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·The Adyar Library Series–No. 32 ĀLAMBANAPARĪKSA

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·ĀLAMBANAPARĪKSĀ
AND
VRTTI
ce
A.S
BY
DINNĀGA
WITH THE COMMENTARY
३०९
OF
DHARMAPĀLA
Restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese Versions
and edited with Englisń Translations and Notes and with
copious extracts from Vinitadeva's Commentary
BY
N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI
S. V. S. COLLEGE, TIRUPATI
(Honorary special Editor of Tibetan and Chinese Texts,
Brahmavidyā", Adyar, and formerly Professor of
Buddhist Studies, Santiniketan)
THE ADYAR LIBRARY
1942

·Price Rs. 3-8-0
Printed by
C. SUBBARAYUDU,
AT THE VASANTA PRESS,
APYAR, MADRAS,

·Dedicated
To
THEM
Who laboured for the cause of cultural
and spiritual advancement of all
living beings

·他 ·CONTENTS PAGE ix xi . . 1 . 9 21 Prefatory Note Preface Restored Sanskrit Text with Author's own Vịtti Literal Sanskrit Translations of Paramārtha's and Hiuen Tsang's Chinese Versions in parallel columns Dharmapāla's Commentary--Sanskrit Text. English Tra nslation of the Text with Extracts from Vinitadeva's Commentary English Translation of Dharmapāla's Commentary Romanised Tibetan Version of the Text Additional Notes Appendix : A. Vasubandhu on Externalism B. Sthiramati on Externalism C. A Treatise on Yogacārās' Classification of Dharmas D. Sauträntikas' Classifications Indexes 41 56 87 95 . . . . . . 105 110 111 116 . . . 119

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·PREFATORY NOTE In the scheme of publications planned for the Adyar Library, Buddhistic literature forms one important branch of study. Special attention has been paid in recent years to the study of Tibetan and Chinese versions of certain Buddhistic Texts in Sanskrit which had been lost and could only be reconstructed on the basis of their Tibetan and Chinese versions. The Bhavasankranti-sutra and Nagarjuna's Bhavasankranti sastra published by the Adyar Library in 1938, under the editorship of Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri, were our first attempts in the direction of such restoration. Encouraged by the reception which the Bhavasankranti-sūtra received at the hands of the scholars, we are now issuing the second of the series, the Alambana. parīkşa and Vịtti of Ācārya Dinnāga under the same editorship. A fortunate circumstance has preserved this important Buddhistic work in their Chinese and Tibetan versions while the Sanskrit original has been lost. The Journal Asiatique (Vol. CCXIV, No. 1) contains a French translation of this work with copious extracts from the commentary of Vinītadeva under the joint efforts of Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi of Japan and Henry Meyer of Paris. For increasing its usefulness, it was felt necessary to have the treatise reconstructed into Sanskrit along with an English translation. Paņdit Aiyaswami Sastri who is eminently fitted for the task, kindly undertook to prepare and edit the work and has now carried it through to a successful completion. In the B ·present edition, he has incorporated all the salient features of the French translation including the extracts from the commentary of Vinītadeva and has also gone much farther. The Commentary of Dharmapāla in the Chinese version of I-tsing has been rendered into both Sanskrit and English and incorporated in this edition. It is noteworthy that this Dharmapāla is earlier in point of time to Vinītadeva. He is further stated to be different from his South Indian namesake who lived near Negapatam. Valuable information on Dinnāga is also presented in the Editor's preface. It is hoped that the 'Additional Notes' and four Appendixes will be helpful to students of research on the subject. The need for a reorientation of Indological studies from the point of view of cultural contact with the Far East and China, has not yet been adequately provided for in our country. Only a few institutions and Universities have made provision for the study of Tibetan and Chinese Literature and fewer still for original research. It is earnestly hoped that our Universities and other cultural centres will realize the imperative need for providing for this branch of study as early as possible. A chair in each University to promote the study of the cultural contributions of the literature of the Far Eastern countries may well be expected to open up new and fascinating fields of research. It is with great pleasure that I record here our obligations to Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri for placing his most valuable and scholarly services at the disposal of the Library, freely and generously. Adyar G. SRINIVASA MURTI, 7th April, 1942. Honorary Director.

·PREFACE THE Alambanaparīkņā is one of the smaller treatises on the selected subjects composed by Acārya Dinnāga, the father of mediæval Indian logic. The treatise, as its title denotes, starts an enquiry about the true nature of the alambana, object of consciousness. The author, after a thorough examination of the standpoints of the Realists such as Vaibhāșikas, Vais'eșikas and others who hold the external things to be real, and proving their views untenable, establishes that the alambana, as it appears to us, is unreal and that consciousness alone is real--a dogma which has been held by his predecessors, Asanga and Vasubandhu, two eminent teachers of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. The main contribution of Dirnāga to that school in his present treatise lies in putting the dogma on a logical basis. This position of the author provoked a vehement protest from the dialecticians of the opposite camp, more specially Kumārilabhaſta and Sankarācārya, two great thinkers and up-holders of the Brāhmanical tradition and culture. According to Yogācāras, only the pure consciousness appears into subject and object; and there exists, for them, nothing external apart from sciousness. What causes consciousness to arise is only its part known as grahyabhaga, knowable aspect, and CON- ·X11 the same is regarded as the object-cause (alambanapratyaya). The opponent asks : " How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness itself ?” Dinnāga answers this question in two ways. The first answer is: It is, though simultaneous, a condition, because it is associated invariably with consciousness : प्रत्ययो ऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सह. The second answer is: It becomes also a condition in succession by transmitting the force (sakti): reagona PATEL II (Alam. parikşa, 7 a-b). Both these answers, according to Kumārila, are unsatisfactory and do not stand the strict scrutiny of the logicians. So he takes up the question for an impartial investigation and proves invalidity of those arguments of Dinnāga in these verses : अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षत्वायुगपञ्चापि जन्मनि । मानमेयत्वनास्तित्वं क्रियाकारकवर्जनात् || etc. . न च शक्त्यर्पणद्वारं क्रमेणालम्बनं भवेत् । etc. (Slokavārtika, Sunyavada, 150-158 and 158-167). Similarly Sankarācārya also has, in his Bhāşya on the Brahmasūtras, summarized and demolished the whole structure of Dinnāga's arguments found in the present work; and in doing so he quotes this line : Territarar a alcanhdi (Alam. par. 6 a-b) in the course of setting forth his own siddhanta. Similar criticisms See my paper on Sankarācārya on Buddhist Idealism" published in the Journal of Sri. Ven. Orien. Inst., Tirupati. Vol. I, part 3, pp. 71-85, where I have studied the Bbāşya in the light of original Buddhist sources. 1 92 ·X111 are also met with in the works of Udyotakara, (Nyayavārtika), Vācaspatimis'ra (N. tatparyaţika) and Sālīkanātha (Prakaranapañcika) and others. I, therefore, need not say how thought-provoking and epoch-making the treatise was in those days. Their arguments and counterarguments will be more understandable, if one could get acquainted with the present work. Further, the work, as it is stated, forms one of the author's original contributions to the logic-minded Yogācāra school of Buddhism. All these circumstances necessitate us to undertake the publication of the present treatise. It is most unfortunate that such an important work should have been lost to us in its original Sanskrit, though available in translations of foreign languages, Chinese and Tibetan. The work has two commentaries, one by Dharmapāla of Nalandā, preserved in Chinese version of I-tsing, and the other by Vinītadeva available in Tibetan version. Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi in collaboration with H. Meyer has translated into French and published in the Journal Asiatique T. CCXIV, (Jan.- March, 1929) this work with copious extracts from the commentary of Vinītadeva, and also edited the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the text. But he did not study systematically the commentary of Dharmapāla. I have restored into Sanskrit this important treatise, text with author's own vrtti from the Tibetan version (Tang. hgyur. vol. Ge, XCV), with the commentary of Dharmapāla from the Chinese version of I-tsing, A.D. 671-695 (Nanjio, No. 1174, Taisho ed. vol. 31, No. 1625) and also translated them all into English. Dharmapāla's ·XIV commentary is incomplete and abruptly breaks off in the seventh verse. I have added to my English translation of the text almost all important portions of Vinītadeva's comment translated into English from its French translation of S. Yamaguchi and H. Mayer. There are two translations in Chinese of the text, one by Paramārtha (Nanjio, No. 1172, Taisho ed. vol. 31, No. 1619; Shanghai ed. "lai" part 10, pp. 13-14) and the other by Hiuen Tsang (Nanjio, No. 1173, Taisho ed. vol. 31. No. 1924, and Shanghai ed. "lai" part 10, pp. 12-13). Literal Sanskrit renderings of these two versions are made and printed in parallel columns so that the readers may themselves note their differences. For preparation of the edition of this work of Dinnāga, I have made use of the above specified and other reference books of the Adyar Library which is one of the richest and well-equipped Libraries of India, and more specially so in regard to rare collections of Buddhist literature including Tibetan and Chinese. I have only consulted for Dharmapāla's comment the Nanking edition of the Chinese version of I-tsing in my possession. Romanised Tibetan text of the treatise has also been added at the end with a view to facilitating the beginner in these studies. As .no printing facilities are available in the Press, I refrain from publishing any Chinese portion or wordindex in Chinese of the work. A copy of this edition was presented to me by my friend and student Mr. Shilu of China during my stay at Santiniketan in 1938-1939.

·ху Before closing this short preface, it will not be out of place to say a few words about the author and his commentators. The following accounts of Dinnāga are narrated by the Chinese traveller, Hiuen Tsang : "Above twenty li further south west of the monastery of Achala near the capital of Pundhra was an isolated hill on the ridge of which was a stone tope where Chenna (= Dinnāga) Pusa composed a Yin-minglun or a treatise on logic. The pilgrim then relates about the circumstances connected the production of this Sāstra in exposition of Buddha's teaching on Yinming. Chenna, the pilgrim relates, after the Buddha departed from this life, came under his influence, and and entered the Order. The aspirations of his spiritual knowledge were vast and his intellectual strength was deep and sure. Pitying the helplessness of the state of his age he thought to give expansion to Buddhism. As the Sāstra on the Science of Inference was deep and terse, and students wrought at it in vain, unable to acquire a knowledge of his teachings, he went apart to live in calm seclusion to examine the qualities of the writings on it and investigate their characteristics of style and meaning. Hereupon a mountain-God took the Pusa up in the air and proclaimed that the sense of Yin-ming-lun originally uttered by the Buddha, had been lost and that it would, that day, be set forth at large again by Chenna. This latter sent abroad a great light which illuminated the darkness. The sight of this light led to the King's request, that Chenna should at once ·xviii having incurred displeasure of his teacher, he was expelled, and he then joined the school of Vasubandhu. Then he lived for some time in a cave on Bhora Saila in Odivisa, sojourned in Nālandā, where he disputed successfully with several defenders of various schools and afterwards returned to Odivisa. Here he resolved to devote himself to the compilation of a treatise on logic, and the resolve was followed by an earthquake, a great light and a noise in the air. When he began to despair of success in his understanding, Mañjus'rī appeared to him, and roused him to renewed application by advice and encouragement. The king of the country also became of his friend and patron.” (v. On Yuan Chwang's travels in India, Vol. II, p. 212). From the above narratives we may conjucturally construe his life as below: He was born in a Brahmin family in a suburb of Kāñcī, then capital of Pallava kings in South India. Being educated in the orthodox teachings of Brahmins and Buddhists, he joined first the Vātsiputrīya sect of Buddhists. Being unsatisfied with its teachings he started for search of truth and finally came to Vasubandhu in Nalanda and studied with him the logic and Vijñānavāda. He composed there several smaller treatises such as commentary on the Abhidharınakosa, the Alambanaparikşa, Nyayamukha and others. After retirement from Nalanda, he settled in a cave on Bhora Saila in Odivisa and also frequently staying in Achala's monastery (=Ajanta caves) where he composed his Pramanasamuccaya, the standard treatise ·XIX I on the Buddhist logic. His date may roughly be fixed about 400 A.D., as he is stated to have studied with Vasubandhu in Sri Nalandā, whose life-period has been fixed as c. A. D. 280 to 360 by V. A. Smith (History of India, 3rd ed. p. 328) on the authority of N. Peri (Bulletin de L'Ecole France d'Extreme Orient, t. XI, pp. 339-90). Turning to Dharmapāla, his commentator, should, at the outset, like to stress on one point, namely that he is not to be confounded with a person of his namesake viz., Dharmapāla of the Theravāda school. The latter is said to be a resident of Badaritittha (v. Visuddhinaggaţika, colophon) which is simply stated in the Sasanavainsa to have been situated in the country of Damila, not far from the island of Ceylon (P.T.T. edn. p. 33). However, the latest Archaeological finds help us to identify it with some place near Negapatam, a small seaport town in South India. The present commentator, Dharmapāla is nowhere mentioned to have been connected any way with Badaritittha. He, on the other hand, is stated to have fled away from Kāñci towards the north in his youth and remained there until his death. I have discussed at length all the points relating to the persons and dates of these two Dharmapālas in a separate paper entitled "On Dharmapāla" published in the Journal of Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, (Vol. II, part 2, p. 347 ff.). The following accounts of the life of the present Dharmapāla are narrated by the Chinese traveller :

·"The capital (Kāñci) was the birth-place of Dharmapāla who was the eldest son of a high official of the city. He was a boy of good natural parts which received great development as he grew up. When he came of age a daughter of the King was assigned to him as wife, but on the night before the ceremony of marriage was to be performed, being greatly distressed in mind he prayed earnestly before an image of Buddha. In answer to his prayer, a god bore him away to a mountain monastery some hundreds of li from the capital. When the Brethern of the monastery had his story told, they complied with his request and gave him ordination and the king on ascertaining what had become of him, treated him with increased reverence and distinction." (v. T. Watters, op. cit. p. 226). The direction to which he fled on the eve of distress is not mentioned there; yet we may assume that it was North where he spent major part of his life. It is stated that he drew up the following works : Sabdavidyasaiyuktas'astra in 25,000 slokas; a commentary on the Satasāstravaipulya ; on the Vidyamatrasiddhi ; and on Nyāyadváratarkasāstra (= Nyayamukha of Dinnāga). The first of the above four works seems to be the same as the commentary on Bhartſhari's treatise called pei-na, mentioned by I-tsing. Takakusu suggests that pei-na is probably 'Beda' or 'Veda.' But this is improbable, because Bharthari is unknown to have composed any treatise on Veda, and much more so, that Dharmapāla should have commented upon it. So it may, perhaps, be Vyakarana.

·XXI This commentary and the commentary on Nyayamukha are not now available. Nanjio's Catalogue mentions four works in his credit: (1) Ālambanaparākṣavyakhya No. 1174, (2) Vidyāmatrasiddhi No. 1197, (3) Satasāstravaipulyavyakhya No. 1198, (4) Vidyamatrasiddhisastra No. 1210. As regards his date, I-tsing A.D. 671-695 speaks of him as contemporary of Bhartſhari who, according to the same Chinese authority died in about A.D. 651-52. It is also believed that he was the elder contemporary of Dharmakįrti who flourished in the middle of the 7th century A.D., and that the latter was the pupil of the former. In the present commentary of Dharmapāla, there are two quotations, both agreeing in spirit with the verses of Pramāņavārtika of Dharmakirti (v. pp. 61, 67). It is not certain whether the former quotes from the latter or they both cite them from a common source.' This Dharmapāla seems to be the same as the teacher of S'ilabhadra who received Hiuen Tsang at Nalandā in 635 A.D. (v. Takakusu, Record of the Bud. Religion by I-tsing, XIV). Prof. H. Li has, however, fixed 539-70. A.D. as Dharmapala's palmy days on the authority of Kwechi's commentary on the Vijñaptimatratasiddhi which is reported to have stated that Dharmapāla died in the 32nd year of his age and was one year younger Instances are not lacking to make us believe that Dharmakirti's Pramāņavārtika contains quotation from some earlier works ; e.g., the verses achfa ofa RH, etc., of the Ratnāvali of Nāgārjuna (ed. G. Tucci. in Journal of R.A.S. 1934, April) found in the Pram. vārtika, L. 221, p. 87. 1 1 ·xxii than Silabhadra. This Silabhadra, says H. Ui, was, according to the Siyuki of Hiuen Tsang, 30 years old while studying with Dharmapāla, and was 106 years old when Hiuen Tsang met him. The Chinese pilgrim started from China in 629 A.D. and arrived at Rājagpha and saw him in 633 A.D. So Dharmapāla was still living in 557 A.D. These are circumstances which prompted H. Ui to arrive at the opinion in regard to the date of Dharmapāla above stated (v. Vaiseșika Philosophy, p. 10). Though the tradition of Kwechi and others is earlier and more trustworthy, yet it is not supported by I-tsing and the Tibetan authorities, (e.g., Tārānātha, pp. 161-2). Therefore we may, as it has been stated above, assign our commentator to the second quarter of the 7th Century A.D. (cf. Tattvasangraha, Intro. xcv). Scholars will themselves see how lucid, and elucidative his commentary is even in the translation of so linguistically unfamiliar and foreign language as Chinese, and how much more useful purpose would have been served, if the Sanskrit original of it were recovered. It is also equally regrettable that the commentary is incomplete. As for Vinītadeva, the other commentator, we know very little of his life, and we have to content ourselves with what Tārānātha briefly remarks: "Zu der zeit liebten die Zauberkundigen : Konig Sahajavilāsa (Lhan.skyes.rol.pa), in Sri Nalanda der Acārya Vinītadeva (er verfasste einen commenter zu dem Pramāņa in Sieben Abtheilungen), der Sautrāntika Subhamitra and der Acārya S'ilapālita," ... (Schiefner's translation, ·XX111 p. 197-8). He was a great logician and commentator of his time, and was one of the gems of Nalandā University. He is said to have flourished in about 700 A.D. His commentary on the present treatise is very learned and helpful to understand fully the position and motive of Dinnāga in writing the present work. Almost all important portions of this commentary have been translated into French by S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer from its Tibetan translation, and again translated into English by me and added as notes to my English translation of the treatise. In concluding the preface I should offer my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Adyar Library, especially the Director, Dr. G. Srinivasamurti, B.A, B.L., M.B. & C.M., Vaidyaratna, and the Editor Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) for kindly publishing this book in the Adyar Library Series. I should like also to thank M. Bhikshu Arya Asanga (formerly A. J. Hamerster) Jt. Director and Curator for the Western section of the Library for the help he has kindly rendered by going through some portions of my English translation of the French passages. However, I must say that I hold myself responsible for those portions as printed in this volume. N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI

·Substitute the following for the verse Ta-b on page 2, line 5
and p. 6, 11.7 and 11:
प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सह शक्त्यर्पणात क्रमात् ।
(cited by Parthasārathi Misra in his comment
on S'lokavārtika, pp. 311 and 312.)

·आलम्बनपरीना
आचार्यदिङ्नागकृता
नम: मर्वबुद्धबोधिसत्त्वेभ्यः
१. यद्यपीन्द्रियविज्ञाद्यांशः (=अणवः) कारणं भवेत् ।
अतदाभतया तस्या नाक्षवद्विषयः स तु' (अणवः) ।।
२. यदाभासा न तस्मात् सा द्रव्याभावात् द्वेचन्द्रवः ।
एवं बाधद्वयश्चैव न युक्तं मतिगोचरः ॥
३. साधनं सञ्चिताकारमिच्छन्ति किल केचन' ।
अण्वाकारो न विज्ञमेरः काठनता दिवा ॥
४. भवेद्धटशरावादेस्तथा सति समा मतिः ।
आकारमेदारेदश्चेत् , नास्ति तु द्रव्यसत्यणौ ।।
1
Tanjur (Narthai), Mdo, ce, (XCY) No. 4.
This verse is quoted in the Tattvasangrahapañjikā (GOS.)
p. 582. The reading 'अणवः' given within bracket is according to
the Tibetan version.
This line being put literally, may read thus : केचित् सविताकारान
साधनमिच्छन्ति ।
'Lit. विज्ञप्ति-मर्थ.
.

·२
आलमनपा
५. प्रमाणभेदाभावात् सः'. अद्रव्येऽस्ति ततः स हि ।
अणूनां परिहारे हि तदाभज्ञानाववाः ।।
६. 'दन्तयां तु बहिर्वदवभासते ।
सोयों विज्ञान-पत्वात्तत्मत्ययतयापि च ॥
७. एकांशः' प्रत्ययोऽवीतात् !पत्यपणाक्रमेण [वा] ।
सहकारिवशावद्धि शक्तिरूपं [तव] इन्द्रियम् ।।
८. सा ॥वरुद विनरेवं विषयरूपकम् ।
प्रवर्ततेनालाल शक्तिश्चान्योन्यहेतु ॥
इत्याचार्यदिग्नागकृता आलम्बनपरीक्षाप्रकरणकारिका समाप्ता
6
'The two quarters 4d and 5a form one idea, and they may be
put literally thus : स: अणौ द्रव्यसति नास्ति प्रमाणमेदाभावात् .
'This may literally read thus अणु परिहारे तदाभज्ञानविप्लव:. The
reading 'fagara' is adopted from the Tibetan version of the
Vrtti.
This verse is quoted in the Tattvas. pari. p. 582. Mr. S. Yama.
guchi suggests in Tib. 6b the reading 'de' for 'te' relying upon
Viditadeva's commentary (Tıb.). It is also supported by the
Sanskrit original. The first half of this verse is cited by Sarkara
in his Bhasya ad II, 2, 28, with the reading 'तत् ' for 'तु'.
=gcig. cha hai. So reads S. Yamaguchi's edition of the Tib.
sersion. But the Xylograph reads gcig. nahai=एकोऽपि.
=अविनाभाव-अव्यभिचार=mi (ma) hkhrul.
This quarter is cited in the Tattvasati. pah. p. 582 along with
the prose passage of the Vrtti thus : अथ वा शक्त्याne, etc.
-
१

·आलम्बनपरांसाहन्तिः आचार्यदिनागकुता नमः सर्वबुद्धबोधिसत्त्वेभ्यः ये चाजानन्यालम्बनं बाह्याथोंऽस्तीतीच्छन्ति । ननु ते कल्प- यन्ति परमाणून् ; तत्कारणत्वात् ज्ञानम्य] । संघातं' वा तदाभज्ञानस्य जायमानत्वात् । तत्र तावत् यद्यपीन्द्रियविज्ञप्तेाद्यांशः (=अणवः) कारणं भवेत् । अतदाभतया तम्या नाक्षवद्विषयः स तु (अणवः) ॥ १ ॥ विषय इति । ज्ञानेन म्वरूप [मेव] निर्धार्यते । तदाकारतया' जायमानत्वात् । यद्यप्यणवः तत्कारणम् । तथापि न तादृशाः अक्षवत । एवञ्च नाणवम्तावदालम्बनम् । संघातम्तु तदाभत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य. नाल- म्बनम् । यतः] । * Tanjur (Narthan), Mdo, ce (XCV) No. 5. The Tibetan version has been edited by Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi with French translation in the Journal Asiatique T. CCXIV, No 1 (1929). hdus. pa. Lit.-कारेण जननात. 'This sentence may also read thus : अणूनां तत्कारणत्वेऽपिन तथाभावः मक्षपत.

·बालम्बनपरीक्षा बदामासान तस्मात्सा गोऽर्थः स्वावभासिविज्ञप्तिमुत्पादयति सबालम्बनं युज्यते । यतः स एव युत्पत्तिप्रत्यय उच्यते । संघातस्तु नैवम् । द्रव्याभावाद द्विचन्द्रवत । इन्द्रियवैकल्यात् द्विचन्द्रदर्शनस्य तदाभत्वेऽपि न तस्य विषयोऽस्ति । तद्वत् संघातः द्रव्यतोऽसत्त्वेन अकारणत्वार नालम्बनः । एवं बाबद्वयञ्चैव न युक्तं मतिगोचरः ॥ २ ॥ अणुः कलापश्चेति बाह्योऽर्थः नालम्बनम् . एकाग्वैकल्यात् ॥ तत्र साधनं सञ्चिताकारमिच्छन्ति किल केचन' । सोऽथों बहाकारः अतः तत्र केनचिदाकारेण प्रत्यक्ष इष्यते । परमाणुष्वप्यस्ति सञ्चिताभज्ञानोत्पत्तिकारणभावः । अण्वाकारो न विज्ञप्तेरर्थः कठिनतादिवत् ॥ ३ ॥ Representative of this view in later periods seems to be Bhadanta Subhagupta ; cf. Tattvas. pari. p. 551 : समुदिता एवोत्पयन्ते विनश्यन्ति चेति सिद्धान्तात् नैकैकपरमाणुप्रतिभाम इति । यथोक्तं भदन्तशुभगृतेन- प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातन्त्रोणास्ति संभवः (Read असंभव) । अतोऽपि परमाणनामेकैका- प्रतिभामनम। =rnam. pa. du. ma. can. yin. pas. So reads S. Yamaguchi's edition. But the Xylograph reads simply 'yin pas'. Cf. the opinion of Sumati, a Digambara, cited in the Tattvas. pan. p. 554: सामान्य विशेषात्मत्वात् सर्वपदार्थानां तुल्यातुल्यरूपेण द्विल्पाः परमाणवः । तत्र समानं यदूपं तदिन्द्रियैर्गुयते नासमानम्। ततश्चैकाकारं विज्ञानमणुष्वविरुखमिति प्रत्यक्षसिताः परमाणवः। ।

·आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्तिः यथा कठिनतादि विद्यमानमपि न चाक्षुषबुद्धिविषयः । 'एव- मणुत्वमपि ॥ भवेद्धटशरावादस्तथा सति समा मतिः । घटशरावादिपरमाणुषु बहुप्वपि न कोऽपि विशेषोऽस्ति । आकारभेदावेदश्चेत् . यदि मन्यमे ग्रीवाद्याकारः विशेषक्रिया. येन बुद्धेविशेषणमुपाधि- भवेत् । इति । अयमुपाधिघटादावस्ति । नास्ति तु द्रव्यसत्यणौ ॥ ४ ॥ प्रमाणभेदाभावात् सः. । परमाणुषु द्रव्यान्तरप्वपि पारिमाण्डल्ये मंदो नास्ति । अद्रव्येऽम्ति ततः स हि । आकारभेदः संवृतिसत्म्वेवास्ति न तु परमाणुषु । घटादयश्च संवृतिसन्त एव ।। अणूनां परिहार हि तदाभज्ञानविप्लवात् ॥ ५ ॥ द्रव्यसत्सु "अपनीतसम्बन्धिप्वपि [नील-] वर्णादिवत् स्वबुद्धिर्न त्यज्यते । तथा सति इन्द्रियबुद्धीनां विषयो बहिर्नास्तीत्युपपद्यते ॥ यदन्तहेयरूपं तु बहिर्वदवभासने । सोऽर्थः । Lit. अणुत्वसदृश: s=zlum. po. More lit. सम्बन्धिनि अपनीतेऽपि 3 or सम्बन्धिन अपनवेऽपि.

