick Regiment. Gunshot round, right shoulder 7774 Ditto 0. Oliver, 1st Royal Tarpick Regiment. right arm. 8136 Ditto tight ear- A. Jay, Ist Royal Warwick Regiment. 4921 Ditto ditto. 99 J. Spicrs, 1st Royal Iarwick Regiment.

·APPENDII I. III.-Wounded-contd. Regimental No. Rank, Yame. Description of wounddangerous, sei ere or slight Nature of pound. 8953 Private. Muir, Ist Royal Sercre Warwick ment Regi ---- I Gupshot wound, left forearm, accidental. 6535 Ditto H. Homer, 1st Seaforth Highlanders left lowcr extremity. 9518 Slight Ditto back. H King, Ist Seaforth Highlanders. 1 9145 Dangerous. Ditto A. Bain, 1st Seaforth Highlanders. neck. Ditto 5736 Colour-Sergeant J Brown, Ist Royal Severe Munster Fusiliers right arro. 6582 Private. Ditto do, T Carroll, Ist Royal Slight Munster Fusiliers 6938 Ditto lcft arn. E. Lynch, 1st Royal Sercre Munster Fusiliers N'alice Troops 2485 Sonar Setere . Gulab Singh, 19th Lancers. Gunshot wound, mouth, Dafadar P. Kırpal Singh, 21st Slight Caralry, F. F. Wound, right finger due to explosion of gunpowder. Gunshot wound, forearm. 2541 Naik Severe . Tulsi Das, 21st Caralry, T. F. 3050 Sowar Sabr wound, foot. Santok Singh, 21st Slight Cavalry, F. 1. 3310 Gunshot wound, leg. 1 Abdullasju Khan, 21st Caralry, F.F. 3211 Seuero Ditto Chanan Singh, 21st Caralry, F. F. left thigh. 3292 Ditto head. 21 Khadamali, 21st Slight Cara!ry, F.F. 3357 Ditto do 1 Jurtaza Khan, 21st Caralry, F.F.

·xii OPERATIOVS AGAINST THE NOHJANDS, 1908. III.-Wounded-conti. Regimental No. Rank, Name. Description of wounddangerous, setere or slight. Nature of wound 29-7 Sowar Sevcro left Wali Jan, 21st Caralry, F. F. Fracture, claviclo (fall from horse). 3119 72 Amar Singh, 21st Slight Cavalry, F. F. Gunshot wound (region not given) 59 Gunner. Ditto hcad. i Vobanda Khan, 23rd Mountain Battery. 5185 Sepoy Ditto leg Amir Husain, Severe Guides Infantry. 4268 Lance-Nark Khan, Ditto do. . Ismail Guides Infantry, 1925 Sepoy Ditto Jamal Din, Guides Infantry thigh. 5211 Ditto forcard. ?> Dawar Khan, Guides Infantry. " 4972 Ditto Bishan Singh, Guides Infantry. both legs. 4944 Ditto calf. 99 Zarı Gul, Guides Infantry. 3531 Hayıldar Ditto head. Sandhu Singh, 22nd Slight Punjabis 3557 Ditto do. Chanda Singh, 22nd Punjabis. 1504 Sepoy Ditto forearm. Chanda Singh, 22nd Severe Punjabis. 3707 Lance-Naik Ditto head. Hari Singh, 22nd Slight Punjabis. 231 Sepoy Severe Ditto left arm. Dalp Singh, 22nd Punjabis. 4947 Hayıldar end Slight Ditto face. Jehandad, Punjabis. 1 4016 Sepoy Ditto Basant Singh, 22nd Dangerous. Punjabis. do ·APPENDIT ? xiii III – Wounded-contd. Regi. mental Yo Rapk, Name Designation of wounddangerous, érvere or slight Rature of wound. 3905 Naik Badawa Singh, 22nd Slight | Punjabis. Gunshot wound, leg. 214 Sepoy Severe Ditto neck. Sharif Khan, 22nd Punjabıs, 1281 Lance Naik Slight Ditto head. Kale Khan, 22nd Punjabis 4780 Sepoy 3 Ditto do, Ram Singh, 22nd Punjabis 4931 Lance-Naik 99 Ditto arm. Surain Singli, 22nd Punjabis 357 Sepoy Ditto 9 nose. Fateh Khan, 22nd Punjabis 236 19 Ditto foot Wazir Khan, 22nd Punjaluis. 4285 Serere Ditto Hasan Muhammad, 2rd Punjabis Jeft shoulder. 319 Ditto back. Hetam Khan, 22nd Sught Punjabis. 229 Ditto Dewan Ali, 22nd Punjabis right thumb. 4718 29 Ditto shin. Lal Singh, 22nd Punjabis. 4988 Ditto 99 left hand. Injur Gul, 22nd Punjabıs. Nagipa Singh', 22nd Panjabis. 91 Serere Ditto right les 316 Ditto Deck, 22 Indar Singh, 22nd Punjabis. 71 Ditto Nand Singh,, 28th Punjabis. both thighs. 4422 Ditto bead. Karm Singh, 28th Dangerous. Panjabis. Tota, 13th Punjabi Slight 395 Ditto shoulder.

·xiv OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOMJANDS, 1908. III.-Wounded-contd. Regi. mental No. Rank, Name. Description of wounddangerous, severo or slight. Nature of wound. 3924 Lance-Naik Serere Gunshot wound, leg. Uttam Singh, 28th Punjabis. 123 Sepoy Dangerous. Ditto Tarlok Singh, 28th Punjabis head, with wound of brain 87 > Ditto left knee. Zugir, 28th Pun Severe jabıs. Saudagar Singh, Sight 31th Pioneers 1974 Ditto right arm. 773 Ditto leg. Ram Singh, 34th Serere Pioncers 2535 Ditto do, > Natha Singh, 34th Pioneers. 3701 Slight Ditto Ganda Singh, 40th Pathans. forehead. Subadar Ditto Said Ali, 53rd Sikhs, Serere F.F. right shoulder. 1791 Havıldar Tara Singh, do. Ditto left leg. > 2130 Gul Akhmad, do. Ditto head. 27 3007 Naik Lal Khan, do. Slight Ditto right upper arm. 2315 Lance-Naik Afzal Khan, do. Dangerous. Ditto chest. . 3426 Sepoy Sohan Singh, do. Severe Ditto left wrist, 3715 Nur Khan, do. Dutto left knee accidental. 3315 Kehr Singh, do. Slight Ditto . right fore-arma. 3591 Amar Singh, do. Ditto left thigh. 3514 Nangu Khan, do. Dangerous. Ditto chest.

·APPL.VDIXI XV III –Wounded-contd. egi. ental No. Rank. Name Designation of wounddangerous, gerere or slight. Nature of sound 3351 Sepoy Sikandar Khan, 53rd Sight Sikhs, F.F. Gunshot wound, right ankle 3526 Gurdit Singh, do Severe Ditto 37 lower jaw 1001 Hayıldar Ditto head. Galardo, 54th Sikhs, Slight F.F. Hashmat Al, do Dangerous 1312 Ditto left thigh. 997 Naik Thaman Singh, do Severe Ditto right thigh 2699 Sepoy Kadir Khan, do Ditto chest 99 2603 » Makan Singh, do Ditto 7 left forearm. 2315 Jawala Singh, do Dangerous Ditto ditto. 2499 Ditto ditto. 72 Jagat Singh, (Ist) Sercre do, 2513 Ditto finger Jagat Singh, (2nd) do. 2597 Bishn Singli, do. Ditto do. 2592 Dangerous. Ditto do. 2533 Makan Singh, do. Bakht Jamal, do Badhawa Singh do. Ditto right leg. 19 1933 Ditto 11 lung and laver. 2215 Partab Singh, do Slight Ditto face. 11 981 Bhawal Babhish, do. Ditto hcad. 19 2023 Jai Dayal, do. Ditto right forearm. 2598 do. Hira Singh, Ditto left wrist. $ 51 0238 Punjab Singh, do Ditto face. 91 ·xvi OPERATIONS AGAINST THIE MOHLANDS, 1908. 111.--Wounded-contd. Regimental No, Rank, Namc. Description of rounddangerous, severe or slight Nature of tround. Subadar-Major. Sught Bullet bruise, abdomen. Zargun Shah, Ba. hadur, 55th Rifles, F. F. 172 Havaldar Kisbun Singh, do. | Dangerous Ditto chest. 836 Blir Dost, do. Sercro 33 Gunshot wound, right thigh. 1300 Lance-Naik Basant Singh, do Ditto right leg. . 1756 Bugler Dan Singh, do 12 Ditto finger. 1473 Sepoy Dasonda Singh, do. Ditto right leg. 1117 Bahadur, do Slight Ditto left knee. 2056 Abdul Kalım, do. Severa Ditto foot 77 1090 Dr Ahmad, do Slight Ditto 1 both arms and chin 1141 Hari Singh, do. Severo Ditto right foro-arm. 1566 Phandi, do Dangerous. Ditto left leg 1753 Mangal Singh, do Ditto right thigh. 2053 Ishar Singh, do. Ditto 92 left knee. 2109 Nur Jir, do. Slight Bullet bruise, left arm. >>> 969 Firoz Khan, do > Gunshot wound, head. 1 Jcmadar. Serere Ditto Bhagat Singh, 57th Rifles, F.E. nght thigh and hand, 928 Havıldar. Gujar Singh, do. Ditto left thigh, ·APPENDIX I. xvii. III.-Wouded-nconid. Regimental No. Rank, Name. Description of wound dangerous, sciere or slight. Nature of wound. 11554 Havildar Sberulla, 57th Rifles, Slight F.F. Gunshot wound, left hand, 1613 Bahawal Khan, do. Severe Ditto left leg. . 73 1739 Muzaffar Khan, do Slight Ditto detto. 1964 Lance-Naik Dewa Singh do >> Ditto right shoulder, 1953 Drab Khan, do. Severe Ditto left thigh. 2068 Ditto Ihmad Khan, do. > 31 right, wrist. 2172 Salim Khan, do Ditto left eye. 29 1958 Subdaral Singh, do. Slight Ditto 2 right taigh. 1628 Sidhu, do Ditto ditto, > 2131 Muhammad Khan, do Severe Ditto right foro-arm. 1453 Sarandaz, du. Dangerous. Ditto neck, 2748 Sepoy Sharlat Khan, do. Slight Contusion, right knce. 2913 Batan Singh, do. Serere . Gunshot wound, right knec. 1772 Das, do Ditto nght thigh. 1993 Malla Singh, do. Ditto chest, 3 2723 Kashim Khan, do. Slight Ditto 19 left for srm. 2000 Hazrat Mir, so. Sovere Ditto right groin. 2012 Bhan Singh, do Ditto nght hand. 2113 Jul Singh, do. Ditto left hand.

·xviii OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHVANDS, 1908. III.-Wounded-contd. Regi mentall Rank, Name. Description of wounddangerous, severe or slight. Nature of yound. No. 2014 | Sepoy Gunshot wound, abdomen. Birju, 57th Rifles, Slight F. F. 2436 Bakar Khan, do. Severo 1 Ditto left wrist. . 2587 Gayan Singh, do. Slight Ditto right arm. 1731 Bir Singh, 7 do. Ditto " right foot, 2577 Vir Zaman, do Severe Ditto left hand. 2910 Farman Ali, do. Ditto right foot. 2986 Zaman All, do Ditto 93 left hand. 2947 Ditto 90 Fateh Muham. mad, right thigh do, 2158 Slight Ditto Bakhtawar Khan, 1? right fore-arm, do. 2679 Khoasta Khan, do Ditto right shoulder. 2323 Hamid Gul, do. Dangerous Ditto head 3 Subadar Ditto Muhammad Khan, Slight 59th Rifles, F. F. scalp Jemadar Severo Ditto Jahandad Khan, 59th Rifles, F. F. right ankle. 2060 Haruldar Ditto Bal Singh, 59th Rifles, F.F. night shoulder. 3085 Ditto left leg. 91 Bukkan Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F. 3215 Ditto ditto. P1 Sultan Ali, 59th Rifles, F.F. 4230 Sepoy Inar Singh, 59th Rifles, F. r. 7 Ditto night knce.

