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·MINUTES OF DISSENT
CONTENTS
MIUT
AOATACT
-TIONARY
ITIT
MIAULVI HAIDULLAA KUAN
VIR KARPOOR CHANDRA PATNI and
3
VIR TIKARAN PALIWAL
VIR CHIRANJI LAL and
NR VIDYADHAR KULHARI
NEMI CHAND KASLIWAL
RAJA SARDAR SINGHJ BAHADUR OF KĦETRI
7
10
THAKUR LUSHAL SINGH OF GEFJGARH
MIR LAXM NARAIN YADAVA
THIKUR SURENDRA SINGHJI OF HACHARI IWAS
CAPTAIN CHIM IN SINGH and
VIR CHIR INJI LAL LOYALKA
19
Acntional note by MR CHRANJILAL R LOYALKA
60
COMPLIMENTARY

·单

·minute of bissent'by Mr. Shah Alimuddin Ahmad, M.A.B.L.,
Syed Hasan Mujtaba, M.A., LL.B., and
Maulvi Hamidullah Khan,
of1 # We sign this Report subject to the following
note of disgent:
--*
1. In Jaipur a legislature composed of two
houses of a bicameral character would be more
'expedient.
2. We are of opinion that the safeguard
necessary for the Muslims is to grant them the right
of separate electorates, with a Treightage extending
upto 25% of the total seats, both in the Council and
in the Assembly.
Having regard to the consensus of Muslim
opinion as evidenced by the overn helming support
to the manifesto issued by the Muslim Political
Organization, we are of opinion that nothing short
of the above mentioned provision would satisfy the
Muslims.
We, therefore, respectfully urge that this
unanimous demand of the Muslims whose servicea
and sacrifices have alsays been requisitioned and
utilized for the honour and welfare of the State,
should be granted in toto.
3. We do not agree with the remark of tho
Chairman that there is no necessity for introducing
a special provision of this kind relating to one
prticular community in the Stato, regarding

·2 matters affecting Muslim religion etc., in the legislature. When matters affecting religion are not excluded from the purview of the legislature, safeguards as proposed' and passed by Committee are very necessary. 4. We are of opinion that at least one of the Ministers, appointed from among the elected members, should be a Muslim. Upto the present, there has been an unwritten convention to have at least one Muslim Minister in the Council. We, therefore, propose that it should be provided by statute that one at least of the Ministers should be a Muslim. 5. We do not agree with the Chairman's opinion that clause (4) of the suggested declaration may be omitted, as we consider that such protection is, essential SHAH ALIMUDDIN AHMAD. SYED HASAN MUJTABA. HAM) DULLAH KHAN. 2 ·Minute of Dissent by Mr. Karpoor Chandra Patnl and Mr. Tikaram Pallwal, B.A., LL. B. 1 . It 2 + 1 The popular demand for the establishment of full iesponsible government 'under the regis 'of His llighness the Maharaja,''as indicated in the ansu crs 'to the Constitutional Reforms Committoo's questionnaire, submitted on behalf of the Jaipur Rajya Prajamandal, was supported by no less than 3113 persons, out of a total of 3273, who replied to the questionnaire. But we are sorry to say, that the constitutional 'reforms' proposed in the Report do not anyw heic approach the fulfilment of the said popular demand. For instance, we think that the proposals 'regarding franchise, composition and powers of the Legislative Council, the extent to which populár element is to be introduced into the Executive and fundamental rights, are utterly inadequate and unsatisfactory. Moreover, it is obvious that the too many safeguards and restrictions proposed “hroughout the Report are sure to hamper , seal 'progress. Nevertheless we have associatey ourselves titlí the Report in the same spirit of heļpfulness in which we originally'decided to co-operate with government in the work of constitution-making, We stand for a constitution framed on fully democratic Les and the believe that too much empliasis laid in the Report on the conciliation of apparently varying interests goos against the spirit of democracy. We feel that claims which cannot: but be regarded prepostorous should not liavo beon put forward on behalf of the 'sardars' (by the way o word used in the Report as a misnomer for jagir. ( 1 1 2 * ·4: dars and other State-grantees in general). Te must make it clear tliat ere are not at all agreeable to thie idea of giving separate representation to the 'sardars'--for the simple reason that the sans cannot be beneficial to them. Apart from this, we cannot help saying that special representation to the extent of 10 seats for about 709 jagirdars and other state-grantees in the Legislative Council, providing only 30 territorial seats for 30 lakhs of people, vould, on the very face, look absurd. Similarly, the allotment to the 'sardars' of 25 seats in the Representative Assembly would tend to defeat the very purpose for which the Assembly is going to be created, viz., to provide "effective representation in a chamber, prelomin.ıntly their own, of tenants, the smaller tradesmen, the primitive tribes and such other sections of the population" who "cannot ordinarily hope to get a place in a chamber elected on a high franchise." Likerise, it is our painful duty to submit that the demands made by the Jluslims are entirely one-sided and unfair. Since Juslim representation far beyond the proportion of their population has already been reserved with liberty to contest other territorial seats, we fail to understand the significance of the suggestion about a reasonable compromise? made in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 31.- Certainly tre do not think there is any room at all for any further compromise. We are sorry that we do not share the opinion (expressed in the same paſagraph) that "the bulk of the Muslim opinion in Jaipur is in favour of separate electorates". Those who press for separate electorates we would ask to ·- see whether they are thereby serving the best interests of the Muslim community itself. For ourselves, wc regard separate electorates in any form ası a deadly poison for the body politic, and as such we place on record, our emphatic and uncompromising opposition to them. Having thus stated our views about some of the fundamentals, we do not feel encouraged to go into further details. However, with the object of making the proposals contained in the Report less objectionable,, at least from the moderate point of view, pre would like to conclude this brief note with the following suggestions :- 1. The President of the Legislative Council should be an elected non-official from the very beginning i 2. The previous consent of the Prime Minister for the introduotion of a Bill into the Legislative Council slould not be necessary; 3. There should be no restriction on the number of resolutions to be moved or questions to be asked by the members in the Legislative Council; 4. The Prime Minister should not have the power to disallow an adjournment motion after the receipt of the cousent of the President of the Legislative Council; 5. Noither of the two sessions of the Legislative Council sliould be of less than a fortnight's duration; 6. The quorum for the Legislative Council should be fixed at 25;

·8 1 7. His Highness' privy purse should be fixed; · 8. The State · Army should not be excluded from thc purvieir of the Legislative Council, nor should the cxpenditure under the leads (1) army', (2) compensation for excise to jagirdars, for bhomclautlan to thikana Diggi, for excise to the Bhomias of Torairati, for customs to thikanas of Sheikhawati, and' (3) the salaries of the Prime Minister and other Minister's, be regarded as expenditure under excluded heads. 9. Clause' (g) under para 67 about the relations of the sardars with His Highness and their privileges etc. should be deleted. 10. The provision suggested in the last sentence of para 42, regarding the power of additions, alterations and amendments in à bill after it has been passed by the Legislative Council should be removed. KARPOOR CHANDRA PATNI.. : TIKARAM PALIWAL.. ſ i- { .܂ ·7 Minute of Dissent by Mr. Chiranji Lal,M.A., LL.B., and Mr. Vidyadhar Kulhari, B.A., LL.B.' 11 -- ? 1 While ve, generally agree with the main recommendations of the Constitutional Reforms Committee, le feel that we are failing in our duty if we do not put our vien-point on various subjects before the Government. The foremost question is of, the goal constitutional progress, We may frankly submit that in the modern age when the problems of government have grown and are still daily growing more complicated, n ben the strength of a government lies upon its popular backing and not upon its armies, and nhen constant touch and consultation with the people is necessary for a government to function properly, there can be no tno opinions about Responsible Government. A government of the people is the universal cry. Out of about 3000 replies received by the Committee to , its questionnaire, 98 per cent demand full Responsible Government immediately. The demand is backed by merchant magnates, medical practitioners, advocates, and professors, leaving aside the general masses who are crazing for it. There is no dearth of talent in Jaipur State and good many citizens of the State have graced the legislatures'and ministries in British India. We feel that the Committee would have been absolutely justified had it recommended the establishment of fall Responsible Government in the State. But as uptill now there pere no representative institutions in the Jaipur State and sardars are unduly nervous about the democratic institutions and want to stick to feudal traditions and their so-called privileges and rights, the its the ·00 Committee las made very modest recommendations. The Committee was actuated by a spirit of realism and is not likely to proceed too fast. We being certain that there was no chance of taking the entire Committee or at least the majority with us on the point of immediate grant of Responsible Government : by His Higliness the Maharaja Sabib Babadur, tre remained neutral on tle proposal, But it does not follow that iſ full fledged responsible government can not be established in the State at present, there is any thing wrong in the declaration of the goal of constitutional progress. We, therefore, reguest the Government to make a declaration that it is the policy of Ilis Highness' Gorernment to increase 'association of the people with the administratiớn of thic State with a view to establish full Responsible Government under the aogis of His Highness the Raharaja Sahib Bahadur. We may further submit that a time-limit should also be fixed in which the necessary changes should be brought and full responsibility conferred upon tlie representatives of the people. The case of Phillipines is an important instance. Such fixing of time. limit.would electrify the masses and would inspire them with more energy, more enthusiasm, and more ambition. The various sections of the public would try to adjust themselves to the coming reforms and tlie evolution will be peaceful, orderly and methodical. 'We may bere say that immediately two or three public men may be co-opted in the administration to strengthen it and to give an opportunity to them to learn the art of government. The war has ·9 created many complicated problems, and not only it affords an opportunity for rapid industrialisation of the country--bampered though wo are, on account of lack of proper machinery, but it has brought great many miseries in the shape of high prices, increasing cost of living, and disruption of normal trade and commerce. We require an eficient system of planned economy and re think that such expansion of the cabinet rould prove a source of strongth to the administration. At present only officials and Ministers are deputed to represent Jaipur State in so many all India committees and conference, and it is in fitness of things that some public men should also be deputed, Though our terms of reference are limited to constitutional reforms, yet life cannot be separated in water-tight compartments. We expect that the administration would try to eradicate illitcracy, poverty and general backwardness. Literacy cam. paigos may be started in co-operation with municipal committees and public organisations like the Praja- ( mandal, Anjman Islamlia, Hindu Sabha, Sardar Sabla etc. We may cite the example of Aundh State. The entire illiteracy of the State was wiped out in a period of three months before the new reformed constitution came into operation. In conclusion we express our fervent hope that the rich and poor, sardars and commoners, officials and non-officials, mercluants, artisans and the agricul. turists, trould all join together in making the greatness of Jaipur. C. L. AGARWAL, VIDYADHAR KULHARI.

