·an
09
The Depariment of public instructior, Bombay.
THE
TARKAKAUMUDI
BEING
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
VAISHESHIKA AND THE NYÁYA PHILOSOPHILES,
BY
LAUGAKSHI BHASKARA,
EDITED
WITH VARIOUS READINGS, NOTES CRITICAL AND
EXPLANATORY, AND AN INTRODUCTION,
BY
MANILÂL NABHUBHÂI DVIVEDI, B.A.,
PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT, SÂMÂLDÁS COLLEGE, BHÀVNAGAR.
1,000 COPIES.
Regestered for Copyright under Act XXV. of 1867.
33 cm bau:
GOVERNMENT CENTRAL BOOK DEPÔT.
1886.
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Price Twelve Annas.
BOMBAY SANSKRIT SERIES NO. XXXII.

·BOMBAY PRINTED AT THE EDUCATION SOCIETY'S PRESS, BYCULLA, ·PREFACE. The present text of the Tarkakaumudi is based on two printed and five manuscript copies of the same, carefully collated with one another. I have divided these into six classes : A. The Nirnaya Sagar press copy-a reprint of the Calcutta edition, the second of the two printed copies referred to above, very incorrect and careless. B. A carefully written manuscript kindly lent to me by the celebrated Pandita Gattulálåji of Bombay, giving more or less a correct reading of A. C. A manuscript from Cambay kindly lent to me by Dr. Peterson from his collection. The whole subject is herein disposed of in a very summary manner-all such portions as are appended for further elucidation being carefully omitted. It may perhaps be an entirely abridged recension of the text, current probably among the Jains. D. Kindly placed at my service with the two following by Dr. Bhandarkar, from the collection in the Deccan College, Poona. These appear to be very old, two of them being thoroughly trustworthy, as assisting a correct reading of A and B. The same as C, but froio a different part of the country, a fact corroborating the supposition of another recension of the text being prevalent. F. The same as D. The present text would thus appear, evidently, to be based ehiefly on A, B, D, F. As is usual with regard to such works and their authors, I have been sorely disappointed in my endeavours to glean even what little I can of the author and his history. The colophon of MSS. D, F, tells us that Bhâskara was the son of Mudgala, the son of Rudrakavindra of the Laugakshi family. We further know that he is the author ·PREFACE. of a small work on the Mimansâ called the Arthasamgraha, lately published in the Benares Sanskrit Series. Here ends all the stock of reliable information we possess about Bhaskara. Bhaskara will appear to belong to the Northern school of Nyaya, from his mention of Shulapåvimisra-probably a Bengal Naiyayika-in his book. If in Shulapânimisra we can discover the identity of Shankaramisra, the author of the Upaskâra-this practice of nomenclature not being without a parallel in the Kanabhaksha and Akshapada of the Sarvadarshanasangraha-we may renture to advance some guess about the date of Bhaskara. Shankara misra quotes Jagadisa, the author of a commentary on the Didhiti of Raghunath Siromani, the founder of the celebrated school of Nudca, and a contemporary of Chaitanya, the Vaishnava reformer of Bengal.* Chaitanya was born in 1489. Allowing a period of at least 40 years between Raghunath Siromani and Shankaramisra, and allowing also some time for the acquaintance of our author with the latter, we may fis upon the middle of the sixteenth century as the probable terminus a quo of Bhaskara. Further than this I am unable at present to proceed; nor even in the above, which I have advanced with great diffidence, do I pretend to be not open to correction. I must not allow this occasion to pass without acknowledging my best thanks to Shastree Bheemâcharya, of Elphinstone College, whose able tuition first encouraged me to undertake an edition of the Tarka Samgraha, which circumstances, however, have brought me to replace by that of the Tarka-kanmadi. My best thanks are also due to the several gentlemen who have kindly assisted me by a loan of manuscripts and other rare works necessary for the compilation of the text and notes. M. N. D. Bhavnagar, 24th dayust 1886. * Colebrooke's Essays, Volume II, pp. 282 and 28:4, nuté.

·INTRODUCTION, Life has ever been a spur of action to the activity of the human mind. Even among the Hottentots of Africa, and the savages of Fiji this feeling does not fail to manifest itself in one form or another. The inexplicable and the invisible has taxed the resources of the human mind to its utinost limit, and has always attracted all energy towards itself with fresh and increased vigoar. Parallel with this research has been the inquiry into the nature of happiness, and the one idea has become blended with the other in such a manner that both have in all countries maintained at all times a kind of intimate relation with each other. The conception of happiness has perceptibly acted on the conception of the invisible, and vice versa. This tendency of the haman mind results in some form of religion. Before the mysteries of the subjective world become even partially soluble, the wonders of ihe objective universe press upon the intelligent mind with a force, which ultimately rebounds in the form of some terrible demon, or a propitious deity. The government of a Supreme Providence being established, a multitude of formal worship gathers round the idea, keeping the mind yet far away from a solation of the 'ultimate mystery.' The mind thus disappointed reflects back upon mitself, and begins to analyse the nature of the "ego " or "self.” If Physics come to its aid, its researches end in materialism and science, if left to itself it loses itself in the sublime regions of metaphysics and philosophy. An assimilation of the two-physics and metaphysicsought, however, to be the more natural result, but history has unfortunately not yet recorded a single instance of this combination. This is the natural history of Religion ; and it is nowhere better illustrated in its entirety than in India. The Vedic Aryans, worshipping different forms of one Sapreme being, came at last to look upon the whole phenomena of nature as one being,* including the observer, the observed, as well as the instruments * Compare R.V., X. 90, 120, 125, 129, &e.

·6 INTRODUCTION. of observation. This mode of philosophising gave rise to the celebrated school of the Vedânta. Similar constructions put upon different parts of the Veda produced the other five philosophies or Darshanas. It is impossible to determine when each of these schools of philosophy came info existence, for we can easily detect an under-current of pbilosophic thought even amidst the turbid flood of primitive formal worship. We can, however, arrange them in the order of their metaphysical accuracy, and thus perceive that they may be current evenin one and the same time. It is a fruitless attempt to prove that each of these systems rose upon the ruins of its predecessor, * for there never was a time when any one of them held entire sway over the Aryau mind. It is nevertheless certain that each of these assumed a formal shape only after the enunciation of its principal truths by some great teacher. The truths of each of these philosophies are primarily conveyed to us in the form of sutras, some of them like those of Panini, others more diffused and therefore recent. Roughly speaking, this branch of literature may be assigned to the latter end of the Sutra period. We do not find any mention of these formal Darshanas either in Patanjali or in any of the writers preceding him. Evidently, therefore, they are very modern in their formal shape and can, on this ground, claim but a very inferior degree of the respect due to high antiquity. As independent monuments of the power of Aryan intellect they are without a parallel. The darshanas or schools of philosophy--the ultimate results of the Aryan mind deeply engaged in solving the mystery of lifeare six in number. The Nyâya of Gautama, the Vaisheshika of Kanada, the Sankhya of Kapila, the Yoga of Patanjali, the Purya- Mimânsâ of Jaimini and the Uttara Mimânsâ of Vyås. All these try to set forth the nature of the Godhead, the soul, the highest happiness ( Moksha) with the means of acquiring it (dharna ). We are concerned here with the first two only. Their conclusions on the three principal issues are, in my opinion, comparatively inferior * As is done by Mr. Taylor in his preface to the Bhagvadgita.

·INTRODUCTION. 7 . to those of the other four branches. Still the phraseology of these two systems holds universal sway over the whole range of Indian thought, and we may therefore not inaptly describe them as the grammar of Indian philosophy. It will thus appear that it is a misnomer to identify this branch of Indian philosophy with. Western Logic, for though an investigation of the laws of thought forms the principal bulk of either, still such an inquiry holds but a subordinate place in the general features of the Indian view. We find the name of Gautama mentioned in Manu* and the Mahâbhârata; † and that of Kanada as Kâsyapa in Shankaramisra's Upaskåra, I but this information can hardly help us to a conjecture of their respective dates. Nyâya, or examination by proper instruments of knowledge, ş the work of Gautama opens with postulating the possibility of final beatitude by the proper knowledge of the sixteen things beginning with Pramâna and ending with Nigrahasthana. Final beatitude is defined as absolute freedom from pain (तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः ॥२२॥.) Similarly Kanâda also proposes in his Vaisheshika sutras (rules treating of Visheshas-differentia-which distinguish substances from one another) to examine the nature of Dharma (STATT TË SITE- स्यामः । ११) for the acquisition of Molesha, (आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः। stato . x) which he declares as within reach after a knowledge of the padúrthas, or substances which are six in number. The Nyâya proceeds by proposing, defining and examining, ** the nature of right knowledge and the instruments leading to it. This covers all the ground occupied by formal logic-including Percep- * III. 16. Col. Essays, p. 280. * I. 4194. Col. Essays, p. 280. I Col. Essays, p. 280. प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं ।। वात्स्यायनभाष्यं ।। || प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छल- जातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानानिःश्रेयसाधिगमः ।। गौ• सू० २।।. | धर्मविशेषप्रसूताइव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधयंवैधाभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानानिःश्रेयसम् ।। वै० म० ४ ।। परीक्षा. ** JET, SITT ·8 INTRODUCTION, tion, Inference, Analogy, Testimony, and the fallacies together with a description of the mental and sensual apparatus. It touches upon the elements — Prithvi, dp, Tejas, Viyu, Akúsha-only casually under a sub-head of Prameya or objects to be investigated,' and says nothing noteworthy on the atomic theory of the universe. Vâtsyayana in his Bhâshya notices the Vaisheshika padúrtha's but once,t and hence the Muktavali remarks that they are not opposed to the arrangement of the Naiyâyikas. Kanâda, on the other hand, devotes himself entirely to an examination of the six heads of predicables, to which later writers have added a seventh-Abhậva, --and gives prominence to the atomic theory of the universe. Both agree in acknowledging the existence of a Supreme Being, standing aloof from his creation and governing the whole by his omnipotence and onnipresence. We will thus clearly be able to perceive that the Nyâya is chiefly occupied with the Metaphysics of logic,' and the Vaishesbika with the “plıysics.' They may be looked upon parts of one system, supplying each other's deficiencies. In all later works, which are generally read all over India, we shall find a misture of both, the Vaisheshika ruling the form and arrangement. The great Bhâshâ Parichheda with its commentary the Muktiivali is a work founded on both systems. The Tarka-Sangraha and the Tarkakaumudi are also works of the same class, though the latter is more Vaisheshika in its character. &S The Tarkakaumudi opens with an examination into the nature of the seven categories, a knowledge whereof is, as we have seen, essential to the acquisition of absolute freedom from pain. Paulárthas.---That which can be namell is a padártha: the meaning of a word, the import of names.' This is substantially an inquiry into the nature of human concepts and their mutual relation with a view to ascertain what is Moksha. The padárthus are declared to be * Vide Sutras 9 to 14 I. I. + अस्त्यन्यदपि द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः प्रमेयं नरेदैन चापरिसंख्येयम् 11 2-2-3 ll aro Holl ·INTRODUCTION seven in number: Substance, Property, Action, Characteristic Genus, Difference or Individuality, Intimate Relation, and Non-existence. I. Substance.-No property can exist by itself, it must have some substratum. This is substance. The substances are nine in number: Prithvi, 4), Tejas, Váyu, Akásha, Kúla, Dig, Atman, Manas. Oi these the first four are either eternal or non-eternal, according as Ghey are in the form of atons or combined effects. The non-eternal kind is again divided into three kinds: the body that is made of that substance, the sense which cognises the properties of that substance, and the inorganic mass of the same. It is here set forth.that creation emanates from infinitesimally small atoms moving at the will of God. The remaining five substances except Manas are each eternal, one, and all.pervading. Atman and Manus.--Atman or the soul, is of two kinds: supreme and inferior. The supreme soul is God, the inferior one individualised soul. Soul is the substratum of so many as fourteen properties. The supreme soul is but one, but the inferior souls are many, as many as there are living organisnis, both being indestructible and all-pervading. Knowledge, absolute or relative, is the distinguishing feature between these two kinds of Atman. Knowledge is never possible without the union of mind or Manas with Atman. Manas is like Atman eternal and numerous, but unlike it, it is merely atomic in form. II. Property. - The properties are in all twenty-four: (1) Form, (2) Taste, (3) Smell, (4) Touch, (5) Number, (6) Dimension, (7) Separateness, (8) Contact, (9) Division, (10) Distance, (11) Proximity, (12) Intellect, (13) Pleasure, (14) Pain, (15) Desire, (16) Hatred, (17) Effort, (18) Gravity, (19) Fluidity, (20) Viscidity, (21) Inpression, (22) Merit, (23) Demerit, (24) Sound. These admit, again of a twofold division, The first into developed and undeveloped; and the second into common and particular. The eye, which is an organ of sense made of Tejas, ought to show its naturally brilliant white colour, which it does not, and may therefore ·10 INTRODUCTION. be said to possess undeveloped form. Similarly properties, which can subsist by themselves in single objects, as form, taste, smell, &c., are 'particular;' those which like 'contact' and others cannot manifest themselves but in more than one object are called 'common. Of these twenty-four properties ' Intellect' deserves special treatment. Causation.--Before entering upon a description of Intellect and its divisions, it is necessary to refer to the theory of causation laid down in the text. A cause is defined to be that which precedes the effect, being in constant concomitance with it, and which is not disproved to be a cause by any other circumstance. Cause, thus, is “the antecedent or concurrence of antecedents on which it (the effect) is in. variably and unconditionally consequent.” There is a case of cauzsation which is distinguished from the general description, on account of its not directly contributing to the effect, but fitting something else for the purpose. This is called learana, as the axe in the act of felling a tree, the contact of the axe with the wood being the intermediate step. A cause is further described as one of three kinds : Intimate, Non-intimate or Instrumental. The threads and the cloth made of them are intimately and inseparably related; the union of the threads being the non-intimate cause of the cloth; and the weaver's shuttle, &c., instrumental causes in the same act. And lastly, a cause may be common or uncommon. Common causes aro those which unavoidably enter into the formation of all knowable things, the uncommon ones being the peculiar factors which make the thing what it is. Intellect-Intellect is knowledge, the common factor underlying our consciousness. * It divides itself into direct cognition and memory. Direct cognition contributes to memory through the impression which it creates, and which is capable of being called into life at any inoment. Direct cognition may be right or wrong, which again may be a false notion, or a doubt. Riglit knowledge is of four kinds : Perception, Inference, Analogy, Testimony--and the instruments of these kinds of knowledge are also four, Perception, Inference, Simi- * The Dipika of the Tarkasamgraha, ·INTRODUCTION. 11 larity and Word. The instruments of knowledge thas enumerated are in accordance with the theory of the Nyâya, for the Vaisheshika recognises only the first two. The Chårvâkâs admit only of Perception, the Bauddhis of Perception and Inference, the Mimansakas and the Vedantins of Implication and Absence in addition to the four of the Nyâya. The Nyîya includes Implications in Inference, and regards Absencet as only a subordinate factor assisting the Perception of the Absence of anything. Perception. -Direct Perception; or Perception is the knowledge produced by the contact of any one of the senses of perception with an external object. This is of two kinds : formal, as this is a post, or general, as of a thing. The instrument contributing to this know. ledge, viz., the contact with external objects, is either objective, i.e., consisting of the’external senses, or subjective, consisting of the intemal mind alone. The first is of six kinds, according as the thing is joined to the sense of perception either directly or indirectly, or according as the object cognised is some positive entity or a negative one. The second has only three divisions, assisting the comprehension of a poet's fancies or of all the things possessing a common attribute from an observation of any single individual of the class, and so on. Among the senses of perception only the eye, the skin, and the mind, can take cognisance of substance; the rule being that a substance becomes perceptible only when it possesses dimension along with some cognisable property answering to the instrument cognising it. And lastly, because the properties of a substance which are related to it by intimate relation, as well as its nonexistence, or the common characteristic to be found in it, can all never stand independent of their substratum, it is laid down that that sense of perception which cognises any particular substance, cognises also the characteristic of the class to which the thing belongs, the * न चतुष्टुमैतिद्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् ॥ २-२-१ ॥ अर्थादापत्तिः अर्थापत्तिः TI: TAs: || ato 375° ll: + Vide 2:2:29-38 Nyâya Sutras. * अक्षस्याक्षस्य प्रतिविषयंवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम् |......मितेन लिङ्गेन अर्थस्य पञ्चान्मानमनु- मानम् | उपमानं सारूप्रज्ञानम् ।...शब्दः शब्द्यतेऽनेनार्थ इति । वा० भा०१-२-३ ।। * ** ·N INTRODUCTION, intimate relation of the thing with other things or properties, as also its non-existence at any particular place or time. Inference.--Inference is the ascertainment of the relation between any two objects by the help of a third called the Helu. The thing of which something is to be predicated is called the palssha, the thing to be predicated the Sádhya. These in Greek logic would correspond to the middle, minor, and major terms of a syllogista, but these and the many other points of similarity between the two systems need not necessarily lead us to believe that the Groeks learnt the lessons of logic at the feet of a Gautama or a Kanada, or that the Indians borrowed their ideas from the master of Alexander. For, it is quite possible for any two nations to work their way to the same solid truth quite independently of one another. It is, besides, now well-known that the sciences of logic and of Grammar were, as far as history allows us to judge, in vented, or originally conceived by tivo nations only, by Hindus and Greeks, '** The important step in Indian logic is the establishment of the Vyapti the universal major premis, setting forth the constant invariable relation between the Hetu and Sádhya. This is a pure process of induction governed by laws answering to the methods of Agrecment and Difference enunciated by Mill. It will not do for the Hetu and Sádhya to be simply found together in a number of instances, but it must conclusively be shown, before enunciating the Vyaptı, that their concomitance is not interrupted in any single instance. This being accomplished the deduction is finished in a few steps. We must know that the Hetu is on the Paksha, and also must have in mind at the same time the Vyápli of this Hetu with the Südhya. This is the Parâmars a which leads to the final conclusion, Modes. --The question of Modality also, has not been passed over. The reasoning may take one of three forms : Kevalánvayi, Kevalavyatireki, Anvaya vytireki. Anvyaya means the concomitance of tlic Hetu and the Sådhya in the form of a universal A proposition ; * Max Muller on Indian Logic.

·INTRODUCTION. $ Vyatireka, the concomitance of the Abhiva of the Sádhya and the Abhiva of the Hetu, corresponding to an A proposition converted per accidens. It may be possible in certain cases to find illustrations to support both these kinds of Vyaptis, as in inferring fire from smoke; in others it may be possible to find instances to support a l'y ápti only of the one or the other kind, as in inferring namableness from perceptibility or in inferring life from the power of breathing. Syllogism.--Inforence may be for one's own conviction, or for convincing somebody else. In the latter case the five-membered syllogism is put forth. The first part is called Pratidnya the proposition, the second Iletu the reason, the third Qadharana the instance, the fourth Upanaya the assumption, and the fifth Nigamano the deduction, e.g.:- The mountain has fire, Because it has smoke; All that has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth; This is such (i.e., this mountain has smoke), . It has fire. easy to perceive that the first, second, and fourth premises of this, properly speaking, rhetorical syllogism can be reduced to one, and the syllogism made to consist of the three usual premises, as in the case of an inference for one's own conviction. It is believed that the instance in the third member deprives the proposition of its universal character, and therefore vitiates the conclusion. To this it is replied that the instance is not cited to support the proposition, but to indicate the modality of the syllogism. * But we may perhaps justify the instance by arguing that it prevents the syllogism from involving a petitio principii by cutting down the major premis to only as much as is actually known by induction. We need not necessarily look upon the proposition as simply particular, because the instance is only one, for that one instance is but one of a class. Fallacies.-All fallacies in Indian logic are more or less inductive * Max Müller on Indian Logic ·INTRODUCTION. in their character. The being the subject of such right knowledge as prevents the comprehension of the conclusion or any member of the inference is called a hetvábhúsa or fallacy. These are five in number. Ancikántika,* or that which is found in places where the sádhya is as well as in places where it is not; Viruddha ; Satpratipaksha; Asiddha; and Badhita. The first is of three kinds. Súdhârana or that wherein the hetu is found in Sapaksha (something, the relation of the sádhya, with which is already proved) as well as Vipaksha (something, wherein the sâdhya is not to be found). If we say the mountain bas smoke because it has fire, we at once have a helu which is found in things with smoke, as well as in things without smoke-- fact which at once constitutes itself into the hetvabhása by preventing us from comprehending the universal: wherever there is fire there is smoke. This evidently corresponds to the assumption of a false premise. The second division of Anaikartika is asádharand, or uncommon, the hetu being found in the paksha alone. The third is Anupasamhâri, having a paksha comprising every known object. For a fuller description of these vide note No. 50. The second Helvábhása is Viruddha. Here we take a hetu which always proves the exact opposite of the sádhya, as in the argument this is a cow, because it has the qualities of a horse Satpratipaksha is one wherein a rival argument disproves the original sádhya. In fact, here, there are two different hetus proving two contradictory things of one and the same thing. Asiddha is of three kinds. The first is that in which the very substratum of the quality of the palesha is a fiction (Ashraylisidha), as in the argument the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus. In the second the hetu is not to be found in the paksha (Svarupásiddha), as in the argument this lake is a substance, because it has smoke. The third is of a kind with the first, the distinguishing feature of the hetu and not of the paksha, being false (Vyapyatvớsiddha), as in the argument this mountain has fire, because it has golden smoke. In the last Báchita, we prove the opposite of * एकस्मिन्नन्ते विद्यत इत्यैकान्तिकः । विपर्ययादनैकान्तिक उभयान्तव्यापकत्वात् ।। १-२-१६ वा० भा० ।।

·INTRODUCTION. 15 the conclusion not by another hely, but by an instrument of knowledge, other than inference. If one should maintain that fire is cold, the best way of proving the contrary will be to place some on his hand and thus verify the falsity of his proposition (by praty alsha). In Sádhá rana and dnupasamhári the vyapti cannot be enanciated ; in the three kinds of Asiddha the parúnursha cannot proceed, and in the rest the very inference is not possible. Upádhí.—Even an accidental circumstance or upâdhi vitiates reasoning by suggesting the non-concomitance of the hetu and the sádhya in certain instances. If the sádhya is invariably to be found with the hetu, then the helu must invariably be found with any thing that is in constant, concomitance with the sádhya. If this does not turn out to be true, we can at once perceive that the universal asserting the relation of the hetu and sádkya is false. Hence the upádhi which vitiates the vyápti is an accident concomitant with the sådhya, and non-concomitant with the helu. If one should argue that the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the accidental circumstance 'wet-fuel' which is always found with smoke, but never with fire, will at once vitiate the universal 'wherever there is fire, there is smoke,' by showing the non-concomitance of fire and smoke in a heated ball of iron. Analogy.-Analogy is the knowledge arising from the comparison of one thing with another. If one not knowing a gavaya (blue-bull), were told that it is something resembling a cow, and if he should then, seeing the gavaya, recognise it as such, his knowledge would be said to proceed from analogy. Testimony.-The instrument of the knowledge conveyed by words is a word. The knowledge produced by a sentence depends on the meaning of each word and its relation with other words. Words denote objects by a sort of convention among men, which some believe to be eternal, others not eternal. The Mimansakas believe that the meaning of words is always connotative, the individual being understood only as the substratum of the properties connoted. The Naiyáyikas, ·INTRODUCTION. sense. on the other hand, contend that words are both denotative and connotative, for every word denotes an individual, and connotes some attributes of the same. This meaning of words is comprehended in a variety of ways, chief among which is the usage of persons of wider experience. The sense of a word may thus be principal or implied. The implied sense is, however, dependent on the principal As in the sentence the city on the Thames' it is impossible for us to understand the city as standing on the waters of the Thames, we naturally imply by the word Thames, the bank of the Thames, which sense, however, is evidently dependent on the principal meaning of the word Thames, inasmuch as it is not far removed from the idea of the waters of the river. The rhetoricians look upon this as an independent sense of words. They add also a third called Vyanjani, which the Naiyáyika would include only under inference. A collection of such words can indicate some meaning only when the words are properly related to one another, according to the rules of grammar, when they convey some possible idea, and when they are said one after another without any long pause. Words are divided into three kinds; those conveying an injunction, those giving out a prohibition, and those that merely by various descriptions, &c., enable one to carry out the first or obey the other. In the ordinary course of life only such words can be acted upon as are said by trustworthy persons, but every word of the Veda is law, it being said by the highest authority of all-God. If may be remarked that the Nydya and the Vaisheshila assign only this kind of authority to the Veda, whereas the Mimonsaka will base his argument for the same on the eternity of shabda-a thesis not agreeable to the present system--and the consequent invariable trustworthiness of the sacred scriptures. Prámánya.-It is lastly proposed to examine whether in our perception of an object we aré rendered conscious of the validity of that perception along with the act of perceiving the thing, or only afterwards. The Mimansaka holds with the Vedantin that both are acts of one and tlie same consciousness, whereas the followers of Gautama ·not be dentical with the thing wherein its absence INTRODUCTION. 17 urge that the one act always follows the other, inasmuch as on the original hypothesis, no doubt' ought to be possible, which is absurd. III. Action.--Actions are of five kinds: motion upward, motion downward, contraction, expansion, and motion in general. IV. Characteristic.--Súmanya is eternal, one, and found in more than one object. The characteristic of the genus of a class is a sámanya higher than the characteristics of any individual of that class. The highest sámanya-sattá-is found in dravya, guna and karma alone. These are supposed to possess the highest sattaexistence-inasmuch as they alone are really existent--the first of itself, and the other two tangibly and perceptibly through it. V. Differentia.-Visheshas or differentiæ distinguishing objects from one another are innumerable. They are to be found in eternal substances alone, which are, as described before, the five substances beginning with Akásha, and the atoms of the first four. VI. Intimate relation.-Samavúya is always one. Any two things, one of which exists as it were in and of the other, are said to be related by samaváya. This kind of relation exists between five sets of things: between properties and substances, actions and substances, a part and its whole, the characteristic of a class and any individual of that class, and differentia and the eternal substances in which it is found. VII. Non-entity.--Distinguished from the foregoing six positive existences, is the seventh negative class of non-entity or Abhava. The direct knowledge of an Abhava is dependent on the knowledge of its counter-entity (pratiyogi), as a book in comprehending the absence of the book. A thing may be absent from another in two is cognised, or it may not stand in contact with it. That a horse is not a cow is an instance of mutual non-existence, and that a pot is not to be found in this room, that of non-existence by contact. The second kind of Abháva is divided into three kinds with respect to the time of its existence. The first is anterior-non-existence as C ·18 INTRODUCTION. of anything before it is produced ; the second ulterior-non-existence as of a thing destroyed; and the third absolute non-existence as of the horns of a hare or a lotus in the sky. Conclusion.--Having exhausted the universe of knowledge (omne scibile) by an anslysis of the whole into these seven categories, it is proposed to shew the utility of such an attempt by setting forth the nature of that final beatitude with an inquiry after which the author began. Before concluding, he explains the meaning and purpose of definitions, for throughout the inquiry he has only named and defined objects without trying (as being useless for mere beginners) to justify the division or the definition. Definition.-The definition of a name is the enumeration of its peculiar connotations. A definition may be vitiated by being too wide or too narrow or entirely inapplicable. These faults, however, fall under the fallacies, (Vide notes Nos. 50 and 51.) Moksha.-Having thus justified his analysis of the universe, as well as his method of conducting it, the author maintains that an insight into the nature of kuowable things and their real essence will ensure that knowledge which will lead to real permanent happiness or moksla, which he defines as destruction of pain not taking place at a time when there is possibility of future pain at the place where it occurs.

