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·STUDIES IN JAINISM
(Being a collection of three original, important
and Informative articles on Jalnism)
BY
Dr. HERMANN JACOBI
EDITED BY
JINA VIJAYA MUNI
(Hon. Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan)
PUBLISHED BY
Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Karyalay
(AXMEDABAD)
SOLE AGENTS:
Gurjara Grantharatna Karyalay
Gandhi Road, Ahmedabad.
V. S. 2002)
Price: Two Rupees
(1946 A. D.

·Pablished by Shambhalal J. Shal, for the
Jalsa Sabltya Samshodhaka Karyalay,
ANMEDABAD.
Printed by Ramchandra Yesu Shodgo,
Nirnaya Sagar Press, 26-28 Kolbhat stroot,
BOMBAY 3.

·CONTENTS PREFACE I-III (1) JAINISM. 1-47 1. Introductory. 1-6 2. Jain View of their Origin, etc. 6-11 3. Canonical Literature of the Svetāmbaras. 11-15 4. The Doctrines of Jainism. 15-39 5. Present State of Jainism. 39-43 6. History of Jainism. 43-47 (II) THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF THE JAINAS. 48-60 7. Jainism, an Original System. 48 8. Statement of the Brahmanio and Buddhistic Doctrines of Being 49-50 9. Jain Theory of Being. 50 10. Doctrines of Syādvāda and Nayas. 51-53 11. Jaina Philosophy compared with Sankhya and Yoga Philosophies. 53-59 12. Jainism older than Nyāya and Vaiseşika. 59--60 (III) THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN THE DEVE- LOPUENT OR INDIAN THOUGET. 61-85 13. The Ancient Concept of Soul. 61-68 14. Original Non-distinction between Spirit and Matter, 68–85 ·By the same Author We intend to publisha shortly a similar volume containing various scholarly writings of this great savant, relating to Jainism, such as the Introductions to Ācārāngasūtra and Kalpasūtra (SBE, Vol. 22), and Uttaradhyayanasītra and Sutrakrtāngasūtra (SBE, Vol. 45), and other articles.

·PREFACE
late lamented Professor Dr. Hermann
THFalconi, Bonn (Germany), was an outstan.
ding savant who enriched the treasure of Oriental
Learning by his various valuable contributions and
even led the front of research in different branches
of Indological studies. Io the fields of Jaina and
Prakrit studies Professor Jacobi can be looked upon
as a Pioneer: and his investigations, extended over
dozens of years, have a unique value in assessing the
progress of studies. It is mainly due to his labours
that suitable position could be assigned to Jainism
and Jaina philosophy in the evolution of religion
and thought on the Indian soil. It is to him
that we owe the authentic translation of four
canonical works in the S. B. E. series; the two
Introductions form a substantial contribution to our
knowledge of Jainism, especially of its career earlier
than Buddhism. All research is a progressive
current; and this is all the more true with regard to
Jaina research, because in the beginning the
scholars had to work with scanty material which,
with the passage of time, is coming out in a volumi.
nous magnitude,
The three essays of Jacobi, included in this
book have a significant value, inasmuch as they
can be safely accepted as the basis for further
researches in Jainism and Jaina philosophy. The
first, JAINISM, is taken from the Encyclopaedia
of Religion and Ethics, vol. VII, pp. 465-474, edited

·by J. Hastings, London; the second, TSIE META- PHYSICS AND ETHICS OF THE JAINAS in the Transaclions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions, vol. II, pp. 59.66, Oxford 1908; and the third, THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN THOUGIIT, is being printed and published, as far as I know, for the first time in this book. It was written in 1922, as is seen from the date put at the end of the article. The original manuscript of this article which has been written in Jacobi's own hand-writing was obtained by me through my late, lamented friend, Mr. K. P. Mody, of Abmedabad. Some of the observations of Jacobi may require modification and restatement. That is but natural and inevitable. In fact, even Jacobi himself revised some of his earlier opinions about Jainism and Jaina philosophy during his life time in the light of his advancing studies. Minor points, here and there, in these essays may require ratification; but on the whole these essays still hold the ground and can worthily serve as the starting points for further studies. It is with this idea that they are issued in a separate book, especially because the original sources are not easily accessible, When I went to Germany in 1928 with a view to acquiring first-hand knowledge of the methods of research and with a view to establishing close contact with the German scholars working on Indological subjects and especially ou fainism and Jain literature, the great scholar, Dr. Hermann Jacobi immediately came from Bonn specially to meet me in Hamburg and invited me with great ·ye [m affection to come there and stay with him for some months. He stayed in Hamburg with his son for some days during which had several and varied discussions particularly on Jainism and Jain literature. I still remember, quite vividly, his high admiration for the cultural contributions of Jainism and Jaina literature in enriching the Indian heritage and his fervent enthusiasm for the progress of studies connected with them. In issuing this book, I record my feelings of respect to the soul of Hermann Jacobi and my sense of gratitude to the original Publishers of the first two essays. My thanks are due to my dear friend, Dr. A. N. Upadhye and my diligent colleague, Dr. A. S. Gopani for their assistance in carrying this book through the press. Though written at different times, say within a quarter of a century, these three essays bape an inherent connection among themselves; so we have brought out this volume mainly for the benefit of research and lay students of Jainism. If they feel benefited by this handy volume, quite within their reach, our purpose of publishing it, even during the hard period of war, is more than fulfilled. BARATIYA VIDYA BHAYAN DOMBAY 7 Dated 29-12-1946. MIUNI JINA VIJAYA

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·JAINISM 1. INTRODUCTORY, Jainism is a monastic religion which, like Buddhism, denies the authority of the Veda, and is therefore regarded by the Brāhmang as heretical. The Jain church consists of the monastic order and the lay community. It is divided into two rival sections, the Sretāmbaras, or "White-robed' and the Digambaras, or "Sky-clad'; they are so called because the monks of the Svetāmbaras wear white clothes, and those of the Digambaras originally went about stark naked, antil the Muhammadans forced them to cover their privities. The dogmatic differences between the two sections are rather trivial"; they differ more in conduct, as will be noticed in the course of the article. The interest of Jainism to the student of religion consists in the fact that it goes back to a very early period, and to primitive currents of religious and metaphysical speculation, which gave rise also to the oldest Indian philosophies-Sānkhya and Yoga -and to Buddhism. It shares in the theoretical pessimism of these systems, as also in their, practical ideal-liberation. Life in the world perpetuated by the transmigration of the soul, is essentially bad and painful; therefore it must be 1 See the article 'Digambara', Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 2 Seo thoso articles, ERE.

·2] JAINISTI our aim to put an end to the Cycle of Births, and this end will be accomplished when we come into possession of right knowledge. In this general principle Jainism agrees with Sankhya, Yoga, and Buddhism; but they differ in their methods of realizing it. In metaphysics there is some goneral likeness between Sāáklya and Yoga on the one hand, and Jainism on the other. For in all these systems a dualism of matter and soul is acknarledged; the souls are principally all alike substances (monads) characterized by intelligence, their actual difference being caused by their connexion with matter;matter is, according to Jains and Sankhyas, of indefinite nature a something that may become anything. These general metaphysical principles, however, are worked out on different lines by the Sankhyas and Jains', the difference being still moro 3 It may be added that, with the exception of Yoga, all these socient systems are strictly atheistic, d, e, they do not admit an absolate Soprome God; even in Yoga, the Išvar, is not the first and only cause of overything ezistent, 4 Tha Sankhyas endeavour to explaid, from their daalistic principles, purusa and praksli, the developmont of the material world as well a9 that of living beings; the Jaios, however, sre slmost exclusively concerned with the latter, and declare that the cause of tho material world and of the structure of the universe is lokasthiti, primeral disposition' (Tallvárthadhigama sutra, lit, com.). Sănkhye, probably based on cosmogonic theories contained in the Upanişads, was intended as a philosop his system which in the coorse of time became the thooretical foundation of popular rsligion. But Jainism was, in the first place, a religion, and developed a philosophy of its own in order to make this religion, % self-consistent agsten, ·INTRODUCTORY (3 sccentuated by the different origins of these systems. For the Sārkhyas, owing allegiance to the Brāhmans, have adopted Brāhmanical ideas and modes of thought", while the Jains, being distinctly non-Brāhmanical, have worked upon popular notions of a more primitive and cruder character, e.g. animistic ideas. But the metaphysical principles of Buddhism are of an entirely different character, being moulded by the fundamental principle of Buddhism, viz. that there is no absolate and permanent Being, or, in other words, that all things are transitory. Notwithstanding the radical difference in their philosophical notions, Jainism and Buddhism, being originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brāhmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, so that even Indian writers occasionally have confounded them. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jain literature easily persuaded themselves that it Tas an offshoot of Buddhism? But it has since been proved beyond doubt that their theory is wrong and that Jainism is at least as old as 5 6. 9., the Såókhya principle mahăn meang mahān alma; the three gunas are suggested by the trioğlkarana of Chandogya Up. vi. S f; and prakſti by the cosmical brahmă of the earlier Upanişad doctrine, wherefore in the Gaudapāda Bkásya on Kärikā 22 brahma is given ag a synonym of prakti, etc. 6 The fondamental theories of Jainism, e, g. the syādrada, their division of living beings, especially the elementary lives, aro not found in Buddhism, 7 Seo SBD x1v. (1895) Introd., pp. xrill 4.

·4] JAINISY Buddhism. For the canonical books of the Budo dhists frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect; under their old name Nigantha (Skr. Nirgrantha, common Prākrit Niggantha) and their leader in Buddha's time, Nātaputta (Nāta- or Natiputta being an epithet of the last prophet of the Jains, Vardhamīns Nabāvira), and they name the place of the latter's death Pārā, in agreement with Jain tradition. On the other hand, the canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahi. vīra the same kings as reigned during Baddha's career, and one of the latter's rivals. Thus it is established that Mahāvīra was a contemporary of Buddha, and probably somewhat older than the latter, who oullived his rival's decease at Para.. Mahāvira, however, unlike Buddha, was most probably not the founder of the sect which reveres him as their prophet, nor the author of their religion. According to the unanimous Buddhist tradi. tion, Buddha had, under the Bodhi-tree, discovered by intuition the fundamental truths of his religion. as it appears throughout his personal work; his : first sermons are things ever to be remembered by his followers, as are the doctrines which he then preached. No such traditions are preserved in the canonical books of the Jains about Mahavira. His becoming a monk, and, some 12 years later, his attainment of omniscience (kevala), are, of course, celebrated events. But tradition is silent about his motives for renouncing the world, and about the particular truths whose discovery led to his exalted position. At any rate, Mabävira is not described by tradition as having first become & disciple of teachers whose doctrines afterwards ·INTRODUCTORY failed to satisfy him, as we are told of Buddha; he seems to have had no misgirings, and to have known where truth was to be had, and 'thas he became à Jain monk. And again, when, after many years of austerities such as are practised by other ascetics of the Jains, be reached omniscience, we are not given to understand that he found any new truth, or a new revelation, as Buddha is said to have received; nor is any particular doctrine or philosophical principle mentioned, the knowledge and insight of which then occurred to him for the first time. But he is represented as gaining, at his kevala, perfect knowledge of what he knew before only in part and imperfectly. Thus Mahivīra appears in the tradition of his own sect as one who, from the beginning, had followed a religion established long ago; had he been more, had he been the founder of Jainism, tradition, ever eager to extol & prophet, would not have totally repressed his claims to reverence as such. Nor do 8 A. F. R. Hoernle, Urāsagadasão, tr., p. 5 £., note (Calcutta, 1890), says that Dlohavira, having been born in Kolaga, 'daturally, when he assumed the monk's vocation, retired (As related in Kalpasūtra 115 f.) to the ceiya of his own clan, called Düipalisa and situatod in the neighbourhood of Kollaga. Mabăvira's parents (and with them probably their whole clan of Naya. Kşattriyas) are said to have been followers of the tonets of Pārsvanātha (880 Āyāranga, ii, 15, $ 16). As such they would, no doubt, keep up a religions establishment (ceiya) for the accommodation of Pārsva, on his periodical visite, with his disciples, to Kaņdapura or Vosalt. Mahāvira, on renouncing the world, would probably first join Pārsva's sect, in which, however, he soon became & reformer and chief himself.'

·JAINISU 6) Buddhistic traditions indicate that the Nigaạthas owed their origin to Nātaputta; they simply speak of them as of a sect existing at the time of Buddha. We cannot, therefore, without doing violation to tradition, declare Mahāvīra to have been the founder of Jainism. But he is without doubt the Jast prophet of the Jains, the last Tirthakara: His predecessor, Parśva, the last Tirthakara but one, seems to have better claims to the title of founder of Jainism. His death is placed at the reasonable interval of 250 years before that of Mahāvīra, while Pärsya's predecessor Ariştanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahāvīra's Nirvāņa. Followers of Pārsva are mentioned in the canonical books; and a legend in the Uttarūs dhyayana Sūtra xxiii relates a meeting between a disciple of Pārśva and a disciple of Mahavira which brought about the union of the old branch of the Jain church and the new one'. This seems to indicate that Pārsta was a historical person; but in the absence of historical documents we cannot venture to go beyond a conjecture. 2. JAIN VIEW OF THEIR ORIGIN, ETC. According to the belief of the Jain religion is eternal, and it 1 again and again, iqmas succeeding periods Tirthakaras. the first Tirthakara 24th, was V.... colours of the 24 T:: T In 9 SDE, xl Introd. p. _ ·Mahävira and the two last Tirthakaras has been given in palyopcemas and sägarozxtmas, the best interval being one krore of krores of sägarens The length of the life and the height of the the karas are in proportion to the lett JÄIN VIBIY OF THBIR ORIGIN [7 (1) Rşabha (or Vrşabha), ball, golden; (2) Ajita, elephant, golden; (3) Sambhava, horse, golden; (4) Abhinandana, ape, golden;(5) Sumati, heron, golden;(6) Padmaprabha, lotus-flower, red; (7) Sapārsva, the svastika, golden;(8) Candraprabha, moon, white; (9) Suvidhi (or Paşpadanta), dolphin, white;(10) Sitala, the Srivatsce, golden; (11) Śreyāmsa (or Śreyão), rhinoceros, golden; (12) Vāsupujya, buffalo, red; (13) Vimala, hog, golden;(14) Ananta (or Anantajit), falcon, golden; (15) Dharma, thunderbolt, golden; (16) śānti, antelope, golden;(17) Kanthu, goat, golden;(18) Ara, the nandyavarta, golden; (19) Malli, jar, blue; (20) Savrata (or Munisuvrata), tortoise, black; (21) Nami, blue lotus, golden; (22), Nemi (or Ariştanemi), conch shell, black; (23) Pārsva, snake; blue; (24) Vardhamāna, lion, golden. Al Tirthakaras were Kşatriyas; Munisuvrata and Nemi belonged to the Harivamśa, the remaining 22 to the Ikşyaku race. Malli was a woman, according to the Svetāmbaras; bat this the Digambaras deny, as, according to them, no female can reach liberation. The interval.in years between the next intervals are krore; the following intervals pressed in definite numbers of year the given above. Nami died '500,000 years before Nemi; Munisarrata 1,100,000 years before Nami; 6,500,000, 10,000,000 - 110 Cannot are ·8] JAINISU interval." These particulars are here given according to the Svetămbaras. In connexion with these items of the mythological history of the Jains, it may bo added that they relate the legends of 12 universal monarchs (Cakravartins), of 9 Vasudevas, 9 Baladeyas, and 9 Prativāsudeyas who lived within the period from the first to the 22nd Tirthakara. Together with the 24 Tirthakaras they are the 63 great person. ages of Jain history; the legends of their lives form the subject of a great opic work by Homacandra-the Trişaşțisalūkapuruşacarita, which is based on older sources, probably the Vāsudevehindi (edited in Bhāynagar, 1906-09, by the Jainadharmaprasārakasabhā). All Tīrthakaras have reached Nirvāṇa at their death. Though, being released from the world, they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, they have nevertheless become the object of worship and are regarded as the 'gods' (deva) by the Jaingan; temples are erected to them. where their idols are worshipped". The favourite Tirthakaras are the first and the three last ones, bat temples of the remaining ones are also met with. The worship of the idols of the Tirthakaras 10 See the articles, Ages of the World (Indian), HRH, 1, 11 Seo the article Atheison (Jain), ERE, ii, pp. 186 f. 12 For images and idols of the Jains ste J. Burgess, Digambara Jain Iconography,' 14 xxxif. (1903) 459 ff.; G, Būbler, 'Specimons of Jalna Scalptures from Bathura ln Epigraphia Indica, il. (1894) 311 ff.;J. Forgasson and J. Burgess, Caro Temples, London, 1880, Pp. 200 . pp. 487 ff:

·[9 JAIN VIEW OF THEIR ORIGIN is already mentioned in some canonical books, but no rules for their worship are given"; it was, however, already in full sway in the first century of our era, as evidenced by the Paümacariya, the oldest Prakrit kārya of the Jains, and by the statues of Tirthakaras found in ancient sites-e.g., in the Karkāli mound at Mathurā which belongs to this period". Some sects, especially, a rather recent section of the Śretămbarás, the Dhundhi or Sthanakavāsins, -reject this kind of worship altogether". It goes without saying that the Tirthakaras, cicept the two last, belong to mythology rather than to history; the 22nd, Aristanemi, is connected with the legend of Krşqa as his relative. But the details of Mahāvīra's life as related in the canonical books may be regarded on the whole as historical facts. He was a Kşatriya of the Jñāta clan and & native of Kundagrāma, & suburb of the town Vaisāli (the modern Basärh, some 27 miles north of Patna ).. He was the second son of the Kşatriya 13 Bome kind of worship, however, seems to be implied from the oldest times by the montion of the various ceżya (cailya ), or shrines, in the sacred books. These shrines were situated in gardens in which Blahăvirs resided daring his visits to the towns to which they belonged. Cf. Ioernle, Urdsagadasão, tr., p. 3, note 4. 14 Epigr. Ind. li. 311 f. 16 80s Notes on the non-Idolatrous Shwetambar Jains,' by Seeker,' 1911; and Bargaret Stevenson, Notes on Modern Jainism, pp. 13 . 16 Kandeggina and Vapigaggama, both Vesilt, bare boen identified by Hoernle (loc. cit. p. 4, noto 8) with the modern villages Baniyå and Basakand. 4 subarts of ·10) JAINISH Siddhartha and Trišala, a highly connected lady. The Svetāmbaras maintain, and thus it is stated in the Acarūngasūtra, the Kalpasūtra, etc., that the soul of the Tirthakara first descended into the womb of the Brāhmaṇi Deranandā, and was, by the order of Indra, removed thence to the Tomb of Triſala". But the Digambaras reject this story, His parents, who were pious Jains and worshippers of Parśva, gave him the name Vardhamina (Vira or Mabāvīra is an epithet used as a name; Arhat, Bhagavat, Jina, etc., are titles common to all Tirthakaras). He married Yasoda and by her had a daughter Anoijā. His parents died when he was 30 years old, and his elder brother Nandivardhana succeeded his father in whatovor position he had held. With the porinission of his brother and the other anthorities, he carried out a longcherished resolve and became a monk with the usual Jain rites. Then followed 12 years of solfmortification; Mahavira wandered about as a mendicant friar, bearing all kinds of hardships; after the first 13 months he even discarded clothes. At the end of this period dedicated to meditation, be reached the state of omniscience (kevala), ponding to the Bodhi of the Buddhists. He lived for 42 years more, preaching the law and instructing his 11 disciples (ganadhara); Indrabhuti, Agnibhūti, Váyubhūti, Ārya Vyakta, Arya Sudharman, Manditaputra, Mauryaputra, Akampita, 17 Cf. the transfor of the embryo of Baladern from the womb of Rohipt to that of Devakt, whence he got the Dame Sankarsana, still retaining the metrodymic Rauhineya. corres- ·CANONICAL LITERATURE OF THE S'YETĀUBARAS (11 Acalabhrātſ, Metārya and Prabhása. In the 72nd year of his life he died at Pavā and reached Nirvāņa. This event took place, as stated above, some years before Buddha's death, and may, therefore, be placed about 480 B. C. The Svetāmbaras, however, place the Nirvăņa of Mahavira, which is the initial point of their era, 470 years before the beginning of the Vikrama ers, or in 527 B. 0.18 The Digambaras place the same event 18 yearslater. 3. CANONICAL LITERATURE OF THE S'VETĀMBARAS. The canonical books of the Svetāmbaras (the Digambaras do not admit them to be genuine ) are not works by Mahāvīra himself, but some of them claim to be discourses delivered by him to Indrabhūti, the Gautama, which his disciple, the ganadhara Sudharman, related to his own disciple Jambusvâmin. Before entering on details about the existing canon, it must be stated that, according to the Jains, there were originally, since the time of the first Tirthakara, two kinds of sacred books, the 14 pūrvas and the 11 angas; the 14 pārvas were, however, reckoned to make up a 12th anga under the name of Drotivāda. The knowledge of the 14 pūrvas continued only down to Sthūlabhadra, 18 In tbe Preface to his ed, of the Pariſişta Parvan (Bibl. Ind., Calcutta, 1891), p. 4 ff., the present writer criticises the Srotambara tradition, and, by combining the Jain date of Chandragupta'a accession to the throne in 155 after the Nirvãng with the historical date of the Eame'event in 321 or 322 B. C. arrives at 476 or 477 B. 0. as the probable date of Mahavira's Nirvana.

·JAINTSY 12) the 8th patriarch after Mabăvira; the next 7 patriarchs down to Vajra knew only 10 pūrvas, and after that time the remaining põrras vere grada: ally lost, until, at the time when the canon was written down in books (980 A. V.), all the pūrvas had disappeared, and consequently the 12th anga too. Such is the Śretambara tradition regarding the pūrvas; that of the Digambaras is similar as regards the final loss of the pūrvas, differing, however, in most details; but they contend that the angas also were lost after 9 more generations". The 11 angas are the oldest part of the canon (siddhanta), which at present embraces' 45 texts. Besides the 11 angas, there are 12 upāngas, 10 painnas (prakırnas), 6 chedasūtras, Nandt and Anuyogadvāra, 4 mülasūtras. A list of these texts according to the usual enumeration followsk'. (1) 11 angas: Acāra, Sūtrakrta, Sthāna, Sama. vāya, Bhagavatī, Jñātādharmakathās, Upāsakadašās, Antakyddasās, Anuttaraupapātikadašās, Praśnávyākaraņa, Vipāka (Dęstivāda, no longer extant); (2) 12 upangas: Aupapātika, Rājapraśniya, Jivā. bhigama, Prajñāpanā, Jambudrīpaprajűapti, Candra. prajñapti, Suryaprajñapti, Nirayāvali (or Kalpika ), Kalpāvatamsikā, Puşpikā, Puşpacülikā, Vrşpidašās; (3) 19 painnas (prakirņas): Cataħsaraña, Sams. tāra, Aturapratyakhyāna, Bhaktaparijñā, Tandu- 19 For details ace A, A. Guérinot, Repertoire d'épigraphio Jaina, Paris, 1908, p. 36. 20 For details see Weber, Sacred Literators of the Jainas, which first appeared (in Germany in Indische Studien, xvi. (1883), and xviL (1885), and was translated in 14 xvil. (1888-xl. (1892).

·CANONICAL LITERATURE OF THE STETAUDARAS ( 13 lavsiyāli, Candārija, Devendrastara, Gaņivija, Mahápratyākhyāna, Virastava; (4) 6 chedasūtras: Nisītha, Mahāničitha, Vyarahāra, Daśāśrutaskandha, Bșhatkalpa; Pañcakalpa ; (5) 2 sūtras without 2.common name; Nandi and Anuyogadvāra; (6) 4 mülasūtras: Uttarādhyayana, Avaśyaka, Dasa- 'vaikälika and Pindaniryukti. Most of the canonical books have been edited in India, some with commentaries. English translations have been published of the Açīrānga, Sūtrakrtānga, Upāsakadaçãs, Antakyddaśās, Anuttaraupapatikadašās, Uttarãdhyayana and two Kalpasūtras. The redaction of the canon took place under Devarddhigani in 980 after the Nirvāņa (4. D. 454, according to the common reckoning, actually perhaps 60 years later); before that time the sacred texts were handed down without embodying them in written books. In the interval between the composition and the final redaction of the texts, and even afterwards, they have undergone many alterations - transposition of parts, additions, etc.- traces of which can still be pointed out". Along with these alterations there seems to have gone on a gradual change of the language in which the texts were composed. The original language, according to the Jains, was Ardhamāgadhi, and they give that name, or Māgadhi, to the language of the present texts. But it has, most probably, been modernised during the process of oral transmission. The older parts of the canon contain many archaic .forms for which in later texts distinct Māhārāstrī idioms are substituted. It 21 Seo Weber, loc. cit. 8.

·JAINISU 14] will be best to call the languago of the sacred texts simply Jain Prākrit, and that of later works Jain Māhārāştri. As the works belonging to the canon are of different origin and age, they differ greatly in character. Somo are chiefly in prose,somo in verse and some in mixed prose and verse. Frequently & work comprises distinctly disparato parts put to gether when the redaction of the canon took place. The older prose works are genorally very diffuse and contain endless repetitions ; some, howevor, contain succinct rules, some, besides lengthy descriptions, systematic expositions of various dogmatic questions; in others, again, the systematic tendency prevails throughout. A large literaturo of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the more important texts." Besides the sacred literature and the commentaries belonging to it, the Jains possess separate works, in close material agreement with the former, which contain systematic expositions of their faith, or parts of it, in Prākrit and Sanskrit. Those works, which generally possess the advantage of accuracy and clearness, have in their turn become the object of learned labours of commentators. One of the oldest is Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigamasutra, a Svetāmbara, work, which, however, is also claimed by the Digambaras." A sort of encyclopaedia of Jainism 22 The development of this commenting literature has been stadied by E. Lermang, ZDUG xlvi. (1892) 585 ff. 23 The Skr. text with a German tr, and explanation has been published by the present writer in ZDMG Is. (1906) 287 ff., 512 ff.; toxt and bhayya are contained in the Bibl. Ind. edition (Calcatta, 1905).

·TBE DOCTRINES OF JAINISH [ 15 is the Lokaprakāsa" by Tejapāla's son, Vinayavijaya (1652). On these and similar works our sketch of the Jain faith is chiefly based. It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular' literature of their own, in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prākrit. Of peculiar interest are the numerous tales in Prākrit and Sanskrit with which authors used to illustrate dogmátical or moral problems. They have also attempted more extensive narratives, some in a more popular stylě, as Haribhadra's Samaraichchakahā, and Siddharşi’s great allegorical work Upamitibhcvaprapañchū kathā (both edited in Bibl. Ind., Cal. cutta, 1901-14), some in highly artificial Sanskrit, as. Somadeva's Yasastilaka and Dhanapāla's Tilakatañjari(both published in the Kūvyamālā, Bombay, 1901-03, 1903). Their oldest Prākrit poem (perhaps of the 3rd cent, A. D.), the Paūma. chariya, is a Jain version of the Rāmāyaṇa. Sanskrit poems, both in purūņa and in kūvya style, and hymns in Prākrit and Sanskrit, are very numerous with the Svetāmbaras as well as the Digambaras; there are likewisə some Jain dramas. Jain authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branchës-grammar, lexicography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc.ºs 4. THE DOCTRINES OF JAINISM. Jain doctrines may be broadlydi vided into (i.) philosophical and (ii.) practical. Jain philosophy 24. Edited by Hirālala Hathsarājs, 3 vols., Jämpagar, 1910. 25 CI, art, Honshandra, ERE, vol. VI. P: 591 ·16) JAINISH contains ontology, metaphysics, and psychology. The practical doctrines are concerned with othics and asceticism, tnonasticism, and the life of the laity. i. (a) Philosophy.- The Arapyakag and Upa. nişads had maintained or woro belioved to main. tain, that Boing is ono, permanent, without begi. nning, change, or ond. In opposition to this viowe, tho Jains declare that Being is not of a persistent and unalterablo nature: Being, they say, 'is joined to production, continuation, and destruction'.** This theory, they call the theory of tho 'Indefini. teness of Being' (anekāntarůda); it comes to this: existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter; this matter, however, may assumo any shape and quality. Thus, clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and perish. It is clear that the Brāhmanical speculations are concerned with transcendental Being, whilo tho Jain view deals with Being as given in common exporience. The doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being is upheld by a very strange dialectical method called Sydvdda, to which the Jains attach do much importance that this namo frequently is used as a synonym for the Jain system itself. 36 See A. Jacobi, 'The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jainas,' in Trans of the Congress for the Elist of Rollgion, Oxford, 1008, ii. 60. [This paper is incladed in this book, after this article, A, N, V.}.

·TEE DOCTRINES OF JAINISH if we [ 17 According to this doctrine of Syādžāda, there are 7 forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word syöt, e. g., syăd asti sarvan, syal nästi sartan. Syūt means 'may be', and is explained by. kathanchit, which in this connexion may be translated somehow'. The word syat here qualifies the word asti, and indicates the Indefiniteness of Being (orastitvam). For example, we say a jar is somehow, i, e., it exists, mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seoming truisms is to guard against the assumption of the Vedantins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' (asti) and is not (nüsti). A third predicate is inexpressible? (avaktavyo); for existent and non-existent (sat and asat) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a co-existence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. The three predicates variously combined make up the 7 propositions, or sapla bhangas, of the Syādrāda. Supplementary to the doctrine of the Syada tāda, and, in a way, the logical complement to it, is the doctrine of the nayas." The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things: all these ways of judgment, according to the Jains, are one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are 7 nayas, 4 referring to concepts, and '3 to words. The reason for this variety 27 Ib. 61.