·10? Minute of Dissent by Mr. Némi Chand Kasliwal, M. A,, LL. B. 1 1 ماس 1. Iliare generally agreed to the recommendations of the Committee iti contained in its Report. I only append a note hicrewith on some of those points with which I find mysell in'rlis:greement. < Declarution re: Responsible Government: Although the Committee's Report has provided for a review of the constitution after five years, it has not said anything about the goal. The Government order appointing the Committee acknowledges a rapid growth in the political consciousness of the people and their interest in public affairs. But it no where says that the goal of this steady and harmonious constitutional progress ofthe State is Responsible Gorarnment. I could suggest that the proclamation of His Highness the Maharaja should contain a declara ion that it is the settled policy of Iiis Highness' Government that there will be greater association of His subjects' in the work of government with a view to the pro- • gressive realization of Responsible Government in the State. ; The constitution nill be reviewed by a Committee, and it will be incumbent on that Committee to report as to what extent the principle of Respousible Government could be established. 'It may be said that my stand for a declaration is not consistent with what took place in the Committee 'on ' Mr. Palivál's' resolution' on Responsible Government on which I remine ncutral. From its very, inception, members had been zware of the ·(11 PI ? fr + immense difficultica, facing the Committee iti its Tabours and it was felt that demands not compatible with this cxisting circumstanc continentant of retarding the work of the i.. of aiding it. It vas, therefothings, that some of the members including the representatives of the Praja Jindal decided to adopt a spirit with the prevailing atmosph state that I equally + stand for the attainment of Responsible Government under the aegis of His Highness the Maharaja, but taking a realistic view. I feel that Responsible Government at one stroke is not feasible. 1 Muslim Representation: vir, In agreeing to give seats for the Muslims in the Legislative Council, I feel that it is adequate enough zw. to give them sufficient weightage and a voice in the deliberations of the House. I would, hon ever, isay that a weightage, more than what we have suggested in,the Report, would smack of over-representation of the Muslims. As Dr. Beni Prasad in his book, Hindu- Muslim Unity" says, "A peightage, in, order to be reasoyahlo must not be so large as to jar on the sepse of justice and fairness and require the exertion of forco rather thu nu appeal to the ti in principles, of justice and political expediency for its maintenance". A weightage : lich gives almost double the number of sdats to the Muslim community which it would Ju otherwise le entitled to, on population'basis, is, in my opinion, icasonabler 1.11n 1 21 ; Representation of Sapulars: Ten scats layo been leserrer for the sardars in the Legislative Council. They have been given ten ·10 times the weightage their confreres in British India liave received. It is, therefore, 'correct to say that tlie sardars would be extremely over-represented in the Legislative Council as well as in the Representative Assembly which neither their history nor their status would justify. The Government have made it clear after an exhaustive enquiry that they are creations of the Rulers of Jaipur and as such they are in ou better position than the ordinary subjects of His Highness. I have agreed to this disproportionate reservation for the sardars purely on grounds of political expediency. i State Army: I am opposed to the exclusion of the State Army from the purview of the Legislative Council. Nearly 1/5th of the State Budget concerns the State Army. And if discussion on the Army is excluded, this item of the Budget is also excluded. Besides, it is a dangerous policy to increase expenditure on the army prithout previously consulting the popular element, as increase in that side would result in starvatiou of the națion-building departments. The regulation of the personnel of the army may rest with His Highness. But the Budget item on it must remain a matter for discussion and vote in the Legislative Council. Out motion in the salary of Ministers: : A cut motion to critise the policy of a Minister regarding the working of a particular department under his charge is a valuable right of the nember's of the Legislative Council. It is used primarily to focus attention on some particular feature of the policy of the Minister in the administration of the department about which the motion is tabled; which ·13 a cut motion under the head of general administration may quite fail to do. My attention has been drawn to the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935, by which salaries of Ministers are no longer amenable to a vote of the House. But this has no application here as there is 10 joint responsibility here, nor is there a provision for a vote of no-confidence being passed against the Ministers. A cut motion in the salary of a particular Minister in the British Indian provinces would be tantamount to a motion of noconfidence against the ni lole Ministry which, if passed, would compel the Ministry to resign because there is joint responsibility. I do not think there is any danger of this right being misused, as the Chairman seems to think. It should remain with the legislators as a cherished right of theirs. 12-4-43. N, C. KASLIT AL.

·*** < - Hinute of Dissent by Raja Sardar Singhji Bahadur of Khet!'i. 3 $ Wbile I am in general agreement urith the recommendations of the Committee on Constitutional Reform, there are certain points on yhich I differ from the view of the majority. The present note embodies these points of difference and my vieirs and suggestions regarding them. Paragraph 29 of the Committee's Report deals with the allotment of seats in tlie Legislative Council. The'Committee recommends that'in a House consisting of fifty-nine members (excluding the Chairman) the seats should be allotted as follows: 1 ma Nom:pated 14 4. Territorial constituencies (including 5 Muslim seats) 30 Saidars 10 Trade and Commerce 2 Women ... fonds Labour 1 Graduates 1 1 59 I would suggest that this arrangement leaves out of account a number of factors. In the first place, tihe sardar's are given only 10 seats or just over 22% of the elected seats. In vier of the part which the thikanedars have played in the history of Jaipur and in view of the fact that the thikanas consist of about two-thirds of the entire state, both in area and in population, they should be given a l'epresentation of at least 33%, uamely, 15 seats, in ·161 1 the Legislativë Council. The Committee'admits the importance of the sardars as a class in the State,' but unless they are given a substantial representation in the Counci there will be an idé.quate" i l'écognitiv: of this order. !! In the second place, I would suggest that there. should be no functional seats in the Council. :: To'the best of my knowledge, no Constitution in the world has recognised that graduates represent'any" Spécial interest and are 'entitled to seats on tbat scere. In all democratic bodies representation is given to particular interests only viben'they'are of an economic'or political cláractèr different to that of the majority: But graduates cannot claim special consideration on' that'scóre, fora graduate maj bo a thikanedar ori a' pe rsant, a Hindu or Dluslim, :in industrial magnato or an office clerk. 2.With regardi to the other, fuuctional seats; I trould'sny tliat the interests wlich it is proposed that they should represent are not sufficiently developed in Jaipur at this stage to reʻjnire special representation irrithe Council i Neither Trade and CommerceEnor Labour is:sufficiently doveloped or organised to lave1 intereststvhich come into claslı viththe rest of the body, politic. These interests could, therefore, be adequatels. represonted through the general territorial constituén.., cies tóřithe time beings. Similarly; - I see no reason why women should be given a special seat. The day is not for off, I liope, rlion women ill contest the territorial constituencies on an equal footing with: mon. To give them a special seat not will retard the process of their progress, fór it'vrill alkäys make, tiem feel that they are vreak and entiiled to special .