·बालापनपता बाबाऽविद्यमाने अन्तस्सदेव बहिर्वदेवमासनमालम्बनप्रत्ययः । विज्ञानसत्वात्तत्पत्ययतयापि च ॥ ६ ॥ उत्तावेज्ञान "मर्थतयावभासते "ततो उत्पद्यते चेति धर्मताद्वय- विशिष्टमित्यतः अन्तस्सदेवालम्बनप्रत्ययः ॥ यदि तावदेवमवभास एव वेद्यते । कथं तदेकदेशः सहजातः प्रत्ययः । एकांशः प्रत्ययोऽवीतात. सहभूतोऽपि अव्यभिचारात् 1"अन्यजातम्य प्रत्ययो भवति ॥ नैयायिकास्तु एवमाहुः । क्रमेण जायमानयोहेंतुहेतुमतोः भावाभावतद्वत्ता लक्षण" मिति || "अथवा शक्त्यर्पणात क्रमेण [वा] । क्रमेणापि सोऽर्थावभास: "स्वानुरूपकार्योत्पत्तये शक्तिं विज्ञानाधारां करोतीत्यविरोधः" || यदि तर्हि स्वरूपमेवालम्बनप्रत्ययः । कथं तत् [रूपं] चक्षुश्चोपादय चक्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते [इति । 10 Or. अर्थः अवभासते. =अर्थात् . cf. Vrtti ad 2a. " Lit. अन्यस्मात् जातस्य. " Cr. Nyayashtra, IV, 1, 49: प्रागुत्पत्तेत्त्पत्तिधर्मकमसदित्यता कस्मादुत्पाद- व्ययदर्शनात्. " The passage, अथवा ... sfakta: is quoted in the Tattvas. pañ. p. 582. The pañjikā cites this passage omitting the words क्रमेण वा in the quarter b of the verse 7. Xylograph reads FTHTHIE rai. snai. ba-. rai. gi. gzugs. . 15 16 ·ओलम्बनपरा-1 17 सहकारिवशायद्धि शक्तिरूपं तत् ] इन्द्रियम् ॥ ७ ॥ इन्द्रियं स्वकार्यात् शक्तिरूपमेवानुमीयते न तु भौतिकम् । सा चाविरुद्धा विज्ञप्तः 'शक्तिस्तु विज्ञाने वास्तु । अनिर्देश्य स्वस्य" रूपे वास्तु कार्यों- पत्तौ न विशेषः । एवं विषयरूपकम् । प्रवर्ततेऽनादिकालं शक्तिश्चान्योन्यहेतुके ॥ ८ ॥ चक्षुराख्यां शक्तिमन्तः"रूपञ्चोपादाय विज्ञानमविभासि आलम्बनादविभक्तमुत्पद्यते । इदं द्वयमपि अनादिकालमन्योन्यहेतुकम् । कदाचित् विज्ञानस्य शक्तिपरिपाकात् विषयाकारता भवति । कदाचिच तदाकारशक्तिः । विज्ञानं सा च उभयमन्यत्वेनानन्यत्वेन च यथेष्ट- मुच्यताम् । एवमन्तरालम्बनं' धर्मताद्वयविशिष्टत्वात् विषयतया उपपद्यते ॥ इत्याचार्यदिङ्नागकृता आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्तिः समाप्ता 17 . The Cf. Madhyamakāvatāra, Sanskrit text VI, 62 and bhāşya thereon. =nus. pa. ni. Xylograph omits it. Or. स्वस्पे-ran. gi. io. bo. la. =nai.gi. gzugs. =de. hi. rnam. pahi. nus. po. Better reading will be अन्तर्विज्ञानं. Cf. vrtti ad 6c-d. 19

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·PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE VERSION अनाकारचित्ताषयशविर १. यद्यप्युच्यतं अणुः इन्द्रिय [विज्ञप्तेः] कारणम् असरूपत्वात् अक्षवन्न विषयः । २. विज्ञप्तिः संघातामा भवति न तस्माज्जायते । संघातोऽसद्रूपः द्विचन्द्रवत् । अनेन द्वौ बाह्याौँ न विषयौ : केचिद्वदन्ति । अणवः संभूय पदार्थसाधनानि विषयाः सिध्य- न्ति, विज्ञानस्य तदाभत्वात् । अणुम्वरूपं द्रव्यसदपि न विषयः 'रजोवत् विनासरूपत्वात् । ४. अणुर्विषयश्चेत , तदा विज्ञप्तिरभिन्ना [स्यात् ] । यद्याकारभेदं वदसि तदा विज्ञप्तिर्विषमा [म्यात] । आकारभेदः प्रज्ञप्तिस्थः । अत आकारो न तथ्यः । ५. अणुप्रमाणं सर्वत्राभिन्नम् । यद्यणून परिहरसि, विषयविज्ञप्ति नोंदियात् । तस्मात् विषयाः प्रज्ञप्तिनामानि । 1 Chén=dust. dirt, This character is also used for विषय. But in the corresponding passage of the vịtti of Paramārtha's and Hsuan Chuan's versions, the character'chien' is used which exactly corresponds to कठिनता of the Tibetan. So 'chén' is, I think, a mistake for 'chien'=कठिनता. 9

·10
आलम्बनपा
।
६. अन्तर्विषयरूपं बहिर्वदेवमासमानं विज्ञप्तिविषयः सिध्यति ।
विज्ञानस्य दृश्याकारत्वा इदं विज्ञानमालम्बनप्रत्ययः ।
७. उत्पत्तिनैयत्यात् युगपत् प्रत्ययः] सिध्यति । क्रमेण वा
मुक्तिननयति । 'द्वितीयमिन्द्रियं-सहजातशक्तिविशेष इन्द्रियं भवति ।
८. विज्ञानस्याप्रतिषः' । अन्योन्यहेतुके शक्तिविशेषविषयात्मके
अनादिकालमन्योन्यप्रवृत्ते ॥
There are two kinds of sense organs, sthila and sūkşma.
The latter seems to be meant here.
अविरोधी.

·PARAMĀRTHA'S CHIXESE VERSION अनाकारचित्तविषयशास्त्रम HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION आलम्बनप्रत्यय परीक्षाशास्त्रम् । १. ये केचित् स्वीकुर्वन्ति चक्षु १. केचित् चक्षुरादिपञ्चविज्ञा- रादिषडावतानानि बाह्यमथै प्रतीत्य नानां बाह्यरूपमालम्बनप्रत्ययं कुर्वन्तः उत्पद्यन्त इति । ते कल्पयन्ति परमाणुं वा कल्पयन्ति वस्तुत परमाणुं वा विषयम् । विज्ञानहे- अस्तीति । विज्ञानजनकत्वात् । स- तुत्वात् । परमाणुसङ्घातं वा विष- वातं वा गृहन्ति । जायमानवि- यम् । सङ्घाताभविज्ञानम्योदयात् । ज्ञानस्य तदाकारबन्धात् । उभयमपि न युक्तम् । कस्मात् । अणुः पञ्चविज्ञानानां कारणमपि नालम्बनम् । तदाकारविज्ञानाभावात् चक्षुरक्षादिवत् ॥ आलम्बनप्रत्ययो यदुत तदाकार- विषय इति किलक्षणः । 'यत् बद्धविज्ञानजनकप्रत्ययः । वस्तुरू- विज्ञानविज्ञापकम् । तल्लक्षणः । यथा पश्च जनकप्रत्ययो भवति । विज्ञानं तल्लक्षणं विज्ञानमुदेति । तस्मात्स तमपेक्ष्य जायते । रूपादिपरमाणु- विषय उच्यते । परमाणु नैतद्वृत्तिः। यद्यपि वस्तुरूपः आलम्धन कारवि. 11 ·12 आलम्बनपरीक्षा PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S 'CHINESE VERSION VERSION यत्परमाणुद्रव्यम् इदं विज्ञान- ज्ञानजनकः तथापि नालम्बनम् । कारणम् | पञ्चेन्द्रियवत् । तस्मान्न चक्षुरक्षादिवत् । चक्षुरादौ तदाकार- विषयः परमाणुः । विज्ञानाभावात् । एवं परमाणुश्चक्षु- रादिविज्ञानस्य नालम्बनम् । २. तथा चेत् परमाणुसङ्घातो २. सङ्घातः पञ्चविज्ञानाना- विषयः स्यात् । यथासङ्घातं विज्ञानो मालम्बनमपि न प्रत्ययः । दयात् । यद्यपि पुनरेवं तदाकार- तद्रव्याभावात् मुदेति । विज्ञानं न तस्माज्जायते । द्वितीयचन्द्रवत् ॥ तस्मात् सङ्घातोऽपि न विषयः । रूपादिसङ्घातः यद्यपि आलम्बनी- कस्मात् । विषयश्चेत् , तदाकाराभ- क्रियते । चक्षुर्विज्ञानादीनां तदाका- विज्ञानजनको विषय आस्थेयः । रकत्वात । तथापि न प्रत्ययः । कस्मात् । अयं हि विषयो वक्तव्यो संक्षुमितनेत्रदृष्टद्वितीयचन्द्रवत् । तस्य विज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रत्ययत्वात् । सङ्घातस्तु द्रव्यतो नास्तीत्यकारणत्वात् । एवं नैवम् । अद्रव्यसत्त्वात् द्विचन्द्रवत् । सङ्घातश्चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां प्रत्ययो संक्षुमितचक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य द्विचन्द्रामवि- न भवति । अतो बाह्यौ द्वावौँ ज्ञानमस्ति । न [तु] चन्द्रद्वयम् । आलम्बनप्रत्यययौ मिथ एकाङ्ग- विज्ञानगोचरस्य द्रव्यतोऽभावात् । विकलौ । अत एव न युक्तौ । सङ्घातोऽप्येवम् । परमाणून् विहाय द्रव्यं नास्तीति सङ्घातो न विज्ञानगो- चरः। तस्माद्वायविषयः-द्वावौँ, ·आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्ति 13 PARANARTHA'S CHINESE: HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION न विज्ञानगोचरः । द्वयो विकलाङ्ग- । त्वात् । ३. केचिदाचार्या वदन्ति । अण ३. केचित् गृहन्ति रूपादीनां वः सञ्चिताः पदार्थसाधनानि बहा- प्रत्येक बहाकाराः सन्ति । तत्र कारसंपन्नाः। तान् गोचरं सधा- एकाकारः प्रत्यक्षविषयः। अतः यामः । कस्मात् । आकारान्तरयुक्तः परमाणूनामाकारसमृद्धानामस्ति प्र- प्रत्यक्षजनकः । न केवल: परमाणुः त्येकं सञ्जिताकारः। अयमाकारो परमाणुसङ्घातश्च । तम्मात परमाणी द्रव्यसन् प्रत्येकं तद्-] आकाराम परमाणुसङ्घाने च अम्त्याकार: मिज्ञानोत्पत्त्यारम्भक इति पञ्च- [यः] षड्डिज्ञानानां विषयः क्रियते। विज्ञानानामालम्बनप्रत्ययीक्रियने । आण्वाकारो न विषयः कठिन- इति । तदपि न युक्तम् । कस्मात् । तादिवत् । परमाणौ सन्ति काठिन्य- सञ्चित[[कार]: कठिनतादिवत् शीतोष्णप्रयत्नस्पर्शाः । तं च द्रव्य- चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां । सन्तो न चाक्षुषविज्ञानगोचराः । चाक्षुषविज्ञानस्य अताशत्वात् । अण्वाकाराभ्युपगमात् ॥ परमाणुवर्तिपदार्थ [आकार] श्चैवम् । यथा कठिनताद्याकारः यद्यपि वस्तुसन् चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां प्रत्यय- भावं भजते । तथापि नालम्बनम् । चक्षुरादिविज्ञानेषु तदाकाराभावात् । प्रत्ययोऽपि नालम्बनम् ·14 आलम्बनपरीक्षा PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION संपादिपरमानां सञ्चिताकारेऽपि युक्तिस्तथैव । तस्य सर्वथा अण्वा- कारतया ग्रहात् । ४. कस्मात् । पदार्थमध्यवर्ती ४. चक्षुरादिविज्ञानकारणपरमा- परमाणु यदि विज्ञानजनकः । तदा णुसञ्चिताकारवादे पुनरस्ति दो- इदं विज्ञानं न मिद्येत । पदार्थ- पान्तरम् । मध्यवर्तिपरमाणुभेदाभावात् । यदि घटशरीवादिमतिः वदसि आकारभेदात् विज्ञानभेदो जायते । घटादिपदार्थाश्च न समाः । तद्दन्ती अभिन्ना स्यात् । नाकारभेदाद् भेदः तदाकारकारणत्वात् जायमानं विज्ञानं आकारभेदस्याद्रव्यत्वात् ॥ भिद्यते । इति । अयमों न युज्यते। कस्मात् । तादृशाकारभेदाः घटादि- घटशरावादिमहदल्पादिपदार्थसाधन - प्रज्ञप्तिपदार्थवर्तिनः न तु 'परमाणु- परमाणुषु बहुषु अल्पेषु वा सा- द्रव्यवर्तिनः । म्यात् तत्कारणा मतिरभिन्ना स्यात् । तत्पदाकारभेदाहुद्धयाकारभेद इति वदसि चेत् । न तथा युक्तन् । ग्रीवाद्याकारभेदः केवलं घटादिप्रज्ञ- तिधर्मेऽस्ति । न तु परमाणुषु । अतस्तन्न प्राचं परमाणवोऽपि मिन्ना- कारा इति ।

·आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्ति 15 PARMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION अणुशस्तस्य मेंदे च्यन्तं । ५. "अणुप्रमाणस्य भेदाभा ५. अणुप्रमाणसाम्यात् वात् । पदार्थस्थपरमाणुप्रमाणं यत्पा आकारभेदः प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रम् । रिमाण्डल्यं तत] अभिन्नम् । तम्मात् पदार्थानामाकारा न वस्तु तद्बुद्धित्यागनियमात् ॥ सन्तः । [किन्तु] प्रज्ञप्तिसन्तः । न घटशरावादिनिप्पादकपरमाणूना. घटादिपदार्थाश्च प्रज्ञप्त्याकारा इत्यु- माकारपरिमाणं भिद्यते । पारिमाण्ड- ल्यलक्षणं हीयेत । अतो ज्ञायते अणूनां परिहारे घटाद्याकारवि- विभिन्नाकारः प्रज्ञप्तिम्थो न द्रव्यम् ज्ञानम्यानुत्पत्तेः । द्रव्येषु संयुक्तधर्मा इति । विभिन्नाकारः पुनः पर- भमाश्चेत् तदापि] द्रव्याकारविज्ञानं माणुशी भज्यने [चेत् ] तदु- न नश्यति । अभग्नकाल इव घंटे द्धिनियमेन त्यज्यते । न नीला- पञ्चविषयविज्ञप्तिर्जायने । भनार्थे पञ्च- देरणुशो भञ्जन तद्बुद्धिस्त्यज्यते । विषयविज्ञप्तेरनष्टत्वात् पञ्चविषयादयो अम्मात आकारभेदः संवृतिसन्मात्रम् । अणुसङ्घात- न नीलादिवत् द्रव्यस्थः । तस्मात्पञ्च- पदार्थो न विज्ञप्तिजनको । तम्मा- विज्ञप्तीनामालम्बनप्रत्ययो न बाचं द्वादयविषयो न विज्ञानगोचरः । रूपादि इतीदमुपपत्त्या संपन्नम् । द्रव्यसन्तः । अनेन ६. तथा चेत् को धर्मो विषयः । ६. ननु तदालम्बनप्रत्ययः सर्व- जस्तविषय बहिर्वदेवमासनं । अयं था नास्ति । नैव सर्वथा नास्तीति । विज्ञानविषय इत्युच्यते । बाह्यविषये तथा चेत् किम् । वस्तुतोऽविद्यमाने, अन्तर्विज्ञाने स- ·16 आलम्बनपरीक्षा PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION त्वानां मुग्धचित्तविकल्पात् षडिषय- अन्तः रूपं बहिर्वदवभासमानं विकल्पः प्रवर्तते । अयं विकल्पो विज्ञानालम्बनप्रत्ययः । यथा बहिर्वर्तते तथा अवमासते । तदाकारो विज्ञानवर्ती चतृषु प्रत्ययेषु अयं नाम विज्ञानाल- विज्ञानजनकश्च इत्यभ्युपगमात् ॥ म्बनप्रत्ययः । अस्य विज्ञानरूप- बाह्यविषयो यद्यप्यसन् । तथाप्यस्ति त्वात् अस्माद्विज्ञानस्य जननात् । अन्तः रूपं बहिषयाकारमदभास- कस्मात् । इदं विज्ञानं, अन्तर्विषय- मानमालम्बनप्रत्ययः । चक्षुरादि- रूपं भवति' अन्तर्विषयाज्जायते इति विज्ञानं तदाकारबद्धं प्रवर्तते तत धर्मद्वयसंपन्नम् । तस्मादादिषयो उत्पद्यते च इति धर्मद्वययुक्तमित्य- गोचर आख्यायते । भ्युपगमात् । ७. पृथ्यते । यथाविषयं वि ७. अयमन्तर्विषयाकारः विज्ञा- ज्ञानं संभवति इतीदमेव युक्तम् । नादविभक्तः । विज्ञानकारणप्रत्ययः अन्तर्विषयोऽयं विज्ञानकदेश एक- कथं भवति । काल उत्पन्नः कथमालम्बनप्रत्ययो सहवृत्तिनैयत्यात् भवति । उच्यते । आलम्बन युगपदपि कारणप्रत्ययः । प्रत्ययः सिध्यति । इति । आलम्बन- पौर्वापर्येण वा प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययोऽयं संभवति अद्विधाभावात् । तच्छक्तयर्पणात् ॥ प्रत्यय इति । कदाचित् एककाल विषयाकारो विज्ञानेन सहवृत्तिनै- उत्पन्नोऽपि अन्यजातस्य धर्मान्तरस्य यत्यात् यगुपज्जातोऽपि विज्ञान- साधनम् । उत्पत्तिविनाशयो' निय- कारणप्रत्ययः । नैयायिका आहुः । तानुबन्धित्वात् । पृठ्यते । क्रमेण यद्ययं तेन असहवर्ती भवति ।

·आलम्बनपरावृत्ति 17 PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION जातयोः कथमालम्ब्यालम्बनरूपम् । युगपज्जातयरपि [न] कार्यकारणभावो उच्यते । हेतुः पूर्व चेत् पश्चात् लभ्यते । फलम् । फलं हि हेत्वनन्तर- भावि । न तु हेतुः फलान- न्तर"भावी । हेतोम्सफलत्वे अवश्यं सत्ता। हेतोर्निष्फलत्वे अवश्यम- सत्ता । फलं हेत्वनन्तरभावि" मद्वा असद्वा । इदमाख्यायनं हेतुफल- रूपम् । अथ अथ वा शक्तयर्पणात् क्रमण आ वा पूर्व विज्ञानाकारः लम्ब्यालम्बन [रूपं] सिध्यति । विष- पश्चाद्विज्ञानप्रत्ययो भवन् मूल- याकारं विज्ञानं क्रमेण उत्पद्य उत्पा- विज्ञाने म्वानुरूपकार्योत्पादकशक्तय- दयति । कार्यानुरूपशक्तयुत्पादनेन र्पणादुत्पादयति । इति युक्तयविरो- विज्ञानधारामुत्पादयति । धात् । । पृड्यने । यद्यन्तर्विषयो विज्ञाना यदि पञ्चविज्ञानानि केवलमन्तः लम्बनप्रत्यय उत्पत्तिकारणम् । कथं रूपं प्रतीत्य जायन्ते । कथं पुनरुच्यते सूत्रं व्याख्यातव्यम् । सूत्रमाह" । चक्षुरादिः प्रत्यय इति । चक्षुरूपञ्च प्रतीत्य चक्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्प- घते । इति विस्तरः। उच्यने । कार्य- सहकारिशक्तिस्वरूपमिन्द्रियमुच्यते ।

·18 आलम्बनपरीक्षा PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHLAXG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION आह। इन्द्रियं किंस्वरूपम् । उच्यते । शक्तिविशेषम्वरूपम् । तत्स्वरूपं केन कारणेनानुमीयते । स्वकार्यात्तच्छक्तिविशेषरूपं विज्ञा- यते । न चतुर्महाभूतरूपम् । ८. सा शक्तिर्विज्ञानम्य अवि ८. विज्ञाने शक्तिरूपाणि रुद्धा। सा शक्तिर्विज्ञाने वर्तने इन्द्रियाणि युज्यन्ते । विज्ञानविभक्ता। अनिर्देश्यं वा शक्तिर्विषयश्चाना- दिकालमन्योन्यहेतुकौ ॥ तत्स्वरूपम् । यथा मया साधित मिन्द्रियं भवता साधित मिन्द्रियञ्च विज्ञानारम्भानुमानेन ज्ञायने इन्द्रि- शक्तयात्मकं समम् । तयोः को यमस्तीति । तत् केवलं शक्तिः न भेदः । एवं शक्तिर्विषयाकाराव- तु बाह्यकृतमिति । अतो मूले विज्ञाने भासश्च अन्योन्यहेतुको । तथा पञ्चशक्तिरूपाणि चक्षुरादीन्द्रियाणि शक्ति विषयाकारावभासश्चोत्पद्य अना- आख्यायन्ने । [इतीदं] न युक्ति- दिकालात्तथा आगच्छतः । इन्द्रि- विरुद्धम् । शक्तिर्विज्ञानारम्भन्या- याख्यशक्तिमाश्रित्य अर्थाख्यमन्त- याभेदात् विज्ञानवर्तिनी अन्यवर्तिनी विषयरूपश्च प्रतीत्य संक्षुभितं वि- वा। अनिर्देश्यापि [वा] । बामधर्मत्वे ज्ञानमनिर्देश्यरूपम् । अयं धर्म युक्तयभावात् सा विज्ञानवर्तिनी अन्योन्यहेतुकः अनादिकालञ्च प्रव- नान्यवर्तिनी इति नियमेनाभ्युपग- तते । कस्मात् । कदाचित् शक्ति- न्तव्यम् । तच्छक्तीन्द्रियं पूर्वविषय- परिपाकात् विज्ञान विषयाकारं रूपञ्च अनादिकालादन्योन्यहेतुके ।

·आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्ति 19 PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE HSIAN CHU'AXG'S CHINESE VERSION V'LRSION प्रवर्तने । कदाचित् विषयाकारविज्ञा- तथाहि । सा शक्तिः परिपाकप्राप्ता नाच्छक्तिः सिध्यति । विज्ञान विज्ञाने पश्चान्तर्विषयरूपाणि अव- मुभयभिन्नं वा उभयाभिन्नं वा अनि- भासयति । इमानि अन्तर्विषयरू- र्वाच्यं वा । एव मन्तर्विषयो धर्मद्व- पाणि पुनः पाकान्तरेण विज्ञाने पञ्चे- यविशिष्टत्वात् विज्ञानगोचरो भाव्यः॥ न्द्रियशक्तीर्पयन्ति । इन्द्रियविषय [त्य रूपद्वयं विज्ञानाद् मिन्नमभिन्न वेति" यथेष्टमुच्यताम् । एवं विज्ञा- नानामन्तर्विषयाकार एवालम्बनप्रत्यय इत्युपपत्त्या निपुणं साधितम् ॥ अनाकारचित्तविषयशास्त्रम आलम्बनप्रत्ययपरीक्षा शास्त्रम | Lit. यदि. 1 . - . ' Lit. नानि उद्दिश्य. Lit. यथा तदाकार.. Lit. आलम्बनभावमाग्विज्ञान.. The chinese text has a nega =ou%D boul. ture particle wu, just before 'a To put more literally this' these two lords. It is to be phrase .रूपय. विज्ञानेन एक मन्यद्वा, omitted to make the sense more अथवा नैक ना. यद्वा०. correct. No case sign in Chinese Lit. क्रियते. Lit. अनुत्पत्ति Or-अनुरुद्धत्वात् . Lit. हेत्वनुमारि. Cf. Madhyamakavrtti, ed. L. V. Poussin, p. 6, 1. 3 with note thereon. "न कोऽपि भेदः इति शेषः । r 11 13

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·CORRECTIONS AND ALTERATIONS IN THE COMMENTARY OF DHARMAPĀLA Page 21 line 7.9 Read तत्र आदिवचनं परसंमतं रूपेन्द्रियाश्रय- पञ्चविधविज्ञानं संगृहाति । 11 यद्यपि मनोविज्ञानमवयविद्रव्यप्रत्ययमङ्गी " . क्रियते । 22 4 .. 6 . " 12 " .. .. • 23 14 . 20 . .. .. . 24 + 8 " ." म्वसमुत्पत्तौ for स्वसंततौ इन्द्रियविज्ञानाहृतभाव्यं मनोविज्ञानम् चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां रूपमाश्रयपत्ययः सत आयतनं भवति । स आलम्बनार्थः यः प्रत्ययेषु विज्ञानम्य उत्पादकहेतुः इति । यत् विज्ञानं यदाकारयुक्तं धर्मिणः स्वरूपविरोधदोषः स्यात् । तथा धर्मवचनमप्रसिद्धम् । तदाकारयोगो हेतु भवेत् । स्वरूपं म्वाकार उच्यते । निर्धार्यते निश्चीयते । यदि यथोक्तमेव कारणं . . . तथा चेत् आह for यद्यप्येवम् . य एव जनकः स एव स एव . व्यवहियते । सञ्चितात्मकाः । अतो न द्रव्यसन्तः ... परमाणूंनां बहुत्वेऽपि अविशेषात् , इन्द्रिय- विज्ञानानान्तु विशेषाकारत्वा । 11 omit "। अनेन" 25 .. 2 .. 16 " 26 -- .. -- 28 " 2-3 " " . .. 32 + " . ." 35 17 " " 38 "

·आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याख्या
आचार्यधर्मपालकृता
.
.
दुर्मेधसां प्रज्ञां प्रदीपयितुं दोषावरणं तिरस्कर्तुञ्च यो' जगाद ।
[त प्रणम्य अयमर्थः परीक्ष्यते ॥
चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां । .] कल्पयन्ति । इति ।
हेयम्य हानमुपादेयम्य वोपादानं परीक्षाफलम् । अतो हेयार्थम्य
[त] द्विपरीतम्य च हेतुः प्रदर्श्यते । तत्र म्वयूथ्या वदन्ति । यत
रूपं चक्षुश्चाश्रित्य पञ्चविधविज्ञानानि [भवन्ति] इति परे कल्पयन्ति ।
तत् ] संगृहीम इति । पंरे तानि एकोन्मुखानि वस्तुप्रत्ययानि इति
प्रतिपद्यन्नं । अतो मनोविज्ञानं न युक्तम् । एकोन्मुखत्वाभावात् स्थादि-
[वन् ] संवृतिमत्प्रत्ययत्वाभ्युपगमात् । यद्यपि मनोविज्ञानं गोचरं वस्तु प्रतीत्य
साकारम् । तथापि, विज्ञानाकारविहीनमतद्विषयमपि गृहाति । चक्षुरादि-
विज्ञानस्य अविनाभृतः 'प्रमिद्धो विषयः आकारः सिद्धः । तम्मात् नाम्य
This commentary has been rendered into Sanskrit from the
Chinese version of I-Ching.
'Lit. यदि.
'Lit. गदितुं शक:
'निषतफायपदार्थगोधराणि.
'Lit. सावयवम् .
'Or अविनाभूतो विषयः प्रसिद्धय (or सिद्धिं लब्ध्वा), etc.
'Lit. प्रदेश:=fang.

·22 आलम्बनपरीक्षा 'मर्यादा प्राप्यते । किञ्च अभ्यासज्ञानबोध्यरूपतत्त्वस्य तर्कागोचरत्वात् दृश्यवत् प्रतिष्ठितत्वाञ्च इहेदं तत्त्वं] श्रवणमननभावनाजन्यज्ञानमात्र- विषयः । तथा मनोविज्ञानालम्बनाथोंऽत्यन्तमभावः सिध्यति । अस्य स्व- सन्ततावशक्तप्रत्ययत्वात् । गतानागतप्रत्यययोः पुनरवस्तुत्वात् असंस्कृतवत् । तदर्थमादिवचनं पञ्चविज्ञानकायसंग्राहकम् । तहि इन्द्रियविज्ञानगृहीतं सर्व मनो विजानाति । इति चेत् । तदपि कथम् । नैतदिन्द्रियविज्ञानसमकालम् | अनन्तरं वा। रूपाद्यालम्बनस्य निरुद्धत्वात् । न वा वर्तमान [आलम्बन] प्रत्ययः । इन्द्रियविज्ञानगृही- तत्वात् । तन्मनोविज्ञानं स्वतो बाह्यार्थग्रहणस्वभाव[च्चेत् । तदा बधि- रान्धादीनामभावः स्यात् । अनुमानविरोधि च इन्द्रियान्तरम् । अधिकरूप- निराकरणस्य इष्टत्वात् । तथा मनोविज्ञाने न पुनराग्रहः । चक्षुरादि- विज्ञानानि "रूपमाश्रित्य "आकारवन्ति । अनावरणमक्रियास्वभावमात्रम् । अतोऽभावः स्वयमभ्युपगम्यते । तथैव "करणं मनः । तदालम्बनं 1 प्रत्यक्षमावि । ग्राह्यस्वभावत्वेन अत्यन्तविषमगतित्वात् । तदालम्बनता- निराकरणं सम्यक् मन्यामहे । तेन च तदाश्रयतानिराकरणम् । सम- कालीनशक्तिरूपेन्द्रियं तत्कल्पयिष्यति । अथापि आह । बाह्यार्थ इति । 10 Or व्यवस्था. 'Lit. अभ्यासकार्यज्ञान. tsun-huai, to preserve and cherish. Lit. रूपाश्रयप्रत्ययानि. "Lit. प्रदेशवन्ति. pen=root, 2, etc. " The translation (तदालम्वनं . . . कल्पयिष्यति) is tentative.

·आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याख्या 23 एतद्वयतिरिक्तमर्थान्तरमस्तीति गृह्यते । तत् तद्विपरीतं प्रकाश- यति । प्रकाशितश्च सोऽर्थान्तरग्रहणयोग्यत्वात् अर्थ इति उच्यते । कथमुच्यते समग्री प्रतीत्यति । न हि सामग्री द्रव्यं युज्यते । [यर्हि] तथागतसत्यं दूप्येत इति । तत् म्वतः पूर्वोत्तरयुक्तिविरुद्धम् । मम तु का हानिः । द्रव्यं मामग्रीच्च प्रतीत्य इति स्वीकृतत्वात् । दोषान्तरमपि विवक्षितं म्यात् । अतोऽयं दोषोऽपि परिहीयते । परमाणुं वा कल्पयन्ति । इति । यद्यपि परमाणुः समदयमात्रनिरुद्धो दृशः । तथापि द्रव्यद्वयं प्रत्ययः न सङ्घातः । यथा रूपादीनि इन्द्रियाणां वर्तमानविपया अपि असंकीर्णाः । इन्द्रियशक्तेः प्रतिनियतत्वात । नष्टेऽपि द्रव्ये सत्तासमर्थ द्वयणुकमालम्बनं । । सिध्यति । तत्कारणत्वादिति । तस्य चक्षुरादिविज्ञानस्य कारणत्वात् । तद्धि अवयवार्थसन्निकर्ष- समुत्थम् । तथाचाहुः । तदालम्बनाओं विज्ञानस्य जननहेतुः सर्वप्रत्यय- वृत्तित्वात् । तत्सङ्घातं वा । इति । तद्वादिनो वदन्ति । परमाणुभाव्यसमुदायस्तदालम्बनमिति । तदाभविज्ञानस्य जायमानत्वात् । इति । सङ्घातस्य एतद्ज्ञानजननात् निश्चीयते स आल बनमिति । यथाह कश्चित् । “यत् विज्ञानं तदाकारयुक्तं, सोऽस्य विषय इति । इमौ 14 " Lit. यदि ·24 आलम्बनपरीक्षा द्वौ वादिनौ आहतुः । तदाकारयुक्तत्वहेतुनोंच्यते । हेतुत्वादिसाधनहेत्वादे- रिव अस्य हेतोदृष्टान्तो नास्तीति चेत् । परमाणुसामान्यलक्षणमालम्बनं तत्साधयति । न च विज्ञानम्य बहिर्द्रव्यं प्रत्ययः । इति यदि स्व[पक्षं] स्वीकरोषि। [तदा] धर्मिणां स्वलक्षणविरोधः" स्यात् । तथा न धर्मानुशंसनं प्रसिध्येत् । यत् इदं परस्य संमतं तदेव दृष्टान्तीक्रियते । इति यथोक्तमेव इति चेत् । साध्येऽपि तत्समानम् । इति । प्रमाणाप्रमनस्कम्तु आह । वादमूलं हेतुद्वयं यन हेतुना विदितम् । साधारणसिद्धदृष्टान्ताभावात् नैवा. स्त्ययं हेतुः । अतः केन तथा तदाकारयोगहतुर्भवेत् । अथ पुनः स्ववादस्य युक्तिरव्यभिचारिणी प्रदर्शयिप्यने । पञ्चमी- विभक्तिनिर्देशेन परसंमतिः प्रकाशिता । यद्यपि कारणम् । इति । यथासंमतम् । "अनुपलभ्यमानपदार्थस्य असत्त्वात् परमाणुर- कारणम् । किन्तु परमाणुकायस्य तत्कारणता तथापि केवलमसंयुक्तस्य आलम्बनता उच्यते। तदाकार[विज्ञान]भावात् । इति । परमाण्वाकार इत्येतदाह । इन्द्रियविज्ञानस्य परमाणुन विषयः अक्षवत् इति । यथा इन्द्रियं विज्ञानसंनिकर्षाश्रयहेतुरपि न तद्विषयः । अनिन्द्रि- याकारत्वात् । तथा परमाणुरपि । अतदाकारा न तद्विषया इति यत् । तदर्थमाह । Is Lit. विरोधदोषः 18 Kar.1,-b. Lit. अविद्यमान 17 ·आलम्बनपराव्याख्या 25 स विषय इत्यादि। स स्वभावो यदुत स्वसमानाकार प्रत्यायननिर्धारणम् । कथं पुन- स्तत्प्रतीयते । तदाकारतया" जायमानत्वात् इति । एतन्मनो वचनम् । तदाकारसरूपं विज्ञानमुदेति । [यत् ] "तदानु- रूप्यं तत्तु तद्विषयप्रत्यायनमुच्यने । वस्तुतो विज्ञानं विना विज्ञेयान्तर- स्यासतः विज्ञानोत्पादकहेतुता कुतः । तथापि अस्त्येव पूर्व विषयाकारः । स तदात्मनि आदर्श बिम्बवदर्ग्यते । इदमेव तद्विषयप्रत्यायकत्वेन संमतम् । द्वयणुकम्वरूपं तु विज्ञानाकारं नानुवर्तते । गेन परमाणुरपि विषयः स्यात् । कारणमपि इति । नैतावता कारणमालम्बनम । अक्षवत् इति । कारणत्वेऽपि नालम्बनम् । यदि कारणल्वेन आलम्बनं म्वीक्रियने । इन्द्रियमपि एतत्समानं "तत साधयेत् । तदाकारयुक्तत्वहेतोरसिद्धिदोपः पूर्वमुक्त एव इत्युक्तं भवति । तथा च मनो न केवलं कारणतया प्रथनं । इन्द्रियतया आलम्बनाकारतयापि । यद्युक्तरीत्या कारणं माधयसि । तदा तस्य कारणत्वात् कथमालम्बनत्वम् । इन्दियस्यादि कारणत्व] मम्ति 19 'Lit. प्रत्येतृ " Lit. तदाकारवत् " Lit. तद्रूपानुसरणात विज्ञानात्मनि =भालम्बनम् ·26 आलम्बनपरीक्षा [आलम्बनत्वं म्यात् ] इत्यनैकान्तिकदोषः सिध्यति । यद्यप्येवम् । तथापि नायं दोषः ।] अतदाभतया इति । । किमर्थमिदम् । स्वप्रतिज्ञाप्रसाधनार्थम् । न परपक्षदोषकथनमात्रेण स्वार्थः सिध्यति । स्वविज्ञानाकाराजनकत्वात् न विषयः परमाणुश्चक्षुरादि- वत् । इति प्रतिपादनार्थमिदं वचनम् । यदि इदं तद्धेतुतावचनम् , शास्त्र- कारः परपक्षं पुरस्कृत्य परसाधारणं मतं ' विशदयति इति भवेत् । तदा परप्रतिषेधे मनः प्रकाश्य सिद्धदूषणः तद्वचनं प्रतिक्षिपेत् । तदैकान्तिकः पक्षः स्वीक्रियते । अनैकान्तिकः परपक्षः असंमतिशङ्की । पूर्व परः अनैकान्तिकदूषणमुत्थापयति । कथं दुष्टं स्वपक्षानुमानं कल्पयसि । प्राकृतजना वदन्ति । व्यभिचारि अनियतमसाधनमिति । तत् संदेहप्रापकम् । तस्मात् अन्यत् प्रमाणं स्थापनीयम् । अतदाम इतीदं अनिर्धारितस्वभावेषु परमाणुषु कदाचित् स्यात् । यथाकारं विज्ञानमुदेतीति यनिर्धारणम् । तदभावात् स्पष्टं ज्ञायते निर्धारणस्याप्यस्यानवकाश इति । अनिर्धारितस्वभाववचनौचित्यात् । तत्कारणं नालम्बनमिन्द्रियपरमाणुवत् इति केवलं भवति । अन्येऽपि विज्ञानकरणविशेषाः चक्षुर्विज्ञानसाधनानि प्रथन्ते न पुनः परमाणुस्वरूपप्रत्यायकाः । अतदाकारत्वात् । इन्द्रिय- विज्ञानवत् विज्ञानान्तराणि वाच्यानि । अक्षवद्वचनं वस्तुतः प्रदर्शनार्थम् । दृष्टान्तान्तरमप्यर्थापत्त्या आपतति । इदं कारणताया वचनमपि अपार्थ- कम् । इति । । Lit. पुरःसाधयित्वा or परसंमतम् ·आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याख्या 27 तस्य कारणवृत्तित्वेऽपि नालम्बनता । एवं सार्थकमिदम् । "यथा शब्दादिसर्वपरमाणवः अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानजननकारणानि मा भूवन्निति। कश्चि- दाह । विज्ञानस्य स्वरूपमसंचातत्वोपलम्भात् नालम्बनम्। इन्द्रियपरमाणुवत् इति । विज्ञाने विषयाकारार्पणाधीना तदाकारता। इत्ये तदसंभवात् युज्यत एव तस्यासंघातोपलम्भः । एवञ्च न परमाणव आलम्बनम् । इति कथितम् । तम्य साधनम नाकारत्वात् प्रमाणमंसिद्धाविषयत्वाच्च इति । तर्हि संघातो विषयोऽस्तु । उक्तभावानां माधनेन यदि पक्ष- स्थापनं वाञ्छसि तदा असिद्धता म्यात् इत्ययं न्यायः । संघातम्तदाकारयुक्तोऽपि इनि । आलम्बनं भवेत् । न कारणत्वम् तदाकागविज्ञानं न जायने । इति । संघाताकारकं -"संघातविज्ञानम । न स [संघात:] तद्विज्ञानं जन- यति । कथमयं तत्प्रत्ययः । आलम्बनलक्षणायोगात् नास्त्यालम्बनार्थः । पूर्वोक्तम्य तु तदाकाग्यांगोऽसिद्धः । तथा चेत् किमालम्बनलक्षणम् । मर्वोऽर्थः तन्ममानम्वरूपं विज्ञानमुत्पादयतीति युज्यते इति । 0 Lit. तया or एवम् Lit. इत्येवं न्यायतत्त्वम् Lit. अकारणत्वात् = यदाभासा न तस्मात मा, Kar. 2, a. * Lit. अजनकसंघात.

·28 आलम्पनराना विषयविज्ञानमनुसृत्य स एव जनकः स एवालम्बनम् । केचि- दाहुः । सर्वोऽयश्चित्तचैतानां कारणं इत्यवश्यं युज्यते । एत एवोत्पद्य यथा- विषयग्रहं शब्देन व्यवहीयन्ते । "अनादिकालमिमे आलम्बनविषया आख्यायन्ते । "यदीदं द्विविधलक्षणं, तद्भागयुक्तमालम्बनं भवति । जनक- तायां सत्यामालम्बनार्थः । आगमे उक्तं । अस्मिन् सति इदं भवति इति प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नताया अभिधानम् । इति । तद्विज्ञानोत्पत्तिकारणमुत्पत्तिप्रत्यय इति अयं तदालम्बनार्थः सम्मतः । स्वलक्षणमुपलभ्यते । नानाधिकमस्ति इत्यतस्तन्नोच्यते । संघातो नोत्पादकः. "द्रव्याभावात् । इति । स संघातो न द्रव्यम् । तस्य संघातिन एकत्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनी- यत्वात् । न चाद्रव्यभूतस्य "उत्पत्तिक्रियाशक्तिः संभवति । द्विचन्द्रवत्" । इति । . यथा द्वितीयश्चन्द्रः न द्वितीयचन्द्रविज्ञानस्योत्पादकः । किं तर्हि तदाकारप्रतिभासकारणम् । इन्द्रियवैकल्यात् । इति । यदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं तिमिराद्युपहतप्रकाशकम् । तदा इन्द्रियवैकल्यात् द्विचन्द्रदृष्टिमर्वति न तु वस्तुत्वेन । 31 *Lit. अनेककाल. More lit. ययर्थः द्विविधलक्षणसंपनः तदा तद्भागयोग आलम्बनं नाम भवति. Kar.2.b. Lit. उत्पति.

·मालम्पनपव्याख्या 29 द्विचन्द्र[दर्शन]स्य तदाभत्वेऽपि न तस्य विषयोऽस्ति । इति । द्विचन्द्रवत् । तद्विज्ञानस्य तदाकारयुक्तत्वेऽपि अनुत्पादकत्वात् न स विषय आख्यायने । 'तद्वत् संघातः द्रव्यतोऽसत्त्वेन तद्विज्ञानस्य न कार- णम् । इति । अद्रव्यत्वात् द्विचन्द्रवत् । तदं शस्याकारणत्वसिद्धेः । नालम्बनम् । इति । द्विचन्द्रवत इत्यावर्त्यने । द्विचन्द्रदृष्टान्तेन तदाकारहेतोरनेकान्ति- कदाषा ज्ञेयः । विज्ञानार्थस्य न्यायसिद्धत्वात् विरोधदोषश्च । चक्षुः प्रतीत्य विज्ञानं भवति । न नीलादिसंघातं परमाणुं वा । तेनाजनितत्वात् अन्य- न्द्रियविज्ञानवत् । अयं दृष्टान्तः सर्वसंमतः । अतोऽन्यो नोच्यते । द्विचन्द्रदृष्टान्तस्य अद्रव्यत्वात् स अकारणतायां भवन् तां साधयति इति ज्ञेयम् । यथोक्तस्य साकारत्वेऽपि न स विषयोऽस्ति । तद्वचनं पुन- स्तत्कारणथै विनैव भवति । द्वितीयश्चन्द्रो नास्ति कथमाकारद्वयं प्रत्यक्ष दृश्यते इति वदसि चेत् । तथा हि । अन्तवर्तिशक्तिविशेषा तक्रमेण तत्समानाकारं विज्ञानं प्रवर्तते । यथा सुप्तो विषयान् पश्यति । ततो मिथ्याकारित्राणि तानि अध्यवस्यति । एवं तश्चन्द्रे अन्यमारोप्य पश्यति । 3. Add here in the Chinese text the character ju "as' fang= अंश or भाग? Lit. छान्तमादाय. 36 ·30 आलम्बनपरीक्षा केचिदाहुः । चक्षुर्विज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भे ऋमिकावस्थानदूषणात् ते समकालं व्याप्रियते । द्विविधाकारैतत्पाठिकं मनोविज्ञानं भवति चन्द्रद्वयं पश्यामीति । अन्यः कश्चिदाह । (एकत्वेन) सर्वसंमने चन्द्रे संख्याविपर्ययः । इन्द्रियवैकल्यात् । यदि बाह्यार्थपक्षं नेच्छसि । तदा स्थूलदृष्टिरभिमान- मात्रं स्यात् । ।इति । न हि चक्षुर्विज्ञानालम्बनसमनन्तरं मनोविज्ञानं प्रवर्तत । एककालमेव सहोभयाकारं प्रतीत्य प्रवर्तते । कथं तदाध्यवसीयने चन्द्रद्वयं पश्यामीति । शब्दादिप्रत्ययतद्विज्ञानयोरनन्तरं शब्दद्वयोपलम्म ऐककालिकः कुतो न ज्ञायते। स्वस्थंनत्रस्य मनोविज्ञानं क्रमिकमपि दुरध्यवसायम् । किं निश्रित्य रूपंन्द्रियविज्ञानप्रमेयतद्विशेषा बहवो भावा सिध्यन्ति । एकं चन्द्रं द्विधा समनुपश्यामि इति यदा विज्ञानातिरिक्तं द्रव्यं स्वीकरोति । सोऽपि किं कृत्वा वदेत् चन्द्रद्वयभ्रामकं संख्याविपर्यय। विज्ञप्ते बर्बाह्यद्वयम् । परमाणोः संघातस्य च एकाङ्गवैकल्यात् यथोक्तसाधनखण्डन- युक्तिबलाच । तद्विषयकं न युक्तम् । एकाग्वैकल्यात् । स्वाकारप्रतिमास उत्पादकता चेत्येतद्दयंशमालम्बनम् । परमाणो. राधाकल्यम् । द्वितीयपक्षे द्वितीयानहानिः । यथाविचास्तिपूर्व दोषद्वयं पुनरै भेदं ग्राहयति ॥ Kar...c. Kar.2.d. 'I. विज्ञानार्ययोः

·आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याल्या
31
मञ्चिताकारमिच्छन्ति केचन'' इति ।
परमाणुषु प्रत्येकं सञ्चिताकारोऽस्ति । स एव स्थूलविषयः परमाणूनां
नरतमभावमनुसृत्य साकारः प्रतिभासते । स च वस्तुमन् । परमाणोः
सञ्चिताकार: म्वाकारविज्ञानजनकः द्रव्यत्वात्
आलम्बनं म्यात् ।
अभ्य तु उभयाजवत्त्वात् । स च पूर्व सिद्ध एव । कुतो
विकल्प्यने किं सञ्चिताकारः परमाणुगेव किं वा न तथा इति ।
सर्वोऽथों बहाकार इति ।
त एवाणवोऽण्वाकागः मञ्चिताकागश्च म्वीकृताः। कथमेकं वस्तु
ध्याकारं न्याय्यम् । बहाकागः सर्वभावाः रूपसमुदायरूपाः पृथिव्यादि-
चतुर्महाभृतात्मकाः। नं म्वभावतो विशिष्टशक्तियुक्ताः । नीलवर्णाधाकारः
द्रव्यवर्ती इन्द्रियवर्ती च विभिन्नः प्रतीतः । मोऽपि बहाकारेपु परमाणों
अम्ति सञ्चिताकारः ।
अम्यैवाकारम्य चक्षुरादिविज्ञानगोचरत्वात्
।
।
प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।
यद्येवम् । अणूनां विज्ञानं सञ्चिताकारकमिति किं नाह । अणुः
सञ्चिताकारः । किं नाह विज्ञानं सञ्चिताकारमिति । केन पुनराह
"परमाणुप्वन्ति सञ्चिताकार इति ।
Lit. वदन्ति
Kar. 3, a.b.
Lit. अभावगत्या or अभावविधया पृच्छयत ।
" Lit. अणों
5

·32 आलम्बनपरीक्षा इदं वचनमेव तत्प्रयोगात्मकं सत् प्रदर्शयति विज्ञानं परमाणु- सञ्चिताकारमित्यपि । तथा चेत् व्यणुकं 'तदाकारकम् । कस्मात् सञ्चिताकारकम् । रूपपरमाणुसंघाता विभिन्ना एतच्छाखस्वीकृताः । त एवं सञ्चितत्वात् न द्रव्यसन्तः इति पूर्ववत् प्रदर्शितम् । किमर्थं पुनर्वचनम् । अस्त्याशयान्तरम् । वस्तुनि विभिन्नरूपेऽपि अयमाकारः सञ्चयमात्रसंमिश्रित इति प्रत्येतव्यम् । विविच्य कथने संञ्चिताकारो न शिप्यते । किञ्च यद्यपि सर्वभावाः परमाणुसंघातात्मकाः । तथापि एकै- कस्य वस्तुनस्तारतम्यमस्ति । "यथावस्तु तत्पश्यामः । यथा च 'नीलरूपं तत्पृथिवीधातुः ।' एवमादि तत्त्ववचनं न्याय्यम् । एवमभ्युपगमे वस्तूनि "अत्यन्ताभाव (?) वत् उत्पत्तेः प्राग् अतिमात्रासम्भवमनुवर्तेरन् । संभवस्थलं निश्रित्य कृतोऽयं मिथ्याव्यवहारः । तथा चेत् कथं परमाणवो नेन्द्रियदृष्टाः । कथं वा पुनस्तथताज्ञानमात्रदर्शनाः परमाणवः । अण्वाकारो न विज्ञप्तेरर्थः । इति । नायमिन्द्रियजविज्ञप्तेविषय इत्यनिन्द्रियः । अनिन्द्रियार्थः केवलं तथताज्ञानभावितः । का पुनर्युक्तिः । न हि प्रत्यक्षतः परमाण्वाकारो दृष्टः । कठिनतादिवत् । यथा कठिनशीततादि । तत्र नीलादि वस्तुसदपि न चक्षुरादिविज्ञप्तिविषयः । -द्वयणुक. प्रतिवस्तु " Chi, extremely : chih, (R. 155) empty. This means also "red ·आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याल्या 33 इन्द्रियशक्तेः प्रतिनियतत्वा । एवमणुरपि । न सर्वसम्मतिबाधः । ननु अणुर्भातु न कठिनता । स्वभावान्त- रत्वात् । उच्यते । भौतिकमात्रदशायतनसाधारण्यन पक्षधर्मः स्वीकृतः । अत इदं वचनमदुष्टम् । तथायमुक्तः । "घटशरावादिमतिरिति । एवं पश्यतम्ने घंटे शरावे च निष्पन्ना इन्द्रियबुद्धिः । समा दृश्येत"। विज्ञप्तेः स्वविषये भेदाभावात् । इन्द्रियबुद्धेः पुरोवर्तिविषयमनुसृत्य आकारोदयाच्च । कथं ज्ञायन विज्ञप्तिविषयो न भिद्यते इति । न घटशरावादीनां बहुपु परमाणुषु विशेषोऽस्ति । इदं वचनमाह । यद्यपि परमाणवः सञ्चिताकारण विषया भवन्ति । नेवाम्ति तु घटादिस्वरूपप्रकाशकाले बहुपु संघानेषु अवयवविशेषरूपम् । तेषां वास्तवाकारात् बहिः विशेषसञ्चिताकारस्यानुपलम्भात् । तत्प्रतीत्य निप्पन्ना इन्द्रियविज्ञप्तिरभिन्नाकारा स्यात् । अनेनांगेन अणुस्वरूपे आलम्बनता सिध्यति । न पुनः तेषामविशेषाकार प्रत्यवमर्शस्य प्रत्ययः । अध्यवसाया- न्तरत्वात् । यथा नीलादि प्रतीत्य । आकारमंदाढ़ेद उच्यते चेत् । Kar.+ a.b. "More it. स्वविषय विज्ञप्यभंदान. Kar. 4 c.

·34 आलम्बनपरीक्षा . आकारः मेदकल्पकं बिम्बम् । घटशरावयो बीवोदरपादादिभिर्मिनाकारत्वात विषयवशेन विशेषबुद्धिरपि विभिन्नानुवर्तते । सत्यं युज्यते 5 51 "नायं वस्तु नेन्द्रियविज्ञप्तिदृष्टविषयं परमाणवा भिन्ना भवन्ति । यद्यपि अयं संघातः सांवृतः । तथापि न स संघातः [अणुशः] विभिद्यमानः इन्द्रिय- विज्ञप्तिविषयोऽस्ति । न पुनरविशेषविषयः विभिन्नविज्ञानाकारस्य कारको युज्यते । कथं ज्ञायनं परमाणुषु आकारमंदो नास्तीति । 58 'परमाण्वाकृतिभेदाभावात् । सर्वे पदार्था स्सावयवा इत्यवश्यमवयवे आकारमंदः संभवति । परमाणनां स्वरूपं तु निरंशमतिसूक्ष्मम् । कथमस्याकारभेदो लभ्येत । घटशरावादिषु द्रव्यान्तरप्वपि परमाणुस्वभावे भेदो नास्ति । एकरूपस्यास्य उपचयापचयाभावात् । ॥ " Lit. एम्. Kar. 1d. "Lit. सविशेषविषय: असन, Kar. 5a. Or व्यविशेषेषु. 31 ·आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याख्या 35 "अतो ज्ञायन संघान न वस्तुभावोऽस्ति । इति । सर्वमवयवि आगेपिताकारं नेन्द्रियविज्ञानगोचरः । एवं तावत् पुरस्तादागतं संघाता आकारभेदप्रदर्शकतया इप्यमाणा- परीक्ष्य दुषिता इति । अता घठगरावादिबुद्धयां न भिन्नवम्त्वालम्बनविषयका । सुख- दुःखवेदनवत । तथा च परमाणवी न विषयभेदकाः । आकारश्च न तद्विषयरूपम् । 'आकारभेदादवयवभेद उच्यते चेत् । इदं वाकयं न अविशेषवस्तु विषया भवति इति वक्तुमिष्टं सिद्ध- साधनम् । ने हि मन्यन्नं । परमाणुर्वम्तुतोऽभिन्नविषयः । तथापि आकारभदाढ़ेद इनि । परमाणुरभिन्न इति ममापि संमतम् । अतः सिद्धमाधनम् । परमाणुप्रमाणभेदाभावात्" इतीदं वाक्यं] वस्तुभेद अर्थमंदक इत्यम्य 'असिद्धि प्रदर्शयति । अथ वा इदं द्योतयति । घटशरावादीन्द्रियविज्ञानाना परमाण्वाकरत्वाभावात् नाम्त्यालम्बनं [पर- माणुः] यथान्यविज्ञानम्य | मनो वा अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानं वा अन्यविज्ञान- मुच्यने । नीलप्रत्यये पीताकाराभावात् । इति । परमाणुनां संघातरूपे अविशेषेऽपि इन्द्रियविज्ञानानां विशेषाकारत्वात् अयं तावत् नाण्वाकृति- Kar. 56. Then follows another interpretation (Chinese Editor). Lit. वचनम. 'Lit. अमिद्धिप्रतिवचनम् .

·36
आलम्बनपरीक्षा
60
रूपमिति संसिध्यति । श्लोके परमाणनां विशेषवचनं वा अनुपूर्वेण पृष्टा
प्रतिवक्तव्यः । यदि संघातो व्यत्यस्ताकारः स्वीक्रियते । आकारो न
द्रव्यमिति न्यायसाध्यम् । एवं न्यायविशेषः साधयितव्यः । "अणूनां
परिहारे इत्यादि ।
"यदा ते [अणवः] परिहियन्ते तदा तबुद्धयभावात् ।
मेनादिवत् घटादिवचनं न द्रव्यम् । अतो द्रव्यतो नास्ति । इदं
पक्षान्तरप्रदर्शनम्-
[यानि] [य] द्रव्यविहीनानि न सन्ति । न [तानि]
तद्वयावर्तकानि इति ।
अयमाकारविशेषः व्यत्यस्ताकारभूतः घटादिविषयकत्वादिति वस्तु-
विरुद्धम् । यथा शब्दादौ सति न नीलबुद्धिरस्ति । यद्यपि संघातो
गृह्यते अन्यत् दृश्यते इति युक्तम् । तथापि परमाणुस्वरूपे विशेषोऽस्तीति
प्रदर्शयितुमत्यन्तमशक्यम् ॥
[यत्] "अन्त यरूपम् ।
इति स्वपक्षे आलम्बनवस्तु साध्यते । यदि, सामान्यतो विभागे
नास्त्यालम्बनम् । तदा लोकविरोधः स्वपक्षस्य दोषः । सूत्रे चतुर्विधानां
प्रत्ययानामुक्तत्वात् । तत्र अन्तश्शब्दः विज्ञानं विना आलम्बनं नास्तीति
प्रदर्शनार्थम् । ज्ञेयपदं ग्राह्यांशः विज्ञानपरिणामः विषयाकारोऽर्थों भवति
M
See Paramartha's version, vrtti ad Kar. 5.
= अणूनां परिहारे तदाभज्ञान विश्वात . Kar. 5c-d. .
Here I have changed the punctuation in the Chinese text so
as to suit the sense.
Kar. 6a.

