·PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. Wlulo I was a student in the college, I took delight in studyiu: the yeye in which I felt keen interest, especially owing to the able lectures on the subject by the late Shastrı Bhimacharya whoso very deep study of the subject lias resulted in his alyayakosha la 1902 I was a guest of Professor Deussen in Germany and in his company I attended the Oriental Congress at Hamburgh where I made acquaintance of many able Sanskritists especially of Professors Jolly, Eggehog, Macdonell and Dendal, and found an occasion to come in contact with the late lamented Professor Cowell, whose profound 1 nowledge of the Nyasa, the Vedanta and Buddhism has remained unequalled in the West During my visit to him in Cimbridgo we twice discussed some hnotty points in the Nyaya Muktaval and as a result thereof he advised me to undertake an edition of a good yaya Work In the month of October of the simo ycar I visited Prof Eggling in Edinburgh He also advised nie to do the same and by way of encouragement, he proposed and bot mo elected a research student of his University, so as to make mo concentrate for an year my studies of Sanskrit literature to that subject Stace tlen for about a year and a half I worked over several manuscripts in the India Office Library About the middlo of 1903 I undertoob to prepare an edition of PTTHRE of HT I collected in all sit copies of the work four of which are in the Labrary of the India Ofhce in London, and two were found in India 1 The first, a copy only of the text in the India Office Library, is written in Nagırı Character with several letters in Jainic form These are follos, 94 in all from 19 to 28 in continua tion of Keshald IshraTarla Par bhash whroh 13 completed in the middle of folio 19 Both the works are copied by the same scribe The portion of the larka panbhasha seems to have been very much used and studied, as appears from myginal notes made on that portion of the MS The portion of न्यायसार has remained untouched The JI$. 19 tolerably correct except in the lust page where there is a repetition of to haes and twice orer of one line It 13 written on fery strong paper 12 x6 with 15 lines on cicli page Ibo colophones at the cou of the far chledas Are ycry sluit w simplu lbey DIYO do suformaliva as iu ·II IRLSCE. WAS This was the author except luis name and he is deserved as qual तार्षिकसार्वभौम This shows that, by the time this MIS copied, the author was recognised as an able and much respected scholar of Nyage Philosophy This Ms I haro noted us B 2 The second 19 a copy of the commentary interposel with tho text The commentary is by भट्टराघव son of सारङ्ग composed, according to Professor Hall in Sahe year 1174 or 1952 AD This manuscript goes as far as the end of second Parichheda only The Vs is very old and very slovenly written, but it is mostly correct. Righara 13 a Lold writer with flashes of originality and independence. Whenever bu differs from his author, he is clear and strong in his view This copy I have noted as R. 3 The third DIS is that of the target for a commentary on 741477 by futuft. 1 apıl of Roof of gettone who scems to have flourished in the year 1037 D Ile is known to be the author of Famat and is mentioned in the 997 परीक्षा of धमसागर This copy I 1&ve noted as C 4 Dosides these three, there is a fourth copy in the India Ofico Library anlitus known as Gaikwars cors This is very old In appearance but to my mnl it is 12 t 80, '1hc person who sold it to the Icarned collector of V scems to have use 1 the artifice of puttin, it in a smoby ani dirty place which has ren at the oldish aprerance It is a copy of the above do 3 and often 10ct rrect This I haro noted ns G 5 The fifth copy which I saw lx longs to the library of the Deccan College and was procarel for me Lg Me 1 T Gales sometine Director of l'ublic Instruction, Bonuknu I linse noted this as D 6 A copy of this work, a very recently male is in the library of the l'omlung Broch of the local Asiatic Society and it was Lindly lent to me by tl e llon Secretary Mir Haigu lhus came in my hands rers late, after almost the whole of the text Wis printed I have borcser compared it with my text and made ruch ucc c it as was possible I have noted it as E 7 Arcventh copy of thus was seen by ino at llenares in tho Queen. Cllege Liarary I could t go through it as in spite of the string roomt inilatı nef Vir 1. I Griles, the principal. I tho collec could not be in luced to allow tuc to bribe it to Bombay ·II LI ICL III The first four copies aforesaid belong to the Indir Offcc Library of London and my thanks are due to the Librarian Mr Thomas for allowing me the use of them in London and also procuring the same for me in Bombay on by return I intended to write an introduction discussing the comparatıse methods of reasoning used in erstern and western systems of logio and had collected some materials for the same Engagements, over which I had no control, and several difficulties which I had not anticipated, so much hampered my worl, that for years together I had either to completely put aside this work or had to do it at long intervals only The printing of the text and the notes had been completed for over a year and yet I have found no time to put the introduction in shape I have therefore thought it proper to publish the work without it with a hope, however, that in no distant future 1 may be able to put it before the public BOMBAI 22 CATUDTAL STREFT, 13th September 1910 VISHYANATHIP VAIDYA

·न्यायसारः।
5
श्रीशंभवेनमः।
प्रणम्य शम्भुं जगतः पति परम्
समस्ततत्त्वार्थविदं स्वभावतः ।
शिशुप्रयोधाय मयाऽमिधास्यते
प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्यलक्षणम् ॥
सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् । सम्यग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहा-
र्थम् । तत्राऽनवधारणं ज्ञानं संशयः । स च समानधर्माऽनेकधर्मवि-
प्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिकारणभेदात्पंचधा भिद्यते । तद्यथा । समा.
नधर्मात्किमयं स्थाणुः स्यात्पुरुषो वेति । १ । अनेकधर्मादाकाशविशे-
पगुणत्वात्किमयं शब्दो नित्यः स्यादनित्यो वेति । २। विप्रतिपत्तेरेके 10
भौतिकानींद्रियाण्याहुरन्ये चाऽभौतिकानीति । ३ । उपलब्धेः कि
सदुदकमुपलभ्यत उताऽसदिति । ४ । अनुपलब्धेः किं विद्यमानः
पिशाचो नोपलभ्यते किं वाऽविद्यमानः। ५ । अनवधारणत्वादूहा-
ऽनध्यवसाययोर्न संशयादुर्थान्तरभावः । तद्यथा वाह्यालीप्रदेशे पुरु.
पेणाऽनेन भवितव्यमित्यूहः । किंसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष इत्यनध्यवसायः ॥15
मिथ्याऽध्यवसायो विपर्ययः । तद्यथा । द्वौ चन्द्राविति । सुप्तस्य
1 पर C,R, D. बर B.
2 ससम्यग.
5 अविद्यमान इति°D.
6 वा. स्वाविशेषार ..
7 भाव: B. भाव इति°C, D,
3 के
G,RB
को B.
4 चा... खD.

·न्यायसारः 5 गजदर्शनं चेति ॥ स्मरणशानव्यवच्छेदार्थमनुभवप्रणम् ॥ प्रमातृप्र. मेयव्यवच्छेदार्थ फलाद्भेदज्ञापनार्थ च साधनप्रहणम् ।। सम्यगनुभवः प्रमा। प्रेमाकरणं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता । प्रमाविषयः प्रमेय. मिति ॥ तत्रिविधम् । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागम इति ।। तत्र सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्विविधम् । योगिप्र- त्यक्षमयोगिप्रत्यक्षं चेति ॥ तनाऽयोगिप्रत्यक्ष प्रकाशदेशकालधर्माद्यनु- ग्रहादिन्द्रियार्थसंबंधविशेषेण स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् । तद्यथा । चक्षुःस्पर्श- नयोगाद्धदादिद्रव्यज्ञानम् । संयुक्तसमवायात्ताभ्यां घटत्वादिसंख्या- परिमाणादिज्ञानम् । चक्षुपैव रूपज्ञानम् । स्पर्शनेनैव स्पर्शज्ञानम् । प्रा- 10 णेनैव गन्धज्ञानम् । रसनेनैव रसज्ञानम् । मनसैव मुखादिज्ञानम् ।। एतेषु संख्यादिप्वाश्रितानां सामान्यानां स्वाश्रयप्राहकैरिन्द्रियैः संयु- क्तसमवेतसमवायाद्रहणम् ॥ श्रोत्रसमवायात् श्रवणेनैव शब्दज्ञानम् ॥ तैदानितसामान्यज्ञानं समवेतसमवायात् ॥ तदेतत्पंचविधसंबंधसंव- द्धविशेषणविशेष्यभावादृश्याभावसमवाययोहणम् । तद्यथा । घट- 15 शून्यं भूतलम् । इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तथाहि तंतवः पटसम- वायवंतः । तंतुपु पटसमवाय इति । इत्येवं सर्वाश उदाहरणीयम् । I सरण° B.C. सरणा' R. यात् ८, समवेतसमवायाचदाश्रितसामान्य. 2D omits the whole | शानम्। phrase. 9 तदेतत् । तत् एतत् D. • 3 चच.स्पर्शन' D. 10 पचविधि , पच c, D. 4 योगा B. सयोगार°C. 11 भावादृश्याभावसमवाययोर्महणम् c. 5 घटत्वसख्या D. R, D भावादृश्यते समवायाग्रहणम् 8. 6 शानमिति D. 12 तथाहि...... पटसमवाय 7 श्रोत्रसमवायात श्रवणेनैव शम्दानम् / E, D. and a omit this. R. 03; श्रोत्रसमवायात् शब्दग्रहणम् B, D. has it. 8 सदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञान समवेत समवा 13 एव सर्वत्रोऽदा D.

·प्रत्यक्षम् । समवायस्यतु कचिदेवप्रहणम् । यथा इह घटे रूपसमवायः । रूपस. मवायवान्घट:।। योगिप्रत्यक्षं तु देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थप्राहकम् ॥ तच द्विविधम् युक्तावस्थायां वियुक्तावस्थायां चेति ॥ तत्र युक्तावस्थायामात्मान्त:क- रणसंयोगादेव धर्मादिसहिताऽशेपार्थग्रहणम् ॥ वियुक्तावस्थायां तु च-5 तुष्टयत्रयद्वयसन्निकर्षाद्रहणं यथासंभवेन योजनीयम् ॥ अत्रैवामन्त- भूतम् । प्रकृष्टधर्मजस्वाऽविशेपादिति ।। तव द्विविधम् । सविकल्पं निर्विकल्पं च ॥ तत्र संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबं- धोलेसेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं सविकल्पम् यथा देवदत्तोयं दंडीत्यादि ।। वस्तुस्वभावमात्रावभासकं निर्विकल्पम् यथा प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजं ज्ञा-10 नम् । युक्तावस्थायां योगिज्ञानं च ॥ इति न्यायसारे प्रथमः परिच्छेदः॥ 1 यथारूपसमवायवान्घटः । इह घटे 7 संज्ञासं B, R, D; संशादि° 0. रूपसमवाय इति। 8 करपकम् D. 2 सहिता BB सहिता , G,R. 9 यथा देवदतोयं दडीत्यादि B,0%B 3 संभवेन R, C. समावन B. तदयं परमाणू रूपवानित्यादि. 4 वार्षमन्त B, C. वार्षमप्यन्त R. 10 वस्तुखरूप' D. 5 धजत्वा . धर्मशवा B. 11 कल्पकम् D. 6 सविकल्पकम् निर्विकल्प D.

·४ न्यायसारः। सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम् ॥ स्वभावतः साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरविनाभावः । स द्विविधोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकमे- दात् ॥ साध्यसामान्येन साधनसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिरल्वयः । साधन- सामान्याभावेन साध्यसामान्याभावस्य व्याप्तिय॑तिरेकः ॥ साधनं 5 लिङ्गम् । तच्च द्विविधम् दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्या- र्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् यथा धूमोऽमेरिति । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थाऽनुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टम् यथा रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेरिति ॥ तसुनर्द्विविधम् । स्वार्थ परार्थ चेति । तत्र परोपदेशानपेक्षं स्वार्थम् । परोपदेशापेक्षं परार्थम् । परोपदेशस्तु पंचावयवं वाक्यम् ।। 10 प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ॥ तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिपया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः ।। साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतुः । स त्रिविधः । अन्वयव्यति- रेकी केवलान्वयी केवलव्यतिरेकी चेति ॥ तत्र पंचरूपोऽन्वयव्यति- रेकी । रूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षेसत्वम् विपक्षाब्यावृत्तिरवाधितवि- 15 पयत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं च ॥ सत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्टः पक्षः । तत्र व्याप्यवृत्तित्वं हेतोः पक्षधर्म- त्वम् ॥ साध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः। तत्र सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशे वा हेतो. त्तिः सपक्षेसत्वम् ।। साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी विपक्षः। तत्र सर्वमिं- विपक्षे हेतोरवृत्तिर्विपक्षाढ्यावृत्तिः ॥ प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि प्रतिक्षी- B,D. 1 अविनाभावः 0,D. अनादिभावः B, 7 "विशिधे धर्मी c. a. D. 2 "विधोऽन्वय , C. विथः । अन्वय' 8 सर्वमिन्नेकदेशे वा ०, O, D. सर्व. सिन्. 3 तच्चदि D, D. तद्रिवि' Cr, G. 4 यथा भनित्यः शम्द इति D. 10 प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि 0, . प्रमाणा- 5 Here D. adds यथा दीवादि-दिरोधिनि' B. धर्मोपतत्वाद 11 प्रविशावेऽ. B, R, D; प्रतिज्ञा. 6 स D. समस्तेपि c,. ता०,.

·5 अनुमानम् । तेऽर्थे हेतोवृत्तिरवाधितविषयत्वम् ॥ साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः साधनस्याऽ- त्रिरूपत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् ॥ स द्विविधः । सपक्षवृत्तिभेदात् तद्यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वा- दिति सपक्षव्यापकः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सति-अस्मदादियाह्येन्द्रियप्राय- त्वादिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः ॥ पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्तिरविद्यमानविपक्षः केवलान्वयी । स पूर्व- वहिविधः । तद्यथा विवादास्पदीभूतान्यदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि प्रमेयत्वात्करतलादिवदिति संपक्षव्यापकः । सैव प्रतिज्ञा मीमांसका- नामप्रत्यक्षत्वादस्मत्सुखादिवदिति सपक्षकदेशवृत्तिः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकी यथा पक्षव्यापकोऽविद्यमानसपक्षो विपक्षाव्या-10 वृत्तः । स चाऽप्रसंगोनेयी प्रसंगोन्नेयी च । सर्व कार्य सर्ववित्कर्तृ- पूर्वकं कादाचित्कत्वात् यथाऽऽकाशे । प्रसंगद्वारेणं यथा नेदं निरा- त्मकं जीवच्छरीरमप्राणादिमत्त्वप्रसंगालोष्ठवदिति ।। एतेन हेत्वाभासानामहेतुत्वं भवति । यतो हेतुत्वलक्षणरहिता हे- 1 साधनस्यापि , G. साधनस्य निनेयी च । पूर्व अप्रसंगोनेयिनमाइ. B. साधनस्यानि D, R. 9 D puts सर्व कार्य after पूर्व- 2 सर्वसपक्ष D. कम् , and यथा in the beginning 3 अनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यत्वे D. of the sentence. 4 ग्राह्यत्वाद G,C,D. वाहत्वात् B. 10 Dadds यत्सर्ववित्कर्ट के न भवति 5 केवलान्वयी पूर्ववद्विविधः C,G,R. | तत्कादाचित्कमपि न भवति in the स पूर्व विविधः B. body of the text; but it 6 Domits सपक्षव्यापकः. must be an annotation put 7 D puts eie meeliteit after in by mistake of the scribe, च्यावृत्तः in the sentence. 11 D. आकाशम्. 8 D omits this from the 12 puts in बा. body of the text but puts 13 c, G and Domit anle. in the marginal note piz, 14 p omits त्व', केवलव्यतिरेकी विधा, अप्रसंगोन्नेयी प्रसंगो, ·। ४ न्यायसारः। सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम् ॥ स्वभावतः साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरविनामावः । स द्विविधोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकमे- दात् ॥ साध्यसामान्येन साधनसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिरन्वयः । साधन- सामान्याभावेन साध्यसामान्याभावस्य व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकः ॥ साधनं 5 लिङ्गम् । तच्च द्विविधम् दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । वत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्या- र्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् यथा धूमोऽमेरिति । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थाऽनुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टम् यथा रूपादिक्षानं चक्षुरादेरिति ।। तत्सुनर्द्विविधम् । स्वार्थ परार्थ चेति । तत्र परोपदेशानपेक्षं स्वार्थम् । परोपदेशापेक्षं परार्थम् । परोपदेशस्तु पंचावयवं वाक्यम् ॥ प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः॥ तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिपया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः ॥ साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतुः । स त्रिविधः । अन्वयव्यति- रेकी केवलान्वयी केवलव्यतिरेकी चेति ॥ तत्र पंचरूपोऽन्वयव्यति- रेकी । रूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षेसत्वम् विपक्षाव्यावृत्तिरवाधितवि- 16पयत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं च ॥ तत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्टः पक्षः । तत्र व्याप्यत्तित्वं हेतोः पक्षधर्म- त्वम् ॥ साध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः। तत्र सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशे वा हेतो. पेचिः सपक्षेसत्वम् ॥ साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी विपक्षः। वत्र सर्वर्मि- विपक्षे हेतोरवृत्तिर्विपक्षाड्यावृत्तिः ॥ प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि प्रतिज्ञा- 10 1 1 अविनाभाव. ०,D. अनादिमावः B. 7 °विशिष्टो धमी c.a.D. 2 °वियोन्वय G, C. विधः । अन्वर्य' 8 सर्वसिन्नेकदेशे वा 0, 9, D. सर्व D,D. सिन् R. तश्चति ,B. रद्विदि ,R. 4 यथा भनित्यः सम्दावि D. 10 प्रमाणाऽविरोथिनि ०,०. प्रमाणा- 5 were D. adds यथा दीनादि-दिरोधिनि B. धर्मोपतत्वात् । 11 प्रदिशावेऽ B,R, DB प्रतिशा- 6 सर्य D. वा 00.

·अनुमानम् । - 15 तेऽर्थे हेतोवृत्तिरवाधितविषयत्वम् ॥ साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः साधनस्याऽ. निरूपत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् ।। स द्विविधः । सपक्षवृत्तिभेदात् तद्यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वा- दिति सपक्षव्यापकः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सति-अस्मदादिवायेन्द्रियग्राह्य- त्वादिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः ॥ पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्तिरविद्यमानविपक्षः केवलान्वयी । स पूर्व- वहिविधः । तद्यथा विवादास्पदीभूतान्यदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि प्रमेयत्वात्करतलादिवदिति संपक्षव्यापकः । सैव प्रतिज्ञा मीमांसका- नामप्रत्यक्षत्वादस्मत्सुखादिवदिति सपक्षकदेशत्तिः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकी यथा पक्षव्यापकोऽविद्यमानसपक्षो विपक्षाब्या-10 वृत्तः । स चाऽप्रसंगोनेयी प्रसंगोनेयी च । सर्व कार्य सर्ववित्कर्ट- पूर्वकं कादाचित्कत्वात् यथाऽऽकाशे । प्रसंगद्वारेण यथा नेदं निरा- त्मकं जीवच्छरीरमप्राणादिमत्त्वप्रसंगालोष्ठयदिति ॥ एतेन हेत्वाभासानामहेतुत्वं भवति । येतो हेतुत्वलक्षणरहिता हे- । 1 साधनस्यापि c, G. साधनस्य विनेयी च । पूर्व अप्रसंगोनेयिनमाइ; B. साधनस्यात्रि'D, R. 9 D puts सर्व कार्य after पूर्व- 2 सर्वसपा D. | कम् , and यथा in the beginning 3 अनित्यः शन्दः सामान्यत्वे D. of the sentence. 4 प्राशत्वाद G,C,D. वायत्वात् B. 10 Dadds यत्सर्ववित्कर्तृकं न भवति 5 केवलान्वयी पूर्ववद्विविधः C,0,R. | तत्कादाचित्कमपि न भवति in the स पूर्व द्विविधः B. body of the text; but it 6 Domits सपक्षष्यापकः. must be an annotation put 7 D puts egnefiteit after in by mistake of the scribe, RET: in the sentence. 11 D. आकाशम्. 8 Domits this from the 12 puts in बा. body of the text but pats | 13 C,G and Domit यतो'. in the marginal note viz. 14 Domits त्व. केवरव्यतिरेकी दिधा, अप्रसंगोत्रेयी प्रसंगो.

·+ ६ न्यायसारः। तुवदाभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः । ते चानेकप्रकारा असिद्धविरुद्धाऽनका. न्तिकाऽनध्यवसितकालात्ययापदिष्टप्रकरणसमाः ।। तत्राऽनिश्चितपक्षवृत्तिरसिद्धः । पक्षविपक्षयोरेव वर्तमानो विरुद्धः। पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः । साध्याऽसाधकः पक्ष एव वर्तमानो- 5ऽनध्ययसितः । प्रमाणवाधिते पक्षे वर्तमानो हेतुः कालात्ययापदिष्टः । स्व-परपक्षसिद्धापपि त्रिरूपो हेतुः प्रकरणसमः ॥ यद्यपि चैपां सूक्ष्मा भेदा अनंतत्वान्न शक्यन्ते वक्तुं तथापि स्थूलां दृष्टिमाश्रित्य कियंतो भेदाः प्रदश्यन्ते । असिद्धस्तावत् । स्वरूपासिद्धी यथाऽनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुपत्वात् । १ । 10व्यधिकरणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः पटस्य कृतकत्वात् । २ । विशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति चाक्षुपत्वात् । ३ । विशेपणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुपत्वे सति सामान्य- वत्त्वात् । ४ । विभागाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नान्तरीयक- त्वात् । ५ । आश्रयाऽसिद्धो यथाऽस्ति प्रधानं विश्वपरिणामित्वात् 15। ६ । आश्रयैकदेशाऽसिद्धो यथा नित्याः प्रधानपुरुपेश्वरा अकृतक- त्वात् । ७ । व्यर्थविशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् । ८ । व्यर्थविशेषणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सा- मान्यवत्त्वे सति कृतकत्वात् । ९ । संदिग्धाऽसिद्धो यथा धूमवाप्पा- दिविवेकाऽनिश्चये कश्चिदाहाऽग्निमानयं प्रदेशो धूमवत्त्वात् । १० । 20 संदिग्धविशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिल: पुरुषत्वे सत्यद्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानत्वात् । ११ । संदिग्धविशेपणाऽसिद्धो यथा. 1 Domits ते चानेक"रा', पक्षत्रयवृत्तिः R. 3 भसिद्धभेद: D. 4 शशविषाणत्वाद.. 5 घटस्थ'D. 6 भागासिद्धों. 7 अय धूमो दहनजन्यः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति धूमवत्त्वाद् R. 8 °क: B. 9 सल्ल्याप्य,क.मति सर्वदाप्य B ·हेत्वाभासाः। ७ 10 ऽद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः सर्वदा तत्त्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुप- त्वात् । १२ ॥ एतेऽसिद्धभेदा यदोभयवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षिवास्तदो- भयाऽसिद्धा भवन्ति । यदा त्वन्यतरवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदा- न्यतराऽसिद्धा भवन्ति ॥ विरुद्धभेदास्तु सति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः ॥ पक्षविपक्षव्या-B पको यथा निसः शब्दः कार्यत्वात् । १ । विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः पक्ष- व्यापको यथा नित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियमा- धत्वात् । २ । पक्षविपक्षकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीय- कत्वात् । ३ । परैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा नित्या पृथिवी - तकत्वात् । ४। असति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः ॥ पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथाss- काशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । १ । पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेश- यत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेपगुणः शब्दः कार्यत्वात् । २ । पैक्षविपक्षकदे- शवृत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । ३ । विपक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तियथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दोऽपदात्मक-15 स्वात् । ४। ननु चत्वार एव विरुद्धभेदा नान्ये तेपामसिद्धलक्षणोपन्नत्वेना- ऽसिद्धत्वात् । नैप दोप उभयलक्षणोपपन्नत्वेनोभयव्यवहारविपयत्वात् तुलायां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारवत् ॥ अनैकान्तिकभेदास्तु । पक्षनयन्यापको यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेय-20 त्वात् । १ । पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । २ । पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽयं गौ- 1 Domits भवन्ति. 2 वाह्यन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् C, D. 3 जयसिंह puts this as second and not third and so docs D. 4 Domits न. 5 पक्षकदेशवृत्तिविपक्षव्यापक: B. 6 Bomits ते. 7 लक्षणोपपन्नत्वात् , D. 8 गौरव' D.