·4PPENDIX I. xix III.-- Wounded--Cunid. Regi. mental Yo. Rank. Yame. Description of wounddangerous, severelor slight. Nature of wound. 1112 Sepoy Severe Kaka Singh, 69th Rifles, F.F. Gunshot wound, left shoulder. 3943 Ditto Jeft 13 Bishan Singh, 59th Rifles, FF thigh. +367 Ditto right leg. Jawar Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F. 91 4173 Ditto chest. 73 > Gurmukh Singh, 59th Rifles, F. F. 1174 Ditto mouth Gul Nur, 59th Rafles, Dangerous, F.F. 4288 Ditto lcft leg 93 Ghulam Jan, 59th Slight Rifles, F F. 4112 59th eft al. 39 19 Tara Sugh, Rafles, F.F. 5440 Ditto leg. D Shadman Khan 59th Rifles, F. F. 3759 Serere Ditto Nathu, 59th Rifles, F.F. right foot. 1429 Ditto 11 Lahena Singh, 59th Rifles, F.F. left foro arn. 4100 59th Ditto Lall Singh, Rides, F.F. both thighs. . 4135 Ditto Feroze Khan, 59th Rifles, F. P Icft hand. 4394 Ditto 13 Jurza Khan, 59th Rilles, F, F. left thigh 40.29 Ditto 19 Sauf Ullah, 59th Rifles, F.F +302 Wound, sclap. 11 Habab Shah, 59th Slight Rilles, F.F. 1311 Sercre Ditto. 3) Sarfraz, 59th Ri. fles, F. E ·XX OPORATIONS AGAINST THE MOHN ANDS, 1908. III.-Woundcd-concld. Reg! Rank, Name. Description of wounddangerous, seyere or slight. mental No. Nature of wound. 4337 Sepoy Seyere Gunshot wound, nght leg. Jan Gul, 59th Rifles, F. F. 4212 Ditto Jumma Khan, 59th Riflcs, F.F. chest and left arm. 3605 Ditto 39 Mayya Singh, 59th Rifles, F.F. bead and left thumb. 405 Yar Mast, Khaibar Dangerous. Rifles Ditto ?? left thigh. 1181 Ditto 99 Baranai, Khaibar Slight Rifles. right cheek.) IV.-Missing-Nil. NOMINAL RETURN OF FOLLOWERS, KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS, WOUNDED, AND MISSING. 1.-Killed Rank. Name. Nature of wound. Driver Ghulan Muhammad, 28th Mule Corps. Sword cuts. Feroz, 29th Mule Corps Gunshot wound, head. 1 11.Died of wounds. Rank Name, Nature of wound. Doser Ata Sithammad, 7th Bule Согрѕ. Gunshot wound, abdomen.

·APPENDIX I. xxi III.-Wounded, Rank, Name. Description of wound dangerous, severe or slight. Nature of wound Listri Khan Mur, 1st Jule Corps Slight Gunshot wound, neck Driver All Akbar, ditto Ditto fore. head. Lohar Khan fur, ditto Dangerous. Ditto neck, Driver Niaz Khan, ditto Slight Ditto left leg. . Lancc-Xaik Ditto Raja, Gth Jule Corps . left shin . 17 Syce Diwan, ditto Severo Ditto left thigh. Driter. Fazal Dad, 7th Mule Corps Ditto chest. 3 Mad Gul, ditto Slight Ditto Icft arm. 39 Lanco Naik Halim Gul, 28th Julo Corps . Ditto . 33 tod, rightfouf Ieft lez Sy CO Ram Sahar, 19th Lancers Secro Ditta . Manohar, ditto 3 Yound, Icft leg, crushed by horse. Sowal Khan, 55th Rifles, F. F. Slight Gunshot wound, no.C. Ram Lal, ditto Ditto 9 Icft ankle. Ditto left tlugu. Ditto head, Bearer Abdul Ghafoor, Army Bearer Sercro Corps. Ikki, .irmy Bearer Corps Dangerous. Shamas-ud-dm, 12th Survey Slight Party Prırato Serrant Abdul Ghafur, Ist Scaforth Serero Highlanders, Ditto luft foot Ditto Icit thigh.

·1 xii OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NOHMANDS, 1908. III.-Wounded-contd. Rank Name. Description of wounddangerous, severe or slight Nature of wound. Private Syce. Ram Lal, 22nd Punjabis Severe Gunshot wound, left foot. Grass-cutter Umra, 21st Cavalry, F, F. Slight Ditto (region not given). IV.-Missing-Nil. H. R. WHITEHEAD, Colonel, Principal Medical Officer, Mohmand Field Force. JAMES WILLCOCKS, Major-Gencral, Commanding Dohmand Field Force. 1 PESLAWAB ; 19th June 2008.

·APFENDIX II. STAFF OF JOHNAYD FIELD FORCE. Field Force Staff. General Officer Commanding Major-General Sir Jamcg Willco cks K.CMG,CB, DS.O Aide-de-Camp. Lieutenant A. P Y. Langhorne, R.A. Extra Arde-de-Camp Subadar Khwaja Muhammad Khan. Orderly Officer Lieutenant J. M Blair, Royal Highlanders. Chief Staff Officer Colonel W R Bırdwood, A.D.-C, C.I.E. Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master Colonel A W Money, R.A, General. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Major A W F. Baird, Gordon Highlanders, Press Censor. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General Captain A G Stuart, 40th Pathans. Deputy Assistant Quarter Vaster General Captain G. R. Trotter, 56th Rifles, F. F. (for Intelligence). . . . Attached to Field Force Staff. Commanding Royal Engineer Colonel J E Dickic, R.E. Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer Lieutenant-Colonel W.J Dupdee, R.E. Principal Medical Officer Colonel H. R. Whitehead, RAM C. Senior Veterinary Officer Major A. England, A.V.C. Divisional Supply Officer Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. C. Williams, Supply and Transport Corps.' Divisional Transport Officer Major A. Jullaly, Supply and Transport Corps. Field Treasure Chest Officer and Provost Captain C. Fitz H Lance, 1012 Lancers. Marshal. Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Lieutenant H. B. Tood, Supply and Trans- Officer, port Corps. Divisional Troops Signalling Officer Captain J. G. Heath, The Queen's. Assistant Signalling Officers Lieutenant F. Curtis, 19th Lancers, Lieutenant T. S. Paterson, 1911 Lancers. Survey Officer Captain E. Rich, R.E. Ist Brigade Staff. General Officer Commanding Brigadier-General C. ... Anderson, C.B. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Captain A. L. Tarver, 121th Baluchistan Infantry. Deputy Issistant Quarter Vaster General Captain E. Barwell, 57th Rifles, F. F. Orderly Officer Lieutenant J. A. H. Bannerman, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, (xiii) ·XXIV OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHJANDS, 1908. Provost Sarshal Brigade Supply Officer Attached to ist Brigade Staff. Captain H. N. Holden, 5th Cavalry. Major M. R. James, Supply and Transport Corps. Lieutenant W. Gibson, Northumberland Fusiliers. Brigade Signalling Officer 2nd Brigade Staff. General Officer Commanding Major-General A. A Barrett, C.B Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Major H. M. Allen, 25th Caralry, F. F. Deputy Assistant Quarter Jaster General . Captain J. Bruce, R A. Orderly Officer Captain D. A.D McVean, 45th Sikhs. Attached to 2nd Brigade Staff. Provost Marshal Captain H.J. P. Browne, 5th Gurkha Rifles, F. F. Brigade Supply Officer Captain A H. Babington, Supply and Transport Corps Brigade Signalling Officer . Captain C B Chamley, Seaforth Highlanders. 3rd Brigade Staff. General Officer Commanding Brigadier-Gencral J. G. Ramsay, C B. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Major A I. R. Glasfurd, 97th Infantry. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General Captain W. H. Beach, R.L. Orderly Officer Lieutenant H J. Boyd, 13th Lancers. Brigade Supply Officer Brigade Signalling Officer. Attached to 3rd Brigade Staff. Lieutenant W. R. B. Salmon, Supply and Transport Corps. Lieutenant H C. O'Bricn, Royal Munster Fustlers. . Line of Communication Staff. General Officer Commanding, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Gencral, and Deputy assistant Quarter Master General, of 3rd Brigado in addition to other duties Chief Supply Officer Major G L Saunders, Supply and Trans. port Corps. Chief Transport Officer Major 1. L Amesbury, Supply and Transport Corps Section Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel R G Strange, R F.A. Jajor Ex bank, R.L. 1 Ficld Engineer Base Staff. Base Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel A. R Dick, 22nd Car. alry, F. F. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Major A. S Hamilton, 52nd Sikhs, C.F

·APPENDIX 11.
XIV
Senior Medical Oficer
Officer Commanding British Base Depôt
Officer, Commanding Native Base Depût
Base Ordnance Officer
Supply
.
7)
99
Licutenant-Colonel F P. Nicholls, R.A.J.C.
Captain W. G. R Farmar, R A.
Captain C. J. White, 53rd Sikhs, F. F.
Captain H Clarke, R A.
Aajor E G Vaughan, Supply and Transport
Corps
Jajor J. S. Swan, Supply and Transport
Corps
Captain H. J. P Browne, 5th Gurkha
Rides, F. F (prior and subsequent to his
employment as Provost Jarshal 2nd
Brigade).
» Transport
>
Railway Staff Oficer