·आलम्बनपरीक्षाब्याख्या 37 । इति [प्रदर्शयति । अतो विज्ञाने बाबविकल्पो विषयत्वेन स्थापितो गृह्यते । लोकविरोधः : पुनः पूर्ववद्वर्तनं । लौकिकानां हि संमतं विषयस्य बहिर्वर्तन- मिति । [अतः] उच्यने बहिर्वदिति । स विज्ञानं विना नास्ति । तम्य पायांश:- • 'बहिर्वदवभासते । विषयं पश्यामीति वचनमाभिमानिकं. वस्तुतम्तहेतुकम् । यथा केशाधवभासि चाक्षुषविज्ञानम् । बाह्यार्थेऽविद्यमानेऽपि । बाह्याओं वस्तुतो नाम्ति । अप्रतीतत्वात् । न हि युक्त्या विचारे नियततत्स्वरूपं बहिः प्रतीयन । यद्यपि बाह्यलक्षणं वस्तुसत् इति ते स्वीकुर्वन्ति । तथापि न [तत | विज्ञानालम्बनं भवति । अतदाकारत्वात् न परमाण्वाकारोऽवभासने । । बाह्याकारवदवभासमानमिदमालम्बनप्रत्ययः । - तदाकारयुक्तत्वात् । यत'' [यद्-] आकाग्युक्तं तत तदेव । यथा कारणतादि: म्वाकारयुक्तः । पुनरालम्बनम्य विशेषम्वरूपं प्रदर्शयति । यथाह । 85 विज्ञानस्य तदाकारवत्त्वादित्यादि । Kar.6b. This sentence will literally read यदि आकारयुक्तत्वात् तत् तदेव । यथा कारणतादि: स्वापारयुक्त्वात् . विज्ञानस्यत्वात् , etc. Kar. 6c-d. Ca ·38 बालम्बनपरीक्षा । मिथ्याभूतं बाद्यवस्तु विषयतया नास्तीति स्पष्टम् । यथातर्कित विषयाकारोऽनुवर्तते । यतः तर्कितं विज्ञानमुक्तश्चेत् बहिर्नास्ति । तद्विषयाकारो विज्ञानं विना म्वतो नास्ति । नेन अन्त यरूपमिल्याख्या। अत्र अन्तशब्दो विज्ञानं विना नाम्नीति वदति । तद्वहिः म्वत अविद्यमानमन्तः "इप्यते । तत उत्पद्यते च । स भागः जायते तत [[व] कदाचित् । पञ्चसप्ततिपदार्थस्य मविशेषत्वात् । ज्ञेयं विना विज्ञानं नाम्तीत्यतः स एव भागः विज्ञान- जनितः । न पश्चम [प्रत्ययजनित] उच्यते । धर्मद्वयविशिष्टत्वात । स आलम्बनं. न्याययुक्तत्वात् । [अनेन] साधनं प्रदर्शितमिति स्पष्टम् । इदं साधारणाकारं "ज्ञेयमेव साधनं भवति । यदि विशिष्ट- [-आकार]. तद्विज्ञानस्य न बाह्यवस्तु आलम्बनं. [यथा स्वप्नावस्थायां प्रकाशमानम् । यथोक्तद्विप्रकारमेकं साधनं भवति । विज्ञानं तदाकारवत् पुनर्विज्ञानजनकश्च । इमे द्वे वृत्ती प्रतीत्य भाग एकं ''प्रगाणं सिध्यति । अन्तस्सदेव इति स्वीकारेऽपि । । 11 'In the Chinese text (Nankin Ed.) we have to read mo "plan" tor shui "who", as in the page 36, line last. = विज्ञानस्य. Or areata, yu-pieh. " Lit. विषय or अर्थ. -साधनम् । More lit. स आन्तराकार, etc. 64 I ·मालम्बनपरीक्षाव्याख्या 39 बाह्यार्थस्य मिथ्याभूताकारस्य परीक्षितत्वादेव नास्ति" भूमिलक्षणम् । यथाविकल्पं विषयो वेद्यते । विषयाकारस्तु अन्तर्वर्ती न्याय्यो भविष्यति । कथं तदेकांशः सहजातः प्रत्ययः । ग्राह्यांशस्य विज्ञानं विना अभावात् अस्य एकांशः पुनर्विज्ञानं जनयति । तदा सिध्यति स्वरूपविरोधदोषः । पुनस्तदेकांशत्वात् । ग्राहकांशवत् । अभ्य हि तदा जनकता न सिध्यति । विज्ञानं केवलं बाह्याकारक्लिष्टं प्रवर्तते । स एवाकारांशो विज्ञानसहजातः । न द्वयोः समकालीनयोः कार्यकारणभावोऽस्ति । यथा शृङ्गद्वयम् । किश्च न तदमिन्नं वस्तु एककालं "सहवर्तन [इत्युच्यते । सहशब्दस्तु तत्संयोगवाची । नापि विज्ञानभिन्नो विषयोऽम्तीत्युच्यनं । अम्य तु कथं सहजातत्वमित्या- ख्या। सत्यमेवम् । तथापि आकारविशेषबलात् तत् भिन्नं व्याकृत्य निरुच्यते । दृश्यांशाकारांशयोर्भेदोऽतीति तत विज्ञानं सविशेषं गृह्यते । यद्येवम् । ' प्रत्ययत्वमेव ग्राह्यं स्यात् । न विकल्पितं वस्तु सस्वभावम् । तदा अस्य सिध्येत अप्रत्ययत्वम् । इदमविरुद्धम् । अन्यग्राह्यविशेषविषय- म्यायं प्रत्यय इति सर्वसंमतम् । यथा समनन्तरनिरोधः । समागविज्ञाने निरुध्यमान तदेव विज्ञानं चतुर्विधैः प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययो भवति ॥ । " bhumi, ti earth" is probably an error for anya, ta, another as has been noted by the Chinese Editor. "Or सहजातस्य. " Lit. सहवर्तमानं सहशब्देन तत्संयुक्तमुच्यते. Lit. प्रत्ययस्वभाव. Here ends the Chinese text. The Chinese Editor notes that the commentary on remaining portion of the text is not known. 6 6

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·ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE JLAMBANAPARIKSĀ WITH COPIOI'S EXTRACTS FROM VINIT.IDEVA'S CONMENTIRY A TREGTISE ON THE EXAMIXITIVA OI THIC OBJECT-I-CAUSE) ( CUNSCIOL SALSS ADORATION TO ALL BUDDHAS AXD BODHISATTVAS ! THOSE who accept that there exists an external thing which serves as the object-cause (ülambana) of the consciousness of the eye, etc. imagine either atoms to be the ultimate object]; because they serve as causes of the consciousness; or aggregates of atoms; because the consciousness arises representing the image of the aggregates. Now [says the author :) 1. Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness (vijñapti) of the sense-organs, they are not its actual objects like the sense-organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms.

·42 ĀLAMBANAPARĪKSĀ [As regards the nature of] the object, [declares the author,] consciousness grasps only the form of its own; because it arises in that form ?. Though the atoms are causes of consciousness, they do not possess the form reflected in consciousness just like the sense-organs. Therefore they cannot become its actual objects (ālambana). Though. aggregates of atoms are alike the image of consciousness, (they cannot become its actual objects ;] because 2a. The consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it. What" object produces the consciousness endowed with the image of the object, is properly said to be the actual The following extracts are translations from the French of Vinitadeva's commentary on the Alambanaparikṣā. They are first translated into French from the Tibetan version of the commentary by Mrs. Susumu Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, and incorporated into their French translations of the Alambanapariksā published in the Journal Asiatique, Jan.-Mar. 1929. [The opponent says :) If consciousness were not capable of being what possesses the form of atoms; it could perceive itself. Why will not (then) the atoms, while producing the perception, become the object (vişayır)? The author replies the following. Speaking otherwise, beyond the production of the form of object, consciousness cannot conceive the object (vişaya). * That is to say, if a consciousness does not manifest itself under one form particularly adapted (pratiniyata) to the atoms, how can it conceive their proper existence ? (And] if it does not conceive (the atoms), how can they (atoms) become the object ? 'Though (the organ) is the cause (that produces consciousness), it is not capable of being the object itself ; because the consciousness which is born of this (organ] does not grasp the proper nature of the organ. • In order to refute the opinion of the opponent who maintains that the aggregate is the object (artha), the author says the following. * [The opponent asks :) When one understands that (the representation is not produced by this aggregate, why could not 1 ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 43 object(ālambana) of the consciousness; because that alone is spoken of [in the S'āstra] as the productive cause of consciousness. But the aggregates of atoms are not so (i.e. do not give rise to consciousness); lu 26. Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon", The double moon is perccived (by a man] on account of defects of his sense-organs. But [this perception is not produced by the double muon, as] there exists no object like the double moon. Similarly the aggregates of atoms do not exist in substance and cannot act as causes of consciousness. Hence they are not its actual objects. 2c-d. Thus both the external things are unfit to be real objects of consciousness. this (aggregate] be the perceivable object (ālambana)? The author replies the following. When consciousness occurs according to the form of the object and this object produces consciousness, this object (urtha) is capable of being the perceivable object (alambana). The following is reply to the question: Why is that which produces (consciousness) only the perceivable object? "The S'āstra explains further that this object (artha) which is the cause (hctu) of the production of the mind and mental things (cittacaitta) and which gives the designations (ryavahāra) to this object (artha) when the mind and mental things have been produced, is (precisely) the perceivable object (alambana). This is reply to the question : \l'hy is not the aggregate what produces (the representation) ? "For example, since a second moon does not exist in substance (dravyatas), it is not capable of being the object (bhāva) of the cause of the perception (jñāna) which appears as if it is a second moon : in the same way the aggregate is no longer the cause of the perception which appears as if it is (the aggregate) itself.

·44 ĀLAMBANAPARİKSĀ The external things, atoms and their aggregates cannot serve as the actual objects of consciousness, as both of them are defective in one or other respect. 3a-b. "Some [ācāryas) hold that the combined form of atoms (sancitakara) is the cause of consciousness. All" things are possessed of many forms; they are pcrccived in one or other form of many. Even in atoms, therefore, therc cxists the aspect which produces the consciousness possessed of the combined form ". That is, (1) when, for the thesis of atoms, though there is causality (hetutva), there is no form (ākarū), and (2) when, for the thesis of aggregate, though there is form, there is no causality. Having thus refuted these two theses, the author examines a third thesis of some of the advocates of the external things (bahyārtha), vis., Vägbhata, etc. What does it matter what exists in atoms, they all exist substantially (drar patas). Therefore, since they exist substantially, the state of combination (sancitükāra) is capable of being itself the cause of knowledge (vijñāna). The atoms are thus the object (vşayu) in another manner. [The author asks of these opponents :) Is it not that the character of atoms is well-known to be very subtle? (Now] where is found in these (very subtle atoms) such a state of combination (sancita-kāra)? How can there be two contradictory characters in a single (thing)? [The opponents reply :) All the material things are composed of four great elenients (cuturmahābhūta) and since these latter possess the characters of colour, of odour, etc., there is what possesses several characters. Just as there are several characters in the atoms which are composed of four great elements, so also there are several characters in the state of combination. Thus all things have several characters, but one cannot see all of them at the same time. Because their powers being differently affected, the organs cannot cognise all the objects (artha) at the same time. Having proved that in the atoms there is the combination, one, further proves that in the atoms there is the cause which 15 ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 45 3c-d. The atomic form does not become the object of consciousness just like the attributes such as solidity, etc. Just as the attributes, solidity and others, though existent in atoms, are not perceived by the visual consciousness, so also the atomic form ". ta-b. In that case, the different] perceptions of a pot, cup, etc. will be identical". Though the atoms of a pot are greater in number and that of a cup (less], there exists no distinction whatever amongst the atoms ". 1: produces the perception manifesting itself as if it is a combination. It is, one asserts, the two parts of the perceivable objects (alamba. nasya duibhiga) which lack in the two (previous propositions. When one says that the existence of cause produces the perception, he asserts the causality. When one says that what manifests itself as iſ a combination (produces the perception), he supposes the form, and he proves the reality (astitva) of the state of combination. If there is in the atoms the state of combination which is their gross character, how can one call them atoms? (The opponent continues the following). "It is so because the powers of the organs are differently affected (pratiniyata). Likewise, though there are atoms) they are no longer (capable of being object of the visual perception). The author, wishing to refute the third proposition, asks: What state of combination do you want to assert in the atoms?, (and he adds :) In all cases, it is well-known that the vase and cup, etc., are combinations (of atoms). In such case, what state exists in the atoms ?. If you say: "It is the state of vase," the perception of vase will arise in all the combinations of the cup, etc. If you say: "It is the state of the cup," the perception of the cup will arise in all (the combinations of the vase, etc.). Therefore the (different) perceptions (orthagbuddhi) called in certain case" perception of the vase and in some other case perception of the cup" will pot arise. *"The opponent says: With regard to the vase, atoms are numerous; with regard to the cup, they are a few; one recognises 9 ·46 ALAMBANAPARIKSA 4c. If [the opponent says that] the perception differs in accordance with differences in the forms of the pot and others; If you think that the parts of the pot, etc. neck, etc. (and that of the cup] are different, whereby these differentiating clements differentiate their respective cognitions. True, this differentiating element exists in the pot, ctc. 4d-5a. But it never exists in the atoms which exist in substance, because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimensions , Though » the atoms are different in substance, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic size (pärimandalya). 6 equally atoms either many or a few in other cases; therefore there exists a distinction (vis eşu) of perception made by "many" a few". The author replies : The distinction in the perception (buddhi. rişcsa) is not capable of being made by "a few," or many": for though in the vase there are many atons and la few] in the cup, houcver therc is, when the question is the character of atoms, no difference which exists in itself. Therefore it will happen that in the case of numerous atoms, 'one will have a large ressel, and in the case of a few atoms, one will have a small one ; but it will not happen that in the same state of combination the perception of the vase will arise in the case where there are many atoms, and that the perception of the cup will arise in the case where there are a few. The difference is not found any longer in what is called the exiguous sphericity (pārimāndalya) of atoms. » The opponent asks: Is it not that the atoms of the vase are precisely of one substance (dravya) other (than the cup), and that the atoms of the cup are also of one substance other (than the vase]? And how can one say that there is no difference in measure ? The author replies the following. The difference in form does not reside in the atoms. Just as whatever they may be and however numerous they may be, they all exist in the substance, so whatever may be their measures, the atoms are all of an exiguous sphericity, and this spbericity of the atoms is 1 ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 47 Now, 56. Therefore the differentiation goes along with things substantially non-existent. The difference in forms lies only in the empirical things," but not in the atoms *. The " pot and other things are only empirically true. 5c-d. For, if you remove one by onc thc atoms [of the pot, etc.] the perception illuminating the image of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away. Even if that which is connected with them (sambandhin) is excluded, what substantially exist, do not ccase to produce their own cognitions, as for example, the colour (bluc,] * etc. precisely their unique character. Therefore how could one diſſerentiate the perception [by means of) the difference of atoms? One will assert to this that the state of combination is gross. since the atoms exist in substance, they ought to exist in "being which has no extension ", otherwise, if they had extension (digblāga), they would not be capable of existing in substance. Therefore, since the atoms are not extended, wherefrom comes the difference of arrangement ? Having thus refuted the difference of forms of atoms, the author concludes the following. Because they are extended. Because they are not extended. According to the Vais'eşikas, the vase, (cup), etc. are substantially existent. If the Vaisteșika asks: How do you know that what are called vase, (cup), etc. exist by convention ? The author replies the following. * (The Vais'esika continues :) If one would exclude ſentirely) the atoms one after another, the perception which possesses the representation of the vase, etc. having not arisen, how might it result form this that the vase, (cup), etc. might exist conventionally? The author replies the following. * If the vase, (cup) etc. were substantial beings, if even what is connected with them, was entirely excluded, they would not cease (to produced the perception (of colour, etc). [The Vais eşika replies :) If one excludes entirely the atoms one after another, the cohesion (samyoga) which produces (ārambha) 7 21 ·48 ALAMBANAPARIKSA It is ", therefore, rationally deduced that the objects of differcnt sensual cognitions do not exist externally. 6a-c. It" is the object (artha) which exists internally in knowledge itself as a knowable aspect and which appears to us as if it exists externally. Though the external things are denied, what exists internally in knowledge itself [i.e. its knowable aspect] the substance, being destroyed, and (consequently, if) the vase is destroyed, is it not that the perception does not arise any more? What prevents the vase, (cup) etc. from being existent (substiantally] always (san'adu) and wherever this may be (sar. vatra) (without their destruction) (The author replies :) If the vase and other substantial things formed of parts (avayaridrarya) exist beyond the atoms, when one says that the vase, (cup) etc. are constituted by atoms, is he willing to say (1) that the atoms exist in proper being as numerous as they may be, or (-) that they exist partly? In the [second] case, what is beyond the elements that produce one whole (arayavin) exists by means of a single element of this whole owing to which this (whole) is going to exist there ; if (as in the first case) what is beyond the constituent elements does not exist that is going to exist in (its) proper nature (svarīpena) howerer numerous the atoms may be ; thus, the atoms as numerous as they may be, become one whole: vase, (cup,] etc. consequently, when the unity component (that is to say the atoms) of the whole is destroyed, this whole does not exist any more substantially ; because if it existed again, one would assert simultaneously several contradictory states (bhāva). Having thus proved that three propositions are not capable of [demonstrating] that the external object is the perceivable object (alambana), [the author says) in conclusion : Since the atoms are not capable of being the perceivable object, therefore, etc. "Having thus refuted the principal doctrines of other schools whose proposed theories could be destroyed by means of wellestablishod reasonings, the author, now, wishing to establish his principal doctrine on the perceivable object, says the following. The opponent says: If there was no external object, is it not true that there would not be any conditional cause (pratyaya) of the perceivable object of consciousness? (The author replies :) Here, one is not in the error of non-exis. tence of the conditional cause of the perceivable object; for, ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 49 and appears to us as though it is existent externally, serves as a condition of the actual object (alambanapratyaya) (to consciousness"]. 6c-d. Because consciousness is the essence (of the external object] and that [object essence of which is consciousness) acts as the condition [to consciousness]." The internal consciousness appears as [manifold external] ohject (artha) and also arises from that [objective aspect of its own"]. Thus the internal consciousness is endowed with two parts (i... image and cause) (which circumstance is absent in all the previous propositions) and therefore what exists internally in the consciousness (i.c. the objective aspect) is the object condition (ülambunapratyaya) to the consciousness. If only the objective appcarance of consciousness is cxperienced, [it will be a part of the consciousness and appearing simultancously with it). How a part of "For example, for the eye-diseased person (taimirika), appearances of hairs, flies, etc., appear in the perception with the forms of hairs, fies, etc., (real). Likewise, since the knowable aspect (grālijā-bhāga) is capable of being characteristic of the object (artha), one calls it the conditional cause of the perceivable object (alambana). "Ths opponent asks again : Then how could the knowable aspect be the characteristic of the perceivable object? The author answers the following. And also because, thanks to the maturity of impregnations (vāsanā=perfume) frequently repeated of the blue, yellow, etc., the perception (pāna) arises in possessing the characteristic of the blue, yellow, etc., this characteristic is the conditional cause of con. sciousness. * Mrs. S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, probably on the authority of l'initadera, translate this passage thus: As consciousness, (through the characteristics of the object (artha) (which exists internally (.e., subjectively) (=the knowable aspect) possesses the characteristic of this object, this characteristic existing, the consciousness arises. can ·50 ĀLAMBANAPARĪKSĀ consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness [itself] ? 70. [Though the external object] is only a part [of the internal consciousness,]it is a condition (pratyaya) (to the consciousness), because it is invariably associated with the consciousness. The objective aspect of consciousness,] though arising simultaneously with it, becomes condition to the consciousness] which is produced by other conditions]. "Logicians (naiyāyika) say as below' : The possession of existence (bhāra) [by existence] and of non-existence (abhāra) [by non-existcnce] is the characteristic sign of successive productions of the cause and result, [this result] possessing the cause." [The opponent says :) In all cases, one comprehends that what is perceivable internally existent (i.e., subjectvely) in the con. sciousness, be thus the appearance itself ( what appears). But, he will say, if this perceivable object (alambana) appears as an appearance designed (dessinée) by the character of what is perceivable Greyākāra), this perceivable object will be what appears at the same time as a part of this (appearance). How could (such an appearance) be conditional cause (pratyaya) [of the object perceivable by the consciousness)? If it was possible, this would be oneself made by oneself" or, the knowable aspect (grähyabhāga) would produce the knowable aspect (grāhyabhāga); horns of the right and left of the ox would themselves produce one by the other; this would be a formidable error (atiprasanga) [there). "[To this objection the author replies the following). » [The opponent says :) By means of discrimination of parts, it would be possible that oneself makes oneself, how would it be possible that it is what possesses the determinate cause (nimitta) without the confusion between the being of cause and of its result ? The author replies the following. " That is to say, at the moment when the knowable aspect exists, the perception exists also; when it does pot exist, (the perception) exists no more. Consequently these two [existences) which arise simultaneously are capable of being the cause and its result, ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 51 Or," 76. It becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force " (sakti). It is also possible successively that the objective appearance of consciousness (arthavabhasa), in order to give rise to a result homogeneous with itself, makes the force (sakti) seated in the [storc-house) consciousness, and it is not contradictory" (to the reasoning). "Having thus explained that the existence (bhāva) of the object (visaya) and the existence of that which perceives the object (vişayin) exist at the same time, the author, now, explains that the existence of the object (vişuya) and the existence of that which perceives the object (viseyin) arise also successively (kramena). *: When the knowable aspect disposes (dispose) the dominant force, it objectivizes itself into a proper being which produces successively [consciousness], for, while destroying itself, this knowable aspect deposits at this moment its dominant force on the Alayavijñāna. If therefore this dominant force produces ac. companying factors (sahakurin) at the second moment, it will produce a consciousness homogeneous with (the dominant force), but at this moment only. If the [dominant force) at this moment, does not produce the accompanying factors, when they arise in the third, fourth, or no matter what instant, this [dominant force), they having matured, wiil produce the same consciousness as this. When one has this comprehension, he has no more difficulties oneself is made by oneself" or "they arise at the same time" and others. Thus this blue and other (colours), the characteristics of the knowable aspect, which existed in the precedent perception produce the following perception which will have the characteristics of blue, yellow, red and other [colours). The opponent says: If the dominant force (sakti) produces the perception Grāna), the dominant force will be precisely the object (vişaya), while the precedent knowable aspect will not be the object. [The author replies the following.) * If the dominant force is not determined (vyavasthita) [to the action) by the knowable aspect, this dominant force will not produce any more such perception. Consequently, since the perception ·52 ĀLAMBANAPARĪKSĀ [The opponent says :) If only the self of consciousness constitutes the object-condition ; how should we explain [the saying that] the visual consciousness arises depending upon the che and [form" (riīpa)] ? (The author replies :)" 7c-d. What is the sense-organ is (nothing but] the force itself [in consciousness) by virtue of its acting simultaneously [with the object] as an auxiliary cause (sahakarin) [for raising up of consciousness). Thc" scnse-organs are inferred from the nature of] their results to be only the forces of consciousness, but never constituted of matters." which is born of the dominant force, is also product of the knowable aspect, there is no any contradiction (rirodha). [The idea that the interior) possesses two modalities is precisely possible according to the former proposition (pakşa), for, the knowable aspect producing the perception similar to itself, (the interior) possesses two modalities. " It is so because, the eye acting simultaneously with the force which had already appeared, had produced (visual] consciousness. But if the interior form had not appeared previously to the eye, how could it produce the visual consciousness in acting simulaneously with the interior form? "If the organs are made by elements, (as the Sarvāstivadins assert,) there will be this difficulty raised by the opponent, but in our opinion, the proper nature of the dominant force (sakti) which one believes as the organ itself and which acts simultaneously (with the object (vişaya)] is precisely the organ. Therefore, for us, just as the form is interior, the eye also is an interior proper being. "[The opponent asks :) How could one know that the organ is the proper being of the dominant force? [The author replies the following **For, one could infer merely some cause in considering the result, but one could not infer the genus (riseşa) of the cause. For example, one could infer the fire on merely seeing the smoke, but one could not infer the genus of the fire and say if these are of herbs, of leaves (that burning]; likewise, one could, solely by the ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 53 . 8a. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness." That force be in consciousness, or in its self which is of indescribable nature; there "is no difference in production of the result. 86-d. Thus" the objective aspect (vişayarupa) [of consciousness) and the force (sakti) [called fruit characteristic of consciousness, make inference on the cause, but one could not deduce the genus of the cause, that is to say that wluch has been made by the elements, etc. "The opponent says: The dominant force (sukti) depends on the possessor of that force (suktimull; for, without basis (utharu), the dominant force is not capable to exist. The possessor of the force (saktat) is one of the organs: now this (organ) itself has been constituted by the elements. The author answers: If one considers the representation (rijapti) of consciousness, (the conception] of one basis for the dominant force is not contradictory. This being admittcel, it one basis is necessary, the consciousness (vijna) itself is capable of being this basis (israra): for, in the consciousness, there is al proper being which knows the object and (at the sanie time) a proper being which know's itself (svasamtcdana). 'The opponent replies: while the dominant force residing in this organ] inade by the elements, produces one fruit different [from that of consciousness) the dominant force residing in consciousness produces (in ils turn) one fruit different (from that which a compound of elements would produce). (Now, you assert that the organ consists in the dominant force (and) however the fruit of elements and that of consciousness are different: the organ does not reside thus in the dominant force, but it is necessarily composed of the elements, thus the dominant forcc would be capable of being sometime in consciousness and sometime in the proper naturc inexplicable (anirdes'ya) (that is to say in the organ). The author replies: There is no any difference in the production of the fruit; for, in all manner (sarvathā), to see the form, [to hear the sound, etc. are simply productions of the dominant force. "[The opponent asks :) Then what is thus the cause of the dominant force of the organ ? The author replies: Just as consciousness arises from the dominant force of the organ, so this dominant force of the ·54 ALAMBANAPARIKSA sense-organ] go mutually conditioned from immemorial time. Depending upon the force (sakti) called eye, and the interior form (antah rūpa) arises the consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated from the perceivable object. These two act mutually conditioned without beginning in time (anādikāla). Sometime when the force ſcalled vāsanā] gets matured, consciousness is transformed into a form of object (visayakūralā) and sometime" the force arises from [the consciousness] cndowed with the form of object. The consciousness and force, both may be said to be either different organ arises equally from the previous consciousness which causes the activity (avedha) of the organ, and this previous consciousness arises from the dominant force of the organ still more anterior. Thus, etc. * The opponent asks: Then wherefrom does this dominant force proceed? The author replies: The dominant force proceeds also from the anterior consciousness which causes the activity of the organ; this consciousness in its turn proceeds from a dominant force more anterior, and this same dominant force proceeds from a consciousness still more anterior which has caused the activity of the organ. Thus these two, etc. * Having thus explained that the dominant force of the organ and consciousness are beings (bhāva) of the cause (hetu) and of the fruit (phala), the author, now, in order to explain that the dominant force and consciousness are reciprocally mutual causes and this without commencement in time, says : Sometime, etc. The translation of this passage is done according to Paramärtha. According to l'initadeva, French translators have done thus : Sometime, in (the mind which possesses the form of this (object) it is the dominant force (which is produced). Then at this moment, the cause and its fruit arising reciprocally in an uninterrupted continuity, one says that the time is without commencement.