·16 cusitleration on the basis of their weukuess and lackwardness. Shuni these live functional scats be done away withi, they could be added on to thic tell allotted to ile sardars. T'us tlic sardars coull be given their 1.7 soats without decreasiuy the 30 seats allotte:l for popular ropresentation. Tith regard to representation in the Assembly, I would sugyest that here ngain the sardars bave not been given an arlequnie mmber of sents. The 25 seats allotted to them i'rpresent just over 20% of the stre-, ngth of the entire house whereas they should be given 20%, namely, 29 seats. Moreover, as the Assembly is mainly a deliberative body, the sardars should he given the alternative of sending their representatives to attend the meetings, instead of themselves. This will save a good deal of embarrassment and unpleasantness as there will be a number of cases in which tenants will bring up complaints about their thikanedars. So far as the Assembly is concerned, I am in favour of introducing functional representation as suggested by the Committee. As the main function of this body will be to discuss and deliberate over public matters, it would be very desirable to have it as vridely representative a gathering as possible. Paragraph 9.1 (1) of the Committee's Report reads "he must be qualified as a voter for the House for which he vishes to stand as a candidate; - ·17 "Provided that a sardar, as defined in the Constitution Act, shall not be eligible to stand for election in a territorial constituency." The reason for this proviso is explained at length in paragraph 93 11 here it is stated that although zamindars and landholders who have been given a special representation in British Indian Councils are allowed to contest general seats, the sartlars here should not be allowed to do so as they may use improper methods to induce the electorate to vote for them. In the first place, when a section of the body politic' is given special representation it is never debarred by that fact from its rights to contest general territorial seats. For instance, in this same Report, the Muslims, Trade and Commerce, Labour, women and graduates are given special seats, but this does not debar them from standing for the general territorial constituencies Why then should the sardars be thus handicapped ? In the second place, if the only reason for this proviso is the fear that the sardars muy coerce the electorate by improper means, there will still be cause for apprehension, for if the sard urs ienily are in a position to exercise sucli coercion, what is to prevent them from using it on behult of their hominees even though they camot context the constituencies them els es? I would suggest that the use of improper inengs for obtaining votes can only be prevented by the growth of political consciousness in the inasses, not by constitutional provisos ubich handicap a particular class.

·18 :'! With regard to the exclusion of certain subjects from the purview of the legislature, I.support the vieir of the majority of the Committee which recommends that the following subjects should be added to the list of excluded subjects; 112! the relations of the sardars with His Highness the Maharaja and their personal: or hereditary privileges, rights and status, granted or recognised by His Highness the Maharaja. The Chairman, on the other hand, while agreeing with the desirability of introducing , a popular element into the Council fears that statutory restriction of the choice of Ministers to the elected members of the Council might prove embarrassing in practice and hinder the appointment of the best available men. (6) the State Army. Paragraph 112 embodies the Committee's . recommendation that in order to introduce popular element into the Council, at least one-half of the Ministers (excluding the Prime Minister) may be appointed by His Highness the Maharaja from amongst the elected members of the Council. I am in complete agreement with the view of the Chairman that no fetters should be placed on the choice of His Highness the Maharaja to appoint his Ministers. His Highness has shown a keele desire to associate his people more and in the administration and we may feel certain that his Ministers will be chosen to an ever-increasing extent fron among the elected representatives of his people, SARDAR SINGH, more 80-4-43. RAJA BAHADUR OF KHETRI.

·19 Minuta of Dissent by Thakur Kushal Singhji of Ceej. garh, Mr. Laymi Narain Yadava, Thakur Surendra Singhị of Khachariawas, Captain Chiman Singh, and Mr. Chiranjilal Layalka! -- 1. Fundamental differences of opinion bave constrained us to write this separate Report in which we shall briefly indicate our views and proposals regarding Constitutional Reform in this State. In the prefaratory remarks to their Report, our learned colleagues have referred to the existence of diversity in the cliaracteristics of Inding, States and to the necessity of relating the constitutional problem to the special features, 'past history and present requirements of the State. These very con. siderations have led us to conclusions which differ, in important respects, from those arrived at by the other members of the Committee. 2. Historically the constitution of a Rajputana State like Jaipur is a modifica continuation or a product of the ancient Indian polity. A patrıạrchal type of m chy, in which the interests of the ruler and the ruled are identified. is the distinguishiug feature of this system of government. While the protection of the subjects and the promotion of their relfaro is the highest duty imposed on a ruler by Divine dispensation,sovereigntysvests m the ruler, not in the people. 3. A constitution based on these principles is still considered by the bulk of the population to be the most desirable form of government Political theories and constitutions of foreign countries are unknown to the masses. There is no general discontent or unrest in the State. The desire to gain political power by invitating the Westein den.ocratic n ·20 form of government is a phenomenon restricted to a small section of those who have received modern education. We are not suggesting that our system of administration does not stand in need of improvement or that there should be no reform so long as there is no agitation. Statesmanship requires that steps should be taken to introduce a carefully considered scheme of reforms calculated to revive the true spirit of our own politica) organisation and to secure the closer association of the people with the administration. 7 1. In paragraphe 3 of our colleagues' Report, there is a reference to the inalienability of land. The correct position is that land in thikana areas as well as that held by landholders of all types is, by custom and usage, inalienable. We do not also consider some portions of the description of sardars and thikanas given in paragraph 6 of that Report to be correct. It was outside the purview of our Committee to determine the status, rights, powers and privileges of sardars and thikanas. The importance of the aristocratic order of 'sardars is self-evident and history bears ample testimony to it. + THRED SCHEMES 5. We wish to offer some observations regarding the three schemes which have been criticised by our learned colleagues in chapter II of their Report. The Sardar Sabha's scheme does not envisage the establishment of a bereditary house on the lines, of the British House of Lords, because it is not suggested that all the sardars should sit in the Upper House which is to include a certain percentage of members belonging to other classes also. It does { ·21 $ enot seem to be intended that the representation of sardars should be a marked feature in the Lover House where the representatives of the people would sDaturally be expected to be in a decided majority. Il'hen sardars are to be returned by election to both the Houses, they canuot be called hereditary legislators. 6. It has been mentioned in paragraph 18 that 'none of the Western countries has copied the hereditary system of the British Parliament for the constitution of an Upper House. On this point Sir Henry Maine says: "There is much reason to believe that the British House of Lords would have been exclusively or much more extensively copied in the Constitutions on the Continent, but for one remarkable difficulty This is not in the least any dislike or distrust of the hereditary principle, but the extrempe numerous ness of the nobility in most continental societies, and the consequent difficulty of selecting a portion of there to be exclusivly privileged l'he Abbe Sioyes insisted that the fatal obstacle to the engrafting of a House of Lords on to the Constitution 'made' for France in 1791' was the 'number and theoretical equality of the nobles'. Still the nobility was very substantially represented on the Upper Houses of Italy, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Prussia, Soy. Bararia, Wurtemberg, Baden Hesse,, and Japan., Erea the modern "Canadiana desired to follow the British mode tatas hereditary membership (like that in the Esel3 H:-* of Lords) could not be arranged, Senators are apporta 1-2 Hungary, n bere tlie nobles amned one eighth of the land in the Kingdom, had the House of Vagnates luich resembled tle British House of Lors. In countries where hereditary aristocracy dces not exist, the Upper Chamber has necaurly to be com. posed of different personnel. + 1 ·: 22 7. The iuestion «f sverciznty und jurisdiction raised in przyraplı 19 of the other Report is, in our "pinioni, not germane to the issile. According to the Gororumont of India Act of 1933., tose for won the seats were reserved in the legislature included not only Ruling Princes but also other's known by different names and possessing no sovereignty.or jurisdiction at all. For t’xample, a very large number of talukdars, of Fathiaurar belong to the latter category. In such cises, the Cro Representative legislates and exercises jurisdictiou., Many of these units, before their allegiance was transferred to the British Crown, were tbikanas subordinate to Ruling Princes. The recent decision of His Excellency tlie Croin Representative to attach such units to neighbouring States shorts bor greatly the status of these talukdars differs from that of Ruling Princes enjoying full legislative and jurisdictional powers. The position of these non-jurisdictional units in relation to tlie: British Crown is not better than that of thikanas in: relation to their suzerain Rulers. Indian States form part of the Britis. Dominions, thougli not of British India. Thikanas fórm part of a State, though they are distinguished fr:m khalsa territory. While the relationship of sardats with the Jaipur Thırone is of a special nature, its political aspect cannot be ignored. We have referred to some of the points mentioned by our learned colleagues but we consider it quite unnecessary, for our present purpose, furtlier into these controversial questions. It was not because the nobles enjoyed soveto $ (1) Sir J. A. R. Marriott: The Mechanism of the Modern State. Vol. I, page 412. (2) V. S. Rain and B. M. Sharma: Modern Government.--page 289. w ·23 reign powers or exercised jurisdiction that the House of Lords was copstituted in England or the Upper flouses, containing a predominance of nobles, were established in the countries mentioned above. 8. The quotations given on pages XXVIII to XXX of the Sudar Sabhi's reply to the Questionnaire make it abundantly clear thnt the possession of sovereignty or jurisdiction is not the criterion for the inclusion of auy wit among those for wliom 40% seats were reserved. It should be noted that the claim of sardars for adeunte representation and safeguards is not based exclusively on the analogy of the Goverument o India Act, 1935. They themselves say that "po analogy can completely and correctly describe the status of the Rajput sardars which is sii generis.” They have stated, in reply to the Questionnaire, other grounds also in support of their chim. These grounds may be suminarised thus:- (1) Possession of 72% of the total area of the State by sardars and landliolders. (11) Their ties of kinship to the Ruler. 1971) Their martial and historical contribution to the establishment and preservation of the State. (1) Their position of special and great importance wd their political predominance in the State, enjoyed by immemorial custom and tradition, 5 1 ) Possession of cortain lereditary status, . rights powers and privileges.