·६ न्यायसारः। विपाणित्वात् । ३ । पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः, सपक्षकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नायं गौर्विपाणित्वात् । ४ । पक्षत्रयैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽनित्या पृथिवी प्रत्यक्ष- वात् । ५ । पक्षसपक्षैकदेशयत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा द्रव्याणि दिका- लमनांसि अमूर्तत्वात् । ६ । पक्षविपक्षकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापको । यथा न द्रव्याणि दिकालमनांस्वमूर्तत्वात् । ७ । सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः पक्षकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा न द्रव्याण्याकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशे- पगुणरहितत्वात् ॥ ८॥ अनध्यवसितभेदास्तु । अविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्त्वान् । १ । अविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षकदेशवृत्ति- 10 यथा सर्वमनित्यं कार्यत्वात् । २ । विद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्या- पको यथाऽनित्यः शब्द आकाशविशेषगुणत्वात् । ३। विद्यमानसप- क्षविपक्षः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्व द्रव्यमनियं क्रियावत्त्वात् । ४ । अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा सर्व कार्य नि- त्यमुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् । ५ । अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्षः पक्ष- 15 कदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्व कार्य नित्यं सावयवत्वात् । ६ । कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदास्तु । प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो यथाऽनुप्णोऽमिः कृतक- त्वात् । १ । अनुमानविरुद्धो यथाऽनित्याः परमाणवो मूर्तत्वान् । २ । आगमविरुद्धो यथा ब्राह्मणेन सुंग पेया द्रवद्रव्यत्वात् क्षीरवत् । ३ । प्रत्यक्षैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्व तेजोऽनुष्णं रूपित्वात् । ४ । अनुमा- 20 नैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा नित्याऽऽश्रया द्रवत्वरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शा नित्या अ- प्रदेशवृत्तिसमानजात्यारंभकत्वे सति परमाणुवृत्तित्वात् तद्गतैकत्ववत् 1५1 आगमैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्वेषां देवीणां शरीराणि पार्थिवानि शरीरत्वादस्मदादिशरीरवत् । ६। 1 तन'.. 2 c omits # which is a mistake as shown by the commentary. 3 परमाणवो निसा मूतत्वा . 4 पेये मुरादि . w ·उदाहरणम् । १९ प्रकरणसमस्योदाहरणं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वा- सपक्षवत् । नित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात् सपक्षवत् ।। - एकत्र तुल्यलक्षणविरुद्धहेतुद्वयोपनिपातो विरुद्धाऽव्यभिचारीत्येके यथा नियमाकाशमर्मूर्तस्वादात्मवत् । एवमंनित्यमाकाशमस्मदादि- वाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणाधारत्वात् घटवदिति ॥ स खलु पुरुषविशेषमपे. । क्षमाणो हेत्वाभासो भवत्यन्यतरासिद्धवत् ॥ सम्यग्दृष्टान्ताभिधानमुदाहरणम् । तहिविधम् साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभे- दात् ।। तत्रान्वयमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं साधम्र्योदाहरणं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दस्तीवादिधर्मोपेतत्वात् । यद्यत्तीवादिधर्मोपेतं तत्तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा सुखादिः ॥ व्यतिरेकमुसेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं वैधर्योदाहरणम् । यदु-10 नियं न भवति तत्तीवादिधर्मोपेतमपि न भवति यथाकाशमिति ।। एतेनोदाहरणाभासानामनुदाहरणत्वमुक्तं भवति ॥ उदाहरणलक्ष- णरहिता उदाहरणवदाभासमाना उदाहरणाभासास्ते चानेकप्रकाराः ॥ यथा चाऽनित्यं मनो मूर्तत्वादियस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे सर्वेप्युदाहरणाभासा उच्यन्ते ॥ यन्मूर्त तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा परमाणुरिति साध्यविकलः। १।15 यथा कर्मेति साधनविकलः । २ । यथाऽऽकाशमित्युभयविकलः।३। 1 तुल्यलक्षण B. तुल्यक्षण c. नित्सा. न्यस C. 3 अमूर्तत्वाद B.C. अमूर्तद्रव्य- त्वा D. 4 एवम्. B. C. omits एवम्. 5 'माणो B. माणो. 6 Donits न. 7 Domits एतेन भवति. 8 'दित्येतसि p. 9 Domits एच. 10 B here quotes a passage from the commontary of जयासेह. २ ·१० न्यायसारः 1 यथा सपुष्पमित्याश्रयहीनः । ४ । पटवदित्यव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । ५ । यदनित्यं तन्मूर्त दृष्टमिति विपरीतव्यात्यमिधानम् । ६ । इत्येतो व- चनदोपौ ॥ यत्त्वनित्यं न भवति तन्मूर्तमपि न भवति यथा परमा- पुरिति साधनाऽच्यावृत्तः । ७ । यथा कर्मेति साभ्याऽव्यावृत्तः । ८। 5 यथा घट इत्युभयाऽव्यावृत्तः । ९ । यथा सपुष्पमित्याश्रयहीनः॥१०॥ आकाशवदित्यव्यात्यमिधानम् । ११ । यन मूर्त तदनित्यं न भवति यथाऽऽकाशमिति विपरीतल्यात्यभिधानम् । १२ । इत्येतो वचन- दोपौ ॥ अत्राद्याः पट् साधर्योदाहरणाभासाः । इतरे पट वैधयो- दाहरणाभासा इति । अन्ये तु संदेहद्वारेणाऽपरानष्टावुर्दाहरणाभासा- 10 न्यर्णयंति ॥ संदिग्धसाध्यो यथा महाराज्यं करिप्यत्ययं सोमवंशोभू- तत्वाद्विवक्षितराजपुरुपवदिति । १३ । संदिग्धसाधनो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो रागादिमत्त्वाद्रध्यापुरुषवत् । १४ । संदिग्धोभयो यथा स्वर्ग गमिष्यत्ययं विवक्षितः पुरुषः समुपार्जितशुक्लधर्मत्वादपरिचितदेवद. न्तपुत्रवत् । १५ । संदिग्धाश्रयो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो वहुवतकत्वात् 18 भविष्यदेवदत्तपुत्रवत् । १६ । संदिग्धसाध्याऽव्यावृत्तो यथा यो म- हाराज्यं न करिष्यति स सोमवंशोद्भूतो न भवति यथाऽन्यो राज- पुरुषः । १७ । संदिग्धसाधनाच्यावृत्तो यथा यस्तु सर्वज्ञः स रागा- दिरहितो यथा समस्तशास्त्राभिज्ञ इति । १८ । संदिग्धोभयाव्यावृत्तो यथा यः स्वर्ग न गमिष्यति स समुपार्जितशुधर्मोऽपि न भवति 1 शशविषाणम् C. D3; पुष्ण B. 7 p omits इनि. 2 आश्रयविकल: D.. 8 अष्टानुदा B. अष्टायुदा C. D. घटवदिति व्याप्त्यनभिधानम् । र, 9 देवदत्तवत् C.D; अपरिचितदेवदत्त. 4 य य R, यन्नि' c. D; पुत्रवत् B. 5nomits न भवति. 10 वकृत्वात् . 6 पदमूर्त . 11 तोपि B. D.

·उपनयनिगमने । यथा दुःस्थः पुरुषः । १९ । संदिग्धाश्रयो यथा यः सर्वज्ञः स बहु- वक्ता न भवति यथा भविष्यदेवदत्तपुत्रः । २० ।। "दृष्टान्ते प्रसिद्धाऽविनाभावस्य साधनस्य दृष्टान्तोपमानेन पक्षे व्याप्तिापकं वचनमुपनयः ॥ से पूर्ववहिविधः । तथाच तीव्रादि. धर्मोपेतः शब्द इति साधम्योपनयः । न तथा च तीवादिधर्मोपेतः 5 शब्दो न भवतीति वैधम्योपेतः ।। उपनयानंतरं सहेतुकं प्रतिज्ञावचनं निगमनं । तस्मादनिस ए- वेति ॥ न चेदमनर्थकम् । साध्यविरुद्धाभावप्रतिपादकप्रमाणसूचक- त्वादिति । न च तदंतरेण साध्यावधारणमुपपद्यते । तथा चोक्तम् ॥ विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णय इति । गौ. सू. 10 १-१-४१.॥ निगमनामिधानमसाधनांगमभ्युपगम्य बाधकं प्रमाणमभ्युपगच्छतो निग्रहस्थानं प्रसज्येत । निगमनार्थत्वाद्वाधकस्य । निगमनार्थविप्रति- पत्तौ हि बाधकप्रमाणोपन्यासोऽभ्युक्तो हेत्वर्थविप्रतिपत्ती तत्साधक- प्रमाणोपन्यासवदिति ॥ सोयं परमो न्यायो विप्रतिपन्नपुरुषप्रतिपाद-15 कत्वात् कथाप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाच ।। वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः कथा । सा द्विविधा वीत- रागकथा विजिगीपुकथा चेति । यत्र वीतरागो वीतरागेण सह तत्व- . 1 स बहुवक्ता न भवति C. D; सो-/पादकप्रमाणाभावसूचकत्वाद. उवधं न वदति B; 5 B omits T. 2 प्रतिपादक D. ख्यापक C. 6 °भ्युक्तो B. युक्तो C. D; .3 D omits this whole 7 नोः . R; B; phrase. 8 प्रतिपक्षमहः B. प्रतिपक्षपरिमदः 4 Raghaya quotes anoth- C. R. er reading riz, साध्यविरुद्धप्रति.

·न्यायसारः। निर्णयार्थ साधनोपालंभी फरोति सा वीतरागफया चादसंशयवोच्यते। तथा चोक्तं ॥ प्रमाण-तर्कसाधनोपालंमः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पंचावयवोपपन्नः पक्ष- प्रतिपक्षपरिप्रहो वादः ॥ गौ. सू. १-२-१. 5 तं प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनमपि वा कुर्यात् । प्रयोजनार्थित्वेन यथा शिष्यो गुरुणा सह प्रश्नद्वारेणेवेत्यर्थः ॥ यत्र विजिगीपुर्विजिगीपुणा सह लाभपूजाख्यातिकामो जयपराजयार्थ प्रवर्तते वीतरागो वा परा. अनुप्रहार्थ ज्ञानांकुरसंरक्षणार्थ च प्रवर्तते सा चतुरंगा वादिप्रतिवादि- सभापतिप्राभिकांगा विजिगीपुकथा जल्पवितंडासंज्ञोक्ता ।। तथाचाह तत्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थ जल्पवितण्डे वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थ कंटक- शाखावरणवत् । गौ. सू. ४.२-५०.॥ यथोक्कोपपनश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः । गौ. सू. १-२-२.॥ स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा । गौ. सू. १-२-३.॥ वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् । गौ. सू. १-२.१० ॥ तत्रिविधम् वाक्छलं सामान्यछलमुपचारच्छलं चेति । गौ. सू. १-२-११॥ 10 15 यथा अविशेष हितेऽर्थे वक्तरमिप्रायर्यादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् । 20 गौ. सू. १-२-१२ ॥ नवकम्बलोयं माणवक इत्युक्ते छलवाद्याह कुतो नवकंवला इति । . 1 प्रमाणातक 1, प्रमाणतर्क C. R3; 2 Bomits जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्र. रोदसंरक्षणार्थ, 3 यथोपलक्षणोपपन्न 1. 4 °प्रायापरिज्ञानाद B, C.

·छलम् । --- - तस्याऽप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणं निप्रस्थानं वाच्यं नवः कंबलोऽस्येतिवार- भिप्रायाऽपरिज्ञानाद्वा विप्रतिपत्तेर्वा विपरीतज्ञानादिति ॥ संभवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना , सामान्यच्छ- लम् ॥ गौ. सू. १-२-१३ ॥ अहो न खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणश्चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञ इत्युक्ते केनचिच्यायवाचाह 5 किमत्राश्चर्य संभवति हि ब्राह्मणे चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञत्वमित्यन च्छलवायाह न ब्रात्येनानैकान्तिकत्वात् । तस्याऽपि पूर्ववन्निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यम् । कस्माद्धेतुत्वेनाऽविवक्षितत्वात् । किं तर्हि । ब्राह्मणत्वे सति चतुर्वेदा- भिज्ञत्वमाश्चर्यकारणं न भवति सुक्षेत्रशालिसंपद्वत् ।। उपचारप्रयोगे मुख्यार्थकल्पनया प्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् । यथा 10 भश्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्युक्ते च्छलवाद्याह पुरुपाः क्रोशन्ति न मञ्चास्तेपा- मचेतनत्वात् । इति तस्याऽपि निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यं पूर्ववत् । उभयथा- ऽपि लोके शास्त्रे च प्रयोगदर्शनादिति ।। प्रयुक्त हेतौ समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसंगो जातिः ॥ पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानमिति बहवश्वानयोः सूक्ष्मा भेदास्तेषां कियन्तो भेदा लक्ष-15 णोदाहरणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यन्ते ।। साधर्म्यवैधाभ्यामुपसंहारे सद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः साधर्म्यवैधयं. समौ । गौ. सू. ५-१.२. ॥ यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्धटवदित्युक्ते जातिवाद्याह यद्यनि- त्यघटसाधात्कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्द इष्यते तर्हि नित्याकाशसाध-20 ादमूर्तत्वान्नित्यः प्राप्नोति यदि च नित्याकाशवैधात्कृतकत्वाद- नित्य इष्यते तर्हि घटाद्यनित्यवैधादमूर्तत्वान्नित्यः प्राप्नोति विशेषा- 1 वादिप्रतिपत्तिा B, वा विप्रति- पत्तेवा" c. D; वा विप्रतिपत्सिर्वा R; 2 न° B,CT R. D. ३ हेतृत्वस्या' D; हेतुत्वेना B. C. 4 °तीत्यभिप्राय 5तेः गौ. D; ति: B. O. 6 D. omits तदि. 7 मूल तर्हि' D.

·न्यायसारः। - भावात् । अनयोगत्तरम् । अविनाभाविनः साधर्म्यस्य वैधर्म्यस्य च हेतुत्वाभ्युपगमादप्रसंगो धूमादिवत् ।। साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्द्धमविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाचोत्कर्षापकर्पवावर्ण्य- विकल्पसाध्यसमाः। सू. ५.१.४.॥ साध्ये दृष्टान्तादनिष्टधर्मप्रसंग उत्कर्षसमः ॥ इष्टधर्मनिर्वृत्तिरपक- सिमः । यदि मृतकत्वाद्बटवदैनित्यशब्द इप्यते तदां घटवदेव सा. वयवोऽपि स्यात् । अर्थ नैवमनित्योऽपि तर्हि न स्यादविशेषादिति । अश्रावणश्च घटो दृष्टः शब्दोपि श्रावणो न स्यादविशेपादिति । शब्दो यदि कृतकत्वाऽनुमानेनाऽनित्यो वर्ण्यते तदा घटोऽपि कृतकत्वाऽनु- 10 मानेनाऽनित्यो वर्यः स्यात् । घटस्तेनैवानुमानेनानियो वर्ण्यते ततः शब्दोप्यवर्ण्यः स्यादविशेषादिति वर्ष्यावर्यसमौ ॥ कृतकत्वाऽविशे- पेऽपि यथामूर्तत्वाऽमूर्तत्वादिधर्मविकल्पस्तथा नित्यत्वाऽनित्यत्वविक- सोऽपि स्यादविशेषादिति विकल्पसमः ॥ यदि कृतकत्वादुभयोरनि- त्यत्वं तर्हि साध्यत्त्वमुभयोः स्यान्न वा कस्यचिदविशेपादिति साध्यसैमः।। 15 एतेपामुत्तरं । किंचित्साधादुपसंहारे सिद्धधम्यादप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-५ ॥ किंचित्साधाभूमवत्त्वादिलक्षणात्साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पेऽपि व्यवस्था दृष्टा । तदपलापे लोकादिविरोधः सर्वाऽनुमानानामप्रामाण्य- प्रसंगश्चेति ॥ 1 "पकर्षवर्ध्यावय विवरपसाध्यसमाः c. गौ. R. "पकर्षविकल्पसमा: B. 2 दि° B.द... D. 3दि B. द... D. 4तथा B. तदा C. D. 5 अधाने B, G'B. 7 This is the reading of R and c. omits, certainly by mistake, मावणो न सात्"शब्दो. 8षो B.C. तक्त्वादि. 9 साभ्यत्व तदा D. 10 c.omits साध्यसमः. 11°°.

·जतियः । 5 10 प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्याऽविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्याऽसाधक- त्याच प्रात्यप्राप्तिसमौ । गौ. सू. ५-१-७ ।। यद्ययं हेतुः प्राप्य साध्यं साधयेत्तदोभयोः प्राप्स्यविशिष्टत्वादंगु- ल्योरिव किं कस्य साध्यं साधनं चेति । अप्राप्यसाधको नास्ति का- छादग्निवदिति ॥ अनयोरुत्तरम् । घटादि-निष्पत्ति-दर्शनात्पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिपेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-८॥ प्रात्यप्राप्त्यविशेषेऽपि प्रतिनियतार्थवृत्तय एवैते साध्यसाधनत्यादयो धर्मा दृष्टास्ते निराकर्तुमशक्याः सर्वप्रमाणविरोधादिति ।। प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१२ ।। यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वादित्युक्ते प्रागुत्पत्तेरनित्यत्वे कारणं ना. स्तीति नित्यः प्रसक्तः । तस्योत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् । तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१३ ॥ अनुत्पन्नः शब्द एव नास्ति कैस्य नित्यत्वादिधर्माश्चिन्यन्ते ।। त्रैकाल्याऽसिद्धेहेतोरहेतुसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१८ ॥ यदि पूर्व साधनमसति साध्ये कस्य साधनम् । अर्थं युगपत्तथापि किं कस्य साधनं साध्यं वा द्वयोस्तुल्यकालत्वादिति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् । न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धे प्रवृत्त्यादिविरोध इति सूत्रार्थः । प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेश्च त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः । स्वमतेनैव प्रतिषेधासिद्धौ हेतुसिद्धिरिति सूत्रार्थः ।। 20 एकधर्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाऽविशेषप्रसंगात्सद्भावोपपत्तिरविशेष- समः । गौ. सू. ५-१-२३॥ 15 1 परिहारम् . 2°दुत्पत्रस्य शम्दस C. 3 तेन्न कारणप्रतिषेधः, गौ., B. C. and D. omitन कारण. 4 कुतस्तस्य पक्षता इति शेष. R. 5 पवादविद्यमान का साधनमय. 6 खवचनेन . 7 प्रतिषेधस्यासिदौ . 8 B omits ए.

·न्यायसारः। ज यथा यदि घटशब्दयोरेफैकस्य कार्यत्वस्योपपत्तेरनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेष इप्यते सर्वभावानां तर्हि सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषः प्रसज्यत इति ।। अने- दुमुच्यते । सर्वथाऽविशेष प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । अनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेपे त्व- नुमानागमविरोधः । केनचिदविशेपे प्रमेयत्वादिना सिद्धसाधनमिति ।। निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलभादुपलब्धिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-२७ पृथिव्यादिपु कार्यत्वसिद्धये निर्दिष्टस्य सावयवस्याऽभावेऽपि धु- ध्यादौ कार्यत्वमुपलब्धमिति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् । सपकदेशस्यापि धूमा- देर्गमकत्वदर्शनादप्रतिषेध इति ।। कथं तर्हि बुद्ध्यादी कार्यत्वसिद्धिरत आह । कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः । प्रमाणान्तरादपि 10 कार्यत्वसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥ प्रमाणान्तरं वाऽनुपलब्धिकारणेप्वसत्सु प्रा. गूर्ध्व वाऽनुपलंभात् घटवदिति ॥ तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलंभादभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-२९॥ तस्य बुद्धयादिकार्यस्याऽनुपलब्धेनुपलंभादभावसिद्धावनुपलब्धिवि- 15 परीतोपलब्ध्युपपत्तेः प्रागूर्ध्वमपि बुद्ध्यादेः सद्भावः सेत्स्यतीत्यभि- प्रायः ॥ अस्योत्तरम् अनुपलंभात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः । गौ. सू. ५-१-३५ ।। 1 Bomits यदि Commits यथा- Dhas यथा यदि. "रेकस्य ३. रेकैकस्स . 3 Dormits one whole line from रनित्यत्वेन....... सद्भावोपपञ्चे: तो . 5 विशेषेऽपि D. 6°षेऽनुमाना D.त्यनुमाना c.D. 7 Coinits आगम. 8 सावयवत्वस्य ०. 9 गमत्व B. 10 "दे: D. 11 द्विरिति C. 12 बार्यत्वादि . 13 वा B.C, चा. 14 C. omits this whole line. 15 विपरीतोपलम्ध्युपपत्तेः . 16 c.omits रनुपलभा लम्धिा 17 वुयादिसद्भावः . 18 °दनुपलब्धेः गो. D; लम्धिः .

·निग्रहस्थानानि । नास्तीति ज्ञानमनुपलब्धिः सा तत्स्वभावतया प्रत्यात्मसंवेद्या त- सदनुपलब्धिरसिद्धेत्यभिप्रायः ।। नित्यमनित्यभावादुनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेनित्यसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-३५॥ अनित्यत्वधर्मस्य नित्यं सर्वदा सद्धावे धर्मिणोऽपि शब्दस्य सर्वदा । सद्भावः । अथाऽनित्यत्वं सर्वदा नास्ति तथाप्यनित्यत्वाभावानाऽनित्यः शब्द इति ।। अस्योत्तरम् । अनित्यत्वस्य सर्वदाऽभ्युपगमे नित्यत्ववि- रोधः । अनभ्युपगमे चाऽसिद्धो हेतुः । प्रध्वंसश्चानित्यत्वं तव तस्मि- न्सति शब्दसद्भाव इति । एतेनान्यत्वस्यात्मनोऽनन्यत्वादन्यत्वं नास्ती- त्यादीन्यसदुत्तराणि प्रत्युक्तानि । निमित्तान्तरात्संज्ञान्तरे योज्यमाने-10 ऽर्थे तथाभावस्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ॥ आनन्त्यान सर्वाण्यपि जात्युत्तराण्युदाहर्तुं शक्यन्ते । सूत्राणामप्युदाहरणार्थत्वादित्युक्ता जा- तिभेदाः॥ अथेदानीं निग्रहस्थानान्युच्यन्ते । तान्यपि विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्त्यो- विकल्पादसंख्यौनि । अतः संक्षेपतो व्युत्पाद्यन्ते ।। प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्व- न्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं" पु. नरुकमननुभाषणमझानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुक्षा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ।। 15 1 संवेधा B. D. वेद्या.. 7 D omits this. तदनुपलम्धि.तत्सदनुपलब्धि... 8 भ्युपगमे ० 'भ्युपगमाव D. D, 3", (गो) सि. C. 9n&c. omit. मिति...पि- 4 भनित्यधर्मस्य अनित्यत्वध- बसा. 10 B. 5 सझाने B.D; सहावा. 11 असंरयानि 1, भसंख्यातानि . 6 तथाप्यनित्यत्वात्सिःशष्दति . 19 अधिकः ॥ अपिरम् D.O. (गो.) ३ मेस्सc.

·१८ न्यायसारः। तत्र साध्ये प्रतिष्टान्तधर्मानुज्ञा प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ॥ यथा यदि कृत- कत्वाद् घटवदनित्यः शब्द इयते ताफाशवदमूर्तत्वामित्यः किमे- प्यते । एवं प्रतिवादिनोको बाधाह । भवतु किं नो बाधव इति । तस्य नित्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमेनाऽनिल्यत्वप्रतिज्ञा हीयत इत्यतः प्रतिज्ञाहा. निनिग्रहस्थानं भवति ॥१॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्यै प्रतिषेधे धर्मविकरपात्तदर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ।। यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्वादित्यत्र दृष्टान्ताऽभावेन प्रतिक्षातार्थ-प्रतिपेधे धर्मों विवादास्पदीभूतलक्षणस्तस्य विकल्पः प्रतिज्ञातार्थविशेषणत्वेन योजनं । तदर्थ इति प्रतिषेधनिवृत्त्यर्थः। "निर्देशो विशेषणामिधानं विवादा- 10 स्पदीभूतं सर्वमनित्यमित्येतत्प्रतिज्ञान्तरं निप्रहस्थानं हेत्वन्तरवत् ॥२॥ प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिक्षाविरोधः । गौ. सू. ५.२.४ ॥ यथा गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं भेदेनानुपलंभावित् ।। ३ ।। पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थाऽपनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः । गौ. सू. ५-२-५ ॥ यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निरित्येतस्य पक्षविरोधित्वेन प्रतिषेधे वा- 16 चाह । संपश्यध्वमहो मध्यस्था नाहमनुष्णमनिं प्रवीम्यनुक्कोपालंभो. यमित्येत्प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासलक्षणं निहस्थानम् ॥ ४॥ अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिपिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरनिग्रहस्थानम् ।। । 1 धर्माभ्यनुशा' (गौतम better reading) धर्मानुशा R. B. D. 3 कार्यत्वात् R. न चावास B. नन्वाकाश° D. 4 "क्ते B, D. 5 बोध्यतेति D. 6 भविष्यति . 7 प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे (गौ,) प्रति- छाताधस्य प्रतिषेधे C, B. 8 प्रतिहातार्थस्य 9 धर्मादित्वा B. 10 भूतत्वाल C. 11 प्रतिशातार्थ B प्रतिज्ञा 12 0&D insert यथामशकायों धूम इति before निर्देशो', 13 c.omits विशेषणाभिधानम्, 14 C. omits घटवर 15 अनुष्णोग्निः कृतक्रत्वाद. 16 c omits पक्षविरोपिखेन'. 17 प्रतिषेध B. प्रतियेथे C. D. 18 B. omits निग्रहस्सानम्.