·ERRATA.
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सत्त्वं.
14 11, सप्रतिपक्षः सत्प्रतिपक्षः
25. दे
प
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13.
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" शब्दप्रमा० शादप्रमा
20, omit the 25th line.
24, line 39, for No. 8 read No. 9.
38, , साध्यभाव
साध्याभाव
70 29, ,, are not required read, are required.
In the notes' premis' ought to be premise.
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·अथ ॥ तर्ककौमुदी॥ ma- श्रीवासुदेवं नवनीरदाभं रमाधरालंकृतपार्श्वभागम् । मत्स्यादिरूपैः कृतलोकतोषं विद्यानिदानं परमं नमामि || अक्षपादं मुनि नत्वा कणादं च ततः परम् । लोगाक्षिणा भास्करण मन्यते तर्ककौमुदी' । तत्राभिधेयाः पदार्थाः । ते च द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवा- याभावाः सप्तैव । तत्र द्रव्याणि' पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्म- मनांसि नवैव । गुणास्तु रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग- विभागपरत्वापरत्व बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नगुरुत्वद्वत्वनेहसंस्कार- धर्माधर्मशब्दाश्चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः । कर्माण्युल्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारण- रामनानि पञ्चैव । सामान्यं विविध परमपरं च । नित्यगव्याणामा- दन्त्यात्तत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव । समवायस्त्वेक एवं | अभावो द्विविधः संसर्गाभावोन्योन्याभावश्चेति । व्यत्वसामान्यवद्गुणवड़ा द्रव्यम् । गुणत्वसामान्यवान्द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नः सामान्यवान्वागुणः । कर्म- स्खलामान्यावञ्चलात्मकं वा कर्म नित्यमेकमने कसमवेत सामान्यम्।। अयमस्माझ्यावृत्त इति व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिमानहेतुर्विशेषः नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः | भावभिन्नोनावः ॥ इति व्यादिसामान्यलक्षणानि ।। अथ तद्विशेषलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते । -पृथिवीत्वसामान्यवती पृथिवी' । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्व- द्रवत्वसंस्कारात्मक चतुर्दशगुणवती । सा द्विधा नित्यानित्या च । नित्या परमाणुलक्षणानित्या कार्यलक्षणा । सापि त्रिविधा शरीरे- न्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमपि विविध योनिजमयोनिजं च । तत्र a. B. E. घननीलकान्तिम् । लक्ष्मीसमालिङ्गिन्तहृत्पदेशन. . C. E. omit अभि- e. C. E. °परत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वत्ने हशब्दबुद्धिसुख. धेयाः.

·( २ ) शुक्रशोणितसंनिपातनं योनिजमस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम् । शुक्रशो- णितसंनिपातं विना धर्मविशेषसहकृतपरमाणुप्रभवमयोनिजं देवर्षिनार- दादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं ब्राणं नासाग्रवति । विषयो मृत्पा- षाणस्थावरभेदान्त्रिविधः । मृत्पाषाणी प्रसिद्धौ । स्थावरो वृक्षलतादिः ।। अन्वसामान्यवत्य आपः। रूपरसस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग- विभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वलेहसंस्कारात्मकचतुर्दशगुणवत्यः । ता अपि द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्चेति । नित्याः परमाणुलक्षणा अनित्याः कार्यलक्षणाः । ता अपि त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरन- योनिजमेव वरुणलोके प्रसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहक रसनं रसनाप्रवर्ति विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिहिमकरकादिश्च ॥ तेजस्त्वसामान्यवत्तेजः । रूपस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगवि- भागपरत्वापरत्वद्वत्वसंस्कारात्मकैकादशगुणवत् । तद्विविध नित्यम- नित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुलक्षणमनित्यं कार्यलक्षणम् । तदपि विधि- धं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमयोनि जमेवादित्यलोके प्रसिद्धन इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराप्रवति | विषवलक्षण तेजश्चतुर्विध भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । पार्थिवेन्धनं वह्नयादिक भीमम् | अविन्ध- नसौरविडवानलादि दिव्यम् । मुक्ताहार परिणामहेतुर्जरानलहा- मौदर्यम् | सुवर्णरजतायाकरजम् ॥ वायुत्वसामान्यवान्यायुः। स्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभाग- परत्वापरत्वसंस्कारात्मकगुणनवकवान् । स विविधो नित्यानित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुलक्षणोऽनित्यः कार्यलक्षणः । अनित्यश्चतुर्विधः शरी- रेन्द्रियविषयप्राणभेदात् । शरीरनयोनि जमेव वावुलोके प्रसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं सर्वशरीरव्यापि लक् | विषयो महावाय्वादिः । शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुः प्राणः । स एव क्रियाभेदालाणापानव्यानोदा- नसमानसंज्ञां लभते न तु शरीरे पञ्च वायवो भूर्तानां समानदेशताविरो- धात् ॥ a. C. E. Tead शरीरमस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं, ke. b. C. E. read शरीरं वरुणलोके प्रसिद्धम्. B. adds लोके पुराणप्रसिद्धम्. c. C. and E. omit अयोनिजम्. d.c. and E. omit अयोनिजम्. e. A. B. read after प्राणः "हुदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः। उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यान: सर्वशरीरगः।।' f. E. omits from स एव क्रियाभेदात्, &c., to साधनं वित्रयः in the next para. (H. A. B.E. omit वायवो. ..

·( ३ ) मूर्तत्वे सति निरवयवः परमाणुः । स चातीन्द्रिय एव । तदुक्तम् । जालान्तरस्थसूर्याशी यत्सूक्ष्म दृश्यते रजः | भागस्तस्य च षष्ठो यः परमाणुः स उच्यते ॥ कारणपश्चाद्भावि कार्यम् । तच्च व्यगुकत्र्यणु- कादिभेदेनानन्तविधम् । तत्र इयोः परमाण्वोः संयोगाइयगुकम्। त्रयाणां इयणुकानां संयोगात्त्यणुकम् । चतुर्णी व्यणुकानां संयोगाच्चतुरणुकन् । एवं पञ्चाणुकादिभोगायतनमन्त्यावयवि शरीरम् । सुखदुःखान्यतर- साक्षात्कारो भोगः । द्रव्यानारम्भकं कार्यद्रव्यमन्त्यावयवि । शरीरसं- युक्तं ज्ञानकरणमतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियम् । ज्ञायमानत्वे सति भोगसाधन विषय इति ॥ शब्दसमवायिकारणमाकाशः। शब्दसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगवि- भागगुणषट्वान् । स च लाघवादेकः सर्वत्र कार्योपलम्भाविभुर्विभु- स्वाञ्च नित्यः । तथापि कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्नः सञ्शब्दग्राहकोत्रे- न्द्रियात्मक: ॥ ज्येष्ठत्वकनिष्टत्वज्ञानाधीनपरत्वापरत्वानुमेयः कालः। संख्यापरिमा- गपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागगुणपञ्चकवान् । सोप्येको विभुनित्यश्च । तथा- प्युपाधिभेदात्रिविधो ऽतीतोनागतो वर्तमानश्चेति । तयक्तिध्वंसविशिष्टः कालस्तवचरतीतकालः । तव्यक्तिप्रागभावविशिष्टः कालस्तव्यक्ते- रनागतकालः | तव्यक्तिध्वंसप्रागभावानवच्छिन्नः कालस्तव्यतर्व- तमानकालः॥ दूरत्वसनिहितत्वज्ञानाधीनपरत्वापरत्वानुमेया दिक् । संख्यापरिमा- गपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागगुणपञ्चकवती । साप्येका विश्वी नित्या च । तथाप्युपाधिभेदाच्चतुर्विधा प्राची प्रतीच्युदीची दक्षिणा चेति । उदयाच- लसंनिहिता दिक्माची | अस्ताचलसंनिहिता दिक्प्रतीची। सुमेरुसंनिहिता दिगुदीची। सुमेहव्यवहिता दक्षिणा च ॥ आत्मत्वसामान्यवानात्मा । स विविधो जीवेश्वरभेदात् । अनित्य- ज्ञानादिमाजीवः । संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागवुद्धिसुखदुःख. च्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारगुणचतुर्दशवान् । स च सुखदुःखादिवैचि- Cl. C. E. read स चैक एव विभुर्नित्यश्च, and omit from तथापि to आत्मकः. ८. C. E. read स च वस्तुगत्यैकोऽप्युपाधि c. C. E. तद्व्यतिविशिष्ट:. d. C. R. सा च वस्तुगत्यैकाप्युपाधि ।

·( ४ ) त्र्यालतिशरीर भिन्नः नित्यज्ञानादिमानीश्वरः। संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व- संयोगविभागबुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्नगुणाष्टकवान् । स चैक एव शरीररहितश्च शरीरहेत्वदृष्टाभावात् । यहा सोऽपि शरीरी पुरुषादृष्टेन कान्ताशरी- रस्येवास्मदीयादृष्टेन तच्छरीरस्य जननसंभवात् । न चास्मदीयादृष्टेन मुक्तस्यापि शरीरोत्पादः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । शरीरहेतोरिच्छादेस्तत्राभा- वात् । अत एव चतुर्भुजत्यादिश्रवणं "स्मृत्यादौ संगच्छते । द्विविधोऽ- प्यात्मा विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥ मनस्त्वसामान्यवन्मनः। संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वा- परत्वसंस्कारगुणाष्टकवत् । तदेव सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं प्रति- जीवं भिनमगु नित्यं च ॥ इति द्रव्यविशेषलक्षणानि ॥ अय गुणविशेषलक्षगान्युच्यन्ते-चक्षुमीत्राह्यजातिमान्गुणो रू- पम् । गुणपदं प्रभावारणाय तच्छुक्ल कृष्णपीतरक्तहरितकापलभेदात्य- विधम् । शुक्लादि पविषं पृथिव्यामेव | शुक्लं स्वच्छं जले । शुक्लभा- स्वरं तेजसि ॥ रसनामात्रयाद्यजातिमारसः स च मधुरतिक्तकटुकषायाम्ललव- णभेदात्पविधः । षड्विधोपि रसः पृथिव्यामेव | मधुर एव जले ॥ ब्राणमात्रायजातिमानान्धः । स द्विविधः सुरभिरखराभिश्च । विवि- धोपि गन्धः पृथिव्यामेव ॥ बमात्रग्राह्यजातिमान्स्पर्शः । स विविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् शीतो जल उष्णस्तेजस्यनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥ द्विविधायामपि पृथिव्यां रूपादयश्चत्वारोप्यनित्याः पाकजाश्च । तत्र हि तेजःसंयोगात्पूर्वश्यामादिनिवृत्तौ रक्ताद्युत्पाददर्शनात् । तत्रापि पूर्व- रूपादिनाशकल्पाद्यन्तरोत्पादकपाकः परमाणुष्वेवेति वैशेषिकमतम् । इयगुकाद्यवयविन्यपीति नैयायिकाः । जलतेजोवायुषु च नित्यगता रू- पादयो नित्या अनित्यगताधानित्या: । उद्भुतानुद्भुतभेदेनापि रूपादय- श्चत्वारो द्विविधाः । ब्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वगादावनुद्भूताः । उद्भूतास्तु योग्य- पृथिव्याद्यारम्भकपरमाणुव्यणुकत्र्यणुकादौ । चित्राचिन्नभेदेनापि ते द्वि- ४.. A. B. omit स्मृत्यादौ. b. C. H. omit this clause. c. C. F. जातिमद्रूपम्; and omit गुणपदं प्रभावारणाय. d. C. E. कपिलचित्रभेदात् सतवि.e. C. E. "सप्त ·विधा इत्यपि केचित् । नीलपीतादिमधुरतिक्तादिसुरभ्यसुरभ्यादितुकु- भारकठिनाद्यवयवारब्धपटादिषु चित्राः । अन्यत्राचित्राः ॥ गणनाव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं संख्या । सा द्विविधैकानेकवृत्ति- भेदात् । तत्रैकत्वमेकवृत्ति' । तच्च नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनित्य- मेव द्वित्वादिकमनेकवृत्ति । तच नानकत्व विषयापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यं तन्ना- शनाश्यं चेत्यनित्यमेव । परमाणुव्यणुकादावतीन्द्रिये तु भगवदपेक्षाबु- द्धिजन्यमदृष्टनाशनाश्यम् ॥ मानव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणम् । तच्चतुर्विधमणु हस्वं महदीर्घ चेति । अणुहस्वपरिमाणे परमाणुव्यणुकयोः। महदीर्घपरिमा- गे- व्यणुकचतुरणुकादौ । चतुर्विधमपि विविध नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनित्यम् । तत्रिविध संख्याजन्यं परिमा- णजन्यं प्रचयजन्यं चेति । तत्र व्यणुकपरिमाणं परमाणुद्वित्वसंख्याज- न्यं त्र्यणुकपरिमाणं च व्यणुकत्रित्वसंख्याजन्यम् । तत्रावयवगताणु- परिमाणस्यासमवायित्वे तस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गात् परिमाणस्य स्वसमा- नजातीयोत्कृष्टजनकत्वनियमात् । चतुरणुकादिपरिमाणं "परिमाणज- न्यमवयवगतमहत्त्वस्यैव तत्रासमवायित्वात् । तुलपिण्डपरिमाणं प्रच- यजन्यम् । अवथवानां प्रशिथिलः संयोगः प्रचयस्तस्यैव तत्रासमवा- यित्वात् ॥ पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं पृथक्त्वम् । तदपि द्विविधमेका- नेकवृत्तिभेदात् । तत्रैकपृथक्त्वमेकवृत्ति । इदं च नित्यगतं नित्यम्- नित्यगतमनित्यम् । हिपृथक्त्वाद्यनेकवृत्ति । तच नानकपृथक्त्वविध- यापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यं तन्नाशनाश्यम् ॥ संयुक्तव्यवहारासाधारणं कारण संयोगः । स विविधः कर्मजः संयो- गजश्चेति । कर्मजोपि द्विविधोऽन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजश्च । आद्यः 1. C. E. omit from तत्र हि तेजःसंयोगात्, &c., tc अचित्राः. b. C. E. add द्वित्वादिक मनेकवृत्ति तचापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यं तन्नाशनाश्यम्. and omit from तच नित्यगतं, &e., to °नाशनाश्यम्. €. A. B. C. E. omit from farang to free मेव. d. C. E. घटपटादौ. e. A. प्रमाण. f. D. omits Fa. b. C. E. omit from चतुर्विधमपि द्विविधम् to °समवायित्वात्. from इदं च to °नित्यम् .. C. E. omit from तच to नाश्यम्. g. A.प्रमाण i.C. E, omit ·संस्कारोऽपीत्यतिव्याप्तविरहात् स्मृतिभिन्न ज्ञानमनुभवत्व जातिमान्वा- ( ६ ) श्येनशैलयोईितीयस्तु मेषयोर्मल्लयो । हस्ततरुसंयोगात्कायतरुसं- योगः संयोगजः ॥ विभक्तव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं विभागः । सोऽपि विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्चेति । कर्मजोपि विविधोऽन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजश्चेति । आद्यः श्येनशैलयोईितीयस्तु मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्वा । हस्ततरविभागात्कायतरु- विभागो विभागजः । । संख्यादयः पञ्च सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तयः॥ परव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परत्वम् । अपर व्यवहारासाधारणं का- रणमपरत्वम् । ते द्विविधै दिकृते कालकृते चेति । यो यदपेक्षया ज्ये- टस्तत्र तदवधिकं परत्वं कालकृतम् । यो यदपेक्षया कनिष्टस्तत्र तदव- धिकमपरत्वं कालकृतम् । अत्र कालपिण्डसंयोगोऽसमवायी ज्येष्ठत्व- कनिष्टत्वज्ञानं निमित्तं तन्नाशश्च तन्नाशनिमित्तम् । एतेनित्यद्रव्य" एव | यो यदपेक्षया दूरस्थस्तत्र तदवधिकं परत्वं दिकृतम् । यो यदपे- क्षया संनिहितस्तत्र तदवधिकमपरत्वं दिकृतम् । अत्र दिपिण्डसंयो- गोऽसमवायो दूरत्वसंनिहितत्वज्ञानं निमित्तं तन्नाशश्च तन्नाशनिमि- त्तम् । एते मूर्तद्रव्य एव ॥ 'बुद्धिवसामान्यवनी बुद्धिः ।सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च । संस्का- रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । यथा सा मणिकर्णिका स विश्वेश्वर इत्यादि । तत्र पूर्वानुभवः करणं संस्कारो व्यापारः। न च सोऽयं देवदत्त इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायामतिव्याप्तिः । तत्र संस्कारजनिततत्ता स्मृतिरेव हेतुर्न तु Samauce नुभवः । स द्विविधः प्रमाप्रमा चेति । प्रमाणाभासजन्योऽयथार्थानु- भवोऽप्रमा । सोऽपि वेधा भ्रमसंशयभेदात् । विपरीत निर्णयो भ्रमः । c. E. omits from अत्र to निमित्तम् and C. omits from अत्र to द्रव्य एव. b. D. जन्यद्रव्य F. जन्यद्रव्यमात्र. c. C. E. omit from अन to निमित्तम्. d. E.द्रव्यमान. e.C. E., here follows a description of गुरुत्व, द्रवत्व, स्नेह and शब्द, but the order in the text and in A. B. D. F. is in accordance with the Vaisheshika Sutra, vide note No. 4. A. B.D. add अर्थप्रकाशो वा०. J. A. B. C. E. read संस्कारमात्र२. h. D. omits सा. t. A. तत्राश.. C. E. omit from न च सोऽयं, &c. to विरहात . C. E. omit अनुभवत्वजातिमान्वा. . E. here adds स चतुर्विधः, &c., and proceeds with a short explanation of प्रत्यक्ष, &c. t. E.विपर्ययज्ञानं भ्रमः ·७ ) SHUBINIRMANANDMUNITER यथा पीतः शङ्कः लोहितः स्फटिकः । एकस्मिन्धमिणि विरुद्धनानाको- टिकं ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा दूरवर्ति न्युच्चैस्तरेऽयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा । फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनन योग्यत्वं च यथार्थत्वम् । स्मृ- त्यनुभव साधारण प्रभाकरणं प्रमाणम् ॥ व्यापारवत्कारणं करणम् । यथा छिदिक्रियां प्रति कुठारः। तज्ज- न्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः । यथा कुठारदारुसंयोगः । अन- न्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्ति" कारणम् । यथा तन्त्वादिकं पटस्य कपा- लादिकं घटस्य । अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यमनन्यथासिद्धम् । अन्यथासिद्धि- स्त्रिविधा । येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्वभावोऽवगम्यते तेन तस्य तं प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धिराद्या | यथा घटप्रति दण्डेन दण्डरूपस्य दण्डत्वस्य च । दण्डेन सहैव दण्डरूपस्य दण्डत्वस्य वा घटं प्रति पूर्वभावग्रहात् । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्व' गृह्यते तं प्रति तस्यान्यथासिद्धिईितीयः । यथा घटं प्रत्याकाशस्य कुलालपितुश्च । आ- काशस्य ह्याकाशत्वेन घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं' ग्राह्यम् । आकाशत्वं च शब्दसमवायिकारणत्वम् । तच्च शब्दनियतपूर्ववृत्ति त्वघटितम् । तथा च शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वग्रहाखटं प्र- त्य काशोऽन्यथासिद्धः । एवं कुलालपितुरपि कुलालपितृत्वेन घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं ग्राह्यम् । कुलालपितृत्वं च कुलालजनकपुंस्त्वम् । तच्च कु- लालनियतपूर्व वृत्तित्वघटितम् । तथा च कुलालं प्रति पूर्ववृत्ति"त्वे ज्ञात एक घट प्रति पूर्ववृत्ति"त्वग्रहाखटं प्रति कुलालपितान्यथासिद्धः । अन्यत्र कृतनियतपूर्व वृत्तिन एव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतत्वमन्यथासिद्धिस्तृतीया । यथा घटविशेष प्रति दैवादागतरासभस्य । घटविशेषादन्यत्र घटान्तरे कृप्तनियतपूर्ववृत्ति दण्डचक्रादेरेव घटविशेषस्यापि संभवे दण्डचक्रादि- सहभूतो दैवागतरासभोऽन्यथासिद्धः । रासभसामान्यस्य घटसामान्यं प्र- ति हेतुत्ववारणाय नियतपूर्ववृत्तीत्यत्र नियतपदम् । तत्र यथोक्तान्य- थासिद्धरभावात् । न हि घटसामान्यादन्यत्र पटादौ कृप्तनियतपूर्ववृत्ति t. E. omits दूरवतिन्युच्चैस्तरेयम्. b. C. E. omit the whole clause. .. C. E. omit स्मृत्यनुभवसाधारणम्. d. F. वति. e. F. वर्ति. वात. T.F.वातंत्वं. h. F. वति...F. वतित्वे.. F.तित्व. h. F. वर्तित्वं 1. F. तित्व. n. F.वर्तित्व. 2. F. वर्तित्व.0. F. वतिन. p. F. वति.. F. वनि... A. अन्यपटर f.F.

·( ८ ) तन्तुवेमार्घटसामान्यस्य संभवो येन यथोक्तान्यथासिद्धिः स्यात् । नि- यतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं चाव्य वहितपूर्वकालावच्छेदेन कार्यदेशे सत्त्वम् । न चेदं रासभसामान्यऽस्त्यतो नातिव्याप्तिरिति संक्षेपः॥ तच्च कारणं त्रिविध समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । तत्र यत्स मवेतं कार्य तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य कपालानि घ. टस्य पटघटादिश्च स्वगतरूपादेः । समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्न कारणमस- मवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य । तस्य पटसमवायिकार- णेषु तन्तुषु प्रत्यासन्नत्वात्कारणत्वाच्च । एवं तन्तुरूपादि पटरूपादेः । तस्यापि पटरूपादि समवायिकारणे पटे स्वाश्रयसमवेतत्वेन प्रत्यासन- त्वाकारणत्वाच्च । समवाय्यसमवायिकारणतातिरिक्तकारणतावन्निमि- त्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य दण्डचक्रादिकं घटस्य ।। तच प्रमाणे विविध प्रत्यक्षानुमानभेदात् । शब्दादेश्वानुमानविध- यैव प्रामाण्यमिति वैशेषिकमतम् | चतुर्विधमिति नैयायिकाः । तदुक्तं सूत्रकृता-प्रत्यक्षानुमानापमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । तच्चेन्द्रियात्मकम् । इन्द्रियार्थसनिकर्पोत्पन्नं ज्ञानं प्रत्य- क्षम् । तद्विविधं सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकभेदात् । विशेषणविशेष्य- संबन्धावगाहि प्रत्यक्ष सविकल्पकम् | यथायं घट इत्यादि । विशेषण- विशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि प्रत्यक्ष निर्विकल्पकम् । तच्च घटघटत्व इत्याका- रकमतीन्द्रियम्। न त्वत्र मानाभावः । तदसत्त्वे तुप्तोत्थितस्यायं घट इति विशिष्टज्ञानं न स्याविशेषणीभूतस्य घटत्वस्याज्ञानात् । विशे- षगज्ञानं विना विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयेन तस्य तद्धेतुत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष पुनरपि द्विविधं लौकिकालौकिकभेदात् । तत्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षहेतुः संनिकर्षः षद्विधः । संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः स- मवेतसमवायो विशेषणता चेति । तत्र संयोगेन द्रव्यग्रहः । इह घटो- ऽस्तीति चक्षुरादेर्घटादिना संयोगसत्त्वात् । एवं मनसा संयोगेनात्मग्रहोऽ- हमस्मीति । संयुक्तसमवायेन गुणकर्मद्रव्यगतजातिग्रहः । इह घटे ct. E. omits अव्यवहित.. A. B. कार्यमुत्पद्यते. c. C. omits पघटादिश्च, &c. d. A. B. सन्नकार'. e. C. E. read तच्च प्रमाणं चतुर्विधम् | तदुकं, &c., and omit the rest.f.C.E. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो द्विविधः.. A. B. C. add विशेष्यता. h. C. E. omit एवं मनसा to इति.. C. E omit this. E. is extremely incorrect at this point and is difficult to be followed.

·( ९ ) रूपं चलनं द्रव्यत्वादिकमस्ति चक्षुरादिसंयुक्ते घटे रूपादीनां समवा- यात् । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायेन गुणकर्मजातिग्रहः । वटगतरूपे रूपत्वा- दिकमस्ति घटगतचलने कर्मत्वादिकमस्तीति चक्षुरादिसंयुक्ते घटे सम- वेतं रूपादिचलनं च तत्र रूपत्वादेः कर्मत्वादेश्च समवायात् | समवायेन शब्दग्रहः । इह वीणाशब्दोस्तीति । कर्णशकुल्यवच्छिन्नं नमः श्रोत्रम् । तत्र शब्दस्य समवायात् | समवेतसमवायेन शब्दत्वादिग्रहः । इह शब्दे शब्दत्वगुणत्वादिकमस्तीति श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वादेः समवायात् । विशेषणतया समवायाभावोर्ग्रहः । तथाहि । विशेषणता द्विविधा | इ- न्द्रियविशेषणतेन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणता चेति । तत्रेन्द्रियविशेषणतया श- ब्दसमवायस्य शब्दाभावस्य च ग्रहः । इह शब्दसमवायोऽस्तीह शब्दो नास्तीति श्रोत्रेन्द्रिये शब्दसमवायस्य शब्दाभावस्य च विशेषण- त्वात् । इन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणतया घटादिसमवायस्य घटाभावस्य च ग्रहः । इह कपाले घटसमवायोऽस्तीह भूतले घटो नास्तीति चक्षुरा- दिसंयुक्ते कपाले घटसमवायस्य भूतले च घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । समवायस्य प्रत्यक्षवर्णनं न्यायमतेन । वैशेषिकमते तु समवायोऽती- न्द्रियः॥ अलौकिकप्रत्यक्षे हेतुः संनिकर्षस्त्रिविधः । सामान्यलक्षणो ज्ञानलक्षणो योगजधर्मश्चेति । एतत्त्रितयसंनिकर्षः षडिन्द्रियसहकारीति संप्रदाय- विदः । मनस एव सहकारीति शूलपाणिमिश्राः । तत्र सामान्य ज्ञाय- मानमेव स्वाश्रयाणां संनिकर्षः । ज्ञायमानघटत्वसंनिकर्षण घटा इत्या- कारकं सकलघटानां प्रत्यक्ष मनसा" जन्यते । ज्ञानलक्षणसंनिकर्षण तद्विषयीभूततत्तत्पदार्थानां प्रत्यक्षं मनसा जन्यते । कथमन्यथा कवि- काव्यमूलभूततत्तत्पदार्थसंसर्गज्ञानं । एवं सुरभि चन्दनमिति चाक्षुषे सौर- भस्यापि भानं ज्ञानसंनिकर्षण | सौरभस्य चक्षुरयोग्यत्वेन चक्षुःसंयुक्त- चन्दनसमवायस्य तत्र सत्त्वेऽप्यप्रयोजकत्वात् । योगजधर्मसंनिकर्षण च योगिनां वस्तुमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्ष मनसा' जन्यते ॥ तच्च" प्रत्यक्षं षड्विं ब्राणरसनचक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वङ्गनोभेदात् । गन्धप्रa. D. omits शब्दे. 1. C. omits एतत्रितय toमिश्राः, and F. reads एतत्रि- तयसंनिकर्षों मनस एव सहकारी. c. F. B. ज्ञायमानघटत्वेन संनिकर्षेण घट इ० C. D. onmit मनसा. c. A. C. D. onmit मनसा... A. C.D. omit d. A. मनसा. 2 ·( १० ) त्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं प्राणम्। रसप्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं रसनम् । रूप- प्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं चक्षुः । शब्दप्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं श्रोत्रम् । सुखादिप्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं मनः । प्राणादिलक्षणेऽसाधारणपद मा- त्मादिवारणाय । गन्धादिप्रत्यक्षं च चन्दने सौरभं गुडे मधुरो रसो घटे रक्तो वर्णो जले शीतस्पी बने सिंहनादो मयि सुखमित्याद्याका- रकम् । तत्र करणीभूतस्य प्राणादेापारो घ्राणादिमनःसंयोगी मन- सस्त्वात्ममनः संयोगः । न च ब्राणादेर्गन्धादिप्रत्यक्षजनकत्वे पदमागुम- ण्यादिगन्धादेरापि प्रत्यक्ष स्यादिति वाच्यम् । यतो गन्धादयो महत्त्वस- मानाधिकरणोद्भूता एव प्राणादियोग्याः । परमाणुगन्धादयश्च न महत्त्व- समानाधिकरणाः | मण्यादिगन्धादयश्च नोद्भूता इति न तत्प्रत्यक्षम् । एवं भेर्यादिदेश 'उत्पन्नशब्दाद्वीचीतरंगन्यायेन कदम्बगोलकन्यायेन वा शेत्र- देश उत्पन्नः शब्दः श्रोत्रयोग्यस्तस्यैव श्रोत्रसंबन्धसंभवात् । अत्र प्राण- रसनश्रोत्राणि द्रव्याग्राहकाणि चक्षुस्त्वङ्गनांसि द्रव्यग्राहकाणि । महत्त्वो- द्भूतरूपवद्रव्यं चक्षुषो योग्यम् । एवं महत्त्वोद्भूतस्पर्शवव्यं त्वचो यो- ग्यम् । अत एव परमाणुवायुपिशाचादयश्चक्षुषा न गृह्यन्ते पर- माणो महत्त्वाभावाहायो रूपाभावात्पिशाचादावुद्भूतरूपाभावात् । अत एवं प्रभापि त्वचा न गृह्यते तत्रोद्भूतस्पर्शाभावात् । एवं योग्यद्रव्यसभ- वेता द्रव्यत्वादिसामान्यकर्मसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वा- परत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहवेगास्तत्समवायस्तदभावश्च चक्षुषस्त्वचोऽपि योग्याः। जीवात्मलक्षणं द्रव्यं मनोयोग्यं तत्समवेता आत्मत्वादिसामान्यबुद्धिसु- खदुःखेच्छाइषप्रयत्नास्तत्समवायस्तदभावश्च मनोयोग्याः। येनेन्द्रियेण यद्गृह्यते तेनन्द्रियेण तद्गतं सामान्यं तत्समवायस्तदभावश्च गृह्यत इति नियमादिति व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ अथानुमानं निरूप्यते । -अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । तच्च धूमो व- निव्याप्य इति व्याप्तिज्ञानम् । वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति तृतीयलिङ्गपरा- मर्शो व्यापारः । तृतीयत्वं कथमस्येति चेदुच्यते | महानसादौ दृष्टान्ते a. C. E. F. पदं मनोवारणाय । मनालक्षणे च तत्पदमात्मवारणाय !. b. B. तत्त- करणी. A. तत्र कारणी. c. A. B. C. omit मनः. d. C. omits भेर्यादिदेश उत्पन्न शब्दात् . .C. omits this clause .. C. अनुमितिप्रमा.. C. E. read very differently here, ·( ११ ) वधूिमर्योर्भूयः सहचारदर्शनाड्याप्यत्वेन धूमज्ञानं प्रथमम् । ततः पर्व- तादौ धूमं दृष्ट्वा व्याप्यत्वेन तत्स्मरणं द्वितीयम् । ततस्तत्रैव व्याप्यत्वेन धूमस्य परामर्शो वह्निव्यायधूमवानयमित्येवं रूपी जायत इति तृतीय- त्वं तस्येति बोध्यम् । लिङ्गज्ञानजन्यं लिङ्गिज्ञानमनुमितिः । यथा पर्वता- दौ धूमज्ञानानन्तरं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानम् । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावल्लिङ्गम् । "ननु केयं व्याप्तिरिति चेदुच्यते । अव्यभिचरितसाध्य"सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः । अस्ति चेदं पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमवत्त्वादित्यादिसद्धेतौ यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र' वनिरिति नियमस्य सत्त्वात् । नास्ति चेदं पर्वतो धूमवान्व- ह्निमत्त्वादित्याद्यसद्धेतौ यत्र यत्र वह्निस्तत्र तत्र धूम इति नियमस्यास- स्वात् | तप्तायः पिण्डे वह्निस त्वेऽपिधूमासत्त्वात्। व्यभिचार ज्ञानविरह- सहकृतं हेतुसाध्यसहचारदर्शनं व्याप्तिग्राहकम् कथमेतदिति चेदित्यम् ।। हेतोः साध्याभाववदृन्तित्वं व्यभिचारस्तज्ज्ञाने सति व्याप्तिमहाभावात्तद'- भावस्तत्र कारणम् । हेतुसाध्यसहचारदर्शनं त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तत्र कारणम् । का पुनः पक्षधर्मता पक्षाश्रयवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता पक्षता चा- नुमित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयाभावः । अस्ति चेदं पर्वतादौ पक्षेऽनु- मित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयस्य तत्राभावार्पवतादौ साध्यनिश्चयेस- त्यपि सत्यां चानुमित्सायां पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमादित्यनुमानसंभवात् । तत्र पक्षतासंपत्तयेऽनुमित्साविरहविशिष्टत्वं'साध्यनिश्चयविशेषणम् तथा चा- नुमित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयस्य तत्राभावात्पक्षता ॥ तच्चानुमानं त्रिविधम् । केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरे- कि चेति । यत्रान्वयव्याप्तिरवास्ति तत्केवलान्वयि । यथा घटोऽभिधेय: प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र घटः पक्षस्तस्याभिधेयत्वं साध्यम् । प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः । तस्मिन्यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्राभिधेयत्वं यथा पट इत्यन्वयव्या- तिरेवास्ति । न तु यत्र यत्र साध्याभावस्तत्र तत्र हेत्वभाव इति व्यतिरे- कव्याप्तिः। अभिधेयस्य प्रमेयत्वस्य च सर्वत्र "सत्त्वात्साध्याभावादेरेवा- प्रसिद्धत्वात् । यत्र व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरेवास्ति तत्केवलव्यतिदोकि । यथा 8. D. reads this clause after °इत्याचसद्धेतो. A. B.नियमत्वात्. d. A. e. A. B. मत्त्वे. 1. D. उच्यते. g. A. B. h. A. °स्येतरत्रा.. A. B. C. E. विशिष्टसाध्य... A. घट. i. C. E. om. अभिधेयस्य......सत्त्वात. ci. A. B. om. साध्य. तथाय:. C. om.चा.

·जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्त्वादित्यादि । अत्र जीवच्छरीर पक्ष- स्तस्य सात्मकत्वं साध्यं प्राणादिमत्त्वं हेतुस्तस्मिन्यत्र यत्र सात्मक- स्वाभावस्तत्र तत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वाभावो यथा घटादाविति व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति- रेवास्ति । न तु यत्र यत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वं तत्र सात्मकत्वमित्यन्वयव्याप्ति- दृष्टान्ताभावाज्जीवच्छरीरमात्रस्य पक्षीकरणात् । अन्यत्र च हेतुसाध्य- योरेवासत्त्वात् । यत्रान्वयव्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिश्च निगद्यते तदन्वयव्य- तिरेकि । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमादित्यादि । अत्र च पर्वतः पक्षस्तस्य वह्निमत्त्वं साध्यं धूमादिति हेतुस्तस्मिन् यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निर्यथा महानसादाविइत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । एवं यत्र यत्र वह्नयभा- वस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभावो यथा जलमहाहदादाविति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिश्चा- स्ति | अन्वये साधनं व्याप्यं साध्यं व्यापकमिष्यते । साध्याभावोऽन्य- था व्याप्यो व्यापकः साधनात्ययः । व्याप्यस्य वचनं पूर्व व्यापकस्य ततः परम् । एवं परीक्षिता व्याप्तिः स्कुटीभवति तत्त्वत इति । त्रयाणां मध्ये योऽन्वयव्यतिरेकी स पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव स्वसाध्यं साधयति । तानि पञ्चरूपाणि पक्षधर्मत्वम् । सपक्षे सत्त्वम् विपक्षाव्यावृत्तिः ।अबा- धितविषयत्वम् । असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चति | पक्षताश्रयवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मत्वम् । निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । तत्र विद्यमानत्वं सपक्षसत्त्वम् । निश्चितसा- ध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । तत्राविद्यमानत्वं विपक्षाच्यावृत्तिः । प्रमाणान्त- रेणाप्रमितसाध्याभावकत्व'मबाधितविषयत्वम् । साध्याभावसाधकहे- त्वन्तरशून्यत्वमसलतिपक्षत्वम् । एतानि पञ्चरूपाणि वह्निसाधकधू- मादावन्वयव्यतिरोकिणि विद्यन्ते । केवलान्वयिनि विपक्षाड्यावृत्ति- नास्ति विपक्षाप्रसिद्धेः । केवलव्यतिरेकिणि सपक्षे सत्त्व नास्ति सपक्षासिद्धेः ॥ त्रिविधमप्यनुमानं द्विविधम् | स्वार्थ परार्थं चेति । स्वस्यैवानुमिति- हेतुः स्वार्थम् । स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितुं पञ्चावयवोपेतमनु- मानवाक्यं प्रयुड़े तत्परार्थम् । पञ्चावयवास्तु प्रतिज्ञाहेतृदाहरणोपन- यनिगमनानि । तत्र पक्षे साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा | यथा पर्वतो वह्निमा- a. A. जीवशरीरम् for जीवच्छरीरम् throughout. D. D. omits from जीवच्छ- रीर° to सत्त्वात् ; and C. from अन्यत्र to सत्त्वात्, e. A. 'वृत्तित्वं प्रमाणा. f. A. भावत्वम् .. D. परार्थानुमानम्, c. A. om. एवम्. ८.A.B. अन्यत्र.

·निति । पञ्चम्यन्तं हेतुप्रतिपादकं वाक्यं हेत्ववयवः । यथा धूमादिति । व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं वचनमुदाहरणम् । यथा यो यो धूमवान्स स वह्नि- मान् यथा महानस इति । व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मताप्रतिपादक वचनमुपनयः । यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवांधायमिति । अबाधितत्वासत्ल- तिपक्षितत्वतात्पर्यकं वाक्यं निगमनं यथा तस्माइह्निमानिति । तथा" चायमित्युपनयस्य तस्मात्तथेति निगमनस्य शरीरमिति प्राञ्चः । व्य- तिरेकिणि प्रतिज्ञाहेतू तुल्यावेवोदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि तु भिद्यन्ते । यथा जीवच्छरीरं लात्मक प्राणादिमत्त्वादित्यत्र यत्सात्मकं न भवति तत्प्राणादिमन्न भवति यथा घटः। न चेदं जीवच्छरीरं प्राणादिमन्न भवति तस्मान तथेति ।। .5 अथ हेत्वाभासा:-अनुभितितत्करणान्यतरप्रतिबन्धक ज्ञानविषय- धर्मों हेत्वाभासलोपाधिस्तद्वान्हेत्वाभासः । ते चानेकान्तिकविह- द्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पञ्च । तत्र सव्यभिचारोनकान्तिकः । त त्रिविधः साधारणोऽसाधारणोऽनुपसंहारी चेति । तत्र सपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः साधारणः । यथा पर्वतो धूमवान्वलेरिति । वलिाई सपक्षे महानसे वि- पक्षे तप्तायपिण्डे च वर्ततेऽतः साधारणः । एतज्ज्ञानं च विपक्षवृत्तित्व- रूपव्यभिचारविषयकत्वाव्यभिचार ज्ञानविधया व्याप्तिग्रहे प्रतिबन्ध- कम् । व्यभिचारज्ञाने सति व्याप्तिग्रहानुदयस्य सुप्रसिद्धत्वात् । सपक्षावि- पक्षव्यावृत्तत्वे सति पक्षवृत्तिरसाधारणः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वा- दिति । शब्दत्वं हि सपक्षाद्गनादविपक्षाच्च घटादेावृत्तं पक्षे शब्दे च वर्तत इत्यसाधारणम् । एतज्ज्ञानं च साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकम् ! क- थमिति चेदित्थम् । शब्दत्वं हि नान्वयी हेतुईष्टान्ताभावात् । किं तु व्यतिरेकी । तथा च यो हेतुर्यद्धर्भवतो व्यावृत्तः स स्वाश्रये तद्धर्मा- भावं साधयति । यथा धूमो वयभाववतो जलहदादेावृत्तः स्वाश्र- ये पर्वतादी वह्नयभावाभाव वहिं साधयति । तथा शब्दत्वं नित्यत्वव- तो गगनादेः सपक्षायावृत्तमित्ति स्वाश्रये शब्दे नित्यत्वाभावमनित्यत्वं साधयेत् । एवं नित्यत्वाभाववतो घटादविपक्षायावृत्तमिति स्वाश्रये (1. A. यथा.. E. F. 'तोपाधिः.. C.विषयतया.. A, B. D. यो यतो व्यावृत्तः, e. A. B. D. तदभावम्. .A. B. D. om. वह्निम्. d RS ·। ( १४ ) शब्दे नित्यत्वाभावाभाव नित्यत्वमपि साधयेत् । न चैकत्र शब्दे नि- त्यत्वानित्यत्वयो : संभवस्तयाविरोधात् । तस्माच्छब्दत्वेऽसाधारणत्व- ज्ञाने सति न साध्यानुमितिरिति । वस्तुमात्रपक्षकोनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्व नित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वालमेयत्वं हेतुरनुपसंहारी। एतज्ज्ञानमपि व्याप्तिग्रहे प्रतिबन्धकम् सर्वस्य पक्षत्वे व्याप्तिग्राहक सह- चारदर्शनस्थलाभावेन सहचारनिश्चयाभावे सति व्याप्तेरनिश्चयात् । सा- ध्याभावव्यानो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथायं गौरश्वत्वादिति । अत्र च यत्र यत्राश्वत्वं तत्र तत्र गोत्वाभाव इति साध्याभावव्याप्नेः सत्त्वादश्वत्वं हे- तुर्विरुद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानं च साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकं “पक्षे गोत्वाभाव- व्याप्याश्वत्ववन्त ज्ञाने सति गोत्वनिश्चयासंभवात् । साध्याभावसाधक- हेत्वन्तरं प्रतिपक्षः । तद्वान्लप्रतिपक्षः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्यूमान्म- हानसवत् । स वनयभाववान्पाषाणमयत्वात्कुद्यवदिति । अत्र व इयो- रपि हेत्वोः परस्परसाध्याभावलाधकत्वान्मिथः सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् । एत- ज्ज्ञानं च साक्षानुभितिप्रतिबन्धकम् । वलिव्याप्यधूमवान्वयभावव्या- प्य पाषाणमयत्ववांश्च पर्वत इति द्विविधपरामर्श सत्येकस्मादप्यनुमितेर- भावात्परस्परं प्रतिबन्धात् । परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषयवजिसिद्धि- स्तज्ञानसिद्धः सत्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वा- सिद्धश्चेति । तत्र पक्षतावच्छेदकाभाववत्पक्षक आश्रयासिद्धः । यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्सरोजारविन्दवदिति । अत्र चारवि- न्दे पक्षे गगनीयत्वं पक्षतावच्छेदकं नास्तीत्यरविन्दत्वं हेतुरात्र- यासिद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानं परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकम् | अरविन्दे गगनीयत्वं ना- स्तीति ज्ञाने सुरभित्वव्याप्यारविन्दत्ववद्गगनाराविन्दमिति परामर्शसं. भवात् । एतस्यारविन्दे गगनीय त्वसंबन्धावगाहित्वात् । पक्षनिष्ठामा- वप्रतियोगी स्वरूपासिद्धः । यथा इदो द्रव्यं धूमादिति । अत्र च पक्ष दे धूमस्याभावोऽस्तीति धूमो हेतुः स्वरूपासिद्धः। एतज्ज्ञानमपि परा- ce. A. नित्यत्वाभावम. B. अनित्यत्वाभावम. D. om. एवं नित्यत्वाभाववतो घटादे to नित्यत्वमपि साधयेत्. E. C. साध्याभावाभावम् . b. C. E. प्रतियोग्यभावयो- रेका विरोधात् ..C.E.निश्चायकं. d. A.. B. D. F. om. पक्षे. J. A. °वच्छेदके. h. A. नीयत्व- हेत्वसं° D.नीयसं. e.A.D.T व्यात्या. f. A. B. D.F. om. पाषाणमयत्त्व.

·मर्शप्रतिबन्धकम्। इदे धूमो नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति द्रव्यत्वव्यायधूमवान्द्र- द इति परामर्शासंभवात् । एतस्य हृदे धूमसंबन्धावगाहित्वात् । व्या- प्यतावच्छेदकाभाववान्हेतुाप्यत्वासिद्धः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्काञ्च- नमयधूमादिति । अत्र च धूमे व्याप्यत्वावच्छेदकत्वेनाभिमतं काञ्चनम- यत्वं नास्तीति धूमो हेतुाप्यत्वासिद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानमपि परामर्शप्रति- बन्धकम् । धूमे काञ्चनमयत्वं नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति बहिव्याप्यकाञ्चनम- यधूमवान्पर्वत इति परामर्शासंभवात् । एतस्य धूमे काञ्चनमयत्वसंब- न्धावगाहित्वात् साध्याभाववत्पक्षको बाधितः । यथा वहिरनुष्ण: पदा- थत्वाजलवदिति । अत्र च वन्ही पक्षेऽनुष्णत्वाभावस्योष्णत्वस्य त्वगि- न्द्रियेण निश्चयात्पदार्थत्वं हेतुधितः । एतज्ज्ञानं साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिव- न्धकम् । वनावनुष्णत्वं नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति वहिरनुष्ण इत्यनुमितेरसं- भवात्तदभावलौकि कनिर्णयस्व तद्वत्ताज्ञाने प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । इति हेत्वाभासाः॥ ननूपाधेरपि हेतुदोषत्वात्सोपाधिकोऽपि हेत्वाभासोऽस्तीति कथं पञ्चै- व त इति चेन । व्यभिचारादिज्ञानस्येवोपाधिज्ञानस्यानुमितितत्करणान्य- तरप्रतिबन्धकताभावेनोपाधेर्हेतुदोषत्वाभावात् । कथं ताई वाय्वनुमान उपाधिरुपन्यस्यत इति चेयभिचार ज्ञानप्रयोजकत्वेन तत्र तदुपन्या- तः । अथ कोऽयभुपाधिरिति बेदुच्यते । साध्यव्यापकले सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः । यथा धूमवान्बोंरित्यत्रा।न्धनम् । भवति च तत्साध्यस्य धूमस्य व्यापकं यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राद्रेन्धनमिति सत्वा- त् । भवति च साधनस्य वढेरव्यापकं यत्र बतिस्तत्रान्धनमित्यस- त्वात् । तमायापिण्डे वह्निसत्त्वेऽप्यान्धनाभावात् । एवं यांगोया पशु- हिंसाधर्मसाधनं हिंसात्वाकाबात्यहिंसावदित्यत्र निधिद्धत्वभुपाधिः । भवति च तदधर्मसाधनस्य साध्वस्य व्यापकं यत्र यत्राधर्मसाध- नत्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति सत्वात्सायनत्वस्य हिंसात्वस्याव्यापक यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वामित्यसवात् । पक्षीकृतहिंसायां हिंसात्वसत्त्वेऽपि निषिद्धत्वस्यासत्वात् एवं गर्भस्थो भित्रातनयः श्यामो ४. E. om. लौकिक... A, कत्वमुपाधिः. (.E. onmits from भवति च तत्सा- यस्य &c. to इति सखात् d. E. e. A. 'त्वम् । साध्य D. न त्वसाध्य. 1. E. om. from साधनत्वस्य &e. to निषिद्धत्वस्यालस्वात. साधनवत:.

·गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र तीरोपस्थापकं गङ्गापदम्। शक्यसंबन्धी ल- मित्रातनयत्वादृश्यमानमित्रातनयषटवदित्यत्र शाकपाकजत्वमुपाधिः । ल च श्यामत्वस्य काकादौ सत्त्वे शाकपाकजत्वाभावात्साध्याव्या- पकत्वं काकादिव्यावृत्तश्यामत्वस्यैवात्र साध्यत्वात् । इत्यनुमाननि- रूपणम् ॥ अथोपमानं निरूप्यते ।-तत्रोपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । तच्च सादृ- श्यज्ञानात्मकम् । उपमितित्वजातिमत्युपमितिः । कथमियमुत्पद्यत इति चेदुच्यते । गवयमजानन्कचिनागरिक: कंचिदनेचरं कीदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इति पृच्छति । ततस्तेनोक्तो गोसदृशो गवयपदवा- व्य इत्युत्तरितः स कदाचिदनं गतो गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यन्प्रागुक्ता- तिदेशवाश्यार्थं स्मृत्वासी गवयपदवाच्य इति प्रतिपद्यते सोपमितिः । अत्र गोसादृश्यज्ञानं करणम्! अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः । इत्यु- पमाननिरूपणम् ॥ अथ शब्दो निरूप्यते।-शब्दप्रमाकरणज्ञानविषयः शब्दः । यथा नदीतीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्तीत्यादि । वाक्यार्थगोचरं यथार्थज्ञान शाब्द- प्रमा । अत्र" पदज्ञानं करणम् । पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितियापारः । पदोप- स्थितानां मिथः संसो वाक्यार्थः । पदसमूहो वाक्यम् । अर्थ वाचकं पदम् । तद्विविध मुख्यगौणभेदात् । यच्छक्तिवृत्त्या यमर्थमुपस्थाप- यति तत्तस्मिन्नर्थे मुख्यम् । यथा गोघटादिव्यत्युपस्थापक गोघटादि. पदम् । अस्माच्छादयमों बोद्धव्य इत्याकारकोऽनादिसंकेतः शक्तिः। यल्लक्षणावृत्त्या यमर्थमुपस्थापयति तत्तस्मिन्नर्थ गौणं लाक्षणिकमित्युच्य- ले यथा क्षणा । यथा गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवह जलौघस्य तीरे संयोगसंबन्धो गङ्गापदल- क्षणा । तस्य च शब्दस्याकाङ्कायोग्यतासंनिधयः सहकारिणः । यस्य पदस्य येन पदेन विनान्वयानुभवजनकत्वं नास्ति तस्य पदस्य तेन पदेन समभिव्याहार आकाङ्का । घटमानयेत्यादी कारकपदस्य क्रियापदेन ८. E. नरविशिष्टमित्रा. . B.F. om. from न च श्यामत्वस्य &c. to साध्यत्वात्. ८. E. and C. read quite differently the whole subject of उपमान. . C. (omits from अत्र पद to गङ्गापदलक्षणा and agrees with E. e. E. प्रतिपादक म्. E. शक्तं लाक्षणिकम् | गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ गङ्गापदं तीरे लाक्षणिकम् । गङ्गापदश- क्यप्रवत् . A. D. हारादा.

·विना घटकर्मकमित्यन्वयानुभवजनकत्वाभावात्कारकपदस्य क्रियापदेन सहाकाङ्का । एवं क्रियापदस्य कारक पदेनापि सह बोध्या। अत एव गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीत्यादौ नान्वयबोध आकाङ्काविरहात् । एकपदार्थे- ऽपरपदार्थसंसी योग्यता | यथा पयसा सिञ्चतीत्यादौ पयःपदार्थ सेक- संसर्गस्य कार्यकारणभावलक्षणस्य सत्त्वाद्योग्यता। अत एव वलिना सि- ञ्चतीत्यादौ नान्वयबोधो योग्यताविरहात् । पदानामव्यवधानं संनिधिः । यथा गामानयेत्यादी पदानामविलम्बनोच्चारणासंनिधिः । अत एवेकैकशः प्रहरे प्रहरऽसहोचारिते गामानयेत्यादौ नान्वयबोधः संनिधेरभावात् । सोऽयं शब्दस्त्रिविधी विधिनिषेधार्थवादभेदात् । तत्र प्रवृत्तिपरं वाक्यं विधिः । यथा ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतोदनकामस्तण्डुलं पचे- तेत्यादि । ज्योतिष्टोमनामको यागः स्वर्गरूपेष्टसाधनं तण्डुलकर्मकपाक ओदनरूपेष्टसाधनमित्युभयवाक्यार्थः । यजेत पचेतेत्यादिविधिप्रत्ययेनेष्ट- साधनत्वोपस्थापनात् । निवृत्तिपरं" वाक्यं निषेधः । यथा न कलजंभ- क्षयेदिति । कलञ्जभक्षणं जेष्टविशेषसाधनमित्यर्थः । इष्टविशेषश्चात्र पापानुत्पत्तिरेव तथैव वाक्यतात्पर्यात् । विधिनिषेधभिन्नः शब्दोऽर्थवादः । यथादित्यो युप इत्यादिः । स चायं शब्दो लोके वेदे च समानः | इयां- स्तु विशेषः किंचिदेव लौकिकं वाक्यं प्रमाणं यदाप्नोक्तं वेदवाक्यं तु सर्व- मपि प्रमाणं परमाप्तेन भगवता कृतत्वात् । इति शब्दनिरूपणम् ॥ अर्थापत्तिस्तु न प्रमाणान्तरम् । पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्ग इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा दिवाभोजिनो रात्रिभोजनमन्तरेण पीनत्वमनुपपन्न मिति ज्ञानानन्तरं देवदत्तो रात्री भुङः इति निर्णायते तस्य व्यतिरेकिसाध्य- त्वात् । तथा हि । देवदत्तो रात्री भुते दिवाभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वात् । यस्तु रात्रौ न भुलेस दिवाभुञ्जानल्वे सति पीनोऽपि न भवति | यथा दिवा रात्री चाभोजीति । अर्थापत्तिरित्यपि व्यतिरेकिण एव नामान्तर- मिति | घटोपलब्धी घटाभावाग्रहात्मतियोग्यनुपलब्धिरभावग्रहे" प्रत्य- C. E.C. बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वेष्टसाधन त्वाभिधायकप्रत्ययघटितं वाक्यं विधिः and so b. E.C, नघटितं वा° and omitting from यथा न कललं, &c., to तात्पर्यात् read इह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादौ लौकिको निषेधः. C. A. B. add अग्नि- हिमस्य भेषजम्। वजहस्तः पुरंदरः. and E. reads for the whole यजमान: प्रस्तरः सिंहो माणवक इत्यादि. 4. C. E omit from अर्थापत्निस्तु, &c., to °आयजलज्ञानवदिति. forth.

·क्षस्यैव सहकारिणी नतु प्रमाणान्तरं प्रत्यक्षेणेवाभावग्रहोपपत्तेः । अन्य- थेह घटो नास्तीति निर्णयानन्तरमिह घटाभावं साक्षात्करोमीति प्रती- त्यनुपपत्तेः॥ प्रामाण्यं स्वतो ग्राह्य परतो वेति विचार्यते | दुरात्प्रत्यक्षेण जला- दिज्ञाने जाते तत्र स्वत एव यथार्थज्ञानत्वरूपप्रामाण्यमवधार्य जलार्थी प्रवर्तते ज्ञानग्रहे तद्गतप्रामाण्यस्यापि ग्रहालामाण्यस्य यावज्ज्ञानग्राहक- ग्राह्यत्वरूपस्वतस्त्वोपगमादिति मीमांसकास्तन्न । स्वत एव प्रामाण्यग्रहे ज्ञानग्रहानन्तरं वचिज्जातं मे जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेति प्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यानिश्चिते संशयायोगात् । न च संशयस्थले ज्ञानग्रहोऽपि नास्तीति वा- च्यम्। ज्ञानाग्रहे ज्ञानधर्मिकप्रामाण्यतदभावकोटिकसंशयानुपपत्तेः संशये धर्मिज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात् । न हि पुरोवर्तिन्युञ्चैस्तरे धर्मिण्यज्ञातेऽयं स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति संशयो भवति । तस्माज्ज्ञाने परत एव प्रामाण्यमबंधार्यते । तथा हि । अनभ्यासदशापन्नजलादिज्ञाने जाते तत्र प्रामाण्यसंशये सत्य- पि पुरुषः प्रवर्तते । ततो जलप्रतिलम्भे सति जातं मे जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् । यत्तमा न भवति तत्समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकं न भवति । यथा जलभ्रम इति व्यतिरेकेणानभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञानप्रामाण्यं निश्चीयत इति । अभ्यासदशापन्नजलादिज्ञानेषु प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमप्यन्वयिना प्रामाण्यमवधार्यते । तत्रैव द्वितीयादिजलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनक- जातीयत्वादाद्यजलज्ञानवदिति ॥ धर्मप्रभवं सुखम् । अधर्मप्रभवं दुःखम् ॥ इच्छात्वसामान्यवतीच्छा। सापि देधा फलविषयिणी तत्साधनविषयिणी चेति । सुखं दुःखाभावश्च फलम् । तदिच्छां प्रति 'फलज्ञानमात्र कारणम् । साधनेच्छां प्रति तु फ- लसाधनताज्ञानं कारणम्" ॥ द्वेषत्वसामान्यवान्प्रज्वलनात्मको वा द्वे- षः । स विविधः दुःखविषयस्तत्साधनविषयश्च । दुःखद्वेषं प्रति दुःखज्ञा- नमात्र कारणम् । साधनद्वेषं प्रति तु दुःखसाधनताज्ञानं कारणम् ॥ प्रय- नत्वसामान्यवानुत्साहरूपश्च प्रयत्नः । स त्रिविधः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिजीवa. D. F. omit this clause. b. D. F.त्वस्वरू. c. D.°ग्रहे तु तत°. d. A. ते. e. C. E. सुखसाधनभिन्नत्वे सति धर्म' and also दुःखसाधनभिन्नत्वे सति अधर्म?. 5. C. E. उपायज्ञान. g. C. E. करणम्. h. C. E. करणम्... C. L. करणम. PRITA ·( १९ ) नयोनिभेदात् । चिकीर्षाजन्यो यत्नः प्रवृत्तिः। द्वेष साधनताज्ञानजन्यो यत्नो निवृत्तिः । श्वासप्रश्वासहेतुर्यत्नो जीवनयोनिः । स चातीन्द्रियः॥ बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना आत्ममात्रसमवेताः । तत्रेश्वरगता नित्या जीवगता अ- नित्याः ॥आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वम् । तच्च भूजलमात्रवृत्ति ॥ आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वम् । तद्भिविषं सांसिद्धिकं नौमि- त्तिकं चेति । अग्निसंयोगानपेक्ष्यं द्रवत्वं सांसिद्धिकम् । तज्जलमात्र- वृत्ति । अग्निसंयोगापेक्ष्यं द्रवत्वं नैमित्तिकम् । तद्धृतादिरूपायां भुवि सुवर्णादिरूपे च तेजसि तदुभयत्रैव वहिसंयोगाइवत्वोत्पत्तेः ॥ लेहत्व- जातिमांचिक्कणतारूपः स्नेहः । स च जलमात्रवृत्तिः । चणकचूर्णादिव्य - गयः। घृततैलादौ स्नेहोपलम्भस्तु जलोपाधिकः ॥ गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहाः परमाणुगता नित्याः कार्यगता अनित्याः ॥ श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । स त्रिविधः संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । भेर्यामभिहन्यमानायां यः शब्दः स संयोगजः। तत्र भेर्याकाशसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । भेरीद- ण्डसंयोगो निमित्तकारणम् । वंश उत्पाटयमाने यश्चटचटाशब्दः स वि- भागजः । तत्र वंशदलयाकाशविभागोऽसमवायिकारणम् । वंशदलद्वय- विभागो निमित्तकारणम् । वीचीतरंगन्यायेन कदम्बगोलकन्यायेन वा ये द्वितीयादयः शब्दास्ते शब्दजाः तत्रोत्तरोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वपूर्वशब्दोऽस- मवायिकारणम् । अनुकूलवातादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । पुनरपि शब्दो द्वि- विधो वर्णात्मको ध्वनिश्च । ताल्वादिव्यापारप्रभवो वर्णात्मकः । मृदङ्गा- दिप्रभवो ध्वनिः । सर्वोऽपि शब्द आकाशमात्रसमवेतः ॥ जीवात्मसम- वेतबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाः शब्दश्च विक्षणावस्थायिनस्तृतीयक्षणे नश्यन्ति | योग्याविभुविशेषगुणानां स्वद्वितीयक्षणोत्पन्ननाश्यत्व"नियमा- त्" ॥ विहितक्रियासाध्यो धर्मो निषिद्धक्रियासाध्योऽधर्मः । एतो जीव- मात्रसमवेती भोगप्रायश्चित्ता दिनाइयौ च ॥ संस्कारत्वजातिमान्संस्का- रः। स त्रिविधो वेगः स्थितिस्थापको भावना चेति| वेगवजातिमान्चे- गः । स मूर्तद्रव्यमात्रसमवेतः । आश्रयपूर्वावस्थापादकः संस्कारः स्थि- तिस्थापकः । स पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयवृत्तिः । आकृष्टतरुशाखादौ पुनस्त- B. विष्ट. . C. E. om. from बुद्धीच्छा, &c., to °अनित्याः c. A. 'द्रव्यपयोघृत'. d. C. E. F. omit from जीवात्मसमवेत, &c., to °त्वनियमात्. e. C. . बुद्धयादयोष्टावात्ममात्रसमवेताः. namentoMAILWArise C.