·JAINISH 18] of stateinent is that Being is not simple, "48 the Vedāntins contend, but is of a complicated nature; therefore every statement and 'evory denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplote and one-sided; and, if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we are bound to go astray. Hence it is usual in explaining notions to state what the thing under discussion is with reference to substance, place, time, and state of being. (6) Bſetaphysics. - All things, i, c. substances (drarya), are divided into lifeless things (ajicakāya) and lives or souls (jira). The former are again divided into (1) space (ikūra); (2) and (3) two subtle substances called dharma and adharma, and (4) matter (pudgala). Space, dharma, and adharma are the necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter; space affords them room to subsist; dharma makes it possible for them to move or to bo moved; and adharma, to rest. It will be seen that the function of space, as we conceivo it, is by the Jains distributed among three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical. . But the conception of the two cosmical substances dharma and adharma, which occur slready, in the technical meaning just given in canonical books, seems to be developed from a more primitive notion. For, as their names dharma and adharma indicate, they seem to Lave denoted, in primitive speculation, those invisible .Auids' which by contact cause sin and merit. The Jains, using for the latter notions the ·THE DOCTRINES OF JAINISH [19 torms pāpar and punya, 'vers free' to 'use the current names of those "fluids' in a new 'sense not known to other Indian thinkers. Space (ākāša) is divided into that part of space which is occupied by the world of things (lokākāša), and the space beyond it (alokākāsa), þvhich' is absolutely void and empty, an abyss of nothing. Dharma and adharma are co-extensive with the world; accordingly no soul nor any particle of matter can get beyond this world for want of the substrates of motion and rest. Time is recognized by some as a quasi-substance besides those enumerated. Matter (pudgala) is eternal and consists of atoms; otherwise it is not determined in its nature, but, as is already implied by the doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being, it is something that may become anything, as earth, water, fire, wind, etc. Two states of matter are distinguished: gross' matter, of which the things which perceive consist, and subtlè matter, which is begond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter, for: instance, is that matter which is transforred into the different kinds of karma (see below). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. Two atoms form a compound when the one is viscous and the other dry, or both are : of different degrees either of viscousness or dryness. Such compounds combine with others, and so on. They are, however, not constant in their nature, but are subject to change or dévelopment (parinūma), which consists in the assumption of qualifies. (gunas). In this way Te ·were 20) JANNISU originate also the bodies and senses of living beings. The elements-earth, water, fire, and wind-are bodies of souls in the lowest stage of development, and are, therefore, spoken of as earth-bodieg' 'water-bodies', etc. Here we meet with animistic ideas which, in this form, are peculiar to Jainism. They probably go back to a remote period, and must have prevailed in classes of Indian society which not influenced by the more advanced ideas of the Brāhmans. Different from matter and material things are the souls (jiva, lit. 'lives'). There is an infinite number of souls; the whole world is literally filled with them. The souls are substances, and as such eternal; but they are not of a definite size, since they contract or expand according to the dimensions of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. Their characteristic mark is intelligence, which may be obscured by extrinsic causes, but never destroyed. Souls are of two kinds; mundane (sansărin), and liberated (mukta). Mundane souls are the embodied souls of living beings in the world and still subject to the Cycle of Birth; liberated souls will be embodied no more; they have accomplished absolute purity; they dwell in the state of perfection at the top of the universe, and have no more to do with worldly affairs; they have reached natrvāna (nirusti, or multi). Metaphysically the differeace between the mundane and the liberated soul consists in this, that the fornier is entirely filled by subtle matter, as, a bag is filled with Band, ·THE DOCTRINES OF JAIN1931 [ 21 while the latter is absolutely pure and free from any material alloy. The defilement of the soul takes place in the following way. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into karma pours into the soul; this is called 'inflax' (aśrava). In the usual state of things a soul harbours passions (kaşaya) which act like & viscous substance and retain the subtle matter coming into contact with the soul; the subtle matter thus caught by the soul enters, as it were, into a chemical combination with it; this is called the binding (bandha) (of karma-matter). The šabtle matter 'bound' or amalgamated by the soul is transformed into the 8 kinds of karms, and formas à kind of subtle body (kārmaņasarira ) which clings to the soul in all its migrations and future births, and determines the individual state and lot of that particular soul. For, as each particular karma has been caused by some action, good, bad, or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so this karma, in its turn, produces certain painful, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. Now, when a particular karma has produced its effect in the way described, it (i. c. the particular karma-matter) is discharged or purged from the soul. This process of purging off is called nirjara. When this proces8 goes on without interruption, all karma-matter will, in the end, be discharged from the soul; and the latter, now freed from the weight which had kept it down before the time of its liberation (for matter is heavy, and karma is material), goes up in a straight, the top of the universe wherom 1 ·22] JAINIS the liberated souls divell, But in the usual cotirse of things the purging and binding processes go on simultaneously, and thereby tho soul is forced to continue its mundane existonce. After the death of an individual, this soul, together with its kümnice, prasarira, goes, in a fow moments, to the place of its ne's birth and there assamos a new body, expanding or contracting in accordanca with the dimensions of the latter, Embodied souls are living beings, the classification of which is a subjcct not only of theoretical but also of great practical interest to the Jains, As their highest duty (parama dharm) is not to kill any living beings (ahimse), it becomes incumbent on them to know the various forms which lifo may assume. The Jnins divide, living beings according to the number of sense-organs which they possess: the highest (patrichendriya) possess all five organs, viz. those of touch, taste, smell; sight, and hearing, while the lowost (ckendriya) have only the organ of touch, and the remaining classes each one organ more than the preceding one in the order of organs given avore: 0. . vorms, etc., possess the organs of touch and testo; ants, etc., possess, in addition, smell;-bees, etc., seeing; The vertebrates possess all fire organs of sense; the higher animals, men, denizens of bell, and gods possess an internal organ or mind (manas), and are therefore called rational (samnin), wbile the lower animals have no mind (asaminin). The notions of the Jains about to organ are, in part, peculiar to for a more detailed notice J006 ·THE DOCTRINES OY JAINISM 2 [ 23 It has already been' stated that the four elements are animated by souls; i. l.; particles of earth, etc., are the body of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives;, they live and die and are born again, in the same or another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or'subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organed lives are plants; of some plants cach is the bodỹ of one soul only, but of other plants. each is an aggregation of embodied souls which have all functions of life, as respiration and nutrition, in common. That plants possess Boals is an opinion shared by other Indian philosophers. But, the Jains have developed this theory in a remarkable way. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. "But those plants of which each is a colony of plant-lives mag also be subtle, i, e. invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. These subtle plants are called nigoda; they are composed of an infinite number of souls forming a very small cluster, have respiration and nutrition in common, and experience the most exquisite pains. Innumerable nigodas forma a globule, and with them the whole space of the world is closely packed, like & box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply of souls in placo of those who have reached nirrāna... But on infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to replace the Facancy caused in the world by the nittänu of all the souls that have been liberated from the beginningless past down to ·SAINIS 243 the present. Thus it is evident that the samsara will never be empty of living beings (soe Lokapresum kāsa, vi. 31 ff.). From another point of view mundane beings are divided into four grades: denizens of hell, animals, men, and gods; these are the four walks of life gati), in which beings are born according to their merits or demerits.* We have seen the couse of the soul's embodi. mont is the presenoo in it of karma-matter. Tho theory of karma is the key-stone of the Jain system; it is necessary, therefore, to explain this theory in more detail. The natural qualities of soul are perfect knowledge (jnana), intuition or 28 The Jains recognize 5 bodies which an individual may possess (though not all simultabbonsly), ono gross and 4 sabtle ones. Besides the karmanasarira, which is tho receptacle of karma and has no bodily fanctions, there aro (1) the transmutation body (Vaikriyssarira), pro ducing the wonderfal appearances which gods, magloads, sto., may asgute; (2) the translocation body (Gharaka farira), which certain sages may assume for a short timo in order to consult a Tirthakara at somo distanco; (3) tho ignornas body (taijaralarira), which in common beings causes the digestion of food, bat in persona of berit gives effect to their cursos (that they bura their objects) and to their benedictions that they sladder as the rays of the moon), etc. This doctrine of the subtle bodies, in which, however, many details are subject to controversy, seems to be the optcome of very primitive ideas abort magic atc. which the Jsins attemptod to reduce to s rational theory. With the terras raikriya and faijasasarira may be compared the raikärika and taijata dhankára vf the gáikhyas, ·TES DOCTRINES OF JAINISU [ 25 faith (darsana), highest bliss, and all sorts of perfections; but these inborn qualities of the soul are weakened or obscured, in mundane souls, by the presence of karma. From this point of view the division of karma will be understood. When karma-matter has penetrated the soul, it is transformed into 8 kinds (prakrti) of karma singly or severally, which form the karmanasarira, just as food is, by digestion, transformed into the various fluids necessary for the support end growth of the body. The 8 kinds of karma are as follows, (1) Jñànāvaraniya, that which obscures the inborn right knowledge (i, e. omniscience) of the soul and thereby produces different degrees of knowledge and of ignorance;" (2) darsanavaraniya, that which obscures right intuition, e.g. sleep;(3) vedaniya, that which obscures the bliss-nature of the soul and thereby produces pleasure and pain; (4) mohaniya, that which disturbs the right attitude of the soul with regard to faith, conduct, passions, and other emotions, and produces doubt, error, right or wrong conduct, passions, and various mental states. The following 4 kinds of karma concern more the individual status, of a being; (5) nyuşka, that which dotormines the length of life of an individual in ono birth as hell-being, animal, man, or god; (6) ncima, that which produces the various circuma- 29 For details, 888 ERE, the artt. Demons and Spirits (Jain), vol. iv, pp. 6086; Cosmogony and Costrology (Indian), 4, vol. iv. p. 160 f., and Ages of the World (Indian), vol. 1. p. 200. 4 ·JAINIS 261 tances of eléments which collectirely make up an individaal existence, e. g. the peculiar body with its general and special qualities, faculties, etc.; (7) gotra, that which determines the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., of an individual; (8) antarāya, that which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and thereby prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it. Each kind of karnu has its predestined limits in time within which it must take effect and thereby be purged off. Before we deal with thó operation of karma, however, we must mention another doctrine which is connected with the karma theory, viz. that of the six lesyās. The totality of darma amalgamated by a soul induces on it & transcendental colour, a kind of complexion, which cannot be perceived by our eyes; and this is called lesyő. There are six lesyās: black, blue, groy: yellow, red, and white. They have also, and prominently, a moral bearing; for the lexyd indicates the charater of the individual who owns it. The first three belong to bad characters, the last three to good characters, 88 The individual state of the soul is produced by its inborn nature and karma with which it is fitiated; this is the developmental or părinamika state. But there are other states which have 30 Tha Jains acknowledge fire kinds of knowledge: (1) ordinary cogoition (mati), (2) tastimony (frutz), (3) supernatcral cognition (avadhi), (*) direct knowledge of the thoughts of others (manalparyaya), (5) omniscience (kevala), ·THE DOCTRINES OP JAINISH [ 27 reference. only to the behaçiouf of the karma. In 'the common course of things karma takes offećt and produces its proper results; then the soulſis in the audayka state. By. proper efforts karna may be prevented, for some time, from taking offect; it is neutralized (upasamita), but it is still present; just like fire covered by ashes; then the soul is in the aupasamika statě. When karma is not only prevented from operating, but is annihilated altogether, (Kșapita), then the soul is in the kşāyika state, which is necessary for reaching nirvana. There is a fourth state of the soul, kşüyopasamika, which partakes of the nature of the preceding ones; in this state some karma is annihilated, some is neutralized, and some is active. This is the state of ordinary good men, but the kşāyika and aupasamika states belong to holy men, especially the former. It will be easily understood that these distinctions have an important moral bearing; they are constantly referred to in the practical ethics of the Jains. We shall now consider the application of the karma-theory to ethics. The highest goal is to get rid of all karma (nirjară) and meanwhile to acquire no new karma-technically speaking, to stop the influx (asrara) of karma, which is called sarvard, or the covering of the channels through which karma finds entrance into the soul. . All actions produce karma, and in the majority of cases entail on the doer continuance of worldly existence. (simparāyika); but, when a man is free from passions and acts in strict compliance ·283 JAINISH with the rules of right condact, his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated (tryāpatha). Therefore the whole apparatns of monastic conduct is required to prevent the formation of new karma; the same purpose is served by austerities (tapas), which, moreover, annihilate the old karma more speedily than would happen in the common course of things. It is evident from the preceding remarks that the ethics and ascetics of the Jains are to be regarded as the logical consequence of the theory of karma. But from a historical point of view many of their ethical principles, monastic institu.' tions, and ascetic practices have been inherited from older religious classes of Indian society, since Brahmanical ascetics and Buddhists resemble tbem in many of their precepts and institutions (see SBE xxii. (1884) Introd. p. xxji ff.). ii. Jain ethics has for its end the realization of nirucira, or moksa. The necessary condition for reaching this end is the possession of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. These three excellences are metaphorically named the 'three jewels' (triratna), an expression used also by the Buddhist, but in a different sense; they are not produced, but they are manifested on the removal of obstructing or obscuring species of karma. To effect this, the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. Of first importance are the five vows, the first four of which are also acknowledged by Brahmans and Buddhists. The five vows (uratas) of the Jains are: (1) not to kill; (2) not to lie; (3) not to steal :

·TDE DOCTRINES OP JAINISU [ 29 (4) to abstain from sexual intercourse; (5) to 'renounce all interest in worldly things, especially to keep no property. These vots are to be strictly observed by monks, who take them on entering the Order, or, as it is commonly expressed, on taking dikşā. In their case the vows are called the five great rows (maharrata). Lay people, however, should observe these vows so far as their conditions admit; the five vows of the lay people are called the small vows (anuvrata). To explain: not to kill any living beings requires the greatest caution in all actions, considering that nearly everything is believed to be endowed with life, Endless rules have been laid down for monks which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living beings whatever. But if a layman were to observe these rules he could not go about his business; he is, therefore, obliged to refrain only from intentionally killing living beings, be it for food, pleasure, gain, or any such purpose. And so it is also with the remaining vovs; their rigoar is somewhat abated in the case of laymen. A layman, however, may, for a limited time, follow a more rigorous practice by taking one of the following particular vows or regulations of conduct (silavrata); (1) diguirati; he may limit the distance up to which he will go in this or that direction; (2) anarthadandavirati; he may abstain from engaging in paything that does not strictly concern him;(3) upabhogaparibhogaparimāņa; he may set a measure to his food, drink, and the things he enjoys, avoiding besides gross enjoyments. (It may be mentioned in passing that certain articles of food, etc., are strictly forbidden to all, monks and ·80] JAISIS) laymon alike, e. g. roots, honcy, and spirits. and likovise no food may bo caten at night.). Tuo preceding threo rows are called gunnurata; the next four are the disciplinary rows (tikpārrata): (4) desavirata, reducing the area in which one will move; (5) scīmuyika; by this you the layman undertakes to give up, at stated times, all sinful actions by sitting down motionless and meditating on holy things;(6) pruşadhopazrīsa, to live as a monk on the 8tils, 14th, or 15th, or day of tho lunar fortnight, at least once a month: (7) atithinnivi. bhāgu, lit. to giro & share to guests, but it is understood in a less literal sense, viz., to proride the monks with what thoy want. Most of theso regulations of conduct for laymen are intended apparently to make them participate, in a measure and for some timo, in the merits and benefits of monastic lifo without obliging them to renounce the world altogether. The rules for & voluntary death have a similar end in view, It is evident that tho lay part of the community were not regarded as outsiders, or only as friends and patrons of the Order, as seems to have been the case in early Buddhism; their position was, from the beginning, well defined by religious daties and privileges; the bond which united them to the Order of monks was an effectise one. The state of a layman was one preliminary and, in many cases, preparatory to the state of a monk; in the latter respect, however, a chango scems to have come about, in so far as now and for some time past the Order of monks is recruited chiefly from novices entering it at an early age, not from laymen in !

·THE DOCTRINES OP JAINISHI [ 31 general,. It cannot be doubted that this close union between laymen and monks brought about by the similarity of théir religions doties, differing not in kind, but:in degree, has enabled Jainism to droid fundamental changes within, and to resist dangers from without for more than two thousand years, while Buddhism, being less exacting as regards the laymen, underwent the most extraordinary evolutions and finally disappeared in the country of its origin. A monk on entering the Order takes the five great vows 'stated above; if they are strictly kept, in the spirit of the five times five clauses, or bhāvanās (SBE xxii. 202 ff.), no new karma can form. But, to practise them effectaally, more explicit regulations are required, and these constitüte the discipline of the monks. This discipline is described under seven heads. (1) Since through the activity of body, speech, and mind, which is technically called yoga by the Jains, karma-matter pours into the soul (israva) and forms new karma, as explained above, it is necessary, in order to prevent the dstava (or to effect samvars), to regulate those activities by : keeping body, speech, and mind in strict control:- these are the three guptis (e. g., the gupti or, guarding of the mind consists in not thinking or desiring anything bad; having only good thoughts, etc.). (2) Even in those actions which are inseparable from the duties of a monk, he may become guilty of sin by inadvertently transgressing the great vows (e. g., killing living beings). To avoid such sing he must obserre ·JAINISH are 82] the five samitis, i. e, he must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body; e.g., a monk should in walking look before him for about six feet of ground to avoid killing or hurting 'any living being; he should, for the same reason, inspect and sweep the ground before he puts anything on it; he should be careful not to eat anything considered to possess life," etc. (3) Passion being the cause of the amalgamation of karma-matter with the soul, the monk should acquire virtues. The 4 cardinal vices (kaşāya) anger, pride, illusion, and greed; their opposite virtues are forbearance, indulgence, straightforwardness, and purity. Adding to them the following 6 virtues, veracity, restraint, austerities, freedom from attachment to anything, poverty and chastity, we have what is called the tenfold highest law of the monks (uttamadhan. ma). (4) Helpful for the realization of the sanctity of which an earnest searcher of the highest good stands in need are the 12 reflexions (anuprekşā or bhāvanti) on the transitoriness of all things, on the helplessness of men, on the misery of the world, and similar topics,' which form the subject of endless homilies inserted in their works by Jain authors. (5) Furthermore, it is necessary for a monk, in order to keep in 31 The belief in colours of the soul seems to be very old and to go back to the time when expressions like 'a black soul, a bright soul', were onderstood in a literal 19036. Traces of a similar belief have also been found elsewhere (888 Mahabharata, xli. 280. 33 ., 291. 4 ft; cf. Yogatütra, ir, 7).

