·PREFACE. No apology I dcem is necessary for this edition of the Ny aj asārı with the very valuable commentary of Vasudio of Kashmir which is among the earliest of the numerous commentaries on the book Ill preparing this edition I have collated the following MSS all from the Bhandārkar Oriental Research Institute 1 # No 391 of 1875-76 which contus the commentary herein printed No Soo of 1887 1897 no of 1873 1874 2 3 Besides these I have occasionally consulted Vs lo of 1884 1887 which contains the text interposed with the cominentary called Vayahalanidhi of Vahāde aslıraina Thic already printed editions of the text on by Vr P udya and the other by the late Dr Satis Chandra fidia bhushara which proud of grunt list to me are marked ? and respecti ely in To Dr Sh Belialkar Superintendent V Department of the aforesaid Institute I am indebted for his kindnes lending me the Miss I also desire to express a moru senerul debt to Prof hAblyanhar 1 of the Gujaratla College for advice and criticism Vy best thuls are duc to Dr G Card : { NS of the Oriental Bool Sipplang ngan? lor haring undertahan the publication of this union TERCUSSON COLLEGE 9 July 1922 } CR DCI \DHR, ·INTRODUCTION. The Ajājasăra 15 a brief compendium of the Nyāya in three chapters While generally agrceng with Gautama and his school his work shows considerable traces of Jain anc Buddhist influence Thus in his treatment of the subject he sets aside the old division of sixteen categories which the Buddhist rejected and confines himself to the topics of the nicans of valid knowledge although many of the logical and dialectical categories of Gautama are enumerlied and ex plained in conjunction with the question of inference More striking 15 Bhasarvajna s rejection of comparisen as 1 sepa rate means of pron and he is at great pains to ansuer any Shisection on the ground otys divergence from the Sutrakära If the Sutthāra etjunerates comparison side by side with perception inference and verbal testimony it does not mean contenids Bhaxars and that the Satrakāra recogilised com PAs an mod dent meaire mon rohrad na dole case of example and the fallacies which are separately dealt with though already included in the Pramanias and the Nigrahasthānas respectively so in the present instance ve have to read a deeper motive of the Sutrahera The follon ers of Buddha doubt the validity of word as a means of proof on the ground that verbal testimony is merely corrobora tory of the knowledg that i dered through perception and inference and so like memory is not infallible Nox can it be maintain d that verbal testiniany applies were perception and inference ful for in the first place it is hard to concerc of an object which cantint be establisited by per ception and inference and secondly such an object ain never ·INTRODUCTION. The Ajājasăra 15 a brief compendium of the Nyāya in three chapters While generally agrceng with Gautama and his school his work shows considerable traces of Jain anc Buddhist influence Thus in his treatment of the subject he sets aside the old division of sixteen categories which the Buddhist rejected and confines himself to the topics of the nicans of valid knowledge although many of the logical and dialectical categories of Gautama are enumerlied and ex plained in conjunction with the question of inference More striking 15 Bhasarvajna s rejection of comparisen as 1 sepa rate means of pron and he is at great pains to ansuer any Shisection on the ground otys divergence from the Sutrakära If the Sutthāra etjunerates comparison side by side with perception inference and verbal testimony it does not mean contenids Bhaxars and that the Satrakāra recogilised com PAs an mod dent meaire mon rohrad na dole case of example and the fallacies which are separately dealt with though already included in the Pramanias and the Nigrahasthānas respectively so in the present instance ve have to read a deeper motive of the Sutrahera The follon ers of Buddha doubt the validity of word as a means of proof on the ground that verbal testimony is merely corrobora tory of the knowledg that i dered through perception and inference and so like memory is not infallible Nox can it be maintain d that verbal testiniany applies were perception and inference ful for in the first place it is hard to concerc of an object which cantint be establisited by per ception and inference and secondly such an object ain never ·NYAYASARA 3 One more point of interest in the work is its relutation of the atheism of the Buddhists who abandon the Vedāntic conception of the Absolute or the sathha idea of spirit and accept only the flecting series of mental impressions as a quası scality The soul 15 established by our autl or by infcrunce. It is the substrate of cffccts like cognition pain and pleasure this substrate the sense cannot be lor in that case we will not feel pleasure or pain when the