·निग्रहस्थानानि । १९ यथा नित्या चेदा अमर्यमाणकृतकत्वादियेतस्यै जीर्णरूपांऽऽरामादि- मिरनैकान्तिकलेन प्रतिषेधे संप्रदायविच्छेदे सतीति विशेषणमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरं निग्रहस्थानम् । पूर्वस्याऽसाधकस्योपादानात् ॥ ५ ॥ प्रकृतादादप्रतिसंयन्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-७ ॥ यथा नित्यः शब्दोऽस्पर्शवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । हेतुश्च हिनोतेर्धातोः तुनि प्र.. त्यये सति कृदन्तं पदमित्यादिप्रसकानुप्रसत्या प्रकृतार्थाऽनुपयोगि- शालान्तरमुपदिशतोऽर्थान्तरं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ ६॥ वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवनिरर्थकम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-८ ॥ यथा नित्यः शम्दः कचतटपानां गजवडवत्वात् घाटधभवत् ॥७॥ परिपत्पतिवादिभ्यां निरनिहितमप्यतीतमविज्ञातार्थ ॥ यथा य-10 द्वाक्यं त्रिरमिहितमप्यप्रतीतप्रयोगाऽतिद्वतोचारितादिना निमित्तेन परिपत्प्रतिवाविभ्यां न ज्ञायते तदज्ञानसंवरणायोक्तमविज्ञातार्थ निम- हस्थानम् ॥ ८॥ पौर्वापर्याऽयोगादप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमपार्थकम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१० ।। यथा दशदाडिमानि षडपूपाः कुण्डमजाजिनमित्यादिः ॥९॥ अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-२१॥ प्रतिज्ञा. दीनामर्थवशात्क्रमस्तेषां विपर्ययेणाभिधानं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥१०॥ हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् । भावे साध्यसिद्धरयोगात् ॥ ११ ॥ 15 सू. ५-२-१२ ।। साधना- 1दित्यस्य D. 7 सालान्तरन्. C. D. शासायं B. पोB पारामा c. D. Ra 8 अविज्ञात (गो.) ghar explains मारामादिमिरुपयन:. 9 गादितोचा 3 D. inserts eat. 10 हीनमध्यतिमेनावयवेन c. हीन सा B. मन्यतमेनाप्यायवेन B. D. गो. 5 साम्योरपक्ष c. 11 सापनापसिद्धरयोगादित B. D. 6 पदच नामास्यानोपमर्गनिपालभेश-साधनाभावेसाभ्यसिद्धरयोगाद.८ अनुर्विधनि D.

·२० न्यायसारः। हेतूदाहरणाभ्यामधिकम् ॥ एकेन कृतत्वादितराऽऽनर्थक्यादिति ॥ १२॥ शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादास् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१४ ॥ सार्थक पुनरभिधानमनुवादस्वव्यतिरेकेण पुनर्वचनं पुन- 5 रुक्तम् । यथा नित्यः शब्दो नित्यः शब्द इति शब्दपुनरुक्तम् ॥ अ- र्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुतम् ॥ साधोदाहरणेऽमिहिते वैधयोदाहरणाऽभिधानमिति । कथं तन्निप्रहस्थानम् । कथावसानवि- रोधित्वादेकेन कृतार्थत्वादितरानर्थक्यात् ।। १३ ॥ विज्ञातस्य परिपदा निरनिहितस्याऽप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुर्भापणं प्रसि- 10 वादिनो निमहस्थानम् । अप्रत्युचारयन्किमाश्रयः परपक्षप्रतिपेधं यू- यादिति ॥ १४ ॥ अविज्ञातार्थ चाज्ञानम् ।। यच्च वाक्यं त्रिरभिहितमपि परिपदाऽ- वगतार्थ प्रतिवादी प्रत्युचारयन्नार्थतः सम्यगधिगच्छति तदज्ञानं नाम निमहस्थानं भवति ॥ १५॥ कथामभ्युपगम्य तूष्णीभावोऽप्रतिभा वादिप्रतिवादिनोनिग्रहस्था- नम् ॥ १६॥ कार्यव्यासंगाकथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः । गौ. सू. ५-२-१६ ॥ क- थामभ्युपगम्य सभ्येषु मिलितेपु ब्रवीत्यद्य मे महत्प्रयोजनमस्ति त- स्मिन्नवसिते पश्चात्कथयिष्यामीति ॥ १७ ॥ 20 स्वपक्षदोपाभ्युपगमात्परपेक्षदोपो" मतानुज्ञा ।। यः स्वपक्षे मना- 15 .. 1c.& गौ omit भ्याम्. 2 कतकत्वाद B. 3c and padd here नित्यो. ध्वनिरविनाशीशब्द इति पुनरुक्तम्. 4 कृताधैत्वात् D कृतत्वात् । 5c. inserts here नाम, 6 व्याद् (वा.) कुर्यात् B, D. 7 अपिशातार्थमशानम्.. चाशा- नम् 0.D अविशात चाज्ञान (गो.) 8cand Domit भवति. 9 स्वपक्षे, स्वपक्षB.गी. 10 परपक्ष B.C. परपक्षे. (गो.) 11 दोपो . B. दोषप्रसंगो. (गो.)

·5 निग्रहस्थानानि । २१ गपि दोप न परिहरति केवलं परपक्षे दोप' प्रसजयति । भवाश्चोर इत्युक्ते त्वमपि चोर इति । तस्येद निग्रहस्थानम् । स्वय दोषाभ्युपगमात् ॥१८॥ निग्रहप्राप्तस्याऽनिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ॥ पर्यनुयोज्यो नाम निग्रहोपपत्त्या चोदनीयस्तस्योपेक्षण निग्रह्माप्तौ सत्यामननुयोग इति । एतदुभाभ्यामनुक्तया परिपंदा वक्तव्यम् ॥ १९ ॥ अनिग्रहस्थाने निप्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोन्याऽनुयोगः ॥ यथा सावयवत्वेन पृथिव्यादेः कार्यत्वसिद्धौ परो ब्रूयादप्रयोजकोय हेत्वा- भास इति । तस्येद मिथ्याऽमियोगलक्षणं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ २० ॥ सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्याऽनियमात् कथाप्रसगोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ यथा मी- मासामभ्युपगम्य कश्चिदग्निहोत्र स्वर्गसाधनमित्याह । कथ पुनरमि-10 होकियाध्वस्ता सती स्वर्गस्य साधिका भवतीत्यनुयुक्तः प्राह । - नया किययाऽऽरोधितो महेश्वरः फल ददाति राजादिवत् । तस्येश्व- रानभ्युपगमादपसिद्धान्तो निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थविपर्ययस्तु प्र. तिज्ञाहानि पसिद्धान्तः ॥ २१ ॥ हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः । हेत्वाभासलक्षणेनैव यथोक्तेन हेत्वाभासा18 निप्रस्थानानि ॥ २२॥ एतेन दुर्वचनकपोलताडनवादित्रादीना साधनानुपयोगित्वेन निग्र- हस्थानत्व वेदितव्य । नियमकथायामपशब्दादीनामपि । इति न्यायसारे द्वितीय. परिच्छेदः॥ 1 दूषणम् 2c Dadd here परेणानभ्यु पगमा 3 निग्रह । निग्रहसानप्राप्तस' (गौ) 4 नोदनीय BCD चोदनीय (वा) 5 c omits this line 6 अनुक्तया अनुयुक्तया । (वा) 7 °दों B दाRD (वा) 8 'वासिौ B 9 पुरो 10 योगोलथणम् 0 11 तथा 19 क्रियाया B 13 त परमेश्वर B तो महेश्वर D.

·२२ न्यायसारः। अथावसितमनुमानमागमस्येदानी लक्षणमुच्यते ॥ समयबलेन स. म्यकपरोक्षानुभवसाधनमागमः ॥ स द्विविधो दृष्टाऽदृष्टार्थमेवात् । संत्र दृष्टार्थानां वाक्यानां प्रायेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्प्रामाण्यं गम्यते । अदृष्टार्थानां पुनराप्तोक्तेनेति ।। कथम् पुत्रकामो यजेतेत्यादि वाक्यानां प्रवृत्तिसामात्प्रामाण्यमनुमायं तत्प्रणेतुरतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शित्वेन परमा- मत्वमवधार्य तत्प्रणीतानां सर्ववाक्यानामप्रामाण्ये कारणाऽभावात्प्रा- माण्यमनुमीयत इति ॥ न नित्यत्वेन वाक्यानां हि नित्यत्वे प्रमाणा- भावात् । अनित्यं पुनर्वाक्यत्वाद्यनेकमनुमानं । सर्वदोपलव्ध्यनुपल- ब्धिप्रसंगश्चेति विपर्ययो नियामकाभावात् । तदनुपलब्धिरिति चेन्न तद- 10निर्देशात् ।। वायुसंयोगविभागाविति चेन सर्वशब्दानां युगपदेप्रणप्र- संगात् । कथम् । श्रोत्रं तावत्समानेन्द्रियग्राहसमानदेशसमानधर्माप- नानी प्रहणाय प्रतिनियतसंस्कारसंस्कार्य न भवति इन्द्रियत्वाचक्षुर्वत् ।। शब्दा वा प्रतिनियतसंस्कार संस्कार्या न भवन्ति समानेन्द्रियप्रा- सत्वे सति युगपदिन्द्रियसंयत्वात् घटादिवत् । उत्पत्तिपक्षेप्ययं स- 15मानो दोप इति चेन्न मृत्पिडप्रदीपदृष्टान्ताभ्यां कारकव्यंजकवैधर्म्य. सिद्धेरित्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेनेति ॥ 1 अथवसित B. अवसित c. 2 दृष्टार्थाना D. दृष्टाना B. 3 गम्यते B.O. अवगम्यो D. 4 अदृष्टानां B. 5रत्येवमादि. D. 6 मीयते तत्र. 7 प्रामाण्याभावाद, 8 B. 9 विपर्यय D. 10 अभिव्यंजकाभावात्तदन C,D. 11 युगपदग्रहण B. युगपत्महण C.D. 12 °पनानामर्थानाम c. 13 सस्कार्य B.संस्कारसंस्काय.0.D. 14 सस्कार B. सस्कारक. D. 15 समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे इ.समानेन्द्रिय- ग्राशसमानदेशसमानधर्मापनले. 16 संबंधत्वात्. C. सबद्धत्वाव. B. 17 तम् B. न म.

·त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानि । ३ एवमेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानीति ॥ एष्वेवोपमानाऽर्थापत्तिसंभवा- ऽभावैतिह्यादीनामन्तर्भावः ॥ तत्र यथा गौरवं गवय इत्युपमानं शा- रदेऽन्तर्भूतम् । अनेन सहशी मदीया गौरित्युपमानमिति चेन्न तस्य स्मृतित्वात् ॥ पूर्वमेवहि सादृश्यविशिष्ट उपलब्धो गोपिण्डः । क- स्मात् । उपलब्धियोग्यत्वात् । अयोग्यत्वे वा न कदाचिदुपलभ्येता- 1 ऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ निर्विकल्पेन तु प्रत्यक्षेण पूर्व सादृश्यमुपलब्धं तेन तेदुः- पलब्ध्यमिमानो न भवति । निर्विकल्पकोपालंभेऽपि संस्कारसहकारि- सामादभावादिपु सविकल्पका स्मृतिर्दृष्टेति ।। संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिरथाऽभवचनकार्या । तथा प्रश्नोत्तरामिधा. नादन्यप्रमाणाऽनिर्देशात् ॥ अस्य गवयशब्दः संक्षेति प्रतिपत्तावुपमा-10 नसिद्धिस्तथाशब्दश्रवणादिति चेत् । एवं तर्हि गौरयमित्येवं संकेते कृतेऽस्य गोशब्दः संज्ञेति प्रतिपत्तौ प्रमाणान्तरं वाच्यम् । समान- न्यायत्वात् ॥ गोपिंडान्तरेऽपि संकेताहणे प्रमाणान्तराभिधानप्रसंग इति ॥ तथाशब्दानभिधानेऽपि प्रतिपादकप्रतिपाद्युयोरेवमेवाभिप्राय ईशस्य सर्वस्य गोशब्दः संज्ञेति सामादेवं प्रतिपत्तिरिति घेने 115 समानमेतदवापि गोसरशो गवय इति शब्दादुभयोरेवाभिप्रायो गो- 1 तत्र या तप' D. 11 तदों. पो. तदु D. 2शाग्दे B.C. शदे D. 12 D inserts प्रथमगोपिंटोपलभ- 3 स्मृतिस्वात् B. स्मृतलाद ०. यरिंगत्वोपनमार before निर्विकल्पक. 4 'मेव B. "मेवहि D. C. 13 'पलम .. 5 गौरपदापः उपलम्पो B.c. 14. D. omit संस्कार. 6 'स्वात् ।."स्वारसादश्यस्य D. 15 C. D. omit कृते. 7 pomits न. 16 प्रतिपत्रों मनिपाययो. 8 आष्टवर C. D. भदृष्टत्वाव 1. 17 'देव रा.प. 97. पुन: D. B. 18 चेन . 10 Dinstertshere गश्पशनार.1 19 रेवामि' D. "रेवममि C. D.

·२४ न्यायसारः। . । सशस्यार्थस्य गवयशब्दः संक्षेति सामयादेयं प्रतिपत्तिरिसि ॥ न घ प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽर्थे संज्ञासंझिसंबंधप्रतिपचिरप्रत्यक्षेऽपि शमादौ संज्ञासं- शिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनान् ।। सूत्रविरोध इति चेन्न प्रमाणनिमहस्थानाभ्यां दृष्टान्तहेत्वाभासादी- नामिव प्रयोजनक्शेन पृथगमिधानादिति । तर्हि प्रयोजनं वाच्यमु- च्यते । शब्दमामाण्यसमर्थन प्रयोजनम् । कथम् । केचिदाहुः प्रत्य- क्षानुमानविपयत्वे शब्दस्यानुवादकत्वमेव । अनुवादकं घाऽप्रमाणम् । तदविषयत्वे च संबंधाऽग्रहणादवाचकत्वम् पदार्थस्याप्रसिद्धत्वान्न च पदेन संबंधमणमिवरेतराश्रयत्वात् । वाफ्यार्थस्तु प्रसिद्धार्थानां पदा- 10र्थानामन्वयमात्रमिति ॥ तन्निराकरणार्थमुपमानं निदर्शनार्थत्वेन पृथ- गुक्तम् । यथा गवयार्थिनाऽप्रसिद्धगवयस्य प्रसिद्धगोसादृश्यमुपादा- योपमानाख्येन वाक्येन संज्ञासंनिसंवंधनतिपत्तिः क्रियते तथा कि- चिन्निमित्तमुपादाय शक्रादि-पदपदार्थयोरपीति । तस्मादन्यार्थत्वान सूत्रविरोधः ॥ परीक्षा चार्थापत्तिवत्प्रमाणस्य सतः प्रमाणेप्वंतर्भावज्ञापनार्थम् । अंतर्भावस्तु यथाभुतोऽप्यनुमान एवास्य निराकृतो नाऽऽगम इति ।। धतुष्ट्वामिधानं सूत्रेषु पंचत्वादिनिराकरणार्थ न त्रित्वप्रतिषेधार्थ । प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादतर्भावस्य ॥ त्रित्वाऽनमिधानादयुक्तमिति चेन्नाऽस्य 15 1 तर्दि B. एवं तर्हिD. 7 B here inserts the ph- 2 "त्वमेव लात् B. rase वाक्यं तु पदानामन्वयमात्रमिति. 3 This phrase is found 8 गवायार्थिना कार्याथिनो.. in D, B and comit it. 9 प्रसिद्ध Bअप्रसिद्धD, 4 अप्रसिद्धत्वात् ३. अवसिद्धत्वात p. 10 D omits सूत्रेपु. 5 प्रयत्वात् म. श्रयत्वप्रसगात् D. 11 लादिनिरा B, 'स्वनिरा D. 6 प्रसिद्धानामु, प्रसिमानामुp. 12 c omits बिल...यं.

·आगमविचारः। सूत्रकारस्यैवं स्वभावत्वात् स्वसिद्धान्तमपि कचिन्नाधत्ते । यथा कृत्स्नै- कदेशविकल्पादिनाऽवयविनिराकरणे विशिष्टानामूहादिशक्त्यतिशययु- क्तानामेवात्राधिकारः । तस्मात्स्थितमुपमानं शब्देऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥ अर्थापत्तरप्यनुमानेऽन्तर्भावोऽविनाभाववलेनार्थप्रतिपत्तिसाधनत्वा- त् । अन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्युक्ते सत्येवोपपद्यत इति लभ्यतेऽयमे-5 वाऽविनाभावः ॥ यत्र सामान्याऽऽकारेणाऽन्वयग्रहणं नास्ति यथा मुख्यकारणत्वाऽप्रतिबद्धशत्तयोस्तनापत्तिः पृथक्प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । तत्रापि केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानोऽव्यतिरेकात् । केवलव्यतिरेक्यर्थाप- त्तिरिति संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ अन्वयाऽभावान्नैतदनुमानमिति चेन्न केव- लान्वयिनो व्यतिरेकाऽभावे प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् । अपि वा प्रत्य-10 क्षादिभेदानां केनचिद्वैधर्येण भेदात्प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगः । तस्मादवि. नाभावयलेनैयार्थप्रतिपादकत्वादापत्तिरनुमानमिति ।। बहुसंख्याविषयत्वे सत्यल्पसंख्याविषयत्वस्य सर्वत्रोपलब्धत्वानानु- मानात्संभवो भिद्यत इति । अभावस्य तु निष्वपि यथासंभवेनान्तर्भावः । तथाहि । कौरवाद्य-15 भावप्रतिपत्तिरागमान् । आत्मादिपु रूपाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिरनुमानात् । 8 प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् D.°न प्रमा. मान्तर स्यात् B... I B adds here to 2 प्रा. वृत्ले c. D. 3 अवcि. D. अवयव B. 4 युक्तानामेवात्राधिकार: C. युका. विकारशापनार्थम्. B. 5 बलेन B. C. बलेनैव D. 6रभ्यते c. D. रक्ष्यवे B. 7 'मानाऽव्य . मानादल्या. 9 च C. D.वा B. 10 बहुस्वरल्या' .D. बहुसख्या . 11 पियस C.D. विषयत्व . 12 वारवाय' D. c. omits this whole phrase. देवाय B ·न्यायसारः । भूतलादिपु घटाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यक्षात् । इन्द्रियव्यापारभावभा- वित्वादिति ॥ अन्यत्र तद्भावमावित्वं पर्यवसितमिति चेन्न रूपादि- प्विव वाधकाऽभावात् ॥ संबंधाभावो वाधक इति चेन्न स्वपरपक्षयो. रसिद्धत्वात् स्वपक्षे तावद्रूपादिष्विवापरोक्षानुभवकार्यानुमेयो योग्य- 5 ताख्यः संवन्धः । परपक्षेऽपि संयुक्तविशेपणभावादिः ॥ संयोगसम- वायरहितस्य विशेषणविशेष्यभावानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न विशिष्टप्रत्ययवशेन तसिद्धिरिति ।। अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारंपर्यमैतिहमागमेऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥ यथेह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति । प्रयत्नजनिता शरीरतदवयवक्रिया चेष्टा सा नाट्यशास्त्रादिप्रसिद्धा समयबलेन पुरुपामिप्रायमर्थविशेषं च र्गमयंती नाऽऽगमाद्भिद्यते । लिप्यक्षरादर्थप्रतिपत्तिवदिति ॥ तदेवं व्यवस्थितमेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमा. णानीति ।। 10 किं पुनरेमिः प्रमाणैः प्रमातव्यमित्युच्यते । प्रमेयम् । किं लक्ष- 15 णम् । यद्विपयज्ञानमन्यज्ञानानामुपयोगित्वेनैव निःश्रेयससाधनं भवति 1 प्रत्यक्षात B. प्रत्यक्षत्वात् D. 8 एतानि त्रीण्येव B. एतत्रीण्येव c. Domits संबन्धः, 9 D here inserts इति तृती. 3: B.द्धिः . . योऽयमागमपरिच्छेदः. 4जनिता C. D. जन्या B. 10 'तन्य । उच्यते C. B. सन्य- 5 सा नाय्य C. D, अनादि B. | मित्युच्यते D. अनावशास्त्रादिसमयदलेन c. 11 विषय ज्ञानम् C.D. विषयज्ञानम् इ. 6 पुरषाभिप्रायविशेषम् । पुरषाभि- 12 ज्ञानामु B. शानानुपc. D. प्रायविशेषमर्थविशेपम् C. पुरुषामिप्रायमर्थ- 18 निःश्रेयसाग नि यससा- विशेषम् D धन . 7 गमयती B. गमयती D. C.

