Ramkrishna Mission Institute Of Culture, Golpark

Arthasangraha

Phil, G. Thibaut, Ed. · 2006/04/22

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RESSANSKRIT SERIES:
A
EREDETION OF SANSKRIT WORKS
EDITED BY THE
OF THE BENARES SANSKRIT COLLEGE,
UNDER TIIE SUPERINTENDENCE OF
| R. T. H. GRIFFITH M. A.,
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, N. W. P. & OUDH,
& G. THIBAUT PII, DR.,
PRINCIPAL, BUNARES COLLEGE.
No. 4.
। अर्थसङ्कहः।
TIIE ARTILASAMGRAILI
AN ELEMENTARY TEATISE
ON MIMAMSA
BY
LAUGÁKSHI BHASKARA,
EDITED AND TRANSLATED)
BY
G. TITIBAUT PIIL PASS: N Liv
L'RINCIPAL., BUNA
COLLEG.
LIORARY
C!!!
THI
BENARIS:
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. BRAJ B. DAS & CO.
PRINTED AT THE BENARES PRINTING PRESS.
1882.
Logistered according to Act XXV. of 1867

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PREFACE. The treatise odited and translated in the following is one of the vest known and most oxtensively studies of the elementary works in the Mi:námsá-ýástra. It closely follows-and in many passages iterally agrees with-tho equally popular Mímám sá-Nyaya-Prakasa isually called the Spadeví, which latter work would perhaps be the nost recommendable to the beginner of all treatises on Mimánsá. Cho Artha-samgraha has however been preferred for publication in ho Benarog Sanskrit Scries on account of its smaller bulk. Its cxt has been repeatedly published before, in a lithographed ediion at Benares together with a commentary and in a printed odiion brought out by Pandit Jibánana Vidyá-ságar at Calcutta. Both these editions are incorrect, especially the lattor one. The Arthasangraha is by no meung an easy book, in spite of --or s it woulil perhaps bo more correct to say, owing to-its limited ulk in which a great amount of motter is condensed by incang of bo inost progrant langnago being used. I am greatly obliged to andit Dhundhi Rája tho able and learned Sanskrit Librarian of the Senares Collego for continued assistance given to mo whilo editing nd translating the Arthasamgrala and revising the proofsheets. Vith regard to somo specially difficult points I have likeniso del greatly benefitted by the advice of the distinguished Paụdit ála Sástrí, late Professor of law in tliv Benares Sanskrit-Collego ho combines with a perfect mastery of the Sástras a thorough bo vledge of the Veda and therefore is entitled liko few others to e appealed to in any question connected with the Mímámsáistra.--A more literal translation would havo been of comparilpely small valuo; numerous explanations havo thereforo been Hled and the plan of insorting them into the text by means of kets rather than adding thein in footnotes has been by prenco adhered to. (1. THIBAUT. BENARES: arch, 1882.

INTRODUCTORY REMAKS. An attempt at an exhaustive roview and criticism of tl Mimán sá-śástra would be out of place here. A few remarks hov ever on its general character will form a not unsuitable introdu tion to the Artha-samgraha and will, it is hoped, be of some use those who wish to form an aleqnate idea of the subject mattor this liitherto some what negl..ctori system. The only longer essa on Mimánsá which exists-tho ono by Colebrooke--gives corre information as far as it goes, is however not well adapted to mal the reader acquainted with the leading features of the sástr The current accounts of the Mímánsá found in handbooks & merely extract Colebrooke's remarks and are as a rulo more or les vague and incorrect. The beginnings of the Mímámsá may be traced distinct] enough in the Vedla itself, the very word (mimámsá; mímámsat &c.) being used there to denoto doubt and discussion with regai to points of doctrine anıl ritual. This early Mímámsá may b designated a bona fide Mímámsá as it tries to decidlo the point about which a doubt is raised by free reasoning taking into ac count the circunstances and exigencies of each caso without su! mitting itself to any authority. It originated in the time whe owing to differences in tradition, belief, ritual de. the variou Vedic śáklás began to form themselves, a time when the whiu! religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmins still was in a con paratively unsettled and floating condition. The lator systemati cal Mímámsá on the other hand--the Mimámsá which is embodie in the śástra-is of a more limited scopo, owing to the altered ci cumstances of tho time in which it arose. The creativo period Brahminical religious thought was then past and the spirit of fre inquiry and discussion laul yielded to an implicit faith in t! authority of the sacrel books lianded down by unbroken traditio Difficulties with regard to questions of sacrifice and ritual still i dood presented themselves but they were not as of old difficultr arising from the nature of the things themselves and to be r ni aoved by an independent and unbiassed consideration of all sides of the question, but rather difficulties originating in the peculiar lature of the sacred books and obstructing tho procedure of any mne who endeavoured to obvy the injunctions contained in them. the character of the brahmanas--that part of the Veda which nore immediately concorns us here-is well known and there can so no doubt that any one attempting to carry out the precepts conained in them or--if we limit ourselves to the main point--to perform the sacrifices which they describe and comment on, would soon find himself assailed by numerous doubts and misgivings as o his actions being a faithful representation of what the sacred exts intimato. The description of the sacrifices contained in the brálmanay is so incompleto and obscure, in the best cases so disointed and usystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks ind comments on tho mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent, acts that it would appear almost impossible for the jacrificer to feul assured of hóving dono exactly what he ought to bave dono unless he had somo other help to guido him. That such & help exister at a very carly time already, I mean in the time immediately following on the composition of the cluof brahmanas, is 10atter which does not admi. of any doubt. Wo can not indeed confidently maintain that then already books of the nature of the kolpa-sútrax or prayogas (vistei, but at any rato there must have existed from the outset a full and circumstantial oral tradition reforring to the proper performance of the sacrifices, a tradition for which we may even, from obvious reasons, claim a greater fuluess and clearness the higher we ascend into antiquity Wo may thus assume that during a certain period consequent on the composition of tho bráhmaņas--of whatever length that period may havo lieen--acts of religions duty, whereby are meant in the first place sacrifices, were performed on the double ground of the text of the Veda and of oral tradition, two sources of knowledge ich we may suppose to have agreed tolerably well in all essenal points. But this period was as we know followed by one in which a moro systematical and critical spirit began to stir, a period which the Brahmins felt the want of thoroughly reviewing and Kecasting all the knowledge they were thon possessing, of proving IV. its soundness and validity by the best possible means and of em. bodying it in treatises as pregnant and concise as possible. I of course alludo to the sútra-period. One of the many tasks then presenting themselves was to raise the doctrine of the sacrificial performances on an incontrovertible basis. This was indeed a task for which tho proper way of procedure was much more clearly defined than was the case with regard to most other departments of knowledge. By far the greater part of the Veda directly refers to the sacrifice and the object to be held in viow was therefore to compose treatises describing the different sacrificial performances which should entirely base on the text of the Veda and against which no body appealing to the latter would be able to raise any objection. The difficulties besetting this undertaking originated, as remarked above, in the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts whoso object, as is well known, is to point out the symbolical and mystical meaning of tło singlo acts of the sacrifice, not to give a clear and connected description of the latter which the performer might follow with ease. It will suffice shortly to touch here on some few of the circunstances which rendéred the task of the sútra-writer a by no means easy one. It is f. i. observed that those chapters of tho Vedla which refer to one and the samo sacrifice do not immediately follow on each other but are separated by intervening sections which treat of different matters. The fact that throughout the mantras accompanying a certain sacrifico aro combined in separato sections apart from those chapters which contain the corresponding brálmana is in itself a source of frequent perplexity.- Again it often happens that there is an apparent contradiction betwcon two passages referring to tho samo matter as when f. i. tho bráhmaņa-passage maintains that from out a series of sacrificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place whilo in the section which contains tho mantras accompanying the series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act mentioned occupies the tenth placo.---Or again we find that of two actions referring to the same thing the one which according to the exigencies of the case must be performed in the second place is in the sacred text enjoined before the other one.-Or again the reader of the Veda may be in doubt to whoun a certain injunction contained in .

. he Veda is addressed, what kind of man, in other words, is entitld to perform the sacrifice enjoined and in return to expect the esult promised in the Veda.—Or again wo meet in the Veda with assages regarding which a oprimá facio doubt arises whether they njoin an independent sacrifice to be performed from a special moive and attended by a special result or perhaps merely a subordiate sacrificial act which contributes its limited share towards the uccessful performance of one of tho well known great sacrifices. -Or again--and this must have been a point whose consideration ery frequently pressed itself on the Brahmins at a time when the arious sacrifices mentioned in the Veda were in reality regularly verformed--it becomes a matter for reflection and doubt in what nanner one has to perform the very numerous so-called vikſitis e. the sacrifices which are mere modifications of the few typical acrifices and which as such the Veda does not describe in detail. -It would be useless here to continue the enumeration of difficult ases of this nature as the treatise cilited and translated in tho following pages offers many additional examples. The continually recuring necessity of dealing with difficult vases of the kind described led to the elaboration of a set of rules under the guidance of which it became possible to give an account of the sacrifice which was of real uso for practical purposes and which at the same time could be upheld in every particular as beng foundled on the Veda. So f. i.--to mention only tho principles jy means of which two of the above stated difficulties are to be solved it is laid down that whenever the place of the inantra kecompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action ny a brálmaņa-passage are in conflict the mantra is to have greatir weight than the brahmana because tho formor being actually écited during the sacrifice is connected with it moro intimately han the latter which is not directly used during the performance. And of two actions referring to the samo thing, as f. i, tho huskpg of rice-grains and "heir cooking, the one to which the exigenhes of the case assign the first place is to be done first although the sacred text it may be mentioned only after the other one ; in the goneral principle that we inust try to find for every individual act constituting the sacrifice a visiblo purpose by means of vi. which it may contribute towards the outward form of the sacrific and that only in the case of such a visible purpose not being trace ablo it may be assumed that the act directly contributos toward the supersensuous result of the entira sacrifice. In tho exampl alluded to above tho visible purpose of the ricegrains being huske first is that thereby they are made fit for being cooked while n such purpose can be discovered if the cooking is mado to preced the husking Tho exposition of these rules either directly stated as in the sys tematical treatises of later origin or implied in the discussion particular Vedic passages as in Jaimini's sútras forms the bulk what is called tho Mímámsá-śástra and the latter might therefor broadly be defined as a body of rules enabling us to construct o tho ground of the Veda a kalpa-sútra or a prayoga (a treatiso the nature of the manuals called prayogas-cither actually writ ten down or else mentally conceived--forming the irdispensabl preliminary step for a kalpasútra which is nothing but a prayog highly abbreviated and condensed by means of certain technicali ties and conventions). It would be a by no means uninterestin; task to submit a kalpasitra as f. i. Baudháyana's or Apastamba? to an investigation of this kind and to show f. i. by a comparison of tho accounts given of some primary sacrifice in the Vedic text on ono hand and in the kalpasútra on the other hand how th transition from the former to the latter can only be offected b; certain rules of the Mímámsá boing had recourse to. Although the remarks made in the preceding lines on the scope of the Mímímsí sufficiently characterize the matter occupying the greater part of the sástra and point out its chiefly practical charac ter they by no means render full justice to the form in which the sástra was finally claborated and in which it appears in the systematical treatises a specimen of which is tho Artha-samgraha. In this later form the Mímámsá is a systematic analysis of tha entire part of the Veda which refers to action, preeminently sacri' ficial action, of the so-called Karma-kánda. This part of the Veda comprises all Vedic writings with the only exception of the Upanishads, includes therefore the entire Sambitás and by far the greater part of the brahmaņas. The investigation undertaken by 7 vii. he fully developed Mímisná has of course originated from the noro practical questions above touched upon but it takes a wider İcope and establishes a theory which may indeed be applied to he decision of practical questions but which in addition has its lwn independent interest. The chief features of this theory will le shortly indicated in the following. The entire Veda (excluding the Upanishads) is declared to reat of dharma, i. c. acts of duty foremost among which are sarifices. It in the first place cnjoins certain acts of duty specifyng at the same time the beneficial result which attends the perormanco of each act. If it be asked on what authority these acts re enjoined and certain results stated to belong to them, the anwer is that the Veda as being nitya, eternal is authoritative of its in nature and needs no other basis to rest on. The proofs of he eternity of the Veda aro of course by no means satisfactory nd inay if.closely examined bo reduced to the faith of the comnunity basing on immemorial tradition. But this point really lies utside the scope of the Mimmsá which rather presupposes tho ternity of the Veda and consequently the binding nature of the recepts contained therein and enters on its real task when it beins to demonstrate that every part, in fact every ford of the sacred texts somehow or other refers to acts of duty ncumbent on men. To do this it becomes necessary to classify the ontents of the Veda. The most general classification is to distinglish the mantra-passages from the Brahmana-passages these two great divisions being clearly pointed out by their different form; be systematical books on Mímámsá however as a rule start at onco rith the more detailed division of the Vovla into injunctions (vidhi), nantras, names (námadheya), prohibitions (nishedha) and explanitory passages (arthaváda). Among these five divisions the first lace in point of importance is claimed by tho injunctions, vedic assages which-their character of eternity and authority being Fesupposed-impel mu to perform a certain action in expectation a certain result. As f. i. the passage "a man desirous of parase is to sacrifice" (svargakámo yajeta). Passages of this kind laim an instigatory character in consequence of their finite verb tanding in the optative or imperative form, whereby the hearer or line and every viii. reader is instigated to act. The difference between these optative forms as found in the Veda aud thoso which are employed in ordinary hunan intercourse is that in the latter case the enunciation of the optative form originates in the mird of some individual person who has the wish of making another person act, while in tho former case the instigatory power rests solely in the eternal word of the Veda which has no human mind for its antecedent. If we wish to bring the matter soinewlat nearer to our way of thinking wo might say that the optative forms of the Veda embody the eternal commands of God; although this would not exactly correspond to the doctrine of the Mímámsakas to whom the Veda is a self-subsistent entity. Among the numerous injunctions which are found in the Vedic texts we have in the first place to distinguish those which in the most general terms enjoin a certain action or sacrifice and to which all other injunctions referring to details are sul ordinate. Injunctions of this kind are called utpatti-vidhis i. e. originative injunctions and an example is f. i. "agnihotram juhoti" "he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation.” The very limited number of short sentences embodying injunctions of this nature constitute to the Hindú mind the very kernel of the Veila ail the remainder of which comprising among the rest the entiro Samhitás has its rai son d’être only in standing in a certain relation to the ntpatti. vidhis and being useful to the person who endeavours to carry out tho precepts containeil in the latter. These utpatti-vidhis cannot be said to stand to each other in any necessary relation andfar as known to me--the Mímámsakas have made no attempt to subordinate them to some principle of unity. It can only bo said that the order of the sacrifices enjoined in them is a definite one the sacrificer having to proceed in regular succession from the simpler ones to the moro complicated. But even from this principle of unity tho naimittika sacrifices i. e. those which have to be performed on special occasions arising would have to be excepted! Nor can a principle of unity be discovered in the results to which the sacrifices are said to lead, as these are of the most heterogene ous nature, long life, wealth, progeny, dominion or, as in many cases, paradiso or the heavenly world (svarga). The latter is.

