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·THE
SÁNKIYA APIIORISMS
OY
KAPILA,
WITII
Illustrative Extracts from the Conrmenturies.
TRANSLATED BY
JAMES R.; BALLANTYNE, JLL.D.,
LATE PRINCIPAL OY TILE BENARES COLLEGE.
THIRD EDITION.
LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
1885.
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·ADVERTISEMENT. Tue present work, both in its Sanskrit portion and in its English, is an amended reprint of three volumes,' published in India, which have already become very scarce. An abridged form of those volumes, which subsequently : 1 Their titles hero follow : “The Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy of Kapila, with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries. [Book 1.] Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. Allahabad : Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. Rev. L. G. Hay, Sup't. 1852." 'The Aphorisms of the Sankhya Philosophy, by Kapila, with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary. Books II., III., & IV. In Sanskrit and English. Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. (1st Edition, 550 Copies . Price 12 annas.) All bad : Printed at the Presbyterian Missiou Press. Rev. L. G. Hay, Superintendent. 1851." " Tho Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy, by Kapila, with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary by Vijnána-Bhikshu. Books V. & VI. Sanskrit and English. Translated by James R. Ballantync, LL.D., Principal of the Govt. College, Benares. Printed for the use of tho Lenares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. (1st Edition, 550 Copics :--Price 12 annas.) Allahabad: Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. Rev. L. G. Hay, Supt. 1856." Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Bibliotheca Indica, issued in 1802 and 1865. The proof-sheets of only 32 pagos of the whole, from the beginning, were read by Dr. Ballantyne; the rest, by Professor Cowell. The title of the abridged form runs : “ The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila, with Extracts froin Vijnána Bhiks[b]u's Commentary," &c. But this is a misreprosontation, as regards Book I., which takes up 63 pages out of the total of 175. The expository matter in that Book is derived, very largely, from other coinmentators than Vijnána.

·iv ADVERTISEMENT. appeared, contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but the Aphorisms. Whilo, in the following pages, all the corrections obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to account, an immense number of improved readings have been taken from another sourco. Threo several times I carefully read Dr. Balluntyne's translation in as many different copics of it; entering suggestions, in the second copy, without referenco to those which had been entered in the first, and similarly making independent suggestions in my third copy. All these' were, on various occasions, submitted to Dr. Ballantyno; and such of them as did not meet his approval wero crossed through. Tho rosidue, many more than a thousand, have been embodied 3 Vedánti Mahádeva mainly supplies it at the outset, and, towards the end, well nigh exclusively, Aniruddha. Some share of it, however, will not be traced; it having been furnished by one of Dr. Ballantyne's pandits, whom I have repeatedly seen in the very act, ius by his own acknowledgment, of proparing his elucidations. Many of them, cspecially in Books II.–VI., rest on readings of the original preferable to those which had been accepted. Though not fully published till 1856, my edition of the Sánkhya. pravachana-bháshya, its preface alone excepted, was in print as early as 1853; and Dr. Ballantyne had a copy of it. A few arbitrarily chosen words apart, his text, after Book I., is borrowed from it throughout, but with no mention of the fact. My udvice was unhceded, that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first had access. Greatly to bis disservice, he would not be induced even to look at them. It faring the same with my typographical cor. sections, he has, here and there, reproduced errors, more or less gross, which might easily have been avoided. See, for specimons, pp. 197, 288, 357, 373, 374, 381, 39).

·ADVERTISEMENT. Y 1 in the ensuing sheets, but are not indicated,' as successively introduced. The renderings proposed in the footnotes are, for the most part, from among those which havo recently occurred to me as eligible. That Dr. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing, in whatever form, the volumes mentioned at the beginning of this Advertisement, I was unaware, till some years after he had made over the abridgment of them to Professor Cowell, for publication. Otherwise, I should huve placed at his disposal the materials towards improvement of his second edition, which, at the cost of no slight drudgery, are here made available. The Sánkhya Aphorisms, in all the known commentaries on them, are exhibited word for word. The variants, now given, of the Aphorisms, afforded by accessible productions of that character, have been drawn from tho works, of which only one has yet been printed, about to bo specified : I. The Súnkhya-pravachana-bháshya, by Vijnána Bhikshu. Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. My oldest MS. of it was transcribed in 1654. Nor has attention been topically directed to sundry blemishes of idiom which have been removed; as, for example, by the substitution of unless' for 'without,' of 'in time' for through time,' of 'presently' for just,' and of between the two 'for between both.' 2 "At the time of his departure from India, in 1860, Dr. Ballantyne left with me the MS. of his revised translation of the Sánkhya Aphorisms." "Notice," in the Bibliotheca Indica, New Serios, No. 81, * For details respecting these commentaries and their authors, see my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems, or my Preface to the Sinkhya-sára.

·vi ADVERTISEMENT, II. The Kápila - súnkhya - pravachana - sútra-vritti, by Aniruddha. Of this I have consulted, besides a MS. copied in 1818, formerly the property of Dr. Ballantyne, one which I procured to bo copied, in 1855, from an old MS. without date.? III. The Laghu-súnkhya-sútra-oritti, by Nágeka. Of this I have two MSS., both undated. One of them is entire; but the other is defective by the three first Books. IV. The Sunkhya-pravachana-sútra-rritti-súra, by Vodánti Mahadeva. IIere, again, only one of two MSS. which I possess is complete. The other, which breaks off in the midst of the comment on Book II., Aph. 15, is, in places, freely interpolated from No. I. Neither of them has a date. Nearly all my longer annotations, and some of the shortor, were scrutinized, while in the rough, by the learned Professor Cowell, but for whose searching criticisms, which cannot be valued too highly, they would, in several instances, have been fur less accurate than they Dow are. F. II. MARLESFORD, SUFFOLK, Aug. 28, 1884. 1 I once had a sccond copy of this very rare work, bearing no date, but most venerable in appearance. Like many of my manuscript treasures, it was lent, and never found its way back to me.

·PREFACE. The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sots of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary, the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible; they being designed, not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall havo been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted ; and, this being their end, the obscurity which must needs attach to them, in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault. For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits in the Benares Sanskrit College having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectificd. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve, further, the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East, as regards that of the West. These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proofsheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion. J. R. B. BENARES COLLEGE, 5th January, 1852.

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·THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA. BOOK I. a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila !! 6. Well, the great suge, Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire (which this excites) for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain]:: अथ विविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः॥१॥ The subject proposed. Aph. 1. Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man. 1 2 श्रीकपिलमुनये नमः॥ अथ जगदुद्दिधीषुर्महामुनिः कपिलः फलसौ- न्दर्यज्ञानस्य फलेच्छादारा साधनप्रवृत्ती कारणत्वं पश्यन्फलसौन्दर्यमाह ॥ B ·2 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. a. The word 'well' serves as a benediction ;' (the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one]. b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds,- viz., (1) due to one's self (ruhyatmika), (2) due to products of the clements (áchibhantika), and (3) due to supernatural causes (ilhidaivika),-is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man, among the four human aims, (viz., merit, wealth, pleasure, und liberation (sce Sáhityn-ılarpana, 2)];" because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case. c. But then, let it be that the above- A question whether the pod inny not be attained mentioned cessation [of all the three by ordmary meuns. kinds of pain] is the complete end of man; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth, in the shape of the knowledgo of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz., gems (such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties), and spells, and herbs of mighty 1 2 अथ शब्दो मङ्गलार्थः ॥ विविधस्याध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधिदैविकरू- पस्य दुःखस्यात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्त पुरुषार्थश्चतुषु पु- रुषार्थेषु मध्ये श्रेष्ठः पुरुषार्थ इत्यर्थस्त्रयाणां क्षयि- AT-ATHIRITOfualfefa Hra: ll ·BOOK I., APH. 2. 3 power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system (which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i. e., seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows] :! न दृष्टातत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेरप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ २ ॥ meuns. Aph. 2. The effectuation of this (com- The end is not to be plete cessation of pain] is not (to be alturned by ordinary expected] by means of the visible (such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil,] after [its temporary] ccssation. ܚܕ• नन्वस्तूक्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्त पुरुषार्थस्तथापि सत्व- पुरुषान्यताख्यातिरूपतत्वज्ञानहेतुशास्त्रप्रवृत्ता को हेतुः शारीरदुःखनिवर्तकानामौषधादीनां मानस- दुःखनिवर्तकानां वरस्त्रीमिष्टान्नादीनमाधिभौति- कदुःखनिवर्तकानां नीतिशास्त्रोपदिष्टनिरत्ययस्था- नाध्यासनादीनामाधिदैविकदुःखनिवर्तकानां म- णिमन्त्रमहौषधादीनां सुकराणां सत्वेनानेकजन्म- परंपरायाससाध्ये तत्वज्ञानेऽतिदुष्करे प्रवृत्तेर्दुल- भावेन शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेर्दुर्लभतरत्वादत आह ॥ faqa:, the reading of Aniruddha, and of most MSS., Vijnána has, toʻhe same effect, faça 2 Instead of . Ed.

·THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. a. "The visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., abovementioned [$ 1. c.]. 2 ९ 6. The effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain. c. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood), we see its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general, [from whichever of its three sources ($1. b.)]. d. The state of the matter is this : not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [$1. c.], the knowledge of truth (as a complete remedy] is to be desired.. e. But then, grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by 3 दृष्टादुक्ताषधादिरूपात ॥ 'तसिद्धिदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिसिद्धिः ॥ न भवति कुतः। निवृत्तेर्दुःखनिवृत्तेरनन्तर- मिति शेषोऽनुवृत्निदर्शनाडुःखजातीयोत्पत्तिदर्श- नात्। अयं भावो नेक्तैिरुपायैर्दुःखानुत्पत्तिविशिष्टा दुःखनिवृत्तिर्भवति तत्तदुपायैस्तत्तहुःखेषु नष्टेष्वपि दुःखान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । तस्मादसुकरत्वेऽपि त- वज्ञानमेषितव्यमिति ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 4. 5 again and again obviating it (as often as it presents itself), there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt he states [as follows] :' प्रात्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत्ताप्रतीकारचेष्टनात्पुरु- षार्थत्वम् ॥ ३॥ the end may not be ut- Aph. 3. [Let us consider the doubt] The question whether that the soul's desire (the cessation of turned by the recurrent pain, may result] from exertions for use of ordinary means. the obviation [of pain), as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger. (a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue], then it is to be obviated ; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain ; just as one should eat, when there is hunger; and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognized decision : सर्वासंभवात्संभवेऽपि सत्वासंभवाद्धेयः प्रमाण- 1 कुशलैः॥४॥ 'ननु मा भूदोषधादिभिभीविदुःखनिवृत्तिस्तथा पि पुनः पुनः प्रतीकारकरणे तु भाविदुःखनिवृ तिरपि स्यादिति शङ्कते। यदा दुःखमुत्पत्स्यते तदा तत्प्रतिकर्तव्यं तथा च दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थो यथा यदा क्षुत्रदा भा- तव्यं भुञ्जानस्य क्षुन्निवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थ इति सिद्धान्त- 2 यति ॥ 3 The more ordinary reading of MSS., and that of Aniruddha, is HET, excellence,' not fet, with Vijnána. Ed.

·6 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. lived. Aph. 4. This (method of palliatives This suggestion niya. ($3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all, and because, even if this uere possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness (of the agents employed]. ५. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times ; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be advisable], even if there were the possibility,-i.e., even if these were [always at hand], since physicians are not perfoct [in their art];-for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is mental, &c.; so that there is not [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation from pain. For these reasons, such a soul's uim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are verscd in evidence,' [i.e., who are acquainted with authoritative treatises]. 6. He mentions another proof [of his assertion] : नहि सर्वस्मिन्देशे सर्वस्मिन्काले वैद्यादयः सन्ति संभवेऽपि सत्वेऽपि वैद्यादीनां सत्त्वाभावा- बहि वैद्यादिभिरयवश्यमौषधादिना दुःखं हातुं शक्यते । किं च शारीरदुःखापगमे मानसादेस्तस्य संभव इति न सर्वथा दुःखादिमोकः। तस्मात्म- माणकुशलैरीदृग्विधपुरुषार्थो हेय इति ॥ युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥ 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 5. 7 उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ ५॥ Aph. 5. Also [an inferior method Scriptural evidence in ought not to be adopted,] because of favour of this view. the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Seripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else. a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [$1. c.] ; since iberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendent as a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof (i.c., of Liberation); because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in the text : ' There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul, [with the utter exclusion of pain].' 6. But then [it may be suggested], when tion, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is that bondage essential ? Or is it adventitious ? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction ; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What have we to do with your knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies [as follows] :' you say libera । न तैस्तैरुपायैस्तत्तद्दुःखोच्छेदे यतितव्यं मोक्षस्य नित्यत्वेन सर्वदुःखोच्छेदरूपत्वेनोत्कर्षात्। आत्म- लाभात्परं न विद्यत इति सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेरपि तत्सा- धने तत्वज्ञान एव यतितव्यम् ॥ ननु मोक्ष इत्युक्ते बन्धादिति प्रतीयते। स च 2 ·8 THE SANKHYA APRORISMS. अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥६॥ An objection mct. Aph. 6. And there is no difference between the two. a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were either (see § 19. 6.)]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes place.? b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essentials [$5. b.]: न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः॥७॥ Aph. 7. There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially. Liberation must be possible; clse the means woulit not have been enjoined. 1 बन्धः किं स्वाभाविक उतागन्तुकः। आये ना- शायोगोऽन्ये चेत्स्वत एव नश्यति । किं तत्त्वज्ञा- नेनेत्यत आह ॥ उभयोर्बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकागन्तुकत्वयोमोक्ष- स्योपादेयत्वेऽविशेषः। यथा बन्धस्योपपत्तिर्यथा च मोक्षस्य तथा वयं वक्तुं शक्नुम इत्यर्थः ॥ अथ बन्धमोक्षयोरुपपत्त्यर्थमादी तावत्स्वा- भाविकत्वे बन्धस्य दूषणान्याह ॥ 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 7. 9 a. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, i.e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation : such is what must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. Because, to explain our meaning [by an illustration), fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is essential to it; since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists. 0. And it has been declared in the Divine Song (the tswara-gítá,] : 'If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.'? c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] • Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, ($ 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?' Therefore he declares [as follows] :' 'दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तेमोक्षत्वावन्धो दुःखयोगः स च पुरुषे न स्वाभाविकः । तथा सति मोक्षाय साधनोपदेशस्य श्रौतस्य स्मार्तस्य च विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति शेषः । न ह्यग्नेः स्वाभाविकादी- पायान्मोक्षः संभवति स्वाभाविकस्य यावद्दव्यभा- वित्वादिति भावः। ' उक्तं चेश्वरगीतायाम। यद्यात्मा मलिनो ऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात्स्वभावतः। नहि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपीति ॥ भवत्वननुष्ठानं किमेतावतेत्यत आह ॥ 3 ·10 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रा- माण्यम् ॥ ८॥ Aph. Sinco an essential nature Scripture would be nugatory, if pain were is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, inevitable. betokened by impracticableness, (would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity]. a. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable, i. e., endures as long as the thing itself, it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable in its injunctions. And this is out of the question ; Scripture being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth]. 6. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunetion [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object], on the mere strength of Scripture; 2 [and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question, why the injunction is given]. To this he replies [as follows] : नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥ 1 स्वभावस्यानपायित्वाद्यावहव्यभावित्वान्मा- क्षासंभवेन तत्साधनोपदेशधुतेरननुष्ठानलक्षणम- प्रामाण्यं स्यादित्यर्थः॥ ननु श्रुतिबलादेवानुष्ठानं स्यातवाह ॥ .2 ·BOOK I., APH. 10. 11 An impracticable in Aph. 9. There is no rule, where junction is no rule. something impossible is enjoined : though it be enjoined, it is no injunction. a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit; seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning:' b. Here he comes upon a doubt : शुक्लपटववीजवच्चेत् ॥ १०॥ A dont trhether the essential be not remorable. Apb. 10. If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something cssential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism]. a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the destruction even of what is essential (in spite of what is stated under $7] is seen; as, for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by 1 अशक्याय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुष्ठानं न संभवति यत उपदिष्टे विहितेऽप्यशक्योपायेनो- पदेश एव न भवति किं तूपदेशाभास एव बाधि- तमर्थं वेदोऽपि न बोधयतीति न्यायादित्यर्थः ॥ अच शङ्कते। 2 ·12 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were essential. So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well, if [any one argues thus), such is the meaning [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply]. b. Ile declares- [the real state of the case, with reference to the doubt just raised] : 1 शक्त्युद्भवानुभवाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः ॥ ११ ॥ Decision that an es- Aph. 11. Since both perceptibleness sentral property muy be and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness hidden, but not removed. may belong to some power (which is indestructible), it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, (when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible). a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [$10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of] something essential, which is indestructible [$8]. Why [do we say this] ? Because, in these two 1 ननु स्वाभाविकस्यायपायो दृश्यते यथा शुक्ल पटस्य स्वाभाविकं शोकू रागेणापनीयते यथा च यीजस्य स्वाभावियङ्करशक्तिरग्निनापनीयते । अतः शुक्लपटवड्डीजवञ्च स्वाभाविकस्यापि बन्ध- स्यापायः पुरुषे संभवतीति । तद्ददेव तत्साधनो- पदेशः स्यादिति चेदित्यर्थः ॥ 'समाधते॥