sense-organ becomes multilated but this is contrary to crperience Tor again can the body be regarded as the substrate for the body cier changes so that what "ęciperienced as young men will not be remember ed by us as old men but we know that impressions endure though the senses fail us though the body fauls us Simuarly of the doctrine of the Buddhas of a feeting series of mentri states a previous mental state is diflerent from a succeed 10g one so that the cxperience we had in the previouss tatc cannot endure in the succeeding one but this is contrasen cd by our experience If it be said that spite of the difference between the two states it 13 possible to retain impressions of the one in the other related as they are to each other a, cause and effect we answer that this cannot be for even though He admit the possibility of the qualties of the cause enduring in the effect such a presumption is barred in the case of the Buddhas since therr theory 13 that an effect aries when the cause is completely destroyed And hence by elimina tion sc have to accept the existence of the soul The Soul is of two kinds the absolute which is one all powerful eternal not subject to the limitations of our trans Szent existence Maheshwar the all wise and the individual soul Further our author states that through the grace of this omp. cient creator the worshipper obtain, as a reward of his devotion release in the form of eternal pleasurable cons ·4 INTRODUCTION ciousness To Bhāvarvajna the Varslieshtla idea of a state of release without happiness like that of a stone Or the Vedāntic one that each who seems a separate whole should (use all the skıts of self agam and renege in tire absolute was faith as vague as all unsweet From these premises, it is inferred that our author must have flourished at a time when Jain and Buddhist influence was strong and accordingly Dr Satis Chandra Vidyābhusana places him in the early years of the zoth century He has pomted out that one of the earliest commentary on the work the Nyāyabhusna is quoted by the Buddhist sage Ratna kirti, preceptor of Ratnahirts Sānti who lived about 983 AD and he is placed after Dhammakıtı the Buddhist logi cian (650 AD) whose controversy about the fallacy of non erroneous contradition (fararsantai) seems to have been rcferred to in the Nyājasāra He shows a marked Shaiva influence and so it is further premised of him that he a native of Kāshmir where Shaivabeliet was always strong was Vasudeo, the coinmentator was the son of Sarya and a native of Kashmir Nothing is known about his personality The verve and the strong controsertial animus that he displays in the commentary points to a period when Buddhist and Jain logic excited the liveliest interest, and this is rendered more plausible if we can place hun immediately after the author, and we have evidence to do so In the colophon to his work he refers to the Nyayabhūsaga and says that the present commentary is designed for those who are unable to follow the bigger commentary, tlic Nyāyabljusana , and in the body of the commentary, while Ciplaining the Nigrahasthana Prātijaahanı he says that this Nigrabasthana also includes ·NYAYASARA 5 other minor varicties such as Pratijnaviskıcshahin which are explained by lilin in his Vāja-Bhushana If, therefore, we han believe fum to be the author of the Myāya-Bhushana from which Jayasunhasurt frecly quotes, we shall have to Dace him in the middle of the tenth century 1 immediately after Bhasarvajna, if we accept the early years of the soih century as his probable date CR DEVADHAR ·विषयानुक्रमणिका. । IDYA N MATAL २ १ प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः १ मगलाचरणम्. २प्रमाणलक्षणम्. ३ प्रत्यक्षलणम्. ४ अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्, ५ योगिनत्यक्षम्. २ अनुमानपरिच्छेदः १ अनुमानलक्षणम्. २ प्रातिशा LIBRARBE १६-६५ २५ ४ यामाहाः उदाहरणम् उदाहरणाभासा उपनयः ८ निगमनम् ९ फथा १० याद ४३ १२ विताना २४ जातपः १५ निमारपानानि ३ आगमपरिच्छेदः आगमएम २ प्रमेयम् ३ মানা ४ मोधपिरेपनम् ८४ ·॥श्री॥ भासर्वप्रणीतन्यायसार, वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ।। ॐ देवदेवमभिवंद्य शाश्वतं । योगिवृन्दहृदयैकमन्दिरम् ।। वासुदेवविदुषा विरच्यते । न्यायसारपदपचिका परम् ॥ तत्र तावधिकीर्पितग्रन्यस्य निप्रत्यूहपरिपूरणायाभिमतदेवताप्रणतिपुरःसर श्रोतृजनमनःसमाधानार्थ सप्रयोजनमभिधेय प्रतिजानीते । प्रणम्य शम्भु जगतः पति परम् । समस्ततत्त्वार्थविद स्वभावतः ॥ शिशुप्रबोधाय मयाभिधास्यते। प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्यलक्षणम् ॥ श सुख भवत्यस्मादिति शम्भुः तम् । कम् । विशिष्ट जगतस्त्रैलो- क्यस्य पतिं स्वामिनम् । देवेन्द्रादीनामपि जगत्पतित्वमस्तीति तद्व्यवच्छेदायाह परमिति । उत्कृष्टमित्यर्थः अनन्यप्रेयमिति यावत्। इन्द्रादयः पुनरीश्वरप्रेप्यत्वेन नपरा इति भावः । परत्व ब्रह्मादीनामप्यस्तीति तद्व्यवच्छेदार्थमाह समस्तत- त्त्वार्थविदमिति । प्रमाणोपपन्न स्वरूप तत्त्व । तेन विशिष्टा अस्तित्त्वार्थाः । समस्ताश्च ते तत्त्याश्चिति समस्ततत्वार्थास्तान्वेत्तीति समस्ततत्त्वार्थावत् । त तथाभूत सर्वशमित्यर्थः । सर्वशत्व योगिनामप्यस्तीति तेभ्यो विशेष दर्शयति स्वभावत इति सर्वदेवेत्यर्थः । योगिनस्तु योगाभ्यासप्रसादसमासादितत- स्वशानवशादेव समस्ततत्त्वार्थविद इति न स्वाभाविकसर्वशा इति भावः । तमित्यभूतं प्रणम्य प्रकण भक्तिपुरःसरं नत्वा प्रमाणं च सद्भेदाश्च प्रत्यक्षा- दयः तदन्ये च प्रमेयादयः प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्ये, तेषां लक्षणमितरेतरल्यावर्तको धर्मः । स मया सर्वज्ञेनाभिधास्यते कथयिष्यते । किमर्थ शिशुप्रबोधाय । शिशव इव शिशवः प्रमाणादिपदार्यलक्षणशानशून्याः शास्त्रश्रवणयोग्या विवक्षिता न पुनः स्तनधयाः । तेपा प्रबोधाय तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पादनायेति शास्त्र- ·मासर्वज्ञपणीतन्यायसार स्यास्य प्रयोजनक्यनम् । तपाबालानामपि शिशब्दाभिधान शुश्रूषयोपपन्नः शिशुवत्सस्नेह ध्युत्पादनीय इति शापनार्थम् । ॐ प्रमेयादिपरिशानस्य प्रमाणाधीनत्वात् प्रथमोद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य सामान्यलक्षणमा सम्यगनुभवसाधन प्रमाणम् ॥ सम्पर चासायनुभवश्चेति सम्यगनुमवरतस्य साधन करणम् । प्रमीयते येन तत्प्रमाणामिति प्रमितिकरणभूतस्य प्रमाणस्य भिधानमतो नाव्याति । अन्यथा प्रमिति प्रमाणमिति पलभूतस्य शानस्य सम्यगनुभयसाधनस्यामावादच्याप्ति स्यात् । अन च सम्यक्त्वमनुभवत्व च संशयविपर्ययत्ववदसानावान्तरजातिविशेष । अयाध्यमानाध्यवसायात्मकत्व सम्यक्त्वम् । स्मरणविलक्षणशानस्वरूपत्व पुनरनुभवत्वम् । विशेषणस्याति प्रत्तगापाकरणार्यत्वात् सम्यगित्यस्य विशेषणस्य व्यवच्छेद्य दर्शयति । सम्यन्ग्रहण सशयविपर्ययापोहार्यम् ॥ सध्यविपर्यययोरपोह प्रमाणफलादनुभवाव्यावर्तनम् । पश्यविपर्य याच्या वापोहो व्यवच्छेद प्रमाणफलस्य । स एवार्य प्रयोजन यस तत्तथोक्त । यदा तु सशविपर्यययोरनपोहस्तदा तत्साधन न भवतीत्यर्थ । अशातस्वरूपयो संशयविपर्यययोपोहो शानु न शक्यत इति तदवगमा सलक्षणमाह। तमानवधारणज्ञान सशय ।। तत्र तयोर्मध्ये, अनवधारण च तद् शान चेति विग्रह । न चावधाः णाभाववाचकत्वादनवधारणचन्दस्य क्य भानपदेन सामानाधिकरप्यमित वाच्यम् , तस्य निश्चयत्व'नातिरहितव्यत्तिवाचकत्वात् । तस्यावान्तरभेदानाह सच समानधर्माऽनेकधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिकारए भेदात् पचधा भिद्यते ॥ समानधर्मानधर्मविप्रतिपत्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धयश्च ता कारणानि तेषा भेदात् । अभासाधारणकारणभूताना समानधर्मादीना भेदात्सशयस्य मेर ·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेत - ऽभिहित । न पुन कारणमानभेदात् । अनेककारणजन्यस्यापि घटस्यैकत्व दर्शनात् । एव च समानधर्मादसाधारणकारणाद्विशेषाग्रहादितरकारणसहि ताजायमान सहयोऽनेकधर्मादिकारणजनितसशयेभ्यो भिद्यत इति योज्यम | एवमुत्तरनापि । तेषा सशयाना स्वरूपमाहे । तद्यथा समानधर्मात् किमय स्थाणुः स्यात् पुरुषो वेति । स्थाणुपुरुषयो समान साधारणो धर्म ऊर्ध्वत्वम् । तस्मात्स तचोर्ध्वत्वमूर्धव्यवहारकारण सामान्यमययवरचनाविशेषो वा । इति शब्द प्रकारार्थ । एवप्रकार सशय उत्पद्यत इत्यर्थ । एवमुत्तरवाक्येप्वपीति शब्दो व्याख्येय । द्वितीयसशयमाह । अनेकधर्मादाकाशविशेषगुणत्वात्किमय शब्दो नित्य स्याद नित्यो वेति ॥ समानासमानजातीयमनेकमिहाभीष्टम् । अनेकस्माद्व्यावर्तको धमोंऽने कधर्म इति मध्यमपदलोपी समास असाधारणधर्म इति भाव । ननु स्थाणुत्वादिपुरुषत्वादिविरुद्धोभयविदोषै सह समानधर्मस्योर्ध्वत्वस्य पूर्वमुप लम्भात् पश्चादूरत्वादिनिमित्तेन विशेषद्वयाग्रहेण समानधर्म केवल एवोपलभ्यमानस्तस्मृतिद्वारेण सशयहेतुरिति युक्तम् असाधारणस्तु धर्मों विरुद्धोभयविशेषै सहादृष्ट कथ तत्स्मृतिहेतुस्तदहेतुश्च कथ सशयोपाय इति व्यतिरेकमुखेनेति म । तथाहि नित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तधर्मयोगी खल्बनित्यो दृष्ट , अनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृतधर्मयोगी खलु नित्य । शब्दस्तु नित्यानित्यव्या तेनाकाशविशेषगुणत्वधर्मेण युक्त । तस्मादनित्यव्यावृत्तधर्मत्वान्नित्य स्यादुत नित्यव्यावृत्तधर्मत्वादनित्य स्यादिति सदेह । नन्वेवमपि समानधर्मासाधा रणधर्मविप्रतिरत्तीत्यादि वाक्य स्यिता, किमनेकधर्मत्वग्रहणेनामसिद्धामकृता थेनेति । सत्यम् । अनेकश्वासौ धोऽनेकधर्म , सोऽपि सशयहेतुरिति ज्ञाप नार्थत्वाददोष । तथाहि विरुद्धार्थद्वयाविनाभूतधर्मद्वयस्यैकत्रोपलम्भाविशे घामहणादिसहकारिणि च सति सशय , यथा क्रियावत्यान्मूर्ते मन किंवा स्पर्शशून्यत्वादमूर्तमिति । अनेकधर्मस्य तु विप्रतिपत्तिवर्देव सशयहेतुत्वम् ।

·५ भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसार . विरद्धार्थद्वयप्रतिपादकपचनद्वयी विप्रतिपत्ति । विरुद्धार्याविनाभूतधर्मद्वय छनेकधर्म इति नानपारस्यन्तभेदोऽस्तीति । इदानी विप्रतिमति ननित सराय दयितुपामो शिप्रतिपतिस्वरूप वारदाह। विप्रतिपत्तेरेके भीतिकानींद्रियाण्याहु , अन्ये त्वभौतिसनीति ।। एवरूपाया विप्रतिपत्ते सकाशाकिमिद्रियाणि भौतिकान्याहोस्विदभी तिकानोति । सदायोऽय मध्यस्थस्य विशेषमनानानस्य जायते इति शेष । चतुर्धपचमी सरायो दर्शयति । उपलब्वे , ति सदुदकमुपलभ्यत उतासदिति । अनुपलब्धे किमविद्यमान पिशाचो नोपलभ्यते किंवा विद्यमान इति ।। विधिमुखेन ज्ञानमुपलब्धि । उपलब्ध्यभावोऽनुपलब्धि । न चान केवलमुपरब्धिरनुपला धर्वा मायकारण येनातिप्रसग स्यात् किंतु पाहणादिसहकारिसहिताऽतो नातिमसग । यद्यप्यनयो समानधर्मामेव भेदस्तयापि प्रयोजनवशात्सवकारेण पृयगभिहित इति तदनुसारिणा सग्रता पृयगुक्त इति । अयाजन च परवक्षपतिक्षेप । तयादि शब्दे स एवामिति खायितोपलभादविनाशित्वमटेश्वरादेवानुपलब्धेरसत्त्व केचित्यतिपन्ना । तद युक्तम् । विशेषग्रहणामापे हि खलूपलब्धिमानस्यानुपन्धिमात्रस्य च सराय हेतु पात् । प्रमिलान नु प्रदीपादिष्विव । अनुपलब्धिस्तु भूतान्तर्गतजला दाविवान्यपाप्युपपद्यमान वान निर्णयकारणमिति । सम्याग्रहणेन चेत्साविश्यंययारपोहस्तदूहानण्यवसाययो केन पदेनापोह इत्याराक्याह । अनवधारणत्वाविशेषादृहान व्यरसाययोर्न सशयादन्तिरमाव ।। अनिश्चयामकात्वमेवानयोराह । तद्यथा। वाह्यालीप्रदेशेऽनेने पुस्पेण भवितव्यमित्यूह । विस- ज्ञकोऽय वृक्ष इति धन यवसाय ॥ १ग, है, च Read पुरुषेणानेन ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेतः ५ प्रायेणानेन पुरुषेण भवितव्यमित्यनिश्चयरूप ऊहः । न पुनः पुरुष एवेतिनिश्चयरूपः । अनध्यवसायोहि का संज्ञास्यासौ किसशक इत्यनिश्चयात्मक एवोपपद्यत इति, तस्मादनयोः संशयात्मकत्वात्सम्यग्ग्रहणेनैव व्यवच्छेद इत्यर्थः । ममात्र संशयोऽस्तीत्यशेषपुरुषहृदयसाक्षितया संवेद्यमानस्य निरा- करण परेषामशत्वमेव प्रकाशयति । सम्रपच संशयमभिधाय विपर्ययस्य लक्षणमाह- मिथ्याऽध्यवसायो विपर्ययः ।। अध्यवसायः समीचीनोऽप्यस्तीति तद्व्यवच्छेदाय मिथ्याग्रहणम् । मिथ्यात्वं चातस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानरूपत्वम् । तत्सशयेऽप्यस्तीति तन्निरासायाध्य- वसायग्रहणम् । उदाहरणमाह । तद्यथा । द्वौ चन्द्राविति । सुप्तस्य गादिदर्शनं चेति सकलविषयप्रभेदावबोधार्थनुदाहरणद्वयमुक्तम् । परपक्षप्रतिक्षेपार्थ च । वैशेषिकाः खलु सरायविपर्ययप्रमितिस्मरणेभ्यो विलक्षण स्वमशान मन्यन्ते । तदयुक्तम् । सुप्तस्याविद्यमाना असन्निहिता वाश्वगजादयो विद्यमा- नत्वेन सन्निहितत्वेन च गृह्यन्त इति तद्विषयज्ञान विपर्यय एव । यस्तु गजो वा महिषो वेति प्रत्ययः, स सशयः । स्वप्ने बन्धुदर्शनजनितसुखानुभवस्तु प्रमा। सुप्तस्यैवातीतस्वप्नानुसन्धान स्मरण । अतो न प्रमेयान्तर पश्यामः । अघि- गतशुक्तिशकलमेव रजतमित्येतावन्त काल गृहीतमिति तद्विषयो रजतामिति प्रत्ययो विपर्ययः । तत्सद्भाचे प्रमाणमनुमानम् । तथाहि विवादपद शक्तिशकलं रजतज्ञानविषयः । रजतोपायान्यत्वे सति रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वात् । सम्प- ग्रजतवत् । प्रमाणलक्षणान्तर्गतानुभवग्रहणव्यावळमाह । स्मरणग्रहणन्यवच्छेदार्थमनुभवग्रहणम् ॥ reads गजदर्शनम् । २ ग., ड., च.ज्ञानव्य. १ड., ·भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार सम्यक्साधन प्रमाणमित्युच्चे, स्वर्गादेरशातरूपस्यापि साधन यागाद्यपि प्रमाण स्यात् । तथापि सम्यग्ज्ञानसाधन प्रमाणमिति सिदेऽशराधिकस्या नुभवशब्दस्योपादान स्मरणस्यापि व्यवच्छेदार्यमित्यर्थ । स्मरणविरक्षण हि शानमनुभव ! अथ साधनमहणापोह्यमाह ! प्रमातृप्रमेयव्यवच्छेदार्थ फलादेवज्ञापनार्थ च साधनग्रहणम्।। सम्यगनुभर प्रमाणमित्युक्ते, फरभूतस्यानुभवल्य प्रमाणत्यप्रथम । तथापि सम्यगनुभवहेतुरिति सिद्धे, सायनमिति गुरूकरण प्रमातृप्रमेय व्यवच्छेदार्थम् । साध्यते येन तत्साधनमिति करणव्युत्पत्तैरिह विश्चितस्यात्, कर्मकर्तृविलक्षणस्य नियाहेतो करणत्वात् । माधनग्रहणव्यवच्छेयत्वेन प्रस्तुतयो प्रमातृप्रमेययोर्यरक्षण तत्तयोटक्षण- भूताया प्रमाया लक्षणाभिधानधारणाह । सम्यगनुमव ममा । अमाश्रय प्रमाता । प्रमाविषय प्रमेयमिति । तत्र प्रमाया आश्रय प्रमोत्पत्ती समवायिकारणम् । प्रमाया विषय आलम्बन प्रमेय प्रतिभासमानोऽर्थ इति यावत् । इतिशब्द प्रमाणसामा न्यलक्षणपरिसमाप्तिसूचक ॥ तद्रेदमाह । तत्रिविधम् ।। तिमो विधा मकारा यस्य तत्रिविधम् । प्रकारत्रयमाह । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागम इति ॥ इतिशब्द प्रकारार्थ , अनेन प्रकारेण विविधम् । अन्यथा तु सप्त विधत्वादिकमपि सभवत्येव । तथाहि निर्विकल्पकसविक्रूपभेदेन योग्ययोगि प्रत्यक्षभेदेन वा विविध प्रत्यक्षम् । कार्यकारणानुभयात्मकभेदेन विविधमनु मानम् । इष्टादृष्टविषयत्वेन द्विविध आगम इति सप्त मकारा । . १च क. add प्रमाणम् ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ७ इतरप्रमाणमूलत्वेन ज्येष्ठत्वात्प्रथमोद्दिष्टस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सामान्यलक्षणमाह । तत्र सम्यगपरोक्षानुमवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ अत्रापि सम्यगनुभवसाधनशब्दानां व्यवच्छेद्यं पूर्ववत् । अपरो- क्षग्रहणेन पुनरनुमानादेर्व्यवच्छेदः । अपरोक्षत्व हि शानत्यावान्तरजातिः । अनुमानादिक तु परोक्षत्वजातिमतोऽनुभवस्य साधनमतोऽस्य निरासः । भेदमाह । तविविधं । योगिप्रत्यक्षमयोगिप्रत्यक्षं चेति ॥ चकारो निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदेनापि वैविध्य वक्ष्यमाणं समुच्चि- नोति । विशिष्टत्वेन प्रथममुद्दिष्टस्यापि योगिप्रत्यक्षस्यास्मदादिप्रत्यक्षदृष्टान्तबलेन वेद्यत्वादादौ तदेव लक्षयति । तत्रायोगिप्रत्यक्ष प्रकाशदेशकालधर्माद्यनुग्रहादिद्रियासंबंध- विशेषेणं स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् ॥ प्रकाश आलोको मनसः समाधिश्च । देशः समीपपुरोवादि. । कालो वर्तमानादिः । धर्म इष्टशाने । आदिशब्दादनिष्टोपलब्धावधर्मः । ईश्वरेच्छामि सर्वकार्यनिमित्तत्वात् स्वीक्रियते । रसादिशाने दन्तान्तर्गतोदकादिः । तेषाम- नुग्रहः साहाय्य तस्मात् । इन्द्रियाणि चक्षुरादीनि । अर्थाः पृथिव्यादयो रूपा- दयश्च । तेषां मियः सम्बन्धविशेषः संयोगसयुक्तसमवायादिः । तेनासाधार णकारणेन सह । स्थूल इव स्थूल अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षयोग्यः । तस्य ग्राहक ग्रह पकरणभूत यचदयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् । करणस्यापि कर्तृतोपचारो ण्वुल् प्रत्ययः । न चेदृश योगिप्रत्यक्षमिति ततोऽस्य भेदः । न तु स्थूलस्यैव ग्राहकमिति व्याख्ययमस्थूलस्यापि रूपादेब्रहणात् । इंद्रियार्थसम्बन्धे च प्रमाण, चक्षुःश्रोले प्रासमेव प्रकाशयतः, बायेंद्रियत्वात् त्वगिंद्रियवत्, प्रकाशत्वे सति व्यवदिताप्रकाशकत्वाद्वा प्रदोपवत् । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्य प्रायेणातींद्रियत्वात्तत्फल मेव सबधविशेषोपदर्शनद्वारेणोदाहरति । १ ग. reads विशेषणस्थूला.

·- मासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः तयथा । चक्षुःस्पर्शनसंयोगाद्घटादिद्रव्यज्ञानम् ।। चक्षुषा स्पर्शनेन च संयोगाद् घटादिद्रव्यशानमुत्पद्यत इति शेषः सम्बन्धान्तरात् प्रत्यक्षशानं दर्शयति । संयुक्तसमवायात्ताम्या घेटत्वसंख्यापरिमाणादिज्ञानम् ।। ताम्या चक्षु पर्दानाभ्यां संयुक्ते द्रव्ये समवायः संयुक्तसमवाय स्वस्मात् सयुक्तसमवायात् । आदिशब्दस्य प्रत्येकमभिसवधात् घटत्वसत्त्व पृथिवीत्वादीनि, संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वकर्माणि, द्वी न्द्रियमाह्याणि गृह्यन्ते । हस्तवल न प्रत्यक्षम् , प्रत्यक्षाधितत्वे सति संयोगासम वायिकारणत्वात् , संयोगवत् । फर्मत्व या प्रत्यक्षम् , प्रत्यक्षाश्रितस्योगासम वाधिकारणाश्रितत्वात् , सयोगत्ववत् । न चाश्रयासिद्ध साधनम् । जातिरूपर कर्मत्वस्य परैरनभ्युपगमेऽप्युपाधिरूपस्याभ्युपगमात् नाश्रयादीनमुदाहरणम् एतस्मादेव सबवादकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यतु शानान्याए । चक्षुपैव रूपज्ञानम् । स्पर्शनेनैव स्पर्शज्ञानम् । प्राणेनैव गन्ध ज्ञानम् । रसनेनेव रसज्ञानम् । मनसेव मुखादिज्ञानमिति ।। सर्वत्र सयुक्त समवायदित्यनुवर्तते । चक्षुपैवेत्यादायेवकारो बाधेन्द्रि यान्तरनिषेधार्थः । रूपादिशाने मनसोऽपि हेतुत्वाम्मनस येत्ययकारो वा. द्रियाणा प्रतिषेधपरः । न पुनदृष्टादेः । इतिवान्दः सयुक्तसमवायपरिसमासो अधुना सयधातराजशनापतिमाह । एतेषु संख्यादिवाश्रितानां सामान्यानां स्वाश्रयग्राहकैरिद्रिय संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायाग्रहणम् ॥ सख्यादिवित्यादिग्रहणेन घटादिवनिरास | सामान्ये सामान्यान गमावात् । सामान्यानामिति सदसख्यायपरिमाणवादीनाम् । स्या- यमाकरिन्द्रियैरिति तत्र संख्यात्यादिवर्मत्यान्ताना दाम्या वासना १ घर घटत्वादिसा ·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिक्या समेत ग्रहणम् । रूपादीना त्वेवे केंद्रियेण । सत्तासामान्यस्य तु षडिद्रियग्राह्येप्यविशेषेण ग्रहणात् सवैद्रिग्रहणम् । इन्द्रियेण सयुक्त द्रव्ये समवेता ये सख्यादयस्तेषु समवाय सामान्याना तस्मात् ॥ पुन सबधद्वयात् ज्ञानोत्पत्तिं दर्शयति । श्रोत्रसमवायाच्छन्दग्रहण, तदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञान समवेतसम- वायात् । शब्दो गुण । सामान्यक्त्वारपर्शवत्त्वे सति बाइकेंद्रियग्राह्यत्वात, कर्मव्यति रिक्तत्वे सति सामान्यवत्वे सति सामान्यवतामनाधारत्वादा, रूपादिवदिति गुणत्वे सिद्धे, गुणत्वाचाश्रयवत्त्वे सति, य आश्रय स पारिशेप्यादाकाश । तथाहि शब्द स्पर्शवता गुणो न भवति । प्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वगिद्रियैर ग्राह्यत्वे सति अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षत्वात्सुखादिवदिति। शब्द आत्ममनसोगुणो न भवति, अस्मदादिवाओँद्रियप्रत्य वाद्रूपादिवत् । भूतात्ममनोऽतिरित्तदिकालसद्भा वेऽपि शब्दो दिकाल गुणो न भवति, विशेषगुणत्वाद्, रूपादिवत् । अत पारिशेष्याद्य. शब्दाश्रय स आकाश । स एव च ओनम् । तथाहि शब्दो गुणत्वाचा तरजात्या समानजातीयगुणवतेंद्रियेण गृह्यते, बाडेंद्रियग्राह्यविशेष गुणत्वाद्रूपादिवत् । श्रोत्र या स्वग्राह्यविशेषगुणेनात्यन्तसजातीयगुणवद्, बाहो द्रियवाचक्षुरादिवत् । अत श्रोनत्याकाशा मकत्वात्तदगुणस्य शब्दस्य तेन सह समवाय सबन्ध , इति स्थितम् । न चाकाशात्मकश्रोत्रसयुक्त एवाका शान्तरे समवायाच्छन्दस्य ग्रहणमिति युक्तम् । ततो भेदे प्रमाणाभावात् । एव तीब्रादिभेदभिन्नास्तु शब्दास्तीवादिभेदभिन्नाभिघाताद्यन्वयव्यतिरेका नुविधायित्वान्नाश्रयभेदसाधका । अमेदे तु विवादाध्यासिता शब्दा श्रूय माणशब्दनैकाश्रया , शब्दत्वाच्छूयमाणशब्दासमवायिकारणशब्दवत् । अस मवायिकारणशब्द स्वकार्येणैकाश्रय , अस्पर्शद्रव्यगुणविशेषस्यासमवायि कारणत्वादात्मान्त करणसयोगवदित्यर्थ । तदाश्रित्तेति त शब्दमाश्रितानि १ ड. reads श्रवणेनैव शदशानम् । after श्रोत्रसमवायात् । २ च reads ग्रहणम् ।

·भासर्वक्षमणीतन्यायसारः वदाश्रितानि सामान्यानि सत्त्वशब्दत्ववर्णवादौनि तेषां ज्ञानम् । पदस- बन्धाशानोत्पत्तिमाह। एतत्पश्चविधसंबन्धसंबद्धविशेषणाविशेष्यमावाद् हेश्यामाव. समवाययोर्ग्रहणम् ॥ एते च ते पञ्चविधा एतत्पश्चाविधाः । एतत्पश्चविधाश्च ते सबन्धाथै तत्पञ्चाविषस बन्धाः, सयोगः सयुससमवायः सयुस्समेवातसमवायः समायः समवेतसमवाय इति । एतैः सबन्धैः पञ्चविधैः समन्वयेतेसह विशे यविशेष्यमायो नाम संबन्धः । तस्मादन सनिधिविशेष एवेतरसबन्धलक्ष- ण्यज्ञापनार्थ विशेषणविशेष्यमावशब्देनोक्तः । पुनर्विशेषणविशेष्यमायो नाम कश्चित् संबन्धः । विशेषणविशेष्यभावयो. प्रतिनियताश्रयवृत्तित्वेन द्विष्टसब न्धरूपखानुपपत्तेः । तत्सत् किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् , घटान्यं मूतलमित्यादिशान विशेषणविशेष्यभावसबन्धनिबन्धन, विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीत्यादिप्रत्य- यवत् । अहणवरूपमाह । तद्यथा, घटशून्य मतलम् । इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति। इदमिन्द्रियसयुक्त भूतले विशेषणतया विशेष्यतया चामावस्य ग्रहण दर्शितम् । एवं सर्वत्रोदाहरणीयम् ॥ इन्द्रियसयुक्तसमवैतादौ विशेषणविशेष्यभावसबन्धेनामावस्य ज्ञानमुदा- हरणीयमित्यर्थ । तथा शुद्ध कृष्णरूप, कृष्णरूपे शुहत्व नास्तीति सयुक्तसमवेते कृष्णरूपे गुलवाभावस्य सानम् । अभिन्न गुरचसामान्यं, गुरुत्वसामान्ये भेदो नास्तीति सयुक्तसमवेतसमवेते मुहत्वसामान्ट विशेषणविशेभ्यभावेन भेदधर्माभावत्य ज्ञानमिति । अकार' कारं १च. Reads सबंधसन्धि २* adds तथाहि ततवः पटसमवायवतः सतुयु पटसमवाय इति. ३ इ. reads इत्येव सर्वाश उदाहरणीयम्.