·( २० ) स्थानस्थितिं जनयति । इमो दौ क्रियाजन्यो स्वजन्यक्रियानाइयो । पूर्वानुभवजन्यः स्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारो भावना । स जीवमात्रवृत्तिः । त्रिविधसंस्कारोऽनित्य एव | इति गुणनिरूपणम् ॥ ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुः कर्मोत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेशसंयोगहेतुः कर्मापक्षे- पणम् | स्वसनिकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः कर्माकुच्चनम् । स्वविप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः कर्म प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं कर्म गमनम् । पञ्चविधमपि कर्म मूर्तद्रव्यमात्र- समवेतमानित्यमेव । उत्तरसंयोगात्कदाचिदाश्रयनाशाच नश्यति । इति कर्मनिरूपणम्॥ अधिकदेशवृत्ति सामान्यं परम् । यथा सत्ताया द्रव्यादिविवयवृत्ति- त्वेनेतरसामान्यापेक्षयाधिकदेशवृत्तित्वम् । अल्पदशवृत्ति सामान्यम- परम् । यथा द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादि । सत्तापेक्षयाल्प देशवृत्तित्वात् । पुनः सामान्यं द्विविध जातिरूपमुपाधिरूपं च । साक्षात्संबद्धं सामान्य जातिरूपम्। यथा सत्ताद्रव्यत्वादि।परंपरासंबद्धंसामान्यमुपाधिः । यथा प्रमेयत्वज्ञेयत्वादिण्डित्वकुण्डलित्वादिश्च । प्रमात्वमेव हि परंपरासंब- न्धेन घटादिनिष्ठं प्रमेयत्वमित्यादि बोध्यम् । इति सामान्यनिरूपणम् ॥ नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिविशेषाणां सामान्यस्य च विशेषतो विभागाभावात्सा- मान्यलक्षणमेव पूर्वोक्तमबसेयं । परंतु विशेषानभ्युपगमे समानजातिगु- णक्रियावतां परमाणूनां परस्परव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्न स्यात् । तवेष्टापत्तो यो- गिनोपि तादृशपरमाणूनां ज्ञानसंकरः स्यादिति । एवं युतसिद्धयोः सं- योग इवायुतसिद्धयोः समवायोवश्यः । ययोईयोर्मध्ये एकमविन- श्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । एतौ पञ्चविधाववयवाव- यविनी गुणगुणिनी क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चे. ति । अवयव्यादयो ह्यविनश्यन्तोवयवाद्याश्रिता एवावतिष्टन्ते | अव- यवादिनाशानन्तरं विनश्यन्तस्तु क्षणमात्रं निराश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते । अवयवादिनाशानन्तरं विनश्यन्तस्तु क्षणमात्रं निराश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते । इति विशेषसमवाययोनिरूपणम् ॥ c. A. °यात्मदे'. 1. C. E. substitute for the clause up to परंतु, विशेषश्च प्रतिव्यक्निभिन्न एव | and add विशेषनिरूपणम् after ज्ञानसंकरः स्यादिति. c. E. breaks of at this point. d. C. omits from अवयव्यादयो to the end, ·( २१ ) तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽभावोऽन्योन्याभावः । स च घटः पटो नेत्यादिप्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः। अन्योन्याभावभिन्नोऽभावः संसर्गा- भावः। स त्रिविधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति । उत्पत्तेः प्राक्समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य संसर्गाभावः प्रागभावः । स चेह कपाले घटो भविष्यतीति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । उत्पत्तेरनन्तरं समवायिकारणे कार्य- स्य संसर्गाभावः प्रध्वंसः । स ह कपाले घटो ध्वस्त इति प्रत्ययप्रसि- द्धः । त्रैकालिकः संसर्गाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावः । स चेह भूतले घटो नास्ती- त्यादिप्रत्ययसिद्धः । एवमन्येषामत्रैवान्तर्भावः । यथान्धकारस्यालोका- भावे यत्रालोको नास्ति तत्रैवान्धकारव्यवहारात् ॥ लक्षणदोषाणामव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसंभवानां तु यथासंभवं हेत्वाभासेष्व- न्तर्भावः । लक्ष्यैकदेशे लक्षणस्यावर्तनमव्याप्तिः । यथा शिखातूबवा- ब्राह्मण इत्यस्य संन्यासिन्यव्याप्तिस्तस्य शिखासूत्रवत्त्वाभावात् । अ- लक्ष्ये लक्षगगमनमक्तिव्याप्तिः । यथा मनुष्यो ब्राह्मण इति लक्षणस्य शूद्रेतिव्याप्तिस्तस्यापि मनुष्यत्वात् । लक्ष्ये वापि लक्षणस्यावर्तनम- संभवः । यथा शुण्डदण्डवान्ब्राह्मण इति लक्षणस्यासंभवः कस्यापि ब्राह्मणस्य शुण्डदण्डाभावात् । एतदोषरहितं तल्लक्षणम् | विशुद्धमाता- पितृजन्यत्ववान्ब्राह्मण" इति | विशुद्धत्वं च षटुर्माधिकारवत्त्वम् ॥ इयता प्रबन्धेन सर्वेषां पदार्थानामुद्देशलक्षणे कृते बालानुपयोगाच परीक्षा न कृता । लस्यतावच्छेदकमात्रेण लक्ष्यसंकीर्तन मुद्देशः । असा- धारणधर्मो लक्षणम् । उद्देशलक्षणयोरुपपत्त्यनुपपत्त्यन्यतरफलको वि- थारः परीक्षा । ननु निःप्रयोजन मात्मेतरपदार्थनिरूपणं तज्जन्यपदार्थ- तत्वज्ञानस्य सुखदुःखाभाव तत्साधनेतरत्वेन प्रयोजनस्वाभावादिति चेन। पदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानस्यात्मतत्त्वज्ञानद्वारा मोक्षसाधनत्वात् । आत्यन्तिकदुःख- ध्वंसो मोक्षः । स च "स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःख प्रागभावासमानकालीनदुः- खध्वंसः । संसारकालीनदुःखध्वंसस्य मोक्षत्ववारणाय कालीनान्तं ४. A. त्वादान. b. A. D. मेतत्. c. D. भाववत्.d. D. om स्व. ७. D. दुःखासमान.

·( २२ ) दुःखध्वंसविशेषणम् । अस्मदीयदुःखसमानकालीनशुकमोक्षेऽव्याप्तिवार- णाय "स्वसमानाधिकरणेतिदुःखविशेषणमिति सर्वं 'शिवम् ॥ विद्वद्भास्करशर्मा यो बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये । यथा कणादसिद्धान्तमकरोत्तर्ककोमुदीम् ॥ श्रीवासुदेवं सुरवैरिभङ्ग रमाधरालिङ्गितसुन्दराङ्गम् । पादाब्जसंभूतपवित्रगङ्गं नमामि तं वारितदोषसङ्गम् ॥ इति लौगाक्षिभास्करशर्मविरचिता तर्ककौमुदी समाप्ता" । . ८t. D. om. स्व. . C. मोक्षश्च चरमदुःखध्वंसः । इदानींतनदुःखस्य चरमताभावान्न तटुंसे ऽतिव्याप्तिः । चरमटुःखं च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःख प्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखम् | स्वं चरमदुःखत्वेनाभिमतम् । तत्समानाधिकरणं दुःखं तत्पूर्वकालीन मंव | तत्भागभावासमानका- लीनं चरमदुःखमिति मैत्रीयचर मदुःखस्यापि चैत्रीयदुःखप्रागभावसमानकालीनत्वादसंभव इत्यतः स्वसमानाधिकरणत्वं दुःख विशेषणम् । एव च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःख &c. as in the text. c. D. F. om. this verse. d. D. P. इति श्रीमन्महोपाध्यायलौगा- क्षिरुद्रकवीन्द्रात्मजविद्वन्मुद्रलसूनुना भास्करण रचिता तर्ककौमुदी संपर्णा || ·NOTES. .. 1. तर्काणां कौमुदीव प्रकाशिकेति तर्ककौमुदी. तर्क is defined in the Dinils of the Tarleasangrah as तय॑न्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादि- सप्त पदार्थाः. It may, hence, be described as that which is discussed and established, i.e., results obtained by an analytical process of classification. Compare, "If we attempt to proceed further in the same path, that is, to analyse any further, the import of propositions, we find forced upon us, as a subject of previous consideration, the import of Names, Now what we do, what passes in our mind, when we affirm or deny two names of one anotler, must depend on what they are names of, since it is with reference to that, and not to the names themselves that we make the affirmatiou or denial.” Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 21. 2. अभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम्. A padartha is anything namable. These according to the author are seven. It may be noticed that all namable things are capable, at the outset, of being divided from the conception of existence they imply, into existences positive (भाव), and negative (अभाव): the भाव things again being divided into 6. अत्र सप्तमस्याभावत्वकथनादेव षण्णां भावत्वं प्राप्तं तेन भावत्वेन पृथगुप- न्यासो न कृतः।। मुक्ता || Kanada, according to whom the enumeration of substances is here given, appears originally to accept only six classes of objects, and not seven : तत्र द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावा इति षडेव पदार्थाः ॥ सर्व० सं० औ० द० ॥ There are, again others, who look upon शक्ति सादृश्य, &c., as so many padúrthas, but they are shown to be included in the heads already given. ननु कथमेत एव पदार्थाः शक्तिसादृश्यादीनामप्यतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वात् । तथाहि । मण्यादिसमवहितेन वहिना दाहो न जन्यते तच्छून्येन तु जन्यते । तत्र मण्यादिना वह्नौ दाहानुकूला शक्ति - श्यते । उत्तेजकेन मण्याद्यपसारणेन च जन्यत इति कल्प्यते । एवं सादृश्यमप्यति- रिक्तः पदार्थः। तद्धि न षट्सु भावेष्वन्तर्भवति सामान्येऽपि सत्वात् । यथा गोत्वं नित्यं तथाश्वत्वमिति सादृश्यप्रतीतेः। नाप्यभावे सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वादिति चेन्न । मण्याद्यभावविशिष्टवन्द्यादेहादिकं प्रति स्वातन्त्येण मण्यभावादेरेव वा हेतुत्वं कल्प्यते । अनेनैव सामञ्जस्येऽनन्तशक्तितत्प्रागभावध्वंसकल्पनानौचित्यात् । न चोत्तेजके सति प्रतिबन्धकसद्भावेऽपि कथं दाह इति वाच्यम् । उत्तेजकाभाववि- शिष्टमण्यभावस्य कारणत्वात् । सादृश्यमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । किन्तु तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तगतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वं । यथा चन्द्रभिन्नत्वे सति चन्द्रगताहादकत्वादिमत्त्वं मुखे - ·NOTES. n ...... We have FFAETAT I Toll On the classificatiou of namable things further compare, A proposition is discourse which affirms or denies something of some other thing. This is one step. There must, it seems, be two things concerned in every act of belief. But what are these things ?......... If, therefore, we knew what all names signify, we should know everything which in the existing state of human knowledge, is capable of being made a subject of affirmation or denial, or being itself affirmed or denied of a subject. now carried this survey far enough to be able to take an account of its results, and to exhibit an enumeration of all kinds of things whiclı are capable of being made predicates, or of having anything predicated of them.” Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 49. And further, “The necessity of an enumeration of existences, as the basis of logic, dich not escape the attention of the schoolmen, and of their master, Aristotle............ The categories or predicaments.........Were believed to be an enumeration of all things capable of being named.” These are ten in number, and constitute 66 a mere catalogue of distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of these common distinctions.” Idem, p. 50. Another able writer, however, justifies this classification, in the words, they seem to have been rather intended as a generalisation of predicates, an analysis of the final import of predication." Bain's Logic, Vol. I., p. 265. 3. Some include THE or darkness among the dravyas. It is said न च कृप्तद्रव्येष्वन्तर्भावात्कुतो दशमद्रव्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । आकाशादिप- ञ्चकस्य नीरूपत्वाद्वायोश्च नीरूपत्वान्न तेष्वन्तभावः । जलतेजसोः शीतोष्णस्पर्श- विरहान तेष्वन्तर्भावः । तमसो निर्गन्धत्वान्न पृथिव्यामन्तर्भावः । तस्मात्तमसो दशमद्रव्यत्वं सिद्धमिति चेन्न । तेजोऽभावेनैवोपपत्तावतिरिक्तकल्पनायां मानाभा- वात् । न च विनिगमनाभावात्तेजस एव तमोऽभावरूपतास्त्विति वाच्यम् । तेजसो ऽभावस्वरूपत्वे सर्वानुभूतोष्णस्पर्शाश्रयद्रव्यान्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । उष्णस्पर्शरूप- गुणाश्रयतया तेजसो द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तमसि रूपप्रतीतिस्तु भ्रान्तिरेव । दीपापस- TTTT Ta a traa 11 FNTO atoll Adravya is defined as that which is the substratum of TT, or fier, or is capable of becoming the समवायिकारण of some effect. गुणवत्त्वं कर्मवत्त्वं समवायिकारणत्वं वा 57 GOTETTATOETSETTET || If a property or action can be predicated of a thing, that thing may be called a dravya. By saying that what is dark, and that it can move, we can include it among the dravyas, but it could be shown to be included in mere Stry, and not among the dravyas, as is done in the passage quoted above. Vide Note No. 8. :

·NOTES. The Gunas enumerated in the Vuisheshika sutras are only 17 in number. रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः सङ्यापरिमाणे पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्व- बुद्धयः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्च । The Siddhanta chandrodaya adds चेति बैशेषिकसूत्रस्थ चकारस्यानुक्तसमुच्चायकत्वान्नात्र सूत्रविरोधः। 5. Some argue that several karimas, such as for and TFT, &c., are not taken into account, and therefore the classification is faulty: laut the Mastitvali says भ्रमणं रेचनं स्पन्दनोज्वलनमेव च । तिर्यग्गमनमप्यत्र गमनादेव लभ्यते। 6. It is difficult to translate the word rare into genus, inasmuch as the word does not exactly indicate a class higher than any other given class, as animal and man; but it rather refers to the conmon characteristic running through all the members of a class, e.g., 566 in PTEFF refers, therefore, to the characteristic of the genus of a given class, and HTTFRAGE to the characteristic of the class itself, e.g. in the case of पृथिवी, द्रव्यत्व is the परसामाज्य, witla reference to which पृथिवीत्व is अपरसामान्य. Thus though पर and STITEHTI are merely relative conceptions, the Naiyáyikas recognise, as it were, an absolute or supreme Súmanya, which they distinguish by the name सत्ता. This is supposed to reside in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म only. सामान्य विविध प्रोक्तं परं चापरमेव च । द्रव्यादित्रिकवृत्तिस्तु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ परत्वमधिक देशवृत्तित्वमपरत्वमल्पदेशवृत्तित्वं । सकल जात्यपेक्षया सत्ताया अधिक देशवृत्तित्वात्परत्वं तदपेक्षया चान्यासां जातीनामपरत्वम् ॥मुक्ता०॥ This tenet is peculiar to the Naiyáyikas, for several other schools of philosophy have not only not recognised it, but some like the Buddhists have tried to actually refute it; vide Sørvadarshana Sangraha on the philosophy of the Bauddhas. The meaning of the word za neay here be casually noticed in connection with the theory of FAIrā neans the characteristic of a class, and is opposed to see or an individual of that class, e.g., द्रव्यत्व and पृथिवी or तेजस्, &c. Among the Padárthas सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव can have no a. AS ETAIEU is itself a siia, it is impossible for it to have any fresh gría, for such an arrangement will involve us in confusiou. ad infinitum (TTTET or FETT). On this point compare, " If every general conception, instead of being the one in the many, were considered to be as many different conceptions as there are things to whiclı it is applicable, there would be no such thing as general language." Mill's Logic, Vol. I., footnote, p. 204. For or differentia always distinguish one thing from another. As thus no two Vesheshas cari be alike, it is impossible to find out a common likeness in a group of 4 ·NOTES, unlikes ( रूपहानिः). समवाय being a particular kind of relation masti always be one, and as such must be sui generes (व्यक्तरभेदः). It is rule, as will be seen later on, that sia and af are related to one another by the relation called समवाय. It will also be seen that STIZ is not related to anything by this kind of relation. Hence अभाव can have no जाति (असंबन्ध). Udayanacharya thus sammarises the objections in the way of making a Jiiti: व्यक्तरभेदः (1) तुल्यत्वं, (2) संकरो, (3) ऽथ-अनवस्थितिः (4) रूपहानिः (5) असंबन्धः (6) जातिबाधकसं- ग्रहः ॥ कुसु०॥ We have seen instances of 4, 5, 6 and 1. तुल्यत्व stands in the way when all the different names we intend to generalise a जाति from, are but different expressions of one and the same idea, e.g., शशी, चन्द्र, विधु, &c. संकर (परस्परात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणयोर्ध- र्मयोरेकत्र समावेशः।। सि० चं०॥) or confusion arises from each of the confused Jatis existing somewhere independently of the other (with which the first has got in confusion), and by both of them existing somewhere else entirely together, e.g. The Murtaclravyas are पृथिवी, अप, तेजस्, वायु and मनस्. The Bhutadravyas are the first four and आकाश. Now any one of the two Jittis, मूर्तत्व or भूतत्व gets into confusion with the other; because, one of them, area for example, exists in आकाश without the other-मूर्त्तत्व, which again is found in मनस् without its second-भूतत्व, both finally being seen together in goet. Hence age or ce can be no sira. 7. Nityadravyas are the five dravyas beginning with SETET, and the Paramánus of the first four. These being without number, there can be no limit to the marks that distinguish them from one another. घटादीनां घणुकपर्यन्तानां तत्तत्वयवभेदात्परस्परं भेदः । परमाणूना परस्परं भेदको विशेष एव । स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तस्तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्ती- त्यर्थः॥ मुक्ता०॥ 8. Non-existence can be divided into two kinds: a thing is not at or upon a particular thing, or in a particular thing. In the first instance the thing does not exist in contact with (cat) the thing before our eyes, in the second it is not identical with it (तादात्म्य). e.g., इह भूतले घटो नास्ति and अयं घटः पटो न. The first conception modified by the three conditions of time-futurity, past time, and eternityyields three kinds of अभाव-प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव. The second is called अन्योन्याभाव. 9. The Siddhanta chandrodaya has द्रव्यत्वसामान्यवत्त्वं गुणवत्वं सम- * विशेष is sometimes defined as सामान्यभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्य शून्यत्वे सति समवे- तत्वम्।

·NOTES. 27 WO धायिकारणत्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम्, If we make the जाति-द्रव्यत्वthe definition of a 02, it may be asked how before knowing IT come to द्रव्यत्व. द्रव्यत्वजाताविदं द्रव्यमिति प्रत्यक्षम् (the identical cousciousness--this is t-produced every time we see an object of the class called 63, is direct proof of some common characteristic as 5364 running through the whole class, in order to present all the individuals in the same form) द्रव्यवृत्तिर्या कारणता सा किंचि- द्धर्मावच्छिन्ना कारणतात्वाइण्डवदित्यनुमानं वा मानम् (or the same can be arrived at by an inference). If 64 can become the Thai TOT of some effect, the orta must reside in the 53. This irrotat must be distinguishable by some description of attributes (say 636) as in the case of a दण्ड (which is distinguished by दण्डत्व, as the कारण of a घट). This कारणता, to continue, must be किंचिद्धर्मावच्छिन्ना, distinguishable by certain attributes as said above. But this concise yet pregnant phrascology of Nyaya means that the firturas in the 7521 must be co-extensive and co-existent with the attributes (2) of the 6t; otherwise it can never be comprehended as existing in the 63. In other words, the Frrrat must be shown to be concomitant with the tip of the 6, in the form, wherever the qe is, there TTTT exists; wherever the Th is not the FTTTTTT also is not. Such a za of 4 is evidently none other than 50476. Thus a som may finally be described as that which is possessed of the properties of the genus 467; or which is the site or substratum of qualities; or which is capable of becoming the hairToT of some effect. Before leaving the subject of definition it is necessary to advert to two very important considerations at the beginning. We must try to know what makes a true definition, and what faults vitiate its character as such. Definition or ment is defined at the end of the book, as असाधारणधर्मो लक्षणम् ; and the three faults to which a definition is open are enumerated as लक्ष्यैकदेशे लक्षणस्यावर्तनमव्याप्तिः। अलक्ष्ये लक्ष- णगमनमतिच्याप्तिः । लक्ष्ये कापि लक्षणस्यावर्तनमसंभवः | If we define the term Brihmlana, as शिखासूत्रवान् , one having a शिखा and सूत्र, we shall leave out from the denotation of the term Brühmana, all Sanycísins who wear no thread and bear no hair on their head, and are yet Bráhmans to all intents and purposes. The STETETTE or peculiar property (connotation) of the term Brúhmana in this instance, being thus found to exclude a part of the thing defined (*), the definition is vitiated by the fault called sta. Again if we define the term ET as any one who is a man," such an ·28 NGTES, STT will include things not intended to be defined ( su). The definition will, in this instance, be faulty on account of its involving an staan. If, in the last instance, we were to define the term aS शुण्डदण्डवान्, such an असाधारणधर्म, will not cdescribe any member of the class defined. The definition is here vitiated by 5*49. In fact, whenever we find that a definition has any of these faults in it, we at once perceive that the enumeration of the connotation of the term is not exhaustive or precise. The Dipilea of the Turkasai.. graba, therefore, has : एतद्दूषणत्रयरहितो धर्मो लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म gegeud. So also our book aciza TTH. It should, however, be carefully noticed that a y may be STETITT, i.e., may not be साधारण or common to the लक्ष्य as well as अलक्ष्य; and yet it may be open to the city called starih. It is therefore necessary to see whether STETETTT means simply other than ET TOT or something else. ननु साधारणस्य लक्ष्यालक्ष्यवृत्तित्वरूपतया तदभावरूपासाधारणत्वस्याव्यात्यादि- होषग्रस्तधर्मेऽपि सत्त्वात् कथं दोषत्रयरहित एवासाधारणधर्म इत्याशंकां परिजि. हिर्षुरसाधारणमन्यादृशं निर्वक्ति । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छे- दकव्याप्यत्वम् (असाधारणत्वम् ) ॥ नील०॥ असाधारण accordingly means the being the व्यापक as well as the व्याप्य of the लभ्यतावच्छेदक. Let us analyse an instance. In the definition विशुद्धमातापितृजन्यत्ववा. ब्राह्मणः the असाधारणधर्म is विशुद्धमातापितृजन्यत्ववत्त्वम्. Here the लक्ष्य being ATETOT, the main covers the same ground as that term. The y or property, which can exactly describe the term res can be none other than Eng, for this connotation of the term is exactly co-existentand co-extensive with the whole of its denotation. (132TOT ऽन्यूनानतिप्रसक्तधर्मस्यैव लक्ष्यतावच्छदेकत्वम् ।। न्या० को०॥). In other words, the असाधारणधर्म-जन्यत्ववत्त्वम् must be shown to be constantly concomitant (व्यापक and व्याप्य) with the लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक-ब्राह्मणत्व in the form where there is are there is °F410471, where there is ºstera F# there is arr. In fine, there must exist a convertible kind of concomitance between the term and its collective connotations, “It is only necessary that the definition thus formed should be convertible with the name which it professes to define, i.e., should be exactly co-extensive with it, being predicable of everything of which it is predicable, and of nothing of which it is not predicable." Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 157. To sum up, then, the definition of a name is the enumeration of that peculiar or essential connotation or connotations of it, which as it were denoted nothing more nor less than the naine of which it is the connotation. “ The only ade- ·Enau NOTES. 29 quate definition of a name is that which declares the facts, and the whole of the facts which the name involves in its signification.' Idem, p. 155. When we look upon a definition as declaring the whole of the facts" implied by the name, we are at once confronted with the almost insurmountable difficulty of enunciating any correct definition at all, inasmuch as we know very little of the whole of the facts of a name. This is the second point to be noticed in this connection. The one great advantage of such definitions as गुणत्ववान् गुणः । द्रव्यत्ववद्व्यम्, and the like, consists, though at the apparent sacrifice of clearnoss, in the fact that they remain unaltered even with our increasing knowledge of the connotations of the name defined. Nilleuntha substantially says the same thing : यद्यपि लक्षणलक्ष्यताव- च्छेदकयारभेदस्तथापि लक्षणेनेतरभेदे साध्ये हेतौ साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यनिश्चये ऽपि हेतुधर्मितावच्छेदकसाध्यनिश्चयस्यापि नियतत्वाभिप्रायेणेदमिति संक्षेपः ॥ 10. It will be remembered that those Padarthas which have a Samānya Jati are द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म only. 11. अनेकसमवेतत्वं संयोगादीनामप्यस्तीत्यत उक्तं नित्यत्वे सतीति । नित्यत्वे सति समवेतत्वं गगनपरिमाणादीनामप्यस्त्यत उक्तमनेकेति। नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकवृ- त्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावस्याप्यस्तीत्यतो वृत्तित्वसामान्यं विहाय समवेतेत्युक्तम् । एकव्य- क्तिमात्रवृत्तिस्तु न जातिः। मुक्ता ॥ 12. The word मात्र is inserted to exclude रूप, &c., which are a cause of enabling us to separate objects from one another (व्यावृत्ति); but which are not the cause of this sense of distinction only, i.e., they do not produce this kind of sense of distinction only, but they contribute to several other things besides, such as प्रत्यक्ष, &c. 13. अभावसामान्यलक्षणं तु भावभिन्नत्वम् ॥ वाक्य० ॥ इदमिह नास्ति इद- मिदं न भवतीति प्रतीतिनियामको भावाभावसाधारणः स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः ।। न्या०को दीधि०॥ प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनज्ञानविषयत्वम् ॥ सिचं According to the last definition, that is called STII, whose knowledge is depen dent on the knowledge of its grainst or counter-entity. For example, tartra becomes comprehensible only by our knowledge on घट, which is the प्रतियोगी of its own non-existence. 14. great is often defined as paat. It must be remembered that though gitár possesses many gunas in common with 377 and others, the quality of Te is peculiar to itself. So among the other dravyas each though possessing many qualities besides the one by which it is distinguished, is generally described by that peculiar quality alone. तत्र क्षितिर्गन्धहेतुर्नानारूपवती मता ।। गन्धहेतुरिति । गन्धसम- वायिकारणमित्यर्थः ।। मुक्ता ॥ गन्धवत्वं समवायेन बोध्यम् । तेन कालिक- ..