·BOOK I., APH. 11. 13 instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see $ 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., . but not the remoral of the whiteness, or of the power of germination ; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted Beed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogi, (the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c.' 6. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of somo (adherent] cause, he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.:' . 1 उक्तदृष्टान्तयोरयशक्याय स्वाभाविकायोप- देशो लोकानां न भवति । कुतः। शक्त्युद्भवा- नुगवाभ्यां दृष्टान्तद्दये शुक्लत्वादेराविर्भावतिरोभा- वावेव भवतो न तु शैक्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चापायः । रजकादिव्यापार्योगिसंकल्पादिभिश्च रक्तपटभृष्ट- बीजयोः पुनः शाक्यस्याङ्करशक्तेश्चाविभावादिति भावः॥ ' एवं बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकत्वं निराकृत्य नैमित्ति- कत्वमपि निराकरिथनिमितानि कालादीनि नि- राकरोति ॥

·14 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसं- बन्धात् ॥ १२॥ Teme, which applies Aph. 12. Not from connexion with to all, cunnot be the cause time [docs bondage befall the soul]; of tlu bonduye of a purt. because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage]. a. The bondage of man is not caused by time; because [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberatoil; because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times asso. ciated with all men,' [and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any]. 1 न देशयोगतोऽयस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥ Pluce, for the same reason, cannot be the cause. Aph. 13. Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, cither, for the same [reuson]. . a. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. Why? For the same reason,' i.e., for that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated 1 न कालनिमितकः पुरुषस्य बन्धो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य कालस्य सर्वैः पुरुषैः सर्वकालावच्छेदेन संवन्धान्मुक्तामुक्तव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 14. 15 or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated, also.1 नावस्थातो देहधर्मवातस्याः ॥ १४ ॥ conditioned. Aph. 14. Nor (does the bondage of The soul is not kept the soul arise] from its being condiin bondage by its being tioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body. a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that; because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage might befall even the liberated (which is impossible), if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different. b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes], he declares : १ 1 2 देशयोगतोऽपि न बन्धः। कुतः। अस्मा- पूर्वसूत्रोक्तान्मुक्तामुक्तसर्वपुरुषसंबन्धान्मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापरित्यर्थः ॥ अवस्था संघातविशेषरूपता। ततो न बन्ध- स्तस्या देहधर्मवादन्यधर्मस्य साक्षादन्यबन्धकवे मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरिति भावः ॥ ननु पुरुषस्यैवावस्था स्यातबाह ॥ 3 ·16 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. असङ्गेोऽयं पुरुष इति ॥ १५॥ Aph. 15. Because this soul is The soul is absolute. [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is absolute. a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason ; the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned. 1 न कर्मणान्यधर्मवादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ १६ ॥ Aph. 16. Nor [does the bondage of The fruit of works belongs not to the soul. soul arise) from any work; because (works are] the property of another (viz., the mind), and because it (the bondage] would be eternal) [if the case were as you imagine]. 1 इतिहेता पुरुषस्यासङ्गत्वादवस्थाया देहमा- चधर्मत्वमिति पूर्वसूत्रेणान्वयः॥ 2 The commentator Aniruddha omits the final word, .Ed. 3 Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered 'undue result.' For the synonymous utiprasukti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53, with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151, of this Book. Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. As technicalities, they generally signify illegitimately extended application of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed. 6 ·BOOK I., APH. 16. 17 a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated', [through some acts of some one else]. b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate” (viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur (where it does not,] even in such cases as the universal dissolution [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organi, but not the soul]. (. But then [some one may say], if bondage, also, belongs not that be the case, then let the bondage, to somethiny else tlun too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works (to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection A doubt u hether the the souls 1 न विहितनिषिद्धकर्मणापि पुरुषस्य बन्धः कर्मणोऽन्यधर्मवादनात्मधर्मवादित्यर्थः । धर्मेण साक्षादन्यस्य बन्धे च मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापतेः ॥ अन्य- 2 Upádhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed. 3 ननु स्वोपाधिकर्मणा बन्धाङ्गीकारे नायं दोष इत्याशयेन हेत्वन्तरमाहातिप्रसक्तेश्चेति प्रलयादा- वपि दुःखयोगरूपबन्धापत्तेश्चेत्यर्थः ॥

·18 THE SÁNKIIYA APHORISMS. of the mind, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the soul, also ? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows] : विचित्रभोगानुपपतिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १७ ॥ Aph. 17. If it were the property of Why it is to the soul that the body must any other, then there could not be belong diverse experience. a. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.c., a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and unother man's not : [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of minil, but of soul, that inen are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [thit attaches to its attendant organism); and this reflexion is of its own attendant (organism) only; so that there is no undue result - [deducible from our theory]. 1 नन्वेवं दुःखयोगरूपोऽपि बन्धः कर्मसामाना. धिकरण्यानुरोधेन चित्तस्यैवस्तु दुःखस्य चित्तधर्म- तायाः सिद्धत्वाच किमर्थं पुरुषस्यापि कल्यते बन्ध इत्याशङ्कायामाह॥ दुःखयोगरूपबन्धस्यान्यधर्मत्वे चित्तधर्मत्वे वि- चित्रभागानुपपत्तिः कश्चिदेव दुःखभोक्ता कश्चि- बेति विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः । अतः पुरुषेऽपि 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 18. 19 b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakriti) is directly the cause of bondage: प्रकृतिनिबन्धनान्चेन्न तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम्॥१८॥ Nature is not the Aph. 18. If [you say that the soul's immerltate care of the bondage arises) from Naturc, as its soul's bonude. cause, then I sayj 'no;' [because that, also, is a dependent thing. a. But then (some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say 'no;' because that, also, i.C., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it (Nature) were to occasion bondage, even without that conjunction which is next to be mentioned), then bouclage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution,' [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal]. . दुःखयोगःस्वीकार्यः। स च दुःखप्रतिबिम्वरूप एव प्रतिबिम्बश्च स्वोपाधेरेव भवतीति नातिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ 1 साक्षात्प्रकृतिनिमितकत्वमपि बन्धस्यापाक- रोति ॥ 3 2 Here and in the comment, I have corrected TeiTfq. Ed. ननु प्रकृतिनिमित्ताबन्धो भवत्विति चेन्न यत- स्तस्या अपि प्रकृतेरयुत्तरसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणसंयोग- पारतन्त्र्यं तेन विनापि बन्धकत्वे प्रलयादावपि बन्धप्रसङ्गात् ॥

·20 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 6. If the reading in the aphorism] be nibandhanu' [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that the bondage is caused by Nature.' &c. c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.c., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorisn], through this Very sort of conjunction (it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire;' (water being held to be essentially cold, and to scem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it]. d. lle establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come] : न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तयोगस्तयो- गादृते ॥ १९॥ ? This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed. 3 * निबन्धना चेदिति पाठे प्रकृतिनियन्धना बद्दता चेदिति योज्यम् ॥ अतो यत्परतन्त्रा प्रकृतिबन्धकारणं भवेतस्मा- देव संयोगविशेषादीपाधिको बन्धोऽग्निसंयोगा- ज्जलोष्ण्यवदिति ॥ स्वसिद्धान्तममुनैव प्रसङ्गेनान्तराल एवाव- धारयति॥ 5 Here follows, in the first edition, the particle तु, for which no 4 authority has been discovered. The word translating it I have retained, but bracketed. Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 19. 21 to the soul. Aph. 19. [But] not without the con- What really is the junction thereof (i.e., of Nature) is relutrun of its bondaye there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain) with that (viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence. a. Therefore, without the conjunction thereof, i.e., without the conjunction of Nature, there is not, to the soul, any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bondage; but, moreover, just through that connexion with Nature) does bondage take place.” 6. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional (and not inherent in it, either essentially or adventitiously), he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative, ['not without'). For, if bondage were produced by the conjunction of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating (in the case of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking), then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom ; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the removal thereof). lence, as bondage ceases, on the disjunction (of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflexional, and neither essential ($ 5. 6.] nor adventitious [$ 11. 6.]. | The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnána here supplies the comment. Eil. 2 तस्मानयोगादृते प्रकृतिसंयोगं विना न पुरु- षस्य तयोगी बन्धसंपर्कोऽस्ति । अपि तु तत एव बन्धः ॥ बन्धस्यौपाधिकवलाभाय नञ्ययेन वक्रोक्तिः। 3 ·THE SÁNKUYA APHORISMS. ('. In order that there may not be such an arror as that of the Vaiseshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is an absolutely real conjunction (of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [$ 19]. That is to say : as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose (the hue of which, scen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal), just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever essentially pure, &e., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontancously,' [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure). d. This has been declared, in the Suura, as follows: 'As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something (as a China-rose] 1 यदि हि बन्धः पाकजरूपवत्प्रकृतिसंयोगजन्यः स्या- तदा तद्ददेव तद्दियोगेऽप्यनुवर्तेत। अतः प्रकृति- वियोगे बन्धाभावादीपाधिक एव बन्धो न तु स्वा- भाविको नैमितिको वेति ॥ वैशेषिकाणामिव पारमार्थिको दुःखयोग इति भमा मा भूदित्येतदर्थं नित्येत्यादि। यथा स्वभा- वशुद्धस्फटिकस्य रागो न जपायोगं विगा घटते तथैव नित्यशुद्धादिस्वभावस्य पुरुषस्योपाधिसंयोगं विना दुःखसंयोगो न घटते स्वतो दुःखाद्यसंभवा- दित्यर्थः ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 19. 23 ~ that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul' (is regarded as being affected by pain].' e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from rcul pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflcrion is not a real bondage," (any more thar the reflexion of the China-rosc is a real stain in the erystal]. f. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [$ 19.c.]. And now enough as to that point." 9. Now he rejects [$18.01.] certain causes of the soul's] bondage, preferred by others: तदुक्तं सौरे। यथा हि केवलो रक्तः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनैः। रञ्जकाग्रुपधानेन तद्दत्परमपूरुष इति ॥ * तत्र नित्यशुद्धत्वं सदापुण्यपापशून्यावं नित्य- बुद्धत्वमलुप्तचिद्रूपत्वं नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदापारमार्थि- कदुःखायुक्तत्वं प्रतिबिखरूपदुःखयोगस्वपारमार्थि- को बन्ध इति भावः ॥ तथा च संयोगविशेष एवात्र बन्धहेतुतया सूचकृदभिप्रेत इत्यलम् ॥ 'इदानीमन्याभिप्रेतान्बन्धहेतूचिरस्यति ॥ 3 ·24 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. नाविद्यातोऽयवस्तुना बन्धायोगात् ॥ २० ॥ The Tedantic trnet on this point olisputed. Aph. 20. Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise] ; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding. a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned Time,' &c.,' [$ 12, which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in $ 19, of the received cause]. b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,'as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality for the existence of no reality save one (see Verliintu-siira, $ 20.5.)]; because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed.? r. But, if Ignorance' be a reality (as some assert], then he declares fas follows] :: वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ २१ ॥ Aph. 21. If it ['Ignorance'] be (asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then cvuile the objectron, without stultifying himself. there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedanta]. The Vedanti cannot 1 2 अपिशब्दः पूर्वोक्तकालाअपेक्षया ॥ अविद्यातोऽपि न साक्षाबन्धयोगोऽवैतवा- दिनां तेषामविद्याया अयवस्तुत्वेन तया बन्धानौ- चित्यान्नहि स्वानरज्ज्वा बन्धनं दृष्टमित्यर्थः ॥ अविद्याया वस्तुत्वे त्वाह ॥ 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 22. 25 a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance'is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma (see Nyaya Aphorisms I., $ 31] of the unreality of Ignorance;'1 [and so you stultify yourself]. 6. He states another objection :' विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ २२ ॥ Aph. 22. And [if you assume 'Igno- The Vedanti cannot rance' to be a reality, then] there would erade the objection, wrthout conceiliny a duty. be a dhuality, through [there being] something of a different kind (from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing]. a. That is to say: if Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedantís cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Verdanta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind (with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind.) 1 2 यदि चाविद्याया वस्तुत्वं स्वीक्रियते तदा स्वाभ्युपगतस्याविद्यानृतत्वस्य हानिरित्यर्थः ॥ दूषणान्तरमाह ॥ 'यद्यविद्या वस्तुभूतानादिस्तदा नित्यात्मतुल्या। अनात्मत्वे विजातीयद्वैतत्वम् । ते हि वेदान्तिनो ऽद्वैतवादिनः सजातीयविजातीयवैताभावं मन्यन्त इति ॥

·26 THE SÁNKUYA APHORISMS. b. IIe ponders a doubt :: विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् ॥ २३॥ The l'eduntí must not alleve that Tomorence is at once real and unreal. Aph. 23. If [the Vedanti alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, (then we shall say 'no,' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism]. a. The meaning is: if (the Vedantí says that] Ignorance' is not real,-else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],-and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal, [like Plato's öv xai un öv: (see Voluntasára, § 21)]. न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः॥ २४ ॥ Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that There is no such thing 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal, as a thing ut uncc real we say] ‘no;' because no such thing is known (as is at once real and unreal.] a. That is to say: it is not right to say that Ignorance is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words ' because no such thing,' &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. and un cul. 1 2 शङ्कते॥ अविद्या न सती येन विजातीयद्वैतापति- नीयसती कार्योपलम्भात्किं तु सदसद्रूपा चेदि- qu: 11 ·BOOK I., APH. 25. 27 For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an example of the thing (i.e. (seo Nyáya Aphorisms, I., $ 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found ; [for, where is thero anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the impor'.! b. Again he ponders a doubt :- न वयं षट्दार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ २५ ॥ A question whether the l'edat is bound to (1- rou self-contradictwn Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] "We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiseshikas and others.' a."We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiseshikus, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyáyikus, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to peoplein general], as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and umreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal (see सदसद्रूपाविद्येति न युक्तमित्यर्थः। तत्र हेतु- माह तादृगिति सदसद्रूपस्य कस्यचिदपि पदार्थ- स्याप्रतीतेः। विवादास्पदे हि वस्तुनि दृष्टान्त आ- वश्यकः स च भवनयेऽप्रसिद्ध इति भावः॥ 'पुनः शङ्कते॥

·28 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. Vedúnta-sára, $21]; because this is established by proofs,' [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyaya Aphorisms, I., $ 35)]. 6. By the expression [in the aphorism] ' and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas; for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories" [see Nyaya Aphorisms, I., $1]. c. He confutes' (this pretence of evading the objection, by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya): अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा बा- लोन्मतादिसमत्वम् ॥ २६ ॥ sible. Aph. 26. Even although this be not The self-contradictory compulsory [that the categories be is altogether inumissix, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like. a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vaišeshika, 925); still, since being and notbeing are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to न वयं नियतपदार्थवादिनः । अतोऽप्रतीतो ऽपि सदसदात्मकः सदसदिलक्षण वाविद्यापदार्थ इत्यङ्गीकुर्मो मानसिद्धत्वात् ॥ आदिपदान्नैयायिकः स हि षोडसपदार्थवा- दीति ॥ परिहरति ॥ 2 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 26. 29 adinit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at opce real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness : otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning. 6. Certain heretics (deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individually; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something cquivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows] :- ' पदार्थनियमो मास्तु तथापि भावाभाववि- रोधेनायौक्तिकस्य युक्तिविरुद्धस्य सदसदात्मकप- दार्थस्य संग्रहो भवदचनमाचाछियाणां न संभ- वति। अन्यथा बालकायुक्तस्याययाक्तिकस्य संग्रहः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥ Vásaná, a term which Dr. Ballantyne bas rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: ‘An, impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting inerit or demerit, producing pleasure or ain.' Ed. 3 केचिन्नास्तिका आहुः सन्ति बाह्यविषयाः क्षणिकास्तेषां वासनया जीवस्य बन्ध इति तद्दूष- यति ॥