·APPENDIX III. EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON ENGINEER OPERATIONS, MOIM AND FIELD FORCE, 1908. Although sanction to cross the Mohmand border was only received on the 10th May 1908 engineering preparations for military operations had been put in hand on the 18th April On the 21st, an attack was made on the post at the Adezai bridge which had been previously put into a state of defence. The attacks on Garhi Sadar and Matta also found these posts entrenched and with barbed wire obstacles, which proved most effective. The perimeter of the camp by Shankargarh Fort had also been made defensible. The 6th Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, had been employed on this work which also included water-supply arrangements, filtration wells close to the water channels, which were found to answer satisfactorily. 2. Work on the lines of communication, Peshawar-Shankargarh and Peshawar-Hichni as well as Mardan-Shankargarh, had also been put in hand, and the boat bridges covered by detachments protected by entrenchments and obstacles. The ferrics at Khiali, Abazai and Michni were also reconstructed and the hemp ropes replaced by wire hawsers, the boats being worked across by means of “travellers " instead of the old arrangement of warping across. The 2nd Company, 1st Sappers and liners, under Captain Tylden-Pattenson, R.E., had taken the place of No. 6 Company in the Khaibar movable column and been employed on the Michni crossing 3. Captain J. Charles, D.S O., took over command of the 6th Company from Lieutenant A. J G Bird on the 27th April 1908 and Captain A. H. Cunningham, R.E., with No 1 Company, Sappers and liners, joined the field force at Shabkadar on the 30th April. 4. Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Dundee, CI.E., R.E, Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer, joined the Peshawar Infantry Brigade at Matta Mughal Khel on the 20th April and continued the direct supervision of preparations for a possible advance. Meanwhile, at the advanced base at Shankargarh, tools, explosives and materials for barbed wire entanglement were collected and arranged in mule loads. 5. A base hospital had been equipped in Shankargarh Fort and a hospital rest-camp at Daudzai inside the thana. 6. No engineering work was required during the short period of hostilities in the Khaibar, beyond fixing up water standards at Jamrud. At Landi Kotal the existing water supply was found sufficient for requirements and at Ali Masjid the stream was drawn on from the same place as during the Zakka Khel expedition. 7. The divisional camp which was formed on the Shankargarh-dlichni road near Shabkadar village was protected by an entrenched perimeter and water was obtained from the bed of the Gandao stream, then almost dry, shallow ( xxvi) ·APPENDIX III. xxvii filtration wells being dug, revetted with boulders, and pumps used for filling pakhals and drinking troughs.* The drinking water was carefully fenced in with barbed wire and was of course above the places used for watering animals and for washing, a water guard securing the observance of orders. Incinera. tors were constructed, log bridges made over wet nalas and camp roads and approaches made. 8. On the 12th May No. 1 Company marched with the 2nd Brigade to Hafiz Kor and there took in hand the water-supply, and also works on the road towards Dand, into which on the 14th, after the departure of the 1st Brigade from Dand the same day, a new approach road 300 yards long was made into camp. On the 13th, the 6th Company, Sappers and Miners, and the 34th Pioneers were employed on the road leading to and also beyond Dand By the 16th Day the 2nd Brigade had joined the Ist Brigade at Nahakki having brought all their camels over the Karappa and Nahakkı passes which had been made practicable by the 2 Companies of Sappers and the 34th Pioneers. Part of the work both in the Karappa and Nahakkı passes was very heavy and necessitated the liberal expenditure of explosives. Remarkably littlo trace was found of the road used in 1897, the work, having been doubtless chiefly building up," had gradually got knocked down and fallen away under the action of traffic and weather. 9. Both at Dand and Ghalanai water was obtained from the Gandao stream, pumps being used to fill pakhals and troughs. The same arrangements were made as at Hafiz Kor. 10. At Nahakkı where General Sir James Willcocks, who accompanied tho flying column under Brigadier-General Anderson, arrived on the afternoon of the 14th May, the only known water-supply was a large tank near the village. This tank which was then 5. feet deep in the middle and computed to contain from 130,000 to 150,000 gallons of water, was at once protected as usual and water drawn by pumps and delivered into palhals and drinking troughs, the latter made of canvas and paulins. When there was a crush of animals, as on the arrival of a convoy, it was found necessary to fill troughs by gravity, a small channel being dug for the purpose. This however was resorted to only when unavoidable as it was most desirable to prevent water being drawn by dipping, vessels used for which could not be guaranteed as clean. 11. Shortly after the arrival of the force at Nahakki it was brought to notice by Subadar Khwaja Muhammad Khan, who liad been with General Sir Edmond Elles in 1897, that there was a spring in a gorge near Sro silage. This was inspected on the 16th and proved to be an excellent potable water, yielding about 120 gallons an hour or say 10,000 gallons during the time it was possible to use it daily. On the 17th a pump was put in, and work was started * Note by Sir James Hillcoc!s - The use of pumps generally was the solragon of the force from a water, and hence, from a sanitary, pout of new I strongly recom. mend that they form a part of engineer equipment to be maintained at the base of any expedition during summer months, or in a country where the water has to be obtained from tanks.

·xxviii OPERATIONS AGAINST TUE NOUVANDS, 1908. to make a good mule road between the spring and the camp, a distance of about 11 miles. On the 23rd instant a second spring in the gorge just beyond No. 3 picket was reported, the ravine was neårer than the one near Sro but the water was higher up. A pump was placed in the spring and mule tracks constructed as in the case of Sro spring. From this moment there was little 3nxiety about the water supply and the tank was used more freely for watering animals, which had been sent whenever possible to other small tanks in the vicinity under a strong guard. These tanks however had gradually become cxhausted and the level of the Nahakki tank had dropped from 5; fect on the 15th to 21 feet on the 29th so that by that date about of the contents or say 30,000 gallons alone remained, and of that amount probably would have proved undrinkable. The tank however had under careful supervision served its purpose and the last troops left Nahakkı on the 30th May. , At one time there were in camp 2,500 mules and 700 camels ; if these had been given the full' allowance of 7 and 10 gallons respectively or say 24,500 gallons in all it will be seen that the tank only contained originally sufficient for just one week. Nahakki was occupied for 16 days. 12. If therefore the springs had not been discovered and every effort made to regulate the distribution of the water-supply, it is evident that Nahakki could not have remained for that period a central advanced base from which operations could be carried out. Moreover, without a sufficient number of pumps the distribution of water would have been impossible. 13. The pumps used were of two kinds, zrz. :- (1) Wilcox semi-rotary lift and force No. 5–11". (2) Double barrel aluminium lift and force pump_3" At first there were two semi-rotary pumps and one aluminium lift and force pump to each brigade. 14. As the continuous and hard work made the pumps show signs of breaking down, on the 19th a telegram was sent to Captain Ogilvie, R.E., Peshawar, to obtain from Pindi or elsewhere three more lift and force pumps and send them up by special convoy ; six were obtained from Rawalpindi Arsenal, three despatched on 20th from Rawalpindi and arrived at Nahakkı on the following day. The remaining thrce pumps were used on the lines of communication. 15. The two Companies of Sappers and the 34th Sikh Pioneers also carried out the demolition of village defences and blew up no less than 144 towers of various descriptions, some round, others square, and both solid and hollow bases. Of these No. 1 Company accounted for 57. The average charge was a little over 17lbs. guncotton. 16. The nala crossings on the tracks leading both to the Bohai Dag country and also in the direction of Yakh Dand and Mulla Kalai were also ramped down and made fit for camel traffic. As a rule one Company of Sappers and half a Battalion of the Pioneers accompanied each brigade and assisted in the various operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Dundee accompanied practically all the punitive expeditions undertaken.

·APPENDIY 111. xxix 17. Major Ewbank as Field Engineer, Lines of Communication, had charge of the work on the road and at the various posts on the lines of communication as well as improving the road up the Alikandi Nala. He was assisted by Captain A. R. C. Sanders, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer, and Lieutenant P. C. S. Hobart, 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners. 18. Huts were crected at Hafiz Kor and also at Shabkadar Camp for the sick and wounded, and arrangements made in all cases for a sufficient supply of pure, and in some instances of boiled, water, 19. Captain R. B. Skinner, R.E., accompained the R E Field Park to Nahakki and was of great assistance generally. 20. In the work of forwarding stores, tools and explosives and assisting on the lines of communication great help was given by Barrack Sergeant Walke who had been sent to Shankargarh some time before the expedition started. 21. As regards personnel of the Sapper Companies I consider it would be advantageous if each section had its own commander. 22. As to material and equipment- Pumps. For a brigade a suitable outfit would be- (1) Two aluminium lift and force pumps, 3" Complete with armoured Four No. 5 Wilcox semi-rotary » 16" S section. (2) Canvas troughs According to requirements. Six pickets 6 feet long for ends of suction pipes. 23. The lift and force pumps must be carried on camels, the semi-rotary on mules; 3 of the latter and some troughing should be in charge of a half section sappers and accompany the advanced guard on the march as a rule 24. It will thus be possible to prevent pollution of water by dipping. The rest of pumps, etc., should follow at head of baggage. 25. The semi-rotary pumps worked well, are portable and can be easily and quickly fixed up. They weigh 90lbs, and two are a fully heavy load for a mule, but they are a good load and ride easily. The hoses go on a second mule. 26. It would be an improvement if the delivery hose had a “union " at each end to allow of second length being joined on. 27. The wrench supplied for the hose“ union” is badly made, several of them broke. A flat bicycle spanner to fit the nuts is desirable and could, with the wrench, be made to fit into recess of board. The ordinary McMahon spao. ner cannot reach all the nuts owing to their confined situation. 28. The handle is very badly designed, three out of six broke. It should consist of a flat steel bar with two half round pieces of wood rivetted on to each side. 29. The aluminium double barrel lift and force pumps deliver much more water than the semi-rotary and are invaluable when a large number of animals lave to be watered. They are very useful for pumping from tanks which have bigh banks. One pump will water 2,000 mules and horses in 3 hours.

·xxviii OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NOHVANDS, 1908. to make a good mule road between the spring and the camp, a distance of about 14 miles. On the 23rd instant a second spring in the gorge just beyond No. 3 picket was reported, the ravine was nearer than the one near Sro but the water was higher up. A pump was placed in the spring and mule tracks constructed as in the case of Sro spring. From this moment there was little anxiety about the water-supply and the tank was used more freely for watering animals, which had been sent whenever possible to other small tanks in the vicinity under a strong guard. These tanks however had gradually become exhausted and the level of the Nahakki tank had dropped from 5feet on the 15th to 24 feet on the 29th so that by that date about of the contents or say 30,000 gallons alone remained, and of that amount probably would have. proved undrinkable. The tank however had under careful supervision served its purpose and the last troops left Nahakki on the 30th May. , At one time there were in camp 2,500 mules and 700 camels; if these had been given the full, allowance of 7 and 10 gallons respectively or say 24,500 gallons in all it will be seen that the tank only contained originally sufficient for just one weck. Nahakki was occupied for 16 days. 12. If therefore the springs had not been discovered and every effort made to regulate the distribution of the water supply, it is evident that Nahakki could not have remained for that period a central advanced base from which operations could be carried out. Moreover, without a sufficient number of pumps the distribution of water would have been impossible. 13. The pumps used were of two kinds, zzz. :- (1) Wilcox semi-rotary lift and force No. 5–11". (3) Double barrel aluminium lift and force pump_3". At first there were two semi-rotary pumps and one aluminium lift and force pump to each brigade. 14. As the continuous and hard work made the pumps show signs of breaking down, on the 19th a telegram was sent to Captain Ogilvie, R.E, Peshawar, to obtain from Pindi or elsewhere three more lift and force pumps and send them up by special convoy ; six were obtained from Rawalpindi Arsenal, three despatched on 20th from Rawalpindi and arrived at Nahakki on the following day. The remaining thrce pumps were used on the lines of communication. 15. The two Companies of Sappers and the 31th Sikh Pioneers also carried out the demolition of village defences and blew up no less than 114 towers of various descriptions, some round, others square, and both solid and hollow bases. Of these No. 1 Company accounted for 57. The average charge was a little over 171bs guncotton. 16. The nala crossings on the tracks leading both to the Bohai Dag country and also in the direction of Yakh Dand and Mulla Kalai were also ramped down and made fit for camel traffic. As a rule one Company of Sappers and half a Battalion of the Pioneers accompanied cach brigade and assisted in the various operations. Licutenant-Colonel Dundee accompanied practically all the punitive expeditions undertaken.