·30 NOTES. संबन्धेन काले दैशिकसंबन्धन दिशि गन्धवस्वस्य सत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । सिक oll The guna set forth in the definition must be understood to be related to the thing defined by समवायसंबन्ध otherwise the definition might include army and fem-the common limiting cause of all perceptions--which may appear impregnated with T2T (but only }}y contact and not by समवायसंबन्ध). The student must guard himmself against the common error of confounding the term grirait with his conceptions of " earth.” In the philosophical analysis of a number of objects, every thinker has the right to choose his own name for that class of attributes which he, as it were, supposes to constitute the fundamentum divisionis of his classification. It is sufficient if he uniformly keeps to his own definitions and follows them faithfully throughout his enquiry. 15. नित्यत्वं प्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वे सति ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । अनित्यत्वं प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वाल्यतरत्वं बोध्यम् । वाक्य० ।। 16. Ayonija sharira is that which is produced from an aggregation of Paramanus brought about (सहकृत) by some special act of merit (धर्म). 17. Vide Note No. 20, for the definitions of an इन्द्रिय, शरीर and विषय. 18. ननु सुवर्णस्य तैजसत्वे किं मानमिति चेन्न । सुवर्ण तैजसमसति प्रतिबन्ध- के ऽत्यन्तानलसंयोगेऽनुच्छिधमानद्रवत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पृथिवी। &c. ॥ मुक्ता॥ 19. If the वायु known by different names as प्राण, &c., were not one and uniform, but five different Viyus, as प्राण, अपान, &c., each pervading the whole body, then, says the author as cach of these will be a मूर्तद्रव्य (being वायु which is a मूर्तद्रव्य-क्रियावदव्यं मूर्तद्रव्यम् - न्या० को०), they all cannot without conflicting with one another оссиру the same place, viz., the body. It is therefore clear that the various names प्राण, &c., are given to वायु in accordance with the various offices it has to perform. Hence हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः । उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥ also मुखनिर्गमनादि- क्रियाभेदेनापि पञ्चसंज्ञां लभते । उगारे नाग आख्यातः कूर्म उन्मीलने स्मृतः । कृकरः क्षुत्करोज्ञेयो देवदत्तो विजृम्भणे। न जहाति मृतं चापि सर्वव्यापी धनंजयः।। सि०चं०॥ 20. शरीर is defined to be that अन्त्यावयवि-final product, so to speak,—which is the place for experiencing Tist or fruition consisting of pleasure and pain. It may be briefly stated that the paraiuinus which are eternal things with " no parts and no magnitude," as well adlines HARDAR ·NOTES. 31 as the Duyanukas or dinds, the immediate result of paramiinus combining together for creation, through the desire of God, are not amenable to the senses. It is only when the diads form themselves into triads that they become cognizable by the senses. Thus are evolved the great great, 579, &c., combinations whereof result in the formation of certain vehicles or abodes for the fruition of pleasure or pain (by the so circumscribed soul). These are tits, which are I as being incapable of producing any further 953, and transitory in their nature (द्रव्यानारम्भक, and कार्यद्रव्य). If अन्त्यावयदि were defined merely as द्रव्यानारम्भकम्, आकाश and other dravyas which are not द्रव्यारम्भक (these being पृथिवी, अप, तेजस्, and वायु only) will be included in the definition. They are excluded by the words कार्यद्रव्यम् in the definition, for they are not कार्य-अनित्य-द्रव्य, but नित्य. If the words द्रव्यानारम्भकम् were omitted, then all अनित्यद्रव्या will come to be TOIT, which is absurd. It may be remarked that the definition of it as that where pleasure and pain are experienced involves the idea ofan experiencer or conscious agent, viz., the soul; and hence it is often defined by other writers as area TTT TEGOES FITA, 1.c., that in constant concomitance wherewith the soul experiences pleasure or pain is called TerT. That which is in contact with the body and is the Tor (understanding it merely in the sense फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणम्) of ज्ञान, heing itself अतीन्द्रिय, is an इन्द्रिय. If अतीन्द्रिय were left out, strear, the external covering--the vehicle of the internal sense of perception, or any tangible object in contact with the body will be included in the definition; if ज्ञानकरणम् were omitted, काल, दिक, &c., which are reiter and stations at will be included; and if the word, शरीरसंयुक्तम् were not put in, all निर्विकल्पकज्ञान which is अतीन्द्रिय, and which is the immediate cause of all ITFETT will be included. For this explanation of the use of the words Entität I am indebted to Shåstree Bheemacharya of Elphinstone College, who also says that Ta indicates, perhaps, the fact that is becomes a TOT only if in the body, for us and others cannot without the body (in their native form of art, &c.,) produce any knowledge whatever. इन्द्रियत्व is also defined as शब्देतरोतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनः- संयोगाश्रयत्वम् ॥ शब्दतरे य उद्भूता विशेषगुणा घनिष्टरूपादयस्तदनाश्रयत्वं ज्ञानस्य कारणभूतो यो मनःसंयोगस्तदाश्रयत्वं च चक्षुरादावस्तीति लक्षणसमन्वयः। भवत्येवेन्द्रियमनःसंयोगस्तथाप्यात्मा मनसा युज्यते मन इन्द्रियेणेन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षम् । आत्मवारणाय सत्यन्तम् । कालवारणाय विशेष्यम् । श्रोत्रऽव्याप्तिवार- ·32 NOTES. . णाय शब्देतर इति । चक्षुरादावनुतरूपसत्त्वाव्याप्तिवारणायोद्धृतेति । संयोगस्य द्विनिष्ठवेनेन्द्रियार्थसंयोगाश्रयत्वस्य चक्षुरादौ सत्त्वाद्विशेषगुण इति । स्वध्वंसकार- णीभूतकालमनःसंयोगस्तदाश्रयत्वं काल इति ज्ञानपदम् । प्राचां मत इन्द्रियावय- वार्थावयवयोः संनिकर्षोऽपि ज्ञानकारणं तदाश्रयत्वं चेन्द्रियावयवे गतमतो मनः पदम् । या काले रूपं नास्तीति प्रत्यक्ष प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तविशेषणतायाः कारणत्वेन तटकीभूतसंयोगाश्रयत्वं काले गतमतो मनःपदम् ।। सि.च० ।। न चात्मान्यत्वे सतीत्यनेनैवात्मन्यतिव्याप्तिवारणसम्भवे किं गुरुतरशब्देतरेत्यादिविशेषणेनेति वा- व्यम् । तथा च सति चर्ममनःसंयोगस्य ज्ञानमात्र प्रति हेतुत्वमते तत्रातिव्याप्तेरि- त्यलमतिविस्तरेण ॥ नील०॥ A विषय or mass is defined as ज्ञायमानत्वे सति भोगसाधनम् ite., that which contributes to भोग, on being known, as such, is a विषय. The words ज्ञायमानत्व exclude शरीर and इन्द्रिय, for though they are भोग- साधन, they do not contribute to भोग on being known, but merely by their own existence. In sleep, for example, the actions of CT and इन्द्रिय are not suspended, but a विषय is certainly useless then, for it cannot be grasped (it can have no ज्ञायमानत्व) in the time of sleep. The Valvyavrritti accordingly defines विषयत्वम् as शरीरोन्द्रियभिन्नवे सति भोगसाधनत्वम्. 21. If we take that to be multiform we will be involved in confusion ad infinitun, inasmuch as there would be no end of different allsas, all divided from one another without any known differentia. Hence for the natural uniqueness of reasoning (लाचव) tihasa must be accepted as one and uniform. It is विभु-all pervading--inasmuch as it is found in all karya dravyas ; (fuca being defined as *सर्वमूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वम् ॥ वाक्य० ॥. As, finally, it is one and all-pervading it must be forces also. Though Brity is thus one and eternal, it appears as many through its being joined with certain accidents. नत्वाकाशं लाघवादेकं सिद्धम् । श्रोत्रं पुरुषभेशाद्भिन्नं कथमाका स्यादिति चेत्तत्रापि-इन्द्रियं तु भवेच्छोत्रभकः सन्नप्युपाधित इति आकाश एकः सन्नप्युपाधेः कर्णशष्कुलीभेवाद्भिन्नः श्रोत्रात्मको भवति ॥ मुक्ता | We know that stof is the ToT of spirat, but this manifests itself only at places (आविच्छन्न) where the tympanum and other accessories are available. Hence though the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is one uniform आकाश-the latter appears as if it were many in consequence of the difference in the कर्णशष्कुली, &c., of different beings. 22. अतीत or past time (of a thing), is that period of time which is qualified by the destruction of that thing. The future is that period of time which is qualified by the anterior non-existence of * पृथ्व्यतेजोवायुमनांसि. ..

·NOTIS. 33 that thing. That period of time which is not iya (accompanied--limited) by the destruction or anterior non-existence of a thing is called its present time. 23. From the definitions अनित्यज्ञानादिमाजीवः and नित्यज्ञानादि- मानन्धरः it follows that आत्मा is ज्ञानवान् or possessing ज्ञान as a property; and that it may therefore be defined as Fir TTTTTCHE Fo). It is here maintained, it will be observed, against the doctrine* of Shankaracharya and the Vedanta in general, that I rosides in 579T as a Tor; and that therefore a greater or smaller degree of knowledge forms the principle of dividing SAT into जीवात्मा and परमात्मा. For further discussion vide Muktavali verses 48 and 49, and Panchadasi chap. VI. The stra-31576E-which mcians सुखदुःखादिसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकत्वम् (मुक्ता०) can be shown good of sitarar, but as it is difficult to show it good in the case of at without the attempt tending to annihilate the distinction between the tivo, (viz., 5 treat and ytarHT) the naiyáyikas substitute another argument for establishing the existence of an extra-cosmic creator. करणं हि सकलकम् ॥ वास्यादीनां छिदाकरणानां कर्तारमन्तरेण फलानुपधानं दृष्टम् । एवं चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञानकरणानामपि फलोपधानं कर्तारमन्तरेण TTTTET HTETT: fait surga lli.e., in other words, the existence of an extra-cosmic God is inferrible from the celebrated argument of design. Compare also कार्यायोजनधृत्यादेः पात्प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः । वाक्या- त्सङ्ख्याविशेषाच साध्यो विश्वविदव्ययः । कुसु०५.१॥ After effecting this, as it were, quantitative difference in TEAT, the naiyáyikas create a qualitative difference also, by attributing fee or permanent FT to ईश्वर and अनित्यज्ञान to जीव. It is further proposed to examine whether sat has a smett? Our text says he has none inasmuch as es Stçe (the cause of the bodies of the created world) is not to be found in his case : or he may have a TOT, if not by His own spez, by that of ours—by the stee of the creation he sends forth (for creation implies a creator). Just as in the case of a woman, the się z of the man, who will take her to be his wife, must be accepted as a cause in the particular make of her body, &c., so the Syre of created beings may be a cause of the creator having a Tit. It may, on this latter supposition, be doubted that this line of reasoning will invest even i persons (those whose connection with the body, the cause of fruition, is so severed as not * (FTATE 29. I. 1-12 (Brahma Sutras), ·NOTES. 1. to be resumed at any future moment) with a body; but this is not possible inasmuch as persons absolved have lost all =9T, whereas God possesses it as a विशेषगुण. This ईश्वर being proved to be with a body, the Smritis in which he is described as having four hands, &c., become at once comprehensible. 24. तथा चैकैकात्मन एकैकमनस आवश्यकत्वेनात्मनामनन्तत्वान्मनसोऽप्य- नन्तत्वमिति भावः। नन्वाकाशादिवन्मनसो विभुत्वे विभुदयसंयोगानङ्गीकारेण ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्न स्यात्। ज्ञानासमवायिकारणामसिद्धेः। अत आह (परम)अणुरूपमिति तथात्र मनसोऽणुखेनात्ममनःसंयोगः संभवत्येवेति भावः । मीमांसकास्तु मनो विभु स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदित्यनुमानेन विभुत्वं सिद्ध्यति विभुद्वयसंयोगोप्यस्ती- त्याहुः । नैतत् । तादृशसंयोगस्य नित्यत्वापत्त्या सर्वदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसंगेन सुषुप्त्य- भावापत्तेः। मम तु यदा मनः पुरिततिप्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तियंदा नि:सरति तदा ज्ञानोत्प- त्तिः। पुरिततिबहिर्देशावच्छिन्नात्ममनःसंयोगस्यैव ज्ञानकारणत्वात् । अत एव ज्ञान- मात्रे वननःसंयोगः कारणमिति मतं निराकुर्वन्ति नव्याः (vide note No. 20, quotation from Niluleantha). ननु मनसोऽणुत्वे ऽष्टावधानीनां कथं युगपज्ज्ञानो- त्पत्तिर्मनसश्चक्षुरिन्द्रियसंयोगकाले त्वगिन्द्रियादीनां संयोगासंभवादिति चेन्न । मन- सोतिशयवेगशालित्वेन क्षणविलम्वेनैवेन्द्रियसम्बद्ध सदस्यातीवशेषशाल्यष्टाव- धानीनां ज्ञानोत्पादनायुगपदनुभवामीति प्रत्ययो अनः । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । चुगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गामिति ॥ सि० चं०n also साक्षात्कारे सुखादीनां करणं मन उच्यते । अयोगपद्याज्ञानानां तस्यापुत्वमिहोच्यते ॥ तथाहि। सुखसा- क्षात्कार: सकरणको जन्यसाक्षात्कारत्वाचाक्षुषसाक्षात्कारवदित्यनुमानेन मनसः करणत्वसिद्धिः । ........ तत्र मनसोऽणुरवे प्रमाणमाह । अयोगपद्यादिति । ज्ञानानां चाक्षुषरासनादीनामयोगपद्यमेककालोत्पत्तिर्नास्तीत्यनुभवसिद्धम्। तत्र नानेन्द्रिया- णां सत्यपि विषयसंनिधाने यत्संबन्धादेकेनेन्द्रियेण ज्ञानं जन्यते यदसंबन्धाच्च परैर्जानं नोत्पाद्यते तन्मनसो विभुत्वे चासंनिधानं न संभवतीति न विभु मनः ।...... ...नच मनसः संकोचविकाशशालित्वादुभयोपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । नानावयवत- न्नाशादिकल्पने गौरवात् ।। मुक्ता|| The substance of all this may be thus briefly expressed. There must be some instrument like the mind for the experience of our daily pleasure and pain; and this must be atomic and eternal. The mind must be 37T for if it were fat, no knowledge will be possible, there being no संयोग between आत्मा and मनस् (necessary for knowledge in general) for two far things cannot unite. If, however, it may be assumed with the Minansakas that two things can unite, then there would be no cessation of knowledge, as in sleep; the union of car and 777 being indissoluble. Thus either way the mind cannot be विभु. It cannot be even as large as the body, for then it will be liable to be destroyed with the body and therefore 3477627, which we cannot assume it to be, for the retainer of the impressions of acts done in this life being anni- ..

·NOTES. 35 hilated by death there will be nothing to account for the inequality of birth ( TTTTT), which must then be assumed to arise without any reason (TFUTTA)--a reductio ad absurdun. The mind must therefore be atomic. Though it will be in constant union with th soul which pervades the whole body, still the naiyűyika will now be able to account for the phenomena of sleep by saying that when the mind enters a particular region in the body called gitara capable of neutralising the effect of आत्ममनःसंयोग, sleep is produced. It must be atomic, again, for the reason that multifarious and simultaneous perception is never possible. If, lastly, it were suggested that the mind may be fare and may receive impressions or not according as its various parts expand or contract, the atomist will content himself with his simpler explanations than accept the cumbrous theory of assuming so many little parts as developing, and so many as contracting, &c. Thus the mind is shown to be sta and नित्य. 25. यद्यपि चक्षुर्मात्रमाह्यत्वं (ग्राह्य जातिमत्त्वम्) चक्षुरितराग्राह्यत्वे सति चक्षु- गायत्वं तच्च रूपे न संभवति तथापि त्वगिन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वे सति चक्षुर्माह्यत्वं तदिति ध्येयम्। ......त्वगमाह्यगुणविभाजकधर्मवत्त्वपर्यवसानेनादोषात् । अत एवन परमाणुरूपादावच्याप्तिरिति बोध्यम् ॥ नील० ॥ The words चक्षुर्मात्र, &c., may seem to mean that guna which possesses a Frâ not cognizable by any organ of sense other than the eye. Such an interpretation of the definition will, however, hardly allow it to include even the thing defined (STETT), viz., 67, which is cognizable not by the eye alone, but by the mind and soul as well. In trying then to find the usefulness of the word Fry in the definition, the commentator fixes upon ASESIT and such other gunas as the only ones meant to be excluded. Because Ter is coguizable by the skin as also by the eye, the word A excludes Ce by making the definition to mean that guna which has that arra in it, which is cognizable not by the skin but by the eye. If the words stāHF were omitted, the definition will not extend (अव्याप्ति) to the रूप of परमाणु, for, it is always invisible. But with the word attaat in the definition, the Face of a 964rt, though invisible can be imagined as possessing the जाति-चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्व (i.e., AiTaNTATTITEH15174), and hence included in the definition. The word गुण prevents the definition from including रूपत्व (a जाति) as also प्रभा or light (a द्रव्य), which both are चक्षुर्मात्रगाह्यजातिमान्. The definition, however, includes ( TETA) THÁrs; for the union of light with a wall, satisfies the necessary tonditions by not ·36 NOTES. being cognizable by the skin, but by the eye. To obviate this आति- व्याप्ति, the word गुण must be understood as meaning विशेषगुण,* and thus excluding her which is not one. With this explanation the word FF will now appear to be superfluous, for fear which is meant to be excluded by it, is at once excluded by the word TT meaning a विशेषगुण, which सङ्ख्या is not. Further analysis will, however, show that मात्र is still required to exclude सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्व which is a विशेषगुण, but which is not स्वगग्राह्यचक्षुर्माह्य &c. Similar terms used in the following definitions must be similarly explained. For example, the word as in the definitions of th and Tra prevents द्रव्य and कर्म from being included in them through सत्ता. सत्ता is already described to be a kind of qThər731 or supreme sifa residing only in द्रव्य, गुण, and कर्म; and if we define any गुण say गन्ध as घ्राणग्राह्यजातिमान there will be nothing to prevent this from becoming & definition of पृथिवी, for it has in it a जाति, viz., सत्ता cognizable by the प्राण (according to the rule येनेन्द्रियेण या व्यक्तित्वते तेनेन्द्रि- येण तद्ताजातिस्तदभावस्तत्समवायश्च गृह्यते). This सत्ता being, however, cognizable not by the nose or the tongue alone, but by the eye as well, is excluded by the word मात्र. 26. एतेषां (रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शानाम्) पाक जत्वं तु क्षितौ नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् । तत्रापि परमाणौ स्यापाको वैशेषिके नये ॥ १०५॥ नैयायिकानां तु नये इयणु- कादावपीष्यते । and note पृथिव्यां हि रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शपरावृत्तिग्निसंयोगाडुपल- भ्यते । नहि शतधापिध्मायमाने जले रूपादिकं परिवर्तते । नीरे सौरभमौष्ण्यं चान्व- यव्यतिरेकाभ्यामोपाधिकमेवेति निर्णायते । पवनपृथिव्योः शीतस्पर्शादिवत् । तत्रापि पृथिवीष्वपि मध्ये परमाणावेव रूपादीनां पाक इति वैशेषिका वदन्ति । तेषामयमा- शयः । अवयविनावष्टब्धेष्ववयवेषु पाको न संभवति । परन्तु वह्निसंयोगेनावयविषु विनष्टेषु स्वतन्त्रेषु परमाणुषु पाकः पुनश्च पक्कपरमाणुसंयोगाचणुकादिक्रमेण पुन- महावयविपर्यन्तमुत्पत्तिस्तेजसामतिशयितवेगवशात्पूर्वव्यूहनाशी व्यूहान्तरोत्पत्ति- श्वेति। .........नैयायिकानां मते इयणुकालवयविन्यपि पाको भवति । तेषाम- यमाशयः । अवयविनां सच्छिद्रत्वाचह्नः सूक्ष्मावयवैरन्त प्रविष्टैरवयवेष्ववष्टब्धे- ष्वपि पाको न विरुध्यते । अनन्तावयवितन्नाशकल्पने गौरवात् । इत्थं च सोयं घट इत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञापि संगच्छते । यत्र तु न प्रत्यभिज्ञा तत्रावयविनाशोपि स्वीक्रि- यत इति । मुक्ता॥ With reference to the first four qualities the Naiyáyikas as well as the Vaisheshikas believe that in the case of पृथिवी of both kinds (i.e., नित्य as well as अनित्य) they are always अनित्य, and are capable of being produced by the application of heat (पाकः-तेजःसंयोगः); and that in the case of जल and the other two * Such gunas as are capable of standing by themselves in any particular thing, i.e., which are not produced like संयोग by the union of two things (द्विनिष्ठ). .