·30 THE SANKIIYA APHORISMS. नानादिविषयोपरागनिमितकोऽयस्य'॥ २७ ॥ The heretical theory of it Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, succession of momentary ohjects from all eternity, moreover, is not caused by any in- Os causing the soul's boite fluence of objects from all eternity. duye, rcjcoil. a. Thereof,' i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,-not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasiomed : such is the meaning.' b. IIe states the reason of this impossibility]: 40929 न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि देशव्य- वधानात्सुभस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥ २६ ॥ i Instead o-fafai, Auirullia his the substantially equivalent -निमितः. 1 अस्यात्मनः। अनादिविषयोपरागः प्रधाह- रूपेणानादिकायो विषयवासना तनिमितकोऽपि बन्धो न संभवतीत्यर्थः ।। अत्र हतुमाह ॥ | Dr. Ballantyne had, most probably by mere oversight, the un• authorized बाह्यान्तर०, which I have corrected. The reading उपरज्य०, here followed, is, perhaps, that of Aniruddha. उप- T554fo is the form of the word recognized by Vijnúna ; and I know of nu inanuscript warrant for the alteration of it sten in the following page, l,-an extract from his cominentary. It is, further, a regular derivative, which the other is not, if it is not even unjustified by grammatical prescription. Ed. 6 Aniruddha has -भेद, 'division, in place of -व्यवधान, separation.' Ed. 2 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 28. 31 where it is not. Aplo. 28. Also [in my opinion, as A thing cannot act well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pátaliputra. a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to), the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pátaliputra: such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (crésuni) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the flower-busket' [to which they impart their odour.] 6. By the word 'also' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects (see S15)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected (with the matter of the present aphorism]. 1 तन्मते परिच्छिन्नो देहान्तरस्थ एवात्मा तस्या- भ्यन्तरस्य न बाह्यविषयेण सहोपरज्योपरञ्जक- भावोऽपि संभवति । कुतः । सुनस्थपाटलिपुत्र- स्थयोरिव देशव्यवधानादित्यर्थः । संयोगे सत्येव हि वासनाख्य उपरागो दृष्टो यथा मञ्जिष्ठावस्त्र- योर्यथा वा पुष्पपुटकयोरिति ॥ अपिशब्देन स्वमते संयोगाभावादिः समु- 2 च्चीयते॥

·32 TIIE SÁNKUYA APHORISMS. c. Srughnu and Pataliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart. . But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship. Therefore he declares (as follows]: दयारेकदेशलब्धोपरागान व्यवस्था ॥ २९ ॥ Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the On the hereticul rieur, soul's bondage should arise] from an the free son could lie equally liable to wndaye. influence received in the same place (where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, (the band and the free]. a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows : "It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just us likely to come across objects as any other] : such is the meaning: 3 1 2 सुभपाटलिपुत्री विप्रकृष्टदेशविशेषा ॥ ननु भवतामिन्द्रियाणामिवास्माकमात्मनो विषयदेशगमनाविषयसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो व- क्तव्यः। तचाह॥ एकस्मिन्विषयदेशे लब्धादुपरागाइन्धो न 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 31. 33 6. Here he ponders a doubt :: अदृष्टवशाचेत् ॥ ३०॥ Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to The herctic's attempted defence. save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases (see $29) does exist] in virtue of the unscen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism]. a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue] : ' But then, granting that they (the free soul and the bound) are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.c., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if" [this be urged, then we look forward]. a. This he disputes,* (as follows]: न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्योपकारक भावः ॥३१॥ - । 1 संभवतीति शेषः। कुतः। यरमाद्वयोर्बद्धमुक्तात्मनो. व्यवस्था मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापनेरित्यर्थः ॥ अब शङ्कते॥ नन्वेकदेशसंबन्धन विषयसंयोगसाम्येऽ ऽप्यदृष्ट- वशादेवोपरागलाभ इति चेदित्यर्थः ॥ परिहरति ॥ 2 3 D ·34 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. Each back must bear its oun burden. Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time. a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time (believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that ohjects (see $ 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation (between the soul at one time and its successor at another) as that of deserver und bestower (or transınitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [$ 27] taking effect on a patient (say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent (say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning? 6. He ponders a doubt:? पुत्रकर्मवदिति चेत् ॥ ३२ ॥ Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests I'luther merit may, or that] the case is like that of the ceremy mot, lx imputeil. monies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward]. a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that 1 तव मते कर्तृभोक्तो दादेककालासंबन्धाच्च नैवोपकार्योपकारकभावे नहि कर्तृनिष्ठादृष्टेन भो- तृनिष्ठा विषयोपरागः संभवतीत्यर्थः ॥ शङ्कते॥ 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 33. 35 the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's “Hindú Law,' Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated) in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiate the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday] : such is the meaning [of the heretic]. 6. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact:- नास्ति हि तब स्थिर एक आत्मा यो गर्भाधानादि- ना' संस्क्रियेत '॥ ३३ ॥ Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves This will not help the herotic's myument. nothing ;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c. a. 'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of ननु यथा पितृनिष्ठेन गर्भाधानादिना पुत्रक- मणा पुत्रस्योपकारो भवति तद्दयधिकरणेनैवा- दृष्टेन भोक्तुर्विषयोपरागः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥ दृष्टान्तासिया परिहरति ॥ * Aniruddha has alytatfe ÀUT; and Dr. Ballin- * A common reading, but inferior, is संस्क्रियते. 57. 2 tyne's rendering suits it. Ed.

·36 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. the son, by [means of the performance of] the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.c., because, on that theory, there is not one (self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated (by the ceremonies in question), so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertuin to the time subsequent to birth (such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Bráhman woulul not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception hul been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one, [on your own theory : it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact]. b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' (merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet (of my school], that it (the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunetion' [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the sume grounds). -1 | The brackets are of my inserting. Ed. 2 तब वन्मते गर्भाधानादिकर्मणापि पुत्रस्यो- पकारो न घटते हि यस्मातत्र गर्भाधानमारभ्य जन्मपर्यन्तस्थाय्येक आत्मा नास्ति यो जन्मोत- रकालीनकर्माधिकारार्थं संस्क्रियेतेति तथा च दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः ॥ 'अस्मन्मतेऽपि स्थैयाभ्युपगमादचनाञ्च पुत्र- कर्मणा पुच निष्ठादृष्टोत्पतेः पुत्रोपकारसंभवादृष्टा- न्तस्यासिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 34. 37 c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] . But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,'' (which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]: स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम् ॥ ३४ ॥ a. 2 Aph. 3.1. Since there is no such J!'hether linnlage may thing as a permanent result (on the not be momentury, und so require no cuuse. heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted). Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorisnn]. b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.] : (1) Bondage, &c., is momentary; (2) Because it exists, (3) [Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.3 'ननु बन्धस्यापि क्षणिकवादनियतकारणको- भावकारणको वा बन्धोऽस्वित्याशयेनापरो ना- स्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते॥ 'बन्धस्येति शेषः॥ तथा चाकारणक एवास्त्वित्याशयः। तथा चायं प्रयोगो बन्धादिकं क्षणिक सत्वाद्दीपशिखा- दिवदिति ॥ 3 ·THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. 1 result' c. And [continues the heretic,] this reason, viz., 'existence '] does not extend unduly' (as you may object,] to the case of a jur, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion), is like the subject in dispute, [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, since there is no such thing as a permanent 19:34]. dl. He objects* (to this heretical view) : न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ ३५ ॥ Aph. 35. No, [things are not mo- The fout of recogni- mentary in their duration); for the tion proces thut thinus absurdity of this is proved by recoynition. a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument (to that under $31. v.], taken from such facts of recognition as, 'what I saw, that same do I touch, [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz. : (1) Bondage, &c., is permanent; (2) Because it exists, are not momentury. i Vyabhichára is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings ; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' derogation,' 'failure,' 'impossibility,' "unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed. 2 न च घटादा व्यभिचारस्तस्यापि पक्षसमत्वात्। एतदेवोक्तं स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेरित्यनेन ॥ दूषयति ॥ 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 37. 39 That things are momnentury is contrarlicted (3) [Everything that exists is permanent,] as a jar, or the like.1 श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच ॥ ३६॥ Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and rousoning. by Scripture and by reasoning. a. That is to say: nothing is momentary ; because the general principle, that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., '[All] this, ( ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this, viz., 'llow should what exists proceed from the non-existent ?'' दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ ३७॥ The heretic's tillustru. tion is not a truth. Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact. 1 न कस्यापि क्षणिकत्वं यदद्राक्षं तदेवाहं स्पृशा- मीत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानुगृहीतेन बन्धाधिकं स्थिरं स- स्वाइटादिवदिति प्रत्यनुमानेन क्षणिकत्वस्य बाधा- दित्यर्थः॥ सदेव सौम्येदमय आसीदित्यादिश्रुतिभिः कथमसतः सज्जायतेत्यादिश्रौतादियुक्तिभिश्च कार्य- कारणात्मकाखिलप्रपञ्चे क्षणिकत्वानुमानस्य वि- रोधान्न क्षणिकत्वं कस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥ 2 ·40 THIE SÁNKTIYA APIIORISMS. a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things) is denied; because this momentary character does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, ($3.1. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants (really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import.' b. Moreover, if the momentary dura- 1/things were momen tion, &c., [of things] be asserted, then tary, there could be no relation of cuuse und there can be no such thing as the rectict. lation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect, [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows] :' युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ३ ॥ 2 दृष्टान्ते दीपशिखादा क्षणिकत्वस्यासिद्धेर्न क्ष- णिकत्वानुमानमित्यर्थः । किं च सूक्ष्मानेकक्षणा- नाकलनेन क्षणिकत्वभ्रम एव तप तवेति भावः॥ किं च क्षणिकत्ववादे मृद्घटादिस्थले कार्यका- रणभावो नोपपद्यते। न च नास्त्येव स इति वाच्यं कार्यार्थिनः प्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्सिद्धे- रित्यभिप्रेत्याह॥

·BOOK I., APH. 39. 41 Aph. 38. It is not between two things The causal relation is coming simultaneously into existence, not between things that arise simultaneously. that the relation of cause and effect exists. a. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive ? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production). Neither is it the last; in regard to which he declares (as follows] : पूर्वापाय उत्तरायोगात् ॥ ३९ ॥ 1ph. 39. Because, when the antece- A product cannot sure dent departs, the consequent is unfit vive its substuntrul cause. [to arise, and survive it]. a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things ; because, at the time when the antecedent, i. e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.c., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from,] its 1 'किं मृद्धटयोयुगपज्जायमानयोः कार्यकारण- भावः किं वा क्रमिकयोः । नायो विनिगमका- भावाइटार्थिनो मृदादिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च । नान्य इत्याह ॥

·42 THE SÁNKUYA APHORISMS. substantial cause, [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it]. b. With reference to this same topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objections [to the theory of the momentary duration of things] : तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ ४० ॥ Aph. 40. Moreover, not on the The coexistence of subs theory of the momentary duration of impusselle, e' things to things, can there be such a relation as momentary. that of cause and effort]; because, while the one [the untecedent] exists, the other (the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder. 3 a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot cocxist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and sub 1 पूर्वस्य कारणस्यापायकाल उत्तरस्य कार्यस्या- योगादुत्पत्त्यनौचित्यादपि न क्षणिकत्ववादे संभ- वति कार्यकारणभाव उपादानकारणानुगततयैव कार्यानुभवादित्यर्थः ॥ उपादानकारणमधिकृत्यैव दूषणान्तरमाह ॥ 2 3 For vyabhichára, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, supra. Ed. Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichára. Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 40. 43 stance, are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives, that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists : and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things (in your opinion,] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent," belong to opposite times, [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined]. b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, "I have inserted the words in product and substance.' Ed. ? The original dual of concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singular number, see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed. 8 Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38, a, at p. 41, supru. Ed. . पूर्वस्य भावकाल उत्तरस्यासंबन्धादुभयव्यभि- चारादपि न कार्यकारणभाव इति शेषः । यदो- पादेयं तदोपादानं दोपादानाभावस्तदोपादेया- भाव इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेका उपादेयोपादानयोः का- र्यकारणभावयाहको ती च क्षणिकवेन क्रमिक योस्तयोविरुद्धकालत्वान्न संभवतः ॥

·44 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. as it belongs to the instrumentul cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.' To this he replies : पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः ॥ ४१ duct dors not thstuntumsh strument. Aph. 41. If there were merely an- Antecedence to the proteccilence, then there would be no deterthe latter from the Inmination (of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause]. Q. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence to the product]; because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumentul causes ; for, (as we need scarcely remind you), that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning." 6. Other heretics say: 'Since no- The queston whether thing [really] exists, except Thought, unything earsts besueles Thoughi neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream [have no real exist- 1 ननु निमित्तकारणस्येवोपादानस्यापि पूर्वभा- वमात्रेणैव कारणतास्त्विति तत्राह ॥ * पूर्वभावमाषाभ्युपगमे चेदमेवोपादानमिति नियमो न स्यानिमित्तकारणानामपि पूर्वभावा- विशेषादीदृगेव हि निमिझोपादानयोविभागः सर्वलोकसिद्ध इत्यर्थः॥ .

·BOOK I., APH. 43. 45 ence). Therefore it has no cause; for it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of these? [heretics] : न विज्ञानमा बाह्यप्रतीतः ॥ ४२ ॥ Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists ; of Intuition for the Erbecause there is the intuition of tho ternul, as well as for the external. We have the evidence Internal. - a. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, ure proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.' b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in Ircams [sce Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects !' To this he replies: 3 तदभावे तदभावाछून्यं तर्हि ॥ ४३ ॥ Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one The denial of the cir does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all]. tornul (Limounts to Vhulasm. 1 अपरे नास्तिका आहुः । विज्ञानातिरिक्तव- स्वभावेन बन्धोऽपि स्वप्नपदार्थवत । अतोऽत्यन्त- मिथ्यात्वेन न तब कारणमस्तीति तन्मतमपा- करोति ॥ न विज्ञानमात्र तत्वं बाह्यार्थानामपि विज्ञा- नवत्प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः॥ ननु स्वप्नप्रतीतिदृष्टान्तेन विषयाभावेऽपि तदुपपत्तिरिति । तबाह ॥ 2 3 ·46 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. a. That is to say : if external things do not exist, then a mere roul offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist ; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, it the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought. b. Then let the reality be a mere void ; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because u roid is all:' with such a proposal [as recorded the next aphorism] does (some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition : शन्यं तत्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तधर्मवादिना- शस्य ॥४४॥ The heretic goes the Aph. 44. The reality is a void: what length of assertiny sheer is perishes; because to perish is the Nihilism. habit of things. (a. The roid alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, for the only 1 तर्हि बाह्याभावे शून्यं प्रसज्येत। कुतः । बाह्याभावे विज्ञानाभावाप्रतीतिर्हि विषयसा- धिका बाह्यप्रतीतिश्चेन्न विषयं साधयेदिज्ञानप्रती- तिरपि न विज्ञानं साधयेदिति भावः ॥ अस्तु तर्हि शून्यमेव तत्त्वमतश्च बन्धकारणा- न्वेषणमयुक्तं तुच्छत्वादिति नास्तिकशिरोमणिः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते॥ 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 45. 47 truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that which is perishuble is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,-is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what? This [question is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own unture ; (so that nothing could continue, if it ceasell to perish]: such is the meaning.' b. Ife rejects" [this heretical view] : अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ ४५ ॥ Aph. 45. This is a mere counterassertion of unintelligent persons. a. :Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counterassertion, that a thing must needs be perishable, because it Mihelisi de nuel ; 118 the indiscrptible is indestructible. 1 शून्यमेव तत्वम् । यतः सर्वोऽपि भावो विन- श्यति यश्च विनाशी स मिथ्या स्वप्नवदतः सर्व- वस्तूनामाद्यन्तयोरभावमात्रत्वान्मध्ये क्षणिकसत्त्वं सांवृित्तिकं न पारमार्थिकं बन्धादि। ततः किं केन बध्येत इत्याशयः । भावानां विनाशित्वे हेतुर्वस्तु- धर्मवादिनाशस्येति विनाशस्य वस्तुस्वभावत्वा- स्वभावं तु विहाय न पदार्थस्तिष्ठतीत्यर्थः ॥ परिहरति ॥ 2 ·48 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. erists ; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.? b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old), so, too, by such a cognition as this, that the jar has passed away,' it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having pussed away.: c. Ire states another objection" [to the heretical view] : उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ ४६॥ Aph. 46. Moreover, this nihilistic Nihilism is open to the sume objections as theory is not a right one]; because it both the Momentury and has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before]. 2 tlue Ikul theories. 1 अबुद्धानां मूढानामपवादमावंभावत्वाविना. शिवमिति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकारणाभावेन निरवयवद्रव्याणां नाशासंभवात् ॥ किंबहुना। कार्याणामपि न विनाशसिद्धिः। घटो जीर्ण इति प्रत्ययेनेव घटोऽतीत इत्यादिप्र- त्ययेनापि घटादेरतीताख्याया अवस्थाया एव 2 सिद्धेः॥ 3 दूषणान्तरमाह ॥ * Anirudilha, according to the MSS. which I bave seen, reads -क्षेमाद°. Ra Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 46. 49 i. c., a. This view, moreover [$ 44], is not a good one ; because it has the same fortune as, is open to similar reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [8 26.1..], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. b]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [as stated in $35), the fact of recognition, &c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things), and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [as stated in $42], the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism] : such is the import. b. Morcover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., 'Let the mere l'oid [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim (and summum bonum), since herein consist at once the cessation of pain (which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing], and also the means. thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],' this, too, can hardly be : so he declares [as follows] :' 1 क्षणिकबाह्यपक्षेण विज्ञानमात्रपक्षण सह समानमत्वानुल्यनिरसनहेतुकत्वादयमपि प्रो न सम्यक् । क्षणिकपक्षनिरामहेतुः प्रत्यभिज्ञा- दिर्विज्ञानपक्षनिरासहेतुर्बाह्यप्रतीत्यादिश्चात्रापि समान इति भावः॥ " यदपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया तत्साधनतया च शून्यस्यैवास्तु पुरुषार्थत्वमिति तैर्मन्यते तदपि दुर्घ- टमित्याह ॥