·APPENDII III. Ixix 17. Major Ewbank as Field Engineer, Lines of Communication, had charge of the work on the road and at the various posts on the lines of communication as well as improving the road up the Alikandi Nala He was assisted by Captain A. R. C. Sanders, R E., Assistant Field Engineer, and Lieutenant P. C. S. Hobart, 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners. 18. Huts were erected at Hafiz Kor and also at Shabkadar Camp for the sick and wounded, and arrangements made in all cases for a sufficient supply of pure, and in some instances of boiled, water. 19. Captain R. B. Skinner, R.E, accompained the R. E. Field Park to Nahakki and was of great assistance generally. 20. In the work of forwarding stores, tools and explosives and assisting on the lines of communication great help was given by Barrack Sergeant Walke who had been sent to Shankargarh some time before the expedition started. 21. As regards personnel of the Sapper Companies I consider it would be advantageous if each section had its own commander. 22. As to material and equipment Pumps...For a brigade a suitable outfit would be- (1) Two aluminium lift and force pumps, 3" Complete with armoured Four No. 5 Wilcox semi-rotary , 16"section. (2) Canvas troughs According to rcquirements. Six pickets 6 feet long for ends of suction pipes. 23. The lift and force pumps must be carried on camels, the semi-rotary on mules; 2 of the latter and some troughing should be in charge of a half section sappers and accompany the advanced guard on the march as a rule. 24. It will thus be possible to prevent pollution of water by dipping. The rest of pumps, etc., should follow at head of baggage. 25. The semi-rotary pumps worked well, are portable and can be easily and quickly fixed up. They weigh 90lbs, and two are a fully heavy load for a mule, but they are a good load and ride easily. The hoses go on a second mule. 26. It would be an improvement if the delivery hose had a "union " at of ith the wrench, be made to fit into recess of board. The ordinary McMahon span. ner cannot reach all the nuts owing to their confined situation. 28. The landle is very badly designed, three out of six broke. It should consist of a flat steel bar with two half round pieces of wood rivetted on to each side. 29. The aluminium double barrel lift and force pumps deliver much more water than the semi-rotary and are invaluable when a large number of animals lave to be watered. They are very useful for pumping from tanks which have high banks. One pump will water 2,000 mules and horses in 3 hours.

·XXX OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, 1908. The base board however is badly designed and should be made thicker and hinges omitted, iron loops being fitted to admit of board being picketted down. In both cases suction and delivery hose should be interchangeable and have the same size" union," 30. In all cases the field park should carry a supply of steel, square and. flat, of size suitable for repairs and when required more charcoal. 31. For the demolitions, Nobel's Copper Octuple (No. 8) detonators were used, two for each charge with 1 oz. primers. The primer hole, however, is too small for these detonators and either larger primer holes should be made or else a rectifier of proper size should be supplied. Perhaps the detonator might be made with a thinner tube, of the same diameter as the sextuple (No. 6) Nobel detonator. 32. The gunmetal rectifier (screwed pattern) does not enlarge the hole in the primer nearly enough. 33. The “Octuple” copper detonator is recommended as possessing so many advantages, of portability, safety in handling, compactness in confined holes in towers, walls, etc., over the red “ No. 8, Mark III Detonator for safety fuze" from the arsenal, that the latter was hardly ever used. These latter besides being very unnecessarily long do not keep well, and cannot be relied on if over thrce years old. * * 35. The question of hand grenades has been raised and although it has been objected that an enemy might also make up bombs it would appear advisable to have a number for the use of pickets, as recommended by Lieutenant- Colonel Dundce. 36. There are occasions when a search light would be useful if one could be manufactured suitable for mule carriage. Star shells have their use but flare lights as a rule are not a success. 37. Fougasses are very useful on occasion and it was rcmarked that when their existence was suspected the enemy held further off at night. 38. As regards tools carried by the Pioneers the usual complaints were heard, and when full sized tools were available from the R. E. Field Parks they were always used. 39. The Pioneer equipment might be improved, but it would be very inadvisable to arrange for all their tools to be carried on mules even though extra ammunition was issued to make up the weight. It is of immense importance to liave the tools there when wanted. J. E. DICKIE, Colonel, Commanding Royal Engineer, lohmand Field Force. Taler-supply.--In the Hohmand country good springs were found and usod in the vicinity of the Nahakki camp, their combined output being about ·APPENDIX III. Xxx; 20,000 gallons per diem. A small spring (about 5,000 gallons per diem) was used 1} miles north of the Ata Jor camp. Other springs were occasionally found, as at Koda Khel, and from the appearance of the hill sides, trees, vegetation, and sites of villages, many springs exist, but were too far away for use. Running water was met and used at these points:-1 mile north of the Shabkadar camp, Dand camp, Ghalanai camp, Ambahar valley from 1} miles west of Had to the Swat river, Mulla Kalai.* Elsewhere tank water alone was available. These tanks are usually about 40x30 yards, oval in plan, and vary from l' to t' deep They are filled automatically by rain water, from gathering grounds of varying sizes, and are more or less dirty. The advance guard always put sentries over the tank, and no one was allowed to draw water tall the arrival of the pumps The pumps were rigged up, and pumped water into canvas troughs for animals, and pakhals and mussachs for men. The troughs for animals were variously made, troughs were cut in the ground and lined with tarpaulins, canvas troughs were made with rough wooden uprights, or inside inverted charpoys, etc The use of the pumps at tanks and springs prevented fouling to such an extent that the Nahakki tank, for example, after a week's use, had clearer water than when the troops arrived I think that the use of these pumps must bave had a very beneficial effect on the health of the troops, and I strongly recommend that they always be used. A brigade in my opinion requires four hand pumps (one spare); a division thus should have eight at divisional headquarters. I prefer the semi-rotary type. The liſt and force pumps got out of order frequently, the handles worked by the men not lasting well. ** * W.J. D. DUNDEE, Lieut.-Colonel, R.E, Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer, Johmand Fild Force. • Also at Laghan.

·APPENDIX IV. EXTR.ICT FROM MEDICAL REPORT, MORMAND FIELD FORCE. (9) Water-supply.—The water in the Mohmand country was by current report very scarce and of indifferent quality. It was found that the inhabitants in many parts were altogether dependent on tanks filled by rain water, which drained into them from higher ground. The troops were on several occasions obliged to use this water as the only available supply. No epidemic was traced to the water supply though no doubt some of the cases of bowel complaint might be attributed to the bad water-supply met with at certain camps, although the force did not on the whole suffer greatly from this cause. Below Shabkadar there was an excellent water-supply from the very rapid branches of the Kabul river ; the water was usually thick, but from the rate of the flow and free aeration it experienced, it could hardly have become contaminated to any extent. At Fort Shankargarh the drinking water was obtained from an excellent well outside the fort. The well was well built and protected, and the supply was plentiful. At Camp Shabkadar wells were sunk in the dry bed of the river Subhan from which a sufficient and good supply was obtained. At Hafiz Kor, Dand and Ghalanai the water was of excellent quality, and plentiful ; it was obtained from the River Gandao. The river in its course sinks at various places into the ground to reappear lower down, thus natural filtration is obtained. At all these posts, the places for drawing drinking water were well protected, and surrounded by barbed wire; sentries were placed over the place where drinking water was obtained, and pumps were used to draw the water. Special places were also assigned and below the spot where the drinking supply was obtained, for animals and for washing. At Nahakki at first the only place for obtaining drinking water was from a large tank with high banks. The water from this had to supply all needs of men and animals. Had any contamination of this supply taken place the result would have been most serious. A flying column was sent on to seize Nahakkı and to secure this vater-supply. Deasures were at once taken to guard it against contamination. The tank was enclosed by barbed wire, an officer's guard was also mounted, and very stringent orders issued as to tho times and method of supply. Pumps were used to draw the water, and a channel cut to carry the water into troughs for animals, On a rough analysis (by Captain Bradfield, I.J.S.) tank water was found to be a clear, bard, tasteless water, with 110 smell. Chlorides and oxi. (xxx) + ;

·APPENDII IV. xxxiii dizable matters were not in cxcess, though naturally it contained more oxidizable matters than the springs, which were ultimately discovered. Although a bacteriological examination would probably have shown contamina. tion, the water was classed as a fair drinking water, and its use did not affect the lealth of the troops to any grcat extent. Besides this tank a well existed at the east side of the village; this was told off for the use of hospitals. This well was over 200 feet deep, cut through a rocky strata, and there was about 20 feet of water at the bottom. The well was reported to have been used by the villages for drinking purposes before our occupation; as it was not protected by a wall it had probably been contaminated by surface washings It was returned after analysis as a very fair drinking water not containing chlorides or oxidizable matters in excess Sro spring and No 3 picquet spring — These two springs were discovered shortly after our occupation of Nahakk They were situated on the hills to the east side of the camp, the height of the source rendered any contamination impossible. The water was obtained from them by pumping it from two small reservoirs, about 5 yards square The water was very clear and spark. ling. On analysis it proved an excellent drinking water These springs wcie well picquetted and contamination prevented The supply was ample, and was brought to the camp in the palhals The water at Kasai, Umra Kalai, Habibzai, Khan Beg Kor, Lakarai and Taru was from rain svater tanks It was sufficient for a brigade, but of doubtful quality. At Kargha the water was from the Ambahar stream and was good and plentiful; at Mulla Kalai from the Danish Kol, which supplied excellent water, at Lagham from the Bann stream which gave a good and ample supply A water column had been formed to bring drinking water up from Ghalanai to Nahakkı The pakhals were carried on camels 150 lbs of alum and 20 lbs of permanganate of potash were also carried by this water column, for the purification of water. As the water had been reputed as had in the Mohmand country, an application was made for a supply of Nesfield's sterilizing tablets for the two British regiments who were originally to have accompanied the force, with the vicw of prevention against enteric fever. Enough for 20,000 followers was supplied and tlus was distributed in equal parts to the two British battalions originally included in the 1st and 2nd Brigade, rız., the 1st Battalion, Northumberland Fusilicrs, and the 1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. When cholera was found to be prevalent an application was made for enough of these sterilizing tablets for the whole force, but these did not arrive till later These tablets were distributed to British officers' messes and to native regiments. No objcction was taken by the native soldiers to the water thus treated. Thic lst Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, who used these tablets through the campaign had very little bo.vel complaint, and the inference in this case was distinctly favourable.

·Xxxiv OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORMANDS, 1908. It does not seem assured that these tablets are absolutely reliable, and the matter is still under debato. If their entire reliability could be assured, they would supply an easy method of water sterilization, which is badly needed. Arrangements had been made for each British regiment to take six extra oval camp kettles to boil the water in, but the difficulty of cooling water, especially in the hot weather, makes boiling almost impracticable with troops on the march and engaged daily in expeditions from which they return late. If boiling is to be relied on it must be carried on by one of the exchange system water sterilizers, by which the water comes out after boiling almost as cool as the water originally put in. Griffiths' sterilizer is a good example of this system and can be easily carried on a mule ; it gives about 50 gallons an hour; probably one per a companies would be required. A specially instructed staff or two men would also be required to use it. * * H. R. WHITEHEAD, Colond, Principal Medical Officer, Lohmand Field Force, CHIERAT; 27th June 1908.