·NOTES. 37 travyas they are not produced by the application of heat, but are fy or ST172 according as they are found in the final atoms of these substances (FET), or in the combinations of these atoms (traca). The hcat (Eure) felt at times in water or in the air they explain. as owing entirely to the presence of particles of are in the water or the air. Thus ruír alone being admitted as subject to the change of form, taste, smell, and touch at a certain degree of temperature, opinions diffor as to the way in which heat acts on any given mass of पृथिवी. A jar of carth being placed in fire, the Vaisheshikas maintain that the heat first reduces it to its component atoms which begin to change their form, &c.; and then forms these prepared atoms into the baked jar we see-for the heat cannot act on the atoms held together in the form of a jar, which, if it at all is to change its form, &c., must allow the atoms to be affected first. The Naiyáyikas, on the contrary, maintain that, under similar circumstancos, the jar (form) is not at all destroyed, but heat acts on the whole up to its very atoms through the porosity of matter ; for if it were not so it will be difficult to account for the food that is daily being cooked in earthen pots, or for our recognition of the baked pot, in the form - this is the same jar once placed in fire.'' 27. ==qchiq=capable of being directly cognised. The four gunas ET, &c., may be either doveloped or undeveloped. In the eye which is a FTT TEA, as the thing which ought to be yeyF is not visible, it is assumed to be the or undeveloped. Developed aq, &c., are found in that combination of atoms which produce great, &c., capable of being directly cognised. 28. The word tanto excludes all HTETT or common causes of things in general. ईश्वर, ईश्वरेच्छा, ईश्वरज्ञान, ईश्वरकृति, प्रागभाव, दिक, काल, अदृष्ट, and starta are so many common causes in the formation of a thing. That therefore, which, over and above these, becomes the immediate special cause of the intercourse aboutnumbers is called FEAT. STTTT SZENT ET: FCEAC Traat 11 70€ il fête नित्यमेकत्वमनित्ये ऽनित्यमिष्यते। द्वित्वात्यः परार्धान्ता अपेक्षाबुद्धिजा मता: ॥ १०७ ।।.........अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाच नाशस्तेषां निरूपितः ॥ १०८ ॥ अनेकैकत्वबु- द्विर्या सापेक्षाबुद्धिरिष्यते ॥.........प्रथममपेक्षाबुद्धिस्ततोद्वित्वोत्पत्तिस्ततोविशेष- णज्ञानं द्वित्वत्वनिर्विकल्पात्मकं ततो द्वित्वविशिष्ट प्रत्यक्षमपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशश्च ततो द्वित्वनाश इति.........अयमेकोयमेक इत्याकारिका (अपेक्षाबुद्धिः) इत्यर्थः ।। मुक्ता० ॥ The number ” is facer or strice according as it is found in free things or the things; but all the remaining num- 2 ono ·38 NOTES. bers from two upwards are free, they being the products of sistrare or sense of comparison. The mind can cognise but one thing at a time. When we see a group of things our knowledge of the various members of that group begins in a sort of comparison or differentiation of the several objects, with or from one another: in the form, this is one, this is one, and so on; the result being expressed by saying these are so many, or so many. The numbers two, three, and so on are various symbols of expressing the result of this act of comparison, and are cut, being the products of this cause. These compound numbers are destroyed by the cessation of the action of the sense which produced them, viz., Spiretrais. The passage from the Mulctavali describes how these numbers are produced and destroyed. It may be noticed by the way that the Vaisheshikas look upon faca &c., as Feat and not TFCIT. 29. It will be seen further on that is or dimension is one of the causes of our direct perception of things. Hence aq and ATT must exist in things, which are directly perceptible. It may be noticed that according to the evolution of the Nyáya, paramánus and dvyanukas are not accessible to direct perception, which becomes possible only from tryanuka, and upwards. 30. We take TEYTATT as an instance of that TTTT which is produced by सङ्ख्या, which, therefore, becomes its cause (अस कारण). If instead of (the अणुनिष्ठ) सङ्ख्या we assume अणुपरिमाण (to be found in the परमाणु which forms the घणुक) as the असमवायिकारण, we shall be involved in the necessity of believing the TT to be smaller (अणुतरपरिमाणवत्) than the परमाणु in dimension; in accordance with the rule: one dimension always produces another finer in kind than itself. This, however, is absurd. E, therefore, must be accepted as the अस०कारण of घणुक, &c. 31. Hence a data is described in the Sarvadarshana Samgraha as. द्वित्वे (note No. 28) च पाकजोत्पत्तौ (26) विभागे च विभागजे। यस्य न स्खलिता बुद्धिस्तं वै वैशेषिकं विदुः ।। 32. That which has the जाति-बुद्धित्व is Buddhi. In the Tarleasangraha Buddhi is defined as सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानं बुद्धिः । जाना- मीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानत्वमेव बुद्धेर्लक्षणमित्यर्थः। on which Nilalenthu ज्ञानवमात्रं लक्षणम् । जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यत्वं तु ज्ञानत्वस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वसू- चनाय । घदं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायस्यानुगतधर्ममंतरानुपपन्नत्वेन तस्य स्वीकर्तव्य- तया लाघवाज्जातित्वसिद्धिः । इत्थं च मूले सर्वव्यवहारहेतुरिति । बुद्धलक्षणं ·NOTES, thing ; the अनुभव contributing to the इदंत्व expressed as अयं (देवदत्तः) in स्वरूपकथनमव ।। नील! As all intercourse depends on knowledge which is the function of art, a will be the correct and precise detinition of the term. How we arrive at this tic, Tace is described in the words FIFTÄTZTETETT, &c. In all our perceptions we have the general consciousness of knowledge in the form I know this, I know that, and so on. As without this common consciousness, all perception will be rendered impossible, we describe that impor tant factor by a general name yra. Thus the व्यवसाय or, as it were, primary consciousness is one inferrible (#) from the TETAP Os secondary consciousness FTFIFA, which is identical in all perception. 33. Knowledge can be of two kinds : immediate or mediate Immediate cognition is called TTHT, and mediate cognition is called Fra. All direct cognition leaves some impression (ATT) on the mind, capable of being recalled into life at any moment. Henco that knowledge which is produced by FAIT is Franco Here the previous ST247 acts through the art (vide note No. 35). The word ज्ञान in the definition prevents its अतिव्याप्ति to संस्कारध्वंस, fox" by the rule स्वध्वंसं प्रति स्वस्य कारणत्वम्, संस्कार is a cause of संस्कारध्वंस which is thus #Fre, but is excluded not being t. Nor should it be imagined that the definition still extends (STÍTETT) to qaratt, a kind of direct cognition helped by memory in the form this is the same man I saw the other day: (First TTT:). It can easily be seen that this knowledge is produced by 37T5, plus somethe act of cognition, and the additional factor in question contributing to the ar expressed as #: in the same. If here the additional factor contributing to the तत्ता were संस्कार, the cognition called प्रत्यभिज्ञा will become #Fahrez, and will be included in the definition of Faia. It is with this view of FITTT that certain writers insert the word #r after fire in the definition of errat. But as, here, the remembrance (Fajã ) of the art produced by the previous संस्कार is the factor in question, प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not संस्कारजन्य, and cannot, therefore, be included in the definition (STGJITĀTETT). 54. All knowledge that is not fara is syaT7, which is of two kinds : प्रमा or यथार्थानुभव and अप्रमा or अयथार्थानुभव. अप्रमा or false cognition is produced by that which has only the semblance of an instrument of right knowledge. This, again, is of two kinds : 77 and ref. The actual cognition of a thing as entirely different from ·NOTESO .. : its real nature is 4+ (or again as it is often called); and the rocog. nition of various attributes opposed to one another in one and the same thing is संशयः एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि एकस्मिन्नेव पुरोवर्तिनि पार्थे विरुद्धा व्यधिकरणा ये धर्माः स्थानत्वपुरुषत्वादयस्तेषां च वैशिष्टयं संबंधस्तत्वगाहि (को- टिक) तद्विषयकं ज्ञानं संशयः. The word एकस्मिन् in the definition excludes such collective knowledge (समूहावलंबनज्ञान) as इमौ घटपटौ FT:s predicated of a collection of g and qe, which certainly is no संशय but प्रमा. The word विरुद्ध prevents the definition from including all cases of such ordinary definitions as घटी द्रव्यम् (घटत्वद्रव्यत्व- विशिष्टोऽयं पदार्थः). The word नाना keeps of such प्रमा, as पटत्वविरुद्ध- घदत्ववान् घटः. The illustration of संशय, स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा is Tariously interpreted : अयं पदार्थः स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वविशिष्टः । अयं पदार्थः स्थाणुर्वा न वा । अयं पदार्थः पुरुषो वा न वा।।. Some add a third kind of अयथार्थानुभव called तर्क and define it as व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः ॥ तर्क० सं०॥ व्याप्यपदं व्याप्यत्वेनहायमान- परम् । तेनाव्याप्यारोपेण तक नाच्यातिः। आरोपप ज्ञानमात्रपरं । तेनायोमोलके धूमाभावेन ववभावत: नाव्यातिः व्यापकारोपेत्यत्रारोपपर बाधविषयकायथार्थ- निश्चयपरं । तेन इहो वातिनानित्यनुलितो नातिव्याक्षिः! ......इत्थं च व्याप्यत्वेन ज्ञानजन्यत्वे सति बाधविषयकायथार्थनिश्चयजन्यल्वं पर्यवतितम् ॥ वाक्य० ।।. The falsifying of the GUTT by assuming the 22 is a ca, in the form यदि वह्निन स्यात् तहि धूनोऽपि न स्यात्, वनयभाव being the व्याप्य and धूमाभाव being the व्यापक. The object of तर्क is to show that if one should deny the existence of fire and admit the existence of smoke, he is at once involved in the necessity of denying the existence of smoke as well, which being contrary to the hypothesis, is absurd. Thus we can easily see that a fan always ends in an absurd conclusion, and so far resembles the reductio ad ahsurdum of European Logic. A Tarka is used in establishing a suria, as in the in ference पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात् , the व्याप्ति between धूम and वडि. Because smoke is seen, fire is inferred, but if some one should so far forget the laws of causation as to admit smoke and deny fire, the pre-if no fire, no smoke--will at once render him conscious of the absurdity of his conclusion. Thus, though ach is useful in establishing a TAT, it itself is an अप्रमा, in which it always must result. Compare व्यभिचार- स्यांग्रहोथ सहचारग्रहस्तथा । हेतुाप्तिहे तर्कः क्वचिच्छानिवर्तकः ।। २३७ ॥ व्यभिचारामहः सहचारग्रहश्च व्याप्तिमहे कारणम् । यत्र भूयोदर्शनादापि शङ्का नापति तत्र विपक्षे बाधतर्कोऽपेक्षितः । तथाहि । वहिविरहिण्यपि धूमः स्या- दिति यद्याशङ्का भवति तदा सा वहिधूमयोः कार्यकारणभावस्थ प्रतिसंधाना- निवर्तते ।। मुक्ता , ·CameERTRAISENTER NOTES. 41. All that knowledge which is apart from अप्रमा is यथार्थानुभव or प्रमा (भ्रमभिन्नं तु ज्ञानमत्रीच्यते प्रमा ।। मुक्ता०॥). That is, यथार्थ, which is capable of producing such action as leads to some real result, and an अनुभव which is of this kind is प्रमा; as the cognition of gold in a piece of gold. प्रमा and अप्रमा are defined by some as तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवः and तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवः ॥ तर्क० सं०॥ तत्प्रकारकं यज्ज्ञानं तद्विशेष्यक तत् प्रमा। तच्छून्ये तन्मतिर्या स्यादप्रमा सा निरूपिता ।। मुक्ता० ।। In all direct cognition the thing seen and the form in which it is seen are supposed to be related to each other as the qualified (विशेष्य) and the qualifier (विशेषण or प्रकार) e.J., the cognition इदं रजतम् is equal to रजतत्ववत (विशेषण) इदम् (विशेष्य), equal again to इदं पार्थविशेष्यकं रजतत्वप्रका- रकं ज्ञानम्. Hence यथार्थानुभव means तद्वत् (किंचिद्धर्मवत्) विशेष्यकं तत् (किंचिद्धर्म) प्रकारकं ज्ञानम् (सप्तम्यर्थो विशेष्यत्वम् ।। नील० ॥), i.e., continuing the prerious illustration, रजतत्ववति (रजते) रजतत्वप्रकारक ज्ञानम्. Similarly in अयथार्थानुभव, it will be observed, that the विशेष्य is the अभाव of the धर्म which is the प्रकार of that knowledge, e.g., रजतत्वाभाववति (शुक्तौ) रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्. It must further he noticed that the relation of the विशेष्यकत्व and प्रकारकत्व with the thing must be the same as that between the ti and the thing, viz., सनवाय. इदं तु बोव्यं । येन संबन्धेन यत्ता तेन संबन्धेन तद्विशेष्यकलं तेन संबन्धेन तत्मकारकत्वं वाच्य। तेन कपालादौ संयोगादिना घटादिज्ञाने नातिव्याप्तिः ।। मुक्ता॥ The instrument (करण see note No.35) of प्रमा,i.e., that which leads to यथार्थानुभव, is called प्रमाण, and is common to स्मृति as well as अनुभव. प्रमाण is defined in the Sarvadarshana Sangraha as साधनाश्रयाव्यति- रिक्तत्वे सति प्रमाव्यात प्रमाणम् !l, which Mr. E, B. Cowell renders as "proof is that which is always accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from the proper instruments (as the eye, &c.), and from the site of knowledge." 35. That cause which contributes to an effect through some व्यापार is ealled करण. व्यापार means that which directly produces the effect to be produced by the cause, from which it itself has ori. ginally been produced. तत् (कारण)जन्यत्वे सति तत् (कारण)जन्य(कार्य) जनको व्यापारः ५., संस्कार which directly contributes to स्मृति (the effect of अनुभव), and which is produced firom अनुभव is the व्यापार through which the original cause (अनुभव the करण) acts in producing स्मृति. Though itu is but a case of causation, it is distinguished from the general description of "cause," "as it possesses a peculiar feature, 6 " ·NOTES . and presents a greater degree of complexity than the common case. It often happens that the effect or one of the effects of a cause is not to produce of itself a certain phenomena, but to fit something else for producing it. In other words, there is a case of causatica in which the effect is to invest an object with a certain property." Mill's Logic, p. 388, Vol. I. From this view of a ToT we naturally come to consider the nature of causation, and first begin with the query what is a cause? 37772 थासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम्-अनन्यथासिद्धम् and कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् । नियतत्वं हि व्यापकत्वम् । यत्र कार्य तत्र कारणमिति रूपम् ॥ नील॥ The words पूर्ववृत्ति exclude कार्य from the definition, for a कार्य is व्यापक of itself, but not पूर्ववृत्ति A causé is - necessarily preceding its effect, for "causation is the law of the succession of pheno. mena.” Mill's Logic, p. 396, Vol. I. If, again, the words 375FYUTTE- CF were omitted, several accidental circumstances will be included in the idea of a cause, as will appear further on. All such accidental things must be excluded, for, in order to arrive at a correct induction -- which process is essentially an enquiry into cases of causation" it is necessary that all circumstances which do not immediately and invariably contribute to the result, must be carefully excluded from the idea of a cause. Thus the word F2C constantly concomitantwill be seen to exclude all remote circumstances, for constant concomitance of effect and cause means that the one is where the other is, and the one is not where the other is not(97-99afia STTE FET). When divested of all accidental and remote circumstances & cause may be defined as “the antecedent or concurrence of antecedents on which it (the effect) is invariably and unconditionally consequent” -Mill's Logic, p. 392, Vol. I. Thus, then, that is the cause of a given effect which precedes the effect, and is in constant concomitance with it, and is not 9FTEITHG (disproved to be a cause by some other circumstance). A thing can be shown to be no cause by one of three ways: (0) येन (दण्डेन 01 तन्तुना) सहैव यस्य (दण्डरूपस्य, दण्डत्वस्य, &c., or तन्तुरूपस्य तन्तुत्वस्थ, तन्तुसंयोगस्य, &c.), यं (घटम् or पटम्) प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तेन (दण्डेन or तन्तुना) तस्थ (दण्डरूपादेः or तन्तुरूपादेः) तं (घटम् 01 पटम्) प्रत्य- FITOTELE:. All those which are known simultaneously with any particular immediate antecedent of an effect (argach EFTECTIE arger lifirato ll) are prevented from becoming the cause of that effect, by the antecedent on whose knowledge, the grasp of these .

·NOTES. 43 things depends, e.l., araca, &c., which are known with are the antecedent of a qz, are prevented from becoming the cause of that पट. by तन्तु. (2) अन्य (शब्दं) प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य (आकाशस्य) यं (घटम्) TT game Truà Tĩ (427) TH (TIẾh STEPI) surf fig. That which is known to be antecedent to the given effect, on being known is the antecedent of something else is STFATTITE with respect to that effect. As farm in the case of a Tr. If 5Terat were the canse of se, we must understand its character as such, viz , the कारणतावof stret. This, in the present instance, will be BTTTET, which, however, cannot become a ría (see note No. 6), and cannot, therefore, be clearly grasped. We must, therefore, understand si- 3767 as TomTFITTE (1155 being the yuna of stret). Thus, as in trying to understand the nature of Tratai, the supposed cause of ze, we find it to be the antecedent of you alone, we at once esclude it as sang, from the category of causes contributing to the घe. So also the कुलालपिता, &c. (8) अन्यत्र (घटान्तरे) क्लप्तनियतपूर्ववृत्तिनः(दण्ड चक्रादेः) एव कार्य (प्रकृतघट) सम्भवे तत् (दण्डचक्रादि) सहभूतत्वं (वैवागतरासमस्य) अन्यथासिद्धिः. The effect in hand being producible by causes known to be sufficient and necessarily concomitant and antecedent in similar other effects, anything that chances (with respect to the effect in hand ) to exist with these causes, is STEGTUITF. With respect to a particular ere, we know that as in the case of other ghatas so in the case of this, 525, &c., must be the sufficient and necessary causes. Now an ass chancing to be among these causes (being used for the purposes of fetching the clay and the like) is 3TEFTATIEG with respect to the qz in question, it being no more necessary to bring the clay on the back of an ass than in the hands of a man. It may here be questionect that though thus a particular ass may be prevented from becoming the cause of a particular 577, is it not necessary that the ass-kind (i.e., some instrument of carrying the clay) should be a cause of the ghata-kind in general? The word area in the definition at once suggests a negative answer, inasmuch as 742 is not an invariable antecedent of 2257; or, in other words, it is not present at the place where the fire is forming (Free), at the moment immediately antecedent (Hogar na TEC). If, however, instead of this, the words 377477 in the definition were made to refer to a thing belonging to a class other than the one implied by ·NOTES. the word ori in the same, then TFT can be shown to be अन्यथासिद्ध, but it will be impossible to understand how we can institute any comparison between the causes of effects, each belonging to a different class? Hence, says the text, नहि घटसामान्यादन्यत्र पटादौ, &c. On careful examination it will appear that this kind of अन्यथा- hig includes the first two: gay अन्यथासिद्धिषु मध्ये (अय)मन्यथासिद्ध आवश्यकः। तेनैव परेषां चरितार्थत्वात् । तथाहि । दण्डातिभिरव. श्यकृप्तनियतपूर्ववृत्तिभिरेव कार्यसंभवे दण्डत्वादिकमन्यथासिद्धम् । एवमन्येषामप्यनेनैव चरितार्थत्वं संभवति || मुक्ता०l also लघुनियतपूर्ववर्तिन एव कार्यसंभवे तद्भिनमन्यथासिद्धम् । इत्येकविधमेवाल्यथासिद्धत्वम् । लघुत्वं च शरीर कृतमुपस्थितिकृतं संबन्धकृतं च । तत्र प्रथमननेकद्रव्यत्वापेक्षया महत्त्वे । द्वितीयं गन्धं प्रति रूपमागभावापेक्षया गन्धप्रागभावे गन्धस्य प्रतियोगिन उपस्थितत्वेन शीघ्रं तदुपस्थितः। तृतीयं दण्डत्वं दण्डरूपाद्यपक्षया दण्डा स्वाश्रयदण्डसंयोगादि- रूपपरंपरथा गुरुत्वात्। एवं चैतावतैव निर्वाहेऽन्यथासिद्धिस्त्रिधा पञ्चधा चति प्रप- ञ्चो व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्याय ॥ नील०॥ With the third kind of 37TTIETIS in mind I am unable to perceive the usefulness of the word en in the original definition of कारण, and would recommend this point to the consideration of the reader. It should finally be remembered that with so many kinds of अन्यथासिद्धि in hand, we shall find that every कारण which acts through व्यापार will become अन्यथासिद्ध. The philosophers of this school, however, obviate this difficulty by ruling : व्यापारण व्यापारिणो नान्यथासिद्धिः॥ 36. यत्समवेतं कार्य &c.यस्मिन् समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत्, &c. For the kinds of समवाय, and its meaning (see note No.68). The words प्रत्या- सन्न in the definition of an असमवायिकारण mean समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमान- त्वम् (न्या०को०), the being in Sunardya relation. That, therefore, is an असमवाथिकारण, which is related by Samardya with its समवायिकारण e.g., तन्तुसंयोग, which is a cause of पट, and which is related to the असमवायिकारण of पट, viz.., तन्तु by समवाय, is the असमवायिकारण of पट. So also तन्तुरूप is the अ० स० cause of पटरूप, being related by समवाय with the समवाधिकारण (of पटरूप, viz., पद), through its (पटस्य) आश्रय (the तन्तु) with which again it . stands in समवायसंबन्ध. Here we observe that the existence of the अस कारण in a common object along with its effect, is either direct, or through the cause of that effect. In the first instance, तन्तुसंयोग and Ta, are both found to be related to तन्तु by the same relation, viz., समवाय; but in the second, तन्तुरूप, is found to be related to तन्तु, not with its effect पढरूप, but ..