ix. nost probably on account of its indefiniteness, declared by the Mímánsá to be the fruit of all those sacrifices for which the Veda Joes not mention a special result. These originative injtinctions impressing man's mind excite in im the desire to perform the action as the result of which the reavenly world or else soine eartlıly possession is pointed out. Che utpatti-vidhi itself as a rulo intimates the result and in addiion to this the general nature of the action by means of which the esult is to be obtained, this action being in most cases a sacrifice; ut in order to enable the person desirous to sacrifice to carry out is intention the special mode of procedure (the so-called itikartayatá) remains to be stated. This is done by the second class f injunctions distinguished by the Mímámsakas, the so called iniyoga-vidhis, injunctions of applicatioộ by means of which all the ctions and things subsidiary to a certain sacrifico (the so called ńgas or members of the sacrifice) are intimated. Tho injunctions elonging to this class are as they supply information about all the etail of the sacrifico very numerous and the discussion of the diferent principles according to which they are to be combined with ach other and subordinated to the utpatti-vidhis is one of the most, tactically perhaps the most important topic of the mímámsá. The ramáņas which are to guide us in subordinating the various objects od acts constituting the sacrifice to one another and finally to tho entral action are stated to be six, of successively recreasing force nd it must bo admitted that the reasoning by which the relativo trength of these pramáņas is settled shows extraordinary acuteoss and an astonishing grasp of all the intricate and perplexing stail furnished by the Vedic texts. A full discussion of the matter Fill be found in the Arthasaingralia; here it must suffice to state a ** cases exemplifying the general principles. Above was menóned as an example of the utpatti-vidhi the passage "agnihotram hoti” “he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation." With this inaction now we have tu connect the viniyoga-vidhi "dadhná ju- $i" which as the Mímámsakas explain, in reality means "dadhná bhávayet" "he is to effect the oblation by means of sour ilk.” This passage shows us that sour milk is an anga, a subsidiby matter of tho aguihotra-oblation and the special reason from mam e. which we infer the stated relation is in the present case srutii. direct statement or direct enunciation, the instrumental form "da. dhná” showing directly that sour milk is the means by which the ohlation is accomplished. This éruti is justly declared to be the strongest of all the proofs enabling us to infer the connection of subsidiary matter and principal matter; the one of widest application lowever and the one which inust be applied at the outset when wo wish to find the link connecting the entire sacrificial action with its constituent parts is prakaraṇa or interdependence i. e. the prin. ciplo according to which we consider as referring to each other one passago which enjoing some sacrifice in general as leading to a certain result and another which enjoins some special act without naming a special result accruing from it. So f. i. when we read the passage enjoining the darśapúrnamása-sacrifice "he who is de sirous of paradise is to offer the darśapúrņamása-sacrifice" we feel the want of other passages pointing out in what way the named sacrifico is to be performed and on the other hand when wo meet; with the passage referring to the oblations called samidh "ho is to offer the samidh" we rest unsatisfied because we do not iinmediately see what is to be effected by means of the samidh. The consequence is that wo becomo aware of the interdependence vi these two injunctions, the particular action incntioned in the latter being subscrvient to the comprehensivo sacrifice enjoined in the former ono. Again after we have by means of the viniyoga-vidhis understood the interior structure of the sacrifice and the successive subordination of its parts to the whole we require, in order to become able to perform the sacrifice, additional information about one point viz the ordor in which the several parts have to succeed one another. This want is supplied by the so-called injunctions of performance, prayoga-vidhi. It is however to be remarked that we meet on! in very rare cases with vedic passages having no other purpose thar to settle the order of tho acts constituting the sacrifice. In almost all cases this order of succession is to be concluded from the vari ous indicia given in the viniyoga-vidbis, mantras &c. so that the prayoga-vidhis have rather an inferential than an actual existence. -Hore again there are enumerated six means of proof of varying xi. force by means of which order of succession is determined. The translation of the Artha-samgrala will be found to give the requisite details. There remains one class of injunctions to be noticed, viz. tho 50-called injunctions of claim or qualification, adhikára-vidhi. The injunctions enumerated hitherto have taught us firstly what acts are to be done, secondly in what manner the acts enjoined are to be done and thirdly which is the order of succession of the subordinate acts the aggregate of which constitutes the principal act. There remains one question more to be answered viz. who is the person to whom all these ditterent injunctions are addressed? who is qualified to perforin the sacritice enjoined and to claim its promised fruit? and this question is settled by the adlikáravilhis. About this class of injunctions too it is to be remarked that fow passages only are more adhikára-vidhis it frequently happening that one awıl the same passage is utpatti-vidhi as well as adhikáravidhi. And again we must note that a groat number of adhikúravidhis have a meroly ideal existence, as certain qualifications of the sacrificer are nowhere explicitly enounced but have to be Inferred from the requirements of the case.So much about vidli, Injunction. If we now turn to the second of the five divisions of the Veda, the mantras, the first question presenting itself is again “in what relation do they stand to the sacrificial action? in what manner do they help the latter?" The answer here is somewhat curious. As already remarked the Mímámsakas are extremely anxious to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word and gesture are of visible use, contribute their share towards the proper accomplishment of the outwarılly appearing set of actions as which the sacrifico presents itself to the senses and they insist on ascribing what we might call a purely ceremonial character, a significance of purely spiritual and supersensuous nature to those actions only or which a visible pui lose can not by any means be made out. he principle is on the whole certainly a sound one as its applicalon tends to convert the sacrifice into a well connected whole the arts of which are subservient to each other, while the too free use |f the contrary principle i. e. of ascribing an independent cbaracxii. tor to each individual act would resolve the whole sacrifice into a string of performances of whom no body would understand how they came to be combined.-In the special case of the mantras however the former principle appears to be carried too far. If w consider the point impartially we can bardly deny that by far the greater part of the verses and short sayings which accompany the different acts of the sacrifice can only have been meant to have a mystical, supersensuous effect, to contribute directly towards the transcendental result, the apúrva, which in a manner unknown to man is produced by the sacrifice and is the means of procuring for the sacrificer his reward. The Mímámsakas however maintain tha while some mantras must be acknowledged merely to have the effect stated just now the great majority of them have the pur pose of reminding the sacrificer of the different matters con nected with the sacrifice, f. i. of the divinities to whom the vari ous oblations are made. It is clear that the first position is her unduly assigned to a circumstance which is altogether secondary and accidental. While it is easy to understand why injunction (vidhi) an mantra are declared to constitute two of the subdivisions of th veda and again why the same position is assigned to arthavád and nishedha, it is, on a superficial view of the matter, difficult t see why námadheya, name is coordinated with the four heads enu moratod. The distinction of these four heads bases on the obviou circumstance that the many particular sentences constituting i their totality the "apaurusheyam vákyam” called Veda show pa culiar characteristics naturally leading to the establishment of fourfold division. The head “námadheya" on the other hand do not comprise entire sentences, but only particular worıls occurrir in the vidhi-passages. The question of námadheya is in the M mámsá regularly treated in connection with four different Ved passages viz. "udbhidá yajeta pasukámalı” "chitrayá yajcta paśı kamah" "agnihotram juhoti" "syenenábhicharan yajeta" and might thus appear as if the quoted passages alone had given ri to the discussion. This is however by no means the case; ever passage which contains the name of a sacrifice is equally implica ed in the investigation and three at any rate of the four quoted in xili. junctions appear to owe their selection merely to the circumstance of the sacrifices enjoined in then being comparatively little known pr practised so that it was in addition to the theoretical value of the question a matter of some practical interest to decide what the terms "udbhidá" &c. really denoted. Passages enjoining well known sacrifices—as f. i. "darśapúrņamásábhyám yajeta” “jyotishfomena yajeta”-might however as well be used as examples. --Tho reason now why in all such passages particular words like "udbhidá" "darsapúrņamásábhyám" are singled out as belonging to a special subdivision of tho Veda is as follows. According to the theory repeatedly alluded to in the above all the parts of the Veda must be shown to be connected with the action energy (the so called árthí blávaná) roused in the believer by the injunctive passayes. This cnergy requires a result towards which it tends, an Instrument whereby to realize the result and the indication of the particular way of procedure. The last named demand is satisfied by the many subsidiary injunctions, as stated above. The instrument is implicitly mentioned in the utpattividhis and is in fact the lacrifice itself, the verb "y ajeta" having to be interpreted as mcanng “yágena bhávayet" "he is to effect or realize by nieans of the kacrifice", the object to be crfected being the result of the sacrifice. if we therefore transform the first of the above quoted passages in he sanio manner we get the following sentence "udbhida yagona pasun bhávayet”, in which the word "pasum" indicates the result #hile "yágena" denotes the instrument. Thus--various hypotheles on which the word “udlohida” might be put in connection with the blávaná having been disprovedl—there remains 110 other course but to declare that it merely serves to define or to limit the idea expressed by the word "yígena", is merely a name and as such occupies a position by itself, which entitles it to be considered as melonging to a special subdivision of the Vedic texts. The same easoning applies to the other passages quoted.--I feel not quito are whether this subtio distinction is really defensible or necesry but at any rate it is a striking proof of the thoroughness with hich the Mímámsakas have carried out their analysis of the Veda. The fourth subdivision of the Veda, viz. nishedha, prohibition may be left undiscussed here, as its subject matter is not of primaxiv. ry importance. It is of course intimately connected with vidhi, injunction (many nishedhas being in fact only disguised vidhis) and it is therefore unnecessary to dwell on the position it occupies in the Veda. Arthaváda, explanatory statement forms the last of the five subdivisions of the Veda adopted by the Mímámsá. The translation of artbaváda by "explanatory statement" is not quite adequate, as arthaváda is defined as comprising all those sentences which either contain a praise of the things enjoined (by vidhi) or a blame of the things prohibited (by nishedha). These passages can not be maintaineil to be directly connected with the above mentioned árthii bhávaná, as the whole action enjoined by vidhi is carried out with. out any help from the arthavádla sentences, but they occupy a definite position with regard to the so-called sábdí bhávaná, i. e. the energy inherent in vidhi-passages by which the latter aro able to impress man's mind and make him aet. For the special mode in which the subdí bhávaná acts (its itikartavgatá) is expressed in the artha váda-passages, man being on one hand impelled to perform an action when he hears it praised and glorified and on the other hand feeling disinclined to do things which others reprehen! and object to. It is therehy shown that every part of the Veda somehow or other contributes towards dharma and the task of the Mímáisá i thus fulfilled. It will at the same time appear tiat a theoretica! inquiry of this kind into the nature of the Veda satisfies all practi. cal requirements as well; for if the logical commection in which th. sentences of the Veda stand to each other is understood the proper way of procedure for him who wishes to act on the precepts of the Veda can no longer be doubtful. The above remarks have left many interesting points unnoticed, so f.i. the doctrine of the eternity of sonnd, the doctrino of the different pramáņas &c. A more detailed account of the system I hope to publish in another place. The Mínámsá certainly de serves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed none of the attractions which the other darśanas derived from the speculative character of their contents; its scope is limit, ed and the nature of tile investigations in which it is engaged.

leaves no room for high flights of the imagination. But it possesses counterbalancing advantages. Its subject matter is of a positive nature, its method is sound and its reasoning in juost cases convincing.

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अर्थसङ्ग्रहः। श्रीगणेशाय नमः। वासुदेवं रमाकान्तं नत्वा लोगाशिभास्करः । कुरुते जैमिनिनये प्रवेशायार्थसंग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥ । अथ परमकारुणिको भगवान जैमिनिर्धर्मविवेकाय द्वाद- नक्षणी प्रणिनाय । तत्रादौ धर्मजिज्ञासा सूत्रयामास अथा- मो धर्मजिज्ञामेति । अत्राथशब्दो वेदाध्ययनानन्त-वचनः । अतःशब्दो हि वेदाध्ययनस्य दृष्टार्थत्वं ब्रूते। स्वाध्यायो ऽध्येतव्य इत्यध्ययनविधौ तदध्ययनस्यार्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थकत्वेन व्यवस्था- पनात् । तथा च वेदाध्ययनानन्तरं यतो ऽर्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थक मध्ययनमतो तोधर्मस्य वेदार्थस्य जिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति शेषः । जिज्ञासापदस्य विचारे लक्षणा । अतो धर्मविचारशास्त्रमिद- भारम्भणीयमिति शास्त्रारम्भसूत्रार्थः ॥ १ ॥ अथ को धर्मः किं तस्य लशणमिति चेदुच्यते । यागादिरेव धर्मः। नजमणं वेदप्रतिपाद्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थो धर्म इति । प्रयो- जने ऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय प्रयोजनवदिति।भोजनादावतिव्याप्ति- वारणाय वेदप्रतिपाद्य इति । अनर्थफलकत्वादनर्थभूते श्येना- हावतिव्याप्तिवारणायार्थ इति । न च चोटनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्म ति सौत्रतनशणविरोधः चोदनापदस्य विधिरूपवेदैकदेश- रत्वादिति वाच्यम्। तत्रापि चोदनाशब्दस्य वेदमात्रपरत्वात्। दिस्य सर्वस्य धर्मतात्पर्यवत्वेन धर्मप्रतिपादकत्वात् ॥ ।

स च यागादिर्यजेत वर्गकाम इत्यादिवाक्येन वर्गमुद्दिश्य पुरुषं प्रति विधीयते। तथा हि। यजेते त्यत्रास्त्यंशवयं यजिधातुः प्रत्ययश्च । प्रत्यये ऽप्यस्त्यंशवयमाख्यातत्वं नित्वं च । तत्राख्या- तत्वं दशन्तकारसाधारणं निङत्वं पुनर्निमात्रे । उभाभ्याम- प्यंशाभ्यां भावनैवोच्यते । भावना नाम भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापार विशेषः।सा द्विधा (१)शाब्दी भावना आर्थो(२ भावना चेति । तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेष शाब्दी भावना। सा च लिङशनोच्यते। निशवणे ऽयं मा प्र. वर्त्तयति मत्प्रवृत्त्यनुकूनव्यापारवानिति नियमेन प्रतीतः । य- द्यस्माच्छब्दान्नियमतः प्रतीयते तत्तस्य वाच्यम। यथा,गामानये. त्यस्मिन्वाक्ये गोशब्दस्य गोत्वम । स च व्यापारविशेषो लौकि कवाक्ये पुरुषनिष्ठो ऽभिप्रायविशेषः। वैदिकवाक्ये तु पुरुषा भावाशिङादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव । अत एव शाब्दी भावनेति व्यवद्यिते । सा च भावनांशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधन मितिकर्तव्यतां च किं भावये केन भावयेत्कथं भावयेदिति तत्र साध्याकाङ्क्षायां वक्ष्यमाणांशत्रयोपता अार्थी भावन साध्यत्वेनान्वेति । एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेन समानाभिधानश्रुतेः । सं ख्यादीनामेकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वे ऽप्ययोग्यत्वान्न माध्यत्वेनान्वयः साधनाकाङ्क्षायां लिङादिज्ञानं करणत्वेनान्वेति । तस्य च क रणत्वं (३) न भावनोत्पादकत्वेन तत्पूर्वमपि तस्याः शब्दे सत्त्वा (१) ख ग पुस्तकयोः द्विविधा । (२) ख घ पुस्तकयोः शब्दभावना अर्थभा० । (3) तस्य च भावनायां करणत्वमिति पाठः स्व पुस्तके ।

( ३ ) । किं तु भावनाजापकत्वेन शब्दभावनाभाव्यनिवर्तकत्वेन वा । इतिकर्तव्यताकालायामर्थवादज्ञाप्यप्राशस्त्यमितिकर्त- यतात्वेनान्वेति । प्रयोजनेच्छाजनितक्रियाविषयव्यापार प्रार्थों भावना। सा चाख्यातत्वांशेनोच्यते । आख्यानसामान्यस्य व्या- पारवाचित्वात् । साप्यंशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधनमितिकर्तव्य- नां च किं भावयेत्केन भावयेत्कथं भावदिति । तत्र साध्या- काङ्क्षायां स्वर्गादि फलं साध्यत्वेनान्वेति । साधनाकाङ्क्षायां घागादिः करणत्वेनान्वेति । इतिकर्तव्यताकाङ्गायां प्रयाजाद्य- जातमितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति ॥ अथ को वेद इति चेदुच्यते । अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः । स च वधिमन्त्रनामधेयनिषेधार्थवादभेदात्यच्चविधः ॥ तत्राज्ञातार्थ ज्ञापको वढभागो विधिः । स च तादृश (१) प्र- योजनवदर्थविधानेनार्थवान यादृशं चार्थं प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तं विधत्ते । यथा ऽग्निहोत्रं जुहुयाल्वर्गकाम इति विधिर्मानान्त- रेणाप्राप्तं स्वर्गप्रयोजनवद्वोमं विधत्ते । अग्निहोत्रहोमेन स्वर्ग भावयदिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। यत्र कर्म मानान्तरण प्राप्तं तत्र त- दुद्देशेन गुणमात्रं विधत्ते। यथा दना जुहोतीत्यत्र होमस्यानि- होत्रं जयादित्यनेन प्राप्तत्वाद्धोमोद्देशेन दधिमात्रविधानम् । दध्ना होमं भावयेदिति । यत्र भयमप्राप्तं तत्र विशिष्टं विधत्ते प्रथा मोमेन यजेतेत्यत्र मोमयागयोरप्राप्तत्वात्मोमविशिष्टया- विधानमा मोमपदे मत्त्वर्थलक्षणयासोमवता यागेनेटं भावये- दिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। न चोभयविधाने वाक्रमभन्दा मयेकमभय- (१) स च प्रयोजनोत पाठः ख ग पुस्तकमा LIBRARY; ***U! FOTO HRIN ६.UP THE HI ( ४ ) स्थाविधानात किं नु विशिष्टस्यैकस्यैव विधानात् । न च "ज्यो- तियोमेन वर्गकामो यजेते"ति विधिप्राप्तयागोद्देशन सोमरू- पगुणविधानमेवास्तु सोमेन यागं भावयेदिति किं मत्वर्थलक्षण- येति वाच्यम् । तस्याधिकारविधित्वेनोत्पत्तिविधित्वासंभवात् । ननूद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यस्येव ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्यस्याप्युत्पत्त्य- धिकारविधित्वमस्त्विति चेन्न। दृष्टान्त उत्पत्तिवाक्यान्तराभा- वेन अन्यथानपपत्त्या तथात्वाश्रयणात। किं च ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्य- स्योभयविधित्वे ऽनेनैव यागस्तस्य फलसंबन्धो ऽपि बोधनीय इति सुदृढो वाक्यभेदस्तदरं सोमपदे मत्वर्थनक्षणया विशि- टविधानम॥ विधिश्चतुविधः । उत्पत्तिविधिर्विनियोगविधिरधिकारविधि प्रयोगविधिश्चेति ॥ तत्र कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरुत्पत्तिविधिः । यथा ऽग्नि- होत्रं जुहोतोति । अत्र विधौ कर्मणः करणत्वेनान्वयः । अमि- होत्रहोमेनष्टं भावयेदिति। ननु यागस्य हे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च तथा च रूपाश्रवणे अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रख्यन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न रूपाश्रवणे ऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात। अन्यथा रूपश्रवणान जुहोतीत्ययमेवोत्पत्तिविधिः स्यात् । तथा चामिहोत्रं जुहोती ति वाक्यमनर्थकं स्यात् ॥ अङ्गप्रधानसंबन्धबोधको विधिविनियोगविधिः । यथा दन जुहोतीति । स हि टतीयया प्रतिपन्नाङ्गभावस्य टनी होमसं बन्धं विधत्ते । दना होमं भावयेदिति । गुणविधौ च धात्वर्थम ( ५ ) साध्यत्वेनान्वयः । क्वचिढाश्रयत्वेनापि । यथा दनेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयादित्यत्र दधिकरणत्वेनेन्द्रियं भावयेत्। तच्च किंनिष्ठमि- त्याकाङ्गायां सन्निधिप्राप्तहोम आश्रयत्वेनान्वेति !! एतस्य विधेः सहकारिभूतानि षट प्रमाणानि । श्रुतिलिङ्गवा- क्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यारूपाणि । एतत्महकृतेनानेन विधिना- ङ्गत्वं परोद्देशप्रवृत्तकृतिसाध्यत्वरूपं (१) पार्थ्यापरपर्याय ज्ञाप्यते ॥ तत्र निरपेको रवः श्रुतिः । सा च त्रिविधा । विधात्री अभि- धात्री विनियोलो च। तत्राद्या लिङाद्यात्मिका। द्वितीया वी- यादिश्रुतिः । यस्य च शब्दस्य श्रवणादेव संबन्धः प्रतीयते सा विनियोत्री । सापि त्रिविधा विभक्तिरूपा एकाभिधानरूपा एकपदरूपा चेति । तत्र विभक्तिश्रुत्या अङ्गत्वम्। यथा व्रीहिभि- यजेतेति हतीयाश्रुत्या बीहीणां यागाङ्गत्वम् । तदपि पुरोडा- शप्रकृतितया । यथा पशोहदयादिरूपहविष्प्रकृतितया यागा- ङ्गत्वम् । अरुणया एकहायन्या गवा सोमं क्रीणातीत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये आरुण्यस्यापि हतीयाश्रुत्या क्रयाङ्गत्वम्। तदपि गोरूप- द्रव्यपरिच्छदहारा न तु साशात् । अमूर्त्तत्वात् । बौहीन्प्रोकशाती- ति प्रोगणस्य बीह्यङ्गत्वं द्वितीयाश्रुत्या । तच्च प्रोक्षणं न बी- हिस्वरूपार्थम् । तस्य तेन विनाप्युपपत्तेः। किं त्वपूर्वसाधनत्व- प्रयुक्तम् । बीहोनप्रोक्ष्य यागानुष्ठाने ऽपूर्वानुपपत्तेः । एवं सर्वे- ष्वङ्गप्वपूर्वप्रयुक्तमङ्गत्वं बोध्यम्। एवमिमामगृभ्णत्रशनामृतस्ये- त्यश्वाभिधानोमादत्तइत्यत्र द्वितीयया श्रुत्या मन्त्रस्याश्वाभि- (१) रुप यागादिकमिति ख ग पुस्तकयोः ।