·APPENDIX V. Numerical Return of Hohmand Field Force as on 1st June 1908. British Officers. *British rank and file. *Nativo Officers Non- Commis Publio Private sioned Offi- followers. followers. cers and men 2 3 1 5 6 Divisional Staff 18 3 25 1st Brigade 83 123 3,586 604 116 2nd Brigade 109 684 3,655 419 234 3rd Brigade 122 1,563 3,116 409 242 TOTAL 33+ 2,375 10,361 1,462 017 * Exclusive of Supply and Transport personnel escept sucli as was attaclied to Field and General Hospitals. Statement showing Supplyt and Transport persound and transport animals employed with Blohmand Field Force, 1908. British Oficers 27 56 British IIonorary Commissioned, Warrant and Non- Commissioned Ollicers, Native Establishments. 3,653 Includes 18 Xatıro Oficcis. 3,760 Pack Mules Camels 3,831 Bullochs 133 † Exclusive of that attached to Field and General Hospitals, (XXXV) ·APPENDIX VI. REPORT OX TISUAL SIGNAL STATIO.VS USED AND ATTEJPTED DURING THE OPERATIONS IY THE KHAIBAR LYD JOIL AND COUNTRY-HAY 1908 In considering for future use the practicability of the Visual Signalling Lines and Stations herein described, the following points must be borne in mind (1) The operations were carried out in the month of May when the weather, though exceedingly hot, was fine with but few exceptions, and the atmosphere remarkably clear and favourable for long distance work had such been otherwise feasible. (2) A permanent Telegraph Line connected the Base at Peshawar with Landi Kotal in the Khaibar, while the Field Telegraph extended the Line from Peshawar to the Advanced Depôt at Nahakki village in the Lohmand country. Visual Signalling Lines were established between the Base and these places with a view to- (a) relioving the pressure of work on the telegraph wires if necessary ; (6) bridging gaps caused by the possible breaking or cutting of the wires; (c) transmitting comparatively unimportant messages for intermediate posts on the line. (3) Eight Special Signalling Units were used altogether. One Special Signalling Unit was permanently attached to the Headquarters of tlic Division and one to cach of the 1st and 2nd Brigades. Five Special Units are ordinarily required to work the Line of Communication through the Kbaibar while five were used on the Bohmand Linc, the following being the distribution :- Kharbar Line.-One Special Signalling Unit at cach of the following stations (i) Fort Baude. (ii) Ali Masjid Fort. (11) Kata Kushta. (1v) Block-houso (LK) south of Landi Kotal Fort. (v) Landi Kotal Fort. V B.--Vhen the Klaibar becomes filled with hazo in July and lugust on extra Urut must be put into 2in Tara letscen (ui) and (iv) Total then requircl would Leur Special Signalling Units. Ichmand Line- Ono Special Signalling Unit at Dand. Two do, do. Ghalnnai, do. do. Yalakki. - B.-S15 Special Challeng Units is the least number that can work this lino satisfactorily, a thero sbould Lu thirco Costs at Ghalanai. ( xxxvi ) Tuo ·APPEYDII VI. Xxxvii In deciding upon the number of Special Signalling Units required the length of the operations, arount of work, provision against casualties from sickness or other causes, must be considered as well as the size of the Force and probable number of posts on the Line of Communications. (4) lll bearings, except where otherwise stated, were taken with the same Prismatic Compass, having a variation of 2° East, but to facilitate reference the True bearings of stations have been shown in each casc. In some cases the bearings do not correspond exactly with the lines laid down on the accompanying map; but, with the description given, are sufficiently accurate for the identification of the stations used. Distances taken from map are given to nearest 1 mile (5) Letters enclosed in brackets refer to stations marked with similar letters on accompanying map (6) A set of equipment, except for a Special Signalling Unit for wluch see Field Service Regulations, India, Appendix I, is taken as one Helio., one lamp, one Telescope, one pair Field Glasses with complement of flags, message books, etc. Peshawar. Signal Station. On Church Tower. Personnd.—Six Signallers (four British, two of Indian Army). Equipmeni...Threc sets. Hours of work.-9AM. one day to 9 A... next. Rcliefs.—Every 24 hours. Orderlics.-One foot orderly used A cyclist orderly is required. Shelter.— In the hot weather some extemporized form of shelter is necessary. The mist and lazo rising from the rivers, irrigated land and villages in the evening render comm jucation by means of a single BB'lamp dificult and at tiones impossible This was overcome to a certain extent whicu vorking with Slabkadar by tying two or three lamps together, but estn then communication was difficult. I'CC ' lamp was used a little more successfully. If available, an acctylene lamp here and at Shabkadar might render comniunication morc certain. Even greater difficulty was experienced when working with Michni. 11 ·Xxxviji OPERATIOYS AGAINST THC JOHN ANDS, 1903. Cominunication obtained with Station. Bearing. Distance in mules. Remarks. Shibkadar Michni Jamrud gº 3421 2820 15 13 9 Bearings and distances from map. Communication possible with 23 Karappa l'ass (1a Gandao) Fort Jaudo. 314° 2789 Bearings and distances approximate. Jamrud. Signal Station.-On top of Fort. Personnel.—Six Signallers, British and Indian Army mixed, furnished by Officer Commanding Fort, from troops under his command. Equipment.—Three sets. lours of work. Reliefs.-- Arranged for under orders of Officer Commanding Orderlies. Fort. Shelter. Some kind of extemporized shelter is required during the lot weather. Communication obtained with Station, Bearing. Distance in miles. Remarks 1020 Peshawar (Church Tourer) Shabkadar Fort Maudo 36° 271° 10 41 Bearings and distances from map. A permanent Telegraph Office is located in the Fort. Fort Maude, Signal Station.–At block-house on top of knoll on south side of road; from which a path easily accessible for transport leads to summit. Personnel.--Special Signalling Unit (four British Signallers, two of Indian Army). Equipment.-As for a Special Signalling Unit. Escori. No special escort required, as the block-house was held by : detachment of Khaibar Rilles. Ilclcr.—Supplied by the Native Contractor who provides the dctacliment Kha'bar Riflcs with it. Nalicns.-Supplied for three or four days at a time from Hi Jasjid camp.

·APPENDIY VI. XXXIX Transport (three mules)-Kept at Ali Masjid camp for rationing and safety, as no such facilities exist at the block-house. Communication obtained rith- Distance in Station Bearing iniles Remarks Jamrud AL Masjid 91° 3131° Bearings and distauces from map. 3 Communication possible uith- Peshawar (Church Tower) Zera Kotal 98° 237° 14 5 Bcarugs and distances from Inup. This block-house is typical of those built in the Khaibar, all the rest having been constructed on very similar lines Heliograpls can be worked on the roof, and lamps through the large port-holes which are protected by bullet-proof metal doors. In case of need heliographs can also be worked through these port-holes at certain periods of the day according to the position of the sun. Ali Masjid Fort. Signal Station.—Onroof of Fort at cast end. Personnel. Six signallers detailed by Officer Commanding Fort, assisted' by two British Signallers from camp in ravine below. Equipment --Two sets. Hours of work. Reliefs. Arranged by Officer Commanding Fort. Orderlies.- Communication obtained with Station Bearing Distance in miles. Remarks Cump 10 ravino immediately Lelow Fort Fort Maude block-louso Kata Kushta du, 3 13310 337° Bearings and distances from mar. це ·OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHJANDS, 1908. A Special Signalling Unit should be located at the Fort if the Line of Com. munication has to be maintained for any length of time. Arrangements for their rations, transport, etc., could be made with Camp Commandant in ravine below. A Field Telegraph Office was opened in camp in the ravine, but the Fort itself was not connected by wire. It would be a convenience to connect the Fort and Camp by Telephone. Kata Kushta. Signal Station (KA).—At block-house lying on summit of conical hill, the bottom of which takes one hour to reach on foot from Ali Masjid camp. The ascent, which is commenced from the Ali Dlasjid side of the hill is made in about half an hour by a narrow, very stony and fairly steep path, up which mules inust be led separately. Personnel.—Special Signalling Unit (four British Signallers and two of Indian Army). Equipinent.-As for a Special Signalling Unit. Isscort....No special escort required as the block-house was held by a detachment of Khaibar Rifles. Mater.-Supplied hy the Native Contractor, who supplics it every two days to the detachment, Khaibar Rifles, and stored in block-louse. Rations --Supplied for 3 or 4 days at a time from Ali Masjid cainp. Transport (three inules).-- Kept at Ali Masjid ca.np for rationing anil protection, as no such facilities exist at block-house. Communication obtained with Station, Bearing Distanco in milcs. Remarks 177° 299° AU Masjid Fort Zin Tara Block house (LK) to south of Landi Kotal Fort 9 Bearings and distances from mar. B96° 77 Zin Tara. Signal Station (ZA) - At block-house on spur south of Wali Khel. This station was discontinued when it was found that (LK) could communicate direct with Kata Kushta (KA). Later on, in July and August, the hcat baze renders a transmitting station at this block-house a necessity. It would then require a Special Signalling Unit with its equipment complete. Arrangements for ratiops, and for the protection and rationing of its transport, are more conveniently inade from Landi Kotal than Ali Jasjid. No special escort required as detachment, Khaibar Ridcs, holds block-house. Water supplied locally.

·APPCYDII ** xli Communication obtained with Station Bearing Distance in miles Remarks 119° 24 Kata Kushta Block-louse (LK) to south of landı Kotal Fort Bearings and distances 295° from map Ghutzai block-house to South of Landi Kotal Fort. Sumal Station (LK).--In left of two block-houses (as viewed from Fort) placed close together on ridge about mile south of Fort. Suce this block-house is so hear the Fort, all arrangements for personnel, equipment, rations, water, etc, can conveniently be made from it, A Special Signalling Unit would require to be located here. The light of the helio. and lamp at Kata Kushta just clears the ridge to the right of the Zin Tara block-house as viewed from the Signal Station (LK). Communication obtained routh- Station, Bearing Distance is miles Remarks Zw Tara Kata Kushta Laodi Kotal Fort 115° 116° Bearings and distaocrs irom map. Distance approxunate. Landi Kota.. Signal Stahon (FT) -Over :rain gateway of Fort. A terminal station is pll that is required here to work with the block-louse (LK) on ridge to south, unless operations are being conducted in the neigh. bourhood, or the Line of Communication be extended towards Afghanistan, when arrangements would have to be made accordingly. The transport for Special Signalling Units was kept in an entrecched camp adjoining the Fort. Rations were drawn from a supply depût inside the Fort and special orders issued with regard to supply of drinking water for men and animals. permanent Telegraph office is situated inside the Fort quite c'ose to the Signal Station over the main gateway.

·1 xlii OPERATIONS AGAIVST THE JONVANDS, 1908. Shabkadar (or Shankargarh Fort). Signal Station. On staging in Fort. Personnel.-Six to eight Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed) according to requirements, Equipment.–Four sets. Hours of work — Rcliefs.- Arranged by Brigade Signalling Officer, 3rů Brigade. Orderlies.- Shelter.- Tent and waterproof sheets. As with Peshawar, lamp communication especially towards that place is the main difficulty. Jorom staging in Fort communication was obtained with- Station. Bearing Distanco in miles, Remarks Peshawar Vaguman Bridge Jalakand 1890 1620 31° 15 7 33 Station situated on hill to west of Guides Tower. Signalling Party escorted by Swat Levies. Abazai Matta Mughal Khel Michi 120 330° 2161 7 Station on hull with piquet. Fort itself not visible. Hafiz Kor Dand. Karappa Pass Jamrud Fort Takht-i-Bhai 2820 297° 3050 216° 78° 22 for Transmitting station Mardan, Hafiz Kor. Signal Station. On ridge of a conspicuous isolated hill shown on map to south-south-cast of village of Hafiz Kor. This hill, shaped thus looking at it from south-east side, rises up from the plain conspicuously above the other low hulls in the vicinity and is particularly casy to identify at Shabkadar, Dand and Karappa Pass. A terminal station was formed in camp near the Telegraph tent, 15 minutes walk cast-south-east of the transmitting station on the hul. Personnd. Six Signallers for transmitting station on hill. Threo Signallers for terminal in camp. Equipment.-Two sets for hill, one for camp. * Position of Signal Station.