·24 (ri) Trong established usage of their having a duininant voice in thic-alfairs of state.* (tii) Articles of the 'l're:ity of 1:18. "I'hellalaraja and his lieirs and successors sluaill remain absoluto rulers of their territory and THEIR DEPENDANTS ACCORDING TO LONG ESTABLISH- ED USAG13." 9. :11l these considerations put together afford ample justílication for the claim of sardars for adequate and effective representation and necessary safeguards. Their desire for an Upper House, consisting exclusirely of the isristocracy or of 70% scats for their order, cannot be considered to be unreasonable. In view, however, of the modern trend of thouglit and erents, are would propose it rin media which we shall discuss later, Bicameral Schemes 10. Nine important public bodies have proposed il bicameral constitution. We shall deal with this question later, Mr. Hiralal Shastri's scheme. We now come to the scheme of Mr. Hira Lal Shastri “who may be said to represent the nationalist or Prajamandalist section of political opinion in Jaipur." He wants that "Jaipur should enjoy full l'espousible yorernment as an integral part of free and independent India.” Our learned colleagues l'emark that as things stand at present, the realisation of full responsible government, immediately, is by no meanis practicable The very first "Sırdars are the chief counsellors of the Jaipur Chief." History - of Jaipur" by T. Fateh Singh.