। (६ ) धान्यङ्गत्वम् । यदाहवनीये जुहोतीत्याहवनीयस्य होमाङ्गत्व सप्तमोश्रुत्या। एवमन्योऽपि विभक्तिश्रुत्या विनियोगो ज्ञेयः। प- शुना यजते त्यत्रैकत्वपुंस्त्वयोः समानाभिधानश्रुत्या कारकाङ्ग त्वम् । यतेत्याख्याताभिहितसंख्याया आर्थभावनाङ्गत्वं (१ समानाभिधानश्रुतरेक (२) पदश्रुत्या च यागाङ्गत्वम्। न चामू तयास्तस्याः कथं भावनाङ्गत्वं वाच्यम। कर्तृपरिच्छेदहारा त दुपपत्तेः । कर्ता चाशेपलभ्यः । श्राख्यातेन हि भावनोच्यते सा च कर्तारं विनानुपपन्नेति तमाशिपति । सेयं श्रुतिनिङ्गा दिभ्यः प्रबन्ला। लिङ्गादिषु न प्रत्यको विनियोजकः शब्दो ऽसि किंतु कल्प्यो, यावच्च विनियोजकः(३) कल्प्यते तावत्प्रत्य शया श्रुत्या विनियोगस्य कृतत्वेन तेषां कल्पकत्वशक्ताह तत्वात् । अत एवैन्या निङ्गानेन्द्रोपस्थानार्थत्वम। किं तु ऐ न्या गाईपत्यमुपतिष्ठतइत्यत्र गाईपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्य गाईपत्योपस्थानार्थत्वम् ॥ शब्दमामर्थ्य निङ्गम् । यथाः। सामर्थ्यं सर्वशब्दानां लिङ्ग मित्यभिधीयते । सामर्थ्यं रूढिरेव। तेन ममाख्यातो नाभेटः यौगिकशब्दममाख्यातो रुढ्यात्मकलिङ्गशब्दस्य भिन्नत्वात् (४) तेन बहिवसदनं टामीति मन्त्रस्य कुशनवनाङ्गत्वं वनपादिनवनाङ्गत्वम्। तस्य बहिर्दामोतिलिङ्गात्तजवनं प्रक (१) सख्याया आर्थीभावना० इति पाठः क पुस्तके | (२) श्रुतेरेव ! पदश्रुत्योत पाठः ख ग घ पुस्त पुस्तुकंषु । (3) कः शब्द इति ग घ पुस्तकयोः । (८) यौगिकेत्यारभ्य भिन्नत्वादित्यन्तो ग्रन्थः ख ग पुस्तकयोनीपलभ्यते ।

( ७ ) शयितुं समर्थत्वात् । एवमन्यत्रापि निङ्गादिनियोगो द्रष्टव्यः । तदिदं निङ्गं वाक्यादिभ्यो बलवत् । अत एव स्पोनं ते सदनं कुणामीति मन्त्रस्य पुरोडाशसदनकरणाङ्गत्वं । सदनं कृणो- मीति लिङ्गान् न तु वाक्यात् ॥ समभिव्याहारो वाक्यम । समभिव्याहारश्च साध्यत्वाढिवाच- कहितीयाद्यभावे ऽपि वस्तुतः शेषशेषिवाचकपदयोः सहोच्चा- रणम। यथा यस्य पर्णमयो जुहूर्भवति न स पापं श्लोकं टणो- तीत्यत्र पर्मताजुहोः समभिव्याहारादेव पर्णताया जुहङ्गत्वम्। न चानर्थक्यम्, अन्यथापि जुहाः सिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम्। जुहू- शब्देन तत्माध्यापूर्वन्नमाणात् । तथा च वाक्यार्थः । पर्णतया ऽव- तहविर्धारणद्वारा जुहपूर्व भावयेदिति । एवं च पर्णतया यदि जुहूः क्रियते तदैव तत्साध्यमपूर्व भवति नान्यथेति गम्यतइति न पर्णताया वैयर्यम(१) । अवत्तहविर्धारणदारेति चावश्यं वक्तव्यम् । अन्यथा सवाढिप्वपि पर्णतापत्तेः । सयं पर्णता अ. नारभ्याधीतापि सर्वप्रकृतिष्वेवान्वेति न विकृतिषु । तत्र चोद- केनापि तत्प्राप्तिसंभवात्यौनरुत्यापत्तेः। यत्र समग्राङ्गोपदेशः सा प्रकृतिः। यथा दशपूर्णमामादिः। तत्प्रकरण सर्वाङ्गपाठात्। यत्र न सर्वाङ्गोपदशः सा विकृतिः । यथा सौर्यादिः । तत्र कतिपयाङ्गानामतिदेशेन प्राप्तत्वात् । अनारभ्यविधिः समान्य- विधिः । तदिदं वाक्यं प्रकरणादिभ्यो बल्नवत् । अत एवेन्द्राग्नी इदं हविरित्यादरेकवाक्यत्वाद्दर्शाङ्गत्वं न तु प्रकरणादर्शपूर्ण- मासाङ्गत्वम् ॥ १) एवं चेत्यारभ्य वययमित्यन्त: पाठो घ पुस्त के उपलभ्यते ।

() उभयाकाङ्गा प्रकरणम्। यथा प्रयानादिषु समिधो यजती. त्यादी वाक्ये फन्नविशेषस्यानिर्देशात् समिद्यागेन भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं किमिति उपकार्याकाङ्क्षा। दर्शपूर्णमासवाक्ये ऽपि दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वगं भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं कथमित्युपका- रकाकाङ्ग। इत्थं चोभयाकाझ्या प्रयाजादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासा- ङ्गत्वम् । तच्च प्रकरणं विविधम् । महाप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणं चति । मुख्यभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणं महाप्रकरणम्। तेन च प्रया- जादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वम् । एतच्च प्रकृतावेव, उभयाकासा- याः संभवान्न तु विकृतौ । तत्र प्रकृतिवहिकृतिः कर्त्तव्येत्यति- देशेन कर्थभावाकाङ्गाया उपशमेनापूर्वाङ्गानामप्युभयाकाङ्ग- या विनियोगासम्भवात। तस्मादपूर्वाङ्गानां स्थानादेव विकृत्यर्थ- त्वमिति । अङ्गभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणम् । तेन चाभिक्रमणादीनां प्रयाजाद्यङ्गत्वम् । तच्च सन्देशनैव ज्ञायते तदभावे चाविशेषात्सर्वेषां फलभावनाकथंभावेन ग्रहणप्रस- ड्रेन प्रधानाङ्गत्वापत्तेः । एकाङ्गानुवादेन विधीयमानयोरप्य- ङ्गयोरन्तरान्ने विहितत्वं सन्देशः । यथा ऽभिक्रमणे । तत्र हि “समानयत उपभृतस्तेजो वा” इत्यादिना प्रयाजानुवादेन कि चिढङ्गं विधाय तदनन्तरमपि प्रयाजानुवादेन (१) “यस्यैवं (२ विदुषः प्रयाजा इज्यन्ते प्रेभ्यो लोकभ्यो भ्राटव्यान्नुदते ऽभि- कामं जुहोत्यभिजित्यै” इत्यनन्तरं “यो वै प्रयाजानां मिथुन वेदे"त्यादि किं चिदङ्गं विधीयते ॥ (१) यस्यैवविदुष इत्यारभ्य तरमित्यन्तो ग्रन्थो ग पुस्तके नोपलभ्यते | (२) प्रयाजानुवादेन प्रयाजत्वं यस्यैवमिति पाठो ग पुस्तके | । ९ ) अतः प्रयाजाङ्गमध्ये ऽभिहितमभिक्रमणं तदङ्गम् । प्रयाजे- पूर्वं कृत्वा यागोपकारं भावयेदिति ज्ञाने कथमेभिरपूर्व क- तव्यमिति कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायाः सत्त्वात् । सा च संदंशपठितैर- भक्रमणादिभिः शाम्यति । न चाङ्गभावनायो कथंभावाकाङ्क्षा- नाक भावनामाम्येन तत्रापि तत्संभवात् । तदिदं (१) प्रक- एणं क्रियाया एव सामादिनियोजक द्रव्यगुणयोस्तु नद्दारा। पथा हि । यजेत वर्गकाम इत्यत्र फलभावनायां कथंभावाका- दायां सन्निधिपठिताश्रूयमाणफलक क्रियाजातमुपकार्याका- यतिकर्त्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति । क्रियाया एव लोक कथंभावा- काङ्क्षायामन्वयदर्शनात् । न हि हस्तेन (२) कुठारेण विन्द्यादि- यत्र कथंभावाकाशायामुच्चार्यमाणोऽपि इस्तो ऽन्वेति कि नु हस्तेनोद्यम्य निपात्येति उद्यमननिपातने एव । इस्तश्च त- द्वारैवान्वेतीति सार्वजनीनमेतत् । इदं च स्थानादिभ्यो बल- त्। अत एवार्दीव्यति राजन्यमिति देवनादयो (३) धर्मा अभिषेचनीयमनिधी पठिता अपि स्थानान्न तदङ्गं किंतु प्रक- रणाद्राजसूयाङ्गमिति देशमामान्य स्थानम । तद्दिविधम्। पाठमादेश्यमनुष्ठानसा- देण्यं चेति । स्थानं क्रमश्चेत्यनान्तरम् । पाठमादेश्यमपि दि- विधम् । यथासंख्यपाठः सन्निधिपाठश्चेति । तत्रैन्द्राममेकादश- कपान्न निर्वपद् वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेदित्येवंक्रमविहि- मेषु इन्द्रामी रोचना दिव इत्यादीनां याज्यानुवाक्यामन्त्रा- (१) यदि दमिति पाठो “ग च" पुस्तकयोः । (२) हस्तकुठारेणेति पाठः क पुस्तके । न हि कुठारेणेति घ च पुस्तकयोः । (3) विदेवनादय इति पाठः ख ग च पुस्तकेषु टीकायां च ।

(१०) णा यथासंख्यं प्रथमस्य प्रथम द्वितीयस्य द्वितीयमित्येवंरूपो विनियोगो यथासंख्यपाठात् । प्रथमपठितमन्त्रस्य हि कैमर्थ्या- कासायां प्रथमतो विचितं कर्मैव प्रथममुपनिष्ठते समानदेश- त्वात् । एवं द्वितीयमन्त्रस्यापि । वैकृताङ्गानां प्राकृताङ्गानुवादेन विहिताना संदंशपतितानां विकृत्यर्थत्वं सनिधिपाठात् । यथा आमनहोमानाम्। तेषां हि कैमर्थ्याकाङ्क्षायां फलं विकृत्यपू. वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते उपस्थितत्वात् । स्वतन्त्रफलकत्वे वि- कृतिसन्निधिपाठानर्थक्यापत्तेः । पशुधर्माणामग्रीषोमीयार्थत्व मनुष्ठानसादेण्यात् । औपवमध्ये ऽगि अग्नीषोमोयः पशरनु ष्ठीयते तस्मिन्नेव दिने ते धर्माः पद्यन्ते। अतस्तेषां कैमर्थ्याका शायामनुष्ठेयत्वेनोपस्थितं पश्वपूर्वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबधते । न च्च स्थानं समाख्यातः प्रबलम। अत एव शुन्धनमन्त्रः सान्ना य्यपात्राङ्गं पाठसादे ग्यात्। न तु पौरोडाशिकमिति समाख्यय पुरोडाशमात्राङ्गम् ॥ समाख्या यौगिकः शब्दः । सा च द्विविधा वैदिको लौकिक च। तत्र होतुश्चमसभक्षणाङ्गत्वं होटचमस इति वैदिकसमा ख्यया। अध्वर्यास्तत्तत्पदार्थाङ्गत्वं लौकिक्या आध्वर्यवमिति समाख्ययेति सपः ॥ तदेवं निरूपितानि सोपतः श्रुत्यादीनि षट् प्रमाणानि एन- त्मचकृतेन विनियोगविधिना समिदादिभिरुपकृत्य दर्शपूर्ण मासाभ्यां यजेतेत्येवंरूपेण यानि नियोज्यन्ते तान्यङ्गानि डि विधानि सिद्धरूपाणि (१) क्रियारूपाणि चेति। तब मिद्धानि (१) सिद्धानि इति पाठ: "स्व ग घ च" पुस्तकेषु ।

( ११ ) जातिद्रव्यसंख्यादीनि तानि च दृष्टार्थान्येव । क्रियारूपाणि च देविधानि गुणकर्माणि प्रधानकर्माणि च एतान्येव सन्निपत्यो- कारकाणि आरादुपकारकाणि चोच्यन्ते। कर्माङ्गद्रव्याधु- शन विधीयमानं कर्म सन्निपत्योपकारकम् । यथा ऽवघात- क्षणादि तच्च दृार्थमदृष्टार्थं दृष्टादृष्टाथं चेति । तत्र दृष्टा- मवघातादि। अदृष्टार्थं प्रोक्षणादि । दृष्टादृष्टार्थ पशुपुरो- डाशादि । तद्धि द्रव्यत्यागांशेनैव अदृष्टं देवतोद्देशेन च देवता- मरणं दृष्टं करोति । द्रव्याद्यनुद्दिश्य केवलं विधीयमानं कर्म पारादुपकारकम् । यथा प्रयाजादि। पारादुपकारकं च (१) परमापर्वोत्पत्तायेवोपयुज्यते । मन्त्रिपन्योपकारकं तु द्रव्यदेव- नासंस्कारद्वारा यागस्वरूपे ऽप्युपयुज्यते । इदमेव चाय कर्मेत्युच्यते । तदेवं निरूपितः सझेपतो विनियोगविधिः ॥ प्रयोगप्राभावबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिः। स चाङ्गवाक्यै- कवाक्यतापनः प्रधानविधिरेव। स हि साङ्गं प्रधानमनुष्ठापय- विनम्बे प्रमाणाभावादविलम्बापरपर्यायं प्रयोगप्राशुभावं वि- धत्ते। न च तदविलम्ब ऽपि प्रमाणाभाव इति वाच्यम। विलम्बे स्वङ्गप्रधानविध्येकवाक्यतावगततत्माहित्यानुपपत्तिः । विलम्बन क्रियमाणयोः पदार्थयोरिदमनेन सह कृतमिति साहित्यव्यव- हाराभावात् । स चाविलम्बो नियते क्रम आश्रीयमाणे भवति । अन्यथा हि किमेतदनन्तरमेतत्कर्तव्यमेतदनन्तरं वेति प्रयो- विशेपापत्तेः । अतः प्रयोगविधिरव स्वविधेयप्रयोगाभा- सिद्ध्यर्थं नियतं क्रममपि पढार्थविशेषणतया विधत्ते । अत ए- (१) कर्म आरादपकारकम् । तश्चेति पाठो 'ग' पुस्तके ।

( १२ । वाङ्गानां क्रमबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिरित्यपि लशणम। तर क्रमो नाम विततिविशेषः । पौर्वापर्यरूपो वा । तत्र षट प्रमा णानि श्रुत्यर्थपाठस्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्त्याख्यानि। तत्र क्रमपरं वचन श्रुतिः। तच्च दिविधम् । केवनक्रमपरं तविशिष्ट पदार्थपरं चे ति। तत्र वेदं कृत्वा वेदिं करोतीति केवनक्रमपरं वेदिकरणा देवचनान्तरप्राप्तत्वात् । वषटकर्तुः प्रथमभश इति तु क्रम विशिष्टपदार्थपरम् । एकप्रसरताभङ्गभयेन भशानुवादेन क ममात्रस्य विधातुमशक्यत्वात । सेयं श्रुतिरितरप्रमाणापेक्षय बलवती तेषां वचनकल्पनहारा क्रमप्रमाणत्वात् । अत एवा श्विनग्रहण त्य पाठकमात्तृतीयस्थाने ग्रहणप्रसक्तावाश्विनो ट शमो गृह्यनइति वचनाद्दशमस्थाने ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । यत्र प्र योजनवशेन क्रमनिर्णयः सोऽर्थक्रमः । यथाऽग्निहोत्रं जुहो यवागू पचतीत्यनिहोत्रयवागूपाकयोः। अत्र हि यवाग्वा हो मार्थत्वेन तत्पाकः प्रयोजनक्शेन पूर्वमनुष्ठीयते । स चायं प ठकमाइनवान् । यथापाठं हनुष्ठाने क्रमप्रयोजनबाधे ऽदृष्टा र्थत्वं (१) स्यात् । न हि होमानन्तरं क्रियमाणस्य पाकस्य नि चिदृष्टं प्रयोजनमस्ति । पदार्थबोधकवाक्यानां यः क्रमः स प ठक्रमः । तस्माच्च पदार्थानां क्रम आश्रीयते । येन हि क्रम वाक्यानि पठितानि तेनैव क्रमेणाधीतान्यर्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति यथाप्रत्ययं (२) च पदार्थानामनुष्ठानम् । स च पाठो विविधः मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठश्चेति । तत्राग्नेयाग्रीषोमीययोस्तत्तद्व (१) बाधो ऽदृष्टार्थत्वं चेति ‘ख ग च' पुस्तकयोः । (२) यथार्थप्रत्ययमिति पाठो 'ग च' पुस्तकयोः ।