·प्रमेयविचार.। २७ तत्प्रमेयम् । तदेव तत्वतो ज्ञातव्यम् सर्वदा भावयितव्यं च । न की- टसंख्यादिवत् ज्ञानस्यानुपयोऽगित्वात् ॥ तंचतुर्विधम् । हेयं तस्य निर्वर्तकम् होनं तस्योपाय इति ॥ तत्र हेयं दुःखमनागतमेकविंशतिप्रकारकम् । शरीरं पडिन्द्रियाणि पड्डि- पयाः षड्बुद्धयः सुखं दुःसं चेति ॥ तत्र शरीर दुःसायतनत्वाहुः- खम् । इन्द्रियाणि विपया बुद्धयश्च तत्साधनभावात् । सुख दुःसानु पंगाहुःसम् । दुःस च वाधना पीडा संतापात्मकं मुख्यमेवेति ।। तस्य निर्वतकमसाधारणं कारणमविद्यातृष्णे धर्माधर्माविति । स- भ्यगध्यात्मविद्भिः प्रदर्शितार्थविपरीतज्ञानमविद्या ॥ सहसस्कारेण पुनर्भवप्रार्थना तृष्णा ।। सुखदुःसयोरसाधारणौ हेतू धर्माधर्माविति ॥10 हानं दुःसविच्छेदः। आत्यन्तिकमिति न कदाचित्कथंचिदुःखसवधः।। तस्योपायस्तत्वज्ञानमात्मविपयम् ॥ तथा चोत्तम् अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यश्चेति । श्रोतव्यः श्रु- तिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्वोपपत्तिमिः । ज्ञात्वा च सतत ध्येयः एते दर्शनहेतवः । तरति शोकमात्मविदिति ।। स द्विविधः । परश्चापरश्च । तथा चोक्तम् । "द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये परं चापर चेत्यादिः ॥ तत्रैश्वर्यविशिष्टः ससारधमैरीपदप्यसंस्पृष्टः परो भगवान्महेश्वरः सर्वतः सकलजगद्विधाता । स कथं ज्ञातव्यः । आत्मा वा 15 . 1°नुपयोगात् 'नुपयोगित्वा BD 8 च। तुCD तत् प्रमेयम् . 9 प्रार्थना B प्रार्थनम् c 3 विनिववकम् निधिम् c. 10 D has नया चोतन् । निवर्दैवम् (जयसिंह). omts it हीनं । हानम् 11 °सम्पृष्ट है पृष्ठ c. 5 प्रचार प्रसारन 1:Daserts after महेश्वर, 6 तस्मापने भावादु सम् D तस्मापन- and before सव , परमेश्वयविरिष्ट. भावाद संसारधन रागदेषमोहन सादिमिगपदप्य- 7 मुखम् B.C, मुसमपि । स्पृशोनादि ·२८ न्यायसारः। 5 अनुमानादागमाच ॥ तथाहि विवादाध्यासितमुपलब्धिमत्कारणकमभू- स्वाभावित्वाद्वस्त्रादिवदिति । सामान्यव्याप्तेरनवद्यतेन निराकर्तुमश- क्यत्वात् । ततः सामान्यसिद्धौ पारिशेपात्कार्यविशेपाच कर्तृविशेष. सिद्धिः चित्रादिकार्यविशेषात्कर्तृविशेषसिद्धियत् ।। एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थुर्य इमान्लोकानीशित ईशिनी- मिरित्यागमाञ्चेति ॥ संसारभोक्ताऽनन्तोऽपरः । स सलु बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामाश्रयभूतो- ऽनुमातव्यः । न हि कार्यमनाधारं किंचिदुपलब्धम् । न चेन्द्रिया- णामाश्रयत्वमुक्तमुपहतेन्द्रियस्य विपयस्मरणाऽयोगात् । अन्यानुभूते- 10र्थेऽन्यस्य स्मरणाऽदर्शनात् । अत एव शरीरस्यापि वाल्यकौमारादिभे- दमिन्नत्वादस्मरणम् । एतेन पूर्वयुद्वयनुभूतेथे उत्तरबुद्धेः कार्यकारण- भावात्स्मरणमपास्तमन्यत्वाऽविशेषात् ॥ कसे रक्ततावदिति चेन्न साधनदूपणाऽसंभवात् । अन्वयायभावान्नसाधनमसिद्धत्वाद्यनुद्भाव- नान दूपणमिति । न च कर्पासेऽपि निरन्वयविनाशोत्पादे रक्ततोत्प- 15 ते कर्पासान्तरवत् । एतेनैव क्षणिकत्वमपास्तम् ॥ प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्येन च प्रत्यक्षेण स्फटिकादिष्वक्षणिकत्वं गृह्यते । प्रदीपादिष्विव भ्रान्त- मिति चेन्नैकत्रवाध्यत्वेन भ्रान्तत्वं सर्वत्र तत्कल्पनायामतिप्रसंगात् । अनभ्युपगमाघ सादृश्यस्य क्षणिकत्वे भ्रान्तिबीजाभाव इति ॥ तत्सिद्धमेतच्छरीरादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा व्यापको नित्य इति । । 1 संसारभोक्ता B समारफलोपभोत्ता C.D. 2 अन्यम B. अन्यस्य स D. 3 "न B.तु. 4 अन्यत्वावि B. अन्यत्ववचनान् ८. अन्यत्वात् . 5 से c. D. कार्पसे B. 6 दूपणाऽभावान् B. 7 नान B. नाचन D. 8 अपास्तम् । निरम्न शेयम् . 9 प्रदीपा B. प्रतीप c. D, 10 तदेतत्सिद्धम् C. तरिसमेतत् ।

·आत्मविचारः । २९ 5 नित्यत्वं कुत इति चेदनादित्वात् । तदेव कथम् । जातमात्रे जन्मान्तरा- नुभवसूचकस्मरणलिंगस्य हर्षभयशोकमोहशून्यामिलापादेरुपलंभात् ॥ धर्मादेराश्रयसंयोगाऽपेक्षस्य गुरुत्वादिवदालयांतरे वाद्यादौ क्रिया- कर्तृत्वादणिमाद्युपेतस्य युगपदसंख्यातशरीराधिष्ठातृत्वाच व्यापकत्व- सिद्धिः। तथा चोक्तं पुराणादिपु- आत्मनो वै शरीराणि बहूनि मनुजेश्वराः । प्राप्य योग्यं बलं कु- र्यात् तैश्च सर्वा महीं चरेत् ॥ भुंजीत विपयान्कैश्चित् कैश्चिदुमं तप- श्चरेत् । संहरेञ्च पुनस्तानि सूर्यस्तेजोगुणानिव ।। तदेवमपरात्मतत्वज्ञानं परलोकसद्भावेन परलोकप्रत्युपैयोगित्वाद- धर्मक्षयहेतुत्वाच निश्रेयसांगमिति ॥ परमात्मज्ञानं च तदुपासनांगत्वेनापवर्गसाधनम् ॥ स चोपासनाविधिः शक्ष्यसमाधिलाभार्थमनुष्ठानम् । तथा चो. तम् । तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिकाक्रियायोगः छेशतनूकरणार्थ- समाधिलाभार्थश्चेति ॥ तत्रोन्मादकामादिव्यपोहार्थमाध्यात्मिकादिदुःससहिष्णुत्वं तपः ।।15 प्रशान्तमन्त्रस्येश्वरवाचिनोऽभ्यासः स्वाध्यायः ॥ परमेश्वरतत्वस्य प्रब- न्धेनानुचिंतनमीश्वरप्रणिधानम् ॥ समासतो रागद्वेपमोहाः क्लेशाः स- माधिप्रत्यनीकाः संसारापत्तिद्वारेण क्लेशहेतुत्वात् ॥ 10 1 जातमात्रे B मात्रस्य जन्तोः D. 8 योग B योग्य D. जातमाने प्राणिनि . 9 परोकं D परलोके B. 2 cand D omit मोह. 10 प्रभ्यु D प्रवृत्यु । 3 गा" c. p°गों B. 11 चोपासना B च तदुपासना D 4 चाc.Dr. 12 केशक्षय B. वेशकर्मक्षय D. 5 कर्तृत्वात् B. कर्तृत्वदर्शनाद C D. 13परमेश्वरतत्वस्या परमेश्वरस्यतत्वस्या. 6 युगपद 0 गुणवद B. 14 अनुचिंतनम् B अनुचिंतनपर्या. 7 व्यापरवसिद्धि..व्यापकासिद्धि B! लोचनम् ।

·न्यायमार । यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रसाहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टायगानि ।। तत्र देगकालावस्थाभिरनियताः पुरपम्य शुद्धिहेतवो यमाः । अहिंमा- ब्रह्मचर्यास्तेयादय इति । देशमारावस्थाद्यपेक्षिणः पुण्यहेतवः निया विशेषा नियमाः । देवताप्रदक्षिणसध्योपासनजपादयः ॥ योगकर्म- 5 विरोधिछेगजयार्थः वरणगंध आसनम् । पद्मकस्वस्तिकादीनि ॥ को यस्य वायोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः । कुभपूरकरेचकप्रकारकः । से शनैः शनैर्जेतव्यो वनगजेन्द्रवत् ॥ समाधिप्रत्यनीकार्थेभ्यः सम. ताचेतसो व्यावर्त्तन प्रत्याहारः ॥ चित्तस्य देशनधो धारणा ॥ तत्र प्रत्ययकतानता ध्यानम् ॥ तदेवार्थमाननिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव स 10 माधिः । ध्यानोकोन्निवाताचरप्रदीपावस्थानमिवैकर्व घेतसावस्थान समाधिरमिधीयते । एवमेतानि योगागानि मुँमुक्षुणा सर्वेषु ब्रह्मादि स्थानेष्वनेकप्रकारदु खभावनयाऽनमिरतिसज्ञित पर वैराग्य महेश्वरे च परा भक्तिमाश्रित्यायवाभियोगेन सेवितव्यानि ॥ ततोऽचिरेणैव कालेन भगवतमनुपमखभावं शिवमवितथ प्रत्यक्षतः पश्यति । तं 15 दृष्ट्वा निरतिशय श्रेयः प्राप्नोति । तथा चोक्तम् यदा चर्मवदाकाश वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः । तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दु.खस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥ तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति ।। नान्यः र: पथा विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥ तस्माच्छिवदर्शनादेव मोक्ष इति ॥ 1 Dadds योगस्य 8 Domits एव 2 Domits अस्तेय १ चेतसा । चेतसो°c D 3 Different copies men 10 Commts मुमुक्षुणा here tion in different order but inserts after अभियोगन 4 सचगने°C D सशने । 11 Domits एव 5 देशवध - D देशसंवध c 12 प्रत्यक्षत B C प्रत्ययेण D 6 प्रत्ययैक्तानता BC प्रत्ययैवाग्रता 13 cand Domit the last 7 अर्थनिर्मासमात्रकम् D मात्रम् c line of the verse अर्धमात्रनिर्यामकम् ।

·मोक्षः। ३१ कः पुनरयं मोक्षः । एके तावद्वर्णयन्ति समस्तविशेषगुणोच्छेदे संहारावस्थायामाकाशवदात्मनोऽयंतावस्थानं मोक्षः ॥ कस्मात् । सु- सदुःसयोरविनाभावित्वेन विवेकहानानुपपत्तिः । कंटकादिजनितदुः- सपरिहारार्थत्वेनाऽपि प्रवृत्तेरुपलंभादिति । मोहावस्थात्वान्मू द्यव- स्थावदन विवेकिनां प्रवृत्तिर्न युक्तेयाहुरन्ये । दुःसे सति सुसोपभो- 5 गस्याऽसंभवात्कंटकादिपरिहारोऽपि मुखोपभोगार्थमेवेत्यसमो दृष्टान्तः|| कुतो मुक्तस्य सुसोपसिद्धिरिति चेदागमात् । उक्तं हि ॥ सुसमात्यन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिमाह्यमतीन्द्रियम् । तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयाहुप्पापमकृतात्मनि ।। 10 तथा- आनंदं ब्रह्मणोरूपं तच मोक्षेऽमिव्यज्यते । विज्ञानमानंदं ब्रह्मेति च ॥ मुख्यार्थे वाधकामावानोपचारकल्पना ॥ सुससवेदनयोनित्यत्वा- न्मुक्तसंसारबद्धयोरविशेषप्रसंग इति चेन्न । चक्षुर्घटयोः कुड्यादेरिव 15 सुससंवेदनयोपियविपयिभावसंबंधप्रत्यनीक्स्य दुःसादेः संसाराव- स्थायां सद्भावात् । तन्नाशे च मुक्तावस्थायां भवति सुससंवेदनयोः संबंध इत्यतो नाविशेषः ॥ सस्य संबंधस्य फूतकत्वेन फैचिन्नाशप्रसंग इति चेन्न प्रध्वंसेनान- कान्तिकत्वान् ।। 20 1 "स्यभवत्यता B. ३ संभवाद् सद्भावात् B समारपइयो । संसारिणो COD. 6 Domats भवति. 3 रिपयिविषयसवधमत्यनारस 7 वचित् । कदाचित् C. D पियविषयीमावसंरचप्रत्यनारस। 8 अनेकान्तिस्त्वा । अनैकान्ति- | धर्मद्गादे B. अट पारे B, 'यसभागा7°1 अनेसान्ना ८.

·न्यायसारः। वस्तुत्वे सतीति चेन्न द्रव्यादिष्वनन्तर्भावेन तदसिद्धत्यादन्तर्भाव वा समवायादिभिः सह तत्संवेदनस्य संबंधो न स्यात् ।। अदृष्टादिवशात्कर्मकारणं विपयतज्जनितं ज्ञानं विषयीति चेन्न । ईश्वरज्ञानस्य नित्यस्याथैः सह संबंधाभावप्रसंगात् । तस्मात्कृतकत्वेऽपि 5 नित्यसुखसंवेदनसंबंधस्य विनाशकारणाभावान्नित्यत्वं स्थितम् ॥त. सिद्धमेतन्नित्यसंवेद्यमानेन सुखेन विशिष्टाऽऽयंतिकी दुःसनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्षः।। इति परमाचार्यतार्किकसार्वभौमनीभासर्वज्ञप्रणीते न्यायसारप्रक- रणे तृतीय आगमपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ॥ समाप्तं चेदं न्यायसाराख्यं प्रकरणम् ॥ 10 1 समायादिभिः B. D. समवायाभावादिभिः .

·RATI BHAV andere stede SN V NOTES. LIBRARY PIL ? TER-The author is a deroleo of Shure As will be seen in the last part of this work, that the author, though he discusses several definitions of Voksha 19 neither a follower of Shankari cl trya school por of any other of the welll nonn six schools PILO -Gaulana an 1 his commentators base their theory of Ajiya ou twenty four Prd?rthas, the cxistence of which they tale for granted Bl isarrayna strikes a new path holding that there is one Padertha only and that one is Pram ina All the other lad orti es discussed by Gautama 224 be followers are recording to our author Jafferent divisions and subdiy isions of the one Pad tha, Pram ina Jayasinha, the Juin commentator of our autlor, says that this thing of one Padertha only as the object of discussion is a reply to the theory of Sadgurus ishya P 1 L 6 AFATEHTANTE--P'ram ena is the cause of correct ex perience Rughara in this connection annotates on the definition of Pramung by 3rd and bus followers. According to them a thing incidental to Prama or knowledge 15 4H1074 In that way, says I ghala, even funt will be a Pram man तद (प्रमाणम् ) हि प्रमाणसंवयित्वमित्युदयनादय । एच जनकरवेनेंद्रियादाविवाश्रयत्वेनेश्वर स्थापि प्रमासबपित्लमस्तीति मोऽपि प्रमाणमिति तमते तात्पय तनिषेधार्थ प्रमाकरण प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणपदादेवाऽगत प्रमाणसामान्यरक्षणमाद ।। राधव ।। P 1 I 6 Tagu-Roylara discusses also the significance of the word Art Prabhara Bhatta his followers, accor ling to A ghala, think that there is nothing like #+47 or fit27757#2 or incorrect knowledge The word RT thereforo in the definition of TTT is unnecessary I ghara says that Dk. sartajna differs from this view and thinks that 747 is necessary to exclude #29 and Aata from true haowledge. P i L 1 TAITOTARPAKA 5197 ( 174 ) #1747-A3 P .ghara remarks, this classification of #It is according to latey yana The sutra of Gautama men tronsonlr 1l ree cases of #9 and Rilar sticks to that opinion.

·( P. 1. 1. 10 विप्रतिपत्तिरेक-परस्परविरुद्धार्थवाक्ये विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यर्थ रापर PI ghava says that by the word on the author means tho Naiya yıkas, but lie does not say who are incant by the word 4 Acoord ing to Jayasinha the word is used for the followers of Sankhya philosophy and in support of his view he quotes the तत्वकौमुदी This सशय 19 आगमिक as it is based on the different आगम of the two schools P 1 L 11 उपरब्धे-कि-The question is wether the sanshayas based on Upalabuht and Unupalal dl 2 are not included in the samana dharma sanshaya Ryhara though he discusses these two sources of sanshaya, is decidedly of opinion that they are not independ ent sources of sanshaya Jayasınha holds a different view and explains it thus समानधमानानयोगेंद इति चेन्न समानधर्मस्य यस्सत्वादनयोश्च ITMEITETI I Iu support of this view Jayasınha quotes भूपणकार whose explanation runs thus-य उपलब्धिमात्रेण शब्दे स्थायित्व मनुपलब्धिमात्रेण स्वर्गेश्वरादीनाममत्व चच्छन्ति तन्मतप्रतिक्षेपार्थमुपलभ्यनुपलभ्यो पृथक्पृथक्सशयहेतुत्वम् P.1... 13 अनवधारण वात्-अत्र सश्यादर्थान्तर्भाव पार्थक्य न भवतीत्यन्वय अनवधारण नामानिश्चिनशानत्वं तेनाविशेषस्तौल्य तस्मात् । (जयसिंह ) ननु सम्यग्ग्रहण सायविपर्ययापोहार्थमिति न वक्तव्य किन्तु सशयोहानध्यवसायविपर्ययापोहा मिति (राघव) Reghara always tries to be very concise But here he cloes so at the sacrifice of clcarness Bk esarvajna takes and अनध्यवसाय as not different from सशय " 1114. वाहालीप्रदेशे-यत्र पाहा वाद्यन्ते सत्क्षेत्र बाह्यालीत्युच्यते (जयसिंह) This is an instance of Free which is the same as ad प्रदेशे) तु प्रायेण स्थाण्वादेरसभवात्कमप्यूर्व दविष्ठ दृशा दृष्टा इनि ऊहते मन्येऽहमत्रानेन केनाप्यूध्वतमेन पुरुषेण भवितव्यम् As to ' see the sutra of Gantana अविज्ञाततस्तेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितम्नत्वज्ञानाथमूहस्तक । ११४० This sutra gives a distinction between & at and an A question raised to Ascertain an object which is not till then known or ascertained 18 5%. A which may be an F 15 A question raised 10 * Case when the object is either unascertained or already ascer tained This very author in lus भूषणम् says वादादिप्रवृत्तिविशेषा तर्क पृथगुक्त ॥ PIL.16 मिथ्याऽध्यवसायो विपर्यय विपर्यय 19 incorrect knowledge R ghava and also Jayasın' a sny that, ag illustrated in the text, this 19 incorrect knowledge Quoting & similar passage from Bhusarryna's Bhusheena, Righara says यत्त स्मरणशानेति पाातर निष्ठति तत्परितमयपाठवदोषादित्युपेक्ष्यम् । भूषणे तु भामर्वनैरशानस्य योगा रिति ग्याकुर्दगिदृश एव पाट कटनोऽपि प्रतिष्ठित इति तत्र (वाहाटी ·(u) P21 ? 14--13H7 ET 10% w pamiliar - poteftate ca sarma AIC ( Tree ) The knowledge is the result but ITT:s the source of that knowledge 'The word HTTTH was also necessary ia the definition to show the distinction between the cause and the effects P 2 L 3 FAX fata-57197 377914 Franco Sart wadah. ( Fr) P. 1. afalau-Both the commentators grec in sajnog that 977TH 15 only one and not three or foar as savgested by the author of the Sutras and other writers Tlus author & view is that 77197 is only one but owing to three different operations employed, 1t 19 of three Linds. Bhakarona thus admits the unity of knowledge PO Longitung ATA 1997 - Thus definition of suma 15 peculiar to Bh Tsariira Rihala in his commentary discusses the definition of Wolven by Gautama wlick us of 14afnal 77784249fait 476477 REPLY. If we adopt this, it gives the knowledge (TFF) Bequired in a particular way as the definition of Ra *77* But as has already been dicussed, 2 STOF 19 not the result but the cause of that result te kaowledge The 9971997 is the rastrumental CRUSO (ANAT or 10) of the direct or immediate and right cognition If wo adopt the definition of C'arılar ta, says the commentator, weexcludo from man the direct cognition acquired by the afora which 13 undoubtedly a star-177 and yet it is not produced by the con nection of the object and the senses (इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे पन्नम्) The word arakteru ia the definition 15 explained by Rughava by Tafs 977--the knowledge which is not produced either by 7 or festa which are instruments of knowledge in 1977 and atgal respectively Raghavn would thus divide ज्ञानम् into परोक्षम् an ! 24779(mediate and immediate) The latter is acquired by the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् The परोक्षज्ञानम् is acquired by one of the two methods Firstly it may be acquired by the help of a restig which means literally a characteristic and stands in the position of what wo call a middle term in the western logic In this case the cause of cognition in the अनुमानप्रमाणम् The other metliod 13 that of 1 PRE, whermo ? utile sale nf .nowledge PL 6 TEATyagueta-It is doubtful if I gavo bad this phrase in bis copy In his commentary he explains only the words FF USEAT in the definition of an Even Jayasınha, although le explains thuis plırase, distinctly says that ayat 16A ·is the principal part of llio definilion of alfaptula 127, 27, काल , धर्म and others are taken as common causes (साधारणानि Oft) of the effect The author of gay, and authors who are of his view, mentron several common causes, but 1977 does not appear in their works as one of them Rujlara does not pention tho phraso and has not therefore any explanation to give Jayasinha explains it as gnat aqueta (a lamp or other light) This seems to be a very gross meaning to ho attached to tho word Do we not saquire huowledge even in dark? This reminds one of the dialogue of Janaka and Tajnatallya in the Upanısind where the prince Tinala asked the sago lajnarallya, • What 19 that 1,ht by which all this is known? Tho enge began with the apprrent source of light, the sun, and on that being doubted, said the lamp light in the absence of the sun, tho P 2 L7 figurigaafadan-By later writers the yeutatis defined as of Arafa7454 AT Thus they do not seen to mako distinction between tlic ASA and afslag unless they tako # as one of the organs of senses Thero nro various hin is of connections (गबधा )as mentioned here, er- योग or संयोग , मयुक्त समवाय , सयुक्तसमवेतममवाय , समवाय , समवेतसमवाय and विशेष्यविशेषणभाव The instruments of direct cognition are the senses which aro recognised to be five viz the eye, the nose, the ear, the skin and the tongue The knowledge acquired through the car is not considered to be by a very immediate process and the knowledge Ac juired by the nose the skin and the tonguc copies under one class of the sense of touching Bh usartajna therefore says that Au object ( 5 & pot ) is known either by tlic eye or the lovels These are the two instruments to acquire knowledge of * corporeal object P T S NETAFITTITT Iztatacat frarotflma-To ander stand properly ti c phrase one has to know the various namcables given by hanıl in lots I alshessha Sutras II. cnumeratos chers ns suðstanco (694), quality (90) action (*), genus (FNTT) diffcrentia (AT), and concomittance (1974) Nonentity (241) is an additional numeable given by the Inter writers of the school After explaining how the immediate cogal tion of substance is arrived at, thic author, from this phraso down ·varus discusses lios ti o knowledge of quality and otlier name ables is arrived at This knowledge is also acquired by tho eye and the touch, but not directlyi e not by the one process of connection (सयोग ) but by the twofold process of connection (मयोग) and con committance (74914 ) Por an explanation of concommittanco (Anar ) ses KTHE The #14 is an eternal connection between an object nod its inberent qualities without which tho object can not exist Thus, in the langungo of tho Naiyayikas, * pot (72 ) can not exist without the aggregate qualities wluch go to make a pot (az) It is a matter of controversy what this €14 19 Is it a quality? It is very difficult to say Some authors try to show that it is a quality but it is not so According to han dt He puts it in the namesbles as one dus tinct from the quality (qu) We cannot call it a connection, because in that case it would become one of the qualities Vido the enumeriuion of qualities (ar) in hanılıs 1 nisl eshika Surras In this place the word is used for a sort of connection wich is different from a connection which 19 enumerated as one of the qualities) Then we want to know the genus of na object ( g 927) wo do so by a twofold process Thie cycs or any other sense which is in operation to know our object, comes in direct contact with the object and by our in tuitive knowledge that tlo genus (at) resides ia tha object, we now the genus. Similarly we come to know the qualities of the object under operation Ja jasınla in this connection enumo rates the twenty four gonas mentioned in the Tausheskha Sutras P2LD परिमाणादि-Jayasanha explains this phrase by अणुमहदादय All this time we have been discussiog the cognition of objects either by the sight or by one of the senses of touch Dut thera are those objects which though recognised by one of the five senses have the necessity of this second kiud of operat P2Lqga-The colour, he says 15 known only by the eye, touch only by the skin, taste only by the tongue, smell by the pose and pleasure de by the mind To know colour one has to know the object in which it is inberent that is one lows the colour of an object by first knowing the object The same process takes place in acquiring the hoowledge of the smell It is understood that smell noser exists by itself, 1 ut exists always nith an object That objec in which 4 smell resi les, is not known by the sense of spelling but by either the ego ·(0) cr tho toucli It may liere le doubted, if the knowledge of the object is at all necessary for the knowledge of the smell Often we do seem to experience smell without the knowledge of the object from which it cmanates Here gain we base to go by the theory of the Paryayılas, which presupposes an olject for the smell to reside in, and holds therefore that knowledge of the object 19 essential for the right understandiag of the smell Then follows tho discussion of knowledgo of the taste by tho tongue and that of the pleasare or pain by the mind In almost all the schools of philosophy in India, mind is taken as an orgia of knowledge It is never taken as one and the same with the soul P 2 L 10 Hân gairah We mark liere one distinction be tween different illastrations of AT HAN In the case of the cognition of qualities the four senses of the sight, the nose, the tongue and the skin receive qualities which reside in er ternal objects but the mind receives qualities which are plerent in the soul ( TTCHT) One more point should be noted bere which Jayasinha discusses As has been already said, according to Indian Philosophers the mind is not one and the same as the soul The reason is plain enough The soul (TCT) 18 always accepted as all pervading and consequently mvat bo all knowing which it does not appear to be The difficu ty 13 Bolved by wccepting the mind as an organ which 19 neccessary for a particular or specific knowledge We come across here, several qualities and the processes of knowing them P 2 L 11 pag antay-This is a further development of mediate cogaition (प्रत्यक्षम् ) The Farshesika recognise a name able known as AHT TT which is aptly translated into Laglisla by the word jenus This nameable is accepted to be residing both in the sabstance (5014) and in the qualitios (go) The genus residing in the (2041fot ) substances is known by the operation known as a FARSANT but not so the genus resed ing in the qualities (TTI ) The qualities (TOT) themselves are known by agnTATY25T and we have thereforo to 50 step furthci to know the genus of the qualities This further process is that of सयुक्तसमवेनसमवाय Take for examplo tlc pro PA dnrin C 1 of touch with the object and the sitar of this substance, Leing a ·quality thereof and residing therein by 1998:, is known by #3644141794. Heat is in Rarity with heat and the operation to know this genus is that of सयुक्तसमवैतसमवायप्रत्यक्षम, P. 2. I. 13. magal:-Jayasinha thus explains this lino- पूर्वोक्ताः । मयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायथेति पच संबधास्त रखा ये अस्तिः सहाऽभावस समवायस च यो विशेषणविशेष्यमाव इतरमंवैधयेण सनिधिविशेषोऽन्यथा तम्य प्रतिनियताययवर्तित्वेन द्वित्वरूपानुपपत्ति- स्तमादभावममवाययोभनम् । It is to be remarked here that Bhitarenjna, who never mentions the seven nameables of Kanada, and accord. ing to liis commentatous limits himself to the discussion of the namcables mentioneul hy Giantamn in his Sutrag, mentions several things which are not alloleil to in those sutras. This passage again refers to the knowledge of #14: and 87: lotla of which fiud no place in the l'adirlhas of Gautama. One more point to be marked 19, that although Dhisarrajna seems to be aware of the seren nameables of Kanada he discusses the modo of knowing five of them only, Jeasing out the action (*) and the dutentin (AT:). Differentia (@ay: )as uuderstood by Kanuda resides in tlie atoms only and they being out of the province of AXTA1917, differenta may well be omitted from the consideration of p9941974. It is the opinion of several Naiyayikas that the action ( 8 ) is known only by inference. This explains the absence of these two dameables from their discussion in this chapter. The explanation of Aquatur: is very important. Abhira of a substance, that is non-existence, is cognised by the senses. When there is no book on the tablo we can know the absence of the book, on the table. But there aro many things which are not on the table, and how do we mark this one particular absence of the book and not of other things, Here comes in the importance of fahmuaa: II there is this knowledge of the qualified and the qualifier in the table and the book, we can know the absence of the book from the table. This 4t can be arrived at only by this method and no other. P. 2. L. 15. auff dat: .9f-There is a difference in the reading of Raghara and the three other MSS. Rūghara reads as it is put in this text before nimia i This reading is more correct than the other, as withoat it the paragraph is certainly incmplete in as much as that will omit the consideration of समवायः। This विशेषणविशेष्यभावः is applicable in five different ways ·(8) ns shown by Raghara who says at fr HATE V ATTATO गावादभावसमवाययोजनम् । नेत्याह । सर्वप्रेन्येर विशिष्टमर्वधविशिष्टेष्विन्यय । तथापि रूप रमत्वशून्य रूपे रमत्व नास्ति । तथा रूपरूपत्वसमवायवद्रुप रूप वसमवाय शी। अथ सयुक्तममोतसमवेते । तथाहि .c P. 3. L. 1. THETURY fan art-The meaning of the word eft in this phrn e 19 very doubtful Oae explanation given by Roghaza is that the cognition of A119: by TWITHT 18 not accepted dy all the schools of philosoplig but only by the Nary iyul as The particle 7 however suggests that this mode of cognition of it is not taken in all the five different connec tions as in the case in 3977194. P. 3 43 योगिम यक्ष तु-Having so far discussed the अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् the author Rot comes to 2544 by which the yogi acquires baowledge of objects without any regard to space, time or nature One natural question which arises hero is that to n Yog, by his powers, every thing is known and consequently further discussion as to any mode of acquisition of knowledge 19 useless Rojhata explains it away by quoting - लौकिकी प्रतिमा यद्वत्प्रत्यक्षाचनपेक्षिणी । न निश्चयाय पर्याप्ता तथा स्यायोगिनामपि । This app is again of two kids, one, when the person 19 10 yapm, and the other when, he is not so P 3 I 4 TA Teart-This is clearly the case when the Yogi 29 an e, that 18 18 A, E when his Y ROTH 19 incessantly connected with his soul, which 19 the result of lus v or religious practices In that state le 19 supposed to be able to know anything and everything P 3 L 5 fagram-When the Yogi is not in samalhs, tho knowledge 19 aoquired by not only the connection of the senso and the object, but it is either by fourfold, threefoll, twofold or single connection as the case may be The fourfold connection is, first the copnoction of soul with tho mad then of the mind with the organ of sense and lastly of that with the object By this he acquires the knowledge of any outward object The object comes in connection with the eye, the eye with the mind and the mind with the soul who receires the impression of the object. Tor the instance of threcfold connection we take the sound whub heung 2.0 FTATy to the par is tabep deptual with the ear which comes in contect with the mind and the mind does 80 with the soul Teelings such as pleasure and pain which are merely functions of the mind are known by the soul hy h19 connection with the mind!