·25 instalment of 'political reform in the State.....cau not in reason, bo uspected to be full-fledgód réponsible government of the British parliimentary type." If the implication of this be that although the goal of full kesponsible Government is not realizable immediately, it might be realised hereafter, we record our dissent from such a view. 12. There is no placo for irrosponsibility in our conception of Government. The moral and spiritual responsibility of the Ruler is an essential characteristic of the Indian type of monarchy. But the significance of Responsible Government, according to modern political terminology is quito different. The Executive Government, instead of boing responsible to the Ruler, is required to become responsible to and removable by the Legislature. This moans the extinction of the Ruler's sovereignty and authority which are to be transferred to the legislature and the people. This western idea of Responsible Government, involviug the idea of the sovereignty of the people is, thus, diametrically opposed to the basic principles of our own polity 13. Party government is an indispensable feature of the Parliamentary type of Responsible Goveramont. A party, by its very nature, is incapable of being so impartial as a Ruler can bo. Recent oxpcrience of the working of Provincial Autonomy in British India has shown that the party in poirer was inclined to dovelop autocratic and dictatorial tondencios. Of what avail is Dowocracy iſ it securos the domination of a singlo party whoso prejudices and partisanslip dony the rest of the people that legitimato frcodom which is their birthright The } ·26 following observations of Bryce regarding majority rulo ar. interesting:- 'Sudars are the chief counsellors of the Jeypore Chief."-'History of Jaipur" by T. Match Singh. "ll, on the other hand, the group constitutos majority in the Chan. br, it is omnipotent. The ball is at its ſect; 16 can count on passing all its casines and need not trouble to expound or defend proposals in debate cicept for tlic pulpose of saving appearances and putting its case before the country. It has only to go on voting steadily what has been previously deterniincd'on, in secret, uninstructed and unmoved, by arguments from any other part of the Chamber, because there is no need for listening to words which cannot affcct its predetermined" action. The Chamber, having ccased to be deliberative, bas become a mere voting machine, the passive organ of an unscen despotism. It may have cven'ccused to cxpress the national will, for the majority of u njolly party does not necessarily represent the view of the majority at the whole Chuber. Assume that whole Chamber to conti sist of 210 members, 111 of whom constituţc the ruling group. Suppose the majority of that group who, decide upon a particular couise to be 60 against 53 dissentients. Add to these fifty the hundred other members of the Chamber who are also opposed to the course proposed That course will be carried by a compact majority of 110 against 100 although, if the real opinion of the members were expressed by thes! vote, it would be icjected by 150) against 60. If we were to try to ascertain the probable will of the people on the matter by examining the popular majouties in cach constituency by which the 60 members whose vote in caucus prevailed had been elected, as compared with the numbei of votes cast for the 150 members who disapproved, the contrast between the truc popular will and the decision rendered by thuso who are supposed to represent it in the Assembly might become still more evident. Yet by this method of subjecting the whole Assembly, . to a bare mnajority of a majority, the most far-reaching and possibly irrevocable decisions might be taken. This may seem a sorry result for representative government to have reached, yet it is a logical and legitimate development of the the principle of Majority Party Rule. "(J. BRYCE: Modern Democracies, Vol. II, pages 338-89). 2 14. The so-called representatives of the people" who are returned by election represent only that party which votes for them. His Highness who is ·27 abovo partics and 'factions, is the representative and guardian of all. The security of the majority as well as minorities, of all classes, communities and sections lies 'iu the benevolent 'protection whiól the Ruler alone can afford, Responsible Government would deprive the people of this extremely necessary and valuable safeguard. 15. We are convinced that it would not be in the best interests of the State and the people to adopt Responsible Government of the foreign type as our immediate or distant goul. The Englislı constitution is the result of a gradual evolutionary process and has not been imported from outside. In Switzerland and America the ministry is not responsible to or removable by the legislature and Jet both these countries arc 'democratic. Constitutional machinery is only a means to an end, the nim of all governments being the happiness and welfare of society. This object can be best attained by 'our own monarchical system of goverument which can be so liberalised as to fulfil all the legitimate requirements and aspirations of the people. THE UNICAJERAL SCIEJE, 16. The other members of our Committee, in paragraph 60 of their Report, lave recommended "a legislature composed of two Houses, but not of a bicameral Character.” What tlies liave actually proposed is a legislature consisting of a single chamber to be called the Legislative Council, and a Representative Assembly "lrich will not take part in legislation" and will not be connected in my 11011 with the Legislative Council. The main function of tlie Ropresentatire Assembly is to be “the renti- ·28 lation of public grievances". The real work of, torjulation is to be entrustel to the Legislative Coun- In this scheme. inspite of there being two Ilulist ve have all the disadvantages of wicameral Vem in none of the advantages of a bicameral lexislature. The contemplated single Legislative (lamber pulil make the constitution definitely uimameral. 17. Democracy is so far luknown in the actual working of the administration of this State. Our esteemed colleagues rrcognise that at presont "there is no constitutional contact between the Government and the people" who have had w opportunities "to require political experience and training". They are aalse) an are of the educational and general back- Wardness of the people". Still they are puroposing a unicameral constitution which is universally recognised as more dangerous than the bicimeral system. IVe cite some eminent men to show that the world thinks of Unicameralism:--- "Nor, perhaps, would the preference for the bicameral form have become so marked but for the exposure, by practical experience of the inconveniences and dangers attendant upon alternntise methods. Some of the smaller European States such as Greece, hare inade trial of the onc.chamber system only to abanlon it in favour of two." (Sir J. A. R. Jarriott: The Vechanism of the Dodo'n State. Vol. I, P. 39). "Except at moments of revolutionary favour, the principle [of Uni. cameralium) has never been adopted by any of the great States of the modern world." (Ibill, p. 399) "Jill, Bagchiot, Henry Sidgwick, Lecky and Lord Acton. videly as they differed in their general political outlook, all concurred in the cunclusion that a single chamber legislature is dangerous to liberty, and does not conduce to cfficiency of government." (Ivid, p. 401), With reference to the British Self-governing Colonies, Sir J. A. R. Qarı iott writes: "Nor will it escape observation that notwithstauding ·129 3 the robustness of their democratic sentiments, not one of them has Adopted the unicameral model" (Ibid. p, 417) "I tell you that unless you have some such thing as a balance you cannot be safe Bs the proceedings of this (single chamber) Parliament, you see thes stand in need of a check or balancing power (OLITER CROMWELL) Of all forins of government that are possible among mankind, I do not know any which is likely to be worse than the government of a single omnipotent democratic chamber ... The tyranny of majorities is, of all forms of tyranny, that which in the conditions of modern life 18 most to be feared and against which it should be the chief object of a wise statesman to provide' LECKY "Democracy and Liberty'. Vol I p. 299 & 322). 1 18. It is with the object of establishing "full Responsible Government" that the Prajamandal proposes a Unicameral Legislature This objective is calculated to destroy our own polity. The phrase "under the aegis of tlis Highness the Maharaja" which is coupled with the demand for Responsible Governinent is meiningless and the demand is selfcontradictory, because, as we have already pointed out, the authority of the Ruler is necessarily extinguislied in a government of this type The people in general, however, lave faith in, and desire the continuance of, our traditional form of monarchy. Since it is, as it ought to be, our intention to seek constitutional progress by udopting such modern methods as vould serve to maintain the integrity of the best elements of our indigenous monarchical system, we should not knowingly introduce a politicil machinery u hich would tend to destory that we want to preserve. The disruptive tendencies of iure trained democracy are likely to mavifest themselres vigorously in a Unicameral Legislature which would certamly not be conducive to the end ne liave iu vieu, 1 ·30 > - In so far as the check and steadying influence of an Upper Ilouse would be absent, the Unicameral constitution recommended for this Staté rould be less balanced and more exposed to the dangers of mobocracy tban the constitution of British India bere at the Centre as well as in all the important Provinces, Bicameralismi reduces the risks associatedrith the introduction of democratic institutions. Even full-fledged lemocracies need the balance and safety which Second Chambers provide. Unicameralism would seriously aggravate the difficulties and perils with which our constitutional experiment would be confronted. In the Legislative Council proposed by our colleayues, a definite majority is provided for the representatives of the people. In any unicameral scheme this will be so. Even if, to begin with, the number of seats for the aristocracy is increased, that will not remove the Ĉity so long as they remain in a minority in the Besides, there will be a constant tendent umber oti: for the aristoci 'ncrease those for le when there j. mbe? Dominat o le party w le i this syste. st" tution vi ny appro will be in . ase the edy, lies in ep 19. 11 constitutio influenced t unicameral: the Seal Con economic, stru economic level i ·31- C interests, rould naturally point to a single chumber?!! The conditions in the Jaipur State are just tult' id verse. Tu' tlic formulation if the selenie n bích tholt other members of the Committee have suggested, and weight does not seem to lave bben'attached to our ! historical hackground and the existing state of society in Jaipur, The proposed constitution would involtos “too sudden a brełk with past history and tradition" which our esteemed culleagues intended to avoid (para 27). It is not possible that the various interests, classes and groups in the State can be satisfactor ily balanced in a single legislative chamber, The schome, as it is, tails to iuspire a scnse of security in sardars, landholders, other special interests, mindritics, Muslims and the orthodox Hindus, ji họ constitute the majority. The Unicameral Legislature u lich we lave been discusstng is inconsistent with the principles which sliould' govern constitutional reform in a Stite like Jaipur, is wanting in the necessary'checks and balınces, and is wholly unsuit-, ed to the genius of the people and the circumstances and environment of our State. 20. Tre Representative Assembly, according to our colleagues' schomes, would not form part of the legislature, and its main business would be "to bring to the notice of the Government the wants and difficulties of the peoples by, means of presentations and hear the answers of the Government to thoso representations." Tuo samo function is, at present, boing performed by the Central Advisory Board and District Advisory Boards w bich have been unfavourably commented upon by our colleagucs. The ncccssity of such a hody as tho Ropresentative Asstmbly is intended to be, would disappear wlion a - ·32 bicameral legislative is established; but if it is considered advisable that there should lic in iddilional agency for the ventilation of peoples' arievences, that purpose: (4111 be served by holding cumaal or periodical ("scrmnces of the same nature at the capital and in the districts. The w-called Representative Assembly is in :0) intended to meet once a year, OUR PROPOSALS. 21. We have, at present, a definite social and political meanisation based on ideals and traditions which have been highly valued for generations. The incasures of reform that we non devise niust, therefore, he correlated to these actualities. If, in order to meet mudlern requirements, we borrow foreigu constitutional devices, they should be such as would harmonise will our existing structure and would prove suitable and beneficial for the people in their present backward stage of general and political education. Keeping these principles in view and aiming at thc well-being of society as a whole, we would recommend that reform may be sought in the follüving directious: 1. The establishment of representative institutions. 2. The increasing association of the people with the administration. 3. Greator responsiveness on the part of the Goverument. 4. Necessary safeguards. . + ! 22. If a loģislature is to be established, it should ·33 be, déšnitely, of the bicameral type. That enlightened opinion in civilised countries prefers Bicameralism would be clear froin the following quotations:-- - "Tbe modern world has, with a singular meagure of unanimity decided in favour of two legislatise chambers. Sost of the constitutions now m existence are the result, as regards the structure of the legislature, of conscious intation of the English Parliament, Sir JA R Marriott "The Mechanism of the Modern State . (Vol I, p 390) 1 "That the British Colonies should have followed the example of the motherland in adherence to bicameralism is perhaps not altogether unnatural It is more remarkable that the antary States of Europa should in remodelling their constitutions have showa similar preference ( [ord, p 418) "Lechy and Lord Acton, approaching the study of politics from very different angles, are alıhe in their solicitude for the maintenance of freedom and both discern in a second chainber one of the strongest securities for its preservation" (Ird, pp. 401-2) "Lord Acton goes so far as to declare that in every genuine democracy & Second Chamber is the essential security for freedom (Lord Aoton "History of Freedom"-p 98, Ibid 402) "Henry Sidgwick, fearful as were many men of his generation lest the Legislature should encroach on the functions of the Executive, held that the langer was sensibly din.nished by the existence of two legislative chambers Sir JA R Marriott The Mechanisin of the Modern State".--p 402 Henry Suigwick Clements of Politus CXXPIII) Parliaments are bicameral mainly for two reasons: 1 - i "As a result of the federul system, and as the institutional result of a desire to check the popular principle in the constitution this does not mean that in federal States the Sucond 'Chamber was devyneil onls to represent the States , 1t 19 Johcly that there nonla base bacncome sort of Second Chamber even if it were not requiredly the Federal principle, it does not mean, therefore that there is al cent froin theee (Federal 5 ·34 Second Chambers) the intention or spirit of a curb" (Herman Finer: "The Theory and Pratice of Modern Government", Vol. I p. 666). Most of the Senates in modern countries bave been deliberately contrived as checks in the popular House, in imitation of ancient Rome or of England."(J.Bryce: "Modern Democracies" Vol. II, p. 434). Those modern thinkers and statesmen who have held that every well-framed constitution should contain some check upon the power of the popular assenibly have usually found it in the creation of a second assembly." (Ibid p. 437) When the first constitutions of the American States were drafted, a second chamber was deliberately introduced in imitation of the British Parliament with its two houses. The example has been followed in most of the countries that have given themselves frainers of more or less popular government in modern tiwcs." ( Ibid p. 138). "A real and strong second chamber is a sine qua non of efficient legislation and government." (Frederick Harrison.) What then is expected from a well-constituted Second Chamber is not a rival infallibility, but an udditional security It is hardly too much to say that, in this view, almost any second chamber is better than none." (Sir Henry Maine). 23. The reasons which make it advisable and necessary for us to have a second Chamber may be further, stated thus:- (1) To maintain proper balance between the different interests, classes and sections and to minimise the dangers of the possible despotism and tyranny of the majority party, a second chamber is essential., "The great majority, of the democracies of the world, even those u hich have come recently into being, have been established on a bicamerai basis. Experience in the Australian and American Federations seems to shoir that their existence haz been a security > ·35 2 t 5 against abuse of power and* impetuosity on the part of the popular chamber In the words of Herman Finer, 'Anarchy must be avoided by a balance of power provided in the constitution." + If it were possible to secure balance of power without Second Chanıbeis the world Tould not liave bot bered about them. (2) An Upper House would reduce the occasions for the exercise of the specia) powers of His Tigliness and the Prime Minister The Indian Statutory Conmission mention, n ther Report, that they do not consider that the Governor 8 powers of overruling the legislature provide, as is often sugges ted, an alternative to an Upper House The sphere of the Governorm his individual capacity is mainly executive The exercise by him of powers of overru Jing the legislature canzot be regarded as equivalent in value to the decision ofa legislative and deliberative body (3) The United Provinces Committee udani mously, favour a second chamber as likely to prevent antagonism arising between the Governor and legisla ture as a result of frequent resort to the veto (1) It is better that the responsibility for aoting as a brabe op the lower house should normally be exercised by second chamber than by the Governor-which is the alternative (2) Viscount Brice says "there is the method of subjecting measures passed by the popular representative assembly to revision or rejection by * Report of the Indian Franchise Committee -- Vol I p 150 (1932) + Herman Liner "The Theory and Practice of Nodern Government Vol I p 144 Report of the Indian Statutory Cominıssion- Vol II p 98 (1930) (1) Report of the Indian Statutory Conimission iki Vol II p. 98 (1930) (2) Report of the Indian Franchise Conmittee Yol I p 151 (1993) 1 1 power