( १३ ) क्यानां याज्यानुवाक्यानां (१) पाठाद्यः क्रम आश्रीयते स मन्त्र- पाठात् स चायं मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठाहनीयान् । अनुष्ठाने ब्राह्मणवाक्यापेक्षया मन्त्रपाठस्यान्तरङ्गत्वात्। ब्राह्मणवाक्यं हि प्रयोगावहिरवेदं कर्त्तव्यमित्यवबोध्य कृतार्थम् । मन्त्राः पुनः प्रयोगकाले व्याप्रियन्ते । अनुष्ठानक्रमस्य स्मरणक्रमाधीनत्वा- न तत्क्रमस्य च मन्त्रकमाधीनत्वादन्तरङ्गो मन्त्रपाठ इति प्रयाजानां समिधो यजति तन्नपातं यजति इत्येवं विधिपा- उक्रमाद्यः (२) क्रमः स ब्राह्मणपाठक्रमात् । यद्यपि ब्राह्मण- वाक्यान्यथं विधाय कृतार्थानि तथापि प्रयाजादीनां क्रमस्मा- एकान्तरस्याभावात्तान्येव क्रमस्मारकत्वेन खोक्रियन्ते । ' स्थानं नामोपस्थितिः । यस्य हि देशे यो ऽनुष्ठीयते तत्पूर्वतने पढार्थे कृते स एव प्रथममुपस्थितो भवतीति यक्तं तस्य प्रथम- मनुष्ठानम्। अत एव साद्यस्के अग्नीषोमीयमवनीयानुबन्ध्याना सवनीयदेशे सहानुष्ठाने कर्तव्ये आदौ सवनीयपशोरनुष्ठान- मितरयोः पश्चात् तस्मिन्देशे आश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयस्यैव प्रथममुपस्थितः । तथा हि । ज्योतिष्टोमे त्रयः पायागा अग्रो- षोमीयः सवनीय आनुबन्ध्यश्चेति। ते च भिन्नदेशाः । अग्नीषो- मीय औपवसथ्ये ऽसिवनीयः सुत्याकान्ने आनुबन्ध्यस्वन्ते । साद्यस्को नाम सोमयागविशेषः। स चाव्यक्तत्वाज्योतिष्टोम- विकारः । अतस्ते त्रयो ऽपि पयागाः साद्यस्के चोटकप्रा. (१) स्तत्तद्याज्यानुवाक्याक्रमाद्यः कम आश्रीयतइति पाठः 'स्व ग' पुस्तकयोः । नद्याज्यानुक्याक्रम आधीयते इति 'च' पुस्तके ।। (२) इत्येवंविधवाक्यक्रमाद्यः इति 'स्वर्ग' पुस्तकयोः । इत्येवंविधिवाक्यक्रमाद्य ते 'च' पुस्तके ।

। ताः । तेषां तत्र साहित्यं श्रुतं सह पटनालभत इति । तच्च साहित्यं सवनीयदेश तस्य प्रधानप्रत्यासत्तेः स्थानातिक्रमणा- साम्याच्च । सवनीयदेशे ह्यनुष्टाने ऽनीषोमीयानुबन्ध्ययोः स्व- स्वस्थानातिक्रमो भवति । अमीषोमीयदेशेऽनुबन्ध्यदेश वानु- ष्ठाने त्रयाणामपि मध्ये इयोः स्वस्वस्थानातिक्रमः(१) । तथा च प्रकृतावाशिवनग्रहं कृत्वा त्रिवृता यूपं परिवीय सवनोयं पा- मुपाकरोतीत्याश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयो विहित इति सा- द्यस्वे ऽप्याश्विनग्रहणे कृते सवनीय एवोपस्थितो भवत्यतो युक्तं तस्य स्थानात्प्रथममनुष्टानमितरयोस्तु पश्चादित्युक्तम्॥ प्रधानक्रमेणा योऽङ्गानां क्रमः म मुख्यः क्रमः । येन हि क- मेण प्रधानानि क्रियन्ते तेनैव क्रमेण तेपामङ्गान्यनष्ठीयन्ते । तदा सर्वेषामङ्गानां स्वैः स्वैः प्रधानैस्तुल्यं व्यवधानं भवति । - क्रमणानुष्ठाने केषां चिढङ्गानां स्वैः प्रधानरत्यन्तमव्यवधान केषां चिदत्यन्तव्यवधानं स्यात्तच्चायुक्तं प्रयोगविध्यवगतसा- हित्यवाधापत्तेः । अतः प्रधानक्रमो ऽपि अङ्गक्रम हेतुः । अत एव प्रयाजशेषेणादावाग्नेयहविषो ऽभिधारणं पश्चादैन्द्रस्य दध्नः आग्नेयैन्द्रयागयोः पौर्वापर्यात् । एवं च द्वयोईयोरभि- घारणयोः स्वस्वप्रधानेन तुल्यमेकान्तरितं व्यवधानम् । व्युत्क्र- मेणाभिधारणे त्वाग्नेयहविरभिधारणाग्नेययागयोरत्यन्तम- व्यवधानम् । ऐन्द्रदध्यभिधारणेन्द्रयागयोान्तरितं व्यवधान नच्चायुक्तमित्युक्तमेव । स मुख्यः क्रमः पाठक्रमाहुबन्नः। मुख्य क्रमो हि प्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षप्रधानक्रमप्रतिपत्तिसापेक्षतया वि (१) मपि स्वस्वेति पाठः 'च' पुस्तके | ( १५ ) बम्बितप्रतिपत्तिकः । पाठक्रमस्तु निरपेशखाध्यायपाठक्रममा- वसापेक्षतया न तथेति बलवान् । स चायं मुख्यक्रमः प्रवृत्ति- माच्च बनवान्। प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमा- ष्ठितक्रमापेशा बहनामङ्गानां (१) प्रधानविप्रकर्षान्मुख्यक्रम तु सन्निकर्षात्॥ सह प्रयुज्यमानेषु प्रधानेषु सन्निपातिनामङ्गानामावृत्त्या ऽनु- छाने कर्त्तव्ये द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमानुष्ठितपदार्थक्रमाद्यः क्रमः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । यथा प्राजापत्यपश्वङ्गेषु प्राजापत्या हि वैश्वदेवीं कृत्वा प्राजापत्यैश्चरन्तीति वाक्येन हतीयानिर्देशात्से- तकर्तव्यताका एककानत्वेन विहिता अतस्तेषां तदङ्गाना वोपाकरणनियोजनप्रभृतीनां साहित्य संपाद्यम् । तच्च प्राजा- पत्यपटना संप्रतिपन्नदेवताकत्वेन (२) युगपदनुष्ठानादुपपद्यते। मटङ्गानां चोपाकरणादीनां युगपदनुष्ठानमशक्यम् । अतस्तेषां साहित्यमव्यवहितानुष्ठानात्संपाद्यम। तच्चैकस्योपाकरणं विधा- यापरस्योपाकरणं विधेयम् । एवं नियोजनाटिकमपि । तथा च प्राजापत्येषु कस्माच्चित्पशारारभ्य एकं सर्वं सर्वत्रानुष्ठाय (३) द्वितीयादिपदार्थम्तेनैव क्रमणानुष्ठेयः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । सो ऽयं श्रुत्यादिभ्यो दुर्बनः। तदेवं संदोपतो निरूपितः घडविधक्रमनि- पणन प्रयोगविधिः ॥ कर्मजन्यफन्न स्वाम्यबोधको विधिरधिकार विधिः । कर्मज- (१) बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिकमाच्च बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिकमे हि बहूनामङ्गानामिति पाठो ।च' पुस्तकयोः ।। (2) देवताकालत्वेनेति पाठः केपु चित्पुस्तके वासीदिति टीकालेख तो ऽवगम्यते । (3) एकं सर्वत्रानाशयति पाठः ख ग च' पुस्तकेषु ।

( १६ ) न्यफनखाम्यं कर्मजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वम् । स च यजेत वर्गकाम इत्यादिरूपः । स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य यागं विदधता ऽनेन स्वर्गकाम यागजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । यस्यारिताग्नेरमिहान दहमो ऽग्नये क्षामवते ऽयाकपालं निर्वदित्यादिनाग्निदाहा- दौ निमित्त कर्म विदधता निमित्तवतः कर्मजन्यपापक्षयरूप फलस्वाम्यं प्रतिपाद्यते। एवमहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यादिन प्राचिविहितकान्नजीविनः सन्ध्योपासनजन्यप्रत्यवायपरिहार रूपफलखाम्यं चोद्यते। तच्च फलखाम्यं तस्यैव योऽधिकारवि शिष्टः । अधिकारश्च (१) यदिधिवाक्येषु पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन श्रृय ते। यथा काम्ये कर्मणि फलकामना नैमित्ते कर्मणि निमित्त निश्चयः । नित्ये सन्ध्योपासनादौ शुचिविहितकालजीवित्वम अत एव राजा राजन्नयन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत्यनेन विधि वाक्येन वाराज्यमुद्दिश्य विदधतापि न स्वाराज्यमात्रकामर तत्फन्नभोक्तत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते। किं तु राज्ञः सतः स्वाराज्यकाम स्यैव राजत्वस्यापि अधिकारिविशेषणत्वेन श्रवणात । क चिः पुरुषविशेषणत्वेनाश्रुतमप्यधिकारिविशेषणम् । यथाध्ययन धिसिद्धा विद्या क्रतुविधीनामर्थज्ञानापेक्षणीयत्वेनाध्ययनविधि मिद्वार्थज्ञानवन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवमग्निसाध्यकर्मसु आध नमिद्धाग्निमत्ता । अग्निसाध्यकर्मणामन्यपेक्षत्वेन तविधीन माधानसिहाग्निमन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । अ ख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात् समर्थ ! त्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं निरूपितो विधिः ॥ (१) आंधकारश्च स एवेति ‘ख ग च' पुस्तकेषु ।

( १७ ) प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारका मन्त्राः। तेषां च तादृशार्थस्मारक- वनैवार्थवत्त्वम् । न तु तदुच्चारणमदृष्टार्थम्। संभवति दृष्टफल- कत्वेऽदृष्टफलकल्पनाया अंन्याय्यत्वात् । न च दृष्टस्यार्थस्मरणस्य कारान्तरेणापि संभवान्मन्त्राम्नानं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । मन्त्र- व स्मर्त्तव्यमिति नियमविध्याश्रयणात् । नानासाधनसाध्यक्रि- गयामेकमाधनप्राप्तावप्राप्तस्यापरसाधनस्य प्रापको विधिनिय- विधिः । (१) यथाहुः। विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्त नियमः पाक्षिक अति। तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्त परिसंख्येति गोयतइति । अस्वार्थः। माणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिरपूर्वविधिः। यथा यजेत ख- काम इत्यादिः। स्वर्गार्थकयागस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्यानेन वधानात् । पक्षे ऽप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिनियमविधिः । यथा घोहीनवहन्तीत्यादिः। कथमस्य पक्षे ऽप्राप्तप्रापकत्वमिति चे- देत्यम् । अनेन हावघातम्य वैतुष्यार्थत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते ऽन्व- घव्यतिरेकसिद्धत्वात् । किं तु नियमः । स चाप्राप्तांशपूरणम् । बैतुष्यस्य हि नानोपायसाध्यत्वाद्यदा ऽवधानं परित्यज्य उपा- पान्तरं गृहीतुमारभते तदा ऽवघातस्याप्राप्त त्वन तद्विधानना- मकमप्राप्तांशपूरणमेवानेन विधिना क्रियते । अतश्च नियमवि- धावप्राप्तांशपूरणात्मको नियम एव वाक्यार्थः । पो ऽप्राप्ताव- घातस्य विधानमिति यावत् । उभयोश्च युगपत्याप्तावितरव्यावृ- तिपरो विधिः परिसंख्याविधिः। यथा पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति । इदं हि वाक्यं न पच्चनखभक्षणपरं तस्य रागतः प्राप्त- (१) साधनद्वयस्य पक्षे प्राप्तावन्यतरसाधनस्याप्राप्ततादशायो यो विधिः स नियम- बपिरित पाठः 'च' पुस्तके | ३ ( १८) त्वात् । नापि नियमपरं पञ्चनखापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य युगपत्याप्ने पक्षे प्राप्त्यभावात् । अत इदमपञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तिपरमिति भवति परिसंख्याविधिः । सा च द्विविधा । ौती लामाणिक चेति । तत्रात्र होवावयन्तोति श्रौती परिसंख्या । एवकारेण प- वमानातिरिक्तस्तोत्रव्यावृत्तेरभिधानात् । पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति तु लाक्षणिको। इतरनिवृत्तिवाचकपदाभावात् । अत एवं षा त्रिदोषग्रस्ता । दोषत्रयं च श्रुतहानिरश्रुतकल्पना प्राप्तबा- धश्चेति। तदुक्तम्। श्रुतार्थस्य परित्यागादश्रुतार्थप्रकल्पनात्। प्रा- तस्य बाधादित्येवं परिसंख्या विदूषणा इति श्रुतस्य पञ्चनख- भक्षणस्य हानाद् अश्रुतापञ्चनखभक्षणानिवृत्तेः कल्पनात्याप्त- स्य चाऽपच्चनखभक्षणस्य बाधनादिति । अस्मिंश्च दोषत्रये दो- षडयं शब्दनिष्ठम् । प्राप्तवाधस्वर्थनिष्ठ इति टिक । येषां तु प्र. योगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वं न संभवति तदुच्चारणस्थानन्यगत्या ऽदृष्टार्थकत्वं कल्प्यते इति नानर्थक्यमिति ॥ नामधेयानां च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतया ऽर्थवत्त्वम् । तथा हि। उभिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोनिच्छब्दो यागनामधेर तेन च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदः (१) क्रियते । तथा हि । अनेन वाक्ये नाप्राप्तत्वात् फलोद्देशेन यागो विधीयते । यागसामान्यस्यावि धेयत्वाद् यागविशेष एव विधीयते । तत्र को ऽसौ यागविशेष इत्यपेक्षायामुनिच्छब्दादुनिद्रूपो याग इति विज्ञायते उद्भिद यागेन पाएं भावयेदित्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्येन नामधेयान्वया न । नामधेयत्वं च निमित्तचतुष्टयात् । मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयादाक्य (१) अभिधेयार्थपरिच्छेद इति 'ब' पुस्तके। ।

( १९ ) संदभयात्तत्प्रख्यशाखात्तव्यपदेशादिति ॥ तत्रोद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोनिच्छब्दस्य यागनामधे- प्रत्वं मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयात् । तथा हि। न नावदनेन वाक्येन फलं ति यागविधानं तं प्रति च गुणविधानं युज्यते । वाक्यभेदाप- । उनिच्छब्दस्य गुणसमर्पकत्वे च यागस्याप्यप्राप्त त्वाद्गुणवि- शिष्टकर्मविधानं वाच्यम् । उभिदता यागेन पशं भावयेदिति । विशिष्ट विधौ मत्वर्थलझणत्युक्तमेव ॥ | चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्र चित्राशब्दस्य कर्मनामधे- बत्वं वाक्यभेदभयान । तथा हि । न तावदत्र गुणविशिष्टयाग- विधानं संभवति । दधि मधु पयो घृतं धाना उदकं तण्डुलाः मत्मसृष्टं प्राजापत्यमित्यनेन गुणस्य विहितत्वात्तद्विशिष्टयागवि- ध्यनुपपत्तेः । यागस्य फलसंबन्धे गुणासम्बन्धे च विधीयमाने वा- जयभेदः । तस्माच्चित्राशब्दः कर्मनामधेयम् । तथा च चित्रायागेन पशं भावयेटिति सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयान वाक्यभेदः । प्र- कृतेष्टेरनेकद्रव्यत्वेन चित्राशब्दवाच्यत्वोपपत्तिः । अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीत्यत्राग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तत्प्रख्यशासात् । वस्य गुणस्य प्रख्यापकस्य प्रापकस्य (६) शाखस्य विद्यमानत्वाद- ग्रिहोत्रशब्दः कर्मनामधेयमिति यावत । नन्वयं गुणविधिरेव कु- तो नेति चेन्न । यद्यमी होत्रमस्मिन्निति सप्तमीसमासमाश्रित्य होमाधारत्वेनाग्निरूपो गुणो विधेयस्तदा यदाहवनीये जुहो- शोत्यनेनैवानः प्राप्तत्वात्तदिधानानर्थक्यम् । अगये होत्रमिति लातुर्थीसमासमाश्रित्य अग्निदेवतारूपगुणो ऽनेन विधीयतइति -य प्रख्यापकस्यति पाठः 'स्व ग' पुस्तकयोः ।