·ENGLISH TRANSLATION 55 3 like. from or identical with one another as one may Thus the interior object (which is not different from consci. ousness) is endowed with two factors, [image and cause) and therefore it is logically concluded that consciousness (alone] is transformed into (external) object (vişaya). The treatise on the examination of the object composed by Acārya Dinnaga is completc. 1 The opponent asks : Are the dominant force of the organ and that of the object different from the consciousness or not? If they are different, there is only difference in denominations, but the object is the same ; because lat this moment) one admits (pratijna) an organ and a perceivable object (alambana) apart from consciousness. If they are not different, one could not say that this dominant force is the organ and that this dominant force is the object. The author replies: The dominant forces are the proper nature (atman) of differentiations (viseşa) of a stage (avastha) and they exist conventionally (samurtya); therefore, relying upon the mundane designation (laukikavyavahāra) one could, as he likes, say that (sometime) consciousness on the one hand and (the organ and the object) on the other are of different nature (anyatua) and sometime) of non-different nature (ananyatva). See additional notes. For, thus, some things which exist conventionally are in certain case designated by different denominations; for example, one says "the perfume of the sandalwood " (now, the perfume is not the same thing as the sandalwood) and in some other case they are designated by non different (denominations); for example, one says the vase is in such matter", etc. (now, the vase could not exist beyond the matter which constitutes]. Thus, having demonstrated that the perceivable object (alambana) is truly interior, the author in conclusion, says the following. 8 ·ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DHARMA- PĀLA'S COMMENTARY ON THE ALAMBANAPARĪKSĀ In order to light up the wisdom In the vicious-and-dull-minded men, and In order to let them extirpate their evils who spoke, I pay homage to Him and investigate the [true] meaning [of the text]. Some philosophers accept the external things as object-causes of the consciousness of the eye and others. The fruit of investigation comprises the rejection of what is rejectable and the adoption of what is worth adopting; therefore the cause for both is set forth here. The word ' "others" includes the five-fold consciousness which arises having the support of material objects and the senses as accepted by other schools of philosophy, They conceive that the senses are directed each to an (invariable external] real object. But the consciousness born of the mind (as the sixth organ] is not to be accepted as correct; for, it is not directed to an 'Road in the Sanskrit text p. 21, lines 7–9, 79 ani परसंमत सेनियाभयपविषविज्ञानं सहाति ।

·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 57 invariable real object, but to an object which is only conventionally true, for example, the chariot' and the like. Though it may be permitted that the mental consciousness is conditioned by a real object endowed with parts. (avayavin); yet it grasps also an object which is not its own and which lacks a form similar to one reflected in consciousness. But for the consciousness of the eye and others, there is well-known separate object invariably associated with each of the senses. No such fixity of object is arrived at in the case of mental consciousness. Moreover, the Truth in its essence is to be realised inwardly by a knowledge born of the repeated practice of trance, and never becomes the object of the discriminative thought (tarka=manas); and again it appears as though it is perceivable, yet it shines as object only of a supreme knowledge born of contemplating what is heard and what is thought out, [and not at all of the mental consciousness]. Thus the object of the mental consciousness becomes absolutely non-existent. For, this object can be no capable of being conditioncause at the moment of its origination ;' nor can it be so in the past and future moments, because the things of past and future are non-entities just like the uncomposite elements of existence, [ether, etc). For this 3 'Cf. Tattvas. paß. p. 206; Nyāyavārtika, p. 80—1 wbere different explanations are given for rathādivat. Read in the Sanskrit text p. 21, line 11, aeft malformat द्रव्यप्रलबमारीकियो। * Read in the Sanskrit text p. 22, line, 4 Episcopi for Front ·58 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSA reason, the word "others" is said to include the body of five sorts of consciousness. Then, if [you say that] the mental consciousness owes its existence to what is brought home by the sensual consciousness ;' how is that also possible? It cannot take place either in the same moment as the sensual consciousness or in the immediate next moment. It is not possible in the immediate next moment, because the object like the colour, etc., has already been vanished away in the immediate next moment. Nor does the object of the present moment become condition to it, because it has been grasped by sensual consciousness. [If you say that] the mental consciousness grasps naturally the external object of its own accord, then there will be no possibility of existence of the blind or deaf,' etc. [To accept] a sense faculty other than the eye, etc. is contradictory to the inferential knowledge. The denial of extra material object [which may suit to the mental consciousness being gladly admitted, why should we entertain a bias for the mental consciousness alone ? To the visual and other consciousness material things serving as supporting causes become bases." [But to the mental consciousness there is no such thing as basis.) What is short of basis, has by nature no 5 Read in the text, p. 22, line, 6, fanfaa14163 AM Whole discussion below, cf. adia, II, 239-244. Cf. Tattvas. pafi. p. 825; Nyāyabinduţikā. p. 10. . Read in the Sanskrit text, p. 22, line 12, yrafallant समाधवप्रसवःसत्वायतनं भवति ·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 59 function to perform, and therefore is to be non-existent; [e.g. ether). So also is the case with the mind. [Though] the object (alambana) may be [proved by] the perceptive knowledge, yet, since it consists in the nature of being grasped * (grahyasvabhava), it is absolutely unreal. So we consider it right to reject the nature of its being object (alambanata) and thereby the nature of its being basis (asryayata). However, the force (sakti) which constitutes the sense faculty and which acts simultaneously [with consciousness) will imagin it to exist. An external thing, etc. It is perceived that there is some object other than this (consciousness). This [consciousness) makes known [to us] something opposite [to itself). That something is called object since it is (as it were) capable of being grasped by an entity other than itself. How could one say that something (e.g. perception) depends upon mere collocation (samagri) ? For, the collocation is not properly a substance. [If one argues that we should accept that principle in accordance with the Tathāgata's teaching in respect of the two-fold Truth, failing which] the Tathāgata's Truth will be far amiss from correctly understood. This argument goes by itself against the reasonings preceding and *Cf. Nyāyavārtika, p. 521 where some anumāna is referred to thus: न चितव्यतिरिका विषया: ग्राह्यत्वात् वेदनादिवत् । तात्पर्यटीका p.656: मात्र विज्ञानवादी स्वपक्षे प्रमाणमाह-चित । This seems to be a reference to the Madhyamika's standpoint. Cl. 9747 asla, etc., in the Bhavasankranti sūtra, 11.

·60 ĀLAMBANAPARIKŞA succeding. But, for my own part; where is the possibility of] incurring such a fallacy ? For, I have accepted that it depends upon a substance (dravya) as well as collocation (samagri). Now it follows that even if some other objection is raised, that also may be taken to be answered. They postulate the subtle atom Though the subtle atom perishes as soon as it appears, yet two substances serve as a cause, but not collocation [of atoms). For example, things, colour and others, though they are simultaneously present before the senses, become objects (only of their respective senses] without any confusion on account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a particular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. All substances are perishing, yet the double" atom which is capable of existing [at the time of grasping] serves as the objectcause. 11 Because the atom serves as cause for that." The word "that " means the consciousness of the eye, etc. It arises on a contact [of the sense-organ] with the object constituted of parts. So say some [Acāryas) : Among the causes, that which acts as the productive cause becomes its actual object." Contrast the Tattvasangrahapaſ. p. 55 anyafecarga: 1 Bhavaviveka calls 2 atoms as a dravya v. Ui, Vaidesika philosophy, p. 131. Read in the Sanskrit text p. 23, line 14: & fran: 4: weite Aura Kureg: 1 Cl. Slokavārtika, p. 285 : Galeria 10 ·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 61 " l? "Or some others postulate the aggregate of atoms" The advocates of this doctrine say that the aggregate formed of atoms serves as the actual object of consciousness. "Because consciousness arises representing the image of the aggregate of atoms." The aggregate is believed to be the actual object of consciousness, since it is born of the aggregate (and endowed with its image). It is as somebody says: "A thing whose form is represented in a consciousness is really its object." Both these disputants say: [Here the following thesis is intended to be formulated : consciousness has an aggregate thing as its object; because it is endowed with the form of that aggregate object). Now, if [the idealist objects that) this reason is invalid and cannot be formulated as such ; for, it lacks an appropriate example just as the second reason which could prove the validity of the first one does. [Moreover, says the idealist, the reason is not recognised by us ; because we do not accept that the image represented in consciousness pertains to an external aggregate thing, nor do we consider real the aggregate apart from its parts i.e. atoms. Therefore we do not have anything external corresponding to the gross form found in consciousness. We may now, answer that] the general quality of atoms (paramānusamanyalakşana) while acting as actual We may conveniently read in Sanskrit p. 23, line 20, यत् विज्ञानं यदाकारयुम्, etc. Cr. Pramayavartika: तत्र बुदियदाकारा क्या स्लायमुच्यते ॥ Vrtti : प्रात्यमुच्यते अणुसंचयः ।

·62 ALAMBANAPARIKSA ; (then] object of consciousness will cause a gross form to appear in it. But if you assume that there is no external thing which may serve as a cause to consciousness there is a fault of the subject of your thesis being contradicted in its own character. So also is your probandum (dharma = sadhyadharma) unknown to us. If you say that what has been recognised by the opponent as an accepted fact, can only be formulated as an appropriate example, then the same is also to be applied in respect of Probandum (you cannot prove by means of inference a thing which is impossible to prove). However, one whose mind is bent on supreme pramana, says: By what reason the two reasons, source of dispute can be made valid, that reason is not to be found because of lack of example which is recognised both by us. Hence in what manner may the representation of the image in consciousness be established as valid reason ?15 Though atoms serve as causes," etc. as accepted [by the advocates of atoms, that is, soine of the early Buddhists and Jains). The atom by itself cannot serve as the cause of the consciousness for the reason that it is not perceived and hence non-existent; Vijnanath Svāthsālambanat is the thesis of the Vijbāna. vādin. This view has been much criticised by Kumärila and Udyotakara ; (S'lokavārtika and N. Vārtika with Tikā and N. Sūtra IV, 2, 26). Read in Sanskrit p 24, line 4 : afin Eperjantokia:efta 1791 referentemente Read in Sanskrit: arytm total 15 ·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 63 yet the body of atoms does so. However, they become objects mutually unconnected. "Like the senses". Just as a sense-faculty, though it serves as a basis of the association of consciousness, never becomes its object; because it does not bear the image of the sensefaculty; so also atoms. What do not possess the image of consciousness are not considered to be its objects. Therefore it is said : [25] "That is the object " "The form of its own" means the image of consciousness itself. “ Consciousness grasps means it determines." How is it known that consciousness grasps only the form of its own ? "Because it arises in that form." This refers to the mind, [the preceding moment of consciousness). Consciousness arises in a form which resembles the mind. When there is a mutual correspon. dence or co-ordination (sarūpya) between the consciousness and the object-image, then we call it grasping of the object by consciousness. In fact, for you, there is no object grasped beyond consciousness. How could you, then, explain the causality of the object nonexistent apart from consciousness for rising up of its * According to Kāşmira Vaibhāşikas and Bhadanta Vasu. bandhu atoms never get combined, (na spţsanti), see. Additional Notes below. " Read in Sanskrit : स्वसं स्वाकार उच्यते । निर्वायते निवीयते। Cf. Pramaqavār. výtti, p. 230 : aktieri 9 ·64 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSA consciousness? Yet there is already in the preceding moment the object-image. When this object-image is brought home in the self of consciousness just like an image in the mirror, it is considered that the consciousness has grasped its object, (and also that the latter has produced the former]. The self of the double atom does not represent the image reflected upon consciousness. If it does so, then we may consider the atom also to be its object. "Like the sense organ Though it serves as the cause, it becomes no object. If you accept that whichever is cause, is object, then the sense-faculty also could possibly become object. [It is also not possible to argue that mere causality is not criterion for its being object of consciousness, but a causal element which is endowed with the image felt in consciousness is so; because] it has already been stated that the reason, the possession of the image in consciousness suffers a fallacy of its being not established. Thus we have to concede that the mind, i.e. the preceding moment of consciousness serves not merely as cause [of the following moment of consciousness), but it appears both as the sense-faculty as well the image of the object. If you establish as the cause what has been stated above, id., atoms"; then, atoms being the cause, how does it follow that the same becomes object? [If you say that the causality and objectivity are mutually concomitant and found invariably together! Read in Sanskrit p. 25, line 16: a (au] R, etc. 19 ·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 65 then, the sense-faculty being the cause, that also will become object. (Because the sense-faculty never becomes object of any consciousness) the said concomitance incurs [26] a fallacy of inconclusiveness. Such being your proposition, we establish this : Because atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness," etc. Why is this sentence? It purports to establish our own proposition. One cannot consider one's proposition to be established by merely criticising other's thesis. In order to formulate his own proposition, (Acārya says thus:) thesis : atoms do not become objects of consciousness; reason : because they do not manifest the form found in their consciousness; example: like a sensefaculty. If the above phrase indicates that this is the reason for this proposition, it would follow that the author of the Sastra having first set forth his opponent's proposition, propounds his own one which goes in agreement with his opponent's. And now the author, having paid his attention to the refutation of the opponent's proposition, would exhibit many defects upon it and set it aside ultimately. [In arguing thus] the thesis which never varies that (i.e. reason) will be asserted. Other thesis which always varies (the reason) will be dissented. At the outset the opponent raises an objection (düşana) [to the above proposition] pointing out to its inconclusive reasoning. How false a syllogism you Read in Sanskrit p. 26, line 1: [arre 1] ·66 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞA 11 have formulated ! Even the ordinary folk says that the reason which is found separated from and never associated with the object to be proved (sadhya) is not at all a reason, but such reason gives rise to the doubt as to the existence of the object to be proved. Therefore you should formulate some other syllogism. Your reason “The atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness may sometimes exist in the atoms whose innate natures are undetermined. But the resolve is not correct that consciousness always arises in co-ordination with the image (of the object]. Therefore there is no room for your determination that the atoms do not possess the form reflect. ed in consciousness. It ought to be stated on the other hand, that they are of indeterminate natures. However, this much is certain that what produces consciousness does not become its object just like the atom of sensefaculty. There are well-known other different causes which produce the visual consciousness; none of them makes known to us the innate natures of atoms, because consciousness never exhibits their forms. What has been stated in respect of the sensual consciousness may also be equally applied to the other types of consciousness. The sense-faculty given above as example is in fact stated with a view of particularisation (pradars'anartham) and other example may also be obtained by way of implication (arthapatti). Thus the statement of the above reason also becomes useless. [27] [The author replies :) Tbe atom, though it functions as cause, becomes no actual object of consciousness, ·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 67 and with this intention the above statement was made. It is so lest the sound and other atoms should cause to raise up the consciousness of other sense-organ. Someone says: In the self of consciousness the gross form is not perceived; hence it is not object of itself" just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the theory that the image of consciousness is due to the bring. ing home of the real object-image upon consciousness is not reasonable, the saying that no gross-form is perceived as appertaining to consciousness is very appropriate. Thus we have spoken that atoms are not objects of consciousness." The reason for this is that they do not possess the form (that is experienced in consciousness) and that the hypothesis that they are its objects is not well proved by any means of knowledge (pramana). If so, [the opponent says,] then, let the aggregate of atoms be its object. [That could not be possible.] If you, (says the author,] desire to prove your proposition on the ground that all things spoken of (in the world) are established (as real); [then, I may reply that] your reason is not an established one; this will be a true logic. “Though the aggregate possesses the image of consciousness". Cl. Pramaqav. výtti, II, 211 : dio a a at Edwiek sial- " It is not clear what the author has replied in regard to the fallacy of reason that has been pointed out by the opponent.

·68 ALAMBANAPARIKŞA And it may become object; yet it does not act as its cause. For, consciousness does not arise from the aggregate. Aggregate-consciousness bears a form (similar to) the aggregate. But it does not produce consciousness. How can this be the cause for it? Since it has no characteristic of an object (alambanalaksana), it could not (be proved to) exist. As regards the nature of what has been previously spoken of, i.e., atom, it lacks the form felt in consciousness. What is, then, characterised as object ? "Every object which necessarily produces the consciousness possessed of the image similar to itself (i.e., the object), is said to be its proper object": [28] In accordance with the process of arising of] the object-consciousness, [we say that] what is a productive cause of consciousness, that is only its object. Somebody says : Every object necessarily is the cause of the mind and mental elements. This object having produced (consciousness) is spoken of as if it was really grasped [by its consciousness) and then it was always designated as its actual object. What object possesses the two-fold characteristic (i.e., causality and form) that becomes object. When there arises the fact of production, [the talk of it as) object (alambana) also arises. It is said in the scripture : When this fact arises, (or exists), this (other) fact also arises. This formula refers to the theory of dependent causation.

·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 69 Since what is the productive cause for that consciousness is a condition for production, we assume that this is a thing [to serve] as object. At the first sight of a thing only the thing-in-itself (svalakşana) is perceived and nothing more; so we do not call the more (i.e., generality) as object (alambana). "The aggregate of atoms does not produce consciousness; because it is not an entity in substance". The aggregate is not a real entity; because it cannot be described either as different from or as one with its constituents. Whichever is nonentity has possibly no efficiency of producing any result. " Like the double moon ". The second moon does not cause to raise up the consciousness of the second moon (as it does not exist in substance]. If so, what is the cause of representing that image (in consciousness]? " Because of the defect of the senses". When the eye has its sight disturbed by cataract and other diseases, then the appearance of the double moon appears and that, too, not as a real entity. [29] “The double moon-cognition has not an object, though the image of the double moon is reflected in it". The double moon does not become object of its consciousness though the latter is endowed with the image of the double moon; because this does not produce consciousness.

·70 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSĀ 'Similarly the aggregate, as it does not exist in substance, does not act as cause for its consciousness ". Since it is not a real entity just like the double moon, it proves certain that the aggregate is not at all the cause. Hence “It does not become object." Here again the word the double moon" is repeated. The example of the double moon, it is to be understood, shows the reason, the possession of the image [by consciousness] to be an inconclusive one. The existence of an object for every consciousness can also be achieved through a common logic; hence your proposition involves the defect of contradiction. [This argument is not valid ; for] the visual consciousness arises through the eye (only), but neither through the aggregate such as a patch of blue, etc. nor through the atom; since the consciousness is not produced by both of them just like the consciousness born of the senses other the eye. This example is acceptable to all. So nothing else is to be mentioned. The example, "the double moon" does not exist in substance, hence that, having the nature of uncausal object, proves the same (i.e. absence of the cause for the aggregate-consciousness). Though the double moon-consciousness is endowed with the image of the double moon, there is no real object [corresponding to it]. The expression also happens even in the absence of its causal object.

·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 71 If you ask me : Well, there exists no second moon; how does one directly perceive the two images of the moon ? Let me explain this. Because of some potent force (sakti) laid down within consciousness, it appears as though it is the consciousness endowed with the image of the second moon. Just as a man, while asleep, dreams that he actually sees many objects, and also imagines in dream that he discharges so many false acts; so also he imagines another moon upon the single moon. [30] Some philosophers say: When the eye-consciousness happens to exist simultaneously [with its alambana] and since it has been criticised that both these under such circumstances, arise in order, i.e. one after the other, immediately after these two images, a mental thought arises murmuring: 'I perceive the second moon.' Some others say: It is due to a mistake in numberº [of the two instead of one) in the moon, that mistake, too, happens out of the defect in the organ of the sight. If you do not admit the proposition of an external object, then the vision of gross form will be merely a perversive thought. [The author says: ] Mental consciousness does not arise immediately after the eye-consciousness and its alambana coming into exisience [as you previously stated), but it does so only simultaneously and depending upon the images of these two. Then, (asks the opponent,] how does an understanding arise that I see the * See Pramāņavārtika, II, 294 : Arai Tha (Foru:) I See Prakaranapaſcikā, p. 38, verses 58–60. M 10 ·72 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSĀ double moon? [The author replies: If you stick to your view,] tell me : why does not the cognition arise of the double sound at a time immediately after the soundobject and its consciousness being present ? It is also impossible to assume that the mental consciousness arises successively in the case of a man who possesses the organ of the eye in a sound condition. Tell me, on what basis, are accomplished many and different things: the material objects, senses, their consciousness and their cognizable varieties (without intervention of the mental consciousness)? (So we must accept that there also arises simultaneously the mental consciousness by virtue of which we are able to congnize many and varied things.] One who says that I perceive the single moon as double and accepts that there is the external object apart from consciousness, how will that man also explain the mistake in number causing the delusion of the double moon to arise ? [That is to say, he must also resort to the aid of mental consciousness to explain it satisfactorily.] 'As both atoms and their aggregates are defective in one or other respect, they are not real objects of consciousness." The alambana consists in two parts, vis. representation of its own image and causality for its consciousness. The atom lacks in the first part, i.e. its image is not represented in consciousness, and the aggregate is devoid of the second part, i.e., causality. Thus these two defects as bave been discussed, point ·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 73 out to the identity between the object and its consciousness. [31] “Some Ācāryas hold that the combined form of atoms (sañcitakara) is the cause of consciousness". In each atom there exists the combined form. That alone is perceived as the gross form in proportion to the number of atoms. That combined forin, too, is real and produces the consciousness of the form of its self; because it exists in substance. " It becomes the actual object "; because it fulfils the said two conditions. This (combined form) is already an accomplished fact. Hence no question arises whether it is the same as the atom itself or not so. “ All things are possessed of many forms ". These atoms themselves are regarded as possessed of atomic form as well as combined forin. How can a single element be described to possess two forms ? All things which are collocations of material elements are considered to be of four great elements, earth, etc. as their essence, and have many forms. They are naturally possessed of distinct forces (each). [For example,] the image of the blue and other colours existing in a substance-element and the same existing in a senseorgan are known to be quite different [from each other). In the atom, among many forms "there also exists the combined form."

·74 ALAMBANAPARİKŞA Only this form becomes object of the consciousness of the eye, etc. So it becomes "the direct object of perception ". If so, why do you not say that cognition of atoms is possessed of combined form ? [You admit that) the atom is of combined form. Why do you not likewise admit that its cognition is also of the combined form? Why do you only say: "There exists the combined form in the atom (32] This sentence, having the nature of a sentence formulated to that effect, shows as well that their cognitions are possessed of the combined form of atoms. If so, binary atom has the form of binary atom, how has it combined form ? Only the aggregates of different atoms are admitted in this system of thought; and these aggregates themselves constitute the combined forms. It is for this reason that they are not [considered to be] existent in substance. This point has already been mentioned; why is it repeated again? With some other motive it is done so. [That motive is his :) Though the substance-elements are each different in their nature, yet it is to be understood that this combined form is related to their mere collocation. When we analyse it, no more exists the combined form. Moreover, though all things are regarded only as the aggregates of atoms, still each thing has a relative difference, and we may perceive it in each substance. However, the scriptural passage like "What is material element, blue, (etc.), that is the earth element (brthividhatu)" ·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 75 is to be interpreted as a sentence intended to demonstrate the Truth. It so, how is it that atoms are not perceived by senses ? and how are they perceived only by the knowledge of Tathatā, Suchness ? [The opponent continues :] "The atomic form becomes no object of the [sensual] consciousness". This does not become object of the sensual consciousness; hence it is beyond the senses. The object which does not fall within the operation of senses, ought to be cognized only by the knowledge penetrating into Suchness. What is the argument for such an assumption? It is simply this : the atomic form never comes within the range of direct perception; just like its solidity and other attributes." Blue and other colours though really existent in atoms, do not become objects of the visual and other consciousness." [33] Because the powers of senses are related to particular objects [only, not to all]. "So also atomic form." This is not contradicted, but consented to by both parties. The opponent objects : Let the atomic form appear as perceptible and not solidity, because they, both differ one from the other in nature. We reply: That property [of atoms) is accepted as probans Since the exact Sanskrit equivalent of the Chinese expression, chi chih is not ascertainable, the passage, garagard. aler: is left untranslated.

·76 ĀLAMBANAPARIKŞA 96 which is common to all ten bases formed by the material elements; hence no fallacy of exclusion of reason from the sapakşadretanta. Therefore this formulation [of syllogism) is in no way defective. "[Different] perceptions of pot, cup, etc., will be identical" for you who hold thus, (that is, the things are mere aggregates of atoms). For, consciousness does not differ as its object does not differ; and the sensual consciousness assumes its form in accordance with the object lying ahead (or in front). The opponent asks: How do you know that there is no difference in the object of consciousness ? The author answers : There exists no distinction among the many atoms of pot, cup, etc." [though the number" many" may vary in each case). This sentence means this: Though the atoms in their combined forms become objects of our cognition, yet, while the self-nature of the pot, etc., being cognized, there exists even among the many aggregates of atoms, no such character that can distinguish one aggregate of atoms from the other". Because we do not admit [as real] the combined form distinct in each aggregate, apart from their own real [atomic] forms, the sensual consciousness that has arisen depending upon that form will be identical. It is thereby settled that only the * The prayoga may be like this: pared a forfat: 19 सात् । वरणुन तद्विजातिविषयः । यथा कठिनतादि. Read more in the Sanskrit text, p. 33, 1. 13 above.

·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 77 11 self-nature of atoms is object (alambana). And in the undifferentiated form of atoms, there exists no element that causes to produce some discriminating and reinvestigating thought [regarding the differentiated gross form, such as pot, etc.); for, such thought will be a separate one, just as a thought springing up from a blae patch, etc. [That being the case, the discriminating thought of gross form, pot, etc., will arise only when there is present the causal element. That causal element being absent, our idea of gross form is baseless.] If [the opponent says that] the perception differs on account of differences in the forms [of the pot, etc.]." [34] Here “the form means the image that distinguishes itself in each case. The pot and cup are distinguishable in their forms by virtue of their different parts, neck, belly and bottom, etc., and our cognitions differ on that account. The author replies: It is quite true, “but the [different forms] do not exist in substance." No atoms constituting the object cognized by the sensual consciousness, are varied [in their size). Though the aggregates of atoms are true empirically, yet they, being closely analysed, do not fall within the cognizance of senses. (There remain as real only atoms, and never the aggregates.] The (real] objects of cognition (i.6. atoms) which are identical in form, cannot, properly ·78 ALAMBANAPARTKŞA speaking, become causes for different forms of cognitions. [The opponent asks:) How do you know that there exists no distinction in form among the atoms? [The author replies :) "Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension". All objects are constituted of parts and these parts necessarily admit of distinction of forms. The proper nature of atoms, however, is devoid of any part and very subtle. Therefore how can we assign to it any distinction of form? Though the pot, cup, etc., are (apparently) varied objects, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic nature." For, anything destitute of parts, neither increases nor decreases. [35] "We therefore understand that there is no reality" in the aggregates of atoms. Everything composed of parts, has a form which is attributed to it, and not real of its own; and as such it does not fall within the domain of senses. Thus the opinion has been above criticised after a careful study that the aggregates of atoms tend to show their different real forms. Therefore (different] cognitions of pot, cup, etc., are, in fact, destitute of real objects different (in form] just as the feelings of happiness and misery are. Thus [it is clear that) atoms do not distinguish objects.

·DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 79 Nor can the form (perceived by our senses] be proper nature of that object. Or "If the distinction in parts is inferred (lit. spoken of) on account of the distinction in forms." This sentence intends to show that the proposition that nothing that is non-differentiated [in its nature] becomes object incurs a logical fallacy called siddhasadhana, proving of what is alrcady well-known. The opponents hold that the atom is in fact a thing which is not distinguishable in its nature, yet the different cognitions happen on account of differences in forms. We also admit that the atom is an undistinguishable object. Therefore this proposition incurs the fallacy of siddhasadhana . The sentence, “ Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension " shows the conclusion to be invalid that the difference in substances, (i.e., component parts, atoms) causes difference in objects (composed of substances). Or, it makes clear that the cognitions of the pot and cup, etc., do not bear the images of atoms; hence the atoms are not their actual objects in as much as they are not objects of other cognitions ; by "other cognitions" is meant either mental consciousness or one born of other senses; for, a condition of some blue patch being present, the cognition (born thereof) does not *This retort of the siddhasādhanadoşa is not convincing as it stands in the text of the Chinese version. 11 ·80 ĀLAMBANAPAKIKSĀ 29 bear the image of some yellow patch. Though the qualities of atoms are many, they cannot be differentiated one another in any way; but the sensual cognitions, however, are distinguishable one another in their forms; therefore the forms felt in the cognitions are not of the atoms. [36] Or, we may take that the following idea is intended in the verse : An objection that the atoms are distinguishable by themselves has been put forth and answered in order. If the aggregates of atoms are regarded as having forms other than that of atoms, then it is logically to be established that those forms of the aggregates are not real. There is also some other reasoning to be mentioned here thus : " If those atoms are removed one by one, the perceptions of the pot, etc., do not arise." Things, that we speak of, like the pot, etc., are not real things just like sena, army and other aggregates, so they do not exist in substance. The following is another mode of reasoning: “What objects are not found separated from what objects, that former objects are not differentiated from that ſlatter] objects. [Aggregates are not found separated from atoms, so the aggregates are not to be differentiated from atoms]." The distinguished form {experienced in cognising the pot, etc.,] is other than the one (pertaining to atoms]; * Read in the Sanskrit text, p. 35, 1. 17: CHIQETİ Erasto afa tua, tatananarne PNIS , etc.