·P. 3. I... अवार्यमन्तर्भूतम्-Some writers suppose that भाशानम् is a
third process of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. Arshu knowledge in the same ay
revelation which, Bhuisarrajna says, is included in alligayt and
it is the result of a higher Dharma,
P. 3. IL. 8. तघ द्विविधम्:--Bhusarvojne mentions a classification of प्रत्य.
on nnother principle which has been latorly adopteil bg
l'ishranith Panchinana and his followers. It is into HATC94
and निर्विकल्पम्. For explanations of these terms I had better
refer the reader to the elaborate notes on them by Mr. Athlye*
in Tarka Sangraha. The following table shows how Bhāsarıajna
dirides प्रत्यक्षम्.
प्रत्यक्षम्.
योगिप्रत्यक्षम्
अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्.
इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यम्.
पचविध मन्त्रिकर्षः
युनावम्यायाम्.
वियुत्तावम्यायाम.
+
Tarla Sangraha annotated by Mr. Athlye and Dir. M. R. Boulas, Bombay
Sanskrit Series pp. 216-221.
2

·TR1767 15 defined as ( 10 ) !.4 L 1 plannida PIETTE HARTTATHIER--The constru tion of this sentence with which the author begins hug discussion on the second kind of HRT4 tr inference, 19a watter of controversy between the commentators Raghara says that the word सम्यग् should be construed with the phraso परोक्षानुभवसाधनम् ani not with THTIT 49 somo authors do Rrughala mentions nnd adversely criticises one Rumul alla, an author not much known Jayasınla, who follows an old writer, says that #746 should be construed with H To understand the con struction clearly let us compare the four definitions given by Bhusarlana where this word is used सम्यगनुभवसाधनम् 4194175 as Faraday#HT424 THTRTEK 15 defined as सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनम् , and the definition of BITTH957934 19 974757 #F499219931477 In all the definitions except that of the gay the word 44 qualifies without doubt, 2748N AMH, for example, is an instrument of correct (791) hoowledge This correct knowledge in the case of 4741 15 ( 2792727) immediate but in the case, either of the अनुमानप्रमाणम् or आगमप्रमाणम् It is mediate or परोक्षम् I think therefore that I ghata 19 correct in construing 875 with परोक्षानुभव 10 this definition and not with अविनामावेन as Jayasinha does Barata 18 & qualification which distinguishes अनुमानप्रमाणम् from भागमप्रमाणम् which is also a source of सम्यग्प रोक्षानुभव , but is to be arrived at by समयबलम् which means yuta or conventional sigas adopted by people The distinction becomes very clear In the first place an ostrument of knowledge (941) is defined as the source of correct knowledge (#74710-amya) The knowledge is either im mediate or mediate (अपरोक्षम् or परोक्षम्) The mediate knowledge 13 either by constant concomitince (@gane ) or by the help of agay of liumra convontion (gecata ) प्रमाणम् प्रत्यक्षम् अप्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानम् आगम In this way, it 13 अपरोक्षवम् which distinguishes the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् ·( 11 ) from tho 374674 and 174: boll of whiclı have the element of परोक्षत्वम् in them. सम्यक्त्वम् which permeates in the definition of all the thres P'ramănas is a part only of the definition of TRITAT, (afarroa: ) Constant concomitance, distinguishes spart from आगम: which latter, though it is सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनम्, is not so by constant concomitance, but by the force of human convention. Jayasinha and other authors whom ho follows, hold the different view and say that 97% qualifies afaria: by which they would reader the definition of ag#197 as the instrument of mediate knowledge by (the help of) good concomitance. Jayasinha 1. -ine that if the word grati The concomitance, to give knowledge, must we u uw won.COM order. This stretchivg of the meaning 19 certainly unnecessary and incorrect, when we see the explanation given of aparata: in the following line of the text. sa arata: does not mean, as Jayasıpha thinks tho concomitance of any two objects, but necessarily and naturally that of the साध्यम् and the साधनम् . Jayasinha notices the view of Bhusarrajna in his retur, that fap is introduced in the definition to avoid ya:-delusionbeing mixed up with a How this supports Jayasinha's interpretation of the definition of **177, I fail to see. Bhāsaovajna is correct in putting 747 with the object as explained by Jayasinha. The very definition of a given by theīsartajna ia this work (Sec P. 3, L, 2.) is very clear on the point, but there cvon 7 goes with na. Rūghara lavgbs at these authors and says that their interpretation does not hear out the construction of the sentence. Both the commentators agree to say that the definition is aimed at the views of the Chorvákas who Iccognise no other प्रमाणम् but the प्रत्यक्षम् . P. 4. L. 1. ffmaa: AT HTETET GAN fratura: A FZ is the thing to be proved and corresponds with the major term of tho western system of logic. साधनम् is the लिंगम् or हेतुः or the middlo term. The literal meaning of fair is 'cing together.' far mctos without, and fang: means the state of being without. Tha: is tbc state of 'not being without,' or the state of being together. The technical weaning given to this awkwardly formcd word is the state of being together of the major and the middle ternis by their nature.' Such a state would occur between the cause ·( 12 ) and the offect, such as tlic clay and a pot tho single and fire do Both the commentators, while discussing the word FTIR, brios in the discussion of 39tff wluich means an accident, What they want to say is that this concomitance between the major and the middle term is very often the result of an accidental oiroum stance in which case the connection is not af ATE This concomitance of the major and the middlo terms (Arena and an ) is expressed in two ways One way 19 by an afirma tivo general proposition and the other by the negative general proposition in the first, the generality of the middle term 19 asserted as concomitant with the generality of the major term Take for example the typical syllogism of the Manhas Faaf मान्धूमात् which when expressed 10 strict syllogistic form would be - EHIT TE उदाहरणम्-यन या धूमस्तन तत्र वहियथा महानसे उपनय -चहिल्याप्यधूमवानय पवत निगमनम्-तस्मात्पवतो वन्हिमान् Here the third member of the syllogism gives tl e aflirmative General proposition hnown as 2779722 The proposition affirms that all cases of smohe are cases of fire The same proposition when converted gives an instance of cafat-ft-ATHT g 777 वह्याभावम्तन तन धूमाभाव !e all the cases of the absence of fire are the cases of the absence of smoke One has to bear in mind that Sanskrit logicians always manage to put their propositions into universal affirmative although in meaning they may be either negative or even particular The elasticity of the language makes it easy to do 80 This explains the definition of cat which is the concomitance of the absence of the generality of the middlo term with the absence of the generality of the major term Tho mddle term 19 tl e sign (-ko ) by which we arrive at the onclusion This ruddle term 19 a, aun of two kinds le ing either दृष्टम् as सामान्यतो दृष्टम् A phala says that are 13 the same as a The latter term is the most common one used by later writers, while 1917 191 102tly found in the old works P4 L 4 साधन लिगम्-Tho साधनम् is the sign which leads to the ·the दृष्ट साधनम् ( 13 ) conclusion. This sign is of two kinds दृष्टम् and सामान्यतो दृष्टम् . By is meant the middlo term, wbigh perceptibly coexisting with the Eng7 brings the knowledge of the same. One has to cleatly mark the two senses in wbich the word want is pead in this naragraph. The word #145is the definition of 3 1 - 80 very commonly used by later writers, has auu vecumu pau! minent in the time of Bhăsarrajna Nor do we find Bhäsarraza enlarging on the theory of causation which led later writers to distinguish between terms like कारणम् करणम् , and व्यापार:. P. 4. I.. 5.a fez@u The commentators, in the explanation of this phrase, and in the one following in the next paragraph viz igara Ar hopelessly mix up things, so distinctly kept apart by Bhāsarvajna. The word ag in this expression refers to area or fest the middle term and not to sa19h as Rīghara thinks. era in the second phrase refers to at and not to format as Jayasinha explains it. As has already been said the middle term is of two kinds the qui, e. the apparent one, and finale ne seen commonly. The first one is not difficult to understand but the second requires explanation. Etatai gyurgh AtraaTE TT. The knowledge of colour, is a sign by which one can infer that he has the senso of seeing. P 4. I. 5. IT HASTUTTUISHTE E TU YATA:--Raghava in annotation on this line gives the interpretation put upon it by those whom he calls ratai 1.e, the ancient writers. The interpretation given by them is अरमदादीन्द्रियग्राहग्राहकम् e. receiver of what could be received by the senses of people of our type This is too narrow an interpretation. The test is not based on the capacity of the cognizor, but on the fact whether the thing to be known is fit to be known by means of #MA. The author means to say that if there was a prior concomitance established by WHITE . e if she माdि-or अविनाभाव: of the साध्यम् and the साधनम् was established " -24, MILJ iies साधनम् which enbe known by a person ch is reputed to be in a ·constant concomitance with tho goncrality of tqt liu jhara rery boldly says इत्यचतुरमेव प्राचीनाचार्यमत मिति मन्तव्यम्. The commentator in support of his view cites the view of one Falwlra, a fellow student of his who says TöceYA SHTETIT FITTARET FISTEARAT 543174 mert a 6481TSFTITITETI TANITTO 11 Rughara is not very happy in the elaborate quotation from his fellow student in the explanation of a very simplo phrase of Bhusarrajna P. 4 I. 8 argalefaya-The two inferences given here are only two different processes of the inference, It is in fact one process, buo In two forms They are स्वाधमनुमानम् and पराथमनुमानम् The first, ICATTL, 19 A process of reasoning which one goes through for his own conviction No one says what that procesa 19, but one can understand that it can not be any other than that of the syllogum either of five or of three members The process is so cry swift that sometimes it 19 reduced even to two members, giving only the conclusion and the ground for it ey qaat aferenta This mode of expressing syllogisms is often adopted by Shanlara charya The Fruit and gain modes of inferences are not the same as the discovery and instruction given by Jevons in h19 work on logic Discovery as explained by him is a process of in duction, whick, though not differently treated by the Indian logician, forms a necessary part of their syllogism viz the third member of the syllogisin which is commonly known as 34TECTT but which involves cfs or aftur The third member 19 in fact a conclusion arrived at by induction It gives expression to generalization arrived at by the knowledge of particulars 44 as explained here 18 a converse method. There we arrive at a particular conclusion by the application of a general propo sition Thus both the स्वार्थम् and परार्थमनुमानम् are dedacito syllogisms, the only difference being, that in the latter we go regularly step by step through all the five members, wlule wo do not necessarily do so in the former, परार्थमनुमानम्, being परोपदेशा 9 may be the method of instruction mentioned by Jevons The स्वार्थमनुमानम् being only a shorter form of the पराधम् no fur ther discussion is given thereof by the author, who now beging to discuss the five members of thghlaq which are necessary for tho properrastruction of the person to w dom sa argamcat isaudressed P 4 In 10 af TECTONTHAATHAT12421 –This enumeration or the five members of a syllogism 15 horlily taken from Gauilama (seo ***) It is interesting to know that the number of these ·( 15 ) different members of a syllogism was not originally fixed to five Eyen Gautama does not expressly say that these members are five and fire only, although he does not mention more tban five. The limeinsalas admitted only three and the Vedantins mado use, very oftea, only of two. The later Naiyayilas stick to five members but the logicians, who flourished before Gautama, had as many as ten, The five others, besides those mentioned in this Satra, are given both by Patsyayan in his Bhashya and by Udyotkara in bis Nyaya-Vartıka. They are fatal, #274:,7945, प्रयोजन and संशयव्युदासः. Very plausible explanation is given by Udyotkara in his Nyuya-Tarlıha as to why the latter five were not included in the Avayavas by Gautama and his followers. Accord. ing to him, a complete argument forms one whole sentence, and the different members of an argument are component parts of the sentence uttered by one person and one only. #tary and other members, dropped by the later Naryarlas can not form parts of ono and the same sentence because all of them taken together are to be spoken by more persons than one. It may be said that taken as a whole all these ten members, mentioned by the early logicians, form part of a controrersy, which begins with a desiro to know (faarat) on the part of one, who wishes to instructed and ends with the removal of his doubt (HTTTT:). Tho other three ris. संशयः, शक्यप्राप्ति:and प्रयोजनम् are intermediate steps to discuss the assertion of doubt, possibility of coming to right con. slusion and the object of the controversy. These aro certainly parts of a debate and need not have a place in a singlo argument. Gautama, who in this part of his Sulras deals with logio proper, and nothing else, tries not to enter into questions of a debate and its rules, but sticks to the consideration of strict rules of reasoning. T'urther on in the last portion of his work, Gautama does deal with the question of fallacies and tricks used in debates by debators, but that portion stands in a separate chapter altogether. The five members of a syllogism, adopted by Caulama and copied from him by our author are afast, tg, ICUT, उपनय: and निगमनम्. When interpreted in English they would be an assertion, the ground, (for it) the illastration (or the instance), the application and the conclusion. P. 4. L. 11. mafifi faqat ay F-This is the definition of the first member of the sșllogism. It is a statement of tho major term(en) with the desire of asserting (something) of it The example given is no Art:- the sound 19 vaeternal. In this ·( 16 ) case, 'the sound' is the major term of which oneternity' uto be established This should not be confounded with fama, the conclusion Although in both the propositions, the state ment is the same, the first proposition (sal) sounds of : question while the other is the conclusion The sense of questioning is borne ont by the word gafar fara in the defint tion of gaat The definition given by Gaulama of fast is very short hat --a statement of that which is to be establish el, which 19 very obscure unless we supply the phrase que प्रतिपिपादयिषया 19 our author does, or the words पक्षे सिसाविषया as 1" done by the later writers on the subject. P 4 L 12 FTUR ATA19* fraan -The sccond member of the syllogism 19 the expression of the ground which lends us to the conclusion to be arrived at Translated into literal Inglish tle phraso means n statement of a sign which expresses the paturo of tuo reason Bhasarayna becomes more methodlıcal than Gautama who gives two Sufras to explain a hetu bat our author gives one phrase explaining the general nature of the hett, and then gives its three classifications and discusses thrin in detail There 19 some obscurity about this phrase explaining the helut The lletu in the first place is a statement of the signa One has always to bear in mind that a regular syllogism is expressed in the form of a sentence, and a letre, is, like others, a clauso in that sentence Iletu then may be expressed either on the instrumental or A Luro caso, imostly in the latter 19TETTA1997, as thorands in tho platuse, would in the ordlipary grammatical construction, qualify the words Tiganbut the construction would not Le proper The proper interpretation is that the left is a statement (1994) of the sign (f) which expresses ( 791977 ) tho crusc-tho instrument ( arra) of all the fire merabers of a syllogusin, the leti 18 the most important nnd diflicult to be understood and treated It is of three hunds, or to say more correctly, can lo expressed in thrco IM T. word Suhana is used The reader will find the word used firstly in L. 5 P. 4, and secondly in this phrase In the former sentence it is used as meaning an instrument and identical with Taulutrftro kinds in the latter also it is identical warb Llim ·( 17 ) hetti but is expressed to be of three kinds. Jayasinha is silent albout it but Raghara explaing it thus:--पद्यपि साधने स्गिमित्यस्थानतर- मेर साधु त्रैविध्याभिधानं तथापि तत्रावान्तरविप्रतिपत्त्यपाकरणायापरथा दैविध्यमेव am 1 The phrase is not very happily worded. What he weang to say is, I think, that although the author in tho very first instande, should have said that he is of three kinds, to avoid a side misunderstanding, he dentioned there, of two kinds. He wanted there to show, that the linga which leads to conclusion is of two kinds. I think the justification given by Raghara was not necessary. The ideas expressed by Dhasarenjna in the two phrases under discussion, are quite clear. In the first i. e. nya PTT, the author explains, what a lunga is, and how it is classified. In the second phrase साधनवख्यापक लिंगवचन हेतु:-the author explains the helt, and not the linga. The hetu as distipguished from the linga is statement an expression of the linga, and is not the same as the linga. This expression of linga, the author says, is of three kinds. 'P. 4. I.. 13. aa davantage fatal-This heln has five requisites. 1969: does not mean of fise kinds.' The word 64: is misleading and should be properly interpreted and understood. The five requisites are enumerated and discussed hereafter, P. 4. L. 16. 77 Arafafste: 94:-Tounderstand very clearly the fire requisites of a helu, it is necessary to understaad the lyapticoncomitance as understood by the eastern logicians, Take the most typical and oft-quoted syllogism, ata YATET. In this argument a:-is the qu:-the subject, of which af 894 Bryness is predicated. a:-in the logical phraseology of the West is the minor tern and althat is the major term. The ketu isya- Lecause there is smoke, Smoke is the fate or the middle term. qat is the quality of concomitance of the hetn and the minor tern. I may mention here that very often the word het is used for the linga. The distinction between the txo is already explained, but they are used indiscriminately. The one word qruhan or act is a prelude to the explanation of the theory of 'yapti which, in abort, is the explanation of everything we mean by induction in the Western system of logic, y: is defined here ag an object which has the quality ( 48: ) of the major term (1297). The explanation thas given of w looks like Anticipating the Conclasion. As far as we are treating the process of reasoning, it is neither unimportant por anticipating. In fact a minor tem 3 ·major term ( 18 ) (98) cannot lon minor term unless there 19 the corresponding It is interesting to note in this connection, the definition given of the minor term by Annambhatta in his Tark sangraha He says संदिग्धसाध्यवा पक्ष He seems to have felt the samo difliculty of anticipating the conclusion and pots therefore the definition in a different form altogether In spite of the great elasticity of Sanskrit phraseology, to give a vory correct and appropriate definition of a term of logic is a difficult task P 4 L 17 74HITTI UHF 494-In detecting a formal fallacy at 13 important often to know & Sapaksha a term similar to the minor terma It means an object in which, the proposed major term is known to exist In the syllogism & afgart II, HEITA - kitel en is the of 980 , which the qy Annam Uhatta def nes सपक्ष as निश्चितसाध्यवान् A सपा is one on which tha major term is ascertained In the caso of a Litchen the predicate fire is an ascertained thing The second requisite of a good helu is that it should exist 10 a 998 (A Fan) It may happen that the common quality may appear in the whole or only a part of the 1984 The reading printed in the text as adopted by Jayasınha 15 also to be found in the Decoan college Ms P ghara has eafer only I see no reason why the reading of Jayasınha should be rejected and yet I feel that R ghara's was the reading in the text It is uncertain how the reading was changed and who did it P 4 L 18 AYUTITTAT UT 99-A 99 is an object which has A quality not to be found in the najor term If an object is not seen in concomitance with another the latter is said to be Vyrrilla of the first In the case of fre and smoke the smoke cannot be in concomitance with that which 19 devoid of the major term In the case of the syllogism of smoke and fire the smoke, which cannot be in concomitance with pond of water, is said to be 1 yarrilla of the pond of water The third requisite therefore is the absence of the Ielu from tpaza In this case hetus must le absent from the whole of the I epaxa, and not only from a part of at P 4 I.. 19 fatisfa&o-This reading as found in C and C, seems to be better and more correct reading than that in B which may be a mistahe by the copyist R ghara explains the last two words of the defnition only and we therefore cannot make out what reading ho had before him When the heti resides in an object without contradiction from authority it is sufafarul wl ich 19 the fourth requisite of a proper arayat A inference ·( 19 ) P.B. L. 1. सापतविपरीतयोः &c.--This is the fiftli requisite for a good अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतु:. The hets must not fultil the first three conditions in the major term to be established and also in some other term. This requisite is called असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्. In short the same ketts should not prove the contrary of the conclusion, P. 5. L. 3. & fefera:-Having explained the five requisites for a good अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः the author gives the twokinds of this sort of kets. The principle of division adopted is the nature of the ketu found in a सपक्ष:. The hetu may bo good of the whole of the सपक्ष: or only of a part of it. As an instance of the first he osamines the syllo gism-शब्दोऽनित्यः । कार्यत्वात्. When expanded it becomes.-- प्रतिज्ञा-शब्दोऽनित्या. हेतुः कार्यत्वात. उपनयः- यत्र कार्यत्व तत्राऽनित्यत्वं यथा घटे. उदाहरणम्-अनित्यत्वव्याप्यकार्यत्ववानयं शब्दा. निगमनम् तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः. In this argument घटः is the सपक्ष: And कार्यस्त्रम् is true of the rhole --of the matter known as qz:. As an instance of the second kind he takes the sane syllogism with the same conclusion but with A different hctu which when expandeừ lccomos - प्रतिज्ञा-शम्दोऽनित्यः हेतुः-सामान्ये सत्यस्मदादिवायेद्रिययाह्यत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र सामान्ये सत्यसदादिवादिययाधत्व तत्रा नित्यत्वम् । यथा घटे. उपनया-अनित्यत्वच्याप्यसामान्यत्वे सति............ .......माझत्ववानय शब्द: निगमनम्-तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः. In this syllogist the expression of the middle term is torthudder- Port' istho us: and घट: is taken as ths सपक्षा. Tho phrars syllablo. The process is thus expletivu. अनित्यत्वम् or non-eternity of Words'. अनित्यत्वम् or noneternity isa torm which includes, according to some schools of philosophy, erery created object or say every effect of a cause. There is no difficulty therefore, in findings for you for any object, which can be shown to be an effect and which will suit the middlc term, will serve the purpose. This is an instance of aव्यतिरेकी हेतु:. To ·( 20 ) explain the distinction between these two helus it is necessary to koow what is 8774 and what is caft, and in connection with these, what is unla yaptı is shortly concomitance To pat 19 simple clear and short phrase it 15 TETT PETE When a thing exists on the existence of another there is a between the two This 15 however 21794-7 The cafeta oilà being the non existence of the one on the non existence of another In the common th of na and afa raqoqlik 19 27 497 af and this is a truo propos ition But the off is not true if the terms are used in the same order it is false to say 27 YHTATA 77 Tahr leg in the hot aron, there is the abs-nce of smoke bat there is not the correspon ding absence of fire But the conversion of this is true It is quite true to say 47 TOTT YATA19 1 This is true universally, under standing of courte in the belief of the ancients that smoke is the concommitant effect of fire and fre only This shows that in a wataifa when it is true, the helut or middle teria resides in a part only of the which is any thing having fire It is seen 10 one thing having fire be a kitchen and yet not seen in a red hot iron, although it is one of the FUT It is therefore now seen that in an azyafataht , the ta may reside in the whole of the you or only in a part of it The Frayofatheg is one which can enable us to arrive at the conclusion by two ways It may be either by giving an अन्वयी उदाहरणम् of by a व्यतिरेकी उदाहरणम् अन्वय is always a general aflirmatire proposition The sate is a particular proposa tion None of them seem to be negative propositions The helu used here is not truc of all the 1931 ? e all the non-eterpal objects, but of a part only The commentators analyse this helt thus It is Decossary to give this lengthy phrase, as it will not do to say सद्रियग्राह्यत्वात् , for even God 1s ग्राह्य by inference through mind, an द्रिय, but He is not अनिस This result is avoided by prefixing माह्यम् This even will not do as according to eastern philosophers, tho amit can see even atoms by their physical organs, and atoms accor ding to Naipagkas are eternal To avoid this second result, the word arma 15 109erted which aroids the physical organs of the yogia by limiting the result to the organs of common people like us Bat even tho physical organs of common people are able to cognise the eternal सामान्यानि (genuses ) शब्द has a सामा यम् yet be ing itself not etornal, the gonus to which it belongs is not takes to be eternal To avoid the eternal Samanyas the phraso intro duced is Harafa, which means 'although there 19 KIHTYYTY ·(21) P. 5. I. 6. पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्ति:-A Ketale'ntayi ketts is that which is concomitant with पक्षः (minor term) and resides in the Sapa.to, and has no Pipara. This again is of two kinds as shown before. The author says that, as shown in the provious note, सपक्षवृत्तिः may mean either that the hetu resides in the whole or only part of the fun and consequently the two syllogisms P. 5. L. 1. विवादास्पदीभूतानि-This is an instance of the first kind of केवलान्वयी which when put in syllogistic tora becomes :- प्रतिज्ञा-अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि. हेतुः-प्रमेयवाद. उदाहरणम्यत्र प्रमेयत्व तर कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षत्वम् यथा करतलम् उपनयः-प्रत्यक्षत्वन्यायममेयत्ववदिदमदृष्टम्. निगमनम् अदृष्टं कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम्, In the first place this is only an 3929zli da: for if we convert the न्याप्ति: of the उदाहरणम् it will be found that the व्यतिरेकव्याcिis not correct. यत्र न प्रत्यक्षत्वम् तत्र न प्रमेयत्वम् 19 not true lbecause even where there is not प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, प्रमेयत्वम् 18 seen to exist. In this case the hele प्रमेयत्वं residesin the whole of सपक्षम् करतलम् . P. 5. 1.8. सैव प्रतिज्ञा-Let us now take the same assertion and the conclusion proving it with a different hetu which in syllogistic form stands thus. प्रतिज्ञा-अदृष्टादीनि कम्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि हेतु:-मीमांसकानाममत्यक्षत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्र कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम् यथा भस्मसुखादिः. उपनयः कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षलव्याप्यमीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्ववन्ति अदृष्टादीनि. निगमनम् तस्मात् अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि. Is it is, this is a very queer argument and at first sight loossa kaultyone. Itisintended to prore that अदृष्टम् or the unseen (katare) ."'. a..arils to some people (the yogis). The reason given onths agredirectly o take for granted that the posts Adv ct thode of Orgnition. (प्रत्यक्षम् ) which the timansakas (who are not yogis) * which according to . Thereasoning is this, The अदृष्टान Aller ause they are apralyarn to the Vimansalar as is the case with FIERI: which though pralyaza to us are apratyara ta the Vinansalas. Let us ·( 29 ) examine this argument first by the definition of केवलान्वयी हेतु'. The hetr मीमांसकानामप्रत्यसलात् must be पक्षव्यापक : e it must reside in the 3 which in this case 13 HUR: This is true according to the theory of the Jumangalas The i then must be found in the 94 which 19 BETETIR. which is also true according to their theory The third condition is, that there should not be a fy. Now under this assertion pi: the future is cognized directly by somo, the predicate is such that there cannot be any thing which 19 not cognized by some directly « e eren by tho yogig, and therefore there cannot be a 9 But even the H, BECHETA as a part of it because all the human Liappinesses are not pratyaza P 5 L 10 Tifa TUPA Kcalavyalırchı hela is that which 18 219 in the minor term, which las no 299, and which is distinct from विपक्ष TI 19 is agun of two kinds wluch tho Author names of staff and theft As an instance of the first hrod ho 8110s an argument which can be thus put in syllogistic form प्रतिज्ञा-सर्व कार्य रावरि कहपूर्वकम् हेतु -कादाचित्वत्वात उदाहरणम्-यत्र यत्र सवायत्कनृपूर्वक्त्वाभाव तर कादाचिकत्वाभाव यथा भाका उपनय -सववित्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वाऽभाव-याप्यवादाचित्वत्वाऽभावन्यापक इदै न TT-AMI & 16 27 alta1124 Thus retsoning 19 absent from many later works but the next is the one often found there I do not sco the accessity nor understand the utility of dividing फेवरव्यतिरेकी हेतु into tro parts Bolli the arguments ciled here oro interesting so far as the first is aimed at the thiost and tho second against the latter s doctrine, that a body has no soul 1' o L 1! gaat gear GTATA TETE Hala – The author now proceeds to discuss the lletrabhasns or fallacies whicb, according to him, have merely, the appearance of the hetu The lino following this phrase, which gires the definition of a helrabhusa merely explains the term Thus definition of heerabhasa is taken from the Bhashya of Valsyuyana oa Gautamas Sutras According to Cautama, there are five hetralhasas They are a,**, प्रकरणसम , माध्यसम and वालातीत . According to our author, they are 51x, pamely mins, aft,affa, FIORITERE and AFT We can mark that thrce of these are in meaning the same as those giren by Gaulana Tuo at n our work ·( 23 ) stands for साध्यसमः of Gautama, अनैकान्निकः for सव्यभिचारः, and File icraft: for prodati, farer, and 4A: are common to both. Our author gives one more taxafag: which is not to be found in Gautama. According to the Vaisheshilkas, there are only three hetvabhasas, e.g. faca, afha, and af:. lana: corresponds to ea Flap of our author. The other two are common. According Shankermishra, अनध्यवमितः is the same as अनुपसंहारि- 3*#41faf: mentioned by the later writers. Buddist autor of the 14 follows Kanāda in classifioation of hervat hasas. The commentator Jayasinha is silent as to the exact number of the helvalihasas ; Raghava Bhatta, however says that really speaking there are only five lrut Dhasarrajna splits one of them into two. He is not very clear as to the one which has been so slipt up. A very pertinent question occurs to a student of Nyaga Shastra, which is how far the helvabhasas correspond with the dallaning of the Western Logio. Aristotle and bis followers I.1. would say 'ormal logic. The distinction is not clear even iu u.. c but taking his syllogism to be purely formal, the helrabhasas are also of that type. P. G. L. 3. aasfafaquaferfp-In understanding a fallacy, ono lias to heep in bis mind that the heln to be a correct ono must fulfil the five conditions already explainel. A breach of any ono of these conditions gives rise to a fallacy. The first of these conditions is that the hetu must co-exist with the 91. or the minor term, Let us examine the argument giro by our author to illustrati this fallacy. gada: TEIL. A word is non-eternal A world refers to the eye. Here the very first requisite is not complied with. The debator forgets that there can be no connection between the eso and the world, Raghara Bihatla in lus commentary fires this ex. planation of sfazi, bat at the same time, he supports the sios of l'atsyayana, and the author of 19792111** that afir: is identicsl with साध्यसम: P. G. I. 3. Tuterwetta quintat farz: When a helu is to ko found in the grand ft: only and not in Ant me get the helmilhara ·in # ( 24 ) farz To remind the reader, the first thiree requisites of a good holu are ( 1 ) that it must bo found in the qu (?) it must Lie found in the 14 and (3) that it must not be found in a fagy The argument cited in illustration is a fra Freia In this syllogism ja 19 the qa the ap of Te as it is to bo far we take to be इश्वर The fary of 7 whicla must be at may be घट Here the reader will understand that 74691C (because it 18 an effect) is to be found in ter, but 19 not to be found 1. इश्वर and it resides in a घट 1. विपक्ष which at should never do Here the ketu if properly worked oat will give ug & conclusion contrary to our SPET Patting the syllog ism in its proper from it runs thus --- प्रतिज्ञा-शब्गे निन्य हेतुयायत्वात् उदाहरणम् यत्र यत्र वायत्वम् तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम् Tbi 18 a false ea because we cannot find an allustration to support at Let us take the oqatata which will run as follows - प्रतिज्ञा-यत्र यत्र अनित्यत्वम् तत्र तनपायाभावत्वम् This 577 is also upsupported by any illustration The correct gra would be यत्र यत्र कार्यवम् तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम् This is supported by the illustration 741 77 The regular conclusion (निगमनम्) drawn from this will be sो नित्य which is a contradiction of the sa WeA ve put tl is syllogism 18 Fnglish from it becomes, All cases of etenity are cases of effect. Sound is a case of effect Sound is enternal This 19 clearly a fallacy of apdistributed middle termi PGJ 4 Tea Sfaturalak - 11 hen a het is found in all the three ti 99 , 744 ad fast, the letrallasa committed 19 Baafat It violates the rulo that the helu shall not be found In the विप The argument cited in the illustration is शम्द प्रमेय वाद् In this case गम्द in the us अनित्यत्वम् 19the साध्यम्, e may be taken as the Fat and fut being eternal may be taken as the faqes 1997 (the quarts of being koowa ) is the ·1 ( 25 ) hetu, All the shastris aim at knowing **:. 497 therfore, resides in &HT:, which is contrary to the rule of fire requisites to be found in & good syllogism. When put in regular form, the argument becomes: sfagiyasidan : -cara, 37/EUR-774 177 EPH ( This is false). 84789:- 790474874CFU 7: (false) fa-asiat: (false) In English it would be All objects of knowledge are non-eternal Sound is an object of knowledge. Sound is non-eternal. In this case the major premise is false, and it is a case of undis. tributed major term. P. 6. T A TUTTI Stry: (c.-A hetu which does not establish the :the qu: (minor term) is not mentioned by the Sulras zor by any out! philosophy. The aggregate of the definition is that it is not proved by the helt a c. both the condition (1) being in the 99: and (2) absent from farg: are not complied with. Quite independent of the existence of Fiog: and faget the helus is found only in the r This is mentioned by :.* The instance gips of this is af mata. Here being the 4: there can neither be a : zor a f:. There is nothing therefore to test the ra: which cannot be mentioned. The helre is therefore waablo to prove the 7E27 of the qy: thonghus residing in the wy: , whioh it does according to Vedant theory. P. 6. L. 5. Fauna & Tlie relu which exists in a qu: bat which is disproved by another प्रमाणम् is कालात्ययापदिष्टः, The very prominent instance is अनुष्णोऽभिः कृतकत्वात्. Here the rery प्रतिशा is false because, Te koop by perception (1437) that fire is not cold. The helu though it may be found in the gy: is false and proves gothing P. 6, L 6. Heret &c. A hela which fulfils the three conditions in the qu: is called us. This is a case of dilemma and is called in later works fira. • vide p. 30 hote 8 8 1. & ·( 27 ) 43 (4) faraonths. शब्दोऽनिलश्चाक्षुषले सति सामान्यवत्त्वार is againsiulty. These first four instances are mera different shades of ono and the same fallacy called FETHI: and all of them necessarily violate the primary conditions required for a valid syllogism. (5) farming is one in which ga: does not exist in a part of the 9: The distinction between this and the first four is, that in the latter the heta does not exist in the whole while in the former it is not found in a part only of the . Jayasinha goes into the theory of the production of g held by the #T: or more correctly by the FT: which is thus explained ** पक्षकदेशेऽसिद्धः भागासिद्धः । प्रयल: शब्दजनको व्यापारः। तत्प्रयत्नानतर भव प्रयलांतरीयः। goes on to explain, the further 57ert which he thinks does not exist, but on which depends the further production of sound. According to him ah is the cause of the first wave of sound, which is absent in the second ware and therefore there is an absence of da: in the whole of the 7. This would come under ETH and therefore in fact, we have five illustrations of ATTE:. (6) aufra: YTSET TAIAT Anfordera. Here the helu stands in the position of sfer: and 311274; with the qu. 94: is $21778 and after 19 FETT, the da: being er of om (because it has characteristic of resulting into fat) Here the author makes a thrust at the Sankhya philosopbers who hold that fax is the result of प्रधानम्. But the नैयायिकाः say that it is a tallaay because it is not true that there is that relation between Tand, and the bety therefore fails to prove the existence of W. This is a very good and yet peculiar illustration of this fallaoy. Later authors give us very common instances as for example गगनारविन्दं सुरमि अरविन्दत्वाद. Here the पक्ष: is qualified by An adjective which makes the very ry: non-existent and macá less therefore fragrant, In the illustration of our author one thing is attempted to be proved by another which itself is zot known to be affirmed of the other. The helt is as uncertain as the FTTH. This illu. stration gives a clear explanation of the DADO FEZ 2 given to this fallacy by Gautama.