·THE DOCTRINES OF JAINISM [ 33 5 degrees the right path to perfection and to annihilate his karna, to bear. cheerfully with all that may cause him trouble or annoyance. There are 22 such troubles' (parişaha) which a monk must endure without flinching, as hunger and thirst, cold and heat, all sorts of trying occurrences, illness, ill treatment, emotions, etc. If we consider that the conduct of the monk is regulated with the purpose of denying him every form of comfort and merely keeping him alive, without, however, the risk of hurting any living beings, it may be imagined to what practical consequences the endurance of the parişahas must lead. (6) Conduct (chāritra) consists in control and is of or phases. In the lowest phase all sinful activities are avoided, and the highest leads to the annihilition of all karma, preliminary to final liberation. (7) The last item is asceticism op austerities (tapas), which not only prevents the forming of new karma (sarivara) but also parges off the old (nirjară) provided that it be undertaken in the 'austerities of fools' (bālatapas) practised by other religious sects, through which temporary merits, such as supernatural powers, birth as a god, etc., can be accomplished but the highest good will never be attained. Tapas is, therefore, one of the most important institutions of Jainism. It is divided into (4) external and (B) internal tapas; the former comprises the austerities practied by the Jains, the latter their spiritual exercises. (A) Among austerities fasting is the most conspicuous; the Jains have developed it to a kind of art, and reach a remarkable proficiency in it. The usual way of fasting is to 5 ·common with Brahmanical Yoga. (B) Internal SAINT836 80 called; 34] ent only one meal evory second, third, fourth day, and so on down to half a goar. Another form of fasting is starring oneself to death maramūntiki samlekhanui.na Other kinds of abstinence are distinguished from fasting properly reduction of tho quantity of tho daily food; restrictions as regards the kind of food selected from that one has obtaind by begging (for monks and nuns must, of course, beg their daily meal and must not eat what has boon specially prepared for them); rejection of all attractivo food. To the category of external austorities belong also sitting in secluded spots to meditate there and the postures taken up daring meditation. The latter item Jain ascetics have in austerities embrace all that belongs to spiritual discipline, including contemplation-0. 8., confessing and repenting of sins. Transgressions of the rules of conduct daily expiated by the ceremony of pratikramana; greater sins must be confessed to a superior (alochana) and repeated of, The usual penance in less sorious cases is to stand erect in a cortain position for a given time (küyotsarga); but for graver transgressions the superior prescribes other penances--in the worst cases a new ordination of the guilty monk. Other kinds of internal austerities consist in modest behaviour, in doing services to other members of the Order or laymen, in the duty of studying, in overcoming all temptations. But the most 27a) See 'Voluntary death or enthabasia', in the art. Death and Disposal of the Dead (Jain) ERE. are ·THE DOOTRINES OF JAINIBUI [35 important of all spiritual exercises is contem. plation (dhyāna). Contemplation consists in the concentration of the mind on one object; it cannot be persevered in for longer than one muhürtco (48 minutes), and is permitted only to persons of a sound constitution. According to the object on which the thoughts are concentrated and the purpose for which this is done, contemplation may be bad or good, and will lead to corresponding results. We are here concerned only with good contemplation, which is either religious (dharma), or pure or bright (sukla). The former leads to the intuitive cognition of things hidden to common mortals, especially of religious truths. Indeed, it cannot be doubted that the pretended accuracy of information on all sorts of subjects, such as cosmography, astronomy, geography, spiritual processes, etc., which the sacred books and later treatises .contain is in great part due to the intuition which the 'religious contemplation' is imagined to produce. Higher than the latter is the “pure' contemplation, which leads through four stages to final emancipation: first, single objects aro meditated upon, then only one object; then there is the stage when the activities of the body, speech, and mind continue, but only in a subtle form without relapse. At this stage, when the worldly existence rapidly draws towards its end the remaining karma may be suddenly consumed by a kind of explosion called samudghūta. Then, in the last stage of contemplation, all karma boing annihilated and all activities having ceased, the soal leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ·36] JAINISSE can enter ever. It must, however, bo remarked that 'pure contemplation is not by itself a means of reaching liberation, but that it is the last link of a long chain of preparatory exertions. Even its first two stages can be realized only those in whom the passions (kaşāya) are either neutralized or annihilated; and only keralins, i, e. those who have already reached omniscience, into the last two stages, which lead directly to liberation. On the other hand, the nirvāra is necessarily preceded by 12 years of self-mortification of the flesha, which should be the closing act ofa monk's career, though it no longer leads to liberation, for Jambūsvâmin, the disciple of Mahavira's disciple Sudharman, vas the last man who reached kevala, or omniscience, and was liberated on his death (64 after Mahāvīra's Nirvīņa); accordingly during the rest of the present Ayasarpiņi period nobody will be born who reaches nir väna in the same existence. Nevertheless these speculations possess a great theoretical interest, because they afford us a deeper insight into the Jain system. In this connexion we must notice a doctrine to which the Jains attach much importance, viz. the doctrine of the 14 gunasthānas, i. e. the 14 steps which, by a gradual increase of good qualities and decrease of karma, lead from total ignorance and wrong belief to absolute parity of the soul and final liberation, 28 Bee Death and Disposal of the Dead (Jain), ERE vol. ir, p. 484. 29 Parikişta Parpan, 17. 50 f. 7 ·THE DOCTRINES OF JAINTSU 97 In the first stage (mithyadrsti) are all beings from the nigodas upwards to those men who do not know or do not believe in the truths revealed by the Tirthakaras; they are swayed by the two cardinal passions, love and hate (rūga and dresa), and are completely tied down by karma. In the following stages, as one advances by degrees in true knowledge, in firmness of belief, and in the control and repression of passions, different kinds of karma are got rid of and their effects cease, so that the being in question becomes purer and purer in each following stage. In all stages up to the 11th (that of a upasāntakaşayavitarāgachchhadmastha) a relapse may take place and a man may fall even down to the first stage. But as soon 'as he has reached the 12th stage, in which the first four kinds of karma are annihilated (that of a kşīņakaşāyavitarūgachchhadmastha), he cannot but pass through the last two stages, in which omniscience is reached; in the 13th stage (that of a sayogikevalin ) the man still belongs to the world, and may continue in it for a long period; he retains some activities of body, speech, and mind; bat, when all his activities cease, he enters on the last stage (that of an ayogikevalin), which leads immediately to liberation, when the last remnant of karma has been annihilated. - A question must now be answered which will present itself to every critical reader, viz. Is the karma-theory as explained above an original and integral part of the Jain system? It seems, so abstruse and highly artificial that one would readily believe it a later developed metaphysical dondui ·88 ] JAINISY which was grafted on an originally religions system based on animistic notions and intent on sparing all living beings: But such a hypothesis would bo in conflict with the fact that this karma-theory, if not in all details, certainly in the main outlines, is acknowledged in the oldest parts of the canon and presupposed by many expressions and technical terms occurring in them. Nor can we assume that in this regard the canonical books represent a later dogmatic development for the following reason; the terms asrava, samvara, nirjară, etc., can be understood only on the supposition that karna is a kind of subtle matter flowing or pouring into the soul (asrara), that this influx can be stopped or its inlets covered (santara), and that the karma-matter received into the soul is consumed or digested, as it were, by it (nirjara). The Jains understand these terms in their literal meaning, and use them in explaining the way of salvation (the samvara of the asravas and the nirjar lead to mokşa). Now these terms are as old as Jainism. For the Buddhists have borrowed from it the most significant term asrara; they use it in very much the same sense as the Jains, but not in its literal meaning, since they do not regard the karma as subtle matter, and deny the existence of a soul into which the karma could have an infüx'. Instead of samvara they say ăsavakkhaya (äsravakşayo), 'destruction of the asravas', and identify it with magga (mūrga, 'path'). It is obvious that with them asrava has lost its literal meaning, and that, therefore, they must have borrowed this term from a sect where it had retained its original significance, or, in other ·PRESENT STATE OF JAINISH [ 89 Tords, from the Jains. The Buddhists also use the term samvara, e. g. silasamvara, 'restraint under the moral lav', and the participle samruta, controlled', words which are not used in this sense by Brāhmanical writers, and therefore are most probably adopted from Jainism, where in their literal sense they adequately express the idea that they denote. Thus the same argument serves to prove at the same time that the karma-theory of tha Jains is an original and integral part of their system, and that Jainism is considerably older than the origin of Buddhism. com 5. PRESENT STATE OF JAINISM. The Jains, both Sretambaras and Digambaras, number, according to the census of 1901, 1, 334, 140 members, i. e, even less than 1/2 per cent of the whole population of India.' On account of their wealth and education the Jains are of greater importance, however, than might be expected from their number. There are munities of Jains in most towns all over India. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India, in Maisūr and Kannada, but also in the North, in the North-Western provinces, Eastern Rājputāna, and the Panjab. The headquarters of the Sretāmbaras are in Gujarāt (thence Gajarati has become the codimon language of the Svetāmbaras, rather than Hindi) and Western Rajputāne, but they are to be found also all 30 The small number of Jaing is explained by the fact thst Jainism is not a religion of the racultivated masses, bat rather of the upper classes. + ·JAFNISY 31 40) over Northern and Central India. Very much the same distribution of the Jains as at present seems, from the evidence of the inscriptions, to have provailed over since the 4th century." Splendid temples bear testimony to the wealth and zeal of the scct, some of which rank among the architectural wonders of India, as those on the hills of Girnăr and Satruñjaya, on Mount Abū, in Ellore, and elsewhere. The outfit of a monk is restricted to baro necessities, and these he must beg: clothes, a blanket, en alms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, - piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it. Tho nuns' outfit is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep on clothes and use peacocks' feathers instead of the broom. The monks share the head, or remove the hair by plucking it out (locha). The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred and is necessary at particalar times; it is peculiar to the Jains and is regarded by them as essential rite. Originally, the monks had to lead & wandering life except during the monsoon, when they stayed in one place; compare the case of the Buddhist monks. Thus Mahivira in his wandering stayed for one day only in a village and five days in a town. But this habit has been somewhat changed by the introduction of convents (upătraya), corresponding to the riluiras of the Buddhists. 21 See Guérinot, Repertoire d'epigraphie Jsign, p. 24.

·PRESENT STATE OF JAINISH (41 The upăsrayas 'are separate buildings erected by each sect for their monks or duns. An Upās'. raya is a large bare ball without bath-rooms and cooking places, furnished only with wooden beds' (M. Stevenson, Mod. Jainism, p. 38). The Svetambaras, as a rule, go only to those places where there are such upăsrayas; and now they stay as long as a week in a village, in a town as long as a month. It is in the upasraya that the monks preach or explain sacred texts to laymen who come to visit them. The daily duties of a. monk are rather arduous if conscientiously performed; e. g., he should sleep only three hours of the night. His duties consist in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), careful inspection of his clothes and other things for the removal of insects, for cleaning them, etc. (for details see lect. xxvi. of the Uttarādhyayana sūtra (SBE XLV. 142 ff.)). There are various monastic degrees. First there is the novice (saikșa), who is not yet ordained. When he or any other man takes the vows (vratūdāna), he renounces the world (pravrajyá) and initiated or takes dikşd. The most important ceremony at that time is the shaving or pulling out of the hair under a tree. From & common monk he may rise to the rank of a teacher and superior called upadhyāya, ocharya, vāchala, garin, etc. according to degrees and occupations. The religious duties of the laity bave, to some extent, been treated above. The ideal of conduct is that of the monk, which a layman, of course, 6 ·JAIN7831 . 42) cannot realize, but which he tries to approach by taking upon himself particular vows.** Bat in practical life also, apart from asceticism, the Jains possess a body of rules composed by monks which lay out a rational course of life for laypen and tend to improve their welfare and moral standard." The monks have also to provide for the religious wants of the laity by explaining sacred texts or religious treatises and delivering sermons; this is done in the upăsrayas where the laymen visit them; similarly the nuns are visited ły, or visit, the lay wonen. But the most conspicuous habit of the laity is attendance in temples, and worship of the Tirthakaras and the deities associated with them.' We must now advert to & peculiarity of the Jains which has struck all observers more than any other, viz. their extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being, a principle which is carried out to its very last consequences in mond- 33 Menţion should be made of the 11 palimãs (kr. pra. tima), or standards of ascetic life, which a layman may tako upon himself especially when he intends to end his lito by starving (cf. Hoernle, Urāsagadasão, tr., p. 45, n. 121., IA xxxfti. (1904) 330). 33 E. Windisch, Yogalāsirche Germ. tra, ZDAG xxvill. (1874); L. Sasli, Yogabindu. Its), tr., Giornale della Societe Asiatica Italiant, xxi. (1908), Varron, Jaining P. 64 £ 34 For a description of the worship of the different sections of the Jains sea Starenson, Mosh Jainism, p. 85 i... where there is also a short notice at the Jain teattuale and fasts (p. 107 0.; cf. also art. Fostival and Paytr (Jala) ERE. Tol. , p. 875 f.).

·HISTORY OF JAINIS3 [43 stic life, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in A great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even any insect, how. ever troublesome; he will remove it carefully withont hurting it. It goes without saying that the -Jains are strict vegetarians. This principle of not hurting any living being bars them from some professions, e. g. agriculture, and has thrust them intocommerce, and especially into its least elevating branch of mones-lending. Most of the money. lending in Western India is in the hands of the Jains, and this accounts in a great measure both 'for their unpopularity and for their wealth." A remarkable institution of the Jains, due to their tender regard for animal life, is their asylums for old and diseased animals, the päñjarāpolas, where they are kept and fed till they die a natural death, 6. HISTORY OF JAINISM. The history of the Jain church, in both the Svetāmbara and the Digambara sections, is chiefly contained in their lists of patriarchs and teachers and in legends concerning them. The oldest list of patriarchs of the Svetāmbaras is the Sthavirāvali in the Kalpasūtra, which begins with Mahüvira's disciple Sudharman and ends with the 33rd patriarch ſāņdilya or Skandila. Of most patriarchs only the names and the gotra are given; but there is also an expanded list from the 6th, Bhadrabāhu, down to the 14th, Vajrasena, which adds more details, viz. the names of the disciples of each patriarch and of the schools and branches (gara, 95 Stevenson, 41.

·44] JAINISH . kula, and saklā founded by, or orginating with, them. As some of these details aro also mentioned in old Jain inscriptions of the 2nd cent. 4. D. found at Mathura,"i this part at least of the Jain tradition is proved to be based on historical facts. Further, the more detailed list of patr. iarchs shows that after the 6th patriarch a great expansion of Jainism took place in the N. and N. V. of India." Beyond the details mentioned, we havo no historical records about the patriarchs; but such legonds as were known about them down to Vajrasena hare been combined in Hemachad. dra's Parisista Parvan into a kind of continuous narrative. For later times there are lists of teachers (gurrūvali, paffārali)" of separate schools, called gachchha which give a summary account from Mabāvira down to the founder of the gachchha in question, and then a moro detailed one of the line of descent from the latter downward, with some particulars of subsequent heads of the gachchha called Sripūjya. The number of gachchhas, 36 800 Bübler, Epigr. Ind. i. (1892) 371 ft., 393 f. 37 It is, however, curious that another tradition statos: 'In India after the time of the Naoda kings the Law of the Jinas will become scarca' (Paimachariya, luis. 42). Perhaps this refers mors spocially to Magadha and the adjoining countries, shers, under the reign of the Madryas, Buddhism soon attained the position of a popular religion, and most hayo becomo formidable rival of Jainism. 38 8se the contents of the work giron in the introduction to the text in the Bibl. Ind. edition, 39 The oldest gurrārali known is that by Munisandara, 4. D. 1410, ed. Benaros, 1905.