( २० ) चेन्न । तद्देवतायाः शाखान्तरण प्राप्तत्वात् । किं तच्छालान्तर- मिति चेत् । यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीति के चित्। अपरे त्वग्निातिातिरग्निस्स्वाहेति मन्त्रवर्ण एवाग्निरूपदे- यताप्रापकः । नन्वनेर्मान्त्रवर्णिकत्वे प्रजापतिदेवताया बाध स्यात् । मन्त्रवर्णस्य चतुर्थोतो दुर्बलत्वात् । यथाहुः ॥ तद्धितेन चतुर्थ्या च मन्त्रवर्णन वा पुनः । देवताया विधिस्तत्र दुर्बन्नं तु परंपरमिति ॥ चेन्न । यदमये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीत्यत्र न केवल प्रजापतिविधानम् । किं तु मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमनिमनूद्य नत्ममुच्चि- तप्रजापतः । एवं च न बाधः केवलप्रजापतिविधानाभावात् । चात्र समुच्चितोभयविधानमेव कथं नेति वाच्यम् । समुच्चितो. भयविधानापेशया ऽन्यतः प्राप्तमग्निमनद्य तत्समुच्चितप्रजाप- तिमात्रविधाने लाघवात् । एवं च प्रयाजेषु समिदादिदेवताना समिधः समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्वित्यादिमन्त्रवणेभ्यः प्राप्त त्वात् । समिधो यजतीत्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्प्रख्यशाम्ला- कर्मनामधेयाः ॥ श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेतेत्यत्र श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं त- व्यपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति याव- न । तथा हि यद्विधेयं तस्य स्तुतिर्भवति । यद्यत्र श्येनो विधेयः स्यात् तदार्थवादैस्तस्यैव स्तुतिः कार्या । यथा वैश्येनो निपत्या- दत्ते एवमयं द्विषन्तं भ्राटव्यं निपत्यादत्त इत्यनेनार्थवादेन श्येनः स्तोतुं न शक्यः । प्रयेनोपमानेनार्थान्तरस्तुतेः क्रियमाणत्वात् । न च भयेनोपमानत्वेन स एव स्तोतुं शक्यते। उपमानोपमेयभा- .. । ( २.१ ) विस्य भिन्ननिष्ठत्वात । यदा तु प्येनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते त- टार्थवादेन श्येनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कत्त शक्यतइति श्येनश- ब्दः कर्मनामधेयं नयपदे शादिति । उत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणवलीयस्व- मपि पच्चमं नामधेयनिमित्तमिति क चित । यथा वैश्वदेवेन यजेतेत्यादौ । अत्रोत्पत्तिशिष्टाग्न्यादीनां बनीयस्वादैश्वदेवश- ब्दस्य विश्वेदेवदेवताविधायकत्वं न संभवतीति कर्मनामधेयत्व- म् । वस्तुतस्तु तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रादेवास्य कर्मनामधेयत्वम । प्रकृत- यागे विश्वेदेवरूपगुणसंप्रतिपन्नगाखस्वार्थवादरूपम्यैव सत्त्वा- है। यदिश्वेदेवाः ममयजन्त तद्वैश्वदेवस्य वैश्वदेवत्वम् ।। पुरुषस्य निवर्तकं वाक्यं निषेधः । निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतु- क्रियानिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वात । तथा हि । यथा विधिः प्र- धर्तनां प्रतिपादयन स्वप्रवर्तकत्वनिर्वाहार्थं विधेयस्य यागादेरि- धमाधनत्वमाभिपन् षुरुषं तत्र प्रवर्तयति तथा न कन्ननं भक्ष- येदित्याटिनिषेधो ऽपि निवर्तनां प्रतिपादयन स्वनिवर्तकत्वनि- हाथं निषेध्यस्य कलाभक्षाणस्य परानिष्टमाधनत्वमाशिपन् पुरुषं नतो निवर्तयति । ननु निषेधवाक्यस्य कथं निवर्त्तनाप्रति- पादकत्वमिति चेदुच्यते। न तावत्र धात्वर्थस्य नार्थेनान्वयः । अव्यवधाने ऽपि तस्य प्रत्ययार्थभावनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितः । न धान्योपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितमन्यत्रान्वेति । अन्यथा राजपुरुष- मानयेत्याढावपि राज्ञः क्रियान्वयापत्तेः । अतः प्रत्ययार्थस्यैव मार्थेनान्वयः । तत्रापि नाख्यातत्वांशवाच्यार्थभावनायास्तस्या लिङशवाच्यप्रवर्तनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितः। किं तु लिङशवा- चशब्दभावनायास्तस्याः सर्वापेशया प्रधानत्वात् । नञश्चैव ख- THE MAMAKRISHNA USIC IUSTITUTE OF CULTURE LIBRARY ( २२ ) भावो यत्खममभिव्याहतपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्वम्। यथा घटो नास्तीत्यादौ अस्तोतिशब्दसमभिव्याहतो नञ् घटसत्त्वविरोधि घटासत्त्वं गमयति तदिह निङ्समभिव्याहतो नञ् लिङर्थ- प्रवर्तनाविरोधनों निवर्तनामेव बोधयति। विधिवाक्य श्रवणे ऽयं मा प्रवर्तयतीति प्रतीतेः (१) । तस्मानिषेधवाक्यस्थले निवर्तनैव वाक्यार्थः । यदा तु प्रत्ययार्थस्य तत्रान्वये बाधकं तदा धात्वर्थ- स्यैव तत्रान्वयः । तच्च बाधकं द्विविधम । तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमी विकन्यप्रसक्तिश्च । तत्राद्यं नतोद्यन्तमादित्यमित्यादौ तस्य मित्युपक्रम्यैतहाक्यपाठात् । तथा चात्र पर्युदासाश्रयणम्। तथा हि । व्रतशब्दस्य कर्त्तव्यार्थे रूढत्वात्तस्य व्रतमित्यत्र स्ना- तकस्य व्रतानां कर्तव्यत्वेनोपक्रमात । कि तत्कर्तव्यमित्याका- शायां नेोतोद्यन्तमित्यादिना कर्त्तव्यार्थ एव प्रतिपादनीयः। अन्यथा पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । तथा च न- अर्थेन न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः। कर्त्तव्यार्थानवबोधात्। विध्यर्थप्रव- नाविरोधिनिवर्तनाया एव तादृशनना बोधनात् । तस्याश्च कर्त्तव्यार्थत्वाभावात्। तस्मानक्षतेत्यत्र नत्रा धात्वर्थविरोध्यनी- क्षण मंकन्य एव ल भणया प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य कर्त्तव्यत्वसंभवात् । आदित्यविषयकानोठाणसंकल्पेन भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थः । तत्र भाव्याकाङ्क्षायां एतावता हैनमा वियुक्तो भवतीति वाक्यशेषा- (१) प्रतीतेरिति । प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतेरित्यर्थः । यद्वा यजेत स्वर्गकाम इति विधिवा- क्यश्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्त यतीति प्रवर्तनाप्रतीति वन्न कलज्जं भक्षयेदित्यादिनिषेधवाः क्यश्रवणे ऽप्ययं मां निवर्तयतीति निवर्तनाप्रतीतोरत्यध्याहारेण, विधीत्यादिहेतुवा वयं दृष्टान्त दार्शन्तिकविधया योजनीयमिति टीकाग्रन्थः । एतदनुसारेण व चित्पुस्त* पाठभेदो ऽपि ॥

( २३ ) वगतः पापक्षयो भाव्यतया ऽन्वेति । एवं च पूर्वोत्तरयोरेकवाक्यत्व निर्वइत्येव । न चात्र धात्वर्थविरोधिनः पदार्थान्तरस्यापि सं- भवात्कथमनोक्षणसंकल्पस्यैव भावनान्वय इति वाच्यम् । तस्य कर्तव्यताभावेन प्रकृते भावनान्चयायोग्यत्वात्। दितीयं यज- तिषु ये यजामहं करोति नानुयाजेम्वित्यादी अत्र विकल्पप्रस- की च पर्यु टासाश्रयणात । तथा हि यद्यत्र वाक्ये नर्थे प्रत्य- यार्थान्वयः स्यात्तदानुयाजेषु येयजामहमिति मन्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधः स्यात् । अनुयाजेषु येयजामहं न कुर्यादिति । स च प्राप्तिपूर्वक एव प्राप्तस्यैव प्रतिषेधात् । प्राप्तिश्च यजतिषु येयजामहं करोती- ति शाखादेव वाच्या शाखप्राप्तस्य च प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव न तु बाधः । प्राप्तिमूलरागस्येव तन्मून्नशाखस्य शाखान्तरेण बाधायो- गान । न च पदे जुहोतीति विशेषशास्त्रेणा हवनीये जुहोती- नि शाखस्येव नानुयाजेम्वित्यनेन यजतिषु येयजामहं करोतो- ज्यस्य बाधः स्यादिति वाच्यम । परस्पर निरपेक्षयोरेव शाखयो- अध्यबाधकभावात्। पद शाखस्य हि स्वार्थविधानार्थमाहवनी- यशाखानपेक्षणान्निरपेशत्वम् । प्रकृते तु निषेधशाखस्य निषे- ध्यप्रसक्त्यर्थं यजतिषु येयजामहमित्यस्यापेक्षणान्न निरपेक्षत्व- म्। तस्माच्छाखविहितस्य शाखान्तरण प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव । स च न युक्तः । विकल्पे शाखस्य पाशिकाप्रामाण्यसंपातात् । न हानुयाजषु येयजामहमित्यस्यानुष्ठाने नानुयाजेष्वित्यस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति । प्रोहियागानुष्ठाने यवशास्त्रस्येव द्विरदृष्टक- रूपना च स्यात् । विधिप्रतिषेधयोरपि पुरुषार्थत्वात् । अतो मात्र प्रतिषेधस्याश्रयणं किं तु ननो ऽनुयाजसंबन्धमाश्रित्य ( २४ ) पर्युदासस्यैव । इत्थं चानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेषु यजतिषु येयजाम- इमिति मन्त्रं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थबोधः । नञो ऽनुयाजव्यतिरि- तलाशाणिकत्वात । एवं च न विकल्पः । अत्र च वाक्ये येयजा- महइति न विधीयते यजतिषु येयजामह इत्यनेनैव च प्राप्तत्वा- न। किं तु सामान्यशाखप्राप्तयेयजामह इत्यनुवादेन तस्यानु- याजव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वं विधीयते । यद्यजतिषु येयजामहं क- रोतीति तटनुयाजव्यतिरिक्तवेवति। नन्वेवं सामान्यशास्त्रप्रा- तस्य विशेष संकोचनरूपादुपसंहारात्पयुदासस्य भेदो न स्यादिति चेन्न । उपसंहारो हि तन्मात्रसंकोचार्थः । यथा प- रोडाशं चतुर्दा करोतोति समान्यप्राप्तं चतुर्दाकरणम् । श्रा- ग्नेयं चतुर्दा करोतीति विशेषादाग्ने यपुरोडाशमात्रे संकोच्य- ते । पयुदासस्तु तदन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इति ततो भेदात् । कुत्र चित् विकल्पप्रसक्तावप्यनन्यगत्या प्रतिषेधाश्रयणम् । यथा ना- तिरात्र षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्यादौ । अत्र हि अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति शाखप्राप्तषोडशिग्रहणस्य निषेधादिकल्पप्रसक्तावपि न पयुदासाश्रयणम्। असंभवात् । तथा हि । यद्यत्र षोडशिप- दाथन नजान्नयस्तदातिरात्रे षोडशिव्यतिरिक्तं गृह्णातीति वाक्यार्थबोधः स्यात्म च न संभवति । अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृ. जातीति प्रत्यक्षाविधिविरोधात् । यदि चातिरात्रण पदार्थेना- न्वयस्तदातिरात्रव्यतिरिक्त षोडशिनं गृहातीति वाक्यार्थबोध स्यात्सो ऽपि न संभवति तविधिविरोधात् । अतो ऽत्रानन्य गत्या शाखप्राप्तषोडशिग्रहणस्यैव निषेधः । न च विकल्यास क्तिः तस्याप्यपेक्षणोयत्वात् । इयांस्तुविशेषो यदिकल्पादेकप्रतिः ( २५ ) धेि ऽपि प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य नानर्थहेतुत्वम् । विधिनिषेधौभय- त्यापि कन्वर्थत्वात् । यत्र तु न विकल्पः प्राप्तिश्च रागत एव प्र- तषेधश्च पुरुषार्थः तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वम् । यथा न कलज भशयेदित्यादी कलञ्चभक्षणादेः। नत्र भक्षणनिषेध- स्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वात् । न च दीक्षितो न ददाति न जुहोतीत्यादौ पाखप्राप्तदानहोमादीनां निषेधादिकल्पापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । बतः पुरुषार्थभूतदानहोमादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावे पि (१) निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात् यथा तो खखीगम- नादेः। तनिषेधस्य क्रत्वर्थत्वेन तस्य ऋतु वैगण्यसंपादकत्वात् ॥ प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः । तस्य च लक्षणया योजनवदर्थपर्यवसानम्। तथा हि । अर्थवादवाक्यं हि स्वार्थ- तिपादने प्रयोजनाभावाविधेयनिषेध्ययोः प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितत्वे क्षणया प्रतिपादयति । स्वार्थमात्रपरत्वे आनर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । पाम्नायस्य हि क्रियार्थत्वात् । न चेटापत्तिः । खाध्यायो ऽध्ये- व्य इत्यध्ययन विधिना सकनवेदाध्ययनं कर्तव्यमिति बोधय- मा सर्ववेदस्य प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसायित्वं मूचयतोपात्तत्वेना- अर्थक्यानुपपत्तेः । स डिविधः। विधिशेषो निषेधशेषश्चेति । तत्र यव्यं भवेतमालभेत भूतिकाम इत्यादिविधिशेषस्य वायुर्वे पिष्ठा देवतेत्यादविधेयार्थप्राशस्यबोधकतयार्थवत्त्वम् । ब- ईषि रजतं न देयमित्यादिनिषेधशेषस्य सो ऽरोटीद्यदरो- होत्तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वमित्यादेनिषेधस्य निन्दितत्वबोधकतयार्थ- त्वम् । न च प्राशस्त्यादिबोधस्य निवप्रयोजनत्वेने पर्थवाद- (1) पिकत्वर्थ लेनोन पाठो ग पुस्तके । LIST... GUR ( २६ ) स्यार्थवत्त्वमिति वाच्यम् । श्रावस्यादिवशादप्रवर्त्तमानस्य पुंसः प्रवृत्त्याटिजनकत्वेन तबोधस्योपयोगात् । स पनखेधा। तदुक्तम् । विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादो ऽवधारिते। भूतार्थ- वाटस्तद्धानादर्थवाढविधा मत इति । अस्यार्थः । प्रमाणान्तर- विरोधे सत्यर्थवादो गुणवादः । यथाऽऽदित्यो यूप इत्यादि। आदित्याभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वादादित्यवदुज्वलत्वरू- पगुणो ऽनेन लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते। प्रमाणान्तरावगतार्थबोध- को ऽनुवादः । यथा ऽग्निहिमस्य भेषजमित्यत्र हिमविरोधि- त्वस्याग्नौ प्रत्यक्षावगतत्वात् । प्रमाणान्तरविरोधतत्प्राप्ति(१)- रहितार्थवोधको वादो भूतार्थवादः । यथेन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुद- यच्छदित्यादि । एवं च यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादि निखिलवेटस्य साक्षात्परंपरया वा यागादिधर्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् । सो ऽयं धर्मो यदुद्दिश्य विहितस्तदुद्देशन क्रियमाणस्तहेतुः । ईश्वरा- पणबुद्ध्या क्रियमाणस्तु निश्रयसहेतुः । न च तदर्पणाबुद्ध्यानुष्ठाने प्रमाणाभावः । यत्करोषि यदनासि यजुहोषि ददासि यत। यत्तपस्यमि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणमिति भगवद्गीताम्मते- रेव प्रमाणात्वात् । स्मृति चरणे तत्प्रामाण्यस्य श्रुतिमूलकत्वेन व्यवस्थापनादिति शिवम् ॥ बालानां सुखबोधाय भास्करण सुमेधसा । रचितो ऽयं समासेन जैमिनीयार्थसंग्रहः ॥ इति श्रीमहोपाध्यायन्नागाक्षिभास्करविरचितपूर्वमीमांसा र्थसंग्रहनामकं प्रकरणं समाप्तिमगात ॥ (१) प्रमाणान्तराविरोधतः स्तुति इति पाठो ग च पुस्तक योः ।

TRANSLATION. Reverence to Krishạ..-- Having shown his reverence to Vásndera the husband of Ramá, ingákshi ---Bhaskara composes the Artha-Samgrala as an introaction to the doctrine of Jaimini. The highly benevolent reverend Jaimini has composed a book twelve adliya yas for the discriminative knowledge of duly. it its beginning he speaks of the desire of knowing duty in the ollowing aphorism at therefore a desire to know luty". In this phorism the worl"next" expresses the immediate consecution of he desire of knowing duty) on the reading of the Veda. The word therefore"expresses the cireumstance of the reading of the Veda laving a visible purpose (anıl not merely tending to produce an inseen result as f. i. the performance of the sacrifices does)., as the vásaye enjoining the reading of the Veda (viz. "one is to read he V-1:") settles that this reading las for its visible purpose he knowledge of the sense of the Vedan. (For: proper understandwg of the aphorism quoted above) we have therefore to complenont. the aphorism as follows "Because the readling of the Vedalias , visible purpose which consists in the knowledge of its sense, for his reason, after the reading of the Verta, the desira of knowing luty which latter is the purport of the Veda has to be entertained. The phrase "desire of knowing" implies the idea of enquiry, so hat the aphorism actually refers to the beginning of the (Mímamá-) sítra and means "411, Sastra wiose matter is the enquiry nto duty is to be begim." (1) Here the question arises :- What is cluty? what is its distinctpige character (its definition)?-To this we reply : Sacrifices etc. nly(2) are duty; and we define cluty as that matter which has a (1) For a fail discussion of the not very important question of the meaning of bbm and atas see Jan. Nyiva M V (*) The woul" only serves to exclule quasi--rehgious acts like thic worship of baltvas which are not taught in the Veda. 11 12.

( 2 ) + . purpose and is to be accomplished according to the Veda. T phrase "which has a purpose" serves to exclude from the thin comprised in the definition matters which are themselves of + nature of a purpose (as f. i. the different results of the sacrific viz. paradise etc.).---The phrase "which is to be accomplished a cording to the Verla" serves to exclude from the definition matte like the act of eating (which is performed not on the authority the Veda but on the prompting of a natural instinct). The wo “matter” (artlia; which includes the idea of goodness or usefi ness) serves to exclude actions like the sacrifice called "Śyena which are to be considered as bad things (anartha) on account their hring a bad result (viz. the death of some enemy, for t bringing about of which the sacrificer himself will have to go hell).(1) Here it might be oljected that this definition of duty is in co flict with the definition given in the Mímánsá-Sútraws where it said (I. 2) "Duty is that matter the distinctive character of whi is instigation"; in which latter definition the word "instigation denotes only that one part of the Veda which has the form of i junctions (vidl!ii )--To this we reply that in reality the two do nitions are not conflicting because in the Sútra also the wo "instigation" denotes the Veda in general as the whole Veda account of its aiming at duty serves to express the accomplishım of duty. (If now we be asked to point ont in detail the appropriatenesour definition of duty we proceedl:) Acts of duty as sacrifices i are enjoined with reference to man by vedic sentences (as f. i.“ who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice") in which paradise is pointed out as the result. The particulars are as follows. I word “yajeta" "he may sacrifice” contains two constituent eleme viz. the root yaj (yaji) anıl the suffix. The suflix again conta (1) Cp. Juim Nyáy M. V ,PP 14 15 But why then-night it be asked- Sacrifices of the nature of the Syena taught in the Veda ? --To this questioa Sabara -- bha-hya (p) 5 ) answers: (Katham pular anarthah kartavyatayopadi. uchiate-) muiva svenálayah kartavií vijnayante-yo hi himsitum ichchhet tasya atihrupryah-iti hi teslim upadeśaḥ--øyenenäblicharan yajcta ati hi sanıámanai' na blacharitavyum ili ( 3 ) U elements as it expresses as well the property of a verb as the froperty of an optative. The property of expressing a verb is Smmon to the suffixes of the teu moods and tenses (all of which hen added to a root turn the latter into il verb); the property of expressing an optative exclusively belongs to the optative suffixes.-- oth elements express it creative energy (hihávaná) only.(1) By bhávaná (“creative energy" or "prodnotive energy" or "tendncy to realize something”) we understand the particular activity soinc productive agent (bhavayitri) which tends to bring About the existence of something which is going to be (blaatri; which is capable of future existence). Such provluctive ergy is twofold being either verbal (sábua ) or actual (ártha)-- By "verlal bhávaná“ we understand the peculiar activity of some productive agent, which tends to make a person act; it is expressed by the optative clement (of words like "yajeta"); for if some person hears al verbs with an optative termination there arises in his mind the exclusive notion " he (the speaker) instigates me to act; he is engaged in an energy tending to make me act." (In this explanation of the element si bieli espresses the blávaná we proceed ) according to the general rule that whatever is exclusively understood in consequence of some worel bring uttered is expressed by it is the sense of the word); as f.i. in the sentence “ bring the cow” the general character of cow (gotva) is the sense of the word “cow." The peculiar activity (which has been mentioned above in the definition of bhávaná) is in the case of a sontence belonging to ordinary worldly language some particular in tention dwelling in the mind of a speaking person; in relic sentences on the other hand where there is no speaking person it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. For this reason this bliávaná is called verbal bbávaná. This bhávná requires three constituent elements; the matter which is to be accomplished the result : Sidhya); the means by which the result is effected (the instrument; sádhana); and the mode in which the result is affectel (itikartavyatá); according to the three questions (suggested by each bhávané): what is to be ef- (1) The word "only" 18 mea to exclude the agent (kartri) etc.