·50 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISM8. The soul's aim is not innihilation. क अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥ Aph. 47. In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim. 1. Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether us consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because the (whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, [(see 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predicable].' b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causcs of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those (proposed by unbelievers, and already rejected, are to be set iiside :: न गतिविशेषात् ॥ ४ ॥ Aph. 48. Not from any kind of It is by no morrment that the soul gets into motion (such as its entrance into a bondage. body, does the soul's bondage result]. 1 दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया दुःखनिवृत्तिसाधनतया वा शून्यस्य पुरुषार्थवं स्यात् । तच्च न घटते स्वनि- ठत्वेनैव सुखादीनां लोके पुरुषार्थत्वावगमास्थि- रस्य पुरुषस्यानङ्गीकारादित्यर्थः ॥ इदानीं पूर्वनिरस्तावशिष्टान्यास्तिकसंभाव्या- न्ययन्यानि बन्धकारणानि निरस्यन्ते ॥ 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 49. 51 a. Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic1 [of discussion]. ८. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.. c. He states a reason for this :3 निष्क्रियस्य तदसंभवात् ॥ ४९ ॥ Aph. 49. Because this is impossible What is all-perruding for what is inactive, [or, in other words, cloes not chunge pluce. without motion]. a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].' b. But then [the objector may say], “Since, in the books of Scripture and of luw, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited in its extent] : and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size 1 2 प्रकरणाबन्धो लभ्यते ॥ गतिविशेषाच्छरीरप्रवेशादिरूपादपि पुरुषस्य न बन्ध इत्यर्थः॥ अब हेतुमाह ॥ निष्क्रियस्य विभोः पुरुषस्य तदसंभवागत्यसं. भवादित्यर्थः॥ 3 ·52 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like :' [but] this conjecture he repels :? मूर्तत्वाइटादिवासमानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः॥५०॥ Were the sout limited, soul is other than all-pervaling; be- Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the it might be puerishulle. cause] by its being limited, since it Would come under the suune conditions us jurs, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishablemess. (१.. That is to say : and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed in dimension), then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and hence in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle, [that the soul is imperishable]. 1. Jle now justifies the text (sce $ 49.7.] referring to the motion+ [of the soul, by showing that the motion is zot really of the suul, but of an accessory]: 1 Swetásvatura Upanishud, iïi., 13. Il. 'ननु श्रुतिस्मृत्योरिहलोकपरलोकगमनागम- नश्रवणात्पुरुषस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वमेवास्तु तथा च श्रुतिरयङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मेत्यादिरित्याश- कामपाकरोति ॥ यदि च घटादिवत्युमान्मूर्तः परिच्छिन्नः स्वी- क्रियते तदा सावयवत्वविनाशिवादिना घटादिस- मानधर्मापनावपसिद्धान्तः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥ गतिश्रुतिमुपपादयति ॥ 3 .

·BOOK I., APH. 51. 53 गतिश्रुतिरयुपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ ५१ ॥ Aph. 51. The text regarding the Soul moues not, any more than Space. motion [of the soul], moreover, is (applicable, only) because of the junction of an attendant;1 as in the case of the Ether (or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar). a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the declaration that . It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent," the text regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining (not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, “As the Ether for space) included in a jur, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, [incapable of being moved]';' and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49.6.),] belongs to Nature [sec Velántu Aphorisms, Part I., $ 4. 1.], from such maxims as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful; i Upádhi; often, below, 'investment' and 'adjunct.' Ed. 2 Bhagavad-gilú, ii., 21. Ed. 3. Text' and 'maxim' are here meant to represent śruti and smriti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for the same terms, in wider acceptations, ' books of Scripture and of law,' &c. The first is revealed law,' the Vedas; the second, 'memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mánava, and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman sourco; but only the former is regarded a8 preserving the very words of revelation. Ed. 4 The anacoluthisin observable in ihe translation follows that of the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, p. 61. vol. ii., ·- 54 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. and it is wilful Nature that, in the three worlds, reaps these': such is the import. 2 b. It has already been denied [816] that the bondage [of the soul is occasioned by works, in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover, does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom :: न कर्मणायतद्धमत्वात् ॥ ५२॥ merit or lemerit Aph. 52. Nor, morcover, [cloes the The bondege of the bondage of the soul result from the soul is no wsult of any merit or demerit arising] from works ; because these belong not thereto. a. That is to say : the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occa- 1 नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थाणुरित्यादिना प्रमाणेना- त्मनोऽपरिच्छिन्नवे गतिश्रुतिपाधिकगतिपरा व्याख्येया। घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा। घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तवज्जीवो नभोपमः। इति श्रुतेः। प्रकृतिः कुरुते कर्म शुभाशुभफलात्मकम् । प्रकृतिश्च तदनाति त्रिषु लोकेषु कामगा। इत्या- दिस्मृत्या गतः प्रकृतिनिष्ठत्वावगमाचेति भावः ॥ 2 For another rendering, see my translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 57. Ed. 'पूर्व विहितनिषिवव्यापाररूपेण कर्मणा बन्धो निराकृतः। इदानीं तज्जन्यादृष्टेनापि न बन्ध इत्याह॥

·BOOK I., APH. 53. 55 sioned by works. Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see $16. a.)] is no property of the soul.2 b. But then [some one may say], ' Let it be that the bondage resulting from the unseen,' i.e., the merit for demerit] even of another, should attach to a different person;' whereupon he declares [as follows] :' अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ ५३ ॥ Aph. 53. If the case were otherwise Else, bondage might [than as I say], then it (the bondage of cling even to the emunci. puted. the soul] might extend unduly, [even to the emancipateu] a. That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause were under other conditions (than we have declared them to be], then there might be an undue extension ; bondage would befall even the emancipated," [for the same reasons as those stated under $16. ४.]. 2 1 Dr. Ballantyne should have taken unseen' and 'works' as in apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter, Clearer than his original, and yielding substantially his sense, is the gloss of Vedānti Mahadeva: कर्मणा त तज्जन्यादृष्टेनापि न पुंसः साक्षाबन्धः। Bd कर्मणादृष्टेनापि साक्षान्न पुरुषस्य बन्धः । कुतः। अतद्धर्मवात्पुरुषधर्मत्वाभावादित्यर्थः ॥ नन्वन्यधर्मेणाप्यदृष्टेनान्यस्य बन्धः स्यातबाह ॥ 4 Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed. अन्यधर्मवे बन्धतत्कारणयोरन्यधर्मवे ऽतिप्रस- क्तिर्मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥ 3 ·56 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. b. What need of so much [prolixity]? IIe states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes), beginning with its essence [400 $6.0.], and ending with its [supposed] works (see $ 16]; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture, [that any one of these should be the cause] : निर्गणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ॥ ५४॥ the soul's relation to bondwe, Aph. 51. And this Copinion, that the .1 simple text of Strong bondage of the soul arises from any of the hicitou notuins of these causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities : and so much for that point. a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those supposed causes already treated of, among which its essential character [S6. b.] is the first, this would be contradictory to such texts as, ' Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is the soul :”” such is the meaning. 6. The expression and so much for that point' means, 1 किं बहुना । स्वभावादिकान्तैरन्येन वा केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिर्न घटते श्रुतिविरोधा- दिति साधारणं बाधकमाह ॥ ? Swetáswatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed. 3 स्वभावाद्यन्यतमेन पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्ती साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्चेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेत्यर्थः ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 55. 57 that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes. c. The case, then, stands thus : since fall] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, There would be no fitness in the enjoining' [see $7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul) is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.2 d. But then, in that case, [some one may sus], this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [$51. c.], whether it be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [$5. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipatel. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as follows] :3 तयोगोऽयविवेकान' समानत्वम् ॥ ५५ ॥ Aph. 55. Moreover, the conjunction How the true cause of thereof does not, through non-discrimi. bonlayr (flicts not the nation, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity, en rutrd. 2 इतिशष्दो बन्धहेतुपरीक्षासमानी ॥ तदेवं न स्वभावतो बदस्यत्यादिना प्रदर्शकेने- तरप्रतिषेधतः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग एव साक्षाबन्ध- हेतुरवधारितः॥ ननु तब प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगोऽपि स्वाभावि- कत्वे कालादिनिमितकत्वे वा मुक्तस्यापि बन्धा- पादक इत्याशय समाधत्ते ॥ तयोगे, the reading which I find in USS. of Aniruddha, 3 seems to be indefensible. Ed.

·58 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. [in this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated] a. The conjunction thereof,' i.e., the conjunction of Nature and of the soul; this conjunction, moreover, does not take place again through non-discrimination,' i.o., through the want of a discrimination (between Nature and soul] in the emancipated, [who do discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]: such is the meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are not on a level, (under the circumstances stated at $ 54. c.]: guch is the import. 1 [विपर्ययाबन्धः ॥५६॥ Aph. 56. Bondage arises from the The true cuuse of bondage, in other words, error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul]. a. lIuving thus declared the cause of that [bondage] non-discrimination. 1 तद्योगः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगोऽयविवेकान्मुक्ते- विवेकाभावान्न पुनः संयोगो भवतीत्यर्थः । तथा च न मुक्तबदसाम्यमित्याशयः ॥ * These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment attached to them, no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he republished the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted them, llence the brackets now ivserted, and my alteration of the numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 56. 59 which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it :1 नियतकारणातदुछित्तिान्तवत् ॥ ५६ ॥ . .. Aph. 56. The removal of it is to be Non-discrimination is removuble by discrimi. effected by the necessary means, just nution alone. like darkness. a. The necessary means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by this alone is 'its removal,' i.e., the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and not by works, or the like: such is the meaning: just as darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone, [and by no other means]. 6. “But then [some one may say], if merely the nondiscrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction (of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination], the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body, &c. ; and this is contrary to Scripture, 2 [' एवं हेयहेतुं प्रतिपाद्य हानोपायं प्रतिपा- दयति ॥] शुक्तिरजतादिस्थले लोकसिद्धं यन्नियतं कारणं विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्तत एव तदुछितिरविवेको- छित्तिर्न कर्मादिभिरित्यर्थो यथा धान्तमन्धकारः प्रकाशेनैव नश्यति॥

·60 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. crimination, to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning.' To this he replies: प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम् ॥५॥ Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimina- The discer emination of tion of other things [from soul] results Nature, as other than from the non-discrimination of Nature soul, inoies all dis. [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results). 1. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [us something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul,] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent (viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the understanding' is an effect or product of Nature,] is, itself, an effect, [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its cause]. 1 'ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाविवेक एव चेसंयोगद्वारा बन्धहेतुस्तयोविवेक एव मोक्षहेतुस्तहिं देहाद्यभि- मानसत्त्वेऽपि मोक्षः स्यात्तच्च श्रुतिस्मृतिन्याय- विरुद्धमिति । तत्राह॥ पुरुषे प्रधानाविवेकाकारणाद्योऽन्याविवेको बुद्ध्यायविवेको बुद्ध्यायविवेके जाते कार्यावि- 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 57. 61 b. The state of the case is this : as, when the soul has been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other (properties], the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its character of walterableness, &c., has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of the products thereof [i.e., of Nature], such us the understanding,' and the like, which have the character of being modifications? [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable]. c. But then (some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a conceit (entertained by people in general,] of a Nature (or primal principle] different from the conceit of an understanding,' &c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first principle] ? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into), such as, 'I am ignorant,' and 80 on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an understanding,' &c., [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an understanding,' &c.] :' 1 वेकस्य कार्यतयानादिकारणाविवेकमूलकत्वातस्य प्रधानाविवेकहाने सत्यवश्यं हानमित्यर्थः ॥ यथा शरीरादात्मनि विविक्ते शरीरकार्येषु रूपादिष्वविवेको न संभवति तथा कूटस्थत्वादि- धर्मः प्रधानात्पुरुषे विविक्ते तत्कार्येषु परिणामा- दिधर्मकेषु बुधादिष्वभिमानो न स्थातुमुत्सहते तुल्यन्यायात्कारणनाशाच्चेति भावः ॥

·62 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. well, if any one says this, I reply, ‘no;' because, unless there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following, viz., 'Having died, having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell;' because no products, such as the understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew,' [any more than a goldl-bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials). d. Morcover, it is inadmissible to The soul's confuuniling say that men's conceit of [the identity itself with Nurire a los guully antecedent to its of themselves with their] 'understandconfounding itself with anythiny else. ing,' &c., is (the primary cause of the soul's bondage, and is not preceded by anything; because 'understanding and the rest (as you will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of fownership in, or of one's identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of ownership, &c.,) in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., pro- . 1 ननु बुद्ध्याघभिमानातिरिक्ते प्रधानाभिमाने किं प्रमाणमहमज्ञ इत्याद्यखिलाभिमानानां बुद्या- दिविषयत्वेनैवोपपत्तेरिति चेन्न मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सृष्टी स्वर्गी स्यां मा च नारकीयाद्यभिमानानां प्रधानविषययत्वं विनानुपपत्तेरतीतानां बुद्याद्य- खिलकार्याणां पुनः सृष्ट्यभावात् ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 57. 63 . duced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the ownership of ] the bracelets, or other things, formed of that gold; and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one's property], there is the removal of those,' [i. e., the removal of the conceits that the grain, &c , and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property : and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding,' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the understanding' is held to be a product]. e. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus in infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign us the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency'in regard to it; or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of 1 कारणा- किं च बुधादिषु पुरुषाणामभिमानोऽना- दिर्वक्तुं न शक्यते बुद्ध्यादीनां कार्यत्वात् । कार्येष्व- भिमानव्यवस्था) नियामकाकाङ्क्षायां भिमान एव नियामकतया सिद्यति लोके दृष्टत्वा- कल्पनायाश्च दृष्टानुसारित्वात् । दृष्टो हि लोके क्षेत्राभिमानाक्षेत्रजन्यधान्यादिष्वभिमानः सुव- णाभिमानातजन्यकटकादिष्वभिमानस्तयोर्निव- त्या च तयोनिवृत्तिरिति ॥