·DILSTORT OP JANISY ( 45 which wspally differ only in minute details of conduct, is said to amonnt to 84, of which only 8 aro represented in Gajarát, the most impor. tant of them being the Kharatara Gachchha, which has split into many minor gachchuas, the Tapi, Auchala, and others. Separate mention is dao to the Upakeśa Gachchha, those members are known as ahe Oskål Jains; they are remarkable for beginning their desent, not from Nabavira, but from his predecessor Pärsva. These lists of teachers socm, as a rule, to be reliable only in that part which comes after the founder of the school to thich they belong; the preceding period down to about the oth cont. A. D. is one of great uncertainty: there seems to be a chronological blank of three centuries somewhere.co Records which allude to contemporaneous secular history are scant; such as te here in inscriptions and legends refer to kings who had istoured the Jains or vore believed to have einbraced Jainism. The first patron king of the Jains is esid to have been Samprati, grandson of tho great emperor Asoka; but this is very doubtful history. A historical fact of the greatest importance for the history of Jainism was the conversion of Kumārapāla, king of Gujarāt, by Hemacliandra. Finally, to must mention the schistas (nihnava) that bare occurred in the Jain church. According to the Sratimbaras, there were eight schisms, of 10 A tall bibliography of this subject is contained in Golrinot, Emai da Libliographis jaina, p. 370 1., apd Peteloire derinli / ·46] JAIXISY which the first was originated by Mabīyira's gon-in-law, Jamali; and eighth, occurring in GOI 5. Y, or a. D. 83, gave rise to the Digambers sect." But the Digambaras seem to be ignorant of the earlier schisms; they say that under Bhadrabāhu rose the sect of Ardhsphālakas, which in A. D. 80 developed into the Sretīmbara sect. It is probable that the separation of the sections of the Jain church took place gradaally, an individual development going on in both groups living at a great distance from one another, and that they became aware of their mutual difference about the end of the 1st cont, A. D. But the difference is small in articles of faith (see art. Digambara ). The sources for the history of the Digambaras are of a similar kind to those of the Svetämbaras, 'but'later in date. The Digambara line of patriarchs is quite distinct from that of their rivals, except that they agree in the names of the first patriarch, Jambù, and the 6th, Bhadrababu, wko, according to the Digambaras, emigrated at the head of the true monks towards the South. From Bhadrabāhu dates the gradual loss of their sacred literature, as stated above. The inscriptions furnish ample materials for a necessarily incomplete history of their ancient schools (ganas); but they : do not quite agree in all details with the more modern tradition of the patjāvalis. According to the latter, the main church (müla-sangha) divided 41 Seo E, Leumano, in Ind. Stadion, zeli. (1885) 91 4. 17 8. ZDMG uitlii. (1884) 1 f.

·HISTORY OF JAINIS
[ 47
into four ganas, Nandi, Sena, Sinha, and Deva,
about the end of the 1st cent, A. D.
Literature. Some of the more important works
and treatises have been cited in the art.; a full
bibliography bas been giron by A. Guérinot, Essai
de bibliographie jaina, Paris, 1907, to which the
reader is referred for all questions detail. Of
new monographs on the subject (besides the old
one by G. Bühler, Uber die indische secte der
Jainas, Vienna, 1887, tr, J. Bargess, London, 1903)
the following will be found useful; Margaret
Stevenson, Notes on Modern Jainisni, Oxford,
1910; Herbert Warren, Jainisns, in Western. Garb,
as a Solution to Life's great Problems, Madras,
1912; H, L. Jhaveri, The First Principles of the
Jain Philosophy, London, 1910. For translations
of some of the principal texts see H. Jacobi,
Jaina Satras, 'SBE xxii., ALF. (1884, 1895).
<

·THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS
OF
THE JAINAS.
All who approach Jain philosophy will be
under the impression that it is & mass of philoso
phical tenets not upheld by one central idea, and
they will wonder what could have given currency
to what appears to us an unsystematical system.
I myself have held, and given expression to this
opinion, but I have now learned to look at Jain
philosophy in a different light. It has, I think,
& metaphysical basis of its own, which secured it
a distinct position apart from the rival systems
both of the Brahmans and of the Buddhists. This
is the subject on which I would engage your
attention for a short space of time.
Jainism, at least in its final form, which was
given it by its last prophet the twenty-fourth
Tirthakara Mahāvīra, took its rise, as is well
known, in that part of Eastern India where in
an earlier period, according to the Upanişads,
Yajšavalkya had taught the doctrine of Brahman
and Atmad, as the permanent and absolute Being,
and where Mahāvīra's contemporary and rival,
Gotama the Buddha, vas preaching his Law,
which insisted on the transitoriness of all things.
Jainism, therefore, had to take a definite position
with refernce to each of these miutually exclusive
doctrines; and these it will be necessary to define
more explicitly.

·THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHIOS OF JAINAS [ 49 The one great Truth which the authors of the Upanişads thought to have discovered, and which they are never weary of exalting, is that, rinderlying and upholding from within all things, physical as well as psychical, there is one absolute permanent Being, without change and with none other like it. The relation between this absolute Being and existent matter has not clearly been made out by the authors of the Upanişads, but all unprejudiced readers will agree that they looked on the phenomenal world as real. On this point the different schools of Vedantins arrived at different conclusions, which, however, need not detain us here. In opposition to this Brahmanical doctrine of absolute and permanent Being, Buddha taught that all things are transitory; indeed his dying words were, that all things that are produced must perish. The principal heresy, according to the Buddhists, is the Atmavâda, i, e. the belief that permanent Being is at the bottom of all things; they are, as we should say, but phenomena, or as Buddha expressed it, dharmas; there is no dharmin, no permanent substance of which the dharmas could be said to be attributes. Thus the Brahmans and the Buddhists entertained opposite opinions on the problem of Being because they approached it from tro different points of view. The Brahmans exclusively followed the dictates of pure reason which forces us to regard Being as permanent, absolute, and uniform; the Buddhists, on the other hand, were just as one-sided in following the teaching of common 7 ·50] JAINISX experience according to which existence is but & succession of originating and perishing. Either vies, the a priori view of the Brahmans, and the a posteriori viay of the Buddhists, is beset with many difficulties when we are called upon to emplog it in explanation of the state of things ss presented to us by our consciousness; dificulties which cannot be overcome without a strong faith in the paramount truth of the principle adopted. The position taken by the Jainas torrards the problem of Being is as follows, Being, they contend, is joined to production, continuation, and destruction (sad utpâda-dhraucya-vinasayuktam), and they call their theory the theory of indefinitea ness (anekāntavāda), in contradistinction to the theory of permanency (nityartida) of the Vedantists, and to the theory of transitoriness (vindra vāda) of the Buddhists. Their opinion comes to this. Existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing continues for erer to exist as matter; which matter, however, may assumo any shapo and quality. Thus clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and perish. The Jain theory of Being appears thus to be merely the statement of the common-sense view, and it would be hard to believe that great importance was attached to it. Still it is regarded as the metaphysical basis of their philosophy. Its significance comes out more clearly when we regard it in relation to the doctrines of Syadrada, and of the Nayas.

·THE VETAPHYSICS AND LTHICS OF JAINAS [51 Syādvāda is frequently used as a synonym of Jainapravacang (e. g. at a later date in the title of a well-known exposition of the Jain philosophy entitled Syadvāda-dlaſījarı); and it is much boasted of as the saving truth leading out of the labyrinth of sophisms. The idea underlying the Syūdvada is -briefly this. Since the nature of Being is intrinsicallſ indefinite and made up of the contradictory .attributes of originating continuance, and perishing, ang proposition about an existing thing must, 'somehow,reflect the indefiniteness of Being, i.e.any metaphysical proposition is right from one point of view, and the contrary proposition is also right from another. There are, according to this doctrine, seven forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word sycīt e. g. syñd asti sargam, syād nuwsti sarvam. Syāt means 'may be', and is explained by kathamcit, which in this connexion may be translated 'somehony'. The word syât here qualifies the word asti, and indicates the indefiniteness of Being (or astitvam). For example, we say, & jar is somehow, i. e. it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow, if we mean thereby that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption made by the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the 8am in all things. Thus we hare the correlative predicates 'is' (asti) and 'is not' (năsti). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (araktarya); for exis. tent and non-existent (sat and asat) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a coexistence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot ·JAINISH 52] be expressed by any word in the language. These three predicates variously combined make up the seven propositions or saptabhangas of the Syādvāda. I shall not abuse your patience by discussing this doctrine at length; it is enough to have shown that it is an outcome of the theory of indefiniteness of Being ( anekāntavāda), and to have reminded you that the Jainas believe the Syādrāda to be the key to the solution of all metaphysical questions. The doctrine of the Nayas which I mentioned before is, as it were, the logical complement to the Syädvāda. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things; all these ways of judgement are, according to the Jainas, one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are seven nayas, four referring to concepts, and theree to words. The reason for this variety is that Being is not simple, as the Vedāntins believe, but is of a complicated nature; therefore, every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we need must go astray There is nothing in all this which, sounds deeply speculative; on the contrary, the Jain theory of Being seems to be a sindication of common sense against the paradoxical speculations of the Upanişads. It is also, but not primarily, directed against the Buddhistic tenet of the transitoriness of all that exists. We cannot, however, say that it expressly and consciously combats the Buddhistic view, or that it was formulated in order to combat it. And this ·THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF JAINAS [53 agrees well with the historical facts, that Mahā. vira came long after the original Upanişads, but was a contemporary of Bnddha. He was obliged, therefore, to frame his system so as to exclude the principles of Brahmanical speculation, but his position was a different one with regard to the nowly proclaimed system of Buddha. I have not yet touched on the relation between Jain philosophy on the one hand and Sankhya Yoga on the other. We may expect a greater community of ideas between these systems, since both originated in the same class of religious men, viz. the ascetics known as the Sramaņas, or, to use the more modern term, Yogins. As regards the practice of asceticism, the methods and the aim of Yoga, it has long been proved that the Yoga of Brahmans, Jainas, ond Bauddhas are closely related to each other, and there can be no doubt that they have all developed from the same source. But. I am now concerned only with those philosophical ideas which have a connexion with ascetic practice and form the justification thereof. Now the Sânkhya view as to the problem of Being is clearly a kind of compromise between the theory of the Upanişads and what we may call the common-sense view. The Sankhyas adopt the former with regard to the souls or puruşas' which are permanent and without change. They adopt the latter when assigning to matter or Prakrti its character of unceasing change. The Sankhyas contend that all things besides the souls or puruşas are products of the one Prakịti or primaeral matter, and similarly the Jainas teach that practically all things besides the souls or jiras are made ·JAIXISSE 54] ap of matter or pulgain, which is of only ono kind and is able to dovelop into operything. It will thus be seen that the Sankligas and Jainas Aro at ond with regard to the nature of watter; in their opinion batter is something which may become anything. This opinion, it mus be romarked, seems to be the mast primitire onc: not only was it entertained by the ancients, but also it underlios the upiversal belief of transformation occurring in the natural course of things or produced by sorcery and spells. This is a point I wish make, that thic Sinkkyns and 'Jainas started from the same conception of matter, but worked it out on different lines. The Sankhyas teach that the products of Prakrti are orolved in & fixed order, from the most subtle and spiritual one (Bruluki) down to the gross olements, and their order is always reproduced in the successive creations and dissolutions of the world. The Jainas, on the other band, do not admit such a fixed order of development of matter (pudgala), bat believe that the universe is eternal and of a permanent structure. According to them matter is atomic, and all material changes are really going on in the atoms and their combinati- A curious feature of their atomio theory is that the atoms are either in a gross condition of in & subtle one, and that innumerable subtle atoms take up the space of one gross atom. The bearing of this theory on their psychology I shall now proceed to point out. But I must premise that the Jainas do not recognize a psychical apparatus of such & complex nature as the Sankhyas in their tenet concerning Buddhi, Ahamkāra, Manas, ons, ·THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF JAINAS . [ 55 and the Indriyas: ; The Jaina opinion is much crader, and comes - briefly to this. According to the merit or demerit of a person, atoms of & peculiar subtle form, which we still call karma. matter, invade his soul or jita, filling and defiling it, and obstructing its innate faculties. The Jainas are quite out-spoken on this point, and explicitly say that karman is made up of matter, paudgalikam karma. This must be understood literally, not as a metaphor, as will be seen from the following illustrations. The soul or jiva is extremely light, and by itself it has a tendency to more upwards (irdhvagaurava), but it is kept down by the karma matter with which it is filled. But when it is entirely purged of karma matter, at Nirvāņa, it goes upwards in a straight line to the top of the universe, the domicile of the released souls. To take another example. The karma matter within a soul may assumo different conditions. It may be turbulent, as mud in water which is being stirred; or it may be inactive, as mud in water when it has settled at the bottom of a basin; or it may be completely neutralized as when the clear water is poured off after the mud has been precipitated. Here again it is evident that-karma is regarded as a substance or watter, though of an infinitely more subtle nature than the impurities of water referred to in the illustration. As a third instance I will refer to the six Lesyās or complexions of the souls, ranging from deepest black to shining white, colours which we common mortals cannot perceive with our eyes. This doctrine was shared also by the Ājivikas, on whom ·56 ) JAINTSU Dr. Hoernle' has thrown so much light. These colours of the soul are produced on it by the karman which acts as a colouring substance. Here also the material nature of karman is quito obvious. To return from this digression, the karma matter that enters the soul is transformed into eight different kinds of karman, about which I shall have to say a word presently. This change of the one substance into eight varieties of karma is likened to the transformation of food consumed at one meal into the several fluids of the body. The karma matter thus transformed and assimilated builds up a subtle body, which ingests the soul and accompanies it on all its transmigrations, till it enters Nirvāṇa and goes up to the top of the universe. This subtle body or kūrmaņasarira is obviously the Jain counterpart of the sūkşmasarira or lingasarira of the Sānkhyas. In order to understand the functions of this subtle body or kārmaņaśarīra, we must take a summary view of the eight kinds of karman of which it is com: posed. The first and second (jñānāvaraniya and darsanāvaraṇīya) obstruct kriowledge and faith, which are innate faculties of the soul or jiva; tho third (mohaniya causes delusion, especially the affections and passions; the fourth (vedaniya) results in pleasure and pain; the fifth (äyuşka) assigns the length of life to the person in his present birth; the sixth (rūma) furnishes him 1 Encyclopaedea of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 1. pp. 259 sq. 2 The Jainas recognize four different aubtle bodies; see Tattvarth., ii, 37 sq.