( 4 ) fected? by what means is it to be effected ? how is it to be effected? Here now the want of a result to be accomplished being felt then steps in the actual blávaná (árthí bkivana) with its three consti tuent elements which we shall explaiit further on and fills the plac of the wanted result, since here takes place a samánábbidhána Śruti i. e, a direct statement of the intimate connexion of two mai ters hy means of the two being expressed by the same word, (ti. śábdí as well as the árthí bhávaná being expressed by the one op tative form). (To supply the árthí bhávanámi. e. the peculia cuorgy of a person to which the sábdi bhávaná instigates-as th: which is to be accomplished is more natural than to supply am thing else as f. i. the sacrifice itself, because the optative forma words like "yajeta" expresses both bhávanás, from which cream stance the intimate connexion of the two is readily inferred It might perhaps bo remark ud by some one that other matto too, as f.i. number (i. c. singular, dual, plural) and time (prese etc.) arc expressed by the one optative affix and that therefor. number, time etc. likewise occupy the place of skillıya wit' regard to the verbal bhávaná. But such an assumption woul be crroneous as number, time etc. are not fit to fill the plac of the thing to be accomplished-If the want of an instrumen (of the verbal bhávaná ) arises, the place of such a one filled by tho knowledge of the optative form etc. The in trumentality of the optative does not lie in its producing t1 bhávaná—for the latter exists in the word even before tl knowledge (by some person) of the optative form—; but r. ther in the circumstance of the optative form capressing the bhávaná or its tending to bring about the result to be effected ? the verbal bhávaná (which result as remarked above is the actu: bhávaná).-I finally the want of a mode (of the verbal bhavan presents itself, the place of such a one is filled by the praise orgy rification (of the acts of duty) which is found in the arthavál! passages. Actual (arthi) bhávaná is to be defined as the peculiar energy some person) which refers to some action (as f. i. a sacrifice) whi energy is engendered by the desire of some object. This act bhávaná is--in words like yajeta-expressed by that clcment of ( 5 ) - word which denotes the verb; for the verb in general (independent of the different moods and tenses) expresses an energy.--This bháraná too requires three constituent elements, the måtter which is to be accomplished,--the result; the means by which the result is ffected--the instrument; and the inode in which the result is offected; according to the three questions (sugested by the actual phávaná as well as the verbal bliávaná): what is to be affected? by hat means is it to be officted? how is it to be effects? If the hing to be accomplished is asked for, results of the nature 8f paralise step in its the things to be accomplished ; if the instrument is isked for, actions like the sacrifice present themselves as the instruments (by wluch the result is obtained): if the mode of action is ished for, all the subsidiary matters as f. i. tho prayájas (which form a part of the sacrifice) present themselves and point out the mode of action. It now the question is asked " what is the Veda", we answer : sentences not produced by man. The Veda is fivefoli), being cither injunction (vidhi ) or sacrificial formula (mantra) or (rímadheya) or probibition (nishedha) or explanatory statement (arthavád:). That part of the Veda which intimates a thing not known (by other means) is called “Injunction." Injunction has a sense in consequence of its enjoining a matter baving a certain purpose in as far as it enjoins the matter as not established by any other means of proof(1); as f. i. the sedic passage he who is desirous of para lise is to offer the agnihotra ;" which injunction enjoins an oblation having for its purpose (the attaining of) paradise which is not settled by any other means of proof; so Cheat the sense conveyed by the passage is "lie is to realize paradise bring meuns of the Agnihot,a-oblation". When on the other hand the (sacrificial) action is already settled by some other means of proof, an injunction inerely enjoins soinese condary matter ( guna) with a view to that action. As is f. i. the case in the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk." Ilore, tho blation itself being already established by the injunction "he is to name (1) This appears a somewhat clumsy way of stating what is more clearly expressed in following words of the Apadevi: Sa cha vidhiḥprayojana vadarthavidhánenártbeon sa chápráptam artham vı!hatte (6) offer the Agniliotra”, there is only enjoined sour milk with a view to the oblation ( as the material to be used for the oblation ); so that the sense is “he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk.”—Where both things are non-established (i. e. in the case of neither the sacrifice nor any secondary matter pertaining to the sacrifice being established by a previous injunction), the injunction enjoins something particularized (or specialized ; viſishţa); as f.i. in the injunction "he is to sacrifice by means of soma”; here, the soma as well (which is the material of the sacrifice) as the sacrifice itself not being established (by any other injunction), there takes place the injunction of that sacrifice which is particularized by soma ( as its material).-- Nor is it to be objected that (the passage being interpreted in the aforesaid manner) there takes place a split of the sentence (vákyabheda) the word "somena" enjoining two things; for there are not enjoined two separate things, but only one particularized thing (viz. that particular sacrifice for which soma is used).--Nor again is it to be ohjected that the passage "somena yajeta" merely enjoins soma as the material of that sacrifice which itself is already established by the other passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice by means of the jyotishțoma," so that the sense of the injunction would be "he is to realize the sacrifice (the jyotishțoma) by means of soma”; it; being pleailed for this interpretation that it allows us to dispense" with the assumption of possessive indication (inatvartha-lakshaná by which term is understood the denoting a thing by something else connected with it, as a quality etc.; as when the word “soma” i: made to denote a sacrifice in which suma is used). For the passa. referring to the jyotishtoma is an injunction intimating a claim (adhikára-vidhi) and this cannot be taken as an originative injunction (utpatti-vidhi; if the passage about the jyotishțoma could be taken as the ono containing the primary, original injunction of the soma-sacrifice, the passage "somena yajeta" might be taken as a guņa-vidbi and thus "somena” would not have to be explained as meaning "somavatá yágena; but as the purport of the passage about tho jyotishțoma is not simply to enjoin the soma-sacrifice but to intimate the claim which the sacrificer has to the fruit of the sacrifice, we are compelled to take “ somena yajeta ( 7 ) s vue originative injunction of the soma-sacrifice and therefore to xplain “somena" by "somavatá yágena").--To this reasoning it miglit be objected that the passage abont the jyotishțoma may be Laken as comprising an originative injunction as well as an injunclion intimating a claim as this is avowedly the case with other passages as f. i. the passage "he who desires cattle is to sacrifice hvith the udblid.” But we answer: It is not so. In the apparently parallel case which you adduce (viz. the passage about the udhbid) we assume the double nature of the injunction because such an assumption is unavoidable, there being no other statement originat- Sve of the sacrifice (while in the case of the soma-sacrifice there are two injunctions; the instances are therefore not parallel).- Aad moreover if we explain the passage about the jyotishțoma as containing two injunctions it would have to be taken as intimating the sacrifice itself and its connection with its fruit and this would be a manifest split of ihe sentence; better than which is the as- Bumption of the passage enjoining something particularized (a Bacrifice particularized by soma), by means of our attributing to the word soma the power of possessive indication.- Injunction is of four different kinds, being cititer originative injunction (utpattividli) or applicatory injunction (viniyogavidhi) or injunction of a claim (authiharavilhi) or injunction of performance (prayogavidhi). : That injuiction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called originative injunction as f. i. the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation". In injunctions of this kind the Bacrificial action itself occupies the place of the instrument, so that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the object of his desire by means of the agnihotra-oblation."-But, it may be objected, the two forms ( aspects; rúpa ) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage “he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation", in which uneither of these two forms is mentioned be considered an originative injunction, the word “agnihotra” (which seemingly indicates . the divinity of the sacrifice viz. agni) being merely a name (and jot indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the exence of another seriptural passage ) declaratory of it; (which ( 8 ) . principle will be explained in the chapter on námadheya ).–To this objection we reply: The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two fornis of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milks" would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the agnihotra ) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (viz. the material) and then the passage “he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation” would be purposeless, That injunction which intimates the connexion of some subsidiary matter with somno principal matter is called applicatory injunction (showing how the subsidiary matter is to be applied to the principal matter ). As f. i. the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk” which enjoins the connexion, with the oblation, of sour milk the subsidiary position of which is intimated by the third case-affix (the muse-alfix of dadlımá showing that sour milk is to be used as an instrument and therefore is merely subsidiary to the action whose instrument it is) So that the sense of the passage is “he is to realize the oblation by ineans of sour milk”.-In injunctions of some secondary matter (guna) that which is expressed by the root (as “juhoti" in the above example) occupies the position of the object to be accomplished (50 that "juhoti” is properly explaineil by " homam bhávayet.-In an utpatti-villii anul an aulbikáravidlli on the the other hand the roost denotes the instrument; agnihotram juhoti = Agnihotra-homem ishtam bhávayet). Sometimes the root expresses the abode of an action as f. i. “hie is to perform the oblation for him, who is desirous of strength of the senses, by incans of sour milk”; where the sense is “he is to realize strength of the senses by the instrumentality of sour milk"; and il now the question arises "wherein does it (the instrumentality of sour milk) reside?" the oblation which is mentioned close hy stops in lenoting the abode. Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, viz. direct statement (śruti); power (liūga); sentence or syntactical connexion (vákya); interdependence ( prakaraņa); place or order (sthána); name (samsíkhyá). Applicatory injunctions assisted by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation ; the ( 9 ) . ubsidiary position of something consists in its being accomlished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of vno other result ( so f. i. the prayájas are performed by a sacricer offering the newmoon-sacrifice with a view to obtaining paruise); the saine subsidiary position is expressed by tho term "páirthya" "existing for the purpose of something else." (We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the above mentioni six means of proof). Direct statement (śruti ; literally "text") we define as irrespecte or independent words (words which intimate their sense dictly without any intermediate steps of the nature of those requiri by the other means of proof). Direct statement is of three iffrent kinds being either injunctive ( vidhátrí) or denotativo ibhidhátrí) or applicative ( viniyoktri). To the first class belong he direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optativo vr'm diroctly indicating the bhávaná). To the second class belong atements as those about the rice-grains (viz. sentences liko "vrlin avahanti" "vrihín prokshati" etc., where the word "rice-grains" irectly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its conexion with the bhávaná). If finally from the mero hearing (the loro statement) of a word a connexion (between some primary ad some subsidiary mattor) is understood, we have an applicatory ruti. Śruti of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct atement by means of case-affixes or direct statement by means one denotative word (or element of a word) or direct statement means of one pada (in the restricted grammatical sense). Direct atement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subdiary, as f. i. in the passage "he is to sacrifice by means of rice ruins" where by the direct statement of tho third case-affix the absidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. his subsidiary relation is here brought about by the rice-grains rming the original substance out of which the cake is made which latter stands in direct subsidiary relation to the sacrifice); the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) inds in subsidiary relation to the sacrifice in consequence of its Pg the original substance from which the parts actually offerod ( 10 ) viz. the heart etc. are taken. - In the passage “he is to buy the soma by means of a tawny, one year old (cow)" the quality of being tawny is by the direct enunciation of the third case affix shown to stand in subsidiary relation to the act of buying; this subsidiary re. lation takes here place by (the quality's) defining a substance viz, the cow, not directly; the latter not being possible on account of the immateriality of a mere quality.-Agair in the passage "he sprinkles the rico-grains with water" the sprinkling stands in subsidiary relation to the rice-grains, as appears from the direct enunciation of the second case affix. And, it is to be observed, this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains considered in themselves as they would be perfect without the sprinkling, but has the purpose of bringing about the transcendental result (apúrva), which woul not be brought about were the sacrifice performed without sprink ling the rice grains with water. In the saine manner it is to be understood with referenco to all subsidiaries that the subsidiary relation has the purpose of contributing towards bringing abou the transcendental result.-Let us take another passage. “Illu I seized this bridle of the right; with these words he is to take hok of the bridle of the horse." Hero the direct enunciation of th second case affix shows the mantra to stand in a subsidiary relation to the bridle of the horse.(1).- Or another passage. « When h offers the oblation in the áhavaniya-fire." Here tho seventh cas affix shows that the áhavaniya stands in auxiliary relation to th 66 (1) The above quoted cxample seems hardly to fall under the category of śru but rather under vákya ; which opinion as we see froin the commentary was actual held by some teachers. The commentary says some teachers maintain that ti application (of the mantra to the action of taking the bridle of the house) 18 found on vákya. Others however objert to this assumption and maintain that, in code quence of linga having greater force than vákya, Inuga would settle the mantra's stan ing in subsidiary relation to a bridle in general before vákya could establish its excl give relation to the bridle of the horse. Those however who suppose the applicati of the mantra to be founded on vákya defend their opinion by maintaining that t mantra does not point to a bridle in general but to the bridle of the right i. e, the hoi which is an instrument to bring about the right and that therefore the mantra is to applied to the taking of the horse's bridle in consequence of the vákya "asvábbid! nim adatte" which is merely assisted by linga.--The author of the text (i. Laugikshi-Bhaskara) however does not admit that a linga in the mantra points sonie peculiar kind of bridle (rather thau to the bridle in general).

( 11 ) ! offering. -Thus in other cases too direct statement by means of ase-afhxes points out the proper application (of subsidiary maters). (We now proceed to the'two other kinds of viniyoktrí śruti). n the sentence “pasuna yajeta" "he is to sacrifice by ineans of an nimal" direct statement by means of one denotative word points out tho subsidiary relation in which singularity and masculinity tand to the káraka; while again direct statement by means of ono lenotative Word points out the subsidiary relation in which the number expressed by the verbal termination of "yajeta" stands to he bhávaná. On the other hand direct statement by means of ine pada points out that this number stands in subsidiary relation o the sacrificial action (for the sacrificial action as well as the ingular number is expressed by the one pada "yajeta.") Nor is the following objection to be raised “how can the immaerial number stand in subsidiary relation to the bhávaná ?"; for This is possible in consequence of the number defining an agent. This agent again is to be supplied by inference. For the verb expresses the blívaná only; but the bhávaní can not take place withjut an agent and therefore it, leads to the inference of the latter. Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestivo power (linga) and he other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to Inother); for in cases where the subsidiary relation is established by uggestive power there is no verbal statement to be found which yould directly teach the application (of a secondary matter to a Srimary one), but such a statement has to be formed (viz. from the jentenco containing tho liūga); and in as far as in the latter case an applicatory injunction has to be assumed while in the caso of direct enunciation such a ony is already actually existing, the power of linga te. which is founded on an assumption is set aside by the hower of the direct enunciation. For this reason we do not conlude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (aparently) addressed to Indra (i. e. a verso containing a mention of dra's name or one of his attributes etc.) is really to be used for Adressing Indra; but rather decido if we find at the same time a Srect enunciation as f. i. “with a verso bearing Indra's mark he Addresses the Cárhapatya” that in consequence of the direct enun- ( 12 ) 11 C ciation of the second case termination (gárhapatyam) the verse i subsidiary to the act of addressing the Gárhapatya-fire.(1) Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote o point out something) is called liága. As it is said "the power o all words is named lińga”. By power the same thing is under stood as by the technical term rúdhi (conventional meaning; i. a word has the power of denoting thai thing as whose name it ha been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore no be said that linga does not differ from samákhyá (name); for ling which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different fron name ( samákhyá) which consists in words the meaning of which i to be made out from the meaning of their constituent part: Therefore the mantra "I cut grass for the seat of the gods” car only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of kuša-grass an not to the cutting of ulapa-grass and other kinds of grass, sino from the power residing in the words “I cut etc.” it appears tha the mantra is able to declare the cutting of kuša-grass only (9) In the same manner in other places too the application of a sub sidiary matter is to be learned from suggestive power. Power (linga) has greater force than syntactical connexion (vá kya) and the following means of proof. Let us take for an ex ample the following mantra "I make a pleasant seat for thee, make it very lovely with a stream of ghee ; on this, the immorta one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded o marrow of th rice-grains”. Here the first half of the mantra (I make a pleasan seat-ghee) is to be considered as subsidiary to the act of makin (1) The quoted rik is "sometimes thou art not hurtful, Indra, but comest tot! worshipper" etc.; a verse which as mentioning Indra would be considered as connect with the worship of Indra, were it not for the direct statement referring it to tt adoration of tho Gárhapatya. The decision in favour of sruti as possessing great force than linga rosts on the principle that on the basis of linga an injunction may! constructed containing a direct statement in the above case" aindramantreņa indra upatishtheta); that however a direct statement actually found in the text (aindrs gárhapatyam upatishthate) has greater force than one constructed. (2) The example of linga given in the toxt does not come in very appropriate after the remark on the difference of linga and Bamakhya as samakhya has nothing whatever to do with it. The passage is discussed as giving rise to a doubt in thi Sútr.; but th doubt wether words like barhis are to be taken in their mukhs: (primary) sense only or also in their gauna (secondary) or derived senso.