·64 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that) there is no occasion to look for any other' predetermining agency,' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance? thereof, [i. e., of that error of confounding one's self with Nature]; because [these two are alike) without antecedent, like sced and sprout,2 [of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old puzzle, ' which was first, the acorn, or the oak ?' being a frivolous question]. f. But then (sonic one may say], if we admit the soul's bondage [it one time), and its freedom (at another), and its discrimination (at one time), and its non-discrimination [at another), then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;' and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, viz., • The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction of the soull, nor production (of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work), nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; (seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never boundt].' This [charge of inconsistency] he repels :' 3 1 To render vúsiina, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. Eu. 2 प्रधानाभिमानतद्वासनयोश्च बीजाङ्कुरवदना- दित्वान्न तदभिमाने नियामकान्तरापेक्षेति ॥ 3 Amțitabindu Upanishad, v. 10. See Dr. Albrecht Weber's Indische Stuilien, vol. ii., p. 61, note 2. Ed. 'ननु पुरुषस्य चेड्बन्धमाक्षी विवेकाविवेकी च स्वीकृतौ तर्हि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तत्वोक्तिविरोधस्तथा ·BOOK I., APH. 58. वाङ्गात्रं न तु तत्त्वं चित्रस्थितेः ॥५८ ।। Aph. 58. It is merely verbal, and The bondage of the soul is merely verbul. not a reality [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resicles in the mind, [and not in the soul]. a. That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul, all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal, i. e., it is rue et praeterea nihil; because is is merely a reflexion, like the redness of [pellucid crystal (when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the Chinarose itself. IIeuce there is no contradiction to what had been said before, [as the objector (under 557. f.) would insinuate] : such is the state of the case.' वै च न निरोधो न चोत्पतिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः । न मुमुक्षुर्न मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थतेत्यादिश्रुति- विरोधश्चेति तां परिहरति ॥ 1 Aniruddha has, instead of न तु, तु न. Hence : • IBut it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. Eil. ' बन्धादीनां सर्वेषां चित्र एवावस्थानातासर्व पुरुषे वाडा शब्दमा स्फटिकलौहित्यवत्प्रति- बिम्बमावत्वान्न तु तत्त्वमनारोपितं जवालाहित्य- वदित्यर्थः । अतो नोक्तविरोध इति भावः ॥

·66 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. b. But then, if bondage, &c., as re- Whether Testimony, or gards the soul, be merely verbal, let Inference, without Per. ceptron, might not avail them be set aside by hearing [that they to disserate the soul's hondaye. are merely verbul], or by argument [establishing that they are so]. Why, in the Seripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative knowledge [of Soul, as distinguished from Non-soul], going the length of immediate cognition ? To this he replies : युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्गढवदपरोक्षादृते॥ ५९॥ Aph. 59. Moreover, it [the non- The truth must be di. discrimination of Soul from Nature,] rectly discerned, and not merely accepted on the is not to be removed by argument ; Pround of Testimony, or of Inforence. as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass (is not to be removed) without immediate cognition. a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word moreover' is intended to aggregate for take in, along with 'argument']'testimony,'' (or verbal authority, which, no more than argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case). . 1 ननु बन्धादिकं चेत्पुरुषे वाङ्गात्रं तर्हि श्रवणेन युक्त्या वा तस्य बाधो भवतु। किमर्थं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिश्यते मोक्ष- हेतुतयेति । तबाह ॥ 'युक्तिर्मननम् । अपिशचः श्रवणसमुच्चयार्थः ।

·BOOK I., APH. 59. 67 b. That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though (granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection), in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass (and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference, without immediate cognition, i. e., without [his] directly perceiving' [how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate perception 'testimony,' or 'inference,' may conduce, but the necessity of which these media, or instruments of knowledge, cannot supersedel C. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the ussertion in Aph. 56], viz., that. The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means,' that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination (between Soul and Nature), is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question), tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing . Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. Dr. Ballantyne had : — That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving ; just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case,' &c. Ed. 2 वाश्रावमपि पुरुषस्य बन्धादिकं श्रवणमन- नमात्रेण न न बाध्यतेऽपरोक्षादृते साक्षात्कारं विना यथा दिङ्गतजनस्य वाङ्काचमपि दिग्वैप- रोत्यं श्रवणयुक्तिभ्यां न बाध्यते साक्षात्कारं वि- नेत्यर्थः ॥

·68 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. [of Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism (3 59]: Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument,' &c. That is to say: non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument, or by testimony, unless there be discrimination as an immediate perception ; just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his direction; because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual perception' [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. lIe may intor that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend, that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk, except a direct perception of its whiteness). d. Ilaving thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination (of Soul from 1 अथवेत्थं व्याख्येयं ननु नियतकारणानदुछि- तिरित्यनेन विवेकज्ञानमविवेकाच्छेदकमुक्तं त- ज्ज्ञानं किं श्रवणादिसाधारणमुतास्ति कश्चिविशेष इत्याकाङ्खायामाह युक्तितोऽपीत्यादिसूत्रम् । अ- विवेको युक्तितः श्रवणतश्च न बाध्यते नोच्छिद्यते विवेकापरोक्षं विना दिङ्गोहवदित्यर्थः माक्षात्का- रभ्रमे साक्षात्कारविशेषदर्शनस्यैव विरोधित्वा- दिति ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 60. 68 Naturo], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination" [here referred to). e. This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (mamiinu) which establishes the existence of these (two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth :? अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वहे ॥६॥ Aph. 60. The knowledge of things The cridence for things imperceptible is by means of Inference; imperceptible. as that of fire when not directly perceptible, is by means of smoke, &c. a. That is to say: 'of things imperceptible,' i.e., of things not cognizable by the senses, e. g., Nature and the Soul, 'the knowledge,' i.e., the fruit lodged in the soul, is brought about by means of that instrument of right knowledge (which may be called] ' Inference' (umumána), [but which (see Nyaya Aphorisms, I., $5) is, more correctly, the recognition of a Sign']; us [the knowledye that there is] fire [in such and such a locality, where we cannot directly तदेवं विवेकसाक्षात्कारान्मोक्षं प्रतिपाद्यातः परं विवेकः प्रतिपादनीयः ॥ 'तवादी प्रकृतिपुरुषसिद्धी हि तद्दिवेकान्मोक्षः स्यादतस्तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमुपन्यस्यते ॥

·70 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign,' occasioned by smoke, &c.' 6. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is established by Revelation. But, since Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the Sankhya] System, 'Inference only is laid down [in the aphorism,] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disregarded" [in the Sankhya system; as will be seen from Aph. 88 of this Book]. C. He [next] cxhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of causo and effect [among these, severally], preparatorily to the argument that will be [afterwards] stuted :' 2 अचाक्षुषाणामप्रत्यक्षाणां प्रकृतिपुरुषादीना- मनुमानेन प्रमाणेन बोधः पुरुषनिष्ठं फलं सिद्ध भवति यथा धूमादिभिर्जनितेनानुमानेन वहे. सिद्धिरित्यर्थः॥ अनुमानासिद्धमयागमात्सिद्यतीत्यपि बो- ध्यम् । अस्य शास्त्रस्यानुमानप्राधान्यातु केवला- नुमानस्य मुख्यतयैवोपन्यासो न वागमस्यान- पेक्षेति ॥ 'प्रकृत्यादीनां सृष्टिक्रम वाक्ष्यमाणानुमानाप- योगिकार्यकारणभावं च दर्शयति ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 61. 71 सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महा- न्महतोऽहंकारोऽहंकारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युभयमि- न्द्रियं तन्मात्रेभ्यः' स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविं. शतिर्गणः ॥६१॥ tres enumerated. Aph. 61. Nature (prakriti) is the The trenty-fire Realistate of equipoise of Goodness (sattuu), Passion (rajux), and Darkness (tamas) : from Nature [proceeds] Mind (muhat); from Mind, Selfconsciousness (ahunkárn); from Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra), and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthila-bhiita). [Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five. (8. The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called Goodness,' &c., is their being neither less nor more [one than another] ; that is to say, the state of not being [developed into an effort in which one or other of them predominates]. And thus ‘Nature' is the triad of (Qualities' (guna), distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning." b. These things, viz., Goodness,' &c., [though spoken of as the three Qualities), are not' Qualities' (guna) in the Vaiseshika sense of the word; because [the ' (Qualities' of . 1 My MSS. of Aniruddha omit तन्मात्रेभ्यः. Ed. सत्त्वादिद्रव्याणां या साम्यावस्थान्यूनानति- रिक्तावस्थाकार्यावस्थेत्यर्थः। एवं च कार्यभिचं गुणवयं प्रकृतिरिति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ॥ 3 For a translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed.

·72 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. the Vaišeshika system have, themselves, no qualities (see Kaņáda's 16th Aph.); while) these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force,' Weight, &c. In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 'Quality' (guna) is employed (as the name of the three things in question],' because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the corils (which the word guna also signifies), viz., 'Mind,' &c., which consist of the three [socalled] Qualities,' and which bind, as a [cow, or other) brute-beast, the Soul.' c. Of this (Nature) the principle called the great one' (mahut), viz., the principle of Understanding' (budilhi), is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality). Of this there are two products, (1) the 4 5 1 Balavattwa; for which I find the variant chalutwu, “inobility.' Ed. 2 Read : “Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c.' Vaišeshiká gunah is equivalent to the višesha-gunál in the original of Book V., 25. a. For the specific qualities,' see the Bháshá-purichchheda, st. 90. Ed. 3 For is employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (teshu), (namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed. Hareifa ganifu a anfaat fut: FÊT- गविभागवलालघुत्वबलवत्त्वगुरुत्वादिधर्मकत्वाच्च। तेष्वच शास्त्रे श्रुत्यादौ च गुणशब्दः पुरुषोपकरण- त्वात्पुरुषपशुबन्धकत्रिगुणात्मकमहदादिरज्जुनिमा- तृत्वाच्च प्रयुज्यते ॥ 6 For a different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c., pr. 43, 44, Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 62. 73 Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs.' The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of Organs,' through their division into the extornal and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five Gross Elements.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggregate of things. That is to say, besides these there is nothing.' d. He [next], in [several aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring' [of the existence of these priuciples, the one from the other : स्थूलात्पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ॥ ६२॥ The esistence of the Subtalc Elements 1sinferred from that of the Gross.' Aph. 62. [The knowledge of the cxistence] of the five Subtile Elements' is [by inference,] from the 'Gross Elements.' 1 तस्याः कार्य महत्तत्त्वं बुद्धितत्त्वम्। अहंकारो ऽभिमानः। तस्य कार्यदयं तन्मा मात्राण्युिभयमि- न्द्रियं च । तन्मात्राणि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः । उभयमिन्द्रियं बाह्याभ्यन्तरभेदेनैकादशविधम् । तन्मात्राणां कार्याणि पञ्च स्थूलभूतानि। पुरुषस्तु कार्यकारणविलक्षण इति । इत्येवं पञ्चविंशति- र्गणः पदार्थव्यूहः । एतदतिरिक्तः पदार्थो नास्ती- त्यर्थः ॥ 2 अनुमानक्रममाह सत्रैः॥

·74 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. : a. "The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied, [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60]. b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist, by Perception; [and] thereby [i. e., from that Perception; for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gotama's 5th Aphorism,] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred, [the otoixeia o toiveiw of Empedocles]. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case) is as follows: (1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic], consist of things [Subtile Eiements, or Atoms,] which have distinct qualities; (the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour; und so of the others]: (2) Because they are gross ; (3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.; [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads ; and so of the others]. बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहंकारस्य ॥ ६३ ॥ Aph. 63. [The knowledge of the And thence that of existence] of Self-consciousness is [by Self-consciousness. inference,] from the external and inter- 2 'अनुमानेन बोध इत्यनुवर्तते ॥ स्थूलं पृथिव्यादि प्रत्यक्षसिद्ध तेन तन्मात्रा- णमनुमानम् । तथा चापकर्षकाष्ठापन्नानि स्थू- लभूतानि मविशेषगुणवयोपादानकानि स्थूल- वाहटपटादिवदिति प्रयोगः॥ my MSS. of Aniruddha there is no after a: Ed. 8 In ·BOOK I., APH. 63. 75 nal (organs), and from these [ Subtile Elements,' mentioned in Aph. 621 a. By inference from the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' thero is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as Self-consciousness. b. The application [of the process of inference to the case) is in the following somewhat circular) manner: (1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness : (2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness : (3) Whatever is not so [i. e., whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i.e., is not a product of Self-consciousness] ; as the Soul, (which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].” c. But then, if it be thus [i. e., if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on Understanding,' or 'Intellect,' or Mind,' the first product of Nature' (sce Aph. 61)], then [some may object, that], since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear, on the beatification of the potter, whose internal organ (or · Understanding'] then surccases. 6 1 बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यामिन्द्रियान्यां तैस्तन्मात्रैश्चाहं- कारस्यानुमानेन बोधः ॥ तन्मात्रेन्द्रियाण्यभिमानवव्योपादानकान्य- भिमानकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् । यन्नैवं तत्रैवं यथा पुरुष इति प्रयोगः ॥

·76 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. And this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case ; because another man [after the beatification of the potter,] recognizes that This is that same jarl [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].' d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or - Intellect'] which could be causes (as the jar no longer can be,] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [cither good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor [an end] of intellect altogether :- [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceuses, on his beatification : but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]: e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch. vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and : 1 नन्वेवं कुलालाहंकारस्यापि घटोपादानत्वा- पत्त्या कुलालमुक्तौ तदन्तःकरणनाशे तनिर्मित- घटनाशः स्यात् । न चैतद्युक्तं पुरुषान्तरेण स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वादिति ॥ 'मैवं मुक्तपुरुषभोगहेतुपरिणामस्यैव तदन्तः- करणे मोक्षोतरमुच्छेदान्न तु परिणामसामान्य- स्यान्तःकरणस्वरूपस्य वोछेदः ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 64. 77 not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c.,' [who may lose their Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiranyagarbha (seo Veliinta-sara, 562), never loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues]. तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥६४॥ Intellect. Aph. 64. [The knowledge of the ex- And thence that ofistence] of Intellect is [by inference, from that [Self-consciousness, $ 63]. a. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] that,' viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' (budilhi), the great 'inner organ' (rintahkaruna), (hence] called 'the great one' (mahet), [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this? [product, viz., Self-consciousness]. b. And so the application (again rather circular, of the process of inference to the case, ) is as follows: (1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment (or mind]; (2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment (proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and] 1 अथवा घटादिष्वपि हिरण्यगर्भाहंकार एव कारणमस्तु न कुलालाग्रहंकारः ॥ तेनाहंकारेण कार्येण तत्कारणतया मुख्यस्या- न्तःकरणस्य महदाख्यस्य बुद्धेरनुमानेन बोध 2 इत्यर्थः ॥

·78 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. 6 (3) Whatever is not so [i. e., whatever is not made out of judgment, or mental assurance), is not thus [i.e., is not a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul, [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent], &c.' c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood : Every one, having first determined anything under a concept [i.c., under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that this which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, 'This is I,' or "This ought be done by mc,' and so forth : 80 much is quite settled ; [and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called Selfconsciousness' (which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to), since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions (the occasional conception, and the subsequent occasional judginent, which is a function of Self-consciousness), it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the (two sets of] functions belong; (and this is suficient,] because it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a fiction of the cause;" [nothing, according to the Súnkhya, being in any तथा चायं प्रयोगः । अहंकारद्रव्यं निश्चयवृ- तिमव्योपादानकं निश्चयकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् । यन्त्र तन्नैवं यथा पुरुषादिरिति ॥ 'अचायं तर्को बोध्यः । सर्वोऽपि लोकः पदा- र्थमादा स्वरूपतो निश्चित्य पश्चादभिमन्यतेऽयमहं ·BOOK I., APH. 65. 79 Nature. product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in the cause of that product]. ततः प्रकृतेः ॥६५॥ Aph. 65. [The knowledge of the exis- And thence that of tence) of Nature is [by inference,] from that [' Intellect,' S 61]. a. By inference from the existence of that,' viz., the principle [of Intellect, termed), the Great one,' which is & product, there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as [its] cause. b. The application [of the process of inference to the case is as follows: (1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness : (2) Because, whilst it is a procluct [and must, therefore, have arisen from something consisting of that which itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness ; [and]] मयेदं कर्तव्यमित्यादिरूपेणेति तावसिद्धमेव । त- चाहंकारद्रव्यकारणाकावायां वृत्त्योः कार्यकारण- भावेन तदाश्रययोरेव कार्यकारणभावो लाघवा- कल्यते कारणस्य वृत्तिलाभेन कार्यवृत्तिलाभस्या- सर्गिकत्वादिति ॥ 'ततो महत्तत्वात्कार्याकारणतया प्रकृतेरनु- मानेन बोधः ॥

·80 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. 1 (3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c. c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, or) partakes of the quality of Goodness;" the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the quality of Foulness ;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of Darkness.?? d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is the principle], that it is titting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the cause." e Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of ] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been men- 3 1 2 अयं प्रयोगः। सुखदुःखमोहधर्मिणी बुद्धिः सुखदुःखमोहधर्मकद्रव्यजन्या कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुः- खमोहात्मकत्वात्कान्तादिवदिति ॥ कान्ता हि भर्तुः सुखदेति सात्त्विकी। अवि- नया दुःखदेति राजसी । विरहिणी मोहदेति तामसी भवति॥ 'कारणानुसारेणैव कार्यगुणाचित्यं चापानुकू- लस्तर्कः॥

·BOOK I., APH. 66. 81 tioned," [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products] : संहत परार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ॥ ६६ ॥ Aph. 66. [The existence] of Soul [is The argument for the inferred] from the fact that the comexistence of Soul. bination of the principles of Nature into their various effects is for the sake of another than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products]. Combination,' i. e., conjunction, which is the cause (of all products; these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, as Nature,' Mind, and so on (unlike Soul, which is not mnade up of parts], is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that Soul exists : such is the reinainder,' required to complete the aphorism]. 6. But the application of the argument, in this particular case, is as follows]: (1) The thing in question, viz , Nature the 'Great one,' with the rest of the aggregate of the unintelligent), har, as its fruit (or end), the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself : 6 1 अथ यथोक्तकार्यकारणभावशून्यस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारान्तरेणानुमानमाह ॥ : Here indicated by the adjective aryaktu, 'the indiscrete.' Seo Apb. 136 of this Book. Ed. 3 संहतः कारणीभूतसंयोगः। तद्दतोऽव्यक्तम- हदादेः परार्थत्वाद्धेतोः पुरुषस्य बोध इति शेषः ॥ 'G ·52 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. (2) Because it is a combination [or compages]; (3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service]." c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the eternityof Nature (prakriti): मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् ॥ ६७ ॥ Argument for the eter- Aple. 67. Since the root has no root, nuty of Nuture. the root (of all] is rootless. a. Since the root' (múla), i.e., the cause of the twentythree principles, which, with Soul and the root itself, make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya, has no root,' i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhúna), is 'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other cause of Nature; because there would be 1 प्रयोगस्तु विवादास्पदं प्रकृतिमहदादिकं स्वेत- रस्य भोगापवर्गफलकं संहतत्वाच्छय्यासनादिव- दिति॥ इदानों सर्वकारणत्वोपपतये प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वमु- पपादयति ॥ 2 3 This seems to mean: There being no root to a root, the root for radical principle, in the Sankhya,] is rootless.' In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange reading : मूलं मूलाभावादमूलं मूलानाम् । 'The 100t. of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like saying thut A=A. Ed.