·TEE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF JAINAS [ 57 with all that belongs to him as an individual; the seventh (gotra) makes him a member of the class or genus he is to belong to; the eighth (antaraya) 'produces hindrances to the realization of his virtues and powers. Each of these eight kinds of karman endures for a certain period, of vary, ing length, within which it must take its proper effect. Then it is expelled from the soul, a process which is called nirjarā. The opposite process, the influx of karman into the soul, is called īsrava, a term well known to students of Buddhism. The occasions for asrava are the actions of the body and mind (yoga); they open as it were an inlet for karma matter to invade the soul. If that soul is in a state of iniquity, i. e. if the person under consideration does not possess right faith, or does not keep the commandments, or is careless in his conduct, or does not subdue his passions, then, in all these cases, singly or collectively, (vrata), or is careless in his conduct, or does not subdue his passions, then, in all these cases, singly or collectively, especially, under the influence of the passions, the soul must retain the karma matter, or, as the Jainas say, binds it (bandha). But the influx of karma matter or asrava can be prevented; this is called the stopping or samvara. These primitive notions the Jainas have worked out into a philosophical superstructure, which serves just as well as that of the Sankhyas (but on different lines) to explain the problems of mundane existence and to teach way of salyation. In order to make this clear I must ada a more details. 8 ·JAINTS) 58] SamFara is effected, i. e. the infns of karma is preronted by the observance of peculiar rules of conduet, by restraint of body, speech, and mind by strict morality, by religious roflections, by indifference to things pleasant or unpleasant, etc. The most effective means, however, is the practico of austerities (tapas), which has this advantage over the other means, that it not only prevents karma from accumulating, but also consumes the accumulated karma. Tapas, therefore, produces also nirjarů and leads to Nirvana; it is the chief means of salvation, as might be expected in a religion of ascetics. The denotation of the word "tapas' in Jainism is somewhat different from its usual meaning. There is tapas of the body (bihya tapas) and tapas of the mind (tūbhyantara tapas). The former consists in fasting, or cating scanty and tasteless food, in vant of comfort and in mortification of the flesh. Tho inental tapas con tains various items, as confession of sins and penance, monastic duties, obedience, modesty, solf-restraint and meditation (dhyāna). I wish to lay stress on the fact that in the course of asceticism taught by the Jainas meditation is only one of many steps leading to the ultimato goal. Though Nirvīņa is immediately preceded by the two purest stages of meditation, yet all other parts of tapas appear of equal importance. We shall see the signficance of this fact more clearly, when we copipare the Jaina tapas with what corresponds to it in Sínkhya-Yoga, Their Yoga contains some of the varieties of Jaina tapas; but they are regarded as inferior to meditation or contemplation. Indeed the whole Yoga ·THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF JAINAS [ 59 centres in contemplation, all other ascetic practices are subordinate and subservient to contemplation--härand, dhyana and samadhi. This is but natural in a system which makes the reaching of the summum bonum dependent on jñāna, knowledge. The theory of the crolution of Prakſti, beginning with Buddhi, Ahamkūra, and Manas, appears, to my mind, to have been invented in order to explain the efficiency of contemplation for acquiring supernatural powers and for liberating the soul. Sankhya-Yoga is a philosophical system of ascetics; but their asceticism has been much refined and has become spiritualized in a high degree. The asceticism of the Jainas is of a more original character; it chiefly aims at the -purging of the soul from the impurities of karman. Jainism may have refined the asceticism then current in India; it certainly rejected many extravagances, such as the voluntary inflicting of pains; 'but it did not alter its character as a whole. It perpetuated an older or more original phase of asceticism that the Brahmanical Yoga, and carries us back to an older stratum of religious life in which we can still detect relics of primitive speculation in the sbape of such crude notions as I have had occasion to mention in the course of my paper. In conclusion I shall shortly touch on the third current of Indian philosophical speculation, viz. the philosophy of the Pandits which is represented to us by the Nyāya and Vaišeşika systems. This philosophy may be characterized as an attempt to register, to define, and to arrange ·JAINISH 60] in systematic order the concepts and general notions which are the common possession of all who spoke the Sanskrit language. Such a philosophy had some attraction for the Jainas who, as we have seen, always sided with common-. sense views, and in fact many Jainas hare written on Nyāya and Vriſeşika. But at the time when the Jain system was framed, the Pandit, as we know him in later times, had probably not yet become distinguished from the Vedic scholar or theologian; it is almost certain that there was as yet no class of persons who could be called Pandits, and consequently their philosophy also was wanting. And the tradition of the Jainas themselves says as much; for according to them the Vaiſeşika system was founded by Chaluya Rohagutta, originally a Jaina and pupil of Mahāgiri, eighth Sthavira after Mahāvira. Thus we have no occasion to inquire into the relation between this system and Jainism. But it may be mentioned that the atomic theory which is a marked feature of the Vaiseșika, is already taught in outline by the Jainas. As regards the Nyāya system, it is almost certainly later than Jainism; for the dialectics and logic of the Jainas are of a very primitive character, and appear entirely unconnected with the greatly advanced doctrines of the Naiyāyikas. In conclusion let me assert my conviction that Jainism is an original system, quite distinct and independent from all others; and that, therefore, it is of great importance for the study of philosophical thought and religious life in ancient India.

·THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN THOUGHT. In the present paper I propose to investigate the development of philosophical ideas in ancient India at the time when Jainism entered on the scene. This enquiry is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the original concepts of Soul (jiva) and matter (pudgala) in the revealed literature of the Brahmans (Brahmanas and Upanişads) in contradiction to the ideas on the same subjects in Jainism and the classical philosophies (darsana), with which the second part will be concerned. PART THE FIRST. 1. CHAPTER:-THE ANCIENT CONCEPT OF SOUL. 1. All Indian philosophers with the exception of the Vedāntists of Sankar's School (māyāvadinah) and the Buddhists, however much they may differ in details, agree in the main about the nature of Soul, viz, that is a permanent or eternal immaterial substance; they consequently maintain the personal immortality of the souls. To all who are accustomed to this belief it is difficult to realize that it is of a comparatively late origin. The primitive Aryans held a distinctly different opinion about the nature of the soul. Their belief may be described as follows. The life of man is continued after death in a form similar to what he ·JAINISY 62] had been during his life on earth; it is but & shadowy existence, yet one in a bodily form, however subtle that body may have been imagined. This post-mortal body is the soul itself, there is no separate soul different from it. It will be convenient to call this principle of conscious life which is conceired under some bodily or material form, psyche instead of soul, and to use the term soul only to denote the immaterial and permanent substance which is possessed of intelligence and consciousness. 2. The primitive ideas of the Aryans about the psyche have been retained, to some extent, by the ancient Indians, and still linger on in the popular belief of the Hindus about the manes (pitarah) which forms the basis of the srāddha practice. For the pits-tarpana or oblation to the manes presupposes the belief that the manes stand in need of food and drink just like mnen; they must, therefore, have been imagined to be of an organisation not quite unlike that of men while living on earth. The psyche is frequently spoken of as a man (puruşa ) or rather manikin of thumb's size (anguştha mitra); at the time of death it departs from the body which is then left behind as a corpse, 3. In the Brāhmaṇas and in the oldest Upanişads' we meet with very remarkable spe- The oldest Upanişads are the following Brahadåraryala, Cahandogya, Taittiriya, Aitaroya, and Kauşilali. After those Upanişads there is a decided break, and those which come Boarest them, the Rathaka, Svetāíver tara, lundaka, etc belong to a new period as will be explained in the second part. 1 ·THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN INDIAX THOUONT [ 63 culations on the nature of the psyche which shor & great advance over the primitive beliefs described above. In those works the psyche is spoken of as consisting in, or being made of several constituent parts which are frequently called pránas. They are regarded as the factors of physico-psychical life. Most usually five such factors are enumerated, viz. pruna breath, vuc speech, chaksuh seeing or eye, frotra hearing or ear, mana) mind. Occasionally more than five factors are mentioned, as in the passage to be quoted in the sequel; but the above set of five factors has, beyond doubt, been the almost generally accepted one. These psychical factors are not as many fanctions of, or qualities inherent in a common substratum, but they are distinct entities which combining form one individual psyche. They are, however, not quite independent or self-existent, for they stand in an intimato relation to the following physical or cosmical essences, taken in the same order: vayu wind, agni fire, aditya sun, disaḥ the heavenly quarters, chandramah moon; and on the death of the indivi. dual man, they will eventually be reunited with the latter, The Upanişads contain somo discussions which throw full light on the theory of the psychical factors and make it quite clear that nono of those factors was regarded as the permanent principle of personality, or, in other words, none of them could be claimed as the soul in the true meaning of word. In the 3rd Adhyāya of the Brhad Aranyaka & great disputation under Janaka, King of Videba, is described, in which Yājiapalkya, ·64] JAINISM answers the questions put to him by the Bra. bmans of the Kurus and Pāñcālas, In the 2nd Brāhmaṇa the opponent of Yājõavalkga is Järatkārva Artabhäga. The problem under consideration is discussed in $$ 11-13, of which I quote the text and translation, the latter based on that of Max Müller in Sacred Books of the East. Vol. XV, p. 126 f. 11 'Yājiavalkya, he said, when such a person (a sage) dies, do the vital breaths (priņas) move out of him or no?' 'No', replied Yājõavalkya; they are gathered up in him, be is swelled, ho is inflated, and thus indlated the dead lies at rest.' 12 Yajāavalkya', he said, “when such a man dies, what does not leave him?' "The name', he replied, 'for the name is endless, the Vißvedevas are endless, and by it he gains the endless world.' 13 Yājāavalkya', he said, "bon the speech of this dead person enters into the fire, breath into the wind, the eye into the sun, the mind into the moon, hearing into the quarters, into the earth the body, into the air (or space) the self, into the shrubs the hairs of the body, into the trees the hairs of the head, when the blood and the seed are deposited in the water, where is then that person?' Yājõavalkya said: "Take my hand, my hand, my friend. We two alone shall know of this; let this question of ours not be (discussed) in public'. Then these two went out and argued, and what they said was Karman (work), and what they praised vas Karman, viz., that a pian becomes good by good work, and bad ky bad syork, After that Járatkā. raya Artabbāga held his peace."

·। because his intention in the whole disputation is to prove that all the speculations of his opponents do not lead up to tho truo knowledge of Brahma. The first two paragraphs deal with the man who on dying reaches moksha. In 8.11 Vajyaralkya declared that the prānas do not move out of him, but remain in the corpse; accordingly the priinas cannot be the Soul. The next question in 12, what remains of such a man is answered ovasively by Yājſavalkya, But his opponent is for the point: where is the person of a his body has been dissolved into its elements and tho constituent parts of his pecue have been reunited with their cosmical prototypes fire, wind, otc.? Yajñaralkya again avoids the declaration THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN INDIAN THOUGHT [654 याज्ञवल्ययेति होवाच यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियत उदस्मात्प्राणाः कामन्त्याहो। नेति । नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्योऽत्रैव समवनीयन्ते स उच्छ्रत्याध्माय ह्याध्मातो मृतः शेते ॥ ११॥ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते किमेनं न जहा. तीति । नामेति । 'अनन्तं च नाम । अनन्ता विश्वे देवाः । अनन्तमेच.स तेन लोकं जयति ॥ १२॥ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रास्य पुस्यास्यामि याग- प्येति वातं प्राणश्चक्षुरादित्यं मनश्चन्द्रं दिशः श्रोत्रं पृथिवीं शरीरमाकाशमात्मा- ओषधी.मानि वनस्पतीन्केशाः अण्मु लोहितं च रेतश्च निधीयते । क्वायं तदा पुरुषो भवतीति । आहर सोम्य हस्तमातभागावामेतस्यैव वेदिप्यावो न नावेत- सजन इति । ती होत्कम्य मन्त्रयांचाते । तौ ह यदूचतुः । कर्म हैव तदूचतुरथ यत्प्रशसंशतुः कर्म हैव तत्पशशंसतुः। पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेनेति । ततो ह जारत्कारव आतंभाग उपरराम ॥ १३ ॥ Tho purpose of the questioner in the foregoing passage of tho Brh. Ar. is, as the reader will have remarked, to elicit from Yājĩavalkya'a declaration about the nature of Soul, for thereby he would be led on to explain its identity with Brahina. But this Yijjavalkya will not do, not to be put off easily; 13; so the makes straight mon, after 9 ·JAIMISIS 66] which his opponent seems to have expected, by referring to karma. They discuss the subject, in private, and therefore their view is not fully stated; but from the hints given in the text it must have come to this: the karma of a man who dies brings about a new set of prānas to start å new life, a good or a bad one according to the nature of the karma lie had accumulated in his previous life. At any rate it is quite clear that both disputants assumed psychical life to be brought about by the combination and co-operation of the five prānas, and had no idea of any permanent substratum of man's personality. If such a belief, in immortal souls had been current at the time of the composition of Brh. Ār., it would have come out in the course of the discussion, or rather it would have been absurd for the author to put into the mouth of Artabhāga the questions which he makes him ask. After all, the discussions as we read them in the Brlı. Ar., are not to be taken as his torical records, but the whole disputation is an invention of the author after the model of a similar disputation on ritualistic items in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa. Therefore the general ideas embodied in this part of the Bșh. Ār. also must be considered to belong to the common stock of ideas current during the Upanishad Period. I do not contend that the sages of that time did deny the existence of permanent souls, but that the very idea that thero might be immortal souls had not yet entered their mind. The same idea relative to soul comes out in teaching of the Upanishads that consciousness ·TIE PLACE OF JAISISU IN INDIAN THOTGIT [ 67 ceases with death: un prctya sanjicīstiti Brh. Ār. 2, 4, 13. 4, 5, 13. sueññā herc mcans according to Sarkara vitesha-sanijih i. e, consciousness of ones' personality. This is no doubt the true meaning of sarjñă in this passage; for sanjñd has both meanings: 'consciousness' aud 'individual name', which are here combined in Sankara's rendering, The loss of self-cousciousness is interpreted in ano. ther passage (Chbandogya Upanishad, 6, 9, 1. 10, 1) by the morging of the individual being in Brahma. As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees, and reduce the juice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that tree, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they havo become werged in the True (cither in sleep or in death), know not that they are merged in the true. In the next Khandla tlie saine idea is illustrated by the simile of rivers and the ocean. (यथा सोम्य मधु मधुकृनो नितिष्ठन्ति नानात्वयानों वृक्षाणां रसान समवहार- मेकता रसं गमयन्ति । ते यथा तत्र न विवेकं लभन्तेऽमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्म्य- मुयाहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्मीसेवमेव राल सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न FEE: ular ha). These similes illustrate onmistakably the loss of conscious personality in death, which indeed could be the consequence from the absence of any permanent substratum of it. Norr all words and expressions in the Upanishads which might be used to denote the concept of Soul, can be proved not to denote the imamortal Soul in our sense of the word. But it is not necessary here to enter in these details; we are here concerned with the main issue only viz. that the ·68] JAINISY concept of immortal souls is entirely absent in the Brāhmaṇas and the oldest Upanishads. 2. CHAPTER:-ORIGINAL NON-DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPIRIT AND MATTER, From what has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter we are lcd to conclude that the distinction between Spirit and Matter was not yot grasped by the thinkers of the oldest Upanishads. For how could they have got at the concept of Spirit, whon they did not possess the idea of permanent Souls? We need, however, not rely on this inference only; we can prove directly from the Upanishads themelves that they do not yet distinguish principally between Spirit and Matter. For this purpose we will examine some passages in the sixth Prapāthaka of the Cbhandogya Upanishad where the evolution of the world from original Being (sat) is taught. In the second Khanda Uddālaka declares to Svetaketu, his son. In the beginning, my doar, there was that only which is, one only, without a Second' सदेव सोम्येदमन आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्: Here the question has been raised already in old times whether this Sat is Spirit or Matter. For we learn from the first Sütras of the Bralma Sutra as explained by the commentators, that the Sinkhyas declared the Sat to be primeval matter, called pradhan, or prakrti in their system. But the Vedāntins identified the Sat with Brahdia which is essentially spiritual. Their argument against the Sankhya view is contained in the 5th. Sūtra (ikşhaternusabdan). For the text quoted above continues: It (Sat) thought, may I be many, may I grow forth It sent forth fire. auta er et la Titisana.