·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 81 because that cognition experiences the forms of the objects like the pot, etc. This inference contradicts the real state of things. For example, when the soundobject is present, no cognition of a blue patch would arise in us. However, although it may be admitted that the aggregate is grasped and some other thing is experienced ; yet it is absolutely impossible to prove that there is distinction among the forms of atoms. "[lt is the object] which exists internally [in knowledge itself as a knowable aspect." This line establishes what the actual object of consciousness is according to the author. If, in general analysis [of a cognition), there is no object [being regarded as one separate from consciousness]; then it evolves lokavirodha, contradiction with the world-a defect for one's own proposition. For, the scriptures state four conditions (for rising up a consciousness). The word “internally" shows that there is no object-cause apart from the inner consciousness. [37] The word “knowable aspect" shows that the thing in the form of object is consciousness-product (vijñanapariņāma). Thus the idea of the external that exists in consciousness is grasped as an external object. Now the contradiction with the experience of world comes in; for, men of the world all accept the objects as externally existing. Therefore the author says as if it exists externally." The real object, however, does not exist apart from consciousness. Its knowable aspect 'appears to us as if it exists externally."

·82 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞĀ 66 The expression “I see the object externally" based upon wrong belief just as the visual consciousness of the hair-like thing in the sky, etc. "Though the external things are denied." The external thing does not exist in reality, because it is not experienced as such. If we examine it very carefully with reasoning, we do not experience it externally and in its own invariable essence. Though the opponent may admit (a thing] characterised as external and existing in substance, yet it cannot become the objectcause of consciousness. Nor is the form of atoms experienced; because the atoms possess no forms [experienced in our cognitions). [That grahyaṁsa] which appears to us as though existent externally, serves as the actual object-cause." Because (that alone] possesses the form of that (i.c.. object). [To prove the above the following syllogism is formulated.] Whatever thing possesses whatever form, that thing is identical with that form ; for example, the causality is possessed of its own form, [i.e., the nature of being cause; that causality is not distinct from the nature of being cause). Again the author shows some distinct character of the actual object (alambana) when he says: "Because consciousness is the essence of that [i.e., object]," etc. (38] It is clear that the external thing which is an illusion, does not exist as an object. The form of an ·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 83 II object follows only in comformity with our menta) imagination; and it is not real; for, if that which is imagined is separated from consciousness; there is nothing left in the external. "The forms of the experienced objects do not originally exist apart from consciousness." Hence it is called "the knowable in its essence existing internally". The word "internally" indicates that the knowable does not exist beyond consciousness. The knowable, [externally) non-existent by its nature is regarded as existent internally. " It also arises from that." part of consciousness may arise, sometime from itself, because the seventy-fifth clcment (i.e. consciousness) has a special character. Since no consciousness arises in separation from its object (jſeya), that part (of consciousness] (i.e. the knowable aspect) is produced by consciousness itself, and we need not admit a fifth cause for it. Because (consciousness) is endowed with two parts (i.e. image and cause)." It is clear that it is the actual object and to be shown as a proof (for our proposition] because of its being decisive argument (i.e. its double nature). This object of double characteristic alone is considered to be probans (sadhana). What is the external thing other than [this object], that is not to be regarded as condition-cause for consciousness ; (for example) things Omit the word "pia" in the Sanskrit text, p. 38, 1. 11. 3.1 ·84 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞA experienced in dream-thought (cannot at all serve as its causes]. " What is said to be of a double character, becomes a single proof (ekaṁ sadhanam); thus only consciousness (i.e. its knowable aspect) is endowed with the image of object, and also gives rise to another consciousness. Therefore a part of consciousness becomes a single proof (ekam pramanam) on account of its discharging these two functions. Now, though what exists internally in consciousness is admitted (as condition-cause) ; [39] since it has been examined that the external things are of unreal character, there can be no other real character thereof. The object is experienced only in pursuance of our mental habitual imagination. But the image of object is immanent in consciousness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. [The opponent asks :) “How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition [to consciousness itself]?" (Author replies :] The knowable aspect (grahyansa), as it does not exist without consciousness, gives rise to another consciousness. [The opponent continues :] Now, [you have) a fallacy called self-affecting (svarūpavirodha *); since " Here prayoga may be thus : विज्ञानं स्वांशालम्पनम् । धर्मद्वयवत्वात् । या धर्मद्वयवत् न तत् मालम्बनम् । यया स्वप्नावस्वायां प्रकाशमानोऽर्थः * = Picafa fanfartata: 31 1 ·DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY 85 it is yet only a part of consciousness just like its part that grasps. (When it becomes as being grasped,] it cannot at the same time serve as a cause. (We always experience that] consciousness arises as being discoloured by the forms of the external things. The image-part of consciousness springs up simultaneously with consciousness; it cannot act as cause for the latter; because no two things simultaneously arising act mutually as cause and effect; for example, a pair of horns of a cow. Moreover, we do not say that an object is co-existent with its self which is no other than that object. For, the term 'co-existence' denotes some connection between two distinct objects. But you do not admit that there is an object distinct from consciousness. Therefore how can you call such an object co-existent? [The author replies:] It is true. But, as different images (in consciousness) are (experienced], we describe them (as if they are] distinct (from consciousness). We assume that consciousness is possessed of distinctions (in itself] for the reason that there exists the divergence between the perceptible part and image-part (of consciousness). [The opponent continues :) If it is so; then, the nature of being condition-cause (pratyayatva) will [as you assume] constitute what is grasped (grahya). No object of assumed character could be regarded as possessing the self-substance. Now such an object See Parthasarathimistra, Slokavārtikavyākhyā, p. 309; Skrine et qui (V. Additional Notes, last page.)

·86 ALAMBANAPARĪKŞA becomes something other than the condition-cause indeed. [The author answers :) This is not contradictory [to our experience]. [The preceding moment of] consciousness, as it has been grasped as a distinct object, is accepted as a condition-cause just like its disappearance of immediate preceding moment (samanantaranirodha) a condition-cause. The moment a consciousness of homogeneous character (sabhāga) disappears, the same consciousness is regarded as cause into four ways.“ Four causes are: hetu, ālambana, samanantara and adhipati.

·TIBETAN VERSION OF THE
ĀLAMBANAPARIKŞĀ
RGYA. GAR. SKAD. DUIĀ. LAM. BA. NA. PA. RI. KȘA |
BOD. SKAD. DUI DMIGS. PA. BRTAG. PAI
Sans. rgyas. dan. byan. chub. sems. dpaḥ. thams.
cad. la. phyag. ḥtshal. lo ll
1. Dban. pohi. rnam. par. rig. paḥi. rgyu
phra. rab. rdul. dag. yin. mod. kyi I
der. mi. snaň. phyir. deņi. yul. ni!
rdul. phran. ma. yin. dbań. po.
bzhin 11
2. gań, Itar. snan. de. de. las. min!
rdzas. su. med. phyir. zla. gñis. bzhin !
de. Itar. phyi. rol. għi. gar. yan |
blo. yi. yul. du. mi. run. no il
3. kha. cig. Îdus. pahi. rnam. pa. dag!
sgrub. pa. yin. par. Îdod. par. byed I
rdul. phran. rnam. pa. rnam. rig. gi!
don. min. sra. ñid. la.
sogs. bzhin 11
4. de. dag. Itar. na. bum. pa. dan I
kham. phor. sogs. blo. mtshuns. par. hgyur |
gal. te. rnam. paḥi. dbye. bas. dbye !
de. ni. rdul. phran. rdzas. yod. la ll
12

·88
ALAMBANAPARİKŞA
5. med. de. tshad. dbye. med. phyir. ro !
de. phyir. de. rdzas. med. la. yod |
rdul. phran. yoňs. su. bsal. na. ni!
der. snań, s'es. pa. ñams. hgyur. phyir ||
6. nan. gi. ses. byaḥi. no. bo. nil
phyi. rol. Itar. snań. gań. yin. te !
don. yin. rnam. s'es. no. boủi. phyir |
deņi. rkyen. ñid. kyan. yin. phyir. ro II
7. gcig. chaḥań. mi. ḥkhrul. phyir. na. rkyen I
nus. pa. hjog. phyir. rim. gyis. yin
lhan. cig. byed. dbaň. nus. pa. yil
ño. bo. gan. yin. dbaň. poủań. yin
8. de. yan. rnam. rig. la. mi. hgal I
de. Itar. yul. gyi. no. bo. dan I
nus. pa, phan. tshun. rgyu. can. dan I
thog. ma. med. dus. hjug. yin Il
Dmigs. pa. brtag. pa. rab. tu. byed. pa. slob. dpon.
phyogs. kyi. glan. pos. mdzad. pa. rdzogs. so II

·TIBETAN VERSION OF THE ALAMBANA.
PARĪKŞĀVRTTI
RGYA. GAR. SKAD. DIT Ā. LAM. BA. NA. PA.
RI. KS'A. BạTTI II
BOD. SKAD. DC | DMIGS. PA. BRTAG. PAŅI. HGREL. PAI
Sans. rgyas. dan. byan, chub. sems. dpaḥ. thams.
cad. la. phyag. ḥtshal. lo ll
Gan. dag. mig. la. sogs. pahi. rnam. par. s'es. pahi.
dmigs. pa. phyi. rol. gyi. don. yin. par. ḥdod. pa.
de. dag. ni. deņi. rgyu. yin. paḥi. phyir. rdul. phra. rab.
dag. yin. pa. ḥam. der. snan. bahi. s'es. pa. skye. bahi.
phyir. de. ḥdus. pa. yin. par. rtog. gran. nal de. la.
re. zhig.
dban. poņi. rnam. par. rig. pahi. rgyul
phra. rab. rdul. dag. yin. mod. kyil
der. mi. snan. phyir. dehi. yul. nil
rdul. phran. ma. yin. dban. po. bzhin ll 1 ||
yul. zhes. bya. ba. ni. ses. pas. raň. gi. no. bo. res.
par. hdzin. pa. yin. tel deņi. rnam. par. skye. baḥi.

·90 ĀLAMBANAPARIKȘĀ phyir. roll rdul. phra. mo. dag. ni. deņi. rgyu. ñid. yin. du. zin. kyan. de. Ita. ma. yin. te. dban. po. bzhin. noll de. Itar. na. re. zhig. rdul. phra. mo. dag. Amigs. pa. ma. yin. no II ḥdus. pa. ni. der. snan. ba. ñid. yin. du, zin. kyan! gan. ltar. snan. de. de. las. min! don. gan, zhig. ran, snar, baḥi. rnam. par. rig. pa. skyed. pa. de. ni. dmigs. pa. yin. par. rigs. telḥdi. Itar. de. ni. skye. bahi. rkyen. ñid. du. bs'ad. pas. so ll hdus. pa. ni. de. Ita. yan. ma. yin. tel rdzas. su. med. phyir. zla. gñis. bzhin dban. po. ma. tshan. bahi. phyir, zla. ba. gñis. mthon. ba. ni. der. snan. ba. ñid. yin. du. zin. kyan. deņi. yul. ma. yin. no II de. bzhin. du. rdzas. su. yod. pa. ma. yin, pa. ñid. kyis. rgyu. ma. yin. pahi. phyir. ḥdus. pa. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no II de. ltar. phy.. rol. gñi. gar. yani blo. yi. yul. du. mi.run. no II 2 || yan. lag. gcid. ma. tshan. baḥi. phyirl phyi. rol. gyi. rdul. phra. mo. dan. tshogs. pa. zhes, bya. baḥi don. ni. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no ll ḥdi. la. ni. kha. cig. ḥdus. paħi. rnam. pa. dag! sgrub. pa. yin. par. ḥdod. par. byed I don. thams. cad. ni. rnam. pa. du. ma. can. yin. pas. de. la. rnam. pa. hgaḥ, zhig. gis. mron. sum. du. ḥdod. do 1 rdul. phra. rab, mnams. la. yan. ḥdus. par. snar, baḥi. s'es. pa. bskyed. pași. rgyuhi. dros. po. yod. do 11

·TIBETAN VERSION
91
rdul. phran. rnam. pa. rnam. rig. gil
don. min. sra. ñid. la. sogs. bzhin || 3 ||
ji. Itar. sra. ba. fid. la. sogs. pa. ni. yod. bzhin. du.
yan. mig. gi. bloņi. yul. ma. yin. pa. Itar. rdul. phra.
mo. ñid. kyaň. ḥdraḥo Il
de. dag. ltar. na. bum. pa. dan I
kham. phor. sogs. blo. mtshuns. par. hgyur |
bum. pa. dan. kham. phor. la. sogs. pahi. rdul.
phra. mo. rnams. la. ni. man. du. zin. kyan. khyad. par.
hgah. yan. med. do 11
gal. te. rnam. pahi. dbye. bas. dbye I
gal. te. ḥdi. sñam. du. mgrin. pa. la. sogs. paḥi.
rnam. pahi. khyad. par. las. gan. gis. na. blohi. khyad.
par. du. hgyur. bahi. khyad. par. yod. do. sñam. du.
sems. na. khyad. par. ḥdi. ni. bum. pa. la. sogs. pa. la.
yod. kyi
de. ni. rdul. phran. rdzas. yod. la || 4 ||
med. de. tshad. dbye. med. phyir. ro 1
rdul. phra. rab. rams. ni. rdzas. gzhan. yin. du.
zin. kyan. zlum. po. la. ni. med. do II
de. phyir. de. rdzas. med. la. yod!
rnam. paḥi. dbye. ba, ni. kun. rdzob. tu. yod. pa.
dag, kho, na. la. yod. kyi. rdul. phra. mo. rnams. la.
ma. yin. noll bum. pa. la. sogs. pa. ni. kun. rdzob. tu.
yod. pa. ñid. de 1
rdul. phran. yons. su. bsal. na, ni I
der. Snah. s'es. pa. ñams. hgyur. phyir | 5 |

·92 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSĀ rdzas. su. yod. pa. rnams. la. ni. hbrel. pa. can. bsal. du. zin. kyan. kha. dog. la. sogs. pa. bhzin. du. rar. gi. blo. ḥdod. pa. med. do Il de. Ita. bas. na. dban. pohi. blo. rnams. kyi. yul. ni. phyi. rol. na. ma. yin. par. hthad. doll nah. gi. s'es. byahi. no. bo. nil phyi. rol. Itar. snan. gair. yin. tel don. yin phyi. rol. gyi. don. med. bzhin. du. phyi. rol. Ita bur. snan. ba. nan. na. yod. pa. kho. na. dmigs. paḥi. rkyen. yin, noll mnam. s'es, iro. bohi. phyir | dehi. rkyen. ñid. kyan. yin. phyir. roll 6 II nan. gi. rnam. par. s'es. pa. ni. don. du. snan. ba. daň | de. las. skyes. pa. yin. pas chos. flid. gñis. dan. ldan. paḥi. phyir. nan. na. yod. pa. kho. na. dmigs. paḥi. rkyen. yin. no 11 re. zhig. de. Itar. snan. ba. ñid. yin. la. reg. nal deņi. phyogs. gcig. po. Ihan. cig. skyes. pa. go. ji. ltar. rkyen. yin. zhe. na! gcig. chahan. mi. ḥkhrul. phyir. na. Tkyeni Ihan. cig. par. gyur. du. zin. kyan. ḥkhrul. ba. med. paḥi. phyir. gzhan. las. skyes. pahi. rkyen. du. hgyur. tel hdi. Itar. gtan. tshigs. pa. dag. ni. yod. pa. dan. med. pa. dag. gi. de. daň. Idan. pa. ñid. ni. rgyu. dan. hbras. bu. rgyu. dan. Idan. pahi. rim. gis. skye. ba. dag. gi. yan. mtshan. f'id. yin. par. smraḥo Il ·TIBETAN VERSION 93 yan. na. nus. pa. hjog. phyir. rim. gyis. yin I rim. gyis. kyan. yin. tel don. du. snan. ba. de. ni. raň. dar. mthun. pahi. Îbras. bu. skyed. par. byed. paḥi. nus. pa. rnam. par. s'es. pahi. rten. can. byed. pas. mi. hgal. lo 11 gal. te. ḥo. na. nan. gi. gzugs. kho. na. dmigs. pași. rkyen. yin. na l ji. Itar. de. dan. mig. Ia. brten. nas. mig. gi. rnam. par. s'es. pa. skye. zhe. nal lhan. cig. byed. dban nus. pa. yil iro. bo. gan. yin. dban. polian. yin 11 7 || dban. po. ni. ran. gi. Îbras. bu. las. nus. pahi. no. bo. ñid. du. rjes. su. dpag. gi. hbyun. ba. las, gyur. pa. ñid. du. ni. ma. yin. no ll de. yan. rnam. rig. la. mi. hgall nus. pa. ni. rnam. par. s'es. pa. la. yod. kyan. ruń lbstan. tu. med. paḥi. raň. gi. no. bo. la. yod. kyan. run. ste. ḥbras. bu. bskyed. pa. la. khyad. par. med. do || de. ltar. yul. gyi. no. bo. dan nus. pa. phan. tshun. rgyu. can. dan thog. ma. med. dus. hjug. yin || 8 || mig. ces. bya. baḥinus. pa. dan l nan. gi. gzugs. la. brten, nas. rnam. par. ses. pa. don. du. snan, ba.dmigs. kyis. ma. phye. ba. skyeħol ḥdi. gñis. kyan. phan. tshun. gyi. rgyu. can. danl thog. ma. med. pași. dus. pa yin. tei res. hgaḥ. ni. nus. pa. yoňs. su. smin. pa. las. mam. par. ses. pa. ni. yul. gyi. rnam. pa. ñid. du. hbyun. la. res. hgah. ni. deņi. rnam. pa. la. nus. paḥoll rnam. par.

·94
ĀLAMBANAPARIKSĀ
s'es. pa. dan. de. gñis. gzhan. ñid. dan gzhan. ma. yin.
pa. ſid. du. ci. dgar. brjod. par. byaḥo ||
de. ltar. na. nar. gi. dmigs. pa. ni. chos. ñid. gñis.
dan. Idan. pași. phyir. yul. ñid. du. ḥthod. do il
Dmigs. pa. brtag. paḥi. hgrel. pa. slob. dpon. phyogs.
kyi. glan pos. mdzad. pa. rdzogs. so II

·ADDITIONAL NOTES Page 3, line 1. faaray - Trims'ikābhāşya ed. S. Levi, p. 21. straat fange stream (=arta)ą i Mad. výtti ed. L. V. Poussin p. 364, 7. Alambana stands for alambanapratyaya-So explain the Chinese translators, Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang. It may also be clear from Dharmapāla's comment, pp. 21-22 above. Alambanapratya is explained by Candrakirti: उत्पद्यमानो धमों येन आलम्बनेन Syed a faqat | Mad. vịtti, p. 77, 2. (Cf. S'ālistamba Sutra : चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्य ... रूपमालम्बनकृत्यं करोति । Ibid. pp. 567,9.) आलम्व्यत- इत्यालम्बनम् ।वि निषार यथायोगमालम्बनम आलम्बनप्रत्ययः सर्वो धर्मः। Madhya. makāvatāra (Sanskrit text) pp. 12, 2. Another interpretation is also given by him : वृद्धपुरुषोत्थानवत् चित्तवेता हेतुत उत्पद्यमाना अवलम्बनयष्टि- gruan ada A4: Ibid. p. 12, 7. According to this interpretation alambana is an element (dharma) by support of which a consciousness arises, that is to say, a supporting element in the process of cognition is ālambana. S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, on the authority of the Abhidharmakos'a of Vasubandhu (chaps. I and II, p. 307, 11. 5-6) and of the Trims'ikābhāşya of Sthiramati, p. 21 (निमित्तं तद्- (= विषय) विशेषो नीलपीताद्यालम्बनव्यवस्था- RUTH) translate everywhere the term ālambana as “perceivable object ". And Yasomitra's comment makes the point clearer : यस्य विज्ञानस्य यदालम्बनं तदेव तस्य आलम्बनं भवेत् । भवेत्रान्यदिति pp. 1, 18, 17. P. 3, 1. 1. aft Dharmapāla comments that the five-fold consciousness is meant here. Hiuan Tsang follows him. But, according to Paramārtha six-fold consciousness is meant there with addition of manovijnana. Vinitadeva is said to agree with Para. mārtha bere. 13 ·96 ALAMBANAPARIKSĀ P. 3, 1. 2. Omit in the Sanskrit text the word "TFT " after तत्कारणत्वान्. P.3, 11. 1–3. Vasubandhu in his Vimsikā and its bbāşya, speaks of three different opinions on the external things: (1) The first opinion is that the object of our cognition is one (eka), i.e. one whole (avayavin); (2) the second one is that it is many, i.e. atoms, and (3) the third view is: it is the collocation of atonis (sanghāta). The first opinion is held by Vaiseşikas. The holders of other two views are not named there (see Appendix A, p. 105 below). According to the commentary of Vinitadeva on the Vimsakaprakarapa as recorded by the French translators, the second opinion, that is referred to by Dišpāga as the first, is that the numerous atoms exist allowing amongst themselves some intermediate space=rdul. phra, rab. phrag. can. de. gnas. du. ma. The third one that is referred to by D. as the second, affirms that the atoms exist without any intermediate space amongst themselves =rdul. phra. rab. de. dag. bar. med. par. gnas ; that is to say, these atoms which have reciprocal support are united=phan. thsun. bltos. pa. dan. bcas. pahi. rdul. phra, rab. de. dag. nid.hdus. pa (French trans., p. 48, n. 3). Again Vasubandhu in his Kosa, says that it is the Kasmira Vaibhāşikas who hold that the atoms exist with some interspace and in close vicinity, (TETRT: Rama:) but do not get combined, and that Bhadanta (Vasubandhu) asserts that the atoms exist without any interspace, and due to this, they are called "combined " (nirantaratve tu sprsta saingna). Compare Tattvasangraha with Pañjikā, p. 197: समानज्वालासंवर्यथा दीपेन विश्रमः । नरन्तर्यस्थितानेकसूक्ष्मवित्तौ तयकता ॥ . . . तथा नैरन्तयणानेमक्ष्मतरपदार्थसंवेदनतोऽयमेकत्वविनमः। See again on p. 552: Bhadanta-Subhagupta's view : Rarografareteari usciterai yang tenant स्थल इति मानसो विनमो भवति । But there is no real combination of atoms (sparso na asti). See Abh. Kosa, Tib. text, pp. 82-3). Both these schools seem to hold that the atoms are direct objects of our cognition. Therefore Disnāga might have included both these opinions in the first of the two. He might have meant by the theory of sanghāta the Vais eşikas' opinion. This may be clear from ·ADDITIONAL NOTES 97 Vinitadeva's comment p. 47 above. It may also be pointed out here that Kamalasila has recorded three views on the atomic theory (see his Pañjikā, p. 556, 8, and my paper “Sarkara on Buddhist Idealism," published in the Journal of S. V. Oriental Institute, Vol. I, part 2, p. 82.) Jainas are also credited with the opinion that the atoms are direct objects of our perception. (See note 6 on p. 4 above). P.3, 1. 4. A long note has been put on the word " vijñapti" by S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer. P. 3, 1. 8. According to the Chinese translations, we may read in Sanskrit: afta: era:, etc. P. 4, l. 1. We may read in the Sanskrit a garagrafeneau sa qanta (bsad. pas. so) for 4a: 8 ... Jord According to Vinitadeva pratyaya is meant nimittapratyaya, see French trans. p. 52, 1. 7. Ibid., and p. 43, 2. Dharmapāla also here refers to the Agama, अस्मिन् सति इदं भवति, etc. P.4, 1. 9. $971 Dharmapāla does not give any indication as to who were the advocates of this opinion. Vinitadeva says that this is the opinion of Vägbhata and others—which is not confirmed in Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus (pp. 311-313). Kouechi, the commentator on the Siddhi of Hiuan Tsang presents this third thesis as that of Sarghabhadra, (see La Siddhi, p. 45, and Fren. Trans. p. 52. n. 11). I have already pointed out that Bhadanta S'ubhagupta might be a representative of this view in later period (see note 4, on p. 4 above). The earlier Buddhists, Sarvāstivādins may also be said to have held this opinion. Cf. Tattvasangraha, p. 197: समानज्वालासंभूते यथा दोपेन विनमः। ... तथा नरन्तयस्थितानेकसूक्ष्मवत्पदार्थसं- aandisharafasta: Rata: 1 cp. Ibid., p. 552, Sabbagupta's view: परमाणनामविच्छपवेशानां सजातीयानां युगपद्ग्रहणे स्थूल इति मानसो विनमो भवति । Observe Vinitadeva's comment below: afanlar: = FOTOR: 1 P. 4, 1. 9. 17 = sgrub pa. Hiuan Tsang translates it as pratyaya. But Paramartha explains thus : qua: afaat: 4741 see p. 13 above. Vinitadeva comments thus : hdus. pahi. rnam. pa. rnam. par. ses. pahi. rgyu Nid. hgyur. ro: the state of ·98 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞĀ combination becomes as the cause of the consciousness. (See Fren. Trans. p. 52, n. 12). P. 4, 1. 9. Vinitadeva says that the state of combination is here the gross form, sancitākāra=sthulākāra. See La Siddhi, p. 45. (Fren. trans., p. 53, n. 13). P. 4, 1. 12 ver. 3 a-b. According to Vinitadeva this is the statement of the opponent. Dharmapāla also seems to have meant the same. So we may supply before this the following: सञ्चिताकारः न अण्वाकारः । यदि स्यात्, अप्रत्यक्ष: स्यात् । See Dharmapāla's comment here. But Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang interpret that this is the refutation of the above view by the author. P. 5, 1. 3 ver. 4 c-d. Hiuan Tsang introduces this line thus : चक्षुरादिविज्ञानकारणपरमाणुसञ्चिताकारावादे पुनरस्ति दोषान्तरम् । P. 5, 1. 6. Note Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang have much simplified this sentence. See p. 14 above. P. 5, 1. 15. See Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang for clearer interpretation of the passage. Ver. 5 c-d. cp. Nyāya Sūtra, IV, 2, 25: yau faqamang alami गाथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् तदनुपलब्धिः । P. 5, 1. 17. According to Vinitadeva, the nature which is capable of being perceived is the characteristic of the object, that is to say, the knowable aspect (grāhyabhāga). (Fren. Traps.) See Dharmapala's comment : शेयपदं ग्राह्यांश: विज्ञानपरिणाम: विषयाकारोऽथों भवति इति प्रदर्शयति । see p. 36. P.6, 1. 1. Here Paramārtha's version agrees with Dharmapāla's comment Ver 7 a-b: quoted by Pārthasārathi Misra in bim comment on Slokavārtika, pp. 311, 312: प्रत्खयोऽन्यभिचारित्वात्सह शकपकमात् । P.6, 1. 8. There are 4 pratyayas, (1) hetu, (2) samantara, (3) alambana, (4) adhipati. Abhidh-koslavyākhyā, p. 18, 22. These are well explained in the Madhyamakavſtti, p. 77. P.6, 1. 9. The following is the Tibetan text: Yod. pa, dati. moda pa. dag. gi. de. dag. Idan, pa. Hid. ni. reyu. dan. abras bu.