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः वा न भवति, अकारे ककारत्वं नास्तीति श्रोत्रसमवेताकारे विशेषण- विशेष्यभावसबन्धेन कवाभावज्ञानम् । अभिन्नमत्वम्, अबे भेदो नास्ती- ति श्रोत्रसमवेतसमवेतेऽत्वसामान्ये भेदधर्माभावज्ञानमिति । दृश्यस्य द्रष्टु योग्यस्य घटादेरभावः। युक्त तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्व न पुनः पिशाचाद्यभावस्येत्यर्थः । नन्वेव सत्यभाववत्समवायेऽपि विशिष्टप्रत्ययदर्शनात्समवायिभिः सह संब- न्धान्तर स्यात्, ततस्तस्यापि संबन्धिभिः सह संबन्धान्तरमित्यनवस्थामसग इत्याशक्याह । समवायस्य तु कचिदेव ग्रहणं, यथेह घटे रूपसमवायः. रूप समवायी घट इति । क्वचिदेव शास्त्राभ्यासविपर्ययासितबुद्धौ समवायत्य विशेपणतया विशेष्यतया विपयाच न पुनरभाववाल्लौकिकबुद्धावपात्ययः । न च प्राक्तनहेतो रूपसमयाथी घट इति विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वेन व्यभिचारः । प्रत्यक्षात्मकविशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वस्य हेतुत्वेनोपादानात् । न चाय प्रत्यक्षरूपः पत्यय इति । कथ तर्हि समवायस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति चेद, अनमितरूपनिर्विकल्प- विषयत्वात् । तथाहि शुक्लः पट इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षप्रत्ययो ज्ञायमानसंबन्धपूर्वकः प्रत्यक्षविशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वात् दण्डीतिप्रत्ययवत् । अन्ये पुनरिम ग्रन्थमन्यथा योज यन्ति । समवायस्य तु कचिदेव सयुक्त सयुक्तसमवेते समवेते विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन ग्रहण न त्वभाववत्पञ्चविधसबन्धेष्वपीति, तदयुक्तम् । क्वचिदपि समवायस्य विशेषणतया विशेष्यतया वा प्रत्यक्षत्वानभ्युपगमात् । अभ्युपगमे हि, समवायस्यापि संबन्धा-तरप्रसङ्गः । तच्चानिष्टम् । विशेषण- विशेष्यभावात् दृश्याऽभावसमवाययोर्महणमिति अन्धस्तहिं कमिति चेदुप- चारा दव्यवहारः । तथाहि, रूपरूपिणोविशेषणविशष्यभूतयोविशिष्टप्रत्यय हेतुत्वात् तत्समवायेऽपि विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इत्युच्यते । स्वविषयालोचन- हेतुश्च स एवेति भेद उपचरितः । किमुक्त भवति । विशेषणविशेष्यभावसब- चत्वात्समवायोऽपि निविरूपत्वेन गृह्यत इति । न चेय यनिर्विकल्पत्वेन गृह्यते तत्सविकरूपत्वेनापि ग्राह्यमिति व्यासिरस्ति, पथि गच्छतो गृह्यमाणतृ- गादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् । योगिप्रत्यक्ष लक्षयति । - प ·भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायप्तारः तत्र संज्ञादिसंवन्धोदेखेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं सविकल्पकामिति । मंशादीत्यादिशब्दाद्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्याभावाः स्वीयताः । सझादीन सबन्धः सशासबन्धः, तस्योलेसस्तद्विषय भान, तेन सहकारिणा सः विशिएशानोत्पत्ती निमित्त कारण यत्तत्तविकल्पक प्रमाणम् । आवृत्या. न्योऽप्यर्थः । सज्ञादिसबन्धस्योलेसः प्रतिभासविषयत्वम् , तेन सहिता शानो स्पतिस्तस्या निमित्त कारण यत्तत्सविपरपामिति व्याख्येयम् । विशेषण सभा दि, दण्डादेः पूर्व ज्ञाने सति तत्सहकारिणेन्द्रियेण विशेषणविशेष्यविषयस्यैव स्य विशिष्टज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिः । अत एयामिमानपर्वत इति भानमनुमानफलम् व्यातिरमणकाले प्रतीतेनामिना विशिष्टस्य पर्वतस्पानुमेयत्वात् । अन्या निराधारस्यानेः क्थमनुमेयस्वमिति । प्रमाणस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्तत्पलमुदाहरति देवदत्तोऽयं दण्डीत्यादि ॥ अब देवदत्त इति सज्ञासबन्धोल्लोरी ज्ञान, दण्डीति दर सबन्धोलेरिस ज्ञानम् । आदिशब्देन शुरुः पट इति गुणोलेरि गच्छति नर इति कर्मोल्लेसि, गौरश्च इति सामान्यशब्दोटेखि, घट हित गृहमित्यभावोल्लेखि भान गृह्यते । अन विशेषणविशेष्ययं बोकेकेन्द्रियग्राह्ययोस्तु विशिष्टज्ञान वाह्येन्द्रियज, यथा दण्डी, गुह' इत्यादि । भिन्नेन्द्रियग्राह्ययोतु विशिष्टशान मानसमेय, यथा देवदत्तोऽ सुरभिकुसुममित्यादि। अन्ये तु सर्वस्यापि सविकल्पकशानस्य सज्ञादिसधन्धोई खेनोत्माद्यमानत्वात्, सज्ञादेश्च विशेषणत्वेन विशिष्ट प्रत्ययालम्बनत्वाच लदिर चक्षुरादीना घ्यापारासमवान्मानसो व्यापार इति मानसमेव सविकसकी त्याचक्षते । सझायाश्च विशेषणत्व व्यावर्तकत्वात, यथतेषु पुरुपेषु दणि नमाड्यांत दण्टेन पुरुषः पुरुषान्तराळ्यावतते तथैतेषु पुरुपेषु देवद माढयेति सशयापि। वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रावभासकं निर्विकल्पकम् ॥ मानग्रहणेन सशादिसबन्धनिरामः । अवभासकमिति तद्विषयावभार ११. खभाव.