·APPCNDII VI. xlii Trater.-Obtainable from pools in bed of Gandao stream, about one mile east of signal station on hill. Transport.—Jules can be got to foot of the hill with ease, whence kits and equipment can be carried up to the Station by hand. From bill north-west of camp communication obtained with Station Bearing Distance in miles Remarks. Shabkadar Daud 1020 315° 41 4 Station on hill clo.e to Balaro Jens Kandıo. Karappa Pass 3170 7 From cam Shabkadar 1020 41 There is only one place in camp where the light from the Fort con be seer through an opening in the rising ground to the southeast. 16 Dand, Signal Stations — North-north-west of camp on plateau above river-bed and tituated on round hill-top (provided with a sangar) which lies about 50 yards on east side of road at point where it crosses first lolal (Bakoro Mena) above camp, from a solitary tree in middle of which it is about 15 to 20 minutes climb by the road. The following bearings were taken from the Signal Station to further fis its position To bighest point on ridge immediately above and on nest side of camp To highest point of 3-cond hill to the eastward. 39 A Terminal Station is required in camp and was cstablished near the Telegraph Office which was close to the isolated tree nientioned. A piquet was located on this hill-top and connected by telephone with Signalling Station in camp This Signal Station with piquet on hill top can be occupied for night work. Personne -One Special Signalling Unit (ſour British Signalers and two of Indian Armyfor station on hill. Three Signallers for l'erminal Station in camp, or one Telephone Operator onhill and one in camp. Equipment -Two sets for lull, one set for camp, or tlags if no helio avail. able, as distance between hill and camp in direct linc is only about I to mile. Water -Obtainable from bed of Gandio stream belos camp on platens.

·xli OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHJANDS, 1908. Shabkadar (or Shankargarh Fort). Signal Station. On staging in Fort. Personnel -Six to eight Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed) according to requirements. Equipment.-Four sets. Hours of work. Reliefs. Arranged by Brigade Signalling Officer, 3rd Prigade. Orderlies. Shelter.—Tent and waterproof sheets. As with Peshawar, lamp communication especially towards that place is the main difficulty. From staging in Fort communication was obtained with- Station. Bearing. Distance in miles, Remarks. - Peshawar Yaguman Bridge Jalakand 1899 1620 31° 15 74 33 Station situated on hull to west of Guides Tower. Signalling Party escorted by Swat Levics. Abazai 7 Matta Mughal Khei 12° 350° 21010 Jichni 7 Station on hill with piquet Fort itself not visible. 2829 297° Hafiz Kor Dand, Karappa Pass Jamrud Fort Takht-i-Bhai 3050 4% 73 11 19 92 216° 78° Transmitting station Mardan. Hafiz Kor. Signal Station.---On ridge of a conspicuous isolated hill shown on map to south-south-east of village of Hafiz Kor. This hill, shaped thus looking at it from south-east side, riscs up from the plain conspicuously above the other low hills in the vicinity and is particularly easy to identify at Shabkadar, Dand and Karappa Pass. A terminal station was formed in camp near the Telegraph tent, 15 minutes walk east-south-east of the transmitting station on the hill. Personnel -Six Signallers for transmitting station on hill. Three Signallers for terminal in camp. Equipment.—Two sets for hill, one for camp. * Position of Signal Station.

·APPENDII VI. slili Fater.--Obtainable from pools in bed of Gandao stream, about one mile east of signal station on hill. Transport.-Mules can be got to foot of the hill with ease, whence kits and equipment can be carried up to the Station by hand. From hill north-west of camp communication obtained with- Station. Bearing. Distance in miles, Remarks 1020 4} Sbabkadar Dand 315° Station on hill cloze to Bakaro Mena Kandao Karappa Pass 3170 From cam Shabkadar 1020 41 secr There is oply one place in camp where the light from the Fort cap be through an opening in the rising ground to the southeast. . 16 38 Dand. Signal Stations.- North-north-west of camp on plateau above river-bed and situated on round hill-top (provided with a sangar) which lies about 50 yards on east side of road at point where it crosses first Lotal (Bakoro Mena) above camp, from a solitary tree in middle of which it is about 15 to 20 minutes climb by the road. The following bcarings were taken from the Sigual Station to further fix its position :- To highest point on redge innediately above and on west side of camp To highest point of 3.coned hill to tle eastward. A Terminal Station is required in camp and was established near the Telegraph Office which was close to the isolated tree mentioned. A piquet was located on this hull-top and connected by telephone with Signalling Station in camp. This Signal Station with piquet on Inill top can be occupied for night work. Personnd. --One Special Signalling Unit (four British Signallers and two of Indian Army) for station on hill. Three Signallers for Terminal Station in cimp, or one Telephone Operator onhill and one in camp. Equipment.-Two sets for hill, one set for camp, or flags if no helio available, as distance between hill and camp in direct line is only about to mile. l'aler.-Obtainable from bed of Gandho stream below camp on plateas.

·xliv OPERATIONS AGAIYST THE NOIVANDS, 1903. Transport.—Jules can be taken right up to Signal Station. Road.—Road from camp, steep and rocky, but very greatly improved by working parties. Communicalion obtained with- Station, Bearing Distance in miles. Remarks. Shabkadar Hafiz Kor Karappa l'as3 117° 135° 321° 77 4 31 Station immediately to west of local Dapd Camp 102° } to Ghalanai, To connect Ghalanai with Dand and Nahakki Pass the following Stations were furnished front the Ghalanai Post:- 1. Transmitting Station (KP) at Karappa Pass. 2. Transmitting Station (G.N.)-- either (a) on low hill about two miles north-west of Ghalanai camp, or (6) on high ridge about 3} miles north-west of Ghalana i camp. 3. Transmitting Station (S.C.).- (a) on kill south of Ist camp, used until this camp was vaca ted; (O) on knoll on north face of 2nd camp, used until this camp was broken up. If available threc Special Signalling Units should be detailed to Ghalanai. I. Karappa Pass (K. P.). Signal Studion.-Situated on rocky point a few yards to rest of point where roar crosses kotal and furnished by a Special Signalling Unit sent out daily from Ghalanai with a suitable escort. It was considered too far (about 13 to 50 minutes march) from camp, and would have required too large an escort, for a night as well as a day station. Equipment.-Asisid down for a Special Signalling Unit. JFaler.Taken up in metal palkals with party from Ghalanai ca722P. Transport.-Road accessible for transport to top of kotal. Hlours of work.-8..31. to 5 P.. unless pressure of work great, when station closed at 6 P.J., to enable party to get back to camp before dark ·APPEVDIY t'l. Communication obtained with Station Beari.gs Distance in miles Remarks Dand Hafiz kor Shabkadar Peshawar 141 1370 1230 (approx ) 161° 23 fer messages were exchanged one day with a party of Artillery Sg. nallers practising on par. ade ground. Bearing and distanco unre. liable, S.C. (a) (Hillsouth of Ist camp) 310° 1 303° 2 S.C (5) (Knoll north face of 2nd camp) GX. (a) (Hill 2 mles sortin-west of camps) 2900 31 Bearing unreliable. IB-Communication with Xahabhi Pass cnpfot be oltained direct ce notes on thic Nations used on Xalakli ndge 2. Transmitting Station G. N. (a) Signal Station. On low hill surmounted by dark coloured stone ruin on vest of road about 2 miles north-west of Ghalanai camps. Position marked on map as south of sangar and south-east of Durba Khel. This station was also occupied by day only by Special Signalling Unit sent out under escort from Ghalanai camps. From the Signal Station the Nahakkı and Karappa Passes, the high hill SC() south of 1st camp and the knollSC(6) on north face of 2nd camp can be scen, but neither of the two camps themselves not yet the Khapak ridge are visible from this point. Equipment.—As laid down for a Special Signalling Unit. Water.--Taken out in metal palhals with party from Ghalanai camp. Transport.—The ground between the camps and top of Signal Station hill is casy going for mules, thc route for most of the distance following the bed of a broad and shallow nala. Hours of work. As for Karappa Pass. Communication obtained with Station, Beating Distance in miles. Remarks 31 Karapp l'ass (K.P.) Xalakli l'ass (X, 1) 11010 3490 Bearing upreliable, Station B 00 map (acc Xalnhli ridge). SC. (a) (till south of Ist camp) S.C. () (Knoll rorth face, and camu).

·xlyi OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHJANDS, 1908. Transmitting Station G.N. (0) Signal Station. On high, rocky point of ridge to east of road about 31 miles north-by-west of Ghalanai camps. This station, which is a stiff climb up from the foot of the slope (hour) was given up in favour of G. N. (a) owing to the greater distance from camp and its inaccessibility to mule transport, the only advantage it possesses over G. N.(a) being that communication 'can also be obtained with the Khapak Pass in addition to the Nahakki Pass, Karappa Pass, S. C. (a) and S.C. (b). The station was only occupied by day and an escort was required. Eguipment.--As laid down for a Special Signalling Unit. A third helio. would be wanted here if communication were also required with the Kbapak Pass. Water.—Taken out from camp with the party in metal pakhals and left at foot of hill, with mules. Transport.--Mules can only be got as far as the bottom of the hill whence equipñent and chayuls, etc., must be carried up by hand. Hours of work.--As for Karappa Pass. Communication obtained with- Station, Bearing Distance in miles, Remarks - Xabakki Pass (X.1.) 3410 32 2750 Khapak Pass Karappa Pass 41 11 Signal station on ridge about 400 yards west of Aotal (marked B on map). Bearing unreliable. Sigoal station on very high point about 1,200 yards south of hotal SC. (a) SC (6) bearings not taken Transmitting Station S.C. (a) Signal Station. On west end of a high and unmistakable hill immediately south of Ist camp used to connect Karappa Pass, G. N. (a) and G. N. (6) with terminal station in 1st camp. The Signallers, together with their equipment, were furnished from troops in camp under the orders of the Post Commandant and worked as long as communication was required. Transmitting Station S. C. (0) Signal Station.-On knoll on north face of 2nd camp, used for connectig G. N. (a) or G. N. (6) and Karappa Pass with camp. The personnel and equipo inent were also found under thu orders of the Post Commandant from the troops under his command. A pathway was made up to the Signal Station from camp and the station itself protected by a sangar, I couple of foot orderlies are required for the delivery of messages to and from the telegraph office and other parts of camp. + ·APPENDII 'I. xlvi: Nahakki ridge (including Khazana hill). Signal Stations. The following three stations furnished froin camp at Nahakki village were used at different times and are mentioned in order in which occupied : Station A.–On high rocky point on ridge about 1,200 yards west of the road over the kotal This possesses no advantages over B as regards communication with the Ghala naistations or with those to the northwards But if direct communication be also requued with the Klapak ridge to the south-west as well as with the Ghalanai stations, a signal station established here can comniunicate direct with a station (K K.) placed on the summit of a very high conical point on the ridge about 1,200 yards south of the Khapak Pass from which conical point the camp at Ata Jor tank aboatl} miles to east of Khan Beg Kor, and the station G. N. (b), 3} miles north-west of Ghalanai camp, can likewise be got direct. Both stations, A. and K K , are each a stiff 1 hour's climb from their respective kolals, which is as far as mules can be got, while G. N. (6) takes from 1 to bour to ascend from foot of hill, and each of the three stations requires a strong escort. If, however, a transnutting station be established on the ridge to the north-east of the Khapak Pass at D (vide map), as was actually done during the first combined operations on the Pass, then B is a more convenient station than A. A column moving by the Bohai Dag valley towards Koda Khel becomes lost to view near the village of Ato Khel, being shut out by the ridges and spurs of the Nahakkı ridge immediately to the westward of this point ... Similarly a column moving from Ghalanai towards the Khapak Pass becomes lost to view near Kasai village owing to the ridge lying to the south of, and parallel to, the Nahakki ridge intervening, and a column moving westwards from Umra Kalai is obscured by the Darwazagai range about a mile to west of the former village. After these points shall have been passed, therefore, communication must be sought through stations estab. lished with piquets on the intervening heights. This also applies to stations Band C excepting that the valley of the Bohai Dag again becomes visible to the latter station (C) in vicinity of Koda Khel, e.g., points Find G, vide map and notes on Koda Khel Signal Station. Personnel, equipment, water and transport same as for station B. Hours worked, 8-15 .1.2. to 6-5 P.J. Communication obtained with — Station Bearing Distance in miles, Remarks. - 1 Bearing not taker, Nahahli villago X. (u)(hull 2 miles north-n est ut Ghalanei and south of Kangur) 157° 3 ·xlviii OPDR.ITIONS AGAINST THD MOHJANDS, 1908. Communication possible with- Koda Khel village through (1) Khapak ridge (K. K.); (2) ridge (P.S.) about 3 or 4 miles north-west of Ata Jor tank (A.R.); (3) knoll (IV.) north-east of Koda Khel ; all three of which stations require escorts. VB-This line should not be used if station can be established on Khazana bill (C). (4) Ata Jor (A R.) through Khapak ridge (K.K.) (5) Lakarai village through station (M) on west bank of nala about mile south-west of Lakarai village. (6) Kasai, south of Darwazagai range —direct. (7) Umra Kalai (U.I.)—direct. (8) G. N. (6) hill 31 miles north-by-west of Ghalanai-direct. Nahakki Ridge Station B. Station B.---On rocky point about 400 yards west of road over klal. This point was most frequently used from 15th to 30th day for undermentioned reasons (1) It was more easily accessible than either A or C. It was comparatively close to the road over the kotal and could be reached in about hour from Nahakki tank, whereas I took about 11 and C 2 hours to ascend from same place. (2) It could be, and was, used as a night as well as a day station, as piquets were located here both by day and by night, whereas A and C were too far away and would have required too large an escort to furnish a night station. (3) Special escort not required as in case of A and C. (4) Communication was established with the majority of places desired if not direct, then through transmitting stations with piquets, and moreover could be maintaiucd longer by day than.I and C. Personnel.—Special Signalling Unit. Equipment. - Three sets, if possible. Wałcr.-Obtainable from tank at Nahakki village or from springs in direction of Sro village to cast of former place. Transporl.-- Jules taken to top of kolal, whence equipment kit, rations, water carried up by land to Signal Station along ridge. llours o/ trork.-3.1.31. toj r. 3., or as required.