·ADDITIONAL NOTES 99 rgyu. dan. ldan. pahi. rim. gyis. skye. ba. dag. gi. yan. mtshan. Nid. Vin. pa., lit. : भावाभावयोस्तद्वत्ता हि हेतु तमत्फलयोः क्रमेण जायमानयोरपि लक्षणम् । Both Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang are not very helpful in interpreting this quotation. P. 6, 1. 13. This is a quotation from a Sutra. See e.g. Slalistamba Sutra : चक्षुः प्रतीत्य रूपं च क्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते. Madhya. vrtti, p. 567, 8 and p. 6, with notes thereon by Prof. Poussin. P. 7, 1. 1. This view is much criticised by Candrakirti. See his Madh. Avatāra, my restored Sanskrit text with Bhāşya, VI, 62 ff. and 57-9. P.7, 1. 4. According to Diināga, the nature of the organ is inexplicable. So he seems to have anticipated all criticisms levelled by Candrakirti against his view that the sense-organs are some forces (sakti). P.7, 1. 7. Cp. Slokavārtika, S'ünyavāda, ver. 17: Bruinigai चैव ज्ञानशकयोरनादिका। P.7, 1. 9. "The consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated " is explained in the commentary of Vinitadeva thus : ma, res. pahi. don. gyi. mnam. pa. can. gyi, riian. par. s'es. pa=consciousness possessing the characteristics of the object not differentiated. That is, according to the doctrine of those who affirm the external object, the consciousness arises depending upon the object substantially dif. ferentiated. But the school of Vijñaptimātratā does not accept the object substantially differentiated. Vinitadeva, after having given another explanation on the bāhyārthajhāna, says: "Other (school) asserts : It is the consciousness which appears as an inexpressible object. Vinitadeva refutes this assertion in these terms: "But, in this case, there is every necessity to say inexpressible". For, all the proper characteristics are inexpressible. Therefore, if the perception which appears as these proper characteristics, arises, what arises in reality ? (sic). If one says: one could not assert that the perception arises in possessing the characteristic 40 ·100 ALAMBANAPARIKŞA Qon of the object", then, is it that wbich is not expressible, because there is nothinc, or because it is there justly the proper characteristic ? In all cases, if it is so (1) because there is nothing, this not logic, for one could express the very non-existence. For example, one could express the horns of a rabbit, etc. If it is so (2) because it is justly the proper characteristic, we have just refuted this (proposition, in saying: all the proper characteristics are inexpressible). What Paramartha translates on this subject by: louan che pu ko yen chi hsiang (=imateuren) is justly this last doctrine which Vinitadeva has just refuted." (Fren, trans.) Pārthasărathi Misra has ably presented the standpoint of the Vijßänavādias that the object, blue, etc. is not different from its consciousness, see his comment on Slokavārtika, p. 274. P. 7, 1. 11, and p. 54. 1. 12. After different" and different" Paramartha adds inexpressible" pu ko chouo, anabhilapya, (or anirvācya). One could not find this word either in the Tibetan text or in the text of Hiuan Tsang. But, if one takes account of the phrase of Vinitadeva one could explain why "inexpressible" finds its way in the text of Paramartha. Vipitadeva in his commentary, says: (gal. te. dros. kyi. tshul. dpyad. na. ni. dehi. tshe. nus. pa. rnams. gnas. skabs. kyi, khyad. par. gyi. bdag. Aid. yin. pas. kun. rdzob. tu. yod. pahi. phyir. mam. par. s'es. pa, las. gzhan. Nid. dam. gzhan. ma. yin. pa. Nid. du. brjod. par. bya, ba. ma. yin, no.) "If one examines tran. scendently (paramārthena) the proper nature (of dominant forces), they are then inexpressible whether they are or not of a nature different from consciousness. For, being the proper nature of a characteristic of a stage of forces (sakti), they exist but conventionally" (saktināṁ avasthāviseşātmakatvena samuytisattvat). This explanation signifies : things being not capable of existing in proper nature, one could not give them any designations“ different " or non different", but one could simply call them "different non different" when they are considered as conventional things." or ·ADDITIONAL NOTES 101 or This is justly the principal doctrine of Nāgārjuna ; for, in the opinion of Paramärtha, one finds always the trace of the ideas of Nāgārjuna rather than in that of Hiuan Tsang. Thus the thesis of a conception "inexpressible" will not be accidental, but rather fundamental. (Fren. trans.) French translators have taken the Tibetan word. “gnas skabs': to be "avzkāsa" and therefore rendered "lieu determine." But the exact Sanskrit equivalent will be here" avasthā "="stage" "condition." P. 39, 1. 13. geraha aurah; cf. Pārthasārathi Misra's comment on Slokavar. p. 309: frucada HTCİ ANINA I P. 42, 1. 2. Consciousness grasps the form of its own ": cf. Tbid., p. 325 : संवेदनामीलं न भित्रम् । नानात्मनः संवेदनं संभवति । P. 50. n. 37, horns of the right and left of the ox, etc. cp. Ibid., p. 310.40 TATLI P. 50, n. 40. Cf. Ibid., p. 310. ver. 153. agranduri : 1 P. 54, 1. 6. Undifferentiated from the perceivable object. cf. Ibid., p. 325: Horaits a funt i 1. 12. Ibid., p. 342 ver. 255. PP. 56-57 (pp. 22-23). Compare the crittcism of the sixth sense, manas as accepted by Earlier Buddhists and Naiyāyikas, etc. with the verse: न मुखादि प्रमेयं वा मनो वास्तीन्द्रियान्तरम् । अनिषेधादुपात्तवेद-येन्द्रियस्तं वृथा । Cited from Dirnāga by Vācaspati Mistra in his Nyāyavār. tātparyaţikā, p. 97. It is to be understood that the Vijñāna vādins deny only the material character of the manas as accepted by Realists, but do not deny it as such. Note Yasomitra's Comm. : theme para In. fantaszfafiantscyfra Aalung: 1 (Abh. Kos'avyā. p 40, 1. 24). As to the opinion of the Earlier Buddhists, the same authority remarks: तापीया अपि हृदयवस्तु मनोविज्ञानधातोराश्रयं कल्पयन्ति । तथास्यवातावपि विद्यत इति वर्णयन्ति । बारूप्यधातावपि हि तेषां समभिप्रेतम् । आल्प्य इति च ईषद भाल। furcaleta (Ibid.).

·102 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSĀ According to the Vaibhāşika-Sautrāntikas, manas is defined by Vasubhandhu as below: जाणामनन्तरातांत विज्ञानं यदि तन्मनः । षष्ठाश्रयप्रसिद्धयर्थ घातवोऽटादश स्मृताः ॥ Abh. Kosa, I, 17. Santarakṣita also explains it in the same manner : चक्षुरायतिरिकंतु मनोऽस्माभिरपीष्यते । षण्णामनन्तरोतप्रत्ययो यो हि तन्मनः ॥ Tattvas. p. 209, ver.631. Speaking of the manas, Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky writes : Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas do not admit manas as 6th organ. The Older Hinayanists reckon 6 organs of senses, 5 outer senses and one inner sense. The Realists, Naiyayikas, Mimamsakas and Säskhyas characterise mind as a 6th organ. The Madhyamikas and Vedantins also do the same. (Buddh. Logic. II, p. 318, n. 9). P. 57, 1. 15 and p. 22, 1. 1. (तर्कागोचरत्वात् ) Cf. Vasubandhu's Vims'ikābbāşya, ed. S. Levi, p. 11. तर्काविषयत्वात् । कस्य पुनः सा सर्वथा गोबर इत्याह । युद्धगोवरः॥ P. 58, n. 5. Tattvas. paijika, p. 825 : यद्यपि तत् (मनः) सर्वविषयम् । तथापि न तस्य स्वातन्त्रबेणार्थग्रहणव्यापारोऽस्ति । अन्धवधिरायभावप्रसाशात् । Cp. Nyayabindutikatippani, p. 27, 1. 1. P. 61, last line. There are two views regarding sanghāta (=paramāņusāmānyalakşaņa), viz. one is held by Kās'mira Vaibhāşikas, and the other probably by other Vaibhāşikas. In his Kosabhisya, Vasubandhu has clearly expressed the former's view thus : काश्मीर[वैभाषिका] आहुः । [परमाणवों न स्पृशेयुः । .. ....सावयवाः प्रसज्वेरन् । निरवयवा हि परमाणवः । तदेवेषां निरन्तरत्वं यन्मध्ये नास्ति किचित् [बालोकादि] । अपि खलु संघाताः सावयवा: स्पृशन्ति" इत्यदोषः । (Abhi. Kosa, Tib. text, p. 82.) a. cf. संघातास्तु परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते इति काश्मीरमाषिका: । His Vimsika bhisya, p.7,1. 10., and p. 106 below, . . .

·ADDITIONAL NOTES 103 This sanghäta is, for them, different from atoms (v. Yasomitra's comment : यथा वैभाषिका: कल्पयन्ति । p. 89,1. 20). Other Vaibhāsikas, on the other hand, maintain that the aggregates are not different from atoms : नव परमाणुभ्योत संचाताः। त एव संघाते स्पृश्यन्ते । यथा स्प्यन्ते। (.1bh. Kosa, Tib. p. 83,1. 15). यः परमाणूना संघात: न स तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरम् । (Nimsika bhāsya, p. 7,1. 11 and p. 106 below). According to Dharmakirti, Dirināga pleads for the external reality from the standpoint of the latter Vaibhāşikas. This will be clear from the following extracts : सञ्चित: समुदाय: स सामान्यं तत्र चाक्षधीः । सामान्यबुद्धिश्चावश्यं विकल्पेनानुबध्यते ॥ प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति, II, 194. वृत्तिः । ननु सञ्चितालम्वनाः पञ्चविज्ञानकाया इति सिद्धान्तः । 'तात्काजिना- त्वात् स्वार्थ सामान्यगोचर ' इति चोक्तम् (प्रमाणसमुपये)। अत्राह । अर्थान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् जायन्ते येऽणवोपरे । उक्तास्ते सञ्चितास्तं हि निमित्त ज्ञानजन्मनः ॥ Ibid., 195. वृत्तिः । उक्ताः सञ्चितालम्बनाः [पञ्च] विज्ञानकाया इत्यादौ । ज्ञानजन्मनस्त एव हि निमित्तमुक्ताः तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वादित्यादिना । अणूनां स विशेषश्च नान्तरेणापरानणून । तदेकानियमात् ज्ञानमुक्तं सामान्यगोचरम् ॥ Ibid., 196. वृत्तिः । अणूनां स च ज्ञानजननसामर्थ्यलक्षणो विशेषः .....। न हि प्रत्येकमणवो दृश्याः। किन्तु सहिता एव । .... . . . . एकस्मिन् परमाणौ शानस्यानियमात् सामान्यगोचर सचितपरमाणुसंघातविषयं ज्ञानमुकं तत्त्ववादिना । न तु परमाण्वतिरिक्तसामान्यविषयम् । Exactly this same opinion is expressed by the opponents in saying "the general quality of atoms ", etc. P. 61, n. 12. तत्र वुद्धिर्यदाकारा, etc. Pramanavar. II, 224, p. 73, 1. 3. The holders of this view may be some of the Vaibhaşikas who maintain that the single atoms are act objects of our cognition, but their generality (sāmānya-saħcita) does so. Cf. the above •extracts from Pramanavar. and vrtti thereon. . 14 ·104 ALAMBANAPARĪKSĀ P. 85, 1. 10. (-p.39,1.9). This objection, according to Nya. yaviniscaya of Akalanka, has been made by Bhadanta Slubhagupta; see Subhagupta's passage cited by Akalaika: तत्र भवन्त शुभगुतस्त्वाह । विस्खोऽयं हेतुः (सहोपलम्म:)। यस्मात् , सहशब्दश्च लोकेऽन्यो(स्या)लेवा- न्येन विना कचित् । विरुद्धोऽयं ततो खुर्यशस्ति सहवेदनम् ॥ (Nyāyaviniscaya, Akalarikatraya, pp. 159-60). P. 85, 1. 33. The idea is well expressed by Dharmakirti in this verse : भित्रकालं कथं प्रात्यमिति चेत् ग्राह्यतां विदुः । हेतुत्वमेव पुच्क्षिाः हानाकारार्पणक्षमम् ॥ Pramanarartika, II, 247. This verse is often quoted by other writers: Vācaspatimis'ra ; N. Tātparyaţikā, p. 101; Pārthasarathimisra: S'lok. Comment, p. 283 and Advayavajrasadgraha, p. 17.

·APPENDIX VASUB.INDHU'S CRITICISM OF THE EXTERNAL THINGS [The following is the extract from Vasubandhu's Viſs'ikā with bhāşya, ed. S. Levi. Vasubandhu, the earlier champion of the Vijñānavāda school, criticises, there, in his own way, the views of those who hold the external things to be real. I have reproduced the particular portion of Vasubandhu's arguments in favour of his thesis, vijñaptimātrata, reality of only consciousness and nothing else, to facilitate comparison with Dinnāga's method of argument.] न तदेकं न चाने विषयः परमाणुशः । न च ते संहता यस्मात्परमाणुन सिध्यति ॥ ११ ॥ इति किमुक्तं भवति । यत्तद्रूपादिकमायतनं रूपादिविज्ञप्तीनां प्रत्येक विषय. स्यात् , तदेकं वा स्यात् यथावयविरूपं कल्प्यत वैशेषिकैः । अनेक वा ‘परमाणुशः। संहता वा त एव परमाणवः । न तावदेकं विषयो भवति । अवयवेभ्योऽन्यस्यावयविरूपस्य कचिदप्यग्रहणात् । राप्यनेका परमाणूनां ·106 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞĀ प्रत्येकमग्रहणात् । नापि ने संहता विषयीभवन्ति । यस्मात्परमाणुरेकं द्रव्यं न सिध्यति । कथं न सिध्यति । यस्मात् । पटकेन युगपद्योगात्परमाणोः षडंशता' । षड्भ्यो दिग्भ्यः षड्भिः परमाणुभिर्युगपद्योगे सति परमाणोः षडंशता प्रामोति । एकस्य यो देशः नात्यात्यासंप्वात् । षण्णां समानदेशत्वात्पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥ १२ ॥ अथ य एवैकस्य परमाणोर्देशः स एष षण्णाम् । तेन सर्वेषां समानदेशत्वात्सर्वः पिण्डः परमाणुमात्रः स्यात् परस्पर[]व्यतिरेकादिति न कश्चित्पिण्डो दृश्यः स्यात् । नैव हि परमाणवः संयुज्यन्ते, निरवयवत्वात् । मा भूदेष दोषप्रसङ्गः । संहताम्तु परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते इति काश्मीरवैभाषिकाः । त इदं प्रष्टव्याः । यः परमाणुनां संघातो न स तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति । परमाणोरसंयोगे तत्संघातेऽस्ति कस्य सः । संयोग इति वर्तते । न चानवयवत्वेन तत्संयोगो न सिध्यति ॥ १३ ॥ । 'ct. Abhidharmakosabhasya (Tib.), p. 83, 17-19; and Vyakhya, p. 89 : परमाण्वपरिनिष्पति वक्तुकाम प्राचार्यों विचारयति । यदि परमाणो- रेकस्य पूर्वादिविग्भागभेदः कल्प्येत । etc. अत्र साधनम् । न निरवयवः परमाणु:, दिग्भाग- मेदवत्वात् । भारत इति । तदेतदिग्भागमेदवत्वं नेच्छन्ति वैभाषिका: । दिग्भाग- भेदो हि संघातस्माणामेव कल्प्यते । एवञ्च ते वर्णयन्ति । धर्मवेयं यत्सप्रतिघानां मिन- देखत्तम् । तेषां नैरन्तणावस्थानाद् अभिनवेशत्वं मा भूदिति सान्तराणामपि सप्रतिषत्वेन गतिः प्रतिवन्चत इति॥ 'Abh. Kostabhasya (Tib.), p. 82, 19: संघाता: सावयवत्वात् स्पृशन्ति । Vyakhyā, p. 89, 7. Ibid., p. 89, 20.

·APPENDIX 107 अब संघाता अध्यन्योन्यं न संयुज्यन्ते । न तर्हि परमाणूनां निर- वयवत्वासंयोगो न सिध्यतीति वक्तव्यम् । सावयवस्यापि हि संघातस्य संयोगानभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् परमाणुरेकं द्रव्यं न सिध्यति । यदि पर- माणोः संयोग इष्यते यदि वा नेष्यते । दिग्भागभेदो यस्यास्ति तस्यैकत्वं न युज्यते । अन्यो हि परमाणोः पूर्व दिग्भागो यावदधोदिम्भाग इति दिग्भागभेदे सति कथं तदात्मकस्य परमाणोरेकत्वं योक्ष्यते । छायावृती कथं वा योकैकस्य परमाणोदिग्भागभेदो न स्याद् आदित्योदये कथमन्यत्र छाया भवति अन्यत्रातपः । न हि तस्यान्यः प्रदेशोऽस्ति यत्रातपो न स्यात् । आवरणश्च कथं भवति परमाणोः परमाण्वन्तरेण यदि दिग्भाग- भेदो नेप्यते । न हि कश्चिदपि परमाणोः परमागोऽस्ति यत्रागमनादन्येना- न्यस्य प्रतिघातः स्यात् । असति च प्रतिघाते सर्वेषां समानदेशत्वात्सर्वः संघातः परमाणुमात्रः स्यादित्युक्तम् । किमेवं नेप्यते पिण्डस्य ते छाया- वृती न परमाणोरिति । किं खलु परमाणुभ्योऽन्यः पिण्ड इष्यते यस्य स्याताम् । नेत्याह । ते अन्यो न पिण्डवेन तस्य ते ॥ १४ ॥ यदि नान्यः परमाणुभ्यः पिण्ड इप्यते न ते तस्य इति सिद्ध भवति । निवपरिकल्प एषः । परमाणुः सघात इति वा किमनया चिन्तया, लक्षणन्तु रूपादि यदि न प्रनिषिध्यते । किं पुनस्तेषां लक्षणं चक्षुरादिविषयत्वं नीलादित्वच । तदेवेदं संप्रधार्यते । यत्तचक्षुरादीनां विषयो ·108 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞA नीलपीताकिमिप्यते । किं तदेकं द्रव्यम् अथवा तदनेकमिति । किशातः । अनेकवे दोष उक्तः । एकत्वे न क्रमेणेतियुगपन्न ग्रहामहौ । विच्छिन्नानेकवृत्तिश्च सूक्ष्मानीक्षा च नो भवेत् ॥ १५ ॥ । यदि यावदविच्छिन्नं नानेकं चक्षुषो विषयः तदेकं द्रव्यं कल्प्यते । पृथिव्यां क्रमेणेतिर्न स्यात् । गमनमित्यर्थः । सकृत्पादप्रक्षेपेण सर्वस्य गत- त्वात् । अम्भिागस्य च ग्रहणं परभागस्य चाग्रहणं युगपन्न स्यात् । न हि तस्यैव तदानीं ग्रहणश्चाग्रहणञ्च युक्तम् । विच्छिन्नस्य चानेकस्य हस्त्यश्वादि- कस्य अनेकत्र वृत्तिर्न स्यात्, यत्रैव खेकं तत्रैवापरमिति कथं तयोविच्छेद इष्यते । कथं वा तदेकं यत्प्राप्तञ्च ताभ्याम् न च प्राप्तमन्तराले तच्छून्य- ग्रहणात् । सूक्ष्माणाश्चौदकजन्तूनां स्थूलैः समानरूपाणामनीक्षणं न स्यात् । यदि लक्षणमेदादेव द्रव्यान्तरत्वं कल्प्यते नान्यथा । तस्मादवश्यं परमाणुशो भेदः कल्पयितव्यः । स चैको न सिध्यति । तस्यासिद्धौ रूपादीनां चक्षुरादिविषयत्वमसिद्धमिति सिद्धं विज्ञप्तिमात्रं भवतीति || प्रमाणवशादम्तित्वं नास्तित्वं वा निर्धार्यते । सर्वेषाच प्रमाणानां प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं गरिष्ठमित्यसत्यर्थे कथमियं बुद्धिर्भवति प्रत्यक्षमिति । प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः स्वप्नादौ यथा विनाप्यर्थेनेति पूर्वमेव ज्ञापितम् । साच यदा तदा। न सोऽयों दृश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं कथं मतम् ॥ १६ ॥ यदा च सा प्रत्यक्षबुद्धि(न)भवति इदं मे प्रत्यक्षमिति । तदा न सोऽयों दृश्यते । मनोविज्ञानेनैव परिच्छेदात् चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्य च तदा निरुद्ध- ·APPENDIX 109 त्वादिति कथं तस्य पहानाम् । विशेषेण तु क्षणिकस्य विषयस्य तदानीं निरुद्धमेव तद्रूपं रसादिकं वा ॥ नाननुभूतं मनोविज्ञानेन स्मर्यत इत्यवश्यमर्थानुभवेन भवितव्यम् । तश्च दर्शनमित्येवं तद्विषयस्य रूपादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वं मतम् । असिद्धमिदर अनुभूतस्यार्थस्य स्मरणं भवतीति । यस्मात् । उक्तं यथा तदाभासा विज्ञप्तिः विनाप्यर्थेन यथार्थामासा चक्षुर्विज्ञानादिका विज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते तथोक्तम् । स्मरणं ततः । ततो हि विज्ञप्तेः स्मृतिसंप्रयुक्ता तत्प्रतिमासैव रूपादिविकल्पिका मनोविज्ञप्तिल्पयत इति न स्मृत्युत्पादादानुभवः सिध्यति ॥ यदि यथा स्वप्ने विज्ञप्तिरभूतार्थविषया तथा जानतोऽपि स्यात् । तथैव तदभावं लोकः स्वयमवगच्छेत् । न चैवं भवति । तस्मान्न स्वम इवाथोंपलब्धिः सर्वा निरर्थिका । इदमज्ञापकम् । यस्मात् । स्वमे दृविषयाभावं नाप्रबुद्धोऽवगच्छति ॥ १७ ॥ एवं वितथविकल्पाभ्यासवासनानिद्रया प्रसुप्तो लोकः स्वम इवा- भूतमर्थ पश्यन् अपबुद्धस्तदभावं यथावन्नावगच्छति । यदा तु तत्प्रतिपक्ष- लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्प नलाभात्प्रबुद्धो भवति । तदा 'तत्पृष्ठलब्धशुद्धलौकिक-- ज्ञानसंमुखीभावात् विषयाभावं यथावत्वगच्छतीति समानमेतत् ॥ 'See Mahāyānasūtrāladkāra XIV, 43 with Bhāşya.

·110 ĀLAMBANAPARIKSĀ B STHIRAMATI ON THE EXTERNAL THINGS .. [The following extract is from the Bhāşya (pp. 16-17) of Sthiramati on Vasubandhu's Trims'ikā, ed. S. Levi. Sthiramati is well-known to be one of the champions of the Agamānusāri Vijñānavāda school. It will be seen from the extract below, that he has put forth for his view the arguments which are almost similar to those of his two predecessors, Vasubandhu and Dinnāga.] कथमेतद्गम्यने विना बाहयेनार्थेन विज्ञानमेवाकारमुत्पद्यत इति । बाहयो अर्थः म्वाभासविज्ञानजनकत्वेन विज्ञानस्यालम्बनप्रत्यय इष्यते न भारणत्वमात्रेण समनन्तरादिप्रत्ययादिविशेषाप्रसङ्गाः । न च सतमवयन- संहतिमात्राद् अन्यद् विद्यते । तदवयवान् अपोष सञ्चिताकारविताना- भावात् । तस्माद्विनैव बाधेनार्थेन विज्ञानं साञ्चताकार पद्यते । न च 'परमाणव एव सञ्चितास्तस्यालम्बनम् , परमाणूनाम् अतदाकारत्वात् । न Aarur: सञ्चितावस्थायां परमाणूनां कश्चिदात्मातिशयः । तस्माद् असञ्चितवत् सञ्चिता अपि परमाणवो नैवालम्बनम् || अन्यस्तु मन्यते । एकैकपरमाणुरन्यनिरपेक्ष्योऽतीन्द्रियः। बहवस्तु परस्परापेक्ष्या इन्द्रिय- प्राधाः । तेषामपि सापेक्षनिरपेक्षयोरात्मातिशयाभावाद् एकान्तेनेन्द्रिय- ग्रामत्वम् अतीन्द्रियत्वं वा । यदि च परमाणव एव परस्परापेक्षा विज्ञानस्य विषयीभवन्ति । एवं सति योऽयं घटकुड्यावाकारभेदो विज्ञाने स न स्यात् । परमा नामतदाकारत्वात् । न चान्यनिर्मासस्य विज्ञानस्य अन्याकारो विषयो युज्यते । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च परमाणवः तनादिपर परमार्थतः ·APPENDIX 111 सन्ति । अर्वाङ्मध्यपरभागसद्भावात् । तदनभ्युपगमे वा दक्षिणापरोत- रादिदिग्मेदो यः स परमाणो न स्यात् । ततश्च पि निवत् परमाणोरप्यमूर्त- त्वमदेशस्थत्वञ्च प्रसज्यते । एवं बाबा भावाद् विज्ञानमेवाकार सबते । स्वमविज्ञानवद् इत्यभ्युपेयम् । वेदनादयोऽपि नातीता ना[ना]गतास्तदाकार- संज्ञानजनकः । निरुद्धाजातत्वात् । न च वर्तमाना वर्तमानजनकाः । उत्पद्यमानावस्थायामसत्त्वाद् उत्पन्नावस्थायां विज्ञानस्यापि तदाकारणोत्पन्न- त्वान् न किञ्चित् कर्तव्यमस्तीति मनोविज्ञानमप्यनालम्बनमेवोत्पद्यते ॥ YOGĀCARAS' CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA (DHARMAS) महायानशतषमावधामुखम् बोधिसत्यपसुष- कृतः Mahayanasatadharmavidyamukham [The following is the Sanskrit translation of a trea. tise above named from the Chinese version of Hiuan Nanjio No. 1213. Shanghai ed. Vol. marked lai, part 10, fol. 11a. 15 ·112 ĀLAMBANAPARİRSĀ Tsang. It is attributed to Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. It will be clear from the perusal of the treatise that it is merely a catalogue of a hundred dharmas into which the Yogācāras have classified the things external as well as internal as against the Vaibhāșikas who have put them into seventy-five items. A detailed account of the classification of dharmas made by Vaibhāşikas is given by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky in his Central Conception of Buddhism ; Appendix.] यथाह भगवान् । सर्वधर्मा निरात्मका इति । तत्र] के सर्वधर्माः । किं नैरात्म्यम् । सर्वधर्माः संक्षपेण पञ्चविधाः-१ चित्तधर्मः, २ चैत- सिकधर्मः, ३ रूपधर्मः, ४ चित्तविप्रयुक्तसंस्कारधर्मः, ५ असंस्कृतधर्म इति । प्रथमश्चित्तधर्मः संक्षेपेण अष्टप्रकारो भवति । १ चक्षुर्विज्ञानम्, २ श्रोत्रविज्ञानम् , ३ प्राणविज्ञानम् , ४ जिहाविज्ञानम् , ५ कायवि- ज्ञानम्, ६ मनोविज्ञानम् , ७ मननविज्ञानम् ( क्लिष्टं मनो०), ८ 'आलय- विज्ञानमिति । द्वितीयश्चैतसिकधर्मः संक्षेपेण एकपञ्चाशद्विधः षडाशिषु विभक्तः । 1 + See Mah. Sutralaikara, XI, 37. Prakaranaryavāca sastra. as quoted by Prof. Tucci; v his article, The Idealistic School in Buddhism, p. 8, published in the Dacca University Bulletin, No.XII. The Vaibhäşikas do not accept the last two types of consciousness, manana and Alayavijñāna, and bring the other types under one group, vijñāna, counted as one dharma. 'According to the Vaibhasikas Cetasikadharmas are only 46: (1)Cittamahabhumikah 10, (2) Kusalamahabhumikadharmah 10, (3) Klesamahābhūmikadharmāḥ 6, (4) Akusalamahābhūmikadharmāh 2, (5) Upaklesa.(paritta) bhūmikadharmāh 10, (6) Aniyatabhumikadhārmāḥ 8: Total 46.

·APPENDIX 113 सर्वत्रगाः पञ्च 5 5 11 १. २. विनियतभूमिकाः पञ्च ३. कुशला एकादश ४. क्लेशाः षट् ५. उपक्लेशा विंशतिः ६. अनियताश्चत्वारः इति । 6 20 4 Total 51 - (१) पञ्च सर्वत्रगाः १ मनस्कारः, २ स्पर्शः, ३ वेदना, ४ संज्ञा, ५ चेतना। (२) पञ्च विनियतभूमिकाः -१ छन्दः,२ अधिमोक्षः, ३ स्मृतिः, ४ समाधिः, ५ मतिः । (३) एकादश कुशलाः' -१ श्रद्धा, २ वीर्यम् , ३ हीः, ४ अपत्रपा, ५ अलोभः, ६ अद्वेषः, ७ अमोहः, ८ प्रश्रब्धिः, ९ अप्रमादः, १० उपेक्षा, ११ अहिंसा। (४) षट् क्लेशाः -१ रागः, २ प्रतिधः, ३ मानः, ४ मोहः, ५ विचिकित्सा, ६ 'मिभ्यादृष्टिः । 4 * These are mentioned by Vasubandhu in his Trims'ikā, vers. 3c-dand explained by Sthiramati in his Bhasya thereon. Trims'ikā, ver. 10 b-c; Bhäsya. pp. 25-6. It may be noted that this group and the previous one are put under one class, cittamahābhūmnikāḥ by the Vaibhāşikas. Trios/ikā, ver. 10d-11a-c; Bhasya, pp. 26-28. The Vaibhāşikas omit amoha in this group. 'Trim. ver, 11c-12a; Bhasya p. 28-9. The Vaibhasikas count them thus : 1. moha, 2. pramāda, 3. kaustdya, 4. asraddha, 5. styā. na, 6. auddhatya which are, omitting moha, counted amongst 20 upaklesas by Yogācāras. Lit. असम्पष्टि: Sthiramati explains it as panca satkaya. dratayah.