·SHARMATHAKAAMSARAN NOTES. with the cause of that effect, viz., पट. Thus we find असवायिकारण sometimes defined as कार्येण कारणेन वा सहकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणम् तर्क० सं०॥ 37. The word तत् in तच प्रमाकरणम् refers to the word प्रमाण in the definition प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्. The Vaisheshilsas accept only two प्रमाणs or instruments of right knowledge : प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान ; the other two Tag and TATT deriving their validity, but from the second of the first two. The Naiyáyikas, on the other hand, hold all four to be good instruments of knowledge; and the Mimansakas and the Vedantins add two more in the form of अर्धापत्ति and अनुपलब्धि. 38. The order of perception, established is this : STTT ATT युज्यते-मन इन्द्रियेण-इन्द्रियमर्थेन-ततः प्रत्यक्षम्. External objects come in contact with the various organs of sense, which come in contact with the mind, which in its turn is joined with the soul; thus results प्रत्यक्षज्ञान. Hence प्रत्यक्ष is defined as that which is produced by objects (अर्थ) coming in contact with (संनिकर्ष) the senses (इल्द्रिय), This प्रत्यक्ष is the instrument (करण) of प्रत्यक्षप्रमा-प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, इन्द्रियार्थसं- निकर्ष) being the व्यापार. In order to prevent the अव्याप्ति of this definition to the direct perception of God, in Whose case nosiocare- सनिकर्ष is supposed to be necessary, some argue that this definition does not imply ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष, but is meant to describe जन्य or अनित्य or mortal perception only. इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम् । अर्थो घटादिः । तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगः । तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । संनिकर्षध्वंसवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । अनुमितिवारणायेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोति । ......... न चेश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिरिति वा- च्यम् । अत्र जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्षितत्वात् । यथाह भगवान्सूत्रकारः । इन्द्रियार्थ- संनिकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारिव्यवसायात्मकप्रत्यक्षसाधारणमिति । सि० चं०॥ also न चेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाभावादीश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिरत आह ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष तु न लक्ष्यमिति । तथा च जन्यप्रत्यक्षमेव लक्ष्यमिति भावः। ........ अव्यभिचा- रिभ्रमाभिन्नमित्यर्थः। . ....... अव्यपदेश्यमिति । निर्विकल्पकमित्यर्थः। .. व्यपदेशपदवाच्यत्वं तदविषयकमित्यर्थाद्विशिष्टज्ञाने तत्तत्पश्वाच्यत्वमुपनीतं भा- सत इति प्राचीनमतानुसारित्वात् । ......... व्यवसायात्मकमिति विशिष्टज्ञानात्म- कमित्यर्थः । विशिष्टज्ञानात्मकमिति यावत् । ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्यापि लक्ष्य- त्वमभिप्रेत्याह । ज्ञानाकरणकमिति (in the Mulstavali) ज्ञानाजन्यमित्युक्ती चाव्याप्तिर्विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रस्य विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वादतो ज्ञानाकरणकामति । अ- नुमित्यादौ व्याप्त्यादिज्ञानस्य करणत्वमस्त्येवेति न तातिव्याप्तिः। अकरणकत्वा- देव चेश्वरज्ञानसंग्रहः ॥ दिव०॥ Though by the words इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष the writer implies an exclusion of अनुमिति, &c., the author of the Pedánta Paribhúshá, bearing in mind the circumstance that the Nai. Rjayilea calls मनस् an इन्द्रिय, and that प्रत्यक्ष to him is possible by such ·46 NOTES. Frans as TETETT and others, calls in question, and perhaps justly, the division of knowledge into प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, &c. 39. Pratyaksha is of two kinds: arra and area. That which arises from the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is called सविकल्पक,and that which respects no such relation is called निर्विकल्पक, e.g., इदं पदार्थविशेष्यकं घटत्वप्रकारकं घट इति ज्ञानं सविकल्पकम् । घट घटत्व इत्याकारकमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकम् | All सविकल्पकज्ञान has todo with the thing and the form in which it is seen, whereas para a TETT not being of this kind is necessarily sati, beyond the grasp of the senses, and hence indescribable. It is a kind of knowledge wherein there is an unbroken consciousness of the thing itself, e.g., por 206, &c. It is thus of the form g or the form Ecg or the like, but not of the form इंदं पदार्थविशेष्यकं घटत्वप्रकारकम, &c. It cannot be maintained that such Frasah5T does not exist, for if it were so, one rising from sleep (which is supposed to obliterate all previous knowledge) will not recognise a ge without having previously (in his mind, in the form of संस्कार), the निर्विकल्पकज्ञान-घटत्व, the form which the substance presented possesses, and is, therefore, at once recognised as a 7-all For TEF17--formal knowledge-being in this theory dependent on the FETT-the knowledge of the form. For further discussion about the connotation and denotation of words in this connection see note No. 55. Compare with this view of fate कल्पकज्ञान the Vedantic view निर्विकल्पस्तु ज्ञातृज्ञानादिभेदलयापेक्षया आहि- तीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेरतितरामेकीभावेनावस्थानम् ॥वेदा० सा॥ 40. In every act of direct perception the star is, as we have seen, the gratis. But as everything, which is the object of direct perception, is not always in immediate contact with the sense of perception, the start in acts of (i.e., produced by external senses) TT&T is assumed to be of six kinds. Perception (1) by actual contact, as the sight of a jar, &c.; (2) by being in 1997 with that which is in direct contact (Fyn), as the grasp karina, or játi of a substance; (3) by being in HAETU with that which is already in FETE with the thing in direct contact, as of the jilti गुणत्व' and कर्मत्व (4) by simple समवाय, as of शब्द (5) by being in समवाय with that which is grasped by समवाय, as शब्दत्व ; and lastly by (6) adjectival relation, as of Hair and staa. Inasmuch as Er and start are not capable of being directly observed, we perceive them only in the form of an adjective qualifying the thing of which one or both of them are predicated; thus 5 Tamara sita is equal to of the gund, ·Teantha NOTES. 47 शब्दसमवायविशिष्टमिदम् । इह घटो नास्ति is equal to घटाभावविशिष्टमिदन्. It is further easy to observe that the adjective may at times qualify the instrument of knowledge (इन्द्रिय), as in the case of the cognition of शब्दसमवाय or शब्दाभाव (for' शब्द is cognizable by the ear alone, and it stands to the ear in FETT relation); or the object in direct contact with the instrument of knowledge (इन्द्रियसंबद्ध), as in the case of घटसमवाय or घटाभाव. अभावप्रत्यक्ष समवायप्रत्यक्षे चेन्द्रि- असंबद्धविशेषणता हेतुः । वैशेषिकमते तु समवायो न प्रत्यक्षः । अत्र यद्यपि वि. शेषणता नानाविधा तथापि भूतलादौ घटाघभावः संयुक्तविशेषणतया गृह्यते । सं- ङ्ख्यादौ रूपाद्यभावः संयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणतया! शब्दाभावः केवलोत्रावच्छिन्न- विशेषणतया। कादौ खत्वाद्यभावः श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नसमवेतविशेषणतया। ..... बटादौ पटाभावश्चक्षुःसंयुक्तविशेषणतया.........तथापि विशेषणता त्वेकैव सा मुक्ता०॥ 41. In the प्रत्यक्ष called अलौकिक (not cognised by the external senses) or mental, the act which is the instrument is of three kinds : (1) सामान्य लक्षण, (2) ज्ञानलक्षण, (8) योगजधर्म. सामान्य लक्षणं यस्येत्यर्थः । तत्र लक्षणपदेन यदि स्वरूपमुच्यते तस सामान्यस्वरूपा प्रत्या- सत्तिरित्यर्थी लभ्यते । तच्चेन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेष्यकज्ञानभकारीभूता बोध्या। तथाहि । अन्द्रियसंयुक्तो धूमादिस्ताहिशेष्यकं धूम इति ज्ञानं यत्र जातं तत्र ज्ञाने धूमत्वं सकारस्तत्रं धूमत्वेन संनिकर्षेण धूमा इत्येवं रूपं सकलधूमविषयकं ज्ञानं जायते। ......आसत्तिराश्रयाणां तु सामान्यज्ञानमिष्यते।...तथा च सामान्यलक्षण इत्यत्र लक्षणशब्दस्य विषयोऽर्थस्तेन सामान्यविषयकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थों लग्यते।। To ll. The (mental) perception of all that is the substratam of a particular सामान्य, follows immediately upon the comprehension of that parat. In having therefore a knowledge of the whole class to which an object directly cognised belong's, the व्यापार is सामान्य- लक्षण, viz., that whose लक्षण is a सामान्य. We see धूल at a particular place, and though the विशेष्य here is the धून, the प्रकार is धूमत्व, the required सामान्य, through the comprehension whereof everything which is the आश्रय of धूमत्व, viz., धूम in general, is at once cognised. 2he व्यापार in this प्रत्यक्ष, therefore, is the सामान्यलक्षण-धूमत्व. About the physical instruments which are rendered capable of cognising objects in any one of these three ways, opinions are divided. The old school (संप्रदायविदः) holds that the perception produced by these is capable of being produced by any one of the six senses; whereas later writers hold, and porhaps correctly, that it is the mind alone {hat becomes the instrument. (2) By the ज्ञानलक्षणसंनिकर्ष is protinced through the mind a knowledge of all objects which are the sabject thereof; e.g., the imaginary forms of a poet's fancy. So also, , ·NOTES. in the perception, this ointment is fragrant, the knowledge of the abstract-Fit-is produced by this mor; for as aty is not perceptible by the eye (चक्षुरयोग्य, it being no substance or जाति or अभाव &c.) it cannot be cognizable by the संयुक्तसमवाय Or संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय संनिकर्ष. The difference between ज्ञानलक्षण and सामान्यलक्षण संनिकर्ष lies in the fact that the one leads to a perception of the thing itself and the other to a perception of the substratum of that thing. r=37- लक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिर्हि तदाश्रयस्य ज्ञानं जनयति। ज्ञानलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिस्तु यद्विषयकं ज्ञानं तस्यैव प्रत्यासत्तिः ॥ मुक्ता०॥ (3) By the योगजधर्मसंनिकर्ष (योगजी योगाभ्यासजनिती धर्मविशेषः श्रुतिपुराणादिप्रतिपाय इत्यर्थः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥) is produced in the Pogin, the direct perception of all knowable things. 42. Having described the two kinds of our or Floof as the means through which the senses perceive objects, the author takes up the original TEZTETETEHT (WT CTET, &c.); and divides it into six classes according as the thing perceived belongs to the class of things cognizable by any one of the senses. 43. If Eros and the other senses were really the STETETTUTTO of the various perceptions of गन्ध, &c., the गन्ध of a परमाणु as well as of a jewel must be cognizable by all. This, however, is not possible, for the rule of perception is that stret, &c., become amenable to the senses only when they are found in the same place as dimension (#592HFTIETOTT:), and are developed (599). The smell in the atom is not co-existent with dimension, for atomic combinations begin to assume any visible dimensiou only from the व्यणुक and upwards; that in the jewel is not developed. So also in the case of 757, though 3 ATT, the generating cause, is everywhere, the sound is not heard by us from wheresoever it may be produced. Sound produced by the beating of a drum at some distance is heard only when it is transmitted to the portion of आकाश intercepted in the ear, by what is called the वीचितरङ्गन्याय (=the argument or analogy of a wave propelling a wave. As one wave in the ocean drives forth another, till the first and all in succession reach the shore, so one sound propels another in the great ocean of HTT, till the first and all successive sounds reach the ear and become cognizable), or the cariche (=the argument or analogy of Kadamba buds. No sooner does rain water touch the closed buds of a Radamba tree, they open on all sides at once. Some say the buds of the Kadamba, whenever they open, put forth their petals on all four sides at once. In both the ideas ·NOTES. 49 . the point is the simultaneity of the process. Just as these buds open at once or put forth petals on all sides immediately, so on the production of sound its forms, so to speak, branch off on all sides to the ear which can cognise them). Leaving the gunas and the rule of their perception, the author comes to the dravyas, and the rule of their perception. He concludes that of the six senses, प्राण, रसना and श्रोत्र are not capable of apprehending any dravya ; whereas TT, 27 and 777 are. That drarya which has dimension, as well as developed form, is capable of being cognised by the eye. So also, mutatis mutandis, of the skin. Hence the जाति-द्रव्यत्व, &c., कर्म and the other gunas enumerated become cognizable by the eye or the skin, according as they stand by Hart in some proper 562, i.e., et amenable to the senses, as also the TET and STTT of each. TETEHT together with its gunas, &c., is cognised by the mind. The rule, therefore, is : that organ of sense which cognises anything, cognises its सामान्य, समवाय and अभाव as well. 44. Anumána is the karana of Safara or inference, and it takes the form of the generalisation TT . 523 is a term which covers a smaller area than its correlative care as in the present instance Ta, whose 52777 is afg. The expression af, therefore, means that is constantly and invariably accompanied by fire, i.e., they are related as cause and effect; or there exists a TIF between the two. 52rczy generally corresponds to the middle term of a syllogism and 5279 to the major, these being respectively called हेतु or साधन and साध्य. Now, when अनुमान is said to be the lsar ani, the लिङ्ग-परामर्श or तृतीयलिङ्ग-परामर्श, as it is here described, becomes the व्यापार. परामर्श is often described as व्याप्तिविशिष्ट पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परा- मर्शः, and it takes the form वहिव्याप्यधूमवानयम्. पक्ष is the thing about which something is to be proved; and corresponds to the minor term of a syllogism. पक्षधर्म is the quality of the पक्ष, as धूम of the mountain on which it is seen. The Tahar, therefore, is in the धूम. धूमवानयम् is the पक्षधर्मताज्ञान, but it hardly assists us to the last inference, till we know that this in which the mountain possesses, is constantly accompanied by fire. Thus the TFT of the That must be qualified, must be invariably accompanied by a knowledge of the relation between धूम and वह्नि, or by the knowledge of the व्याप्ति of the two. It will, however, not do to know that धूम which has a STTTH with arg is on the TT, for, to produce the required inference, the remembrancem has do with the must be almost simultaneous my th ·50 NOTES. with the apprehension of the existence of a on the mountain. Hence व्याप्तिविशिष्टं (and not व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य 0 विशिष्टे) पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं Trafa or sign means the same thing as a, and this kind of परामर्श is often called लिङ्ग परामर्श or तृतीयलिङ्ग-परामर्श. It is further explained how this 974f is the third. The first step in the process of constructing the syllogism is the ascertainment of the major premis, in the form A is B: wlierever there is smoke, there is fire. This is ascertained by observing the frequent concomitance of and are as in a cooking-room &c. When smoke is seen at some place, as on a hill, this generalisation at once comes up to the mind, in connection with that smoke. This is the second step. The third consists in asserting, this hill has smoke which has surfa with fire. It should be remembered that the apprehension of smoke and the remembrance of the care are both acts, as it were, of one consciousness, as explained above. The syllogism being thus complete, the inference folloirs. Thus Anumiti is the knowledge of the fast through the लि., which means that which has a व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता. 'Taking the लि. to be धूम, in order to be able to infer वह्नि (लिङ्गी) we must know that there is a constant concomitance between and वह्नि (व्याति), and that the धूम is on the mountain (पक्षधर्मता). Thus अनुमिति is लिङ्ग-ज्ञानजन्यं लिङ्गिज्ञानम्, The important step in every syllogism is the establishment of the major premis or sale by a series of observations (FETET); the form in which we may afterwards cast our reasoning to ascertain whether any particular instance is included in the generalisation, being but a secondary process. It is very appropriately remarked : " when therefore we conclude from the death of John and Thomas and every other person we ever heard of, in whose case the experiment had been fairly tried, that the Duke of Wellington is mortal like the rest, we may indeed pass through the generalisation all men are mortal as an intermediate step, but it is not in the latter half of the process, the descent from all meu to the Duke of Wellington, that the inference resides. The inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal. What remains to be performed afterwards is merely deciphering our own notes” -Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 214. Also "the reasoning lies in the act of generalisation, not in interpreting the record of that act, but the syllogistic form is an indispensable collateral security for the correctness of the generalisation itself"--p. 225. Hence it is plain that the knowledge of the fog in ·NOTES. 51 the form of the FTAT described before is the real inference. The Naiyayika syllogism is generally stated in a form divested of the petitio principii which the western form of syllogism is supposed to involve. When it is stated यत्र यत्र धूमनत्र तत्रानिर्यथा महानसः we plainly have the major premis divested of the fallacy. "In the argument which proves that Socrates is mortal one indispensable part of the premis will be as follows, ' my father, and my father's father, A, B, C, and an indefinite number of other persons were mortal,' which is only an expression in different words of the observed fact that they have died. This is the major premis divested of the petitio principii, and, cut down to as much as is really known by direct evidence-Vol. I., p. 232. And, lastly, it may be remarked that the form of syllogism under consideration is neither entirely deductive nor inductive, but combines both the processes together, for it is inductive inasmuch as it gives the very steps by which the major premis has been arrived at, and deductive inasmuch as it applies this generalisation to a case in hand. 45. The question of arriving at a generalisation evidently involves the whole theory of causation. It will be interesting, therefore, to observe what rules the ancients have laid down for carrying on the process of induction, and with what success. A SIIT# is defined as अव्यभिचरितसामानाधिकरण्यम्-the सामानाधिकरण्य (constant concontitance-of the fa and :2), without variation ( after) in any single instance. The same is defined by Gangesho-padhyaya, after rejecting the five पूर्वपक्षलक्षण (1) साध्याभावववृत्तित्वम् . (2) साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभावव- स्वृत्तित्वम्. (3) साध्यवस्मतियोगिकाल्योन्याभावासामानाधिकरण्यम्. (4) सक- लसाध्याभाववन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वम्. (5) साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वम्, as हेतुसमा- नाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यम् ।। साध्याभावववृत्तित्वा- दिरूपं न संभवति । इदं वाच्यं ज्ञेयत्वादिल्यादावव्याप्तेः। साध्याभाववत्प्रसिद्धरित्या- लोच्याह । हेतुसमानाधिकरणेति । वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ धूमसमानाधिकरणे यो- ऽत्यन्ताभावो घटात्यन्ताभावस्तदप्रतियोगी वह्निस्तत्सामानाधिकरण्यं धूमेऽस्तीति- कृत्वा लक्षणसमन्वयः ।। नील०॥ This sort of constant invariable concomitance is found in all good as, as in smoke proving the existence of fire. This concomitance is proved by stract and curator in the form A is, where B is; A is not where B is not, or B is not where A is not; answering to Mill's Inductive Methods of Agreement and Difference. The concomitance (FET) 7 Narra: must, however, be established not only by instances corroborating the assertion, but also by showing that is not at any place where fire is not ·52 NOTES. (व्यभिचाराभाव). All good हेतुs, as has been said beforey are of this kind; but a bad one is not such, e.g., if smoke be inferred from the the हेतु-वह्नि vill be a bad one ; for the concomitance of fire and smoke can be shown to be broken (व्यभिचार) in the case of a heated ball of iron. Hence in arriving at a व्याप्ति, we require the सहचारज्ञान with (सहकृत) the व्यभिचाराभावज्ञान. व्यभिचार or variation means the existence of the Eg at a place where the ETEJ is not. As on this being known it becomes impossible to assert a general rule of causation, it follows that the absence of this car is a cause in the assertion of a व्याप्ति. But over and above this there must be am ascertained concomitance of the #Tag and has shown before. Thus this concomitance, assisted by, or accompanied with, a knowledge of the absence of any variation, is the instrument of establishing a general rule of causation (oria). 46. If we are sure that there is fire on the mountain we do not undertake the trouble of proving it to ourselves; but we may still do so, if, in order to convince some one, we desire to demonstrate the existence of fire. Hence in the case of proving something of another thing, two things become necessary; the doubt as to the relation between the two ; and the desire to ascertain the relation (whether previously ascertained or not). Now he is the thing of wh thing is to be predicated, i.e., whose relation with the grey is to be prosed. This can happen only if the साध्य is not known to be with the पक्ष; so also can it take place whenever we want to demonstrate the relation. In order that TOTGT may be found in a thing there should be an absence of साध्यनिश्चय, which (निश्चयाभाव) again must be accompanied by the absence of the desire to demonstrate. If there is FEST no inference can proceed, and even if there is so the inference can proceed if there is अनुमित्सा; so the साध्यनिश्चय must be accompanied by the absence of stai cer to prevent the inference from taking place. When, therefore, the inference does take place, there is an absence of साव्य- निश्चय accompanied with अनुमित्साविरह .., पक्षता is अनुमित्साविरहविशि- ष्टसाध्यनिश्चयाभावः or in the words of the Dipilati सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृत- सिद्ध्यभाव: । साध्यसिद्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका।सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिनोमीतीच्छाया- मनुमितिदर्शनासिषाधयिषोतेजिका । ततश्चोत्तेजिकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाहकारणत्ववत् । सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्धयभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारणत्वम्. compare also: सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धचभावः पक्षता तहान् पक्षः । सिषा- धयिषामात्रं न पक्षता विनापि सिषाधयिषां वनगर्जितेन मेघानुमानात् । अत एव साध्यसंदेहोऽपि न पक्षता। विनापि संदेहं तदनुमानात् । सिद्धौ सत्यामपि सिषाधsome- ·NOTES. 53 यिषासत्त्वेऽनुमितिर्भवत्येवेत्यतः सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वं सिद्धौ विशेषणम् । तथा च यत्र सिद्धिर्नास्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता यत्र सिद्धिरस्ति सिषाधयिषा च नास्ति तत्र न पक्षता सिषाधयिषाविरहाविशिष्टसिद्धेः सत्त्वात् । मुक्ता०॥ 47. The hetu or middle term employed in proving an inference is one of three kinds: केवलान्वयी, केवलव्यतिरेकी or अन्वयव्यतिरेकी. That hetu which has an Anvaya-vyapti only, is amazit. Sy get is an assertion of the concomitance of the ma and the rest, and 61- तिरेक means an assertion of the same between the FTZT and हेत्वभाव. अन्वय corresponds to the A proposition of western Logic in the form All A is B, which in conversion takes the form All not-B is not-A, corresponding to the soraca enunciated here. In a cant- Faer hetu, it is possible to express the premis with the result of previous induction only in the form All A is B, and not in the form All not-B is not-A, for, in the example, examined in the text, not-B is not capable of comprehension, and, therefore, cannot become the subject of predication. It will further be clear that from this view of these three kinds of asserting the surf, we can arrive at something like the modes or moods and figures of western logic. These three, in fact, ways of ascertaining the relation of cause and effect between any two given things, the test being, that the one is where the other is, and the second is not where there is not also the first, in the form यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः (अन्वय); यत्र यत्राग्निर्नास्ति तत्र तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति (व्यतिरेक). As with a केवलान्वयिहेतु it is not possible to prove the inference by a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, so with a केवलव्यतिकिहेतु, it is not possible to deduce the conclusion through an STUE. Though in a केवलव्यतिरोकि inference, we may, unlike the केवलान्वयि, be able to enunciate the proatia, we cannot corroborate it by any instances supporting the generalisation; for all the things upon which we can draw for an instance are, in the example given in the text, placed under the category of **. For an 34 goufatrahen it is easy to find both kinds of fa as in the case of inferring af from M. From an examination of these two kinds of propositions, the nature of stay and sure is explained in the following two couplets. That which precedes, viz., that which begins the proposition with 37 is called 535Cz; and that which follows, viz., concludes the proposition just with agat is called a319. Hence in an 3769272 the साधन, or the हेतु becomes the व्याप्य, and the साध्य the व्यापक; whereas in a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति साध्याभाव becomes the व्याप्य (distributed : minor term), and साधनाभाव the व्यापक. are the 7 ·NOTES. 48. An 3777oration T, in order to be good, must satisfy five conditions: (1) The being on the Paksha; and (2) also on the Sapaksha, or that the relation of the Free with which, is already demonstrated. (3) The not being found (surare:) at a place where the Arty is not (@TET). (4.) The being the subject (1992) of an STATTET I.e., the knowledge that the concomitance between the ay and , is not shown to be inconstant by any other Pramana as in the hetvábhúsa called arren, (vide Note No. 53). (5) The being not opposed by another inference in which the area is shown by another liettl, to be absent from the Cat, (vide Note No. 52). The different names given to these five are, thus, explanatory of themselves. It will be seen similarly that in a TFF inference the third condition cannot be fulfilled, because the rate is not known; and that in a mozetin inference the second condition cannot be satisfied, there being no सपक्ष. 49. The having the property of being the subject of that knowledge which interferes with the inference, or any of its subordinate instruments is the characteristic (उपाधिः-उपाधिरूपं सामान्यम्. C.)of a hetvábnúsa; and that which has this characteristic is a hetvábhásít. In der that an inference should become vitiated by a fallacy it must be shown that some FFTTT is directly opposed to the conclusion in hand, e.g. in the instance IE IT, the THT will be the right contradictory knowledge Ferrar. But it must be noticed, at the beginning, that the word Te is capable of a double interpretation. (1) ERT TÍ TEPITET GET 299: 1 (2) BÄTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTET FTATENGT 517FFFAFACETES: 1 FT AG - नित्यायनुमिति प्रति वन्ह्यभाववान् इद इत्यादिबाधनिश्चयस्य प्रतिबन्धकतया WATCH TreeTrafaqaca T*T*177 ETTEPAT TEFT3: 11 15. 11. Hetvábhúsa, therefore, is (1) that false hetu which looks like a true one; or (2), the fault in the hetu used in the inference in question, as, in the instance, analysed above. Accepting the second explanation of a hetvábhisa, it will be necessary to examine in each instance how and where in an inference the fault occurs. As in many of the hetvábhúsas, especially those which proceed from the stre of the hetu (as TT, TT, YETETT), the part directly affected by the star TMAN is not the conclusion, but the परामर्श, we have the words अनुमितितत्करणान्यतर, &c., in the definition. Again, the word r in the definition must be understood to mean TUFFTTT, otherwise any अयथार्थज्ञान may be brought ·NOTES. to oppose an inference, e.g., if to show the invalidity of the inference पर्वतो बतिमान, which is good, the ज्ञान required were not यथार्थ, any #HETA such as qaaT T afg77, will serve to undo au otherwise valid conclusion. 50. सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिक उच्यत इति शेषः । तत्त्वं च साधारणाद्यन्यतम- त्वम् ॥ सि० चं०॥. The hetva bhusu called सव्यभिचार (accompanied by a STARIT of the a), is one of the three described further on. Sådhå - rana, (i.c., common, that in which the hetu is common to the 1967 as well as ratne), is that wherein the helu is found both in the 997 and विपक्ष. In the illnstration पर्वतो धूमवान् वढेः, the हेतु-वहि-is found in places where the re---is not, as a heated ball of iron. Thus it is found in FTTH ( things with a cooking-room, &c.), as well as in (heated ball of iron), which latter circumstance constitutes the TRIT, whose absence is always necessary in establishing a व्याप्ति (व्याभिचारज्ञानविरह &c.). Thus the ज्ञान of fire being in a place where there is no smoke, prevents the apprehension of the 52# through showing a car in the hetu. Again, because, in the assertion Socrates is immortal, for lie is a being, we find being in constant concomitance with mortals as well as immortals we at once perceive that the inference is a fallacy arising from the assumption of a false premis, the ETF consisting of the Yrr in the form of the sair of the middle term-being. In Asúdhárana (uncommon, i.e., not common, the hetu being in the paksha alone), the hetu is not found either in the 1957 or the विपक्ष, but in the पक्ष only. If we say शब्द is नित्य, becanse it has शब्दत्व, we at once perceive that शब्दत्व is a हेतु which has no सपक्ष or no Faqet, it being confined to the 997 alone. This being ascertained, it is impossible for the inference to proceed even an inch beyond the mere assertion of the relation between yo5 and 1567. We cannot, here, assert the अन्वयव्याप्ति of शब्दत्व and नित्यत्व, for शब्दल is not to be seen in any place with CC (TTT). What is, then, possible is only a statah orra. Inasmuch, however, as there is no Spritzt, we see, that Taeca is szra (turned off, absent) from all its FTTST. Then, by the rule, that hetu which is absent from a thing with certain attributes, establishes the absence of these attributes at the place where it is found, we at once perceive that yea which is ezt from its 1989, i.e., face things, must prove the absence of facerca viz., fiecat at the place where it is found, i.e., in Tok. Turning, again, to the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-यत्र नित्यत्वं नास्ति तत्र शब्दत्वं नास्ति-~-we see ·point of distinction between 56 NOTES. that ca is surah from HerAT (TE). By applying the said rule, we find शब्दत्व to prove नित्यत्व (नित्यत्वाभावाभाव) in शब्द. Thus occa as well as they can be shown to be in Toe from the hetu stoc. But as the existence of a thing and its 37319 is not possible in the same place, at the same time, the assertion of the व्याप्ति of शब्दत्व and नित्यत्व, becomes impossible from our consciousness of this knowledge. Hence seca being confined to tag alone, can prove nothing with respect to 15€, except, at best, a doubt as to its relation with नित्यत्व or अनित्यत्व. Here evidently the argument is vitiated by the assumption of a false premis embodying the relation of Tee and feet, the hetvábhúsa being the T of the impossibility of नित्यत्व, and अनित्यत्व co-existing (निश्चितसाध्यवतो निश्चि. तसाध्याभाववतश्च व्यावृत्तत्वम्-हेतोः). Anupasamhari (non-inclusive : not including or having even a single Eye Ortat to assist either conclusion) is that which embraces every known thing in the 967, and leaves no room for the corroboration of a general rule of causation by proper illustrations. It is here impossible to find any place independent of the Ce, where the relation between the hetu and súdhya can be observed, and the observation turned to any account. If we say the creation is an illusion, because it is momentary, we at once perceive that it is inapossible to find the relation between momentariness and illusion, there being no instance either positive or negative for making the observation, because we know of nothing besides creation : the CTAT consisting in the knowledge that the fais connected neither with any positive, nor negative instances. (यत्किञ्चिन्निश्चयाविषयसाध्यकत्वे सति यत्किञ्चिनिश्चयाविषयसाध्याभावकत्वम् ). Both in असाधारण and अनुपसंहारी the relation of the साम्य and पक्ष is at once made extremely doubtful, and, therefore, they look more like one and the same form of fallacy than two different ones. The noted. In In STETTTTTT, though the EU is found in many places besides the 77, the za is not found with it; whereas in STTTTETÉT neither the firez nor the go are to be found in any place except . the पक्ष. As further interesting illustrations of साधारण and असाधारण, we may examine the nature of South and storh. In the definition गोः शुङ्गित्वम् we evidently have a हेतु common to the 37967 (TT:) as well as the ET (TIET:)Hence all definitions ·NOTES. 57 . which include something more than the thing defined are cases of the hetrabhttsa called साधारण. Again, in गोकपिलत्वम् we have a case of STATOTT". We see an only black-brown cow, or a collection of such cows, and say this ea is accompanied by Tea, which is evidently false, for 195cm being confined only to the individual or individuals seen proves nothing with respect to that individual or individuals. We cannot say TFT Touch A TISTE : there being no other instance (ATT) than the one in question (which we must suppose to include all cases of कपिला). Thus कपिलत्व being व्यावृत्त from all its #93T (things with ca as red and white and other cows,) proves TİCATHTA in the 927 by the rule gra 17: &o. Again, applying the व्यतिरकव्याप्ति-यत्र गोत्वं नास्ति तत्र कपिलत्वं नास्ति यथा वकादौ, we learn that कपिलव is व्यावृत्त from गोत्वाभाव, and, therefore, proves by the same rule, गोवाभावाभाव or गोत्व in the पक्ष. Thus गोत्व and TETTE, two contradictory things, being proved in the Ter, at the same time, it is impossible for the C-19mc to accomplish any. thing. Hence all cases of 375gTF# or definitions, which are too narrow, fall under असाधारण. All these three fallacies are different forms of what in Western Logic may be called the fallacies of false induction, leading to the assumption of a false premis. That smoke is a necessary effect of fire, that eternity is dependent on the possession of the quality of sound, and that being capable of observation is connected with eternity are all conclusions more or less viscious in themselves, being arrived at by imperfect induction, and à priori reasoning. 51. Virrudha (or opposed ) is that hetu, which is sur by (i.e., which has surra with) not as usual the Frez, but the star of the FOT. Pratipaksha (rival) is that hetu which proves in the same TET, the 3r of the Fred of another fa. Satpratipaksha (with rival) is that which has a trans, i.e., which has a hetu establishing à FTSE the STATE whereof is shown in the same thing, by another helu. Though in both these, the hetu proves the star of the TEJT, the difference between the two lies in the fact that in the first this far is proved by the same, whereas in the second it is proved by another. The knowledge that in 796 the hetu is always G# by the ETH constitutes the car which prerents the inference. The hetvábhasa in fata is plain enough. Some, moreover, maintain that in are there is always a zeratorria which constitutes the बाधज्ञान, and in सत्प्रतिपक्ष it is only an अन्वयव्याप्ति that S ·58 NOTES. does the same. For, in अयं गौरकशफत्वात् (=गोरेकशफत्वम् being all instance of the fault of a definition, called असंभव), एकशफत्व is concomitant not with गोत्व but गोस्वाभाव, and, therefore, the प्रतिबन्धक- यथार्थज्ञान is the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-यत्र गोत्वाभावाभावस्तत्रैकशफत्वाभाव: i.e., यत्र गोत्वं तत्रैकशफत्वं नास्ति. The अन्वयव्याप्ति constituting the हेत्वाभास in सत्प्रतिपक्ष, is plain enough. Again for differs from EiTATTU inasmuch as in the forner there is an actual constant व्याप्ति of the हेतु with साध्याभाव, whereas in the latter there is only a सामानाधिकरण्य of the two. In other words, the हेतु in साधारण is found at places, where there is an अभाव of the साध्य, but in re it is found exclusirely in places where there is THE of the साध्य, and has therefore a व्याप्ति with the साध्याभाव. 52. That which has the characteristic of being the subject of such knowledge as interferes directly with the परामर्श, is called असिद्ध (disproved, false). It is of three kinds : (1) आश्रयासिद्ध, (2) स्वरूपासिद्ध, (3) व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. That which has for its पक्ष, a thing possessed of a distinctive characteristic, which is fictitious, is called आश्रयासिद्ध, or that whose substrature is false. In the illustration the पक्ष is गगनारविन्द, i.e., अरविन्द having the distinctive characteristic of being in गगन. गगनीयत्व must therefore be co-existent and co-extensive with अरविन्दत्व ; or in the language of the book must be the अवच्छेदक of अरविन्दत्व. But as the अवच्छेदक here is a mere fiction there is an अभाव of the पक्षतावच्छेदक in the पक्ष, which is therefore पक्षतावच्छेदकाभाववान्. Thus the conviction अरविन्दे गगनी- यत्वं नास्ति being once established, the परामर्श-सुरभित्वव्याप्यारविन्दत्व- वगगनारविन्दम्-cannot stand, the हेत्वाभास consisting of the said conviction. आश्रयासिद्धि or the characteristic of an आश्रयासिद्ध is other:- wise thus defined. आश्रयासिद्धिश्च पक्षे पक्षतावच्छेदकविरह : ॥ नील०॥ आश्रयासिद्धत्वं च पक्षतावच्छेदकाभावकत्वम् । भवति हि अरविन्द गगनी- यत्वरूपपक्षतावच्छेदकाभावकत्वम् । अरविन्दरूपपक्षे गगनीयत्वस्य विरहात् ।। सि०चं०।।पक्षतावच्छेदकविशिष्टपक्षासिद्धिः॥ न्या. को०॥ स्वरूपासिद्धि (falsity of the very form) otherwise called हेत्वसिद्धि, is that हेतु which is the respondent of the अभाव in the पक्ष ; or as Nilakantha defines it in more simple language, the absence of the हेतु in the पक्ष. (स्वरूपासिद्धिश्च पक्षे हेत्वभावः). अत्र पक्षे हेतोरभाव एव दोषः। एतादृशज्ञानं हेतुमान पक्ष इति परामर्श प्रतिबध्नाति ॥ नी॥. व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध (the nature of the व्याप्त-हेतु-being false) is that hetu which is possessed of the starat of that which is the ESEF The व्याप्य in the illustration is धूम and its अवच्छेदक is काञ्चनमयत्व. As it is impossible for smoke to be of gold, the quras indicated in the ·NOTES. 59 .. .. text is rendered invalid by the knowledge of this impossibility; for such a परामर्श is dependent (अवगाहित्वात् ) on the relation of काञ्चनम- यत्व with धूम, in order to constitute the latter into a comprehensible हेतु. 53. That which has for its per a thing with the state of the predicated साध्य is called बाधित (contradicted). This, however, is distinguished from Friage by the fact that in this the star of the Ety is shown by another प्रमाण, and not by another हेतु. The direct knowledge (लौकिकनिर्णय-प्रत्यक्षप्रमा)of the absence of a thing being always a bar in the way of asserting the possession of that thing by something else, no inference can be drawn after knowing (by स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्ष) that there is no अनुष्णत्व in fire. The two other हेत्वाभासs in which the inference is directly vitiated are असाधारण and विरुद्ध ; and these are different from बाधित by the circumstance that in the one the हेतु is neither in the सपक्ष nor in the विपक्ष, which here is not the case 3 and that in the other the हेतु has a direct व्याप्ति with the अभाव of the साध्य, whereas here there is nothing of the kind. Compare on the hetuabhāsas: साधारण: साध्यवदन्यवृत्तिस्तेन च व्याप्ति- प्रतिबन्धः क्रियते । असाधारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणी हे तस्तेन च साध्यसा- मानाधिकरण्यग्रहः प्रतिबध्यते। ...... अनुपसंहारी चात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्य- कादिरनेन व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते । विरुद्धस्तु साध्यव्यापकीभूता- भावप्रतियोगी अयं च साध्याभावग्रहसामग्रीत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकः। सत्प्रतिपक्षे तुप्रति- हेतुः साध्याभाषसाधकः। ...... आश्रयासिद्धिः पक्षे पक्षतावच्छेदकत्वस्याभावः। यत्र काञ्चनमयः पर्वतो बतिमानिति साध्यते तत्र पर्वतो न काञ्चनमय इति ज्ञाने विद्यमाने काञ्चनमये पर्वते परामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । स्वरूपासिद्धिस्तु पक्षे व्याप्थ- स्वाभिमतस्याभावः । तत्र इदो द्रव्यं धूमादित्यादौ पक्षे व्याप्यत्वाभिमतस्य हेतोरभावे ज्ञाते पक्षे व्याप्यहेतुमत्ताज्ञानरूपस्य परामर्शस्य प्रतिबन्धः फलम् । ...... वहिमा- नीलधूमादित्यादौ गुरुतया नीलधूमत्वस्य हेतुतावच्छेदकत्वमपि व्याप्यवासिद्धि- रिति वदन्तिाबाधस्तु पक्षे साध्याभावादिः। एतस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ मुक्ता। All the hevábhásas, which appear more or less to be fallacies of induction, may thus be summarised:- साधारण-(हेतु common to सपक्ष and व्याप्ति. विपक्ष. अनुपसंहारी-(हेतु in पक्ष alone). आश्रयासिद्धः-(पक्ष false). परामर्श. स्वरूपासिद्ध-(हेतु not in पक्ष). व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध-हेतु false ). हेत्वाभास vitiating the असाधारण-(हेतु not in सपक्ष विपक्ष). विरुद्ध-(हेतु in साध्यभाव alone). सत्प्रतिपक्ष-(साध्याभाव proved by an- अनुमिति. other हेतु). बाधित-(साध्याभाव proved by another प्रमाण). ..

·60 NOTES. 54. It is questioned why a सोपाधिकहेतु is not considered in the heterdbhasas, for उपाधि, or aecident, is also a fault in the हेतु. This, however, is not done in this book (though some like the Terkasangraha treat of a सोपाधिकहेतु under व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध) for an उपाधि does not, like the rest of the ECSTATTETS, directly invalidate the inference or any subsidiary member thereof. How then is the argument (proving the direct cognizability) of वायु (from the हेतु-प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्व) pronounced to be vitiated by (the middle term having an gni or) accident (in the form of उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व)? It is replied, simply because उपाधि is only a प्रयोजक-an instrument-in bringing about the व्यभिचारज्ञान (उपाधिव्यभिचारेण हेतौ साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानमुपाधेः प्रयोजकम् मुक्ता. II) of the साध्य and हेतु. Thus a हेतु with an accident may come under हेत्वाभास, not as directly showing any fault in the हेतु, but as indirectly suggesting its non-concomitance with the proposed साध्य. In order to prove anything to be an or accident it has to be shown that that thing is found in places where the साध्य is, i.e., is व्यापक of the साध्य, but that it is not in places where the हेतु is .e., is अव्यापक of the साधन or हेतु. (साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः). आईन्धनसंयोग is an उपाधि of the हेतु-बहिमत्त्व in the inference पर्वतो धूमवान् वल्ले: for "Net fuel" is found in places where smoke is, but is not found in places where fire is (as in a heated ball of iron). This circumstance being known, the concomitance (व्याप्ति) of the हेतु and साध्य becomes difficult to ascertain. In fact, here, we first ascertain the concomitance of the साध्य and the उपाधि and then, from ascertaining the non-concomitance of the हेतु of that साध्य and the उपाधि, at once grasp the impossibility of any concomitance between the said हेतु and the said साध्य. This kind of उपाधि is often called-शुद्धसाध्यव्यापक or केवलसाध्यव्यापक. तथाहि । यत्र शुद्धसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र शुद्धेनैवोपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानु- मानम् । यथा धूमवान् वहरित्यादौ वह्विधूमव्यभिचारी साध्यव्यापकाइँन्धनसंयो- गव्यभिचारित्वासित व्यापकव्यभिचारिणो व्याप्यव्यभिचारावश्यकत्वात् ॥ मु- का 1. The last case of उपाधि noticed in the text resembles the उपाधि called पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक. The साध्यव्यापकता is यत्र यत्र च्यामत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकपाकजल्वम्. This, however, will not hold good with regard to crows and others, and the Fittu must, therefore, be accepted in some modified sense. श्यामत्व-the साध्य-must then be accepted as co-existent and co-extensive only with the अवच्छेदक of the पक्षधर्मः The पक्ष being गर्भस्थमित्रातनय, the पक्षधर्मावच्छेदक will be मित्रातनयत्वम्. The साम्यव्यापकती will now be यत्र मित्रातनयत्वावच्छिन्नं श्यामत्वं तत्र .