·BOOK 1., APH. 68. 83 a regressus in infinitum,' [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause ; and so on without end]. 6. IIe states the argument (just mentioned] in regard to this, [as follows] :- पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम् ॥ ६ ॥ 1 मूले त्रयोविंशतितत्वानां कारणे मूलाभा- वात्कारणभावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशून्यम् । अनवस्थापत्त्या प्रधानस्य न कारणान्तरमस्ती- त्यर्थः॥ The source of the preceding exposition I have not ascertained. vjnhna has : चयोविंशतितत्वानां मूलमुपादानं प्र- धानं मूलशून्यमनवस्थापत्त्या तत्र मूलान्तरा- संभवादित्यर्थः । Nagest : मूलं सर्वेषामुपादानं प्र- धानं मूलशून्यमनवस्थापत्त्या मूलभूते तत्र मूला- न्तरासंभवादित्यर्थः । Aniruddlia: मूलप्रकृतेर्मूलाभा- वात्कारणभावादमूलं यत्कारणं तन्मूलम् । सा प्रकृतिः। Vedānti Mahadeva : बयोविंशतितत्वानां मूले प्रधानेऽनवस्थापत्त्या कारणाभावादकारणं प्रधानमित्यर्थः । त. अब युक्तिमाह ॥ 2 ·84 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. Aph. 68. Even if there be a succes- The employment of the sion, there is a halt at some one point ; tem Primal Agency, or Mature, is merely to de and so it is merely a name [that we bon le regresus in unfi- give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things, under the the name of Nature']. a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if there were a succession of causes,--another cause of Nature, and another (cause] of that one, again,-there must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Ayency (pra-kriti); for this [word prakriti, usually and colveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing moro than a sign to deuote the cause which is the root : such is the meaning.' b. But then [some Vedanti may object, according to tl.is view of matters), the position that there are just twentyfive realities is not made out; for, in addition to the Indiscrete' (or primal Nature], which according to you, is the cause of Mind,' another unintelligent principle, naned Ignorance' [see Textinla-stura, 21], presents . प्रकृतेरन्यत्कारणं तस्यायन्यदिति कारण- पारम्पर्येऽप्यनवस्थादोषादन्ततोऽकारण एकत्रैक- स्मिन्यत्रकुत्रचिन्नित्ये परिनिष्ठा पर्यवसानं भवि- ष्यतीति । अतो यत्र पर्यवसानं सैव प्रकृतिरिति हि मूलकारणस्य संज्ञामावमित्यर्थः ॥ ? Read in connexion with.' Ed. 3 Literally, instead of Mind,''the principle [termed] the Great one.' Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 69. 85 itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares as follows] : समानः प्रकृतेईयोः ॥ ६९॥ Nature and Soul alike uncreuted. Aph. 69. Alike, in respect of Nature, and of both (Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].” a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent (Naturel, the cause which is the root [of all products), the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sankhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedánti]. This may be thus stated : As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts as this, viz. : This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit.' IIence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted, in respect of one of these (and not the literal production of both ; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production (such as that metaphorical one here spoken of,] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned; for there is mention 1 ननु पञ्चविंशतितत्वानीति नोपपद्यते मह- तत्वकारणाव्यक्तापेक्षयाविद्याख्यजडतत्त्वान्तराप- तेरित्याशङ्काह ॥ * This is Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a remark of Vijnána, quoted and translated below, in 6. The rendering now replaced runs: ·Alike [is the opinion) of both [of us], in respect of Nature.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to a., viz.: * He meets a Vodántic objection.' Ed.

·86 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of the Kaurma (Purúna], beginning, 'Of action {or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and so on. And, as there is no mention, in Seripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism of the Yoga, to be (not a separate entity, but] 'an affection of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities, in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled Ignorance]. 6. Or according to another, and more probable, inter- 1 प्रकृतेर्मूलकारणविचारे योर्वादिप्रतिवादि- नोरावयोः समानः पक्षः। एतदुक्तं भवति यथा प्रकृतेरुत्पत्तिः श्रूयत एवमविद्याया अपि। अवि- या पञ्चपवैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मन इत्यादिवा- क्यैः। अत एकस्या अवश्यं गौण्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या तत्र च प्रकृतेरेव पुरुषसंयोगादिभिरभिव्यक्तिरूपा गौण्युत्पत्तियुक्ता। संयोगलक्षणोत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्मज्ञानयोरिति कौर्मवाक्ये प्रकृतिपुरुषयो!- णोत्पतिस्मरणात् । अविद्यायाश्च कापि गौणो- त्पत्त्यश्रवणातस्या अनादिता। अविद्या च मि- थ्याज्ञानरूपा बुद्धिधर्म इति योगे सूचितम् । अतो न तत्त्वाधिक्यम् ॥

·BOOK I., APH. 70. 87 pretation of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning. c. But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of arriving, by inference, at ſa knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, in the shape of discrimination [hetween Soul and Nature), does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to this point, he states (as follows]:" अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ ७० ॥ All do not profit by Aph. 70. There is no rule (or necesit is only the best hind sity, that all should arrive at the truth]; the suriny truth; because of people that are fully because those who are privileged (to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions. a. For those privileged [to engage in the inquiry) are of three descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, aro dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sánkhya) arguments are frustrated (and altogether set aside), by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse (of what these people employ them to prove), or by amenable to reason. 1 279 91 Fa: uafaysaat: FATA DE न्याय इत्यर्थः॥ ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाद्यनुमानप्रकारसम्वे सर्वेषां विवेकमननं कुतो न जायते। तबाह ॥ 2 ·88 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. 1 arguments which are not true: (see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha). But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set forth (in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Naturej: such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth : such is the literal meaning. b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness';? (the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements' (see $61)] : महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्य तन्मनः ॥ ७१ ॥ meunt Mind. , Aph. 71. The first product [of the By the Great one' is Primal Agent, Nature], which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind. Mind' (munas). Mind ' [is so called], because its function is 'thinking' (manann). By thinking' is here meant judging' (nischayn). That of which this is the funca. 1 मनने हि मन्दमध्यमोनमभेदेन विविधा अ- धिकारिणः । तत्र मन्दैबौद्धायुक्तकुतकैरनुमानानि बाध्यन्ते। मध्यमविरुद्धासल्लिङ्गैः सत्प्रतिपक्षि- तानि क्रियन्ते । उत्तमाधिकारिणामेव तूक्तरीत्या मननमिति भावः । सर्वेषामेव तूक्तरीत्या मनन- नियमो नेत्यक्षरार्थः ॥ महदहंकारयोः स्वरूपमाह सूत्राभ्याम् ॥ 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 72. 89 tion is ' intellect' (buddhi); and that is the first product, that called the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning.' चरमोऽहंकारः ॥ ७२॥ The relation of Self- Consciousness to Mind. . " 1ph. 72. 'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.] a. "Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I exist,''I do this, that, and the other thing '], is that which is subsequent: that is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after the Great one [571]. b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit (which brings out the Ego, in every case of cog. nition, the matter of which cognition would, else, have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature, the formless Objective], it therefore follows that the others (among the phenomena of mundane existence,] are effects of this [Self-consciousness]; and so he declares [as follows] :' 1 2 मन इति। मननवृत्तिकं मनः । मननमत्र निश्चयः। तदृत्तिका बुद्धिः। तन्महदाख्यमाचं कार्यमित्यर्थः॥ अहंकारोऽभिमानवृत्तिकः पदार्थश्चरमो मह- तोऽनन्तरोऽहंकार इत्यर्थः । ' यतोऽभिमानवृत्तिकोऽहंकारोऽतस्तत्कार्यत्वमु- तरेषामुपपत्रमित्याह ॥

·90 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ ७३॥ Cinsciousness .. Aph. 73. To the others it belongs All prarticts, sare Afnd, result fiom Self to be products thereof, [i.e., of Selfconsciousness]. a. To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Selfconsciousness : that is to say, the fuct of being products thereof belongs to the others," the eleven 'Organs' indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements. b. But then, if it be thus (some one may say), you relinquish your dogma, that Nature is the cause of the wholo world. Therefore he declares [as follows] :- आहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्येऽयणुवत् ॥ ७४ ॥ ! Instead of उत्तरेषां, which seerus to be peculiar to Vijnana, Aniruddha and others have the preferable lection YRITT. Ed. * To render अन्येषां. Paragraph a is taken, with slight alterations at the beginning and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed. 'तत्कार्यवमहंकारकार्यवमन्येषामेकादशेन्द्रिया- णां पञ्च तन्मात्राणां पारम्पर्येण तन्माचकार्याणा- मपि भूतानां तत्कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः ॥ 'ननु यद्येवं तर्हि प्रधानं सर्वजगत्कारणमिति सिद्धान्तहानिरत आह॥

·BOOK I., APH. 75. 91 Aph. 74. Moreover, mediately, Nature, immediately through that [i.e., the Great one' mediately, the custos (71)], the first (cause, viz., Nature,] all other products. is the cause [of all priorlucts]; as is the ease with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.]. a. Moreover, mediately,' i.c., moreover, not in the character of the immediate cause, the first,' i.e., Nature, is the cause of 'Self-consciousness’and the rest, [mediately,] through the Great one’and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiseshikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,] through combinations of two atoms, and so on : such is the meaning.' b. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing ? In regard to this, he declares [ as follows] :' पूर्वभावित्वे हयारेकतरस्य हानेऽन्यतरयोगः ॥७॥ 1 2 पारम्पर्येऽपि साक्षादहेतुत्वेऽयायायाः प्रकृ- तेर्हेतुताहंकारादिषु महदादिद्वारास्ति यथा वैशेषि- कमतेऽणूनां घटादिहेतुता झणुकादिवारैवेत्यर्थः ॥ ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषयोईयोरपि नित्यत्वात्सृष्ट्यादा कस्य कारणत्वमित्यत आह ॥ पूर्वभाविवे वयोरेकतरहानेनान्यतरयोगः । ruddha's explanation here follows: 7 TAHTARATE कारणत्वं किं वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां योर्मध्य एकस्य Slightly better, perhaps, than this reading is that of Aniruddha : Ani.

·92 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. sole cause. Aph. 75. While both [Soul and Na- Why Nature is the ture] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul,] is devoid [of this character of being u cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature]. a. That is to say: 'while both,' viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent to every product, still, since the one,' viz., Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a jar), must be 'devoid,' or lack the nature of a cause, it is applicable,' i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two.' b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this, he says:' परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ ७६ ॥ पुरुषस्य कारणत्वयोग्यताहानिरविकारित्वश्रुतेः । अतोऽन्यतरस्य प्रधानस्य कारणवयोगः। 4. इयोरेव पुंप्रकृत्योरखिलकार्यपूर्वभाविवेऽये- कतरस्य पुरुषस्यापरिणमित्वेन हाने कारणता- हान्यामन्यतरस्य योगः कारणतासंभव इत्यर्थः ॥ 'नवविवादात्परमाणूनामेव कारणत्वमस्ति- त्यत आह॥ s Aniruddha has, according to both my Mss., परिच्छिन्न- त्वान्न. Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 77. 93 2 Aph. 76. What is limited cannot be Why the theory of a plastic Nature is prefer. the substance of all [things]. able tu thut of Atoms. a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]; as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested,] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning: b. He alleges Scripture in support of this :- तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च ॥ ७७ ॥ Aph. 77. And [the proposition that Scripture declures in Nature is the cause of all is proved] favour of the theury. from the text of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature]. a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in $ 76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, 'From Nature the world arises,' &c.3 1 । यत्परिच्छिन्नं न तत्सर्वोपादानं यथा न तन्तु- र्घटस्य कारणम् । तस्मात्पदार्थानां पृथक्पृथक्कारणं वक्तव्यमेककारणत्वे च लाघवम् । तस्मात्प्रधा- नस्यैव कारणत्वमित्यर्थः॥ अब श्रुतिं दर्शयति ॥ युक्तिस्तावत्प्रोक्ता । श्रुतिरपि प्रधानस्य जग- कारणतामाह प्रधानाज्जगज्जायत इति ॥ 2 3 ·94 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. b. But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause (of each product]; since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause ; the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies :- , 1 नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ ७॥ Aph. 78. A thing is not made out Ex nihilo nihil fit. of nothing. a. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be unreal : such is the meaning b. Let the world, too, be unreal : what harm is that to us ? [If any ask this, he, therefore, declares [as follows] :: .. 2 अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच नावस्तुत्वम् ॥ ७९ ॥ 1 ननु प्रागसतो घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते । नियत- पूर्वभावित्वात्प्रागभावः कारणमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥ 'अवस्तुनोऽभावावस्तुसिधिभावोत्पत्तिर्न संभ- वतीत्यर्थः । यद्यभावागावोत्पतिस्तहि कारणरूपं कार्ये दृश्यत इति जगतोऽयवस्तुत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः ॥ भवतु जगदप्यवस्तु का नो हानिरित्यत आह॥

·BOOK I., APH. 79. 95 real. Aph.79. It [the world] is not unreal; Reasons why the world because there is no fact contradictory is not to be supposed un- [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes, [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed). a. When there is the notion, in regard to u shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the subsequent and more correct] cognition, that this is not silver. But, in the case in question that of the world regarded as a reality], no one ever has the cognition, ' This world is not in the shape of an entity,' by which [cognition, if any one ever really had such,] its being an entity might be opposed.' 6. And it is held that that is false which is the result of a deprared cause ; e.g., some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, throngh such a fault as the jaundice, (which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question, (that of the world regarded as a reality], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses] ; because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality. Therefore the world is not an unreality.” 'शुक्तौ रजतमिति ज्ञाने नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञा- नाद्रजतबाधः । न चात्र नेदं भावरूपं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन भावरूपबाधः स्यात् ॥ 'दुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च मिथ्येत्यवगम्यते यथा का- मलादिदोषात्पीतशङ्खज्ञानं कस्यचित् । अब च जगज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वेषां सर्वदा सत्त्वान्न दोषोऽस्ति । तस्मानावस्तु जगदिति ॥

·96 TIIR SANKHYA APHORISMS. c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the (substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not [necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares [as follows] : भावे तयोगेन तसिद्धिरभावे तदभावात्कुतस्तरां तसिद्धिः॥१०॥ Aph. 80. If it [the substantial cause,] The product of some be an entity, then this would be the thing is somethin! ; und that of nothing, nothin). case, [that the product would be an entits, trom its union [or identity] therewith ; [but if [the cause bee] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case (that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity ? a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world), then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product, this would be the casc,' i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, ' because of union therewith,' i.c., because of the union of the produet] with the reality [which is its substratum]. [But, since, [by parity of reasoning], if u monentity [were' the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world's being [on that supposition, necessarily u nonentity. [like its supposed cause], how could this be the cuse, [that it would be reul] ? . 1 नन्वभावः कारणमस्तु तथाप्यभावत्वं न जग- तो भविष्यतीति । तबाह ॥ नव उपादान कारणे कारणगुणाः कार्य इति 2.