·114 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞA १ - 10 (५) विशतिरुपक्लेशाः'-१ क्रोषः, २ उपनाहः, ३ प्रदाशः, ४ प्रक्षः, ५ माया, ६ मदः, ७ शाव्यम् , ८ विहिंसा, ९ ईर्ष्या, १० मात्सर्यम् , ११ आहीक्यम् , १२ अनपत्राप्यम् , १३ आश्रद्धयम् , १४ कौसीयम्, १५ प्रमादः, १६ स्त्यानम् , १७ उद्धवः, १८ मुषिता स्मृतिः, १९ असंप्रजन्यम् , २० विक्षेपः । (६) चत्वारोऽनियताः -१ मिद्धम् , २ कौकृत्यम् , ३ वितर्कः १ विचारः। तृतीयो रूपधर्मः संक्षेपेण एकादशविधः-१ चक्षुः, २ श्रोत्रम् , ३ प्राणम्, ४ जिहा, ५ कायः, ६ रूपम् , ७ शब्दः, ८ गन्धः, ९ रसः, १० स्पर्शः, ११ धर्मायतनसंगृहीतं "रूपम् । चतुर्थश्चित्तविपयुक्तसंस्कारधर्मः संक्षेपेण चतुर्विंशतिविधः- १ प्राप्तिः, २ जीवितम् , ३ निकायसभागता, ४ पृथग्जातिः, ५ असंज्ञि- Trim. ver. 126-13; Bhāşya, pp. 30-31. The Vaibhāşikas accept only the first ten upakles'as of this group. These two dharmas (ahrikhya and anapatrāpya) are put by the Vaibhāşikas under akusalamahābhūmikadarma. "Trim. ver. 14; Bhasya, pp. 31-33. These are, for the Vai. bbāşikas the first four of 8 aniyatabhumikadharmāh. The other four aniy. dharmāh, rāga, dveşa, māna, and vicikitsā are counted by Yogācāras amongst 6 klesas. Some of the klesa and upaklesa groups are mentioned in the Dhammadāyādasutta (Majjbima, I, 3, p. 15): lobha, dosa, kodha, upanāha, makkha, palāsa, issā, maccheram, māyā, sātheyyam, thambha, sārambha, māna, atimāna, mada, pamāda. These are again, mentioned as upaklesa of the mind in the Vatthūpamasutta (Maj. I, 7, p. 36f.) This is avijñapti for the Vaibhāşikas. According to the Vaibhāşikas they are only 14, vis. Nos. 1-3, 5-14 : thus 13 in the above list of Yogācāras and aprāpti being added, 14 dbarmas are counted. "Chinese has ming-hen which means literally "life-hatred". I think the character hen is a mistake for ken, source; so I have taken botb ming-ken to mean joitendriya or simply jivita, the 7th dharma in the Vaibhasikas' list. 11 19 ·APPENDIX 115 समापत्तिः, ६ निरोपसमापत्तिः, ७ असंज्ञिविपाकः, ८ नामकायः, ९ पद- कायः, १० व्यञ्जनकायः, ११ जातिः, १२ जरा, १३ स्थितिः, १४ अनि- त्यता, १५ प्रवृत्तिः or सोतःसन्ततिः १६ एवंभागीयः or समाध्यन्त- रम्, १७ प्रतिबन्धः, १८ जावन्यम् , १९ क्रमः, २० देशः or दिक्, २१ कालः, २२ संख्या, २३ सामग्री or संयोगः, २४ भेदः or वियोगः। पञ्चमोऽसंस्कृतधर्मः संक्षपेण 'पहिधः-१ १ आकाशः, २ प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः, ३ अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः, ४ अचलनिरोधः, ५ संज्ञा- वेदयितनिरोधः, ६ तथता । उक्तं नैरात्म्यं संक्षेपेण द्विविधम्-२ पुद्गलनैरात्म्यम् २ धर्म- नैरात्म्यम् । इति महायानशतधर्माचाः लम् 1. Cittadharmaḥ 8 2. Cetasikadharmah 51 3. Rupadharmab 11 +. Cittaviprayuktasanskaradharmah 24 5. Asamskrtadharmah 6 Total 100 "The Vaibhasikas admit only the first 3 asamkrtas. 1 The Vaibhāşikas do not admit dharmanairātmya ; dharmas for them are real entities. Nairatmya means "परिकल्पितपुरवधामाव" and not "सर्ववैचामाव". See Mah. Sutralaikāra, XI, 47. One may refer to S. Yamakami Sogan ; System of Buddhist Thought, pp. 217-229 for a clear exposition in English of all the terms mentioned in this treatise.

·116 ALAMBANAPARIKSĀ D CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA (DHARMAS) ACCORDING TO THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS [It is already known that the Sautrāntikas as against the Vaibhāşikas, reduced the number of Dharmas to forty-three. But how they have worked it out actually is not as yet known either from the Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan source. However, some hints as to the method of their classification of things are found in the Sivajñānasidhiyār, (second part, parapakşa) and commentary thereon. The Sidhiyār, a polemical treatise in Tamil on Saiva philosophy was composed by Arunandi Sivācāryar, a great Saivait scholar of South India, who flourished in 1275-1325 A.D. The relevant portion of the section, Sautrantikamata of the Sidhiyār is given below with the commentary which supplements the text with a very valuable necessary information on the subject.] Text: There are only two pramāņas, pratyakşa and anumana. The momentary knowledge and the knowable are their objects. These objects get divided 2 1 This Section is studied and translated in full by the present writer and published in the Journal of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 176-191. The commentator, Jfāpaprakasar in explainping pratyakşa, quotes Dharmakirti: Siron 1 It is divided into four : idriyapratyaksa mānasapr. g'ogapr. and svasamvedanāpr. See Nyāya. bindu, I. 4-11.

·APPENDIX 117 into four, vig, rūpa, arupa, nirvana and vyavahara. Each one of these four objects is again divided into two, and therefore they become eight in all, (ver. 3). Two kinds of rūpa are: upadanarūpa and upadaya-rupa. Two kinds of arūpa are: citta and karman. Two kinds of nirvana are: sopadhiseşanir. and nirupadhisteşanirvara. Two kinds of vyavahara are: sad. and asadvyavahara, (ver. 4). Four upadanarupas are: earth, water, fire and air. Four upadayatupas are: hardness, attraction, motion and heat. Rupa is what is produced from the combination of the above eight elements (4 upadanar. and 4 upadayar.). Citta is that which cognizes a thing cognizable through the senses. Karman is to discriminate what is good and what is bad, (ver. 5). Commentary: The author intends to bring all the five groups of elements of the Buddhists indicated in this verse No. 5. Of these five groups, rūpa includes eight elements, four upadanarūpas and four upadayarupas; vedana three, kustala, akusala and kusalakusala; sanjña six, five sense organs and one citta; This is partly in harmony with Yosomitra's comment : Than हिवते । भूतविकारविशेषा एवेन्द्रियाणीति । प्रवचने तु नैवम् । किं तर्हि । स्पादिव्यति- रिचानि अच्छानि अतीन्द्रियाणि स्वविज्ञानानुमेयानि इन्द्रियाणि येषां चक्षुरादीन्यधिष्ठा- TIA FOI p. 24-25. See . My paper on Sarvāstivāda in Sankara. bhāsya, publ. in the Jour. of Orien. Research, Madras, Vol. XI, p. 28.

·118 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŠĀ 4 vijñana six, vijfānas corresponding to the six above and sanskara twenty, ten good acts and ten bad acts. Thus they work out forty-three in all. So says their Scripture: எட்டிவை யுருவமூனறுவேதனை யாறுஞான, மொட்டிய குறிப்போராறு செய்கை மிருபதாகக், கட்டிய பஞ்சகந்தங்கணத்தினிற் பங்கமாகித், தொட்ட நாற்பத்து மூன்றுஞ்சுகத நூற்றுணிவு தானே. " It is the siddhanta of the scriptures of the Buddhists that the forty-three [dharmas] which are momentary are counted in five skandhas which are built up of eight rūpas, three vedanās, six jñānas, their corresponding six samjñās and twenty saṁskāras." [It may be noted that the asaṁskṛta elements, akasa, etc. which are not real entities for the Sautrāntikas, are not counted in the above list.] *These ten good and ten bad acts are the same as dasa kusalas and dasākusalas divided into three, vācika, kāyika and mānasika.

·SANSKRIT INDEX (Roman figures refer to verses and Arabic ones to pages) 24, अक्षवत् 1,26 अतदाकारत्वात् 26 अतदाभता I, 26 अणुस्वल्पं निरंशम् 34 अण्वाकारो (न किाप्तिविषयः) III, 32 अध्यवसायान्तर 33 अनन्यत्वम् (पि.त्या: 7 अनिर्धारितस्वभावः (परमाणु:) 26 अनेकान्तिक(दोष) 26 (त्रिः), 29 अन्त: VI, 38 अन्यत्वम् (विज्ञानशक्त्योः)7 अन्योन्यहतुको (शक्तिविषयौ)7 अपार्यक26 अमेदः (विज्ञानार्ययोः) 30 अर्थ 23 अर्थानुभव 109 अर्धापत्ति 26 असंघातत्वोपलम्भ 27 असिद्धि (दोष) 25, 35 आकारमेद 33,34 आगम 28 16 बाद” विम्बवत् 25 आनुरूप्य (= सास्य) 25 आरोपिताकार (अवयविन्) 35 मालम्बन (द्विविध) 3, (उत्पत्तिप्रत्यय) 4, (वर्षश) 30,-लक्षण 27-28 आलम्बनाविभकं (विज्ञानम्)7 आशयान्तर 32 इन्द्रियम् (शकिस्पं न भौतिक) VII, 10, 25 -परमाणुवत् 26, 27 पुरः (आकारोत्पत्ति) 33 -विज्ञानानां विशेषाकारत्व 35 वैकल्य 28 -शक्ति: प्रतिनियता 23, 33 उपचयापचयाभाव 34 एकावेकल्य 4 एतच्छाल32 कठिनतादिवत् III, 32, 33 कश्चित् or केचित् 23, 27, 28, 30 कारणतादि (क्या-)37 केशाधवभासि (बधा-) 37 .

·120 ĀLAMBANAPARĪKSĀ क्षणिक (विषय) 109 पारिमाण्डल्य 5 ग्राहकांशवन् 39 पिण्ड (-सहात) 106, 107 प्राणत्व (-प्रत्ययत्व) 39 प्रतिघात 107 गाश (= अणु) I, 36, 39 प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाता 28 चितवैत 28 प्रत्यक्ष 108 छायाक्ती 107 प्रत्यय (चतुर्विध) 36, 39 तत्व 22%3-वचन 32 प्रमाण (अन्यत्) 26%; (एक) 38 तथतावान 32 प्रयोग 32 तथागत 23 बधिरान्धादि 22 तदाकार(एकत्व हेतु 24, 25, बहिल VI, 37 27, 29 बहाकार 31 तारतम्य 32 बायलक्षण 37 दिमागमेद 107, 111 बाह्यवस्तु (मिथ्या) 38, 39 ध्यान्त (साधारण-) 24, 29 बायार्थ (विना-) 110 द्विचन II, 4, 28, 29, भाग 38 (मतमेद) 30 मनस् (न षष्ठेन्द्रियम् ) 20-21,25 दूषणुकमालम्बनम् 23 -विज्ञान 108, 109, 111, (पा- निर्विकल्पहान (लोकोतर-) 109 ठिक-)30 नैय्यायिक 6 रथादिवत् 21 पक्षधर्म 33 स्पादि 107, पक्षस्थापन 27 -असिद्धि 108 पक्षा(न्याया)न्तर 36 लोकविरोध 36,37 पाचसप्ततिपदार्य (= विज्ञान) 38 लौकिकज्ञान (शुद्ध-) 109 लौकिकानाम् 37 परमाणु (बायार्थ) 3, (अमिन) 35, वादिन (दि) 24 (अभेदक) 35, (निरवयव) 34, (अप्र- वास्तवाकार 33 त्यक्ष) 32, (अनिर्धारितस्वभाव) 26. विज्ञप्तिमात्र 108 -सामान्यलक्षणमालम्बनम् 24, (अ- विज्ञानपरिणाम 36 संयुकत्वेन बालम्बनत्वम् ) 24, विशिष्टशक्ति 31 -काव 24, (न एकं बम्बम् ) 106 विषय (=ज्ञानस्वस्म) 3 परपक्ष 26 ·INDEX 121 वैभाषिक 117, 1., विषयाभाव 109 साधन (द्विप्रकार) 38 इति (वि) 38 सामग्री 23 बेदनादि 111 सार्थक 27 काश्मीर-106 सिखसाधन 35 शकि VII, VIII.7 सुखदु:खवेदनवत् 35 शाखकार 26 सुप्त (घटान्त) 29 याद्वय (यथा-)39 सूत्र 17,36 समात 27, (बाह्याथ) 3, 102-33; (न सेनादिवत् 36 व्यम्) 28, (सांकृत) 33, 34 स्थूलदृष्टि 30 (व्यत्यस्ताकार) 36, 106 स्मरण 109 सवय 32 स्वपक्षे आलम्बन 36 सञ्चित 110 स्वप्रादौ यथा 108 सचिताकार III, 31, 32, 33 स्वप्रावस्थायाम् (यथा-) 38 सभागविज्ञान 39 स्वप्रतिज्ञा 26 समनन्तरादि 110 स्वस्पविरोधदोष (-विस्तहेतु) 39 समनन्तरनिरोष (यषा-) 39 स्वलक्षण 28 सर्वमाव (भौतिक) 31, 32 हेतुद्वय (वादमूल-) 24 सह VII, 39 हेतुफल 17 F ·ENGLISH GENERAL INDEX (Figures refer to pages) Abhidharmakosa (BB. ed.) 95, BHĀVAVIVEKA 60 n. 96, 102, 103 buddhiviseşa 46 n.20 Advayavajrasangraha (GOS.) Buddhist 62 104 CANDRAKIRTI 95, 99 aggregate (not real entity) 69, causality 82 70 (empirical), 77, -of-atoms. cause, mutual. 54; inference object theory) 42 ff,61 ff, 105 f. 52 n.48 AKALANKA 104 characteristic, two-fold. (of obakāra, v. form, image ject) 68 ananyatva 55n.57, explained chariot (as example) 57 100 cittacaitta 43 n.9 anirdes'ya 530.50 cohesion, saryoga 47 n.29 anyatva 55n.57, 100 concomitant, mutually- 64 ARUŅANDISIVĀCĀRYA condidition (-simultaneous) 50, 116 84; (-in succession) 51 D. artha 420.5, 43n.9 42; two. 73 arthāpatti 66 consciousness, -of the hair-like atiprasanga 50n.37; (ans thing 82; five-fold - 56; senwered) n.40 sual- 76 atom (its indeterminate nature) contradictory, not-53 0.49 66 co-ordination 63, 66 (atom-object-theory) 41, 60, 106 dependent causation 68 (atom-generality-object theory) Dhammadāyādasutta 114, a 61-62, 103 DHARMAPĀLA 95, 97, 98 avayavin 57 DHARMAKIRTI 103-4 alambana, (.dvibhāga, 450.16; digbhāg (of atoms) 47 2.23 -laksana 68; tā 59; (ex: DINNĀGA 96, 99, 101, 103, planation of) 95 105, 110 ūlayavijnana 510.42 dravyatah 43 2.11 Osraya 53 0.49; -tā 59 elements, great- 44 n. 14 āvedha 54 0.52 externally," as if it exists, "81 Bhavasankrāntisutra 59 n. force, s'akti, 51 ·INDEX 123 form (akāra), 42; -attributed Naiyāyika 50, 101 78; atomic- 45, 75; com. Nyāyabindu (BB.) 58 . bined(sancitākāra) 44 n. 14; Nyāybindutikātippani (BB.)102 (salcitakāra-object-theory Nyāyavārtika (Chawk.) 57, D., and its refutation) 44, 45 n.19, 59, D. 73-74; gross—67,73; (distinc Nyāyav. tātparyatka (Chawk.) tion in.) 46-47, 79; many. 104 44, 73; undifferentiated. 77 Nyāyaviniscaya (Sindh Jain form" 77; -(due to imagina. Series) 104 tion) 83 Nyāyasitra 98 grāhyabhāga 49 p. 33, 50 p.37 object (explained) 43,0.7 ; -cause grāhyārs'a 82, 84 41 ff.; -image 67 grāhyasvabhāva 59 objection (dtişana) 65 happiness, feeling of - 78 parts, two- (of ālambana) 72, HIUEN TSANG 95, 97, 100, (of cons.) 83 112 PARAMĀRTHA 54 n. 55, 95, image, (-immanent in cons.) 84 97-101 internally " 81, 83 pārimāndalya 46 n. 21 1-TSING 21 PĀRTHASARATHI MISRA Jains 62, 97 85, n., 98, 100, 101, 104 JÑĀNAPRAKĀSA 116 n. POUSSIN, L.V. 95, 99 KAMALASILA 97 pradarsanārtham 66 "knowable aspect " 81 Prakaranapaſlcika (Chawk.) KUMĀRILA 62, n. 71, n. LEVI, SYLVAIN 95, 105, 110 Prakaranāryavācāsāstra 112,n. lokavirodha 81 pramāna, ekam-84 Madhyamakavytti 98 Pramāņavārtika (Rāhula's ed.) Madhyamakāvatāra (Sanskrit 58, n., 61, n., 67, n., 71 n., 103, text) 95, 99 104 Madhyamika 59 n., 102 pratijntā 55 n. 57 Mahāyāpasūtrālankāra 109 n., pratyaya 85 112 n., 115 n. reason (inconclusive) 65, 70; (its exclusion) 76; MEYAR, HENRY 42, 49, 54, (not established) 67 95, 101 reinvestigating 77 mind (not the 6th sense) 55-58; resolve 66 (as sense and object) 64, (opi sabhhāga 86 nion on-) 101-102 sahakārin 51 n.42 mirror, image in- 64 sakti (=sense-faculty) 52, 53, misery, feeling of - 78 59,-mat 53 n. 49 modalities, two-- 54 n.44 samanantaranirodha 86 moon, double- 43, 69-71; samurtya 55 n.57 (views) 71-72 SANGHABHADRA 97 NĀGĀRJUNA, doctrine of-101 Sānkhya 102 many" 76 ·124 ĀLAMBANAPARİKŞA safcitakāra, v. form thesis (formulated) 65 SANTARAKSITA 102 thing, (external.), passim sandal wood 55, n. 57 (of great elements) 73 sapaksadystanta 76 (of distinct force) 73 sadhana 83, 84 different views on-) 96; sadhyadharma 62 Vasubandhu's criticism of - sāmagrt 59 105-9. Sthiramati on–110-111 sāmānya (=sallcita) 103 Trinsikābhāşya 95; Extract sārūpya 63, 66 from-110 Sarvästivādin 52 0.46, 97 TUCCI, G. 112, n. Sāstra 43 n. 9author of-65 VĀCASPATI MISRA 104 scripture 81 VĀGBHAȚA 44 n. 13, 97 senā, army 80 Vaibhāṣika 112; Kasmira-63, senses, passiń; power of -75, D... 96, 102 (explained) 52 Vaibhāşika-Sautrāntika 102 siddhasādhana 79 Vaiseșika 47 nn. 27-28; (re- Sivajnanasiddhiyār 116 futed) 48 n. 29, 96, 103 Sautrāntika 116 vāsanā 49 n. 35, 54 SUBHAGUPTA 96, 104 VASUBANDHU 95, 96, 102, Slokavārtika (Chawk.) 60, D., 105-112, (Bhadanta-) 63, n.,98 85 n., 99–101 Vatthupama Sutta 114. n solidity (kathinata) 45, 75 Vimsikābhāsya 96, 102, 103 ; sound-object 81 Extract from-105.9 STCHERBATSKY, Th. 102, Vijñānapariņāma 81 112 Vijbānavādin 62, n., 101, 110 STHIRAMATI 95, 113 n. VIN TADEVA 49n.36; 54 n. --on the external thing 110 55, 95-99. (His criticism of svalakşaņa 69 other school) 100 svarūpavirodha 84 visayākārata 54 svasamvedana 53 n. 49 Vedāntin 102 syllogism 66, 82, formulation of vyavahāra 43 n. 9 -76 UDYOTAKARA 62, D. TĀRĀNATHA 97 UI, H. 60 taimirika 49 n. 33 YAMAGUCHI, SUSUMA 42 tarka 57 49, 54, 95, 101 tathatā, suchness 75 YAMAKAMI SOGEN 115, Q. Tathāgata 59 YASOMITRA 95, 101, 103, Tattvasangraha (GOS.) 57, n., 117, n. 58, D., 60, a., 96, 97, 102 Yogācāra-Sauträntika 102 ·TIBETAN INDEX (WITH AUTHORISED SKT EQUIVALENT) (Figures refer to verses) kyai, apica 6 span yin. te, avabhāsate 6 rkyen, pratyaya 7 phyi. rol. Itar, bahırvat 6 gar, yat 6 phra, rab rdul, aņu (Orig grā. rgyu, kārana 1 hyāmsa) 1 ci dgar, yathestam, vịttı ad 7 byed. pas, karotiti. vrttı ad 7 gcig. chaþar, ekāṁso'pi (Origi. dbar. po. bzhin, akşavat 1 nal saha) 7 dban pohı roam. par. rig, indrıde, ni, sah, vrttı ad 7 yavijñaptı 1 de bı, tasyāḥ 1 ubras. bu skyed par. byed. de hı. rkyen ñid yin phyır pahi, kāryotpädaka (Orig. ro, tatpratyayatayā 6 -utpattaye) vettt ad 7 der. mi. snan. phyır, atadābha mi bkhrul phyir ro, avyabhitayā 1 cārıtvāt 7 don, artha 6 mi hgol. lo, avirodha, vrttı don. du. snai. ba, arthāvabhāsa, ad 7 vrttı ad 7 mod. kyı, yadyapı 1 hdus pahi. rnam pa, sañícitā. zlum. po, pārımāndalya, vittu kāra 3 ad 4 d. rdul. phran, apu (Original yan lag. gcig ma. tshar, ekārgasah) 1 vaikalya, vrttı ad 2 c. d. nar. gi, antab 6 yul, vişaya 1 nus. pa, s'aktım, vrttı ad 7 ran dan mthun pahı, svānuaus pa. hjog. phyır, saktyarpa rūpa. vrttı ad 7 rim gyis, kramāt 7,- kyai, krarpam. par. ses pahi rten can, menāpı, orttı ad 7 vijñādādbārām, vytti ad 7 Bes byahı do. bo, jeyarūpa 6 mam. pa. ses. io. bohi phyır, sra ad la sogs bzhın, kathivijñādarūpatvāt 6 natādıvat 3 ņāt 7

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·Rs A 29 VYAVAHĀRANIRNAYA OF VARADARĀJA-Edited by Rao Bahadur K V Rangaswami Aiyangar, MA, and A N Krishna Aiyangar, MA, LT Adyar Library, 1941 30 SAMGITARATNĀKARA-With the Commentarios of Catura Kallınatha and Siphabhüpāla Edited by Papồit S Subrahmanya Sastr, FTS, Vol I, 1941 31 CATALOGUE OF THE ADYAR LIBRARY, Western Section part 1 - prepared under the direction of Bhikshu Arya Asanga, Jt Director and Curator, Western Section, Adyar Library, 1942 32 ALAMBANAPARIKSĀ AND VRTTI by Diodāga with English translation, Tibetan text etc by Papdit N Alyaswami Sastrı, Tirupati, 1942 33 SOME CONCEPTS OF ALANKARA SĀSTRA by Dr V Raghavan, MA PhD University of Madras, 1943 5 0 3 8 PAMPHLETS 03 A VARIANT VERSION OF THE EKĀGNIKĀNDA (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, October, 1939) Edited by K Madhava Krishna Sarma, MOL THE RĀJAMRGĀNKA OF BHOJA (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin October 1940) Edited by K Madhava Krishna Sarma, MOL THE SAT PAÑCĀSIKĀ a Sulpas'astra maqual (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin February 1942) Edited by K Madhava Krisboa Sarma, MOL IN THE PRESS 04 05 1 ASVALĀYANAGRHYA SOTRA-With Devasvamı Bhagya-Edited by Swami Ravi Tirtha 2 ASVALĀYANAGRHYA SOTRA (Bbaşya of Devasvāmi) Translated into English by A N Krishna Aiyangar, MA, LT, Adyar Library 3 JRĀNANDANAM OF ANANDARĀYAMAKHI with a Commentary by Vaidya ratna Pandit M Duraiswami Anyangar Edited by Vaidyaratna G Srinivasa Murti, BA, BL, MB & C M and Vaidyaratoa Papdit M Duraiswami Alyangar 4 SRI PAÑCARĀTRA RAKSĀ of Sn Vedanta Des'ika-Edited by Vaidyaratna Pandit M Duraiswami Aiyangar and Vedanta Siromapı T Venugopalacharya 5 VAIŞŅAVA UPANISADS-Translated into English by T R Srinivasa Asyangar BA, LT 6 A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE of the Manuscripts in the Adyar Library by K Madhava Krishna Sarma, MOL, under the direction of Prof C Kaphan Raja, MA, D Phil (Oxon )--Vedic 7 USĀNIRUDDHO of Rāma Papıvāda Edited by Papdit S Subrahmanya Sastri, FTS and Dr C Kunban Raja, MA, D Phi (Oxon ) 8 NYĀYAKUSUMĀKJALI of Udayanācārya-Translated into English by Swami Ravi Tirtha 9 THE APASTAMBASMRTI_Edited by A N Krishna Asyangar, MA, LT, Adyar Library 10. THE ACYUTARĀYABHYUDAYAM of Rējanātha Doppima-Sargas 7 to 12– by A N Krishna Asyangar, MA, LT., Adyar Library ·11. VEDINTA PARIBHASA-with English translation Rod Notes by Pro S, Suryanarayana Sastri, M. A., B. Sc. (Oxon.), Reader, Head of th Department of Philosophy, University of Madras. 12. CATURDAS ALAKBAŞI OF GADĀDHARA with Five Commentaries-Edita by Papdit N. Santanam Aiyar. Agents for our publications : THE THEOSOPHICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE Adyar, Madras, S. India WORKS UNDER PREPARATION 1. GAUTMASMRTI-Edited by A. N. Krishna Aiyaogar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 2. THE KĀLĀDARSA OF ADITYA BHATTA-Edited by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 3. THE VışşUSMRTI-With the Kes'ava Vaijayanti of Nanda Pandita. Edited by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyaogar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna Aiyaogar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 4. PAKSATĀ OF GADĀDHARA—with four commentaries by Papțit N. Santanam Aiyar. 5. AVAYAVA OF GADĀDHARA—with four commentaries by Papdit N. Santanam Aiyar. 6. VRTTARATNĀVALI-with commentary, English Translation and Notes by 'H. G. Narahari, M.A. Adyar Library. BRAHMAVIDYA THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN Director: DR. G. SRINIVASA MURTI, B.A., B.L., M.B.& C.M., VAIDYARATNA Editor: PROF. C. KUNHAN RAJA, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.) Rates of Subscription : Life Subscription Rs. 100 $ 50 or £ 10 Per Addum Single Copy India & Ceylon Rs. 6 Rs. 2-8 U.S. A. $ 3 $. 1.25 British Empire Sh. 12 Sh. 5 Other Countries Rs. 9 Rs. 3-8 or IO All Communications to be addressed to : THE DIRECTOR Adyar Library, Adyar, Madras, S. India.

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