·APPEWDIT M'I. xlix or Reliefs. -Duty at Central Station in Nahakki village and on ridge taken in turns by the two Special Units. Communication obtained tcith- Station. Ghalanai camp, through (1) G. N. (a) bearing 162°, distance } miles, (2) G. N. (6) bearing 101°, distance 33 miles. Ata Jor camp, through (1) D. on ridge south-west of and parallel to Nahakki ridge, and (2) K K. on ridge south of Kliapak Pass. Kasai camp, through piquet on hill bearing 315º, distance 37 nules, Lakarai camp, through station J on low mound on west bank of nala, mile south-west of Lakarai village bearing 331°, distance 12 miles. Nahakkı camp direct, bearing 16° to centre of tank adjoining village on west side; distance mile. Yakh Dand direct, bearing 3529 to Signalling Station on bank of tank, distance 7 miles. Umra Kalai direct, bearing not taken, distance 34 miles. Communication possible with Sheto Khel camp, through Sbatai Pass. Had camp, through WR on height 2 miles south-west of Had Koda Khel, through (1) G. N. (6)3} miles north-west of Ghalanai, and (2) K K. on ridge south of Khapak Pass, and (3) L. S. on ridge 3 to 4 miles north-west of Ita Jor, and (4) west on knoll north-cast of Khuda Khel village. VB-Each of the above intermediate stations would require cocorts and coumunua. tion only practicable by day. Nahakkı Ridge Station C. On first highest peak of Khazana about 2,100 yards cast of road over Na hakkı Kotal. This station from its elevation (about 4,800 feet) and extensive range of vision is by far the best of those on the Nahakki ridge for purely signalling purposes. Its drawbacks were — (1) its distance from camp at Nahakkı village, about a two hours' stiff climb; (2) the large escort required. Personnel.-Special Signalling Unit. . Equipment. As for do. do.

·1 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHJANDS, 1908. Jater.— Obtainable from camp tank, spring near Sro and spring in bushy ravine about half way between top of hill and bottom of slope on north side. Transport --Hill not accessible to mule transport. Equipment, rations, water, etc., must be carried up by hand. Road.-No path or track but the bushy ravine south-east of Nahakki village leading past the spring already mentioned is as direct a way as any, and takes about 2 hours to negotiate the summit from the tank at Nahakki village. Communication obtained with — Station Bearing Distance in miles. Remarks 278° IV. on knoll mile north-east of Koda Khel P.S on rulge 3 to 4 miles porthwest of Ata Jor tank 131 2739 11% Nahakki camp Communication possible with following stations from which Khazana hill was recognized :- Ghalanai Camp, through hill marked T on map to westward of 2nd Camp from which it was about 20 minutes climb to top. Distance 6 miles. Karappa Pass, direct. Distance 61 miles. Dand Camp, through station on Bakaro Mena. Distance 10 miles. Khapak Pass, through conical hill K.K. Distance to (KK) 6 miles. Communication probable with following :- Peshawar direct. Distance between 30 and 31 miles. Mula Kala, camp, through (R) on high conical lill on right bank of river. Distance to (R) 6} miles. Nahakki Village. This village lies at the foot of the Nahakki Pass on the north side at about 11 miles by road from the hotel. It is easily distinguishable by a large circular water tank adjoining it on the west side which formed one of the chief sources of water-supply. This was the furthest point ruched by the field Telegraph, and the Advanced Supply Depôt was formed here, so that the place became the point d'appui from which Brigades conducted thcir punitive operations. I central signal station was established on the roof of a native house at the north-east corner of the village. This building, in the courtyard of which the Divisional Staff were quartered, was rendered conspicuous by a stone tower on the east side, on the roof adjoining which the Signallers were stationed.

·APPE.VDII V1. li Special Signalling Unit sent out daily from here occupied one of the Signalling Stations A, B or Con Nahakki ridge to communicate with the Line of Communication through the Ghalanai stations, and also with whichever brigade night be operating in the neighbouring valleys. Station B was occupied a few times by night, and should be used when communication by night with troopis operating in the vicinity of Umra Kalai and Yakh Dand is desired, 23, owing to the low ridge of hills lying inmediately to the south of Lakai, direct communication, either by day or night, between these two places and Nahakki village must not be relied on. One of the brigades at a time was usually camped in and around the village and tank and furnished piquets on Nahakkı ridge for the protection of the Telegraph line over the pass, and on the lower portions of the spurs east of camp. These piquets were connected with camp by lamps at night. Communication obtained with Nahakkı ridge, Stations (A) and (B). Khazana Hill, Station (C). Umra Kalau direct, bearing not taken ; les nearly due north, distance 5 miles Kasai camp througb piquct on hill above camp (bearing not taken). Operating Brigades (1) moving by Bohal Dug valley to Khan Beg Kor, through Station (J) on nound with conspicuous, light-coloured tower on it, about 3 to 4 miles north-west of Nahakkı vilizge; (2) moring to Gumbatai and Khwaja Kuhai, through Station (S) on ridge immediately to south-west of Gumbatai village; (3) moving westwards from Umua Kalai, through Signalling Station established with piquet on the Darwazág31 range north-enst of Darwazaga. Pass, (1) moving down Pipal valley, through Station (W, R ) on height about 2 miles south-rest of tank at Had village. Khapak Pass. Signal Station (KK)-On conspicuous conical height on ridge about 1,200 ards south of the road over the kotal from which it is a stiff 1 hour's climb tu the top along the watershed Two and a quarter bours should be allowed reach this Signalling Station from the camp at Ata Jur. This was used as a Transmitting Station betn een the brigades operatin from cast and west of the Khapak Pass, and also for a limited time tu cum", station B on Nalakkı ridge with At3 Jor camp, once through D and me through GN (6). signalling party was also establ:shed bere during the return of tri., Brigade from Ata Jor to Ghalanji and protected by a suitable paquit, ·lii OPERATIONS 1GAINST THE JOUANDS, 1908. From the summit of this conical height, Ata Jor tank is just visible over shoulder of hill; P.S. on ridge 3 to 4 miles north-Fest of Ata Jor; the Khazana station (C) and station (1) on Nahakki ridge can be got direct, but neither of these lattor stations were occr pied at the saine time as (K. K.). Personnel -Six Signallers. Equipment.-Two sets (preferably three). later.-Obtainable from tank at Ita Jor camp to west of pass, or tank at Tora Tiga village in plain abcut two iniles east of pass. Transport: -Mules can be got up to top of Khapak Pass from either east or west side, but thence equipment, water, etc., must be carried to signal station by hand Road.-- Follow road to top of kotal then take watershed line of ridge as there is no path leading to top of the hill. Communication obtained with Nahakki ridge Station (B) through (1) transmitting Station (D), (2) transmitting station (G. N. (b). [.V B.–Station (B) cannot be got direct from (K K).] ог Ata Jor camp direct, bearing 291, distance 31 miles; G N (6) on ridge north of Sangar. Communication possible with following, which could be seen :- Nahakki ridge, Station (A) dircct, bearing 51°, Nahakki ridge, Station (C) direct bearing 63º. P.S. on ridge, 3 to 4 miles north-west of Ata Jor tank, bearing 2059 Z on sketch below, a ridge with a small ruined tower at either end about 1 mile north-west of Ghalanai csmp, bearing to southern tower 106º. Several small hill-tops in immediate vicinity of Ghala nai were just visible over the intervening ridges, and it was thought probable that communication could be got with that place, by pre-arrangement, between hill S.C. (a) to south of 1st camp, or even S. C. (b) on north face of 2nd camp, without having to send a party out so far as G. N. (6). The Karappa Pass was not visible, being shut out by a spur fron Tora Tiga hill , neither could G. N. (a) be seen. Koda Khel. Signal Station (11).- On top of one of the casternnost of several rouodtopped koolls lying about to wile to the cast of the northerna:ost tank which adjoins a building on west bank of nala. This was not the highest point of this future, the general direction of which was north from the main range which itself ran cast and west, but situated as it was about 300 Sards or so to the west of the track leading to the village, easily accessible to animals, and compunding a view of the country to the cast and west as ·APPENDIX VI. liii 1 well as to the south it formed an ideal position for the staff as well as for a Signalling Station. This point was occupied by the Divisional Staff and was established as a Signal Station, while the 2nd Brigade operating from Ata Jor camp demolished Koda Khel village and seized the hcights to south of it. Bearings taken to fix its position were to Khazana (hill station C) 98°, and to the point where the track disappeared over the kotal south-west of Koda Khel village 227° Personnd.—Six Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed). Equipment -Two sets. Water.-Obtainable from tank adjoining native house on left bank of nala about } to mile to rest of signol station. Transport.-Could get to top of knoll. Good cover exists in folds of ground for animals. Communication obtained with Nahahki village, through Khazana hill (C) bearing 98°, distance 131 miles. Ata Jor camp, through Station P. S.on ridge bettfeen 3 and 4 miles north-west of camp bearing 116°, distance 17 miles. Bearing of Statiun at Ata Jor camp from P.S. 117°, distance 41 miles. On withdrawing with the rear-guard from the Signal Station at Wcommunication with Khazana hill (C) was subsequently obtained from a point in the valley below near that marked F on map. From F the signal station Con Khazana kull was just visible through an opening in the ridge east of Wucha Jawar, but this was the last place in the valley on the return to Ata Jor whence it could be obtained direct owmg to intervening ridges and heights. Further communication flomvalley practicable with C through PS until piquets with latter retired. The best signal station for communication between Nahakki village and Koda Khel or places further up the valleys to the west and north-west is undoubtedly the one used on Khazana hull (C). Stations A and B cn Nabakki ridge present difficulties in the way of furnishing transnutting stations, which render their occupation for this purpose unsuitable. Transmitting Station PS. The transmitting station situated on one of the rocky points (not the highest) towards the west end of a ridge lying between 3 and 4 miles in direct linc north- West of Ata Jor camp, from which it was about a 21 hours' march, forms an important point from which to keep communication with a column moring along the broad valley to Koda Khel or up the Spinkai Tangi as well as Fitb Nahakki village through Khazana bill (C). A Double Company, 28th Punjabis, piquetted this ridge all day, with drawing with the rear-guard, the Signallers (British and Indian Army) retir. ing with it. 1 ·liv OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MORNANDS, 1908. Personnel.Six Signallers (British and Indian Army mixed). Equipment.--Two sets (three if available). Transport.–Brought to foot of slope on south side along a good path. Equipment, water, etc., taken up by hand. Tho Signal Station at Khazana hill looked almost exactly the same in appearance from the signal station (W) near Koda Khel. The station (C) was on a dark coloured conical hill behind which another and higher hull formed a very dark background. Communication obtained with Station. Bearing Distance in miles. Remarks. Ata Jor camp (taok) Khazana hill (c) 117° 930 . 111 Connecting with Nahakkl village. Koda Khel ka oll (W) 296 Communication possible with K. K, bearing 115°, distance 7} miles. Ata Jor Camp. Signal Station (A. R.).-On west bank of water tank around which the camp was formed. Thero was no village here; the tank lies about 1} miles to east of village of Khan Beg Korand about 400 to 500 yards west of i deep wala running generally north and south. Communication with Na hakki village or ridge cannot be got direct, but can be obtained in following ways by day only :- (1) A party of Signallers moved outside the perimeter of camp to a point (marked H on map) ncar west bank of nala 300 to 400 yards north of tank (to which bearing was 185°), con communicate with Nahakkı village through a Transmitting Station sent out under escort from the latter place to a conspicuous light coloured tower on low hill (marked J on map) at foot of a long spur rubning north from the Nabakki ridge. A couple of orderlics for delivery of messages in camp would be required at this station H. This is the best line 3s only onc transmitting station (at J) is necessary. It is howaver open to the objection that a strong escort (Cavalry for choice) Fould be required owing to the distance it lics from Nolakki village (about 4 milos by road). For this season as well as for the fact that the station (11) at ·APPENDIX VI. ly Ata Jor must be outside the perimeter of camp and the hills to the east are too far off to piquet by night, communication cannot be maintained at night and must cease by day at such time as will enable the Transmitting Station at (I) to get back to Nalakkı camp before dark. Bearing of J from H as 54°. (2) Through Transmitting Station on conical hill KK on ridge south of Khapak Pass and another established at A or C on Nahakki ridge. (3) Through Transmitting Stations as KK, D or GN (6) and B on Nahakki ridge. These were each used during the operations. (2) and (3) are alternative methods but, owing to the greater number of transmitting stations required, the distances to be traversed and heights to be climbed, are not to be preferred should choice of methods exist. They, likewise, cannot be used for night work. From tank: communicatio» oblarned with- Nahakli village through following transmitting stations :- Khapak Pass (KK), bearing 114°. Ridge north-west of KK (D), bearing not taken. Nahakki ridge (B), Learing not taken fron: D. Ghalanai camp and Nahalkı village through following: Khapak Pass (KK), bearing 114º. Ridge north of sangar ( GN (6)], bearing not taken but lies approximately due E of KK. Nahakkı ridge (B) invisible from KK, Umra Kalai Camp. Signal Station (U1). In village on roof of house occupied by Divisional Staff. This was the only safe place in village from which communication with Nahakkı village just visible over low ridge of hills to south of Lakai could be obtained at night. A station shuuld be established on Nahakkı ridge at B in addition to the central station at Nahakkı village to render communication certain with Umra Kalai by night as well as by de y. Water obtained from tank about 100 to 500 yards north-east of village. No bearings taken from village itself, but this village lies very pearly due north of Naliakkı village, distance 5 miles. Yakh Dand. Signal Station (¥. D.).— A temporary station was formed on bank of tank close to village on south side whence bearing to station (R) on Vabakki ridge was 1720, distance 7 milcs.