( 13 ) C i sent for the sacrificial cake, on account of the power of the words I make a seat", and (the decision to what act the different parts of the mantra are subsidiary) is not to be made according to synactical connexion (In the above mantra the two halves form one yntactical whole, the connexion being effected by the word "tasmin" on this) boginning the second half. It might therefore be mainained that the whole undivided mantra is subsidiary to one act, ither the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cake in the seat; or else that both acts are to be accompanied by the vhole mantra. But here linga steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placng of the cake). By sentence or syntactical connexion (vákya) we understand common employment and by this term we understand the connectd enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to each other in the relation of principal and subsidiary alihough this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly inlicating tho one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc. (which relations aro directly indicated by vibhakti-śruti etc.) Take f. i. the passage "he whoso sacrificial arlle is made of parņa-wood hears no evil sound." Here we see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of parņa-wood and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter. Nor is it to be said that the circumstance of being made of parņa-wood is purposeless as the ladle could be made also in a different way (i. e. from some other kind of wood). For the word ladle intimates at the same time the peculiar transvendental result to be accomplished by it (by a ladle made of parņa-wood). So that the sense of the passage is “By its being made of parņa-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle, by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (ly avarlána). As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of parna-wood then the ranscendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in шу other the circumstance of its consisting of parna-wood is Pot purposeless.---The phrase "by means of carrying in it the obladon after it has been taken out of the vessel by avadána” (i. e. the case ( 14 ) last clause of this phrase) is necessarily to be used as otherwise the quality of being made of parņa-wood might be extended to sruva, sruk etc. also ( for these implements also might be denoted hy the word “juhú”-explained as a yługika "þúyato'nayá”-and in them also the oblation is carried, but not when it has been taker out of the vessel in the manner called avadána). This quality of the ladle of being madle of parņa-wood althoug! it is given in the text in a detached rule (anárabhyádhíta ; a rule which stands by itsell, out of connexion with some particular sacri fice to which it might be referred; so that it must be considere: as zl general rule) is to be referred only to all the fundamenta forms of the sacrifice (prakriti) not to their modifications (viksiti) for with regard to the latter it is already settled by an express rule (viz. by the general principle that a modification is to be performet in the same way as the fuudamiental form of which it is a modifica tion) and thus there would be a useless repetition (if we directl: referred the statement about the ladle having to be made of parna wood to the modifications also). A fundamental form of the sacrifice (prakriti) is that one wher wo find a set of direct rules extending over all the subsidiar. things (requisite for the sacrifice). Of this nature is f. i. th darśapúrņamása-sacrifice, in immediate connexion with which w find all the requisite subsidiary matters stated in the text.--- mere modification (vikriti) on the other hand is that form of sacri fice where there are no direct rules with regard to the subsidiar matters, as f. i. the oblation made to Súrya (suuryain charum nii vapot ); there some of the subsidiaries are settled (not by direc rules given for this special sacrifice but) by transfer (atideśa; b transferring or extending the rules given for the fundamental for to the modification). Detached injunctions are injunctions i general validity (while rules which are not detached but under th influence of some prakaraṇa refer to that particular sacrifice onl with which the prakaraṇa connects them). Syntactical connexion as a means of settling subsidiary relatio is of greater weight than prakarana and the rest. Thus f. i. wit regard to the mantra (forming a part of the suktuváka )"o Indri gní you accepted this offering etc”. This whole mantra is on a ( 15 ) ount of its forming one syntactical whole to be taken as subsidiary to the newmoon-sacrifice only and not, on account of prakaraṇa, as subsidiary to the fullmoon-sacrifice as well. ( The súktaváka belongs by prakarana to the darśa-sacrifice as well as to the púrņamása-sacrifice. It however contains mantras which by their linga ire marked as belonging to either of these two sacrifices exclusivey; so f. i. the mantra "indrágni idam havir ajusletám avivsidheun maho jyáyo`krátám” which by the word “indrágni” is shown not to be applicable to the púrņainása-sacrifice. It might howøver be maintained that it is sufficient to leave out the one word indrágní” and that then the remainder of the mantra is to bo ased at the púrņamása-sacrifice too, with which it is connected by prakarana. This opinion however is impugned by the Mímámsists who maintain that the syntactical connexion binding "indragní” b the remainder of the mantra is stronger than prakaraṇa and liat consequently the whole mantra has to be left out at the púrņanásil-sacrifice.) | Prakaraṇa means interdependence (uhhayákáńksha; mutual lesire; mutual want of a couplement ). An example is afforded by the following passage connected with the prayájas “he is to offer he samidh”. As in this passage no special fruit ( of the offering ) mentioned, the sense merely being "he is to realize by means of ffering the sami.llı", there arises the question "what (is he to stalize )?" originating in the want of something to which the offerng of the samidh might contribute. And again after the passago bout the darśapúrmamási-sacrifice has given rise to the idea "ho is to realize paraulise by means of the darsapúrņamása" there arises he question "how (is he to realize paradise)?" originating in the want of something which may contribute towards bringing about he desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subdiary relation in which the prayájis stand to the darsapúrņamása established. - This prakarana is of two kinds, grcat prakarana snaháprakarana) and included prakaraņa (avántara-prakaraņa ). the former is to be understood that kind of prakarana which fers to the principal Lhávaná (i. e. the energy productive of fruit of the entire sacrificial action). This great prakarana Kablishes f. i. the subsidiary relation in which the prayájas etc. !!

( 16 ) stand to the darśapúrņamása. Great prakarana takes place wit| reference to the fundamental forms ( prakṣiti ) of the sacrifice only as there only the relation of interdependence or mutual want i found (viz. if a fundamental form of the sacrifice is enjoined there arises at once the want of subsidiaries by means of which the sacri. fice can be accomplished ; at the same time statements regarding subsidiaries give rise to the question to what sacrifico these subsj. diaries belong). The case is different with regard to the modifications ( of the fundamental forms). For there, by the principle of transfer expressed in the words "a modification is to be carried out in the same manner as its fundamental form" the want of some thing indicating how the action is to be performed is already sati fied and it is therefore impossible that the proper application of th new subsidiaries(1) should be settled by interdependence (there be ing in this case no mutual want, but a want on one side only via on the side of the subsidiaries.) Therefore the application of th new subsidiaries is in the case of a modification settled by plac (sthána ) only, not by prakarana.-By included prakaraña is to by understood prakaraṇa connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice. Included prakaraņa f. i establishes the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping for ward (abhikramaņa ) stands to tho oblations called prayájas. Prakarana of this kind is only known by the circumstance of an injunction being inserted in the middle of two others (sandama the inserted injunction being grasped as it were by the two encom passing injunctions as by the two limbs of a pair of tongs). Foi if this peculiar position is not found all the subsidiaries mentioned ( among them the stepping forward) would be taken as expressing the mode of action of the energy productive of the general resul (of the sacrifice) and would then be subsidiary to the principal action ( as the prayájas aro). By the term sandamśa is to be un derstood the position of an injunction between two subsidiaries enjoined with reference to some one subsidiary. An example i furnished by the act of advancing (towards the áhavaniya ; whic forms a part of the sacrificial action of offering the prayájas). Fo (1) Apúrva in this context means simply "new"; the subsidiaries which do De belong to tho prakriti but to the viksiti oply.

( 17 ) r here at first a matter subsidiary to the prayájas is mentioned in se words “he is to pour (the butter) out of the upabhrit ( into le juhú); for splendour etc.”; (after that comes the passage "he whom knowing this the prayájas are offered pushes his enemies it of these worlds; stepping forward he is to offer them for ctory"); and after this passage again a matter subsidiary to the cayájas is enjoined in the words "he who knows the coupling of le prayájas ete". For this reason the stopping forward which is lentioned in the middle of two things subsidiary to the prayájas to be considered as itself subsidiary to the latter (1) For after 10 idea has arisen that a contribution towards the sacrifice is to ? made by means of bringing about a transcendental result by the rnyájas, there arises tho question "how is the transcendental sult to be brought about by means of the prayájas ?" and this ant of something teaching the mode of action is satisfied by the epping forward etc. which actions are enjoined in the middle of latters subsidiary to the prayájas. Nor can the objection be lised that the productive energy connected with the subsidiaries oes not stand in need of a mode of action being pointed out ; for ich a need actually exists this particular kind of proluctive sergy participating in the general nature of productive energy. Prakarana directly teaches the application of actions only, and nly by means of the latter the application of materials, qualities which are connected with the actions ). When f. i. with reard to the energy tending towards the realization of a certain uit expressed in the passage “ho who desires paradiso is to sacrico" the want of some mode low to bring about the result arises e havo to take the set of actions which aro mentioned in tho kcred text in proximity to tho above passage and with regard to hich no fruit is mentionedd (for if some special fruit were inenoned the set of actions could no longer be considered subsidiary some other action); this set of actions which stands itself in ed of something towards which it might contribute is to be onnected with the above passage as indicating the mode of action. 1) For a different argumentation with regard to the same passage sce J. N. M. V. 100.--The practical issue of the decision is that only the person concerned with the vyzíjas has to step forward and not all those engaged in the darśapúrņamása. 3 ( 18 ) the question 1 That actions only can satisfy the want of the mode of procrédure; a matter of common experience. For if with regard to sentences . like "the hand is to cleave by means of the axe asked "how (is the cleaning prformed)?", tho proper answer clues not lie in the word "land" although enunciated, but rather in the raising and lowering of the axe, the sense being "he is to cleava by raising and lowering the are by means of the hand”; and thus the land is connected with the act of cleaving only by means of the raising and lowering as is known to every body. Prakarana bias greater weight than position (sthána) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like clicing etc. which arr enjoined in the passage "ho is to play at dice with a Rájanya" are, although they are real in the holy text in proximity to the abluishechaniya-(remony and therefore woull on the ground of position be subsidiary to the lattor, in reality subsidiary to the rájasuya-sacrifice on the ground of prakarana. By position (sthána ) is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (páthasádesya) or equality of place according to the performance (anushthána-vidassa). The term "kama" (order of succession has the same meaning as sthána (position). Equaliiy of place according to the test again is of two different kinds, leing either text according to number or clse text accord ing to proximity. An (sample of text according to number is offered by the follou ing passagens "he spreads a cake on eleven potsherds to Indragní' and "he spreads a cake on twelve potsherds to Visvánara". With regard to these passages which are found in the toit in the given order the application of the vajya and anuvákya mantras (indirága rochaná divah etc.) is setiled according to “text accorling to num ber" i. e. the first mantra is applied to the first sacrificial action the second mantr to the second action. For if with regard t the mantra road in the first place the question arises “to wha purpose does it serve"?, the sacrificial action enjoined in the fir: place presents itself first, as they both occupy corresponding place. And so with regard to the second mantra also.--That thing subsidiary to a modification, which things are enjoined with refo ( 19 ) ce to subsidiaries of a fundamental form and stand in the middle two injunctions, belong to the modification is to be concluded m "text according to proximity." Sof.i. in the case of the blations called amanahomås (Taitt. S. II. 3. 9). For as with Jegard to them the want of something to which they may rrfer þrises, the transcendental result consequent on a certain modified form of the sacrifice naturally comects itsellas fruit (with these bhlations), because this modified form reulily presents it-c]f (the hodified form of the sacrifice which is mentioned in the holy text close by the amana-homas is the kámyoshți the originative injunction of which is contained in the words "vaišvadlevím sámgrahanim birvaped grámakámah ”).-.If on the other laurd (instead of the hamed oblations being consilere subsidiary to a certain modification ) an independent fruit were assumed for them (they being Consiilered to produce a special apúrra of their own) their being mentioned in the sacred text in imneiliate proximity to some modified form woull be | posebess - · Equality of place acroriling to the performance shows f. i. ihati the different details stated with regard to the sucrificial animal Refer to the animal sacrifices to Agnishoman; for the sacrifice of the animal offered to Ayníshomau is performed on the amavasathya day and on the same day (i.c.anng the description of the Celemonies to be performed on that day) the details concerning the animal sacrifice are stated. And as now there arises the want of something towards which these details might contribute tho tran-cendental result produced by the animal scilice which presents itself as something to be achieved naturally connects itself as that which is to be realized (by means of these details).---Position (sthána) is of greater weight than samáklıyá (name). For this reason the mantra about, purification (sundhadhvam daivyáya karmane etc.) stands in subsidiary relatiou to the sánnáyya-vessel only as it is read in proximity to these vessels, and does not on account of the title "paurodásikam" (i. e. referring to the sacrifial cake; the name of that chapter which treats of the offering of e sacrificial cake) stand in subsidiary relation to all the vessels wpnecteil with the sacrificial cake. By "name" (samákhy á) are to be understood words the meaning of ( 20 ) be which is found by decomposing them into their elements (yaugikah Sabdah ).-It is of two kinds belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language. An example of the former kind is furnished by the vedic term "lotrichamasah.”, from which we conclude that the hotři stands in subsidiary relation to this drinking of (the contents of) the си) called chamasa. (The teri “chamasa” which has to be derived from the root cham" to sip' and signifies the cup from which the soma is drunk shows tha the soma contained in the cup is to be drunk by the hot;i; fo which circumstanco a more direct rule is not given). The wor "áchvaryava" on the other hand which belongs to comnion lan guage points out that the adhvaryu stands in subsidiary relation t different things (mentioned in the áchvaryava káəda.)(i) This is short statement of the power of samákhya. Thus we have shortly explained the six incans of proof, direc enunciation ctc., assisted by which injunctions of application-a f. i. he is to offer the darśapúrņamása-sacrifice contributing toward it with the samidhs etc.--teach the proper application of subsidiar matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accom plished things or actions. By accomplished things we understan species (játi), substances (dravya), numbers (samkhya) ctc.(2) A these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again two different kinyis, being either secondary (gunakarma) or pr mary ( pradhánakarma). These same two classes of actions ai also called actions contributing towards the general result of t1 sacrifice ) through an intermediate step ( sannipatyopakáraka) an actions contributing (towards the general result) immediatel or directly (árádnpakáraka). By actions of the former kind v understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance ci which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action. Of th kind are f. i. tho beating of the rice-grains (in order to detac them from the husks), sprinkling with water etc. These action (1) By "common language" we have to understand the technical terms used by ! yájnikas, in so far as they are not found in the text of the Veda itself. (2) Species us f. i. the generic character of an animal which is offererl as a sacrific substances like rice-grains etc.; number as f. i the singularity, duality etc of 1 things used for the sacrifice--all these contribute towards the accomplishment of 1 svarúpa, che outward form of the sacrifice.