·NOTES. 61 शाकपाकजत्वम् । यथा मित्रातनयष | The साधनाध्यापकता will be यत्र मित्रातनयत्वं तत्र शाकपाकजत्वं नास्ति यथा मित्रातनयषवातिरिक्त मित्रातनय- पञ्चके. Thus शाकपाकजस्व being shewn to be an उपाधि, the inference falls to the ground. Similarly वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् । इत्यत्रो- भृतरूपवत्त्वमुपाधि : is also an instance to the point. The साध्यव्या- पकता-यत्र प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम् will not be true of रूप, रस &c., which are प्रत्यक्षविषय, but have no उद्भूतरूप in them (गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारात्). The उपाधि must, therefore, be assumed to be the व्यापक of the साध्य which is in the same place as (अवच्छिन्न by) the TETETÀ, which we take as are 6357, the Tea in arg. Therefore TT बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम् will be the proper साध्यव्यापकता, for now the साध्य thus modified will exclude रूप, रस, &c., which have no बहिर्द्रव्यत्व in them, and will apply to all such external dravyas as are cognizable by our senses. The rest is clear. Compare on this kind of उपाधि, यत्र तु किञ्चिद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यस्य व्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र तद्धर्मवति उपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानम् । तथा स श्यामो मित्रात- मयत्वादित्यादौ मित्रातनयत्वं श्यामत्वव्यभिचारिमित्रातनये शाकपाक जत्वव्य- भिचारित्वादिति ।। मुक्ता ॥ 55. That which is the subject of the knowledge of the instrument producing right testimony, is शब्द. शब्दज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः । शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥ मुक्ता०॥. Hence in the knowledge नदीतीरे पञ्चफलानि सन्ति, the पदज्ञान or शब्दज्ञान, i.e., the knowledge of the meaning of the terms involved in the statement, is the offror, and the remembrance of the objects denoted by the words is the व्यापार (द्वारम्). A pada is defined as that which has a meaning, as against Panini who says सुप्तिडल्तं पदम् (अष्टा० १-४-१४). A collection of such पहs is a वाक्य, and the interconnection of the objects suggested by the words is the वाक्यार्थ. On this subject the Mimansakas and the rhetoricians hold different views, which may be seen elsewhere. पद is of two kinds : मुख्य or शक्त, and गौण or लाक्षणिक. That which suggests a meaning by the strength of a शक्ति, is with respeet to that meaning called FET, ETTF or principal. aliffi is an eternal contention made about words and their meaning, as in the case of घट, पट, &c., Two questions naturally occur at this stage of inquiry.(1) How is the शक्ति of a word determined ? (2) whether the meaning of words is connotative, denotative, or both? The first question is easily answered in the words of a verse quoted by Nilakantha and others : शक्तिमहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशाप्तवाक्यायवहारतश्च । वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वरs , ..

·62 NOTES. न्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः॥ (व्याकरण-उपमान-कोश-आप्तवाक्य-व्यव- हार-वाक्यशेष as यवमयश्चर्भवतीत्यत्र यवशब्द आर्यव्यवहारादीर्घशूकविशिष्टस्य वाचकः । म्लेच्छव्यवहाराकङ्गीर्वाचको वेति संदेहे, वसन्ते सर्वसस्यानां जायते पत्रशातनं । मोदमानाश्च तिष्ठन्ति यवाः कणिशशालिन, इति वाक्यशेषादीर्घशुकवि- शिष्टे शक्तिनिर्णयः-विवृति-सिद्धपदस्थ संनिधि-all determine the शक्ति of a term). On the second question the Naiyáyikas join issue with the Mimársakas. The latter hold that words like TT, &c., have only a connotative sense (FTA), and not denotative (offi), for the conception of an individual is not possible without its connotation being ascertained first. It is only by आक्षेप-अर्थापत्ति-say the Mimánsakas, that words though connotative in their intent, signify an individual as well. The Naiyáyikas retort that as when using such expressions as 37TATTUT, &c., we find only an individual JT, and not the attribute Trca, brought to us, it follows that the import of terms is both connotative and denotative (जातिविशिष्ट व्यक्तौ शक्तिः). Compare मीमांसकास्त विशेषणत्वेन गोत्वादेरेव प्रथममुपस्थितत्वाद्वादिपदानां गोत्वादावेव शक्तिर्व्यक्तिलाभस्तु गोत्वं ह्याश्रयं विनानुपपन्नमित्याक्षेपादित्याहस्त- दसत् । विनाप्याक्षेपं गौश्वरतीत्यनेन व्यक्तिप्रतीतेः॥ सि.चं०1. The rhetoricians, on the other hand, who reconcile everything by a tripple शक्ति of words, अभिधा, लक्षणा, and व्यञ्जना or import, proper, implied, and inferred, leave the Mimánsakas and the Naiytyikas to settle their dispute among themselves : 3 संनिधियोग्यतावशाहक्ष्यमाणस्व- रूपाणां पार्थानां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थी विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसती- त्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यान्विताभिधानवादिनः ।। का०प्र०॥ 'That which suggests a meaning by the strength of JT or implication, is with respect to that particular meaning called TCTFOTOFI or गौण. In the instance गङ्गायां घोषः, the word गङ्गा refers, not to the stream, but to the bank, --which meaning, therefore, is the TET- णिक meaning of that word. लक्षणा is but a kind of relation with the शक्यार्थ or principal sense, and no separate शक्ति as the rhetoricians maintain. The difficulty experienced in settling the meaning of certain terms, correlated, is the chief cause of directing us to look up for this kind of related or implied meaning (तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्हि लक्षणायां बीजम्). Hence the sense thus inferred under these circumstances cannot be maintained to be an eternal convention or शक्ति. The fit of the word Tyr, in the illustration, is in the stream of the river; but as a village can hardly be imagined to stand thereon, we try' to attach some other meaning to the word Ft, not very remote ·NOTES. 68 from its original sense, and quite naturally think of the bank, which is related to the stream (शक्यसम्बन्ध), and which reconciles the apparent incongruity (तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः). The गौणी वृत्ति-सिंहो माणवकः- as well as the 545FTTT of the rhetoricians, are included by the Naiyayikas in inference. 56. शाब्दबोध or knowledge from words, is produced by words connected with cne another in the four ways enumerated in the text. rşr or interdependence is the being said together of one word with another, withont which other the first is incapable of producing any knowledge, which must follow from the interdependence of words (अन्वयानुभव ). The शाब्दबोध produced by the phrase घटमानय may be interpreted into घटकर्मकमानयनं कुरु. Here if the word indicating some क्रिया,i.e., the क्रियापद, were not present, the knowledge that the is to be carried somewhere, will never have followed; as also in the absence of the word घम् -the कर्म-no knowledge of the thing to be carried would ever have been possible. Hence as each of the word in the sentence has dependence on the other, for producing knowledge, the words have mutual 375gr with each other. This view of graig appears to have been favoured by Nilakantha, but there are others who take a slightly different view of the matter. As every single word is capable of suggesting a relation with some other word, it in either case that relation is indicated by some sort of terminations, &c., all words may be said to have आकाङ्क्षा for such terminations, also. गामानयेत्यत्र गोपदनिष्ठं अंपदाभावमयुक्तं शाब्दबोधानु- पधायकत्वम् | गोपदे अंपदनिरूपिताकाङ्का। शाब्दबोधस्तु गोवृत्तिकर्मत्वमिति ॥ वाक्य० ॥ ननु वृत्तिग्रह एव शाब्दहेतुः । तदा गौरश्च इति वाक्यादपि शाब्दोत्पत्तिः .........अत आह घटादिलक्षणपदस्य पदान्तरं विभक्तिपदं तस्य व्य- तिरेकोऽभावस्तत्प्रयुक्तं. अन्वयाननुभावकत्वं शाब्दबोधानुपधायत्वमाकामा FF 10 11. The other three requisites are plain enough. Hence शाब्दबोध is produced only after the words in any sentence satisfy all the four required conditions. शाब्दलक्षणं तु शक्तिलक्षणान्यतरसंबन्धेन पदजन्यपशर्थस्मृतित्वावाच्छन्नकारणतानिरूपितकार्यत्वम् । अत्रेयं शाब्दबोधप्र- क्रिया। प्रथमं गवादिपदानां गवादी संबन्धज्ञानं । गवादिर्गवादिपदशक्यो लक्ष्यो वेति । ततः कालान्तरे गामानय त्वमिति केनचिदुक्ते गवादिपदेभ्यो गवादीनान् स्मराति । आकाङ्कादीन् जानतस्तदनन्तरं गोकर्मकानयनानुकूलकृतिमांस्त्वमिति शाब्दबुद्धिर्जायते ॥ वाक्य० ।।. 57. A sentence that enjoins an act (which is meant to accomplish some good), is Fare sentence implying such injunction as is generally implied by the termination of the potential, the impera- .........

·64 NOTES. .. tive, the vedic subjunctive (लेद) or the potential participle &c.); one that prohibits an act ( by showing its tendency to sinfulness) is निषेध. Words other than these two are अर्थवाद (the description of the sense, an embellishment of the meaning in a manner to prepare the mind towards the act). तत्राद्यो (विधिः) विध्यभिधायकप्रत्ययघटितं वाक्यम् । स च प्रत्य- यो लिङ् ले लोद तव्य कृत् प्रत्ययरूपः। भवति हि ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति वाक्यम् । तथात्र लिडेव तादृशप्रत्ययः। विध्यभिधायक्रेत्यत्राभिधेयविधि यः। स च प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयः । कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधन त्वमेव सः । इदमेव लिङर्थः। विध्यर्थ इत्यपि चोच्यते।......न कलझं भक्षयोदित्यादौ नमाविध्यर्थाभावो बोध्यते । अत्र प्राभाकराः। प्रवृत्ति प्रति कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं हेतुः । तेन कृत्यसाध्ये न प्रवृत्तिः। ननु विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः इति चेत् । तदनुयायिन इष्टसाधनता. लिङ्गककृतिसाध्यतानुमितिरिष्टसाधनताज्ञानकालीनकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं वा काम्य- स्थले प्रवर्तकमतो नोक्तदोषः। नित्यस्थले चाहमिदानींतनकृतिसाध्यसन्ध्यावन्दन- को ब्राह्मणत्वे सति विहितसन्ध्याकालीनशौचादिमत्त्वादिति शौचादिमत्त्वप्रतिसन्धा- नजन्यकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानमिति समादधते। अथाननुगम इति चेत् । स्वविशेषणवत्ता- प्रतिसन्धानजन्यत्वमेव कृतिसाव्यताज्ञानेऽनुगतम् । स्वं पुरुषस्तत्र काम्ये इच्छैव विशेषणं नित्ये शौचादिकमेवोत प्रलपति तन्न । अलवीयस्त्वादिति ॥सि० चं० ।।. Next, an Arthaváda is said to be of three kinds in the Nykyamálávistarra : विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते । भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः, of which आदित्यो यूपः, अग्निहिमस्य भेषजं and वृत्राय वजमुदयच्छदिन्द्रः are the respective instances. Lastly, we may close this examination of tee with a passage setting forth the difference between the Naiyáyika view, and the view of the grammarians, who recognise the fi of words in a kind of स्फोट or disetosure which is (वर्णानां वाचकत्वानुपपत्तौ यद्बलादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स इति वर्णातिरिक्तो वर्णाभिव्यङ्गयोऽर्थप्रत्यायको नित्यः शब्दः।। सर्व० सं०n also वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति वर्णानां वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णो- चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात्.....तद्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटोनादाभिव्यङ्गयो वाचकः।। कैया), as it were, an eternal power indicating the object (by a kind of व्यञ्ज- ना), independently of the letters of the word. Also, ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्ग- कामो यजेतेत्यत्र कृतिसाध्यबलवदनिष्टाऽजनकेष्टसाधनज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागकः स्वर्गकाम इत्यर्थः। एवमेव सर्वत्र प्रथमान्तमुख्यविशेष्यकः शाब्दबोधी ज्ञेयः । वैयाकरणास्तु धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव शाब्दबोधो यथा चैत्रः पचति तण्डुलमि- त्यत्र तण्डुलनिष्ठविक्लित्त्यनुकूलश्चत्रकर्तृकपाक इति बोध इत्याहुः ॥ सि० चं० ॥ 58. The Mimánsakas add two more Praminas or instruments of knowledge in the form of अर्थापत्ति and अनुपलब्धि. अर्थापत्ति or impli. cation, is a mere case of Anumána, and is capable of being borne out by a व्यतिरेकन्याप्ति. अनुपलब्धि also is no separate प्रमाण. When there is no घट before us, we have the प्रत्यक्षज्ञान of an अभाव whose प्रतियोगी ..

·ta NOTES. is the qe. This knowledge of ET T is possible only because the graft is not found with the Star (lit., there is no knowledge- 39611-of the ere). Hence the not being of the rart at the place of its (gratuit), assists the direct perception of the part (571948-1-ESTEE toit). Thus as the अभाव is cognised by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण assisted by the प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धि, this latter is no separate Tarot whatever. It may, however, be argued that the अभाव is not cognised by प्रत्यक्ष, but by अनुपलब्धि, for as both of these are factors in one and the same act of perception, there is no reason to lay more stress on the one than on the other. But if this were the case, the common experience of first seeing that there is no ea, and then recognising by direct cognition the STT of the घट-experience which in this manner subordinates the योग्यानुपलब्धि to the gover_ought to have been reversed. Anupalabdhi is, there, fore, no separate TATT. It may be noticed, in passing, that the Vaisheshikas do not regard even Toc or 3T7T as any different pramánas. According to them they are included in inference. शब्दोपमानयोनैव पृथक्प्रामाण्यमिष्यते। अनुमानगतार्थत्वादिति वैशेषिकं मतम् ॥ मुक्ता॥. 58. The question is whether the raroz or 7911ce of Art is known by itself (1.e., along with the FT), or by any other subsequent process. In other words, whether on our cognition of a thing do we; also know that that cognition is a TT-ETITUTTET? or is it that we determine the rareef of a perception subsequently? The Mimánsakas (the followers of mat), as well as the Vedantins, accept the first doctrine, while the Naiyáyikas uphold the second. In every perception of a thing, the Mimánsaka will join the seeing as well as the consciousness that it is right seeing in one and the same act of cognition; whereas the Naiyáyika will make the second dependent on an inference, and therefore apart from the first. A man sees by Terat some water at a distance, and recognising along with the act of perception, the rightness of this knowledge, proceeds towards it. Trapoer is thus made the subject of the same act of cognition. This Tarry is a kind of Fica or self-cognizability, in the form of being the subject of that which (viz, the instrument-a-of knowledge in general, i.e., TOIT, &c., as FTATE FATA in the present instance ; for the knowledge that there is water is grasped only in the form of the secondary consciousness FHE, &c.,) enables one to cognise all kinds of 5 in general. The man in a person manifests itself in the form of the Toner- STA.-which, therefere, 9 ·NOTES, .. is the ग्राहक of that ज्ञान.. The प्रमाव of this ज्ञान becomes a subject of the same अनुव्यवसाय which takes cognisance of the original जल- ज्ञान,i.e., the ज्ञान and its मानाज्य are both subjects of one and the same act of cognition. Thus the मामाण्य of a ज्ञान is स्वती ग्राह्य, known of itself. अत्र ज्ञानमामाग्यं तदप्रामाण्याप्राहकं यावद्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीवा- ह्यत्वमिदमेव स्वतो ग्राह्यमिति किंवदन्ती। अस्यार्थः । ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं ज्ञाननिष्ठा प्रा- माण्यवाहिका यावती ज्ञानमाहिकानुव्यवसायादिरूपा सामग्री तबाह्यमिति । इदमेव ज्ञप्तीस्वतस्त्वमित्युच्यते।......घटमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायो घटं घटत्वं समवायं च विषयी कुर्वनात्मनि प्रकारीभूतपटमात्मानं तत्सम्बन्धीभूतव्यवसायं विषयीकरोति । एवं सति पुरोवर्तिप्रकारसम्बन्धस्यैव प्रमापदार्थत्वेन स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्णातीति मुरारिमिश्राः । अनुव्यवसायात्मकमेव सर्व ज्ञानं तच्च स्वप्रकाशमिति मातृमेयविष- यत्वाचिपुटीत्युच्यते। स्वप्रकाशसामदेव स्वात्मानमिव स्ववृत्तिमामाग्यं स्वत एव गृलातीति प्राभाकरा :! अयं घट इति ज्ञानानन्तरं घटे ज्ञातता नान फलं भवति । ततो ज्ञातो घट इति तत्प्रत्यक्ष पश्चात्तया ज्ञानमात्रस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् ज्ञानं तनिष्ठप्रामाण्यं चाहं घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञानवान् घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञाततावस्वादिस्य नुमीयते तस्मात्स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं च ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिकानपेक्षकत्वमिति महा। तन्ने- ति गौतमीयाः॥सि. चं०॥. On further analysis it will appear that the प्रमात्व of a ज्ञान is also a case of ज्ञान, of the same kind, though not the same, as the original ज्ञान, the subject of this अमात्व. If the प्रमात्व of ज्ञान in general, then, were not at some stage स्वती प्राह्य, there will be confusion ad infinitum (31TTEETT), not unaffecting even the last 3717, or godhead. To this theory of the Mimánsúi and the Vedánta, the Naiyáyika takes exception on the following grounds. If the प्रमात्व of a ज्ञान were self-manifest, the doubt whether the cognition of water I have had was yar or not, will never arise, inasmuch as, on the Minansalsa hypothesis, the प्रमाव as well as the जलप्रत्यक्ष are subjects of one and the same act of cognition. If, to avoid this difficulty, it be argued that there is no real h, when there is a doubt, such reasoning will not do. For, if there be no ज्ञानग्रह, then the existence of संशय, which is admitted, will not be possible-a संशय being the absence of that प्रामाण्य which has ज्ञान for its धर्मी,i.e., which is a धर्म of ज्ञान. In every act of doubt the knowledge of the substratum of that doubt is always necessary; and if we admit no ज्ञानग्रह in संशय, the existence of संशय will be but an impossibility, which is absurd on the opponent's own hypothesis-ite being accepted by him as a kind of ज्ञान.* The स्वतः-मामाण्य of ज्ञान reduces itself, * This is the chief point of difference between the Vedanta on the one hand, and Nyaya and other philosophies on the other. The one accepts one uniform IST in the form of प्रमा, explaining संशय, &c., in various ways under names like मापा, विवर्त, अविद्या, &e.; the other set accepting all possible variety in knowledge.

·NOTES. 67 o maintains that any given T stands for three therefore, to nothing. The 48:Aroy of T7 is further illustrated by an instance. A man, who has not had any experience of the phenomena of water, chances to see some at a distance, and proceeds, though yet doubtful of the observation being a Tal or , in the direction thereof. Having, however, succeeded in obtaining water, he reasons within himself: the cognition of water I had had before was pat, for it led to an action resulting in some tangible result, agreeing with the previous observation. Whatever after being seen does not lead to such faara (result according with the observation) is always sqar, e..., seeing water in the mirage. Therefore this TASTAT was tft and nothing else. Thus the Tarca of the trt is determined, not with the TT, but after it. This, however, for a man who takes note of phenomena for the first time. In the event of an experienced mau seeing water at a distance, the area of the is determined even before taking any action in the direction of the water. This is done by an 27TETIT in the form, this (second) TFT is as being of a kind with the first 7 (349-UTET FETTET), which led to agreeable result. 59. The असनवाधिकारण of initial falling is गुरुत्व. गुरुत्व stands to the substance capable of falling, in UE along with a the area---which also stands to the substance in the same relation. Hence TEET is properly described as the STTATTOTT of आद्यपतन. द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेगासमवायित्वाहाचेति ।। दिन मु०॥ 60. See note No. 43. 61. All philosophy is agreed upon the mutability of things; and also of the properties of those things in general. The Buddhists look upon things as now and new at every succeeding second, and hold that they are made up, as it were, of a number of kshanas or moments, following one another. From this view of things in their relation to time nothing can escape, except such things as are necessarily facut on account of being as in their character. The change we see in for things amenable to our senses, is but a change more apparent than real, it being located in the farmut of the thing and not in the thing itself. On the nature of the change to which these gunas, as well as objects in general, are subject there are two opikshanas or moments: (1) ETETT, the stage of production ; (2) ferrater, the stage of existence, during which a new TT, which is to succeed the first, obtains its gr7T; (3) TTT9797, the stage of ·68 NOTES. destruction, when the first guna is destroyed, and the second which is produced in the FEITETETT of the first, takes its place. Thus the first Tr comes to be destroyed only in the third stage of existence, i.e., in the second after its birth: (Fradrett CTA Trecas). The क्षणिकविज्ञानवादी maintains that there is no स्थितिक्षण-everything being destroyed in the moment next its birth. What the text lays down is only with the view of setting aside this theory. 62. See note No. 6. TETETHe is that which is related by TYTT-a kind of indirect relation, through a series. T2169 which means yara is related to the ta (the object of the gar) by a qaqT, THE being in war which again is in te. This 9879TT is described as FarZETEFiEFA in a note to MS. F. 63. Those are called syah, of which one exists as entirely in and of another, without losing its identity, e.g., the cloth of and in the threads forming it. These could be reduced to the five classes enumerated in the text-vide note No. 5. 64. A thing may be absent in one of two ways: it may not be the thing we see, and may, therefore, not be found in it, inasmuch as it is different from it; or it may be that a thing is not seen at any particular time on, or in another thing. That a pot of clay is not a piece of cloth, and vice versa, is an instance of the first kind of SHTET; and that a piece of cloth is not to be found in this room, that of the second, the first being called striran or absence by identity, and the second HETTY or absence by contact. A thing absent by contact may be absent in one of three ways according to the time of observation. The thing was not in a thing, is not in a thing, or does not exist for all time. The effect, before its actual production, was not seen in the cause (THTHITT) i.e., did not exist in contact with the cause, e.g., a ec in the shells that make it. This is TTT. When a thing is destroyed it is merely reduced to its component parts--the original causes-in which therefore it is no longer seen (has no contact with the cause), e.g. a pot of clay broken and reduced to its original shells. This is an E. It will be seen that TTTTT has no beginning but has an end, HHT has a beginning but no end, and 37cmaro is eternal. A thing which does not exist at any one of the three periods of time must be an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. This is tart. After this general view of Spa and its sub-divisions, we may examine the phraseology of the definitions. अन्योन्याभाव is that अभाव which has for its प्रति- ·NOTES. 69 .. योगी a thing defined by तादात्म्यसंबन्ध. In the अभाव of a घट or anything, the प्रतियोगी of the अभाव, has two things : the प्रतियोगिता, as well as the relation by which the thing is known as absent. This latter is of two kinds: तादात्म्य-identity-(as घटत्व-the identity of the घट with itself), and संसर्ग-contact-(as the contact of the घट with the place-अधिकरण-where its अभाव is noticed). The प्रतियोगिता of an अभाव, found in the प्रतियोगी may be defined by either of these two relations. In other words, a thing (प्रतियोगी) may not be another thing (तादात्म्य), or may not be seen on or in a thing (संसर्ग). From the illustrations already given it will appear that in an अन्योन्याभाव the प्रतियोगिता is defined by तादात्म्य; in a संसर्गाभाव by संसर्ग. घट: पदोन which is an instance of अन्योन्याभाव, therefore, means घटत्वरूपा या तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्ना (घटनिष्ठा) प्रतियो. गिता तद्वान् घटाभावः पटे. We have already determined संसर्गाभाव to be of three kinds from its relation to time, and we have there seen that in the third kind of संसर्गाभाव, or अत्यन्ताभाव, the संसर्ग of the प्रतियोगी is not to be found at any one of the three periods of time. Thus the old school of Nyaya held that this अभाव is नित्य, whereas the other two are not so. In other words, though the प्रतियोगिता of all three is अवच्छिन्न by संसर्ग, that of अत्यन्ताभाव is अवच्छिन्न not by any limited period of time but eternity (त्रिकाल). Thus to separate this STATE from the two other abhávas, which are then, it is defined as त्रैकालिकसंसर्ग &c., त्रैकालिकभूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानरूपत्रिकालवृत्तिरित्यर्थः । नित्य इति भावः ॥ वाक्य० ॥ ध्वंसप्रागभावयोः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंबन्धो वर्तत इति मताभिप्रायेण त्रैकालिकति विशेषणमन्यथान्योन्याभाववारकेणैव तद्वारणात्तद्वयर्थतापत्तेः।। नील॥. The other and more modern view of . this ST2TF, however, does not favour this construction, 577-Gr-Tabeing regarded as a mere case of non-existence for a time. They further maintain that if after predicating such an staan of a thing, the thing were introduced in the अधिकरण of its अभाव, the अभाव is not destroyed but rendered merely imperceptible (अप्रतीत). भूतले घटसंयो- गप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामकत्वं कल्प्यते ॥ तर्की | There are others who instead of taking such a view of अत्यन्ताभाव, call this a fourth kind of अभाव-उत्पादविनाशशाली-wide Muktavali, verse 12 and Notes, et. seg. 65. Vide note No. 9; as well as Nos. 50 and 51. 66. The sutra with which the Nyaya opens is: प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्र- योजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवाहजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिय- हस्थानानां तत्वज्ञानानिःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥. The author consistently with ·70 NOTES. this raises a doubt in the form of questioning the utility of describing and understanding all these padárthus, &c., knowledge of which is of no use, it being that of something other than the soul, which, in fact, ought to be the real subject of the inquiry into the nature of happiness--the chief end of all human effort. This is only a misunderstanding, for, according to the aphorism quoted, the essence (of the soul) is comprehended only through a proper understanding of the padúrthas, &c. Knowledge thus acquired will lead to final absolution (from the bonds of death and birth), which is the summum bonum, the highest happiness-मोक्ष. Absolution is absolute destruction of pain. It is that destruction of pain which is not co-eval with the antecedent non-existence of pain to be found in the place where it (the first destruction of pain ) takes place. If this destruction of pain were to be co-eval with the IT-THC of se, every little suspen" sion of worldly pain will be included in the definition of First. For instance, if we are suffering from some pain, and if that pain is removed by some means, this cannot be called Fire, inasmuch as this destruction of pain-et-has taken place at a time when the আমাৰ of is still in us, i.e., we are still open to some future possibility of .0. This repeate to constitute itself into real HTCT must be final, must happen at a time when there is no possibility of any fresh Siet occurring. Again the E: CATT19, with which the citia is required not to be co-eval, must be in the same place as geta (ET); otherwise while there is : CETT-TT at any place in the world, no individual can attain FTGT, and therefore the Fray of persons (TST) frequently reported in Scriptures) cannot be included in the definition (अव्याप्ति), inasmuch as the दुःखध्वंस is then not असमानकालीन, but समानकालीन with the दुःखमागभाव. But if the दुःखप्रागभाव and the grecia are not required to be together in the same individual, (i.e., at the place where the City occurs) the definition will be precise and correct. Hence स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखमागभावासमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसो HT: 11. 3 ·List of abbreviations used in the Notes. न्या० को मुक्ता सि० चं० नील०....... न्या० बो० वाक्य तर्क०सं० तर्क०वी० दिन वेदा०सा० न्यायकोश. मुक्तावलि. सिद्धान्तचन्द्रोदय. कुसुमाञ्जलि. नीलकण्ठी. न्यायबोधिनी. वाक्यवृत्ति. तर्कसंग्रह. तर्कसंग्रहदीपिका. दिनकरी. वेदान्तसार. अष्टाध्यायी. काव्यप्रकाश कैयट on पतञ्जलि. अष्टा०.. का०प्र० कैय० Other Works consulted or quoted. Panchadasi. Mill's Logic. Bain's Logic. Sarvadarshanasamgraha. Do. Translation by E. B. Cowell. Brahmasutras. Jaiminiya Nyâyamâlâvistara. BOMBAY : PRINTED AT THE EDUCATION SOCIETY'S PRESS, BYCULLA.

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·三
中的作
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三十六,是在
大学;
上一产。