·( 28 ) (7) marrfere is explained in a similar way (89) The next two व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्ध and व्यर्थ विशेषणासिद्ध are quite unnecessary divisions Raghava says that these are instances of all the which according to later writers involves & case of 39# but in the instance aited here there is no case of 34 Perhaps Raghala s illustrations were different ag appears from one found in the MS with me It seems to me that the illustration noted 19 not the illustration given by Bhasarvajna and it may be that the copy used by Raghara was one tempered with by & subsequent copyist It is worth noting that Raghara, gives five classes of असिद्ध which he calls स्वरूपासिद्ध, पक्षधर्मवासिद्ध 8127911, quais and FT He further goes on grouping the twelve in these five and suggests several more of his own The copy in this part of it as also in several other parts 13 badly written and although the letters are clear, it becomes very difficult to gather the authors meaning He jumbles up to gether, the views of Gautama bis commentators and lumself and also perhaps of some one of his immediate predecessors. (10 11 12) afrafere 19 an important fallacy If some one with out ascertaining whether the phenomenon in sight is smoke or mist says अय प्रदश अग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात् the com mits this fallacy If we look to the definition of afeta it says that in that there is the uncertainty of the hetu existing with the Para This is not a purely formal fallacy violating one of tbe conditions of a true syllogism The fault lies in the wrong observation, which leads to that piolation The fault has its origin in the doubt In the two following fallacies the doubt exists in the qualified to or the qualifier These three may be classed in one group of fanta P7L5 fa&c Light fallacies known by the name of &re given by Bhasarragna Four these occur when there is and four more wben there is not a In a विरुद्ध the hetu resides in the पक्ष and विपक्ष only and not in सपक्ष This shows that if the helt resides in the hand not in * the conclusion must be contrary to the wat This is very Tell borno out in the definition given by Gautama viz.

·( 29 ) together fathi A: 1 G.S. 1. 2. 6. A still simpler definition is given by Lougari Bhashar in his hangt where he says 877227 1 dolara. The foar illastrations given by our antbor are the modification of one and the same, on aina Here 599: should be *: in which helu TT cannot reside. AT: is sz: in which it does reside, which is contrary to the rule. Thus it violates the condition farlargfa:. To make it clear let us expand the syllogism. afast--13: ht: mira. TA I ACT. This is falso as there is no illustra. carta:- tion or forma:, (BAR) 19 FTúrary79;. This may be false os घटः or true as in अज्ञानम्, उपनया--कार्यवाभावव्याप्य अनित्यत्ववानय शब्द:. hmat-8: afd. In this way all the other instances given by the author could be worked out. P. 7. L. 16. PAR dc. A question arises that there aro not more than four darati, as those in which the es: resides in one ag: are already mentioned in the afrai. The author says, that it does not matter as they can very well be included in both. 1. 7. L. 20. arăta HETEI Lc. Garlano defines this as 37" fitantsaaraa Bhasartajna's definition is fuftra afar. Thus we see that the fault lies in the hetu being concomitazt with fans. This vitistes the third condition of a valid syllogism, Dhasartajna proceeds in a very systematic way and naturally by considering the position of hetu ag to Paza, Sapaun, or Vipass makes as many divisions of the fallacy as could be made wathematically. In a previous portion he has shown tendency to split up consideration of qy into that of the whole and of the part of it. If the helt is to be found or not found in & it may either be not found in the whole or in a part of it. The same may be asid equally of Foy: and fari. He thus equmerates eight different classes of this : which are 1 पक्षत्रयव्यापकः पशम्यापकः सपशविपकदेशव्यापकः 3 पक्षसपक्षन्यापकः विपक्षकदेशव्यापकः । पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपझेकदेशब्यापक j q:

·( 30 ) } 6 पक्षसपक्षकदेशदृत्तिविपक्षव्यापक 7 पाविपक्षैकदेशवृत्ति सपक्षव्यापक 8 सपक्षविपक्षम्यापक पौकदेशव्यापक Let us now examine one of the instances प्रतिज्ञा rustaa हेतु प्रमेयत्वात् शब्द 19 पक्ष अनित्यत्वम् । साध्य STIEUH-1 4847 ET RASCH This is correct ag in प्रमेयत्वम् Is हेतु or यत्र अनित्याभाव (नित्यत्वम् । तत्र प्रमेयवाभाव This is false ag in STEHT EE IS 198 THT is Ty उपनय will be false with विषय निगमनम् must therefore be false Let us put it in Aristotalian form Wherever there is an object of knowledge there is non-eternity ¢ All objects of knowledge arc non eternal. Sound is an object of Lnowledge Sound 19 non-eternal This is an instance of the illicit process of the major term It may be noted that I agharas c,ht names of her nro somewhat different The whole of this part in his commen tary seems to have been very badly copied and 19 full of mistakes It may be that the copist made an uapardonablo mistake in mixing up lines from other pages. P & L 8 aralafaire de As already remarked thus ERTATA 25 mentioned by Bł usarvajna alone except by Shankarmishra who about the 17th century says that it 19 the same as अनुपसंहारी अनेकान्तिक which latter did not take its name and form in the time of Chusarrajna. This is not found in Gaulama nor in the Bhashya on his St tras Unless we fnd out that some other author mentioned it before Bhisarcajna vo must say that he was tbe first to suggest it As at 1$ it not a very important addition in the THTHI He defines it as EZTAN पक्ष एवं वर्तमानोऽनध्यवसित In classifying this again be follows the same method of going on very systematically Although tho het is in this case resides 20 tle 97 only 4 may either have or not the सपथ or विषय That then mokes two broad divisions of having or not having and from Text division is by the hetu being found in the whole wo or in a part only This brings it to four Then logives a further division here there :3 Dofam but thero 15 6949 This ·( 31 ) adds four more to the number, The breach of condition is, in not finding ta: in the 9: Mere quia is not sufficient because that does not prove anything. The conditions violated are 49 सत्त्वम् and विपक्षायावृत्तिः | Let us examine one example:- sfant-AHQSİ (aft being 45: there is neither 44: por qu::) हेतुः-सत्त्वात, व्याप्तिः-यत्र सत्त्वं तत्र नित्यत्वम् There is an absence of safety because there is neither #9: nor AYA: In Aristotalian form it would be All real things are non eternal. All things are real things, All things are non-eternal. This is illicit process of the major term. Rághara raises here a very good question. It may be shown that there cannot be a qifa: in eaqataa: and in that case this fallacy is only a case of 414fa: and need not be separately mentioned. But, says Rāghara, this is a different feature of the fallacy and may be separately treated. P. 8 I. 16 #retrture et dc. The definition already given is 141091f natatat : Arfa:. This fallacy is known in later works as afuas. It is interesting to note that the word used as definition by Gautama in the Sutra (1.2.9) is used here as a name of the fallacy. According to later writers media: is the name of the fallacy. Jayasınha thus explains tetaATORE:. प्रमा गानुपहनपक्षोपन्यासानंतर हेतूपन्यासस्य समयः कालः तदत्ययेऽतिक्रमे सत्यपदिष्टः F. R. Rūghara explains it, thus.--101rRe: dia: दति कालात्यये कालाभावेऽपदिष्टः कथित एकदेशो यस्य हेतोः स तथा । तथाच यस्य कस्याप्यर्थः किंचित्कालसंबंधी यस्य पुनरयों न कसिंश्चित्कालेऽस्ति स कालात्ययापदिष्टो बाधामिधान इति मूत्रतात्पर्यार्थः. It is clear that this is the fallacy known in later works as area. The instance given by Patsyāyana is very interesting though not so easy as that given by Bhararrajna. Fle says fit: TR: ATTET 6990. Here, the hetu is concomitant with which is seen in an object by its connection with light. A 8: in which ar: ought to exist, is not so seen. The sound is the result of the connection of a drum anda stick but the conneotion (:) is not concomitant with the sound. By the time we hear the y: the amn: has disappeared i.. Hati: has passed ( HT4: ) at the time when it should have been a ti. I fail to see how this if the same as afra: or in: of ·( 32 ) the later writers I am oven much more perplexed to see, that Dhusarrajna gires instances of gar under the heading of कालात्ययापदिष्ट Mr Athlye in his annotations on तसंग्रह says that morda or ARTITORE is the same as af There 19 anotber reason why this cannot be the same as 1977 Vatsyayana who does not even mention either ay or qua, says that the fault in gleda occurs in non similarity of the allustration as shown in the syllogism given by him. It may become interesting to find who first thought that कालावीत or कालात्ययापदिष्ट is the same as बाधित It is not done by arik1977 It is not also in urafa As seen from the passage quoted in the Benares edition of accent nor in the airit of area The very first instance given by Bhasarrajna clears his meaning of the fallacy, though it does not appear how he gets it and why he drop, Gautama 8 meaning spot for Hereby gery hr fire is known to be hot. This accordingly violates the fith condition of अबाधितविषयत्वम् Here the hetu कृतकत्वम् does not reside in the stata which is coldness of fire because that coldness is not प्रमाणाविरोधी but it is विरोधी of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् Aquestion 19 rightly raised vız, whether this is a THE The fault does not reside in the go but rather in the H Jayasinha answers this difficulty by suggesting that at 18 ERRATT because when the recipient is faulty you may accept the fault even in the object received The argument 19 not very sound This much can be said, that this does not seem strictly to be a formal fallacy except that it violates the fourth condition This fallacy can ocour even when a rara is proved of the 4 by another by algul If it is the same it becomes a प्रकरणसम P9 L1 प्रकरणसम-This cannot be the same as सप्रतिपक्ष because in this case the Fix is proved by the same helt and not by another which is the case in Frage P9L 3 The author mentions af TT This may be the same as argometri URE P 9 17 TETOT Having treated the first two members of the syllogism et san and es we now come to the important third member BETH which is the most essential member in the argument It is worth remarking here that the word in which playa so important and necessary a part 19 an EGETWH and on the importance of wh ch later writers dwell at very great length case of ·( 33 ) had nol acquired that importanco at the time when Bhusarvajna Frote. Even the definition given by Bhāsarvajna of 37€TUE is not logically correot. It gives only a synonymous term. 27, the wellknown manual writer, does not define it in his text of Age: but in his gloss over it, he defines it ग्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं उदा. TO So also docs Laugākshi Bhashar in his , where he says STANATOR) 9779STETIT. Mr. Athlye, however, points out that Laugākshi Bhāskar in his -999ffspriats: has the courage to say that the employment of the instance is purely con- Tentional and not necessary. We saw that neither Gaulama nor Patsyāyana mentions aqifa:. Mr. Atblye says that even tarafas: the wellknown Bauddha work on logic is silent on this point. It is thus vary conspicuously absent from the earlier works. Ragh explains it as सम्यक्त्व व्याप्तिपुरःसरम्. The prominence of E: is already felt by 3799: in the 12th century. Bhāsarvajna does not mention the word aarfa: but he has the necessary form of 4f#: in his gaT€TV. This may tbrow some light on the dato of our author. He does not belong to that class of authors, who are very early in date, and who do not admit, recognise or even mention the calf, and whose third member is a naked 37677. Nor does he belong to the later writers who recognise the importance of, and insert szyfa:, as a necessary member of a good syllogisma, and make the mention of Jalect as a part of l:. As long as there is no afe: the inference is necessarily from particular to particular, and in the Swira wo do not sco any attempt at generalization which becomes a prominent feature in the later works. The very words ay: and lata: on which hangs the idea of #: sro not to be found elther in the Sutras or in the Bhashya. BEIECUTA 13 of two kinds being cither by similarity or dissimilarity. We however see in this work that although in this connection the author does not mention the word qila:, he gives the form of the sentence which is adopted by subsequent writers as a47fa:. P. 9. L. 12. marts EROTTHIATRIA -The author as well as the comrnentators think thst by meution of उदाहरणम् the उदाहरणाभासाः aro oxcluded or discarded. Why such an interpretation should bo put upon the text I cannot understand. In this way we should also expect उपनयामासाः and निगमनामासा: which do not, and if eg: be correct, cannot exist. This feature of TECIPATET: is B Dovel one and does not exist in the Sutras or in tho Bhashya, nid not creu in subsequont writers, 5 ·( 31 ) ment Tueso ure again of various kinds, only eight of which are mentioned here in condection with one syllogism which 25 भन अनित्यम् मूतत्वात Here TYT Te is the 3TETTHIE The ZTETTATR marks a state of transition in the development of logical science The old process of reasoning appears to be from the particular premises to a particular conclusion Later on comes the idea of generalization with fat as the castru The same process is visible in the western system of logic. Even Aristotle began with infering a particular from a particular proposition The idea of the which aims at gene talization is not to be seen in the Sutras por even in the Bhashya In their view it would only mean concomitance which may be of two particular objects only 'To be clear, 47 aft According to earlier writers would mean, "Here there is smoke and with it fire and here be the place where the concomi tance is seen According to later writers at is यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र af meaning wherever there is smole there is firo & general or universal proposition, HETTH being one of such universal cases Thus the idea of 361E TOTHIE signifies that by this time the idea of generalization was coming into prominence but was not so thoroughly complete and the writers were feeling the awk wardness of finding correct generalization, as they often met with false allustrations which did not suit the earth But if the generalızation is complete or correct the illustration must tally with it In plain words, if the greku 19 incorrect, it can never tally with the wife , as it is only one of tho indivi dual instances which go to form the general rule P 10. L. 1 Taling * as qu. Pe get this splogus प्र.मन-अनित्यम् हे मूतत्वात् घटवत् This is an instance of a TEATRIT which is an art CUTATH 1 do not see why this should be a aty Raghara says you are भिति ध्यातिमनमिधाय यद्धवादात दृष्टान्तामिधान सोय व्याप्त्यनामशान नाम साक्षा en Angle G4-14 I Jaya'ınha has been following न व्याप्तेरमिधानमन्यात्यभिधान नाम दोषो भवति । य न तदनित्यं दृष्ट faat aranara cek gitara! This does not say that ana Lannot be expressed, and if it can be expressed why should it ·( 35 ) be a zta: onig because it is not expressed. The next ala: is also equally unintelligible. There Raghara says यदनित्यमिति । दृष्टमित्यत्र यया घट इति पूरणीयम् । अन्यथा तेनैव दुष्टत्वं स्यात् । यचप्यत्राऽव्यात्यभिधानवत्व- संपूर्णत्वान्न दोषः साध्यसाधनवत्तया दृष्टान्तस्याभिधानात्तथापि व्याप्तिमत्साधनतया दृष्टान्तस्यानभिधानाइसंपूर्णमेवेति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ नहि यदनित्यं तन्मूर्तमित्यत्र मूर्तत्व व्यायाधारतया निर्यित इत्यलं वाचालतया ॥ Now these two the fifth and the sixth faults are only a relati e. committed by the speaker by slip of tongue or by haste in speaking, omitting one phrase which should have been spoken, or it may be by speaking it in an irregular way. The first six of these faults are by साधर्म्यम्. The remaining six are by व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः and therefore by वैधर्म्यम्. The other six उदाहरणाभासाः by वैधय॑म् can be easily understood after one has understood the previous six. Even in these latter six the last two are qarahat and cannot really be called faults. P. 10. 1. 9. भन्ये तु-Some other writers suggest eight more उदाहरणा भासाः. Rāghava Bhatta says that अन्ये means त्रिलोचनाचार्यः and his followers. It may or may not be that this fruitga: lived before भासर्वश:. But he did live before राघवभट्टः- These eight उदाहरणाभासा: are by the instrumentality of doubt, which may be either in the साध्यम् or the साधनम् or in both. Let us take the first instance, प्रतिशा-अयं महाराज्य करिष्यति, हेतुः-सोमवशोद्भूतत्वाद. व्याप्तिः and उदाहरणम्-यत्र सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वं तत्र महाराज्यकरणत्वं विव- क्षितराजपुरुषवत् ॥ Here again we have a व्याप्तिदोषः. All the persons of सोमवंश: may not be महाराज्यकारका. Had the idea of thà: been completely and correctly understood this fault should not have happened. There is no सामानाधिकरण्यम् in मोमवशोद्भूतत्वम् and महाराज्यकरणत्वम्. This and the following seven 2, e, in all eight EGETTATHT: are based on doubt existing (as to the concomitance) between the दृष्टान्तः and the other members of the syllogism. namely- the साध्यम् and the साधनम् or both of them, irstly by आश्रय" or by waypof साधर्म्यम् and then by way of वैवर्म्यम्. P. II.LS.रष्टान्तेtc. The उपनयः is the sentence expressing con. comitance of the साधनम्, which is known to have concomitance in the illustration, with the g: by way of a metaphor of the illustration. This is again of two kinds, being either by ANFIH ·( 36 ) or by 247 This in later worhs would be according as the tayfa 19 by 474 or by bato Hero again we see that the later and the very clear form of 3464 agrer4af24457174,' has not come into existence राघवभट्ट in his commentary does not discuss this definition at all, but he rather discusses the definition given in Gautamas Sutra vi BETTETTY TREAT तथेति वा माध्यम्योपनय उपनय It is the expression of the minor term either by 37794 or ato dependent on the illastration It is the samo defnition that of ZTTART put in a sery concise form P 11 L 7 399TATE le Now we come to the last member of the syllogism 12 mart which comes after 3974 and in the expressions of the past coupled with the Its form 18 तम्मादनिय पवेति (autama defines it a त्वपदेशाप्रनिशाया पुनर्वचा निगमनम् ॥११३-९ It is quite natural that the usefulness of this may be questros ed and consequently the nutbor says that it is not useless The reason is that it suggests that there is authority for proving the absence of the contrary of the 7777 When we begin to argue, the first question which suggests to us is that there may be proof for the contrary When we go through the process we come to the conclusion that there is the absence of the contrary This latter step is not complete unless the RH 13 pat in a clear expression Raghara says that the expression ATACT 779 (L 8 ) shows the art of party and ator (19) shows the प्रयोजनम् of निगमनम् In वदतरेण तद् means the कायम् expressed in the previous sentence It cannot be said that in making an inferenco another contrary or contradictory in ference is not suggested, because such a suggestion is essential to the moving of the inference in hand This Sutra 19 bo held even by Gautama whose 11 41 says that FOT onclusion ) 15 arrived at after considering the arguments for and against P 11 L. 12 Thuy &c It may be said that the expression of निगमनम् is not a part of साधनम् or हेतु and y therefore un necessary It wo admit this we shall bave to admit that there " बाधकप्रमाणम् which gives rise to a निग्रहस्थानम् The latter is defined as Pastafarafagfore PazEME 113 to which in short means that when there is either contrary proof or no proof there occurs a wem because then the T* becomes the गिमनम् or the faगमनम् has the form of a वाधकप्रमाणम् ·( 37 ) P. 11. L. 13. निगमनाविप्रतिपत्तौ-In case me dispute the निगमनम् that will be the proper place to state the 27 M as the contrary inference. In the same way if one doubts the : he has to state the top. P. 11. L. 15. Higit Put This is the best mode of arguing; because it convinces the person who has doubt, and also because it leads to a disputation. Dark the meaning of the word for peculiar to the science of logic. This is not mentioned in any of the known dictionaries. P. 11. L. 17. myr. Taking in (or receiving ) of the thesis of the disputant and adducing argument in soswer thereof by the opponent is called 91. This is again of two kinds ez. Mtatir and farsity41. P 12. L. 1. The first part is known as are: discussion. This takes place between two persons who do not have any worldly expectation but only have a desire to find out the truth. For that purpose one person makes an assertion and the other objects or finds fault with it. The Ear: defines att: as comprehending the thesis and expressing it by a syllogisma of fire members not opposed to the truth but beset with reasons and objections based on inference and doubt. This may again be with no desire to prove the opposite view, as is in the case of a pupil and a teacher by way of question by the pupil and reply by the teacher to instruct the former. P. 12. L. 6. a fafatitgiá farnítgurt FC &c. When a person having a desire to win meets another who has a similar desire or has the desire of some gain, at--worship or reverence or fame, that disputation is called Marriga4f. Rāgara says that it may be said that the IT: did not mention daty but it is not so. Our author says that he has mentioned it by the word an. Again this Apinig at may be held even by a at: to convince others and to keep up the seed of knowledge. This is fourfold, being started either by a art (debator) by a sandt, dispatant, or opened by the leader in a meeting or by a nentoral or independent thinker or what ye may call, a man with open mind. This विजिगीषुकथा may be either जल्प: or विवंदा. P. 12. L. 9. NYT E. The author quotes Gaulama's definition of : and ditt as given in his Sutra 4-2-50 which by a metaphor explains the objects of taq; and femel. -q: and fantasy are for ·( 38 ) the protection of the unclanging trath, just as a fence of thoros 18 for the protoction of the budding seed A 18 mere talk which is of the same form as ar (discussion) but then there in support and opposition by छलम्, जाति and निग्रस्थानम् The same sort of discussion but with no intention of establishing the opposite view 19 fequst (fallacions controversy ) P 12 L 15 wafarat dc This brings us to the discussion of 824, ata and Rapp It is 594, when there is for -- destruction of the statement 10 discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning It is of three hunds ti.. वाक्छलम्, सामान्यच्छरम् and उपचारच्छलम् छलम् can be rendered by the word trick It is - fallacy I ut at 19 letter to render it by trick and thereby avoid confusion of meaning The trick may be by expression or by implication P 12 L. 19 affifea de A trick in an expresion occurs when there is attaching of a meaning different from one intended by the speaker, by the use of a word with two meanings at MTV* This may mean erther that Manayaka bas a new blanket or that he has nine blankets Here the fallacy (agcentru) is of the nature of want of comprebension This result from the nonappreciation of the object of the speaker who wants to say that this man has a new blanket The trick 19 the result of the speaker's not knowing the reply or his muscomprehension of bug false knowledge P. 13 L 3 wagtua-The common trick happens when there 18 an application of a wrong meaping on account of the very commonness of a possible meaning Oh this is a Brahmin Loowing four Vedas' When some one said this, the 214914 says "What wonder there is It is possible that one who knows four Vedas 19 a Brahmin' Then the disputant says, Not so because then we commit the facta fault and include a a (Prahmin deprived of सरवाराधिकार) Here even there 19 fallacy as before P 13 L 10 Taulo Lc To apply to a sentence the primary meaning when the speaker has used it in a secondary meaning 18 297173C# When a person says Beds cry' the disputant (orari) says it is the men (on the beds ) who cry out and not the beds. They cannot do so as they are inanimate objects. Flere even you must understand the fallacy as before because this sort of expression 19 common to the people and also to shifras ·(30) 2. 13. L. 14. प्रयुक्त हेतौ &c. This is the definition of जाति: taken from वात्सायन- who says प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसंगो जायते स जाति: which, literally translated, means, an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first spcaker. Bhūsarvajna improves upon वात्स्यायनः and adds the words समीकरणाभिप्रायेण. Gatstama's definition is shorter oren than Vatsyayana's but is clear. साधर्म्यवैधा- भ्यां प्रत्यवस्थान जातिः ।। गौतमः ॥ प्रयुक्त हि हेतौ यः प्रसंगो जायते स जातिः। स च प्रसंगः साधर्मवैधाभ्या प्रत्यवस्थानमुपालम्भः प्रतिषेध इति ॥ वात्स्यायनः ॥ प्रयुक्त हेतो समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसंगो जातिः। भासर्वशः। Bhāsarvajna's definition means to say that when one ground is put forth in an argument by a speaker and when the disputant (जातिवादी) tries to argue that his argument is similar to that of the first speaker, the case is of Arfa:. P. 13. L. 11. पराजयनिमित्तम्-The cause of defeat is tho निग्रहस्थानम्. Raghavcc says समीकरणाभिप्रायेणेत्यनेन जल्पवितण्डयोः सदुत्तराऽपरिरफूर्ती साम्या. पादनाय जातिरपि प्रयोक्तव्येति प्रतिपादितं ! एकान्तरपराजयादर संदेह इति न्यायात् ॥ It in an argument a disputant cannot find a proper reply, he, instead of courting completo defeat, may give a partial ono by जात्युत्तर:-by showing the futility of the opponents argument-by showing the similarity of his argument with the other's cqually fallacious. This author does not give the proper definition of नियहम्यानम् which is defined by गौतमः as विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च । It is either misaprehension or non-apprehension. Now these Jatis and Nigrahasthanas are innumerble but the author mentions, as Truninho says, twenty four Jatus and twenty Nugrahasthanas. mHवैधम्योत्कर्षाऽपकर्षवर्ध्यावयेवि. करणहेत्वापत्यविशेषोऽपपत्युपल- ध्यनुपलब्धिानलबानमा... The twenty two Nigrasthanas are enumerated as sforcia: शाम्तर प्रतिशाविरोधः प्रतिशासन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तर निरर्थकमविशनार्थमपाथमप्राप्त- कालं म्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमशानमप्रतिमा विशेपो मतानुशा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाः (गो. सू. ५. २.१) The last two sections of the last chapter of Gautama's Sutras deal with the Jalis and Nugrahasthanas. P. 13. L. 17. साधम्र्यवैधाभ्यामुपसंहारे-Then with the object ot proring a proposition, we fix upon the similarity of things and bare at the same time the apprehension of the contrary being prored, the Jatiis साधम्यसमः. Similarly when with the object of proring a proposition we lix upon the dissimilarity of things and ·( 40 ) - . have at the sabe time the apprehension of the contrary being proved, the Jati is aya:. The instance cited by the author is as follows: The mover says: TAA: 94T . The disputant replies To ASÍTETA794. Both these syllogisms are dealt with by Fireprit or by 87a7azifa:. In the same way we can hare two syllogisms proving opposite conclusions by वैधर्म्यम् that is by व्यतिरेकन्याप्तिः. Jayasanta says that this is not प्रतिपक्ष:. cf. नायं प्रतिपक्षो व्याप्तिरूपांग. विकललेनाऽतुल्यबलत्लादित्यर्थः । भमूर्तत्वस्य नित्यत्वेनाविनाभावाभावात् । P. 14. L. 3. ENTERT: This is Satra 5-1-4 of Gautama giving six more futile arguments (ara:). They are rimi, 8944784, qui, ta, 27877: and arth: and Gautama gives one definition for all of them. When there are several ymi: in the दृष्टान्तः and when we apply these different धर्माः to the साध्यम् we get any one of these sis false reasonings. Let us take them in order. - When there is an occasion of an unintended sif: of the en: being applied to the साध्यम्, there is उत्कर्षसमः. I is अनित्यः because of कृतकत्वम् as in घt: there is also सावयवत्वम् in पट: which will prove that शब्दः is सावयवः. If it is not सावयः then it will not be oven fr: because of the similarity. Again wien an intended :disappears from the tho above process it becomes a case of अपकर्षसमः, If शम्दः is अनित्य: becauso it is an effect like qz:, then like : it would also bo nonaudiblo wluch is not true, because in these two cases tho result gocs contrary to 74 Similarly when it is the common ground there may be dither मूर्तत्वम् or tary and in that case, there may be citber man or Beta. This is called forum: eft:. Again if both माध्यम् and इटान्तः that is अनित्यत्वम् and घe: aro afteTT: because there is strant then both of them would become Arqh and thus it becomes Arq##. Now all these aro answered hy Sutra 5-1-3. When the thing to be provod is proved by taking sono similarity, thero is no disproving it lig a dissimilarity. P. 15. L. 1. माय साध्यम्-kither the हेनु: reaches the साध्यम् or it docs' not. If it docs reach, then thero is distinction betreen हेतु: and साप्यम्. This tho case of प्राप्तिसमः. It it docs Frigg boy ·of : ( 41 ) not reach then tbere is no relation like sezon and to: and there is no 1997. This is the case of ShaRTA:. In the explanation, Bhāsarvajnya gives the illustration 'sjreathta. Just as of two fingers, when brought together, neither of them can be said to be the supporter of the other, so the BTETT and Ant cannot be so said, by their mere jesiaposition, if they do not support or are not supported by one another. If they do not reach each other then like the fael and the fire, thera cannot be 774924. Sutra 5-1-3 is a reply to this. In the case when there is the nig: of instruments the result x2: appears. Here the sextaposition of the q: and the wet clay is clearly seen. But it requires 47 (pressing) which is not visible to the eyes ( , e. there is anlè: of it ) yet the result is seen. The author says that without any distanotion as to sa: and starka:, all these yai: of my aad Anrath are known to be constant and we cannot avoid them, because, if we do, all the modes of knowledge will be abstructed P. 15. I.. 10. srera: #HITTE Lc. Where there is no cause for -- nhrect before it is produced there is the fallacy top onred which is said je other side argues that before the very prou were sound, tbero was Ro ground for nga-eternity, and the sound therefore is eternal. If it is eternal the very idea of production cannot be maintained. The next sutra of Gautama is a reply to this. He says emate ise, if the gris 37: (production) the produced pa: should have a oause and therefore there cannot be un objection to the cause. In fact there is no sound which can be said to be not produced and we cannot therefore apply it to say souad. P. 15. L. 16. Freur: &c. It is OHR: xben tbe : cannot he shown to exist at any time (past, present or future). The argument is thus esplaided. The question is whether the to exists before tbe Fr or after it or at the same time with the FIPETE It cannot exist before, because if it does, there is RO ETTETF whose Artistes de If it wenists witd tds Tona cannot say which is the 6735 sad which the FTV. The third case is sot mentioned by Dhāsartajua; but the 1714717: notes it thus. 125A ATT HNL. When tbere is not the ENT whose can it be. A reply to all these ie given lig the Sufra 0-1.19. 07.97: TRAFFITTOAIE 0 & ·( 42 ) means that there is no reagirafas: because the very existenca of Ut presupposes Ogi. By Sutra 5-1-20 Gautama gives another reason which coupled with one in 5-1.19 forbis two answers of 6141caifaf:. At this point it may be mentioned that three copies out of the four collated by me do not mention stuffanti. Jayasinha does not mention it in his commentary. It may be that he followed A copy which dropped it. Raghara mentions it; but he, while professing to comment on 75: really discusses the sutras of Gautama. It cannot therefore be clear whether the copy he lind, did or did not mention aufgferni. At the same time we cannot say that th: purposely omitted it as he mentions all the other a: and in the very order in which they are mentioned in the sutras. It may be that the copy, which Räghara used, had this Jati mentioned therein but subsequently by mistake of the scribe the whole paragrapia was dropped. yrafen: is Jalt where the contrary of the 17th is proved by si format . It is possible that as Gautama refused to recognise auiafer: an independent 46474 Bhasarvajaa omitted this Jati based on that प्रमाण. •P. 10, L. 5. ARCAICOSHI &c. This gia: occurs when thero is cognition of the result even when there is no cognition of the When proving Türatt (effect) of graaft (earth), aven though the cause 1999 is absent, the pract is understood. The author says that this is not a 19:. The cause may be apparent in a part of the Fox and then the cluse is there apparent for the effect. Here the author raises a question; "How is it then that the effect ( 47 ) is understood." He noswers 5 ATE ) by the Satra 5-1-28 that this is so difficulty: The same result can be obtained by other causes also. This be explaing by saying that the result is known by somo other प्रमाणम्. Jayesinha illustrates it thus ययांगारावम्यायो भूमामावेऽपि प्रमाणान्तरान्हिसिद्धिः The author of न्यायसार: puts in hero a new inference and further says that there may be another sonrce of the same inference even though there is no cause which should obstruct cazaition of the effect and the cause it 20 m easily discernible, P. 16. L. 12. uafh: The definition of this Jati is bodily taken from Gautama's sutra 5-1-29, and is construed thus by the भाष्यकार . तोपामाररणादीनामनुपलम्धिनोपलम्यने अनुपलम्मानास्तीनि अमावः &S cause.

·( 13 ) अस्याः सिद्धयति. अभावसिद्धौ हेलभावात् तदिपरीतमसिलमावरणादीनामवधार्यते dc. Dhasarvajna's explanation differs from this. By the first syllable at he means aligta:. The meaning seems to be this. When there is the effect which is not known and when because it is not known, it is held to be non-existent, and when although it is so held to be non-existent, it happens to be cognizable, the ata: is vefty. This fault is explained by ***HERAF &c. 5-1-30 arquefoa: means that there is a knowledge of nonexistance. This very gyfer is cognizable, which fact makes the existance of agysfos: improper. 1. 17. L. 3. Anh: This Jati may be interpreted by the word rulle. It is explained thus:--Suppose the thing to be prored is "Sound is non-eternal ( 27:)." The question arises whether non-eternity is present in sound for erer or for a short time only. It cannot lje for a short time because in that case wben nou-eternity dis- Appears sound will be shown to be eternal, which disproves the proposition. Suppose that this noneternity is over existent in sound i. e, this pon eternity is eternal in sound. Tbo qualificr (t#:) being eternal the qualified (417:) must also be eternal. This is a fallacy -The objector makes the mistake of balıcving that a qualifier (:) exists in the qualıfied (+r) in such a way As to change the (H1). This is not necessarily truc, quality may be of wider or longer existence than the object. In a red pot, the pot may come in existence at one time and disappear at the other. The redness is ever existent but is exhibited in thio pot only during the existence of the pot. This completes the list of Jasis mentioned by Dhisarrjna bat Gautama mentions and so does Patsyāyana many more. Those not mentioned by Bhusarrjna Aro 4:, *vai, vin, TFT 27341:, FT4:, ***, atutele:, awa: and art. All these are fally discussed in clapter 5-1 of Filsyāyana and need not be gono into in detail here. Thisarrjna does not omit any of the PREMA which are given by Ganlama and they are mentional in the same order, We have already explained the description of the fallecy known by this game. Pat Row we give and discuss the defini. tion na girea by Gaularia which is ftaftferit. llw either Both Garulama and false opprehension er nonoppechension, Bhāsarenjan siro tweats instances bcaticand his so many different pardes.