( 21 ) 0 ire cither such as have a secn cffect or such as have an unseen >ffect or such as have a scen as well as an unseen effect. To tho irst class belongs f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (the effect of which is their being detached from the husks); to tho second class belongs f.i. the sprinkling with water (which does not prolunce a visible effect on the rice-grains ); to the third class belong the actions referring to) the animal, the sacrificial cake etc., for besc actions produce an unseen result in as far as they compriso he offering of a certain material (viz. the material offered in tho sacrifice), while at the same time in as far as they are performed with regard to a certain divinity they produce a visible result. viz. che remembrance of the divinity.(1) By an action contributing directly (árádupakáraka) we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As f.i. the prayájas. Such actions are of use only in originating the highest Franscendental result (paramápúrva; the transcendental result procluced by the sacrificial action in its totality ); while the actions contributing throngh an intermediato stop are of use uso for the outward forin of the sacrifice by means of their producing it modification (samskára) of the material of the sacrifice and of the livinity (wherehy they produce the so-called utjatty-apúrva) (2) The same kind of actions are also calleil inherent actions (ásrayikarma ; viz. induerent in some substance, divinity etc.).-.ller with We have given a short account of the injunctions of application. Prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, is that injunction which intimates speediness of performance. This kind of injunction (is not a separate one, there being no passages which aro merely prayogavidhi and nothing else but) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action ( as f. i. "he who is desirous of paradiso is to offer the darśapúrņamása-sacrifice”) 1. (1) For the sacrifice is the parting with a certain substance (lravyatyáva) with a view amor aiming at-a certain divinity (devatoddeścna) -- Regarılıg the relation of the different kinds of actions to the apú va cp. J N. M V. p. 57. (2) On the different kinds of apurva see--in addition to J N. M. V. p. 57.- the pstructive article 3798 in Goldstucken's Sanskrit Dictionary. It is however hardly Prrect to render “apúrva", u G. doos, hy the unseen or transcendental power a religions or sacrificial act which produces the desired result at another time etc.”; apúrva is not the power on producing a result but a result itself, ( 22 ) which forms one syntactical whole with the sentences enjoining subsidiary things (the pravájas (te); for this (injunction of the main action mfc.) causing the execution of the main action with all its subsidiaries onjoins Speedliness of the performance which latter expression means as much as absence of delay (or pause), as there is no special means of proof for delay. Nor must it lie objected that there also is no special means of proof for the absence of delay: For if the things enjoined in the different injunctions were to be alone) with delay, they could not be done connectedly (together; sala) and that they are to be done colinectedly is understood from the circunstance of the injunctions referring to the chief action and its subsidiaries forming one syntactical whole. Just as we see that in conmon life two things which are done with wax (as f.i. the one thing to-lay the other to-morrow ) are unrer said to be done "together" (or “coumectcally"). This absence of delay is obtained when a tire order is followed; for otherwise this arise doubls roganding the order of consecution of the dillirent actions and the whole profomaner is spoiled. Therefore au injunction of performance enjoins, for ile purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it, enjoins, at the same time a lived order which orier is to in taken as a sprcial attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as it morn attribute of the things onjoinci butan an independent thing the prayogavidhi would be open to the reproach of vákvabheda). For this reason "injunction of formance” is also defined as that injunction which teaches this order of the subsidiaries. By "order" (krama) we understand a particular kind of extension or rather (extension being applicable to coexistent things too) the relation of different things) being carlier and later with regard to cach other. For settling this order of succession (of different actions) we have six incans of proof, viz. direct enunciation (śruti), sense (artha), text (pváthia) position (sthána), principal matter (mukhva), procedure (pravșitti). By direct enunciation (śruti) we understand any pixssage whose purport it is to intimate order of succession. It is of two kinds, having either the purport of intimating merely order! of succession or the purport of intimating something particulariz- ( 23 ) be d by order of succession. An example of the foriner kind is the age having prepared the veda he is to prepare the verdi"; his passage merely has the purport of intimating an order of necession; for the preparation of the vei is already taught by nother pissage. (The śruti in the above quoted passage is conined in the suflix ktvá of křilva---velam kritvi velim karoti. passage contains the statement of the relative order of prestration of voda and vedi, in the way of alváda to those other ritssages which have the purpose of enjoining the preparation of he two mentioned things independent of their relative order in ime). On the other hand the passage " the first dranght belongs o the Vashat-karțri" hias the purpose of enjoining a thing (viz. rinking) pirticularized by a certain ouder ; for it can not bo aken as enjoining order only with reference to the drinking beause this would involve a break of the unity of syntactical onstruction. (The passages must be taken as containing inormation of or double nature on there is no other passage enjoinng the act of drinking by the shat-kartri. It might now be baintained that it enjoins two altogether different things, firstly he dunking, secondly the place of this act with regard to other iets. But is this assumption would involve vákyabheda, it is bought more proper to declare that the passage enjoins only one bing particularized by a second onc.--- --('p. the analogous case of somera vajeta”) Direet euunciation has greater weight than he other means of proof, because the latter obtain their authority mly by means of a direct statement founder on them being contructed. For this reason the cnp devoted to the ası inau is offered n the tenth place (among the cups offi-red during the Jyotishtona ) because there is the direct statement" the cup for the Aśvilan is to be offered as the tenth"; although one miglit think bat is to be offered as the third according to the order in Lich the enps are mentioned in the screel text. (Starting from e aindraváy vit graba we find the aśvina graha mentioned in the irid place, Taitt. S. T. 6. 6; VI. 1. 9, so that according to pátha onght to be offered in the third place; but the direct statement ntained in the word “fenth” of the passage quoted above is onger than patha : nd settles the order of performance. The 24 principle according to which the order of precedence of the different means of proof is determined in the case of krama is the same as the one followed in the case of the means of proof assisting viniyoya-vidbi. In the present 'example f. i. we might, on the ground of the ásvina graha being mentioned in the text in the third place, construct an injunction containing a śruti viz. “ be is to offer the áśvina graha in the third placo", the silent presumption being that such an arrangement would not be iinpossible, not against artha, which latter must be satisfied before we can pass from pátha to śrnti. But this constructed injunction would be met and invalidated by an injunction found ready in the holy text viz.“the cup for the aśvinau is offered in the tenth place").- That order of succession which is settled accoriling t the demands of the purpose (for which «lifferent actions are per formed ) is called order according to the sense. As f. i. the relat ire orier of the agnihotra-offering and the cooking of rice-gruel to which actions the two passages "jo is to offer the agnihotra and" he is to cook the rice-cruel” refer. For as the ricc-grue serves the purpose of the agnihotra its cooking, according to th dem:unds of the purpose, is to be accomplished first.---This ordi of succession according to the sense is stronger than order o succession according to the text. For if, the purpose as a mean whereby to settle order of succession being set aside, the action were performed according to the order of the text the cooking the rice-gruel could merely have an unseen purpose, for it on after the oblation it could not serye any visible purpose. (Bit this would run counter to the general principle of never assumi an unseen purpose when a visible one can be established; hene the decision ) ---The order of succession of sentences which inti: mate certain things is called order of succession according to the text and according to it the order of succession of the things themselves is settled. For the sentences following upon cach other in the text in a certain order produce when being read tir ideas of the things (of which they treat ) in the same order an according to the order of the ideas the order of the execution the things is settled. This text (páthn ) is twofold, text of the mantras and text of the Bráhmaņa-passages. The order f. 1 U ( 25 ) which is settled for the cake offered to Agni and the cake offered o Agníslomau by means of the oriler in which the yájsá and nuvákya mantras are read in the text, is founded upon mantraext. (The injunction referring to the agníshomiya-cake is found In the second anuváka of the Taittiriya-brábmaņa, while the pasage enjoining the ágneya cake occurs in the third anuváka. from this it might be concluded that at the fullmoon-sacrifice he agníshomiya cake is to be offered before the ágneya cake. l'he order however of the mantras accompanying the two offernys, as found in the mantra-kánda, establishes the contrary.) Vantra-text is of greater weight than bráhmaņa-text, because the nastra text is more intimately connected with the actual perormance of the sacrifice than the brálmaņa-text. For the latter gives to understand that such and such a thing is to be done, putside of the sacrifice (during which the bráhmaņa-text is not itself of actual use) and has thereby accomplished its purpose. The mantraš on the other hand are actually employed at the time of the performance of the sacrifice the order of the performance depending on the order in which the single parts of the performince are remembered and as the order of remembrance again Jepends on the order of the mantras (whose property it is to femind one), the mantra-text forms an essential part of the performance of the sacrifice. The order of succession of the prayájas which is derived from the order of the text of certain injunctions viz. “ he offers the samidhis” “ho offers tanúnapát” etc.) is based on the order of the bráhmaņa-text. For although the bráhmaga-passages may be said to have fulfilled their purpose by enjoining a certain thing, nevertheless--in the absence of some other passage pointing out the order of succession of the prayájas etc., the same brahmana-passages are to be accepted as pointing out the rider of the succession as well. (1)--By "position" (sthána) is to bo Anderstood presentatiun, presenting one's self (upasthiti) for if at he place of something (as f. i. in the example given below at the lace of the staniya) something else is performed (as f. i. the ag- (1) l'he coinment-rv here takes a different view and maintains, as it appears rightthat the orucr of succession of the prayájas is found on mantra-text, not bral. ana-text. 4 ( 26 ) . nishomíya and ánubandhya in the sacrifice called sádyaskra), tha mentioned something (f. i. the savaniya) presents itself first afte; the thing by which it is regularly preceded (f. i. the aśvinagralia ma) has been performed and it is therefore proper that it shouk be performaed first. For this reason in the soma-sacrifice calle sádyaskra where the three animal sacrifices viz, the agníshomiya the savaniya and the anubandhya have to be performed together (i. e. in immediate consecution) in the place of the savaniya (i. at that point of the sacrifice where in the fundamental form--the agnishțoma--the savaniya alone is offered) tho savaniya anima has to be offered first, the two others afterwards, as in that place after the offering of the ásvina cup tho savaniya first presents it self to the mind. For to the jyotishţoma (of which the sádyaskrs is a modification) belong three animal sacrifices, the agníshomiya the savaniya and the avubandhya. These three have different places, the agníshomiya being offered on the upavasatha-day, the savaniya at the time of the pressing of the soma and the anubandhya at the end of the sacrifice. Sádyaskra now is the name of a particular somasacrifice which on account of its indefiniteness (i. e. on account of no special divinity being mentioned with regard to it) is to be considered as a mere morlification of the jyotishțoms. Therefore the three animal sacrifices are established for the sályaskra also by the original injunction (which establishes them for the prakriti-form i. e. the agnishiţoma and which has to be transferred to the different vikſitis also). That there they have to bu performed together (not on different days) is seen from the direct statement "he offers the animals together.” This common sacrifice of the three animals has to be performed at the place of the savaniya (i. e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the case of the agnishtoma the savaniya alone is offered) since that place is near to the principal sacrificial action (of all somasacrifice viz. the pressing of the soma) and since the fault of some of th animal sacrifices being removed from their proper places is the same (on whatever day they may be performed together). For i the three sacrifices are performed at the place of the savaníya, onl, the aynishoniya and the anubandhya are removed from their prope places; while in the case of the three sacrifices being performcu ( 27 ) ther on the day of the agníshomíya or on the day of the knuban- 1ya all three are removed from their proper places (for if they o perforined on the day of the agníshomíya pašu the latter itself in not be said to have its 'proper place as it thereby is removeel om the pressing of the soina proximity to which becomes indisensable as soon as the injunction of all the three sacrifices having be performed together is observed; the same reasoning if aplied to the anubandhya-pasu shows that the anubaudhya-day not the proper one). (1) As we now read in the description of e fundamental form (of the sádyaskra i. e. the jyotishțoma) having done the kývina cup and having tied round the sacrificial ost with a thrice-twisted string lie leads on the savaniya pasu" nd thereby see that the sacrifice of the savaníya pasu is enjoineil fter the taking of the isvina cup; tiro saviniya presents itself to he mind also in the sályaskra immediately after the taking of he áśvina cup and thus, according to position (sthana) it is profer that it would be prerformed first. The two other animal sacriices have to be performed after the savaniya in the manner explained (viz. in the first pula of Adhy. V of the Mímámsá, phere the commentatory state that the agníshomíya has to precede the anubandhya).--By order founded on the principal matter nrukhya) we understand the order of the subsidiary matters beonging to sono performance in as far as it is settled by the order of the principal matters. For in whatever oriler the principal natters are performed in the saine order the subsidiary matters beonging to them are performe, since in this manner all subsidiary hatters are distant from the principal matters in the same degree. If on the contrary the subsidiary matters were performed in an bverse order (compared with the order of the principal matters ) he Consequence would be that some subsidiary matters would be (l) For the detai's of the lerzthy and unimportant discussion referring to the sthá- Stikramusamya see the commentary on the Arthasamuraha in the lithographed Henares extition (It is to be iemarked that the text of the inúla of the passage is very incorrect in the lithographed edition a piece of the commentary having got mixed up ith it) -In the Jaim. N. M. V. tho pradhanasomapratyásatti is the only-and Rite sufficient-reason for the three aniinals being scuficed on the sutya-day.-lu Holstücker's edition of J. N. M. V. p. 224 1. 3 read º 1171 às ( 28 ) as near as possible to their principal matters and others again as, far away as possible; and this would of course be improper, as it would interfere with the connectedness of actions intimated by the injunction of performance. Therefore the order of succession of the principal things determines the order of the subsidiaries as well. Thus f. i. a part of the (shee which is the) remainder of the prayájas is at first poured over the oblation to Agni and after that an. other portion over the sour milk offered to Indra, because the sacrifice to Agni precedes in time the sacrifice to Indra. In this manner the two acts of pouring ghee are separated from the principal actions to which they belong (viz. the offering of the two oblations) in the same manner viz. by one intervening act (1. pouring of ghee on the ágneya oblation 2. pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation 3. offering of the ágneya 4. offering of the aindra): while in the case of the reverse order being adopted for the pouring of ghee the pouring of ghee on the agneya and the offering of the ágneya would follow on each other immediately and on the other hand the pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation and the offering of the aindra oblation would be separated from each other by two intervening acts (viz. the pouring of ghee on the ágneya and the offering of the ágneya); and this, as already remarked, would be improper. Order founded on the principal matter is weaker than order according to the text (páthakrama); for the former deter. mines the order ( of the sacrificial acts ) in a retarded manner only because it depends on the determination of the order of the principal actions which determination itself depends on some other incans of proof. Order according to the text on the other hand i: of a different kind as it merely depends on the order of the text as it is found in the Veda, which latter order is independent of anything else; it is therefore of greater weight.-On the other hand it is of greater authority than order founded on procedure (prav ſitti); for in the case of order founded on procedure many subsi. diary matters are distant from the principal matter while they are near to it in the case of mukhya krama (about pravritti-krama ser further on). If in the case of several principal matters (or actions) being performed together and the subsidiary actions connected with ( 29 ) hem having to be performed seriatim, the order of succession of he second, third etc. subsidiary actions is regulated according to he order of the subsidiary action performed first, that order of uccession is called order according to procedure (pravritti). So i. in the case of the subsidiary actions connected with the anilal sacrifices offered to Prajapati (during the vájapeya whero venteen animals are offered to Prajapati), with regard to which e read "having offered the vaiśvadeva oblation they proceed with he animals for Prajapati”. In this sentence the animals meant for 'rajápati are, is pointed out by the third case termination, enjoin- 1, together with the actions constituting the mode of procedure, as aving to be offered at one time. Consequently they (the sacrices of the animals) as well as the subsidiary actions connected herewith as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. of the victims) have to be performed together (or connectedly, aha). This performing together becomes, with regard to (the ctual sacrifice of) the prájápatya animals, possible by performing he actual sacrifice (of all of thein) at the same time as one diinity (viz. Prajápati ) is fixed (for all of them ).(1) On the other and it is impossible to perform all the subsidiary actions as the eading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. at the same time nd the only method of performing them together is therefore to crform them in such a manner as to sparate the subsidiary acions to the least possible degree from the principal actions. For bis end one performs at first the leading on of ore animal and fter that tho leading on of the second and follows the saine order vith regard to the tying to the post etc. And thus selecting from mong the animals about to be offered to Prajápati a certain one, ne begins with it and performs the same subsidiary action with egard to all animals; after this one performs the second subsiliary action on the same animal on which the first one had been Ierformed and again proceeds following the same order with rejard to all other animals. The order of succession determined ccording to this principle is called order of succession according (1) 'The Comm. remarks that another reading is “ samprati pannadevatákálatvena”, nd that the time meant is the time after the performance of the vaisvudoví while the vinity is l'rajapati ( 30 ) to procedure. It is of less weight than order of succession found. ed on direct statement etc.--Herewith we have given a short account of injunction of performance by defining the six different kinds of order of succession. By injunction of claim or qualification (adhikáravidhi) we un. derstand that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership with regard to some result which is brought about by some action, By "ownership” we understand the position of one who enjoys the result.To this class of injunctions belongs f. i. the passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice”; which passage while it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to paradise intimates the starte of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by him who is desirous of paradise.-- Another example is the passage "he whose houses Agni should burn down after he has construct ed the holy fires, is to offer to the merciful Agni a cake on eight potsherds.” This passage enjoining a certain sacrificial action or the occasion of a couflagration etc. intimates the ovnership o him who acts on the mentioned occasion with regard to a resul which consists in averting a calamity and which is produced by the sacrificial action.-In the same way the passage "he is daily ti perform the sandhya" intimates the ownership of him who Icad a pure life, observing the proper times for all his duties, with regar to a fruit viz, the avoidance of disaster which ensucs on the prope performance of the sandhya. This kind of ownership with regard to some result belong to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualificu tion (adhikára). By qualification we understand that which in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as a dis tinguishing attribute of the person (whom the injunction con cerns). This is, in the case of those sacrifices which are per formed for the fulfillment of a certain wish, the wish for the particular result; in the case of the sacrifices performed on special occasion the ascertainment of the occasion; in the case o acts of permanent obligation as f. i. the performance of the san dhyá the circumstance of the man leading a pure life and observing the proper times for all his duties. For this reason too the pass age "a king who is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly work ( 31 ) ( z to perform the rájasuya-sacrifice" notwithstanding its enjoinng (tho rájasuya) with a view to the kingship of the heavenly zorld does not intimate that the enjoyment of the result will be btained by any one who desires the kingship of the heavenly vorld, but only by him who being at the same time a king is deirous of the kingship of the heavenly world; for the passage conains a clear statement of the kingly diguity being a necessary atribute of the qualified person.--Sometimes a necessary attribute of the qualified person is to be understood although it may not be lirectly stated as an attribute of the person. This is the case f. i. vith regard to the knowledge dependent on the injunction enforcng the study of the Veda. (This knowledge is a necessary qualiication for any one who wishes to perform sacrifices,) since all he injunctions of sacrifices as they require a knowledge of tho natters (used in the sacrifice) are given for those only who have acquired a knowledge of these matters in consequence of comply- Ing with the injunction inculcating the study of the Veda. In the bame manner the quality of being provided with the sacred fires-- which quality is obtained by the first construction of the fires is i necessary qualification for all sacrificial acts which are to be effected by means of the holy fires; for as all these sacrifices can not be performed without the fires the injunctions prescribing them can be given for those only who by the construction of the fires have acquired the attribute of being owners of the sacred fires. In the same manner capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power etc.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words "power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) cooperates with the verbs expressing a certain sense” (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it.). -Herewith we close the discussion of that bart of the Veda which is denoted by the name “Injunction”. " Mantras" serve to recall to memory the matters connected with 1e sacrificial performance. By this their property of recalling to lemory the matters mentioned they have a purpose and it is not ) be supposed that their enunciation merely tends to produce ( 32 ) some unseen result, as it would be improper to assume merely ay unseen result while a visible result (in this case the circumstancı of the performer of the sacrifice being reminded of certain things exists. Nor can it be maintained that the recitation of the man tras is purposeless because the visible end of reminding one of cor tain things can be obtained by other means also (as f. i. by thu brahmaon-passages of the Veda which would point out the divin. ities etc. of the sacrifice even without being conibined with the mantra-passages ); for (the exclusive use of the mantras for the purpose) is founded on an injunction of a necessary arrangemen (niyama-vidhi) according to which the mentioned matters are to be recalled to memory by means of the mantras only (not by any other means). By an injunction of necessary arrangement is to be understood an injunction which, in the case of one particular instruiment being established (by some other incans of proof) with regare! to an action which can be performed by various instruments, estal lishes the use of some other instrument which is not yet establish ed (by other means of proof). As it is said "An injunction takes place when something is absolutely non-established; an injunction uf necessary arrangement when one alternative is already established; when both alternatives are already established, (the injunction required) is called limitation (parisankhya).” The sense of this passage is as follows.—That kind of injunction which establishes something not established by any other means of proof is called an injunction of something new (apúrva-vidhi) (or simply “injunction" as in the quoted śloka). Such an injunction is contained f. i. in the passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice"; for it enjoins a sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining paradise which is not established by any other means of proof.That kind of injinction which establishes something that is partially (i. e. on certain occasions) non-established is called an injunction of necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi); as f. i. the passage "he is to beat the ricc-grains.” If it is asked ow this passage can be said to establish something partially non-established, we answer: in the following manner. The passage does not intimate that the beating of the ricegrains has the effect of clanninkiem from the husks; (for a special passage intimni SON UN BOY altogether unnecessiury) ..

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Arthasangraha

Author
Phil, G. Thibaut, Ed.
Other authors
Phil, G. Thibaut, Ed. (series)
Title
An Elementary Treatise On Mimamsa
File name
Arthasangraha
Text
OCR done
Citation
1882
Published
2006/04/22
Publisher
Braj B. Das And Co., Benares
Language
Sanskrit
Pages
86
Library
Ramkrishna Mission Institute Of Culture, Golpark
Classification
Hindu Philosophy
Keywords
Indian Philosophy
DLI number
486806
Barcode
4990010095094.00
Scanning centre
C-DAK, Kolkata
Digital publisher
Digital Library Of India
Rights
In Public Domain
VMLT id
SizkxrYEILl
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Arthasangraha