·TAR PLACE OF JAINISH IN INDIAN THOTGUT [.. The Vedantin's argument is that thinking' cannot be predicated of matter which is acetana not intelligent accordingly the Sad being intelligent because it thought' is what wo call Spirit. The argument of the Vedāntin would be unimpeachable, if the author of the Upanishad had distinguished Spirit and Matter in the same way as the Vedāntin did, which borover he did not. For he continues: *That fire thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent for the water. TTT 22767 TE RI TAL- Fant aus. And again: "TVater thought, may I be many, may I grow forth, It sent forth earth (food): ता आप ऐक्षत रहन्यः स्याम प्रजायेमहीति ता अन्नमसजन्त, Now tbere can be no dobut that Fire, Water, and Earth, however subtile they may have been imagined by the author or the Upanishad, must be classsed with Matter, and not with Spirit. Yet they too thought aikslinta; and if thinking' did prove that the Sat is Spirit then those elements too had likewise to be considered to be Spirit. It is true that in the next Khanda the Snt is called derria but the same designation is also given to Fire, Water and Earth. They would, therefore, at the same time be Spirit as well as Matter. This is an actual dilemma, and there is no other way out of it than to assume that in the period of the oldest Upanihads the distinc. tion between Matter and Spirit had not yet clearly been grasped however difficult it may be for modern thinkers to realize such an attitude of the primitive mind. The language of the oldest Upanishads, gives evidence to the correctness of the view I have sought to establish. For those words which in

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·THE PLACE OF JAINISY IN INDIAN THOUGHT [71 its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtilest portion mind. (1). Water when drunk becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes urine, its middle portion blood, its subtilest portion breath. (2). Fire when eaten becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes bone, its middle portion marrow, its subtilest portion speech. (3). For truly, my child, mind comes of earth, breath of water, speech of fire (4) अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते । तस्य यः स्थविष्टो धानुस्तत्पुरीपं भवति यो मध्यमस्वन्मांसे योऽणिठस्तन्मनः । १ । आपः पीतासेधा भवन्ति यः स्थविष्टो धातु- स्तन्मूत्रं भवति यो मध्यमस्तल्लोहितं योऽणिष्टः स प्राणः । २। तेजोऽशितं त्रेधा भवति यः स्थविष्टो धातुस्तदस्थि भवति यो मध्यमः स मा योऽणिष्ठः सा वाक् । ३ । अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयः प्रागतेजोमयी वागिति । ४. Mind, breath, and speech combined form the psyche of man; they consist of the subtilest essence; animâ, as it is called in the next Khanda, of earth, water, and fire. But a still more subtile anime than those spoken of before, is the Sat which upbolding the psyche makes it a soul jiva, as may be gathered from the following two passages. When a man departs from bence, his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath, in fire, fire in the Highest Being (i. e. Sat). Now that which is that subtile essence (the root of all) in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self and thou, Svetaketa art it.' (8th, Khanda 6. 7.) अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वामनति संपवते मनः प्राणे प्राणम्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् रा य एपोऽगिमा । ६ । ऐनदारभ्यमिदं सर्व तत्सलं स आत्मा सत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति । ।

·72) JAINISH The next passage is in the IIth Khanda. This (body) indeed withers and dies when the loving Self has left it; the liring Self dies not. That which is that subtile essence ete. पाव किलेदं म्रियते न जीवो fra spate a guishorati. The last sentence (Sa ya eşo anima etc.) occurs nine times in our text. It inculcates the great teaching of the Upanishads that Brahma is the root of all. The word brahmat, however, does not occur in the whole of the Gth Prapathaka; but in the eighth (8,4) it is said: 'the name of this Brahma is the True' एतस्य ब्रह्मणो नाम सत्यमिति. It will be seen that jira in the second passage comes much nearer of our concept of Soul, but it differs from it in one essential point; it does not possess permanent personality. For on mukti this jiva merges in Brahma and loses its individuality (see above, na pretya Sanjñüistīti). According to the teaching of the Upanishad there can be no personal immortality of the Souls. In the Brhad Aranyaka, in the part which is ascribed to Yājiavalkya, the teaching of the Upanishads relative to Brahma and the souls has reached its highest development. The Chheindogya Up. does not attempt to define the nature of Brahma, but according to Yājšavalky& its nature is pure intelligence. Thus we read II 4 12: Thus verily, O Maitreyi does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knorcleilge rise from out these elements, and vanish again in them. There is no consciousness in 1 At the end of III 9 we read the following delinition of Brahma: Vijñanam anandam Brahma.

·THE PLACE OF JAINISH IN INDIAN THOOGAT [73 death'. एवं या अरे महस्तमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एवंतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति न प्रेस संज्ञास्तीति. Yājữavalkya had no doubt recognized the paramount importance of intelligence (vijnana) not only for the conception of the highest Being (Brahma) but also, and perhaps primarily, for that of the human soul, For Brh. Ar. III 7, 16-23 contains a discussion of the several constituont parts of the psyche; there we meet with a set of eight instead of the usual five pranas spoken of above in the first chapter, the additional ones being trac, vijñānam and reta). The importance of vijñána is apparent in the explanation of sleep in II 1, 17 put in the mouth of Ajātaśatru, king of Kāsī. When this man is thus asleep, then the intelligent person (purusha) having through the intelligence of the prūnns absorbed within himself all intelligence, lies in the space, which is in the heart. Whert he takes in these different kinds of intelligence, then it is said that the man sleeps. Then the breath is kept in, speech is, kept in, hearing is kept in, seeing is kept in, the mind is kept in.' यनैप एतत्सुतोऽभूय एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुष एषां प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमादाय य एषोऽन्तर्दृदय आकाशस्तस्मिन्छेते।' तानि यदा गृहाति अथ हैतत्पुरुषः खापति नाम । तद्गृहीत एव प्राणो भवति' गृहीता वाग गृहीतं चक्षुहीतं श्रोत्रं गृहीतं मनः ॥ This rijnananayak puruşch comes still nearer to our conception of soul than the jita of the Chhündogya Up.; but like the latter it was no permanent existence, and in mukti it merges in Brahma. It is worth remarking that the Kaushitaki Up. which appare- 1 The parallel passage IV 5, 13 has Prajñiñaghana instead of riñánaghana, 1

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·THE PLACE OF SAINISH N INDIAX THOUGIIT [75 discerned, the theories of retribution ( Karma) and of' metempsychosis (punar jnnma). From the passage about Karma quoted in the first chapter ve learn that this subject was not to be discussed in public; we thence .conclude that at that time the theory of Karma was not yet generally known and accepted, as it certainly was ever since, but was still regarded as an arcanum, a secret teaching, not to be divulged to the masses. The migration of souls, first appearing in the Upanishads, is several times hinted at in them; at some length it is explained in Brh. År. VI 2, and rând. Up. V. 10. Waring minor differences the opinion is that the souls first go to the moon, and those which are to be reembodied descend thence. They finally reach earth as rain and become food; he who eats it, will become the father of the individual in his new birth. It goes without saying that this belief is widely different from the theory of rebirth as it has been understood during the middle age of Indian history down to the present day. PART THE SECOND. The Vedic period closes with the group of the oldest Upanishads from which we have largely drain materials for the inrestigation conducted in tlo preceding part. There are, however, three more groups of younger, and cren quite lato Upanishads to be enumerated presently. They too are severally ascribed by tradition to ono or other of the four Vedas; but they differ in tany respects, to such a degree from the oldest group that they must be placed in an altogether ·- nges of India. 76] JAINISY different period. After the oldest group there is an unmistakable break in this branch of Sanskrit Literature occasioned most probably by a longer interval of time during which now currents of thought had set in and had been gradually modifying the dental physiognory of the Vedic period, From this transition-period may be dated the middle The Upanishads have chronologically been divided by the late Professor Deussen into four groups. To the first group belong the oldest Upanishads. The three remaining groups are the following. 2. the meterial Upanishads : Käthaka, Isa, Svetūsvatara Dlındaka, and Mahanārāyana; 3. the younger Upanishads in prose: Prasna, Maitrāyaṇiya, and Mündükya; 4. the host of late Upanishads ascribed to the Atharva Veda. The fourth group may be neglected for the purpose of our inquiry; but I shall have to add some remarks about the second and third groups in order to make good my assertion that between then and the oldest group there is a well defined break, I have already mentioned above a few of terms (cetană etc.) which are absent in the first group and become current in the younger ones. The number of such new words which have been collected from Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the principal Upanishads, Bombay. S. S. 1891, amounts to more than a hundred. I transcribe here some in way of illustration; nonns; avyakta, ahankūra, kurana, tanu (body), deha, dehin, drarya, nivotti, pariņāma, prakrti, phala (result), moksha, ·THE PLACE OF JAISISY IY INDIAN IDOCGHT valni, salti, surtaga, sartajña, sūkshma; verbs : udblī, upalkbh, tyaj, niyam, parin.m, prürth, bandh, vyañj, vyāpa with many of their derivatives, The absence of these words in the oldest Upanishads may, in a few cases, be accidental, but on the whole it must be real; for the first group is of considerable extent and of nearly double the bulk of the second and third groups taken together. In some cases & tvord is quite common in groups 2 and 3, but occurs only once in the first group, e. g. indriya organ of senso (Kaushitaki), jauna (Taittiriya), yoga (ib.), nitya (Brhad Ar.) &c. The change in the vocabulary of the language proves that the texts which exhibit it are of a later date, and indicates, at the same time, that new ideas had risen to express which the new words were employed. Most important in the latter regard are the following facts. In the Svetāśvatara we meet with the Sankhya terms gura (1, 3) and pradhūna (1, 10), and in 1. 4. 5 the principal ideas of Sánkhya are enumerated under the simile of a wbeel: in other Upanishads of the 2nd and 3rd grote geveral of the leading ideas of Sankhya are ruimte red to and made the basis of further species There can be no doubt that in the interte) Lost ween the first and the second group of presset the rise of the Sānkhya philosophy and place. The same is probable also od to Yoga-pbilosophy, because of ita inter nection with Sānkhiya. Yoga is set try name in several of the younger size which Sánkhya terms oecar: un ·78] JAINIS made out whether they refer to the Yoga-philosophy or to Yoga-practice in general. The rise of Sankhya-Yogn is, howover, merely a symptom not the true cause of the radical chango occurring at that epoch. Without underrating the importance and influence of the new philo sophy, we may feel confident that a moro powerful agent was needed to completely modify the mental attitude of whole nation, or at least that of its leading classes. I can imagine no weightier cause to bring about this result than the widespread belief in the personal immortality of the souls which was at that time, as will be proved in the sequel, first introduced. For this doctrine, when once proclaimed was sure to gain the willing assent of the majority of the people who are naturally averse to beliere in their annihila. tion or, what practically comes to the same, in the loss of consciousness after death. The doctrine of the permanent existence of souls leads logically to the distinction of Matter and Spirit which also was not yet recognized in the oldest Upanishads. Now both these doctrines make part already of the oldest philosophies, Sankhya and Yoga, and of Jainismi. Of much later origin are the Vaiseshika and Nyāya philosophies; they also have admitted both tenets into their system. Even the Vedanta philosophy expounded by Bädarāyana in the Brahma Sūtra, though it pretends to systematize only the teachings of the Upanishads, declares that jiva is eternal and indestructible, whatever Sankaracharya by a forced interpretation of the Sūtras may ·THE PLACE OF JAINISI IN INDIAN THOUGET [79' allege to the contrary (as has been convincingly shown by Abhayakumar Gupa in Jivātman in the Brahma Sutras', Calcutta 1921). Sutra in this regard goes a step beyond the younger Upanishads Kathaka and Sretüsratar which dwell on the diversity of the individual souls from Brahma, though on the other hand they maintain also their identity with it.-- The belief in the personal immortality of the souls was, however, only the principal factor in bringing about the new modes of thoughts that obtained in post-vedic and classical times; it cooperated with the theories of Karman and of the migration of souls which were of somewhat older origin, for, as stated above, they were already known, though in an undeveloped and as it were rrascent forin, just before the close of the Vedic period. They reached their final form which is met with in all Indian religions and philosophies except Materialism, at later time probably togother with the new soul-theory. Now to return to the question at issue it may be stated that Sankhya, Yoga and Jainism are the oldest systems which came to the front after the close of the Vedic period. They teach all those novel doctrines just now, especially the plurality of immortal souls and the heterogeneity of Mattor and Spirit. Although they have developed these gencral ideas which they have in common, on divergent lines, still some details which will be discussed later seem to point to a kind of remoter afinity. The agreement in the metaphysical basis of Sinkhya and Jaina philosophg can be accounted for by the assumption that ·80 ) JAINISM these systems rose into existence in about the same age, and naturally rorked out the ideas current in it, but in different ways peculiar to each of them. The supposition of contemporane. ous origin of Sinkhya and Jainism furnishes us with the clue for fixing approximately the corresponding date. All we know about the age of Sankhya and Yoga is that according to Kautilya they and the Lokayatam were the only brahmanical philosophical systems existent at his time, i, e. about 300 B, C.; they wero of course much older. We are better informed about the antiquity of Jainism. Scholars now agree that Jainism wos not founded by Mahāvira, but that one at least of his predecessors, Pārśfanātha was an historical person. Now the Nirväņa of Pársra is separated from that of Mahūvira by an interval of 250 years, and since the latter was an older contemporary of Buddha whose Nirvana occurred about 484 B. C., Mahāvira's Nirvaņa may be placed about 490 B. C., and consequently that of Pārsta about 740 B. C. Therefore the first part of the eighth century B.C. was the time during which Párśva propagated his creed, and for practical purposes the same period may be assigned to the rise of historical Jainisin and the origin of the Sankhya and Yoga philoso phies. Assuming the space of two centuries for the development and general acceptance of the novel doctrines in question to may place the close of the Vedic period in the beginning of the first millennium B. C. Before discussing those doctrines of the Sänkhyas and Jainas which bear some resemblance to each other as regards the underlying general ·[81 THE PLACE OF JAINISI IN INDIAN THOUOST idea, but diffor in other regards, I must remark that our knowledge of Sānkhya and Yoga is unfortunately derived from late sources. The oldest work extant on Sănkhya is īśvara Krshma's Sankhya Kärikäs which belong to the fifth century A, D, The Yoga Sutra of Patañjali seems to be a comparatively late work; the Yoga it teaches has largely been borrowed from Sankhya, and this is still more the case with the Yogabhāshya by Vyāsa who frequently cites passages from older writers on Sankhya. It is, therefore, in many cases not possible to decide whether a particular doctrine explained by him is to be ascribed to Sankhya or Yoge. For our purposes we may regard both systems as fundamentally one, wherefore they will be spoken of as Sānkhya-Yoga. We shall first examine the idea of Matter as conceived by Sānkhya-Yoga and Jainism. They agree in this that matter is permanent as regards its existence, but indefinite as regards quality : indeed, according to their opinion, matter is something which may become anything. This opinion appears to have been generally current at the time when mattar was first recognized as something radically different from Spirit, i. e. the souls, and to have been immediately derived from the older idea of the Chaos or sat, the one substance which gave origin to all things, both material and spiritual. At a later time, however, the original view of matter just explained was superseded by the opposite one, that matter is also definite and unchangeable as regards quality, i. e. that it comprises the four or five elements (bhūtas) 11 ·82 ) JAINISHI which are entirely distinct from one another. This opinion was held by the Lokayatas who are younger in origin than Sānkhya-Yoga, and it was adopted by the Vaišeșika and Nyaya philosophies which seem to have somebow been developed from the Lokāyatam. The unanimous opposition of the later philosophies in this regard to Sānkhya-Yoga and Jainism is a collateral proof of the latter hav. ing been coeral in origin. But they have developed the common general idea of matter on entirely differont lines. The Jains declare matter (Pudba gala) to be atomical, the Sanklyas teach that primeval matter (prakrti or pradhana) is an allpervading substance (vibhu) The atoms according to the Jainas are indefinite as regards quality: they may be in a gross (būdara) or subtile (sükşma) state; in the former they occupy one point of space (pradeda ) each in the latter an infinite number of them may be sinultaneously present in the same point; by the combintion of gross atoras all things in the world are produced except of course the souls (liva) and the substances akasa, dharma and adharma about which I shall have to say a word below. According to the Sankhyas primeval matter consists of the three Guņas sattuan, rajah and tamah of which I had already occasion to speak above in the 2nd. chapter; all three are present everywhere in the pradhana and by acting on one another and mixing in various proportions they produce a series of substances mahür, ahmkāra, etc. down to the five elements which build up all material things in the world, It would seem that the original Sánkhya dispensed with atoms. But as stated in the Nyaya Vārttika - ·THE PLACE OF JAIKISU IN INDIAN THOUGHT [83 P.[?] some Sãnkhya or Yoga author did assumo atoms; Gaudapāda in his commentary on the Sankhya Kärikūs several times mentions them without disapproval; in the Yoga Sūtra I 40 they are also admitted, likewise in the Bhāshya on I 40. 49. 44, III 52. IV. 14, cf. Vācaspatimiśra's comment on I 44. These facts seem to prove that the atomistic theory enjoyed such general favour that even the Sankhyas and Yogas connived at it, if not from the very beginning, but certainly in the course of time. now turn to the Soul-theory of Sānkhya- Yoga and Jainisın. There is agreement with regard to some fundamental aspects of it. Souls are immaterial and eternal; essentially they are intelligent, but their intelligence is obscured by their connexion with matter which is without beginning and ends with Mukti. The Jainas hare a tenet about the size of the Soul (jira) not shared by any other philosopher. For they teach that the soul is of finite and variable size, being always coextensive with the body which it occupies for the time being. It is probable that the original Sânkhya was not explicit on this point. For according to the ancient teacher Pañichaśikha, as quoted in the Yogabhāsya on I 36, the souls (purushas) are infinitesimally small (anumátra), while according to Isvara Krshna and all later writers it is all-pervading (vibhu).--Greater still is the difference of opinion between Sankhya-Yoga and Jainism on the nature of the bondage of the soul and its delivery from it; but it would be to no purpose to explain and compare both ·84] JAINISM theories since they have nothing whatever in common. Two more doctrines, however peculiar to Jainism, are worth noticing: that about the elementary souls (ekendriyas) which are embodied in particles of earth, water, wind and fire, and that about the nigodas. These doctrines, especially the former, bear some affinity to animistic views which probably obtained in popular religion. At any rate difference in most details regarding matter as well as souls is so pronounced as to preclude the assumption that Sankhya should have borrowed from Jainism, or Jainism froin Sankhya. Before closing our inquiry I mention two more points about which the Sănkhyas and Jains do not exactly agree, but entertain ideas which appear to have a curious affinity with each other. The Jainas assume two transcendental substances Dharma and Adharma as the substrata of motion and rest; without thein motion and rest would be impossible, they are in alokākāsa where they are absent. Their function is to render motion and rest of things possible. Akasa is not sufficient for that purpose, as its fonction is restricted to the making room for them (गतिस्थित्युपग्रहो धर्माधर्मयोप- HB: B[TELTETTE: Tattrūrthädhigama Sutra V 17–18.). The Jainas, evidently, thought it necessary to account for motion and rest by assuming two special substances as their conditioning cause. Now Sānkhya-Yoga alone of all Indian philosophies has likewise tried to explain motion and rest as being caused by two substantial principles rajah, and tamah. For rajah is necessary for motion, and immobility is caused by tamaḥ. Immobility ·THE PLACE OF JAINISH IN INDIAN THOUGHT [ 85 or rest is, however, but one aspect of tamak, another is 'iniquity' adharma. This character of tamah consisting in Adharma proves the near relation between Sankhya tamah and Jaina Adharma and explains at the same time why the substratam of immobility has been named by the Jainas by the strange name Adharma. A favourite dogma of the Jainas is the Anekāntayāda, which is elaborately explained and defended by Haribhadra in his famous work Anekāntajayapatākā. According to this theory the Real has infinite attributes (ananta-dharmītmakatvena tattram Hemachandra), wherefore all predicaments about things are one sided, the contrary being also true from another point of view (Syūdvāda). Now Sánkhya-Yoga lays claim to a similar view with regard, however, to Matter only, and this doctrine designated by phrases expressing the denial of aikāntikatva, e.g. Vācaspatimisra commenting on Yoga Sūtra II 23 speaks of the Yogas as aikāntikatvam vyūsech hantah, and Vyāsa on III 13 uses the phrase ekāntānabhyupaganāl. Of course, the opinions of thu Jainas and Sankhya in this regard are far from being identical, but they agree in the peculiar mode of thinking concerning Anekanta. Here I may conclude the present enquiry. It was my aim to show that Jainism together with Sāakhya-Yoga is the earliest representative of that mental revolution which brought about the close of the Vedic and inaugurated the new period of Indian culture which has lasted tbrough the middle ages almost down to the present time. Bonn, 19th, March 1992 H. JACOBI ·INDEX N. B.Figures indicate page numbers and fn means foot-note. A B abstinence, kinds of, 34. tādara 82. Abu 40. bälätapas 33. Ācārāngasūtra 10. bandha 21; 87; 77. Adharms 18; 82. Baing, absolats and porms. Age, of Sankhya and Yoga, 80, nent, 49; Agreement, between Sinkhya Brahmanionl dootripe of, and Jaids philosophies, 49-00; 79. Indefinitoness of, 82; ahankára 64; 59; 76; 82. Jain view of, 50. shimea 22. Beings, living, their division, ajtva 18. 22. ākāśa 18; 82, bhāvanās (reflexions ) 31 ; 32. alocană 34. britas 81. anarthadandavirati 29. Bodies, five kinds of, 24, 28(fa). anekantavada 26; 50; 12; 85. Body, building ap ol, 70-71. Angas 11, Braboa, definition of 72,1 (10) Bogarthanatra 62. Brahma, pure intelligence, 72; Apojja 10. root of all, 72. anuprekşā (reflexions) 32. Brhadāranyoka 65;72; 73; 75. anuprata 29. Buddhi 84; 59. Anuyogadora 12 Budabiam 1; 2; 3; 4. articles, prohibited 30. Gause of its disappearance, ascetic life, standards of (padimās), 42, 32 (in). Bühler 47. Astava (inflex), 21, 57. afithisanvibhaga 30. C Atmaráda 49. Canon Il-15. audayika 27. its redaction, 13. aupalamika 27. chăritra, description of, 83, acaklavya 61. chedasútras 12. aryalta 76. chhandogya 68; 72; 78. 31.