·- P18. L. I. The definition given by Duitarrojna of प्रनिहानिः is माध्य. प्रतिष्टान्तधर्मानुशा. Gautuma says प्रनिदृष्टान्तपमांम्पनुश सदृष्टान्त which is as obscuro as the definition giren by Dhasarrjna. If ***TI ACcording to Vaidya's dictionary means admission in argumeat freera: is a दृष्टान: which agrees with a contrary धर्म: ns qualification. Thus when a statement is going to be prored by an illustration and an opponcnt puts ia another illustration which has a qualification which disprores tlie originnl statamnent, nori the proposer Admits the new qualification (:) be commits this fallacy as ho virtually gives up his original statement. This is tlo syllogistic form of the illustration given in the text. प्रतिक्षा. शम्दोनित्यः हेनु: शतकवाद. उदाहरणं. घटवत. उपनय.. नकत्वव्याप्यानित्यत्ववानय शम्दा. निगमनम् तस्माच्छब्दोमिल.. प्रतिवादिना उच्यते ननु. शम्दो निसः अमूर्नत्वाद. आकाशवन. वादिनोच्यते भवतु. Here by this admission the original argument and therefore the conclusion falls to the ground. Chäsarvajna has expressed this in a very general way without fixing the fault to any one particular member of the syllogist. Pätsyayatus is clearer in the illustration. ऐन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यः शम्दो घटवदिति कृतेऽपर भाह । दृष्टमेन्द्रियकत्व सामान्ये निन्ये कम्मान तथा शम्द इति प्रन्यवस्थिते तमिदमाह ययेन्द्रियक सामान्य नित्य काम घटो निन्योस्त्विति । स सन्चयं मापकस्य दृष्टान्नस निन्यत्वं प्रसन्जयनिगमान्तमेव पक्षं जहाति पक्ष जहत्प्रतिश जहानीयुच्यते प्रतिशाश्रयत्वात्पक्षम्येति. This shows that the fault exists in the yo. of the era: and not in the. In this connection Råghara mentions several kinds of प्रतिशहानिः which are also mentioned by Udayanacharya. P. 18. L. G.प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्. This is the second निमहम्यानम् defined both by Gautama and Bhäsarcajne by the same words. Whon a proposition is objected to by the opponent, on the strength of a different दृष्टान्तः or on the ground of absence of दृष्टान्तः tho proposer by referring to a qualification apparent in the qu: rommits this fault. When one party makes an assertionery. सर्वमनित्यम् , he makes it so very broad that he has no illustration ·to give and has to take anatler iastanca which may have an illustration either suitable or not. But the point is that the 4: is too general not to be covered by the EH. Tlie objector therefore instantly objects and the proposer immediately changes ground by making the same pt: qualified by an adjective as in the instance given in the text. In this way he chaopes the original stain where the 9: was an unqualified all. This kind of trick is very common among debators, Rūghaga thinks that this is the same as cart: Jayasinka however tries to show that this is not the same as farTUTH: which we have already discussed. P. 16. L. 11. sfaatrecat: &c. The third fargering is aan: where the : (the middle term) is inconsistent with the Pat. P. 18. L. 13. aarreare: is that a Mat ia which an assertion is made by the proposer, which is obviously false and when the opponent points it out, the proposer withdraws his argument saying that be nerer made that assertion When eman says that afa: (fire) is ago: (not warm) the opponent says that it is contrary to experience (75T) whereupon the former says, that he never made the assertion and thus withdraws. Jayasinha says thirt in STETRA: tho kast is abandoned hy admitting a vi mentioned by the opponent. In glas ra: the proposer gives up the argument altogether when the other objects to it. P. 18. L. 17. after ear. When an unqualified grouns given by the proposer is objected to and he takes up another qualified ground (हेतु: tho निग्रहस्सानम् is called हेत्वन्तरम्. P. 19, L I. STUITTH. This is a free where the person hilo arguing one thing enters into the discussion of a subject which ſlas nothing wyliaterer to do with the subjects under discussion. When the proposer arguing that गिन्यः शब्दोऽस्पर्शत्वात इति हेतोः enters into a long discussion as to the grammatical formation of tht wordty: the fallacy is rata. I. 10. L. & fatis S A were childish sag of Arguins. }', 19. L. 10. safarimü; is a far where, the meaning of the Argument of the proposer is so obseure, that even though be repeats it three tincs neither the opponent uor the assembly, ·( 16 ) understand him. It way lk, that there is nothing is the Argument and to conccal tho ignorance of the proposer, it is put in a vory obscuro language. 1'. 19. L. 14. 379744.7 uccurs wlicro incro substantises aro usce without a predicate. P', 19. 1. 16. BATERT is a name gireu to an argument where the clifferent members of syllogismo sro und in improper order. Why should this be a fault 1 It is an irregularity which inay proro only a temporary obstacle in rightly understanding the conclusion. 1. 19. 1. 18. -77 occurs when any one of the members of the syllogism is absent from the argument. When conversc is the process, that is when more than pecessary members arc interposed, thero coars a fault called sqf«4. 1. 20. I.. 3. 97. This fallacy ucours when the words in au argument are unnecessarily repeated. But it is po fault it it is अनुवाद: which is described by Thisarrajnee as मायकं पुनरभिधानम् i. C. repeating witli some purpose. This is a very common explanation. Cautama's explanation of 47: is far fra 1977- naar: (2-8-84). It means repetition of words or of senso but of course with an object. Thus repetition without its boing aar: is a fault. The same is tho fault when one and the same sense, is repeated although with different words. The reason why this is fault is that it brings no end to the discussion and also that when one ground is suficient the other becomes redundant. P. 20. L. 9. agni A The word means 'no following in speech.' When the proposer has thrice spoken out his subject and the opponent does not take up the argument it is a fault of the opponent. Distinct from this is the next fault 3067 where the opponent, though told thrice does not understand the thing and therefore does not argue. P. 20. L. 15. Hafah. Dullness or want of ready wit. This may be the cause of the two preceding vir. अन्नुभाषणम् and अज्ञानेन्. This fault is possible to both of the parties. Cf. Gautama's definition: उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा (५२-१८.) 19. 20. L. 17. It is a: Then the discussion is dropped on Account of some other cagagemcat. Ono cannot say that this is a fault ·other censure, ( 47 ) unless it is purposoly created by one of the parties to avoid the discussion. P. 20. L. 20. FTTHE79:-When a person while attributing a fault to the other side admits his own, the fault in the argument is calleri Raiga. When a person says to another you are a thief' and the other is reply says that you are also a thiof virtually the first speaker admits that he himself is a thief although tlic may also be one. P. 21. L 3. निग्रहं प्राप्तस्य &c. पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् means abandoning on Then one is censured for his argument he is made to abandon his position. The abandoning is pressed by the assembly who discriminate between the two. The reading 21 oktyai nenus, by the assembly who is questioned or appealed to. Pätsyāyana says that the party himself, one or the other, would not admit his fault. It is therefore the assembly who has to decide. Rāghava seems to have for his reading arguit as he explains it by at af I. P. 21. L. 6. zferta &o. When there is no ground for a : and yet a party attaches निग्रहः to the other it is निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः P. 21. L. 9. factant &c. When, once a discussion is started on a basis to give up that basis and wander about without any rule, it results in the fault of :. When a hat: who does not admit the existence of gt: argues that afat:-fire sacrifice is the means of attaining leaven and the opponent objects on the ground that a sacrifice which only burns things cannot give heaven, the HRT: turos round and says that the sacrifice plenses et: who gives heaven. By this argument the oftaia commits this fault. The sacrifice, which only burn, Cannot be the cause of heaven. The first replie, that hy the sacrifice the goal is pleased and gives the fruit as does the king. Now this is contrary to the principle of the Hiihfil:. The author says that tliis is ilifferent from vareft: there the slaat is changeul. P.21. I.. 13. Thus he says all the cratitat: are fagena and he further says that even undesirable words used by way of arguments are also ATERIAT.

·( 48 ) P. 22. L. 1. 37 Talarn The third Pramāna discussed by Dhūsarojna, is ara:. Writers differ in giving a name to this 44194, some calling it शब्द: And the others आगमः. ef: आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः (गी. म. १.१.७) and ratsyāyana's Bhushya on the same 1973 TG: (7.7.) विज्ञाताच्छम्दात्पदार्याभिधानदारेण यहाक्यार्थविज्ञानम् तच्छाम्द नाम प्रमाणम. (मा. 214. P. 276. Benares Ed. ) These writers, it seems, consider the words :: and 14: as inter-changeable. Later writers of Purūnas have used the word STA: in a very technical sense meaning the l'edas. Comparing the definitions of 112: by Gautama on the one hand, and of 19: log Bhūsarvajna on the other, we find that the two words as used by these two authors bear different meanings. Firstly ma: as used by the writers of Puranis would be the same thing as daar or tradition which is one of the Pramūnas mentioned but at the same time discarded by Gaulama. The literal meaning of the word #: would be the same. Tho word is derived from the root is with a meaning to come. The l'edas which are taken as having no human source, may very aptly be called me. Caulama, decidedly, disregards any such knowledge The word art: perhaps did not acquire this meaning in his time which it did in the time of Bhūsarujna. Even if the worl did acquire the meaning in which it is used by the Puranas in tlie time of Gautama the later authors on 4: may have rejected this word on that very nocount. Dhūsarejna's definition is "1992. H9791T ANAHTTA:. This definition is quite independent of Gautama who defines 19: is a: 16: covering a narrower space of knowledge than wbat is done by the former definition. Bhusarrina's definition includes also aifa 177 called out. It goes further and includes statements uttered by any person whose veracity the hearer has no reason to doubt. These are things of very com. mon occurence in every day life, very common to be met with in our courts of law. A very disreputable man may go in a witness-bor and make a statement which a judge may believe, if he thinks that he sees no reason why that witness should not have told the truth. A necessary for the defini. tion of e: is absent in this case and yet there is the true knowledge created by & statement, or a 7. Of the six orthodox scbools of philosophy five recognise the T* HIT. Vaisheshtlas and the un-orthodox philosophers such as ·( 50 ) - Bhasarvajna, 'Our author cites the instances of authoritative sentences from ancient works, whose authority in things not within reach of our senses is to be upheld on account of the # of those ancient writings. P. 22. L. 7. a. The proper construction of this sentence should be at TAVS Pintaro Haa ant ASTETTATUTSwara. It should not be said that a sentence is authoritative because it is eternal. There is no proof to show the eternity of a sentence. This is that old stereotyped instance of the middle age logicians of India who held disputations to prove that 8 word was noneternal. We may with no disadvantage omit discussing the usefulness of such a disputation in understanding the simplo rules of logic. The student, who is interested in this subject may he referred to Pītsyāyana's commentary on Gautama's Sutra's Adhaya II Anbik II Sutrag 13-33. P. 22. L. 10. arydama tonfalt. 7, the objector says, is only conjunction and disjunction of air. This, the other man replies, is not true; because all the words aro understood by a man simul. taneously and instantly they are uttered. Just as the eye, being an instrument of knowledge is accustomed to acquire the know. ledge of the whole thing coming within its vision, so does the ear acquire the knowledge of the whole collection of words. P. 22. L. 13. Tot at. Can it not be said, says the objector, that the words, 727, can become the object of being taken in by the ear in the same way as the other objects are taken by other organs of sense. Different sounds striko the ear individually and not collectively, just as in the case of :, different parts are pot in one after another individually. The other man replies that the analogy is not correct. The caso of se: is a question of 1*: (producer). In the case of ye, it is the question of 54979: (exhibiter) just as it is in a lamp. P. 23. L. 1. gaafa troca yolunft. Bhäsarvajno maintains that there are only three Pramānas. Gautama maintained four Pra. māpas viz. 5297, AFT, 8441974, and t:. It seems, however, that tbere are other Pramānās whiob, though not recognised, are mentioned by Gautama in Sūtra 2-2-1. They are according to him ऐतिशम्, अर्थापतिः, समव: and अमाव- Bhāsarrajna also mentions these four with 3461917 as Pramanas which according to hini Deed not be mentioned separately. 14 According to come is ·( 51 ) another form of 294677 and the slightest consideration of different members will show that it is so. But Bhăsarrajna says that it can be included in there which can be expressed in the form 'it is 4: just like at:.' P. 23. L 2.07 Tan. From bere down to line S on page 21 me hare an interesting discussion as to the 34H1AYFIMT which having been objected to has to be accounted for by Dhāsarcajna, as in no way different from one of the three Pramāras already discussed by him. Sereral authors before and after him have suggested that EH4 is in no way different from hr. In this passsge Bhisarrajna tries to refute the theory, and to explain that J4HITE is included in . As already explained the reader will again see that Bhāsartajna is indifferent in asing the words 7: and 74:. Readers of Tarl-laumudi will remember the distinction draya by laugakshi Bhaskara between प्रमाणम् and स्मृतिः स्मृतिः। the result of impressions :eft by the knowledge acquired in the past. 174 is the result of the present operations to acquire that knowledge. Bhäsarrajna thinks that when a man says that this is a 194: because a 1994: is similar to 1:, tho knowledge is not the result of any present operation but only of the impressions left on the mind by knowledge acquired in the past by the similarity of m and 44: Chăsareajna farther says that the present knowledge of 1896: Hat is the result of माप्तोपदेशः. Ho would therefore include उपमानम् in दः. The result, according to him, is arrived at by putting two words together which are in the capacity of tbe qualifier and the qualified He further goes on discussing that it cannot be included even in the sy, because there is not that immediate reception of the knowledge of the object which is essential in #5TH. IA 344794 we have to depend on something more for that knowledgo which, according to him, is the statement of a reliable man, which becomes the last step in the operation. P. 91. L. t. cafute Pt. From here down to P. 25 L 4 wo find an instance of the old-type discussion explainia; how oor Author does not differ from Gaulara, although he holds that there are three pramanis only and not four as Gautama says is 5s Subs P.25 L 4. azienesta-This is a discussion of the suisfenamin. The nathor urs that this is included in the what. The ·( 52 ) अापत्तिप्रमाणम् is the result of अविनाभावः (concomitance). If there is no concomitance, the essential step in age, there would not be the form of reasoning which we call far. The mode of arguing is by coming to an inevitable conclusion. Vatsyāyana's instance is असत्सु मेधेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति सत्सु भवतीत्येतदादा- rent. This instance is not a very happy one, because as Vätsyāyana himself explains that af 941 a sa-sometimes even when there are clouds there is no rain, Vātsyāyana, following Gautama, explains that argjaft: is not a PAINTH at all. Gautama says that अर्धापत्तिरप्रमाणमनकान्तिकत्वात् । २-१-३॥ Later writers do take note of infer: but they say that it is anotber form of अनुमानप्रमाणम्. This अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणम् is introduced in the science of reasoning by the Jlimansalas and the later writers of the Naiyāyiha and Vaisheshika schools have tried to explain it away by taking it as another form of a 1977. The typical instance of these writers is a: fa jaisaia trait at This would not be an aghax according to the Himanshas bat the Naiyay has explain it by putting it in syllogistic form as dagtit trait thi, fatihah fa carr. Our author goes further and says that this is another name of amefaritagury and nothing moro. P.25. L. 15. Fara: is an additional my mentioned but rejected by Gautama. This is explained by the phrase whole includes the part.' This is also another form of art and not an independent IT- P. 25. I. 15. tara; is another 1979 mentioned by our author, wbiel also, he says is not a separate it but one which can be included in any of the three Pramāras according to the three circumstances under which it is used. P. 26. L. 8. older is the next pramāņa about which I bave already spoken in the beginning of this chapter. It is heresay evidence. P. 26 L. 10 21 is another pramāņa not recognised by the Naiyayikas who mention it as a kind of action which forms a function of fis, feria: JOTI 1-2-3{ Tho Tantrikas coasider this as a separate pramuna but, as our author 'says, it is only a form of expression substituting a kind of action for words. It is in no way different from #:.

·( 52 ) aperafettine is the result of afa: (concomitance), If there is no concomitance, the essential step in 348an, there would pot be the form of reasoning which we call 019f:. The mode of arguing is by coming to an inevitable conclusion, Vatsyāyana's instance is असत्सु मेधेपु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति सत्सु भवतीत्येतदादा- a. This instance is not a very happy one, because as Vātsyāyana himself explains that are $9.517 fa-sometimes even when there are cloads there is no rain. Vātsyāyana, following Gautama, explains that meiefe: is not HIT at all Gautama says that अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनकान्तिकत्वात् १२-१-३ || Later writers do take note of suigfer: but they say that it is another form of अनुमानप्रमाणम्. This अर्धापत्तिप्रमाणम् is introduced in the scienco of reasoning by the Jimānsalas and the later writers of the Naiyáyiha and Vaisheshika schools have tried to explain it away by taking it as another form of 2499174. The typical instance of tbese writers is 41 2927: Ret 7 gjthseia na This would not be an Big4177 according to the Mimänslas but the Naryayihas explain it by putting it in syllogistic form as acut traityti, farsgarica afa HAT. Our author goes further and says that this is another name of toyfa 4494694 and nothing moro. P.25. L. 15. a: is an additional Aut mentioned but rejected by Gaulama. This is explained by the phrase "whole includes tho part.' This is also another form of art and not an independent FTTH P.25. L. 15. Hr?: is another my mentioned by our author, which also, ho says is not a separate 474 but one which can be included in any of the three Pramānas according to the three circumstances under which it is used. P. 26. L 8. dfage is the next pramāņa about which I have already spoken in the beginning of this chapter. It is heresay cvidence. P. 26 L. 10 ag is another pramāna not recognised by the Naiyayilas who mention it as a kind of action which forms a function of the pagam129: ATE 1 82.24 11 The Tantrikas consider this as a separate pramāna but, as our author" says, it is only a form of expression substituting a kind of action for words. It is in no way different from 14:.

·( 53 ) P. 26. L. 14. The result of the discussion of soveral modes of reasou. ing brings us now to the object whioh is to be proved or established. This object (974) is defined as the knowledgo of a subject wbich by way of being useful for farther knowlcdge becomes the source of the highest good. This should be known and always to be thought upon. P.27. L. 7. The प्रमेयम् is of four kinds, known as हेयम्, तस्य निर्वतकम् , ETTET and 3914;. In these Prameyas is the principal subject to be known and the remaining three are appertaining tu that principal one. हेयम् is explained as हीयतेऽवश्यपरित्यज्य इति हेयम्, । thing which is necessarily to be abandoned. Here again Bhasaroajna strikes out a new line of division of the Praneyas. Gautama mentions twelvo Prameyas which are enumerated as 3917 fitfizqinglaga: TargetHTA" ataamita 9.47 2-811 Bhäsar. vajne says that there are twenty-five Prameyas in all which can bo grouped into four broad classes as mentioned. The first of thom is gimnames, which is further stated to be of twenty one kinds. Jayasinha says that a lleya is future misery to be avoided; because it is useless to consider of past sufferings and as to the present, they have to be suffered because they are the result of past deeds which cannot be avoided. The twenty one future niseries to be avoided are (1) the body (2-7) the six Indrıyas (8-13) the six objects of senses (14-18) the six conconsciousnesses of the objects (19) pleasaro and (20-21) the two pains of restraint and torture. The body is said to be one of the miseries to be avoided, because It is the home of miseries. If there had been no body the miseries enumerated would have had no place to manifest themselves. Our author does not enumerate the six Indriyas but, if we follow Gautama they are only five प्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि : 8-8-22 11 Vaisheshrkas bowever enumerate () mind with the Indryas and the later Naryāyika writers lika Laugakshi Bhaskara and Vishvanath Panchānana have adopted that view. Jayasinho also follows that yiew and envmerates the six Indriyas in the same order as these writers. Corresponding to these sis senses there are the six objects of senses visa smell, taste, colour, touch, sound and thought. The final reception of these, consciousness of them, are the six Buddhis mentioned by our author. Pleasure is mentioned as one of the ·( 54 ) miseries because it is the source of future pain. Besides these miseries there is the further misery of actual pain of torturo and restraint. P. 27. L. 8. aer faria –The next point considered is the cause of these miseries which are mentioned to be at and your on the one hand and #: and 48: on the other. It is corious that f: by which is meant bere the observance of religious duties, should be mentioned as one of the causes of misery. Jayasınha feels the impropriety and explains यद्यपि धर्मः सुखस्य हेतुस्तथापि सुखस्य दुःखाऽविनाभावित्वादुःखहेतुरेवोक्तः ॥ The definition of अविद्या given is the ordinery one we find in Vedäntic works. The word is purely Vedäntic and is very common in the Upanishads. Fourt means & desire for rebirth with impressions of previous life. This word got its prominence in Buddhistic literature. These two and the religious performances and irreligious conduct result in the heyas or things to be abandoned, that is the miseries. The word faqah means according to Jayasinha 977-producer or cause. P. 27. L. 11. When we know the two sets or things viz. the miseries and the causes thereof, the third thing to know is the complete destruction of them. The word en used here is peculiar one not to be found in dictionaries. One can understand that though this is mentioned here as one of the Prameyas it is the highest aim of all philosophy. P. 27. L. 12. The last Prameya is the remedy for tbe end of all misery. This is the knowledge of Almā (self). Hero the author cites passages from the Upanishads which say that the self should be seen, heard abort, thought of and contemplated upon. P. 27. L. 16. # fefau:-This self, so to be known, is again of two kinds or rather manifests butaself in two forms known as the para and the apara. The para self is that manifestation of Him which though not affected by any quality of this world is all-knowing Bod the creator of the universe. This para self is to be known by Anumina and by Agama. P. 28. L 7. ÅHITHESISAT:-Tho Apara solf is endless and the one who enjoys this world. This is to be known by Anumana as being the support of the work of intellect. The author further goes on explaining the effects of intellect, how these are to bo understood as being supported by this apara self.

·qualities. This is objected to by some philosophers on the graund that that state of things is like & swoon which a philosopher should not desire for. One feature of this Alu: is that there abould be bappiness because bo say the Upanishads. Even Brahma, the highest being 19 explained as TR RETT FTA Thus two things are the necessary for A. They are the absence of misery and the presence of happiness. The author Efter descussion comes to the conclusion that. P. 32. L. 6. afecafeaua e fafetersspilaat getigfa: is that ever conscious happiness which is accompanied by TOUR #18:. The A: (highest good-absolution) of a person ( 55 ) P. 28. L. 19. afire. The author ultimately comes to the conclusion that this Apara self is separate from the physical body, all pervading and eternal. In the next two paragraphs the author explains how that self is all pervading and eternal. P. 39. L. 9. THAT......fa:BRAITE-The knowledge of the Apara self is a step toward the highest good. That knowledge is useful for the attainment of 19: and it leads to the destruction of sin ( 48: ). P. 29. L. 11. TATHERİ 9. The knowledge of para self is the cause of the highest good, led to it by 34194T which is further describod as the practice for the destruction of misery and the attainment of complete concentration, From P. 99 L 14. The author explains 341891 and its different forms and the various practices which go to form ib. Here he enters in the details which are foreign to this subject but which shows an insight of the author in the logashüstro. At p. 30 L. 17 ho citos a Shruti which explains that by the hnoroledge of Ilim one avonds death, there is no other way to attain that state. Our author, therefore says that by the knowledge of Shiva ( which name be attributes to para self ) a person attains the highest good ( absolution-He:). P. 91. L. 1. garci Ate:--The natural question arises as to the meaning of all. What is this site! The author discusses one definition which attributes to #12: that state of things where there is nothing but the self standing by itself like Akasha at the time of final destruction of all general and partionlar csmplete absence of pain.

·INDEX. The figures in Någari refer to pages of the text. The other figures refer to pages of the notes. --Non- उपनयः ११:33 उपमानम् ३३, 51, उपलब्धिः १;1; उपाय: २७ उपासनाविधि. २९: ऊहः २ अनध्यवसाय: १७ अनध्यवासितः ६,25: अनध्यवसितभेदाः ८: 30: अनवधारणम्: 1: भनुपलब्धिः १: अनुमानम् ; ४: अनेकधर्मा संशयः १; अनेकान्तिकः ६24; अनैकान्तिकभेदा. ७,29%; अन्वयः४ अन्वयव्यतिरेकीरेतुः ४; 17; अपवर्गसाधनम्. २९ अबावितविषयत्वम्. ४: 19%8 अभावप्रमाणम् २५,52. अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्: २६ अर्थापत्तिः २५; 51 अवयवाः ( अनुमाने )४ अविनाभावः ४, 10; 11; असत्प्रपतिक्षत्वम् ५, 19; असिद्धः ६;23; असिद्धभेदाः ६,26-27-28; ऐतिचं प्रमाणम् २६, 52, कथा ११; 37, कालात्ययापदिष्टः ६ 25%3 कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदाः 31; केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः ५; 21; केवलान्वयी हेतुः ५; 21; चेष्टा २६; 48, 52; उलम् १२,383 छलभेदाः १२; 38; जल्प. १२; 37, जाति- १३; 39, 40, 41; जातिभेदा. १५, १६, १७ दृष्टं साधनम् ४; आगमः २२, 183 आगमभेदाः २२; 49 निगमनम् ११; 36%; 'आत्मा ( परः-अपरः ) २७, २८, 54, निग्रहस्थानानि १५-२१; 40-47. निर्णयः ११ निर्षिकल्म प्रत्यक्षम्. ३३ उदाहरणम् ९: 32: उदाहरणामासाः९:33: पक्षः ४,173 थार्षम् 9;

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Title Nyayasara ed. by Viswa
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Author Blasárvantina
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