·BOOK I., APH. 81. 97 b. But then [a follower of the Miminsā may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let worlcs alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies : न कर्मण उपादानायोगात् ॥ १ ॥ Action cannot serieus (a substratum. Aph. 81. No; for works are not adapted to be the substantial cause (of any product]. a. Granting that the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause, [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never sce merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause (of any product] : and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. — Nature' is to be accepted ; because Liberation arises (see $ 56,' and $ 83,] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul. . तयोगेन भावयोगेन तसिद्धिः कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वसि- शिः। अभावे जगतोऽभावत्वे तदभावाज्जगदभा- वस्यावश्यंभाषात्कुतस्तत्सिद्धिरिति ॥ नन्वभावस्याभावरूपत्वात्कर्मव जगत्कारण- मस्तु । किं प्रधानकल्पनयेत्यत आह ॥ उपादानत्वायोगात् is the lection accepted by Vij. 1 2 nána, and by him only. Ed. 3 It is the bracketed Aph. 56, at p. 58, supra, that is here referred to. Ed. 'निमितं कारणमदृष्टमस्तु धर्माधर्मयोस्तूपा- H ·08 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. b. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for (our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies :- नानुश्रविकादपि तसिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगा- दपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ १२॥ vklnces. Aph. 82. The accomplishment there- Sulton is not to be of [i.c., of Liberation,] is not, more- Witained by ritwal obser. over, through Scriptural rites : the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, (and is, therefore, a product, and not ctormall, there is still left impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births. a. 'Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, Care so called], because they are heard from the inouth of the instructor in Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.c., the accomplishment of Liberation; ' because one is liable to repetition of births, by reuson of the fact that it (the supposed Liberation,) was accomplished by mans,' i.e., because the [thus fur] liberated दानकारणत्वं न क्वचिदृष्टं कल्पना हि दृष्टानुसा- रेणैव भवति। प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शनान्मुक्ति- रिति प्रकृतिस्वीकारः ॥ ननु वेदोक्तार्थानुष्टानादेव मुक्तिसंभवाति प्रकत्येत्यत आह ॥ 1 ·BOOK I., APH. 83. 99 [soul] is still liable to repetition of births, inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal, [just] because it is [the result of] acts. For this reason, the chief end of man does not consist in this,” (which is gained through ritual observances]. b. lle shows what does constitute the chief end of man :" तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ३ ॥ Aph. S3. There is Scripture for it, In regard to the altainment of the chut one of that he who has attained to discriminamin, the Scripture concurs with the Sankhya tion, in regard to these [i.c., Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births. a. 'In regard to these,' i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no repetition of births; the text, viz., 'lle does not return again,'' &c." ८ - Literally, ' liable to return to mundane existence.' El. 2 वेदादनुश्रूयत इत्यानुश्रविको यज्ञादिः। त- स्मादपि न तत्सिद्धिर्मोक्षसिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृति- योगाकर्मवेनानित्यत्वान्मुक्तस्य पुनः संसारा. नियोगः। तस्मादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ पुरुषार्थत्वं दर्शयति ॥ 3 4 Compare the Chhindugya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed. 5 तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः प्राप्तविवेकस्य विवेक - ज्ञानादनावृत्तिश्रुतिः। न स पुनरावर्तत इति श्रुतिः ॥

·100 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. b. He states an objection to the opposite view : दुःखाहुःखं जलाभिषेकवन जाड्यविमोकः ॥ ४ ॥ puin, not to liberutron from it. Aph. 84. From pain [occasioned, e.g., Pain can lead only to to victims in sacrifice,] must come pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain); as there is not relief from chilliness, by affusion of water. a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, (such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause,] would include a variety of pains; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end : for, to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness.: b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice] ; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, 'By means of acts (of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,' &c. To this he replies :* 1 2 विपक्षे दोषमाह ॥ यदि कर्मसाध्यो मोक्षो भवेत्कर्मणो दुःखबहु- लत्वान्मोक्षोऽपि दुःखबहुलः स्यादन्ततः क्षयित्वे- नापि दुःखं स्यानहि जाड्यातस्य जाड्यविमोको जलाभिषेकात्प्रत्युत जाडयमेवेति ॥ 'ननु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमप्रयोजकं किंतु का.

·BOOK I., APH. 85. 101 काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि' साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ ५ ॥ Aph. 85. [Liberation cannot arise The character of the from acts]; because, whether the end end contemplated makes no difference in regard be something desirable, or undesirable, to the tranetorinese - ese [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but transitory]. a. Grant that pain is not what is intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire, (on the part of the virtuous sacrificer), still, though there is a difference [as you contend,] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by acts, (which, I repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain; for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works, must be perishable, because it is a production. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has reference to knowledge, (which, I grant, may be gained by such means); and Liberation comes through knowledge; 80 that these (works] are instruments of Liberation RIPARATERI G: 1 791 a ofa: FAIT ऽमृतत्वमानशुरिति । तबाह ॥ The reading of Aniruddha, according to my MSS., is an- म्याकामेऽपि. Ed.

·102 THE SÁNKHYA APRORISMS. meiliately:1 [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause]. b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend,] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means), mundane life may return, we are both on an equality, [oce, whose Liberation you Sankhyas look upon as transitory, and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies : 2 निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रे परं न समानत्वम्॥६॥ 1 मा भूनिष्कामकर्मसाध्यं दुःखं तथापि काम्या- निष्कामकर्मविशेषेऽपि मोक्षस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमवि- शिष्टं साध्यत्वात्क्षयित्वेन पुनरपि दुःखं स्यात् । निष्कामकर्मणो मोक्षसाधनत्वश्रुतिः ज्ञानार्थ ज्ञा- नाच मोक्ष इति पारम्पर्येण मोक्षसाधनत्वम् ॥ यदि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानान्मोक्षो भवेन- थापि क्षयित्वात्पुनरपि संसार इत्यावयोस्तुल्यत्व- 2 मित्यत आह ॥ 3 Dr. Ballantyne, on republishing the Sankhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, adopted the genuine reading, JRZAATE, instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Serampore edition of the Sankhya-pravachana-bhāshya, but in no MS. He ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation, ·BOOK I., APH. 86. 103 Aph. 86, Of him who is essentially The right means effect liberated, his bonds having absolutely Liberation once for ull. perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge,] is absolute: there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth]. a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond (see $ 56,'] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination : and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute ? Thus there is no (such] similarity," [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under 85.6.]. b. It has been asserted (in $ 61,] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]; and, since these cannot be ascertained (or made out to be true], except by which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all extinction of bondago is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most eligible. Ed. | This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed. 2 निजमुक्तस्य स्वभावमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसः। बन्धो विवेकः। तविरोधेनाविवकध्वंसो नाशः। अविवे- कनाशस्य च प्रध्वंसत्वात्कुतः संसारस्य पुनरावर्त- नमिति न समत्वम् ॥

·104 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. proof, therefore he displays this ;' [i.e., he shows what he means by proof] : दयोरेकतरस्य वायसंनिकृष्टार्थपरिच्छितिः प्रमा। तत्साधकतमं यत्तत् ॥७॥ dence. Aph. 87. The determination of some- What is mount by evithing not (previously, lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is ‘right notion' (pramá). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i. e., of any given 'right notion'], is that ; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramána)]. a. 'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in one rightly cognizing' (prumutņi); in short, not previously known. The determination,' i.e., the ascertainment [or right apprehension) of such a thing, or reality, is right notion'; and, whether this be an affection of both,' i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul (as some hold that it is), or of only one or other of the two, [as others hold, either way, 'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is (what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramána): such is the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several species falling to be considered hereafter]: such is the meaning. ' पञ्चविंशतिर्गण इत्युक्तं तसिद्धिश्च न प्रमा- णेन विनेति तदर्शयति ॥ ! Nagesa has वासं०. Ed. * Some MSS. have the inferior reading -ATYS. Ed. असंनिकृष्टः प्रमातर्यनारूढोऽनधिगत इति 4 ·BOOK I., APH. 87. 105 . . b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,] the expressions ' not previously known' (which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and ' discrimination,'1 [which excludes doubt]. c. In regard to this topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge), if right notion,' is spoken of as located in the Soul (seo $ 87. a.], then the (proof, or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the right notion' is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection (of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof, or evidence, or whatever we may choose to call that from which ' right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul's cognition and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as (cases of] 'right notion,' then both of these aforesaid (the affection of the Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other ८ यावत् । एवंभूतस्यार्थस्य वस्तुनः परिछितिरव- धारणं प्रमा सा च वयोर्बुद्धिपुरुषयोरेव धर्मो भवतु किं वैकतरमावस्योभयथैव तस्याः प्रमाया यसाधकतमं तत्पमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्ष- णमित्यर्थः॥ 'स्मृतिभ्रमसंशयव्युदासाय क्रमेणानधिगत इति वस्तुन इत्यवधारणमिति ॥

·106 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS, case,) are (to receive the name of] proof (pramána).. You are to understand, that, when the organ of vi: &c., are spoken of as 'evidence, it is only as being mediately' [the sources of right knowledge]. d. How many [kinds of ] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies : त्रिविधं प्रमाणं तसिद्धी सर्वसिद्धेनाधिक्यसि- विः ॥ ८॥ Aph. 88. Proof is of thrco kinds : There are three kini's there is no establishment of more; of evidence. because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs]. a. 'Proof is of thrce kinds ;' that is to say, 'perception 1 अब यदि प्रमारूपं फल्नं पुरुषनिष्ठमुच्यते तदा बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणम् । यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठं वृतिरूपं तदा तदेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षादिरेव । यदि तु पौरुषेयबोधो बुद्धिवृत्तिश्चाभयमपि प्रमेत्युच्यते तदोक्तमुभयमेव प्रमाणं भवति। चक्षुरादिषु प्रमा- णव्यवहारः परंपरयैवेति बोध्यम् ॥ 'कति प्रमाणानीत्यत आह ॥ 3 So reads Aniruddha ; but Vijnána, Nágesa, and Vedánti Mahadeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. Hence : 'That which is, in the highest degree, productive thereof is proof, of three kinds.' Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 88. 107 (pratyaksha), 'the recognition of signs' (anumána), and ' testimony' (sabda), are the (three kinds ot] proofs.? 6. But then [some one may incline to say], let.comparison' (which is reckoned, in the Nyáya, a specifically distinct source of knowledge), and the others (such as *Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in the Mimálisá], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as well as these three], in [the matter of j tho discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, 'because, if these (three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof established, cverything that is really true) can be established [by means of them], there is no establishment of more ;' no addition to the proofs can be fuirly made out; because of the cumbrousness (that sins against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case] : such is the meaning. c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only a triad of proofs, where he says see the Institutes, Ch. xii., v. 105]: By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes (of legal institute, 1 चिविधं प्रमाणमिति प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीत्यर्थः ॥ 'ननूपमानाद्यपि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकप्रमाणमferafa i 297 VIE afhaifafa , fafaun- माणसिद्धौ च सर्वस्यार्थस्य सिद्धेनाधिक्यसिद्धिन प्रमाणाधिक्यं सिद्यति गौरवादित्यर्थः ॥

·108 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. . &c.].' And - Comparison,' and ' Tradition' (aitihya), and the like, are included under Inference and Testimony; and Non-perception' (anupalubdhi) and the like are included under Perception ;' [for the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it]. d. IIe [next] states the definitions of the varieties? [of proof, having already (587) given the general definition] : 'यसंबद्ध सतदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत्प्रत्य- क्षम् ॥९॥ dph. 89. Perception (pratyaksha.) is Perception defined. that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof. (a. 'Being in conjunction,' [literally, existing in con- 1 अत एव मनुनापि प्रमाणच यमेवोपन्यस्तम् । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् । वयं सुविदितं कार्य धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सतेति। उपमानै- तिह्यादीनां चानुमानशब्दयोः प्रवेशोऽनुपलब्ध्या- दीनां च प्रत्यक्षे प्रवेश इति ॥ विशेषलक्षणमाह ॥ 3 Aniruddha has यासंबन्धसिद्धं तदा०, yielding 'deter. mined by,' &c., instead of being in,' &c. Ed. • Vedanti Mahadera has यत्संबन्धं (?). Ed. 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 90. 109 . junction;' 'portrays the form thereof,' i.e., assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction (as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured] ; what discernment,' or affection of the Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., $5 and $8. b.)] is the evilence [called] Perception : such is the meaning b. But then, (some one may say,] this [definition of Perception ($ 89)] does not extend (as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception); because there is, here, no form of the thing, in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it, while absent] : having. pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define :: योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ ९० ॥ 1 संबद्धं सत्संबद्धं भवतदाकारोल्लेखि संबद्धव- स्त्वाकारधारि भवति यविज्ञानं बुद्धिवृत्तिस्त- प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु योगिनामतीतानागतव्यवहितवस्तुप्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिः संबद्धवस्त्वाकाराभावादित्याशङ्क तस्या- लक्ष्यत्वेन समाधते॥ 2 ·110 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. Aph. 90. It is not a fault [in the bp blamed, though it definition, that it does not apply to the should work to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga]; perceptions of the mystre'. because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception. a. That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined ; and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the ecternal organs of sense). Therefore there is no fault fin our definition] ; i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these ;' [because there is no intention to include them). 11. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification [of the definition in question]: लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसंबन्धादादोषः ॥ ९१ ॥ Aph. 91. Or, there is no fault But the definition (in the definition], because of the does amply to the perceptruns of the mystic. conjunction, with cunsal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation." 1 2 ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षमेवाच लक्ष्यं योगिनश्चाबा- ह्यप्रत्यक्षकाः। अतो न दोषो न तत्प्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्ति- रित्यर्थः॥ वास्तवं समाधानमाह ॥ 3 Thus Vijnānu and Vedinti Mahādeva. Aniruddha has -सं- बन्धान्न दोषः. The reading of Nageia is -संबन्धादा न दोषः. Ed. • For the term atisaya, again rendered, in the next page, by 'exaltation, vide infra, p. 116, note 4. Ed.