·INDEX [ 87 ganas 46. guna 77. cbarck, main (Būla-saogha), F 46. Fire, identified with Matter, contemplation (dhyāna) 35. 69, convents (upāírayas) 40-41. cycle, of births, 2. gachchha 44. D death, voluntary, 30. names of, 47, deha 76. Gandapåda 83. dehin 76. Girgår 40, defavirata 30, Gotama, the Baddha, 48. Dhanapăla 15. Guerinot 12, 19 (fa); 47; 40 dhārand 69. (fa). dharma 18; 49; 82. dharmin 49. gunas, in Sankbya philosopby, 70. dhyana (conteczplation) 36; 58; 69. gupasthānas, fourteen, description of, 36-37. Digambaras (akyclad) 1; 1, 1 (fo); sources of their gunaurala 30. history, 46. guptis, the cause of preventing Digambara Jain Iconography Gurvārali (Pattayali) 44, 39 the iſrava, 31. 8, 12 (fn), digvirati 29, (in). dikşā 29. # disciples, oleren, 10. Haribhadra 15; 85. discipline, of the monks, 31. Hemachandra 85. doctring, of the Brahmins, heterogeneity, of Matter and a priori, 50; of the Bud. Spirit, 79. dhists, a posteriori, 50. Hoernle 42, 32 (fa). dravya 18; 76. I Drivāda 11. Indefiniteness, of Boing 16, 19. theory of, 50. 'Indriyas 55. Earth, identified with Dlatter, Infax (āšrava) 21. 69. Inscriptions, at Mathuri, 44, okendriyas 22. doctrine of, 84. Intelligence, characteristic Eliora 40. mark of the souls, 20; Essai de bibliographie Jaina paramount importance of, 47; 40 (in), 73. 36 (p).

·88.1 JAINISY Tryopatha 28. R Isyara Kyahpa 81. Kalpasūtra 43. រ Karona 76. Jacobi 47. harma 85. Jalda philosophy, its compa doctrine of, 55-59; rison with Sankhya and eight kinds of, 25; Yoga, 53-59, Antardya 28; Jainas, their Nelaphysics and Agaska 26; Bihics 48. Darbapšvaraplya 25; Jaina Stitra: 47. Gotra 26; Jain& church 1; Jhipăvarapiga 20; its divisions, 1. Mohaniya 25; Jainism, a metaphysical basis Nama 25; of its own, 48; Vedaniye 25; & monastic religion, 1; theory of, 24; &D original system, 60; theory of retribution 75. antiquity of, 1-4; 80; Kármanasarira 86. doctrines of, 15–39; Karma-theory 37-39; in western garb as a solu in relation to ethics 27. tion to Life's great pro. Andyas ( passions ) 21; 32; 36. blemy, 47; Kathamci: 51 its History, 43-47; Kaushitaki 73. not an offsboot of Bad Kaațilya 80. dhista, 3; K'âyotsarga 31. oldest system after the close Koralins 36. of Vedic period, 79; present state of, 39-43; Ksãyika 27. rise of, in Eastern Indis, 48. Kumarapala 45. Jaing, their peculiarity, 42-43; L their view about their own origin, 6-11. Laity. its religious daties 41 - 12. Jambusvāmin 36. Järatkaraya Artabhăga 64. Leśyās, Doctrine of, 55-56; Jhayeri, H. L. 47. six types of, 26. JNA 18; 65; 82. Leimann 14,22({n); 41(fp), comparison with Soul, 72; liberated (mokta) 20. eternal and indestructible, lingasarira 56. 78; Litorature, Jain, bibliography in chhändegya, 73. of, 47. Nñana 59. looba 40.

·[ 89 INDEX 11 Lokaprakāía 15. Nitapatta, Vardhamina-lla. Lokāyata 80; 82, háyils, 4. Nayas 17-18; M doctrine of, 62. mahan 82, Nigantha 4. Małyira 48. nigoda 23; * historical personage, 9; doctrine of, 84, details of bis life, 9-10; nihnara (sehisms) 45-40. not the founder of Jainisme, nirjara 21; 33; 01. 4-6. nirvana 28; 36. mahaprala 29. of Mahirre, 80. Malli, & womaa, 7. of Parsya 80. manah, & refined product of nityatádla 50. Earth, 70, niortti 76. manas (mind) 22; 54; 69; 62. niyam 17, Datter 19. Non-distinction, between Spi- Ides of, in Jainism, 81; rit and Matter, 68-78. Sãoklya-Yog 81; Notes on Jodern Jainism 47, primeral, 82, Nyaya 82; Motaphysics 18-39. and Vaišeşika, 69-60. Dletempsychosis (punarjanma) Nyaya Vārttika 83. 76. 0 mind (Danas) 22. moksa 28; 76. Ordination, now, 34. Monastie, degrees, 41; P life, 30. polimas (standards of ascetio monk, bis daily datios, 41, life), 42, 32 (fa). Monks, tonfold highest law Painās 12. of, 32; Palicaţikha 83, the outfit of, 40. Paticandrigas 2 Motion, theory of, 84. parināma 7C; 77. mukts (liberated) 20. pårināmika 26. müla-saigla (prio clared) 40. pnrisahas (troubles) twenty- Malasutras 12. murdano (sausāris ) 20. pariciaparran 36, 29 (in); beings, division of, 21, 44;38(in). Pārsva 10; N & historical person, 6; Nandi 19. has better clajm 8 Nandirardlaga 10. founder of Jainiam, 6. 12 two, 33.

·90] JAINTSY passions (hasayas) 21. Repertoire de epigraphie Jaina Patañjali 81. 40 (in). patriarchs 43-45; Rest, theory of, B. Digambarn, 46. Rules, of staying, 41. Pattarali (Gurvāvali) 44, 39 8 (in); 46. Paumacariyam 44, 37 (in); Śakti 77. a Jaina version of the samadhi 09. Samaraiccalaha 15. Rāmāyana 15. pausadhoparāsa 30. sāmāyika 30. phala 76. samitis, five, 32. Sanjña 67. philosophy 10. pitarah 62. Samjfin (rational) 22. pitrarpana 62. sanilelhani (máranåntikz) 31. pradesa 82. Sámparäyiln 27. pradhana 77; 82. Samprati 45, Samsărin (moodana) 20. prajas, synonymous with samud jhâta (kind of orpio- Viirina, 74, praksti 76; 82; theory of, 59. sion) 33. präpas 63; eight, 73. samvara 27; 33; 07-58. Sankhya 1-3; prārik 77. pratikramana 34, oldest system after the close proto-elements (Pire, Water of Vedio period, 79; rigo 01, 77. and Earth ) 70. proto elements (tejah, wpah, Sankhya-Yoga 59. Sankhya Kärikās 81; 83. annam) 70. saptabhangas 52. proto-elements, guras, 70. sarvajña 77. psyche, building up of, 70-71; sat (utpäda-dhrauvya-vināša. conception of, 62-64; yuktam) 60; constituent parts of, 73; called Devali, 69; form of, 71. Pudgala 18; 54; 82. identified with Brahma, 68; or chaos 81; Purvas 11. piiruşa 53; 62; 73, pradhana or prakyti, 68; primeval matter, 68. R Šatruñjaya 40. rajah 82, tattvam 82. rational (samjiin) 22. SBE 47. Ipfelons (anapreksas schisms ( nihnara ) 45-46. bhāvanās) 32. Siddbarşi 15. resembling sarvaga 77. ог ·* INDEX :(-91 also, 14. Siddhartha Io. lapas 33;58; external, 33-34; fikşderala 30. Stavrata 29. internal, 33-31. Skyclad (Nigambaras) 1. Tatidarthidhigamasira claimed by Digambaras also, sleep, explanation of, 73. 14; Somadeva 15. claimed by Śretambaras Sonl, immortal, concept of, 68; its defilement, 21; The First Principles of the ita patare (according to Jain Philosophy 47. Yajtavalkya ) 65-68; Things, all transitory, 49. natural qualities of, 24-25; personal inmortality, 72; Tirthakaras, all of them, Tilakamañjari 15. 78; Ksatriyas, 7; permanent existence, doct excopt the two last, belong rine of, 78. to mythology, 9, Souls 20. Tradition, regarding the immortal, plarality of, 79. Pürras (Svetămbara), 12. individual, diversity of, 79. triralna 28. the ancient concept of, Trišajā 10. 61-62. Trişastišalākápuruşacarita, Soul-theory, in Jainism, 83; based on Vasudevahindi, in Sankhya-Yoga, 83. 8; Hemacandra's great epic, 8. Sraddha 62. troubles (Parișabas) twenty- Stevenson 42, 34 (fo); 43, two, 33. 35 (fo); 47. lyaj 77. Sthavirărali 43. U Sunli 42,33 (in) Uber die indischc secte der Sadharman 36. Jaina: 47. sūkshma 77 ; 82. udbhu 77, tükşmalarira 36, Umásräti 14. ummum bonum 59, {retāmbaras (white-robed) 1. upabhogaparibhogaparimcīna 29, Syād 51. upalabh 77. ivadvāda 16-18; 51-62; 85. Upomitibhacaprapañcākatkū T 15, Upāngas 12. zmah 82. Upanishads, divisions of, 76, anu 76. upaśrayas (convonts) 40-41. Space 19.

·- 92] JAINISSE Water, identided with Matter 69. Webor 12, 20 (tn); 13, 21 urdhvagaurara 55. attnmadharma 32. Uraradhyayan sütra 41. Dvisagadydo 42, 33 (in). V V&caspatimisra 83. Vahni 77. Vaiseșika 82, vatsa 40. Vedic period, close of, 80. vibhu 82. vicey, cardinal (kapayas), 92. vihdras 40. Viñananayak putus 73, Vinaśayāda 80. VOWB, Ave, 28. vyañj 77. vyap 77. Wheel, simile of, 77. White-robed (Srotimbaras), 1. Windisch 42, 33 (tn). World, Its evolution from Sal, 68. World, phenomenal un real, 49. Yagastilala 18. Yasoda 10. Yatavalkya 48; 04. Yoga 1, %; 67; oldest system after the close of the Vedic period, 79; the cause of As'rava, 92. Yogabhdsya 83. Yogafdstra 43, 33 (fa). Yogasutra 81; 83. Wapdering life, rules of, 40. Warren 47.

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