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·87. + 1 is, therefore, necessary that we should proceed with great cantion and care and try to produce a model u lich might be safely and advantageously copied by other sister states. (5) Bicameralism would be more consistent with our polity and more conducive to the preservation of our indigenous system of monarchy tlıan Unicameralism. "(c) Both territorial and functional representartion are desirable and a combination of these can be more satisfactorily and ciuitably secured in a double-chamber legislature. (7) As our colleagues have proposed two chambers, the bicameral system would practically involve no additional cost. (8) The whole problem was fully thrashed out by the British Government in connection with the question of constitutional rcform in British India. Tho Government accepted the view of those who "read coustitutional history as showing that the consideration of legislation by one house is inadequate, and that a sccond chamber has been proved to be the best revisory instrument.” (1) Inspito of the Congress demand for Unicamcralism, tlic Government decided upon a bicameral constitution for tlic contro as well as all the important Indian provinces where aristocracy existed. A for small provinces had to go without second cham- ·38.1 bers “because the material from which they could be formed does not exist in their provinces." (2) The decision of hc British Government in favour of bicameralism is positive proof of its suitability to our conditions. 24. We shall now deal with certain objections against a tiro-chamber legislaturé:- (1) We do not conciur in the view expressed by our learned colleagues that an Upper House with a predominance of the nobility "would be a citadel of reactionary forces hindering all popular progress.” We consider this to be a false apprehension. Présent-day tendencies are being increasingly und and appreciated and the need es is realised t ble e aristoći'acy. n' "If-preservat lu ral leade ogressiv of in only foi U pro Sab .: trit? * ex 4 to Sme i oppo its · Trithi If the 1 mem ·39 יין : nino of these are officials, there will be 26 sardars and landholders and the rest Till lave 24 seats. If, these 24 members combine with the officials they will carry ercry nicasure which the landed aristocracy might opposc. Further, wc are not proposing that measures rejected ly the Second Chamber should be drop ped. In case of a difference of opinion between the two clambers, the measure could be referred to the Government fo acceptance or rejection. \Vith these arrangements there can be no fear of the landed aristocracy dominating the Legislature. (2) There is thing cumbersome about the tuo chamber's lic are proposing. The icameral system is working all over ilie vorlil its well as in India, without any special diflicultı; In the event of disagreement between the two houses one of the three simple devices we are proposing later could lice adopted fo arriving it a decision (3) It was mentioned in the course of one of our discussions that the bicameral constitucion was likely to oversladow the authorits of the Government. Tl.is uzat illca is not, in the least, justified · in creneral experience. The history o 1 (1) Report of the India Statutory Comission, Vol. II. mnge 98 (1930). (3) Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, l'ol II page 97 (1930).

·40 3 second chambers proves, as we have shown above, that they (i) Bjely the Government to maintain cquilibrium and stability, (ii) tend to oleviate the necessity of gorernmental interference, thus preventing friction between the Legislature and the Goveruinent and (vii) curh the recklesseness of the popular chamber. The value of the Second Cliam ler is diminished if it consists exclusively or largely of the same class of men as those vrlo form the First Chamber, but when the Usper llouse is mainly composed of the aristocracy and the propertied classes, it positively strengthens the hands of the Governmeut. Ou proposal that measures on which there miy be disagreement between the tiro chainbers should be referred to tie Government for decision, further enhances the scope for the exercise of the discretion of the Government. 1) Our learned ailleagues really admit the necessity of a second chamber when they say (in para 22 ): "A Double Chamber may be necessary only in cases where a fully democratic Lower House with plenary powers is set up. : In such a case an Upper House may he needed to actos a brake 01 hasty old. considered action by the Lower Ilouse." The Legislative Council recomme..ded by Qur colleagues may uot for the present possess what may technically be called ·41 } 1 1 > - 11111 plenary popers, but the proposed poners must be regarded as very considerable and wide for our peoplę jy ho have never before been associated with legislative bodies. With the exception of the subjects that are usually excluded from the purview of a legislature, our legislative chamber would enjoy almost the same potrers as are exercised by the legislature in British India. We would go the length of saying that, if the peoples' representatives are to be entrusted with legislative fuuctions, however limited they may be, it would be very necessary, in the interests of safety and order, to adopt the bicameral system. Our esteemed colleagues add: "A$ the establislıment of such a Loner House in the immediate future is not envisaged by us, the necessity for a Second Chamber disappears". We see no reason why the possession of plenary poners by the legislature should be made a necessary condition for the creation of ap upper revisory bouse. Since it is intended that one chamber should be invested with legislative functions, ulterer their precise extent may be, ne urge, for reasons which re hare already dwelt upion, that the unicameral scheme would be unsatisfactors and should be tiropped in faronr of a bicameral une, In paragraph 13 of the Report, the otlier members of our Committee secm 1 - ·42 + to express the vicir that the introduction of Bicameralism should be dependent upon the immediate establishment of full responsible government". In this connection we would invite attention to the fact that althongh full responsible government does not exist in British India, the bicameral constitution has been adopted by the Government of India as well as by most of the Provinciul Governments. 25. The vast majority of the people hold conservatire or moderate vieirs, They would prefer a bicameral coustitution to a unicameral one when they know the merits and demerits of both. It is a fact that constitutional problems are unknown to the masses. The replies received by our Committee are not an index to the popular feeling, because it is well known that the overwhelming majority of those who appeared as witnesses before tle Committee or sent written replies to its Questionnaire belong to one particular school of political thought. The people in geueral who are loyalists and moderates did not care, for reasons which are probably known to the Government, to send a suficient number of their representatives as witnesses or written replies. It is, however, significant that as against the Prajamanda) and certain similar associations which have asked for a unicameral legislature, the Sardar Sabha-the organisation of the Sardars of the st.ite, the Rajput Sabha, which res presents the importint Rajput race, the Rajguru Sant Mahant Samiti, the Arya Samaj,* all the four important associations of the Muslim 1) The Hindu Sabba did not send a reply to the Questionnaire The Arya Samaj wants three Houses.

·43 communnity, (2) and the Sanatan Dharma Mandal si buch speaks on behalf of the bulk of the Hindu population, have all indicated, in their ieplies to the Questionnaile, their decided preference for a bicameral constitution Infoi mal discussions among different groups of members of our Committee showed that it might have been possible foi our Committee to evolve an almost unanım us scheme nf reforms on the basis of the bicameral system if the inipression had not been created, rightly or wongly, in the minds of some that the Goicrument favoured the unicamel al model It is still oui fer sent hope that this impiession med turn out to be incorrect and that the weiglity and immense advantages of a Double Chamber legislature may induce the Govcrumeut to decide in its favou We believe Bicameralism will be the most generally acceptable constitution for our Stato. Lvon the Induu National Congress has Worked the cameral system in British Indid. Aftoi carclul deliberation we have come to the Conclusion that in ow socio political structue, a unicameral legislature will not tend to "secue the (2) The four Muslim organisations which sent replıcs are: Anjuman 1 Khaduwul Islam Darul Akhbar Kaim Ibanese Board and Islanu Panchayat The Vuxlım members of our Columittee have cxprcsscd the vicw that thc Vuslu coininudity favours the brcallieral system and the follow ing statement bearing their signatures as well as ours was submitted to our Committee "The cxpression of our views and our pirticipation in voting on all points should be understood to be subject to the reservation that We BIL going to propose a seperate schemo of a bicaucral legislature, ·44 steady anilharmonious constitutional progress of the State from the point of view of all interests concerned," which, as laid down by the Government, should be our ultimate aim. Taking a comprehensive view of the hole question ile would say, unhesitatingly, that a bicameral constitution would, in every way, 'be definitely safer and more advisable and suitable for 'our State. 3 The Legislature 26 We recommend that the Legislature should , consist of a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly r $ The Legislative Council. 27. If the Legislative Council consists of fiftynine members in addition to the President, nine seats inay be allotted to officials. Out of the remaining fifty seats for non-official members, there should be tirenty-six seats for the sardars and landholders and twenty-four for the rest. These twenty-four seats may be distributed among the propertied classes ou a geographical basis, and others. Out of these twenty-four „seats five may be nominated by the Government. --- The idea is that the Second Chamber should consist of a class and type of men different from those who'constitute tbe First Chamber, in order that the various interests may be evenly balanced. The representatives of the people should be in a decided 1 ajority in the Lower House and the landed aristocracy should have one or two more seats than the rest of the members in the non-official bloc in the Upper Touse. What we have proposed would give the sard irs and landholders about 43% of the sonts in the ·Second Chamber. The representation of the landed aristocracy should be proportionate to their importance. Among those classes which could find representation in the Upper Chamlier, the sardars and landholders are fundoubtedly the most important. In vion of the considerations which we have mentioned above in pragrapli S and of the position of special eminence which the nobility enjoys historically in the State, it would not be unreasonable to give them tho represontation we are proposing. They are entitled to substantial weightage and that point! should also be borne in mind. It would be recalled that they are asking for a resei vation of 70% of the total number of seats in the Upper House. If the landed aristocracy is given a representation lesser than 'w lat we have proposed above, it would also' upset the whole balance. The arrangement that we are proposing seems quite fair and should prevent' tho domination of any single interest, party or group. 28! Tbo comparisun which has been drawn between tlie talukdars and zamind us of British Indian provinces and the'sardars of this state in paragraplı 33 of our colleagues' Report cannot be considered to be fair, because the status of the Jaipur sardars is of an entirely diferent and superior nature, and the political organisation and constitution of the State differs materially from that of a British Indian province. The Legislative Assembly. 29. In a Logislative Assembly of one' hundred and twonty mombers, exoluding tho President, thore slonuld be twenty-five seats for sardars and landholders, sixty-four for territorial constituencies, six for functional groups, and twonty-fivc for official and ·46 nominated members. Out of the twenty-five members to be nominated by the Government, not more than half may he officials, the rest being non-officials. Out of the sixty-four territorial seats à certain number sliould be reserved for Rajputs. Weightage for Rajputs should not be less than what may be decided upon for Muslims. It is noteirorthy that seats are reserved for Marathas in the Bombay Provincial Legislative Assembly. It would only be in the fitness of things that reservation of seats for Rajputs must be provided, for they do not only belong to the ruling race hut also form the sword-arm of the State. The proposed reservation of 20% seats for sardars and landholders in the Legislative Assembly Tould suffice, provided that liberty is also given to them to stand for election from the general territorial constituencies and that 43% seats are reserved for these classes in the Legislative Council as proposed above. 30. Sardars and landholders should be elected or separate electorates composed of their own class. This is the recognised and accepted method. 2 31. We have reconsidered the question of joint and separate electorates for Muslims in the light of the view which prevailed in our Committee and which favoured joint electorates. We do not wish to oppose the general opinion that joint electorates would be better. 1 32. A most extraordinary and unfair discrimination against sardars is sought to be made by a proposal embodied in the proviso to clause (1) of paragraph 81 of the Report of our esteemed colleagues. It is suggested that sardars should not be ·47 1) eligible to stand foi election in territorial constitucncies If a definite majority in the Legislative Council is provided for the sardors by the constitution, it would he a different matter so far as that Chamber is concerned, but the imposition of this disability would not be justifiable in the case of the Legislative Assembly in which only about 20 seats are roposed to be reserved foi these classes. The argument advanced by ou learned colleagues is that "if the sardars are alloired to contest terutour] seats, there is a danger of their capturing mms of them to the detriment of the interests of the general public We do not think that this is a correct sending of the situation. It is admitted that out of a total population of thuuty lahls, about eighteen lakhs live in thihan? irers The happiness and prosperity of these eighteen Inhhs of rots vitally affects the sarduis uliose interests ire closely interwoven with those of these people. The landed a istocracy has far greater ieisons to care for the well-being of the ruial masses than those professional politicians 11 ho are munls actuated by a desire to be in the lime-light and who have notlung to gain or lose by the fortune or misfortune of those n hom they profess to iepiesent. The Saidas who have always (listinguished them selves by then patriotism, bare a stahe in the country which gives them a genume and ibiding interest in the welfare of the people and the Stute Tliese natural leaders of the countryside should be encouraged to represent the cause of the rural population The seeking of the votes of the people by the landed aristociep would be a process uluich should yomote hannons and a greate: realisition of the identity of the interests of these sections of society. In British India, no attemet has ever been made to prevent the ·48 بم landholders by statutotry provision, from being returned by general constituencies, although in two of the provinces this class succeeded in capturing as many as 97% and 74% seats. It should also be nemembered that political propaganda is going to make it increasingly lifficult for saldars to be successful at elections in general constituencies. We are emphatically of the opinion that saidus should be allowed to contest the general territorial seats. It would be advisable to make it permissible for Saudars to send their representatives to the Legislative Assembly. This practice exists, at p:esent, in the case of the district advisory boards. 1 33. If the Government desire to reduce the numerical strength of the Chambers, it might be done proportionately, ..34. The Presidents of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly should be appointed by His Highness the Maharaja Salib Bahadur. Each Chamber may choose one of its members to be the Vice-President of the Chamber corcerned. 35. We leave it to the Government to decide the precise extent of the powers to be entrusted to the two Chambers, but we consider it essential that both the Chambers should be invested with co-equal powers. The balance of political strength, which ought to he aimed at, cannot 'e ensured unless this is done. The Upper and Lower Chambers of the British Indian and Provincial Legislatures enjoy equal powers except in the case of Money Bills, whic) originate in the Lower House. (1) Viile Report of the Indian Statutory Commission vol. II p. 77.