·BOOK I., APIL. 91. 111 a. Or, be it so that the perception of the Yogi, also, shall be the thing to be defined ; still there is no fault (in our definition, $ 89] ; it does not fail to extend [to this, also]; since the mind of the Yogh, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things (as existent) in their causes, (whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses]. b. IIere the word rendered 'causal' (linu) denotes the things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in $8:). b.] ; for re, who assert that effects exist (from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant,] is possible.? c. But then, (some one may say, Objection, that the de finitun does not apply to still this [definition] does not extend to the perceptions of the the Lord's perceptions; because, since 'Loid.' these are from everlasting, they can. 1 अथ वास्तु योगिप्रत्यक्षमपि लक्ष्यं तथापि न दोषो नाव्याप्तिर्यतो लीनवस्तुषु लब्धयोगजधर्मज- न्यातिशयस्य योगिचित्तस्य संबन्धो घटते ॥ अब लीनशब्दः पराभिप्रेतासंनिकृष्टवाची स- कार्यवादिनां यतीतादिकमपि स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति तत्संबन्धः संभवेदिति ॥ 2 ·112 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. not result from [emergent] conjunction. To this he replies : ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥ ९२॥ That any Aph. 92. [This objection to the de- • Loril' finition of Perception has no force] ; exists is not proved. because it is not proved that there is a Lord (iswara). a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception), because there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied ? (from $90] b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord’is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of (certain] partisans (who hold an opinion not recognized by the majority). Therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord,' but not the expression, because there is no Lord.'* ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिस्तस्य नित्यत्वे- नासंनिकर्षजन्यत्वात् । तबाह ॥ ईश्वरे प्रमाणाभावाददोष इत्यनुवर्तते ॥ 2 8 Rather, And this (mere] taking exception to a Lord is ex. pressly owing to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude which he assumed is that of suspense of judgment on the point of theisın, as against the positiveness of the professed atheist. Vijnána, here followed, then goes on to say : अन्यथा हीश्वराभावादित्ये- atama I · For, otherwise [i. e., if the aphorist had been atheistie), it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the non-existence of a Lord.' Ed. अयं चेश्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्रौढवादेनैवे- 4 ·BOOK I., APH. 93. 113 c. But, on the implication that there is a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception,(589),] is merely the being of the (sume) kind with what is produced by conjunction' [of a sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the Lord' may be of the sarne kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come froin the same source]. dl. llaviny pondered the doubt, How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, (which declare his existence]?' he states a dileinma which excludes [this]:" मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तसिद्धिः॥ ९३ ॥ Aph. 93. [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the 'Lord,'] exists; proof that there is any because (whoever exists must be either free or bound ; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other. a. The Lord' whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles, &c. ? Or is he in bondage through these? Adilemmar, to circlude Lord.' 1 Rather, 'the view being accepted' (abhyupagame). 2 ति । अत एवेश्वरासिद्धरित्युक्तं न चीश्वराभावा- दिति बोध्यम् ॥ ईश्वराभ्युपगमे तु संनिकर्षजन्यजातीयत्वमेव विवक्षितम् ॥ 'श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां कथमी न सिध्येदित्याशङ्क तर्कविरोधं बाधकमाह ॥

·114 TIIE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 1 . Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord :' such is the meaning. b., He explains this very point :: उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ ९४ ॥ The force of the Aph. 94. [Becuuse,] either way, he dilominu, would be inefficient. a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which (as compulsory motives,] would instigate him to create; and, if he were bound, he would be under delusion; he must be fon either alternative, unequal to the creation, &c. [of this world]. b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord?' 'To this he replics: 1 ईश्वरोऽभिमतः किं क्लेशादिभिर्मुक्तो वा तैर्बो वा। अन्यतरस्याप्यभावादसंभवानेश्वरसिद्धिरि- 2 त्यर्थः॥ तदेवाह ॥ 3 The reading, in a later handwriting, of one of my MSS. of Aniruddha is Ed. 4 मुक्तावे सृष्टिप्रयोजकरागाद्यभावाबद्धत्वे च मू- ढत्वान्न सृष्ट्यादिक्षमत्वमित्यर्थः ॥ नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां का गतिः । 5 तचाह॥

·BOOK I., APH. 95. 115 मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा' उपासा सिद्धस्य वा ॥ ९५ ॥ Aph. 95. [The Scriptural texts which The import of the teats make mention of the Lord' are] which speuk of the Lord.' either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized' [deities of the Hindu pantheon].' a. That is to say: accordingly as the case may be, some text (among those in which the term 'Lord’occurs,] is intended, in the shape of a glorification (of Soul], as the Lord,' [us Soul is held to be], merely in virtue of junction [with Nature], to incite [to still deeper contemplation], to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul, 1. C., absolute Soul in general; and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by resolution [to create, is intended] to extol [anrl to purify the mind of the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known' Brahmá, 2 Another reading, that of Nágest and of l'edánti Mahadeva, ATTATOTO, makes this word of the singular number. Bl. उपामासिद्धस्य, a compound, is the reading ot' Anirudiha, followed by Vedanti Mahadeva. See 1, lwelow. El. 3 In both places, siddha, possessor of supernatural power's' Ed. 4 Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows TT- । गाद्यभावान्मुक्तात्मन इव मुक्तात्मनो न तु मु- तस्य तस्य संकल्पकर्तृत्वाद्यभावात्। तत्प्रशंसा वि- धिवाक्योतम्भनाय। उपासासिहस्य। उपासनया लब्यातिशयस्य योगिनोऽणिमादिसिद्धस्य प्रशंसा- ·116 THE SANKHYA APHORISIS. Vishnu, Siva, or other non-eternal - Lord ;' since these, though possessed of the conceit (of individuality], &c., [and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a secondary sense;" [seeing that the Soul, in crmry combinattion, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so]. b. But then, [some one may sav], even if it were thus [as alleged under $95), what is heard in Scripture, (viz.), the fact that it (viz., Soul) is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case; for, in the world, wo speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that sound so shull take place, &c. To this he replies: TIATEHarafa i According to this, the term iswara, * mighty one,' *loril,' is applied, by way of enlogy, either to a soul as it were liberatel, or to it person who, through devotion, has acqmred transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yuji. Resolution, agent. ship, and the like, ali impracicable of one absolutely liberated ; and such a one, being inert und mpassive, cannot be intended by íswara, it power.' Thence the pression,', it were liberated. Also sce, for uthayu,-tran-lated, above, transcendent faculties,'--Book IV., Bil. Aph. 21. 1 यथायोगं काचिच्छृतिर्मुक्तात्मनः केवलात्म- सामान्यस्य ज्ञेयताविधानाय संनिधिमात्रैश्वर्येण स्तुतिरूपा प्ररोचनार्थी काचिच्च संकल्पपूर्वकस्रष्ट वादिप्रतिपादिका श्रुतिः सिद्धस्य ब्रह्मविष्णुहरा- देरेवानित्येश्वरस्याभिमानादिमतोऽपि गौणनित्य- त्वादिमत्वान्नित्यत्वायुपासापरेत्यर्थः ॥ ननु तथापि प्रकृत्यायधिष्ठातृत्वं श्रूयमाणं नो- 2 ·BOOK I., APH. 96. 117 तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ ९६ ॥ Aph. 96. The governorship (thereof, Soul, like the lortei.c., of Soul over Nature] is from [its] stone, (u'ls not by resolre, but through prurmily. proximity thereto, [not from its re. solving to act thereon); as is the case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron). 11. If it were alleged that [its, Soul's,] creativeness, or [its] governorship, was through a sotre [to create, or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under $95. 1.] would apply. But it is not so; for,] by us (Sankhyas,] it is held that the Souls governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from [its proruity [to Nature] ; 'as is the ciuse with the [lodlestone] gem.'' 6. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving (either to act or to be acted on), &c., -o, by the mere ronjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called] the Great one,' for Mind, (see § 61. .)]. And in this alone consists (what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the meaning.. पपद्यते लोके संकल्यादिना परिणमनस्यैवाधि- ष्ठानव्यवहारादिति। तबाह ॥ 'यदि संकल्पेन स्रष्टुत्वमधिष्ठातृत्वमुच्यते तदायं दोषः स्यात्। अस्माभिस्तु पुरुषस्य संनिधानादेवा- धिष्ठातृत्वं स्रष्टुत्वादिरूपमियते मणिवत ॥ यथायस्कान्तमणेः सान्निध्यमात्रेण लोहाक र्षकत्वं संकल्पादिना विना तथैवादिपुरुषस्य संयो- 2 ·118 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Puranas ]: As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone,] stands void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the Soul, both agency (scemingly,] and non-agency, (really). It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition ; (and it ex] an agent, merely through approximation (to Nature]." dl. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]:" विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम् ॥ ९७ ॥ गमात्रेण प्रकृतेर्महत्तत्त्वरूपेण परिणमनम् । इद- मेव च स्वोपाधिस्रष्टुत्वमित्यर्थः ॥ 1 The Translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. Ed. 2 तथाचोक्तम् । निरिच्छे संस्थिते रत्ने यथा लोहः प्रवर्तते। सतामात्रेण देवेन तथैवेयं जग- ज्जनिः। अत आत्मनि कर्तृत्वमकतृत्वं च संस्थि- तम् । निरिच्छत्वादकतीसा का सनिधिमावत इति ॥ लौकिककार्येष्वपि जोवानां संनिधिमात्रेणै- वाधिष्ठातृत्वमित्याह ॥ 4 Aniruddha has विशेषकार्येऽपि. Ed. 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 97. 119 In like manner, embodied souls do not energlze. a. Aph. 97. In the case of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity}. * The agency is solely through proximity :' so much is supplied' [from $96]. 6. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particular productions, ---the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump, (sce Veilinta-sára, $ 67)],—animal souls, i.e., souls in which the intellects (of individuals] reflect themselves [sce $99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not through any effort ; seeing that these (animal souls) are none other than the motionless Thought.. c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal aud omniscient Lord,' through the doubt of a blind tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship), the Veilas would cease to be an authority; [a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies :- 1 2 अधिष्ठातृत्वं संनिधानादेवेत्यनुषज्यते ॥ विशेषकार्येषु व्यष्टिसृष्ट्यादिष्वपि जीवाना- मन्तःकरणप्रतिबिम्बितचेतनानां संनिधानादेवा- धिष्ठातृत्वं न तु केनापि व्यवहारेण कूटस्थचिन्मा- चत्वादित्यर्थः ॥ ननु नित्यसर्वज्ञेश्वराभावेऽन्धपरंपराशङ्कया वे- दाप्रामाण्यं स्यात् । अत आह ॥ 3 ·120 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वादाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥ llow the Vedas med not the Lord' to authen. Turite them. Aph. 98. The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahma, for example), since he knows the truth, [is authorative evidence]. a. To complete [the aphorism, we must suyl, since Hirunyagarbhu [i.e., Brahmi,] and others (viz., Vishnu and Siru], are knowers of what is certain, i.c., of what is true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence? [altogether indisputable]. b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the -as the magnet may be saill, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet],- who is the primary cor actual, overruler? In reference to this, he says: term, 1 हिरण्यगर्भादीनां सिद्धरूपस्य यथार्थस्य बो- बृत्वातदक्तको वेदवाक्यार्थोपदेशः प्रमाणमिति शेषः ॥ * ननु पुरुषस्य चेत्संनिधिमात्रेण गौणमधि- ष्ठातृत्वं तर्हि मुख्यमधिष्ठातृत्वं कस्येत्याकाङ्क्षाया- माह।

·BOOK I., APII. 99. 121 अन्तःकरणस्य' तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठात- त्वम् ॥ ९९॥ Aph. 99. The internal organ, through It is in the sMayo of its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by the internal orun, that Nature (flects Soul. Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet]. a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in,] Soul; just as the iron,' that is to say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in consequence of [its] mere proximity, [and so acquires magnetisin by magnetic induction) b. IIe (now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception,] states the definition of inference (anumana): 2 1 Aniruddha has महतोऽन्तःकरणस्य: prefixing to the internal organ' the synonymous'the Great One.' Bil. अन्तःकरणस्य बुद्धेः पुरुषच्छायापत्त्या तेन चैतन्येनालितत्वाच्चेतनत्वाभिमानादधिष्ठातत्त्वं लोहवदिति यथाकर्षको लोहो निष्क्रियोऽपि संनिधिमात्रेण कर्षतीति ॥ अनुमानलक्षणमाह ॥ 3 ·122 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. प्रतिबन्धदृशः' प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १०० ॥ . Aph. 100. The knowledge of the con- Inforener defineil. nected [..., fire], through perception of the commexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference. a. That is to say: inference (or conviction of a general truth,] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, (which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by connexion' (pratibandhu) here being meant constant attendedness' (cyipti); and through the perception thereof? [it being thut the mind has possession of any general principle]. b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul;" (whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal orgun, or understunding (see $87.c.)] c. IIe [next] defines testimony (subila): 1 is the reading of Nágesa and of Vedanti Dahadeva. El. 2 'प्रतिबद्धदृशः प्रतिबन्धो व्याप्तिस्तदृशो व्याप्तिज्ञानात्प्रति- बदस्य व्यापकस्य ज्ञानं वृत्तिरूपमनुमानं प्रमाण- मित्यर्थः ॥ अनुमितिस्तु पौरुषेयो बोध इति ॥ शब्दं लक्षयति ॥ 3 ·BOOK I., APH. 102. 123 आप्नोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ १०१॥ . Aph. 101. Testimony [such us is Valid testimony defined. entitled to the name of evidence,] is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed]. a. Here 'fitness' means suitableness ;' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration : such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see $100. b.)] the result is that knowledge in the Soul, (which is called] 'knowledge by hearing' (subilaboulhu). 6. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence : उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणातदुपदेशः ॥ १०२ ॥ denne have been leie set Aph. 102. Since the establishment Why the hinds of Eri of [the existence of] both [soul and forth. non-soul] is by means of evidence, the declaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here mule]. a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, (the one from the आप्तिरच योग्यता तथा च थोग्यः शब्दस्त- ज्जन्यं ज्ञानं शब्दाख्यं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः। फलं च पौरुषेयः शाब्दबोध इति ॥ प्रमाणप्रतिपादनस्य स्वयमेव फलमाह ॥ 2 ·124 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. : other] : therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared : such is the meaning. B. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by which, especially, viz.., by a proof which is one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively: सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १०३ ॥ Thorstence of Soul 1ph. 103. The establishment of both anit Virture uryuu ja vill (inclogu. [Nature and Soul] is by analogy. 11. [Analogy (szimninyato rishtal) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case where, by the force (as an argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken), when we have liad recourse to (as the means of determining this constant accompaniment, what is, for instance, gencrically of a parceptible kind, (where, under such circumstances, we repeat,) anything of a different kind, i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when, 1 उभयोरात्मानात्मनोविवेकेन सिद्धिः प्रमा- णादेव भवति। अतस्तस्य प्रमाणस्योपदेशः कृत इत्यर्थः॥ 'तत्र येनानुमानविशेषेण प्रमाणेन मुख्य- तोऽच प्रकृतिपुरुषौ विविच्य साधनीया तवर्ण- यति ॥ 3 My MS. of Nágesa has दृष्टासिद्धिः. Ed.

·BOOK I., APH. 103. 125 for example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledye, viz., [the instrument named] Sense', is establisherl (or inferred to exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by thus (species of inference], that both, [viz..] Nature and Soul, are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning 1. Of these [viz.., Nature and soul, the argument from analogy for the existence of Nature is as follows: the Great Principle (viz., Unilerstanding (see § 61.c.)] is formed out of the things [called | Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in cquipoise (see $61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is undeniably, Ja production, it huy the characters of Pleasure, lain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,' (has the characteristic pro- 1 यत्र सामान्यतः प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयमादाय व्या- प्रियहात्यक्षधर्मताबलेन तद्विजातीयोऽप्रत्यक्षार्थः सिध्यति यथा पृथिवीत्वादिजातीयं कुठारादिक- रणमादाय व्याप्निं गृहीत्वा तद्दिजातीयमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियं साध्यत इति तत्सामान्यतो दृष्टं तस्मादुभयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥ तब प्रकृतेः सामान्यता दृष्टमनुमानं यथा महत्तत्त्वं सुखदुःखमोहद्रव्योपादानकं कार्यत्वे स- ति सुखदुःखमाहधर्मकत्वात्सुवर्णादिजकुण्डलादिव- 2 दिति ॥

·126 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. perties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like]. c. But, [as regards the argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under 8,66, to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of unother'; because it is something that acts as a combination ; as a house, for instance, which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of organized bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is inferred by analogy,) as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itselt]: such is the meaning.' d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience (whether of pleasure or of pain), and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies :- चिदवसानो भोगः ॥ १०४॥ - पुरुषस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वागृहा- दिवदिति। अत्र प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं देहाद्यर्थकत्वं गृहादिषु गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयः पुरुषः प्रधानादिपरत्वेनानु- मीयत इति ॥ ननु प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वात्प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वाच्च सर्वदा भोग इत्यनिमीक्षः स्यादित्यत आह ॥ 2 .

·BOOK I., APH. 105. 127 When it is that experience ceuses. Aph. 104. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] ends with [the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, us contradistinguished from Nature] 4. By Thought' [we mean] Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, (see Turka-sangraha, $ 92], surceases (when the thing antecedently non-existeut begins to be], so, eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning,] continues (no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]; so that experience whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case. b. [But some one say], il Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow (which seems unreasonable,] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies :: अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोगोऽन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १०५ ॥ The fruit of the action is not always the agent's. Aph. 10.5. The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c. 'चिदात्मा। तद्विवेकावसानो भोगः । यथा- नादिरपि प्रागभावा नश्यति तथा नित्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विवेकज्ञानपर्यन्तः प्रसर इति न सर्वदा भो- गापतिरिति भावः ॥ यदि कर्तृ प्रधानं भोक्ता पुरुषस्तीन्यकृतस्य कर्मणोऽन्यो भोक्तति स्यादित्याह ॥ 2 ·128 THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS. a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit (thereof, i.c., the fruit of the cook's actions), so is the case here, also.' 6. Having stated an exoteric principle which may servc, in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine," [in regard to the doubt started under $ 104.6.): zxfaagigt afrag: ang tata: 11 90€ !! Aph. 106. Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in $ 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent (soul being mistaken for an agent,] hus the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion). a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle (the actual agent (see $ 97.6.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. Or, since it is from non-discrimination ;' that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit;' [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure). To SUPPOSE that Soul acts and experiente's 29 un eri or. 1 यथा सूपकारस्यान्नादिकर्तृत्वमकर्तुरीश्वरस्य फ. लोपभोक्तृत्व तथावापीति॥ 'व्यवहारसिद्धान्तमुक्ता स्वसिद्धान्तमाह ॥ न पुरुषः कती न वा भोक्ता किं तु महत्तत्त्वप्र- 3