·lyi OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOHMANDS, 1908. Nahakki village itself is obscured by intervening bills. This station was occupied while the brigade completed the destruction of crops, buildings, etc., required. 1 Darwazagai Ridge. Signal stations with piquets were necessary on this ridge to connect column moving west along the valley from Unua Kalai and Yakh Dand towards Habibzai. Habibzai Camp. No communication obtained with Nahakki village or ridge from within perimeter of this camp, as the Darwazagai range shut out station (B) (on Nahakki ridge) which latter had been occupied uring the day. Communication with station (1) on Nahakki ridge from within perimeter of camp probable by day, but night work not feasible owing to distance of station (A) from Nabakki village and active hostility of district. Lakarai Camp. During the preliminary stages of the attack from snuthward on the ridges and spurs closing tho Lokarai defile, the cast end of a low rocky ridge (Signal Station marked L on map) almost duc cast of Bagh village and immediately west of the Nahakki-Nasra zai road and of a large water tank about 300 yards or so away, tras occupied for between 4 and 5 hours and communication maintained with station (B) on Nahakki ridge, the bearing of which was 151, alistance 11 miles. The light of the lieliv. of this latter station (B) was just visible over west shoulder of ridge lying to the cast or the Darwazagai Pass. Jloving northwards through the defile, the sillage of Lakarai, lying just north of a large tank at the foot of the northern slopes of a very high ridge, is [cached. This ridge, to the east of the defile, completely hides the Nahakki ridge, with which, therefore, communication could not be established froin within the perimeter of the camp formed round the village. Signal Station (11).—This was formed on a small mound inarked (31) un map on right bank of nala about inile south-west of camp and almost duo west of the tank, and communication opened for a short time with station (B) on Nahakki ridge bearing, as before, 151°, distance 12} milcs. Since Navagai village some 5 or 6 miles up the broad valley to the northwards, and the hills immcdiately behind and above it to cast and west of the pass of that name, can be scen from the roofs of the houses in Lakarai village, and the Nahabki ridge is visible from the low ground (point II) alrcady indicated, there is no object in establishing a Signal Station on the top of the heights to cast or west of the Lakami defile in order to connect Nawagai with Nabakki. Signal Station in a camp formed in the plain immediately to south of Nawagai village would be visible from roofs of Lakarai village and ·APPENDIX VI. Iyii a position near or a little to north of M. could no doubt be found for a transmitting station to connect such camp with Nahakli ridge direct without having to ascend the neighbouring heights. Shato Khel Camp The heights to the south of the necessarily scattered camp formed ncar this place take a horse-shoe formation, the Shatai Pass lying near the centre of the sepiicircle, but they are at po point suficiently close to the camp to render piquets necessary. Unless therefore the heights beseized communication with Nahakki is impossible. The high rocky hill-top on north side of nala being piquetted, was tried as a signal station (marked (N) on map), but found impracticable owing to the beights to the south obstructing the view. A olitary peak of the Nahakkı ridge was seen through an opening in the ridge to the south, but could not be identified nore definitely. From this hill-top communication was sought to be obtained with a party of signallers near Hazarnao Mountain in the Malakand ronge which it was thought might be visible from here, but without success. Water obtainable from tanks. Had Camp. The column, continuing its march castwards along the Pipal valley, sent a Hanking party to crown the difficult heights to the southward close to the junction of the Piral with the Amba har streams near Kargha. The signalling officer of the party got touch with Nabakki village from this point (marked W.R. on map), the bearing from which he made208°, and maintained communication with Divisional Headquarters first just test of Kargha at (0) on map and subsequently at Had camp (marked (P) on map) until obliged to withdraw to camp at the latter place in the evening. The neighbouring hills were of such great height and so distant from canıp at Had that further conmunication with Nabakki vas impossible. Communication with party ncar Hazarnao Mountain again attempted unsucessfully, Water obtainable from stream and tank near isolated bouse. Kota Taraf Pass, This pass lies between the Ambahar and Danish Kol vallcys. Signal Station (Q).- Established on high point between 15 and 20 mmutes' climb up ridge to west of track over the kotal, with a view to opening communication withi Nahakhi ridge or Hazırnao Mountain, but found this inipossible as regards Nahakkindge owing to interveniug hills obstructing the view. Mulla Kalai. 'The highest point marked (R) on map on right bank of river opposite camp was tricd, but though the western portion of the Nahalki range,

·lyui
OPERATIONS AGAINST THB HOHMANDS, 1908.
probably Khazana hill, was visible, the rest of the ridge was shut out by an
intervening range.
Communication with Hazarao Mountain which should surely be visible
from this point was also tried unsuccessfully.
Communication with Nahakki was not re-established until the column
issued from the nala a mile or two to the cast of Umra Kalai at (K) on map.
M. G. HEATH, Captain,
Divl. Signallıng Officer,
Mohmand Field Forcc.

·APPENDIX VII. EXPEYDITURE OF JUUNITION DURIY PELATIONS DORING OPERATIOS. Boonds of ammunition erpended. -- Artillery ammonition, Dattery, Eesmeni nr Detach. ment No of Runior TiB (DgAgod Ja ta h battery or corpo 3037 Shrapo:lshe. Common sha! Machin) guns, 303 caliuto. Total CAgo shot Starshell. King shell 303 Carbino. Pistol. 20 430 .. 867 1,010 .. . .. . 633 19,412 24,208 32,720 55,720 62,016 . .. . 302 3,571 729 .. .. .. .. . .. Ist Battalon, Boys Warwick ature Begiment 1st Xorthumberland Fusiliers 2204 Panjabis. 33rd Sikhs, Y.Y. 57th Wide Bides, P. F.. 59th Banda Rules, F. P. 21st Cavalry, P. P 19th Lancers. . 954 .. FOS 112 743 39,481 3,757 .. . 1. 30,137 255 (29 . 4 334 3,323 .. . 5,936 .. . 168 . 795 50 603 815 .. 419 419 .. 12 211 67 67 301 982 19,709 5 580 377 91 .. 161 557 .. T29 18,995 12,477 1,671 666 11 . Xo 6 Company, 1st Sappers sod Miners Xo & Mountain Battery, Royal Garros Artillery Both Battery, Boyal Field Artillers 22nd Mountain Battery 1x Battallon, Seaforth High. landers 23rd Mountain Batury Yo 1 Company. Sappers and Miners Guides Inlantry osth Panjabi Jith #kh Pioneers 54th Sih, Y. F. 55th Cokeh Eideo, P. Y 18th Battery, Royal Yield Artillery 23th Mountala Battery lat Battalion, West York shiro Legimeat 1st Battalion, Bogel Munster Foxilers 21at Panjabls 40th Pathan 19th Punjat. Takeo by deathert. 721 4,380 . 757 11,669 33,035 29,216 39 1,928 670 .. 2 99 48 217 217 1 30 458 435 . .. 9 . 239 . . . 787 1 600 136 .. 833 18,389 6,793 c25 .. 735 . 437 10,800 717 .. . 702 600 . 18 Lat TEL 2,016 437,662 19,7201

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