·49 } 1 13 Excluded Subjects. 36. While we agree that the subjects mentioned in paragraphs 56 and 37 of the Majority Report should be excluded from the purvien of the Legislature, we propose the following amendments: -- ( 2 ) in clause (6) 'of paragraph 17 after the word "rights” the word “poners” be inserted, and after the word "Maharaja” the "following be added:-- "and the exercise of such privileges, rights and poirers by the sárdars." (22) in order to protect the dignity of sardars, the following be added to the list of excluded subjects:- "sardais". (122) there is a genuine fear in the minds of orthodox Hindus in general as well as Muslims, that the heterodox section of the population, though numerically very small, might find itself in a strong position in the Legislature and try to introduce legislation affecting religion and religious usages w bich would be highly objectionable. This apprehension would, to some extent, be diminished by the establishment of a second chamber, but it cannot be completely removed without a specific provision in the constitution to exclude such matters from the purvicw of the Legislaturc. We, therefore, strongly recommend that the following be added to the list of ercluded subjects: “Ecclesiastical matters and matters atlecting religion, rcligious nages, practices and customs 1 39 ·50 37. We agree that the items of expenditure nientioned in paragraph 59 of the Majority Report should be treated as "excluded' heads" and suggest the following amendments:- # (i; the wording of clause (e) of paragraph 59 is not comprehensive enough. The clause should be so vorded as to include all kinds of compensitions and other payments to thikauas aud bhomias etc. (iz) under paragraph 59 the following should be added to the items of expenditure l'egarded as "excluded heads :-- “Expenditure ou Temples and Religious endomments." 3 Action in case of disnuieement. 38. In case of disagreement between the tiro chambers on ally measure, one of the following three methods may be adopted for arriving at a decision:- (1) both the chambers may meet in a joint sitting ann, after dehate, if 7.5% of the members present yote in favour of the measure it should be deemed to have been passed by the Legislature, otherwise it should be treated as rejected. When the numerical strength of the Lower Chamber is double that of the Upper, it might be taken almost as a foregone conclusion that the opinion of the Lover Chamber mould prevail in a joint sitting. In order to remedy tliis inequality it is necessary that a majority of 75% should be required for the acceptance of a messure; or ·51 (12) the matter may be referred to a joint committee composed of an equal number of members of eich house. Either a 1 effort may be made to arrive at a compromise, failing which the measure lies dropped, or the matter man he decided by a majoiits of votes of the member of the joint committee, or (272) the matter may be referred to the Government which may take such action as it - deems | ropei. T The second methud is similar to the Swiss and American watenis. Of these thiee devices we consider the last two to be better than the first and the last one to be the best of all, at least toi the present. Disqualifications 39. We agree to the proposals contained in paragraph 79 of the majority Report regarding the disqualificntions which skuld render a poison 10- eligible for memberslip of the Legislature. Qualifications of elector's and members 40. We are opinion that the qualificationfor votes and candidate for membership brala ir the same in the case of the Logislative Commons except that voters should live attuined the pages years and candidates tle nge of 27 ein. 11. l'or tlie Legislative Council a pan serii le qualified to be includedi m the cleaner any territorial constituency iſ hie: (2) is n tazimi kardlar or the best or eldest bhanwar of a tam ·52 ; 1 wi) is a klias chouki sardar or the eldest kanyar or eldest blanırar of a khas cliouki sardar ; or (iii) is a Rajguru or Sant Mahant holding at least one village; or (iv) is a lanholder of any description holding at least one villagę; or (2) has an annual income, from any source, of not less than twelve thousand rupees; or (vi) holds any title, order or decoration conferred by or on behalf, of His Majesty not being lourer than Ditan Bahadur, Rao Bahadur, Rai Bahadur, Sardar Bahadur. Khan Bahadur, Malama lopadhyaya or Shamsul-ulams, or any title, order or decoration conferred by His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur, not being of a lower rank than that specified by the Government; or (vir lias been awarded by the Government of Jaipur a civil, military or political pension or by the Governmeņt of India a military pension of not less than two hundred and fifty rupees per month; or (viiii is or has been either: - a Minister or member of the Executive Council of the State; or (ix) a Judge of the Chief Court or High Court of the State; or c) a Chancellor, Pro-Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Fellow or Honorary Fellow of, or a' member, of the senate or Court of any University consti- ܫܝܕ ·53 tiited'hy lau in British India or an Indian States; or (ci) a chairman of a municipal board constituted under the,, Jaipur State , Municipalities Act. The idea underlying the proposal to extend the qualification to the eldest kanıtars and eldest bhanwars i of, sardars is to utilise the educated younger generation of the aristocracy for this purpose. For the, same, renson, we propose that the minimum qualifying ago for membership for sardars, their eldest kanwars and eldest bhannars should be twenty-one years. 42. For the legislativo Assembly we propose a system of election of members through panchayats. Every village with a population of not less than1000 and not more than 2000 should elect five panches and those having a population above 2000 should clect, ong, panch extra for, cach incroase in population of 1000 persons, or part thereof., In towns cach moląļla should elect it panch. All such panches should be the electors. In Jaipur, City and wherever municipalitios exist, the electors should be those who are on the electoraì rolls of the municipalities. 11 l'he pajichayat is a well-known indigenous spinstitution. , A system, of olcations through panchayats is likely to prove simpler and more suitable for our condition, then, other methods. ,, Under this system the electorate will be ofą manageable size and yet the principle of univerzal adult, franchise will be indirectly introduced. We may mention that this system oxist, at present,' in Jodhpur and Bláratpur states. - " 1 ·:54 13. A porson should be qualified to be elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly, from any territorial constituency if he (1) is a tazimi sardar or a kanyar or bhanwar of a tazimi sardar; or (22) is a khas chouki sardar or a kaurar or a bhanwar of a khas chouki sardar; or 1221) is a chhut bhaiya of a thikana; or 129) is a Rajguru or Sant Mahant; or 109) is a landholdes of any description, holding not than less ten blighas of chahi or forty bhighas of barani laud in the constituency; or (vi) owns or resides in the constituency, in a rural area where there is no municipality, in a house or part of a house, the value of which is not less than Rs. 300/-; or (011) is a terant of land in the constituency in respect of which rent or revenue, in cash or kind,' of an annual amount to be prescribed by the Government is payable; or (1121) is on the electoral roll of a municipality within the constituency; or <?x) is a retired, pensioned or discharged officer, i non-commissioned officer; soldier of the State military forces or of the Indian Army; or (2) possesses' the qualifications mentioned in clausés (vi), (vul), (0212); (2x), (x) and (xi) of paragraph' 41 above; or (x2) is a graduate of any univesity constituted by law in British India or Indian State, or 1 1 + } } - ·55 has passad such examination in Oriental' or Indian languages as may be declued by the Government to be equivalent. 1 For rant of the necessary data we are unable to suggest the amount of rent under clause (211) of this paragraph and leave it to the Government to speak cify it. 1 Voters should' bave attained the ice of 21 years and candidates the age of 25 years. 44. Regarding the term of the Legivintive Council and the Legislative Assembly we propose that the practice prevailing, at present, in Butish: Inilia, in this respect, may be adopted ! The Executive. 47. We agree that a popular element may be introduced into the Executive Council, but we are opposed to the idea of making any statutory restriciion requiring one or any number of ministers to be necessarily elected members of the Legislature. TLpopular element will be automatically leprestai in the ministry wlien the following recommande with thich we agree, is accepted:-- "The Comtnittet 14 ngrced that the lar Vint-this should be cuterminous r. Council Tie term of other un terren Minister whould ordillərily, not ry No recoininende that the Vinia*: Jaipurians and that the l'uf 3'-- be a Jaipuram ilargipt in Report). We endore the siess of the Cono iu paraur iph 29, but we feel Lawn paragripli 100, to provide b:

·56 lcast of the non-official Ministers should not be a Sardar" is inconsistent with the recommendation made in paragraph 102 to the effect that there should De no statutory provision circumscribing the poirer of llis lighness in this respect. If the Chairman's proposal were accepted it would make it possible to liare an Executive Concil in which there need not be eren i single sardar. It is a historical fact that there was a time when the linistry (Panich Musa lahat ) consisted exclusively of sardars and that it was always been and is the established practice in this state to hayo, in the Executive Concil, a certain number of sardar's u lose proportio was often more than 50% of the total number of Ministers. It is necessary and iinportant to maintain this practice cither by convention or by statute. In case the Ciovernment decide to make any statutory provisioù with regard to the composition of the Sinistry, it should be laid down that hall of the number of popular Ministers, if any, whether taken from the legislature or from vutside, and half of the total number of Ministers in the Executive Council must he Rijput sardars. The Judiciary and Public Service Commission. 46. We concur in the proposals of the Committee regarding the Judiciary, the Civil Service and the establishment of a Public Service Commission. Our learned colleagues have recommended the adoption of the principles embodied in Section 2:24) of the Government of India Act, 1935, but we think that the provisions of clause (3), (c) of the section hould be considerably modified to suit local coditions.

·57 It was decided by our committee to recommend the establishment of a Public Service Commission on the lives laid dotn in sections 264 to 268 of the Government of India Act, 1935; but oning, férhaps, to an oversight the principle indicated by the words underlined in clause (2), (c) of section 265 of thô Government of India Act, 1935, which we reproluce belor, has not been incorporited as the think iti should have been, in paragraph 107 of the majority Report:- “No other member of the Federal or of any Provincial Commission shall be eligible for any other appointment under the Crown in India without the approval, iả the case of an appointment in connection with the affairs of a Province, of the Governor of the Province in his discretion and, in the case of any other appointment, of the Governor General in bis discretion." One of the greatest grievances of the people is that lccal mén cannot find employment in State Service which is filled with an unnecessarily large uumbu ut outsideis. We recommend that steps should be t'iken to ensure the appointment of local món on all posts and to give them necessary training for all branches of the State Services. This would aftord greater satisfaction to the public than any, other menkuic of reform. Fundamental Rights. 47. Convention ensures, in our State, the enjoy. ment of Fundamental Rights by all. A declantion, in this behalf, rould not only involvo various, ·58 difficulties and complexities, but would prove to be practically ineflectual. We do not think that any useful purpose would be served by such a declaration. -4:8. The principle embodied in section 300 of the Government of India Act, 1935, might be incorporated in our constitution by a suitably vorded provision. 19. We are in general agreement with the proposals embodicd in the following paragraphs of tle Blajority Report:- 32, 11, 43, 46 to 50, 55, 72 to 78, 83, 84, 91, 113 to 115, 117 to 119. m'he word "unanimously” in the first line of paragraph 65 should be deleted, because the proposal contained in this paragraph was not unanimously adopted. Conclusion, 50. In conclusion tre vish to invite the attention, of the Government to certain fundamental considerations. It is generally acknowledged that English system of Parliamentary Government is extremely difficult to work. It pre-supposes certain conditions and cannot succeed in their absence. One of the greatest advantages of our oirn monarchical system of governmect is that it does not allor any group to impose its will upon others. The vesting of authority in a large number of people gives rise to rule by a party. There is a constant tendency on the part of the party in poter to assume that whatever it does is. right and that the opinions of all others can be safely ignored. This is the road that leads to despotism and dictatorship. All those who do not compose the dominant party fail to receive," from such a govern- ·59 ment, that equitable and just treatment to which they are entitled. Herein lies a serious menace to human liberty and safety. The most difficult problem for those who have to reconstruct our constitution is to devise methods by which the increasing association of the people with the Government can be secured without the development of party rule. In the conditions that exist in this State nothing would be more deplorable than party government. That even a democratic country can, to some extent, avoid this evil is demonstrated by the example of Switzerland. What is wanted is a constitution that will prevent governmental authority from being exercised by a single party, will ensuro a balance of political power and promote the greatest good of all sectious of society. KUSHAL SING. LAXMI NARAIN YADAV, SURENDRA SINGH. CAIMAN SINGH (Captain). CHIRANJILAL RAMCHANDRA LOYALKA 5-6-43 ·60 Additional Note by Seth Chiranjilal R. Loyalka Subject to this brief separate note I have signed the separate report along with my esteemed friend Thakur Sahib Kushal Singhji and others. Our ancient conception of state is différent. Bhagwan Manu 'states'as under स्वाभ्यमात्यो पुरंराष्ट्र कोश दण्डौ सहत्तथा । सप्तप्रकृतयो त्योताः स्तोडगं राज्य मुच्यते ॥ ( मनुस्मृति अ० श्रो० २६४) Thus'according to Manu Smriti, a state comprises tlie following component parts: (:) King, (2) Ministers, (3) Capital, (4) Territory, (5) Treasury (6) Army, and (7) Allies. In an ideal government all these component parts function in harmony for the good of the state. The constitution of Jaipur as well as all other ancient Hirídín states has come into being in pursuance of this ideal. According to ancient Hindu political science, sovereignty of the state is vested witu the King. A virtuổus 'and dutiful king is looked upon as father' by all the subjects. The king chose liš ministers, taking into consideration the qualifications of each and governed the state on the advice of these ministers. All the ministers were responsible to the king for their acts and carried out his directions and Will. The popular form of Government is opposed to ancient Hindu political theory. The strength and weakness of the popular form of Government lies in party system. Where parties are formed on tell considered principles such as in Great Britain, such ·61 form of Government has achieved a measure of success, but cren in Eurore in many countries this has led to multiplicity of parties with the result that there is frequent change of Government. Government too is weak and cannot do much good to thic people. In a country like Trdia y here this form of Government is still in an experimental stage it would laid to party bickerings and lower the officiency and moral standard of the state. Any attempt to curtail the poners and rights of the king through populır form of Government would be harmful to the best interests of the state. The imitation of the present system of Government in vogue iu British India, in Indian states will be disastrous. In British India the real power is still in the Lands of the Governor-Geuera) and Governors who are appointed by Ministers of the British Parliament and are responsible to it. In miny times the interests of India and Great Britain are not the same; tlierefore the cry and agitation for Self-Government in British India is natural. In a state like Jaipur the interests of thc Ruler and the ruled are the same, and under these circumstances an enlightened and virtuous Ruler, assisted by able and upright ministeis · can do a great deal for the state. I, therefore, sec no cause for framing any new constitution for Jaipur State on the lines in British India, Iloirever, as the state seems to be in favour of introducing some Reforms, I have signed the-Report. CHIRANJILAL RIJCIIANDRA LOYALKA.

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