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया संमत १५ कारणमित्यर्थ । अत्रापि प्रमाणस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्तत्फल्मेवाह । यथा प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातन ज्ञानम् । युक्तावस्थाया योगिज्ञानं चेति । प्रथमाक्षसबन्धवेलाया सशादिसबन्धस्मरणाभावात् तदनन्तरमुत्पद्यमान ज्ञान निर्विकल्पकमेयोच्यते । उत्पन्ने च तस्मिन्सकैतग्रहणकाले साहचर्य- जानुभूतयो शब्दार्थयोर्मध्येऽन्यतरस्यार्थस्य दृष्टत्वात्तत्सस्कारोबोधेन सशया स्मरणस्योत्पादे च पश्चात्सविकल्पक ज्ञानमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्य युक्तमेव । अत एव हि निर्विकल्पकमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तदभावे हि सज्ञास्मरणाभावे सविक- ल्पकाभावमसगात, तदभावेन भानादेश्वानुत्थानमिति । युक्तावस्थाया च समाध्यवस्थाया योगिज्ञान निर्विकल्पक, तस्या दशाया पदार्थस्वरूपमात्राव लोकनात् । इतिशब्द प्रत्यक्षलक्षणपरिसमाप्तिसूचक । इति कादमीरिकसूर्यसूनुवासुदेवविरचिताया न्यायसारपदपचिकाया प्रत्य- क्षलक्षणपरिच्छेद समाप्त ॥

·द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः। ॐ श्रीगणेशायनम । ॐ सकलप्रमाणज्येष्ठ प्रत्यक्ष लक्षयित्वेदानीमनु मान प्रपञ्चयति। सम्यगर्विनामावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम् ॥ सम्यक् इति भिन्नपद साधनविशेषणम् । इहाविनाभावविषय स्मरणम विनाभाव । उपचारात् । साधकतमाय तृतीया ) अविनामावविषयस्मरणे. नासाधारणकारणेन जनितस्य परोक्षानुभवस्य यत्सम्यक्साधन लिंगशानादिक तत्सर्वमनुमा नमित्यर्थ । सम्यगित्यादिविशेषणाना प्रयोजन पूर्वयद वाच्यम् । परोक्षग्रहण प्रत्यक्षन्यवच्छेदार्थम । शब्दोऽपि परोक्षानुभवस्य साधनामति तेनातिप्रसग । तद्व्यवच्छेदार्थमविनाभावेनेतिपदम् । शब्दस्य समयबले नार्थप्रतीतिहेतुत्वात् । नतु तथानि अविनाभावग्रहणेनैव प्रत्यक्षस्यापि व्यव च्छिमत्वाद् पर्थ परोक्षग्रहणमिति चेत्, सत्यम् । परोक्षत्वारोशत्वजाती बाह्यविषयाश्रिते इति केयाचिद्दर्शन तन्निरासार्थमनुमानफलस्वरूपकथनार्थ चाऽनुभवविशेषणवेनोत्तमिति केचित् परिहरन्ति । वय तु ब्रूम । बधूि मयो सहचरितयोभूयोमहणे सति दहनाविनाभूतो धूम इति ज्ञानमपरोक्ष मानस जायते । ततस्तरसाधनमप्यनुभवसाधनमविनाभावेनानुमानमिति तदव्युदासाय परोक्षग्रहणमिति । केनायनाविनाभाव कस्यापि तात्त्विक सबधो नास्तात्यतोऽनुमानरक्षण न सभवतीतिमत निरस्यति । स्वभावत साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरविनामाव ॥ प्रत्यक्षण प्रतीयमानो निराकर्तुं न शक्यत इति शेप । तथाहि वाला दयोऽपि धूम दृष्ट्वा वाई प्रतिपद्य तदर्थं प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते । न चान्यदर्श नैना यस्य प्रतीतिर्दहन दिनाधूमो नोपपद्यत इत्येवविधाऽविनाभावग्रहणमन्त रेण सभवति । साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरिति यदिद साध्यस्य वहयादा पकत्व साधनस्य च धूमादायत्व यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र ततामिरन्यभावे तु न छचिदृष्टो धूम इति सोऽविनाभाव इत्यर्थ । तथाहि गन्दनित्यत्वे साध्ये -- ·वासुदेवकृतपदपाचकया समतः पक्षपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वादीना कल्पिता व्याप्तिरस्ति । न चासावविनाभाव इति तद्व्यवच्छेदार्थमाह स्वभावत इति । अकल्पनयेत्यर्थः । पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतर- नु त्वादीनां तु शन्दनित्यत्वे न स्वाभाविकी व्याप्तिरस्ति । अनियतसाध्यवृत्ति- त्वात् । यथाहि नित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात् , आकाशवदिति प्रयो गस्तद्वदनित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वाद् घटवदित्यपि सभवत्येव । न च स्वाभाविकाविनाभावो धूमो धूमध्वजमिय तदभावमपि साक्ष्यतीति युक्तम्। द्विष्ठ (१) भेदमाह। स द्विविध. अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥ अन्ये तु विना केनचित्कस्यचिदभावो धविनाभाव इत्यविनामावशन्दाथै पश्यन्तो व्यतिरेकरूपमेवाविनाभाव मन्यन्ते । तदयुक्तम् । न हि व्युत्प- त्तिरेव शब्दार्थ व्यवस्थापयति, अपि तु लौकिकप्रसिद्धिरपि । सा चावि नाभावस्योभयरूपत्वेऽप्यस्ति । व्युत्पत्तिमाननिमित्तत्वे तिष्ठत् गौौन स्याद् छत्तीति गौरिति व्युत्पत्तेः । उभयरूपस्यास्य लक्षणमाह। साध्यसामान्येन साधनसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिरन्वयः । साधनसामान्या- भावेन तु साध्यसामान्याभावस्य व्याप्तियतिरेक । साध्यमेवाविवक्षितावान्तरविशेष सामान्य साध्यसामान्य तार्णत्वमार्णत्व माहानसादिविशेषविवक्षाशून्यमानमामित्यर्थः। तेन कर्तृभूतेन साधनमेवावि- वक्षितावातरवेशेष सामान्य साधनसामान्य तस्य कर्मभूतस्य व्याप्तिः साहचर्य यत् सोऽन्वयः । यो यो विशिष्टधूमः स स मूल एव प्रदेशे वडिमान् यो यो धूमवान्भूप्रदेशः स स बडिमानिति व्याप्तिः सोऽन्वयः। एतेन विशेषेऽनुगमाभावात्सामान्ये सिद्धसाधनात् तद्वतोऽनुपपन्नत्वादनुमानकथा कुतः ॥ इति दूपण प्रत्युक्तम्, अवांतरविशेषेणान्वयाभिधानात् । सामान्ये सेदसाधनादित्यपि निरस्तम् । न हि यनकुचिदनिरस्तीति साध्यते । किं हिँ यत्र पर्वतादौ धूमोपलब्धिस्तत्र मूलप्रदेश वहिरिति प्रदेशस्यापि - . २ ·मासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार सामान्याकारणाविनाभावग्रहणमुपदर्शितमेव । अथवा द्वयमनुमानाङ्ग पक्षधर्मता चेति । तत्र व्यापयाऽमिसत्वसिद्धि पक्षधर्मतावलाच नियतमि सबन्धलक्षणविशेषसिद्धिरित्यरम् । तथा साधनमेव सामान्य साधनसामान्य तस्याभावेन साध्यमेव सामान्य तस्याभाव साध्यसामान्याभावस्तस्य व्याप्ति साहचर्य यत्स व्यतिरेक । यत्र साध्यस्याग्न्यादेरभावस्तत्र साधनस्व धूमादेर प्यभाव इति य साध्यामावसाधनाभावयोाप्यच्यापकभाव स व्यतिरेव इत्यर्थ । साधन लिङ्गम् ॥ इति पर्यायतो क्षणम् । तद्विविध । दृष्ट सामान्यतो ट च ॥ भेदनिरूपणे च शब्द स्वार्थपरार्थभेदेन द्वैविध्यसूचने । तन दृष्टादृष्टविषय वात्साधनमपि दृष्टमुच्यते । साध्य च क्वचित्पूर्वदृष्टमप्यनुमीयते यथा बुज्या दिव्यवहितस्वपित्रादिध्वनिलिदैन । क्वचित्पूर्वमदृष्टोऽप्यनुमीयमानो दहनादि दृष्टसजातीयवाद् द्रष्टु शक्यत्वाद्वा दृष्ट इत्युच्यते । अतस्तद्विपयमपि साधन दृष्टमेव । अयोभयस्यापि साधनस्य रक्षणमाह । तर प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापक दृष्टम् । यथाधूमोऽझेरिति । स्वभाव विप्रकृष्टार्थानुमापक सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा रूपादिज्ञान चक्षुरादे । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्य योग्य प्रत्यक्षयोग्य । स चासावर्थश्च प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थ तस्यानुमापकमिति करणस्यापि कर्तृतोपचारादय उत्प्रत्यय । प्रत्यक्षयोग्यत च पूर्व दृष्टत्वेनारमदादिभिर्दष्ट शक्यत्वेन वा । स्वभान च स्वरूपेण विप्र धार्या अस्मदादिप्रयक्षायोग्या परमावादय । वेषामनुमापक रिङ्ग साम भ्यतो दृष्टमित्युच्यते । व्याप्तिग्रहणवेलाया सामान्यतो दृष्टार्थस्यानुमापकत्वात् यद्यपि सर्वमनुमान सामान्यतो गृहीतव्याप्तिकार्थविषय तथापि दहन धनुमान येन सामा येन ध्यपदिश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षविपयत्वात् तद्विषयमनुमा दृष्टमित्युच्यते । न चैव चक्षुराद्यनुमान येन सामान्येन नयनत्यादिना व्या ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः १९ दिश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति । तथाहि क्रिया कारणपूर्विकेति सामान्यव्या- प्तिबलात् प्रवर्तमानत्वात्सामान्यतो दृष्टमित्युच्यते । तत्पुनदिविधम् । स्वार्थ परार्थं चेति । तत परोपदेशानपेक्षं स्वा- र्थम् । परोपदेशापेक्षं परार्थम् ॥ पर उपदिश्यते येन पदसमूहेनासौ परोपदेशः । तस्य स्वरूपमाह । परोपदेशस्तु पञ्चाक्यवं वाक्यम् ॥ तुशब्दो द्यवयवयवयवादि परपक्षनिरासे ! पदकदम्बात्मकत्वाद् वाक्यस्य तदवयवाः पञ्च किं पदान्येव । नेत्याह । प्रतिज्ञाहेतदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ।। वाक्यात्मका अपि प्रतिज्ञादयो महावाक्यापेक्षयावयवाः । यथावयविनः यादादयः कायापेक्षयावयवा उच्यन्ते दत्यर्थ. । लक्षणमाह। तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा । योऽनित्यः शब्द इति ॥ तल तेष्ववयवेषु मध्ये साध्यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी पक्ष इति वक्ष्यति तस्य पक्षस्य वचनं हेत्वाद्यवयवशून्य यथाऽनित्य' शब्द इति । केवल पक्षवचन प्रतिज्ञा मा भूदित्येतदर्थमुक्त प्रतिपिपादयिपयेति पदम् । पर प्रति प्रमाणेन सिसाधयिषयेत्यर्थः । न च प्रतिज्ञा निरर्थिका, तदभावे हेत्वादिविषयापरि- शानात् । केवलहेत्वभिधायिनोऽमस्तुताभिधायित्वसङ्गात् । शक्तस्य सूचक हेतुवचोऽशक्तमपि स्वयम् । साध्याभिधानासोक्तिः पारपर्येण नायलम् ।। इति वदता बौद्धन स्वप्रवृत्तिः स्ववचनेन विडम्धिता । पक्षोक्तिः आद्यावयवस्य १ ड, reads यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः । च. has यथा नित्यः शब्द इति.

·२० मासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार चकार पारपर्यण नापलामित्यस्य वचनस्य प्रतिमारूपत्वात् । द्वितीयावयवस्य लक्षणमाह । साधनत्वब्यापक लिङ्गवचन हेतु ।यथा तीवादिधर्मोपेतत्त्वादिति लिङ्गवचन हेवरित्युच्यमाने यो यो धूमवानित्यादिवचनास्यपि हेतुस्व प्रसगसानिवृत्पर्य साधनत्वब्यापकमिति विशेषणम् । धूमधत्वाधुमबत्त्वेन वा सघूमो यस्माद्भयतीत्यादियचनमेव हेतुरित्यर्थ । भेदमाह । स विविध । अन्वय यतिरेकी केवलान्वयी केवल यतिका चेति। कारणानुमान कार्यानुमान अकार्यकारणानुमानमिति मूरोत वि-पसूचने । अत्र लिङ्गस्यान्वयव्यतिरेक्यादिरूपेण विध्यात्तद्वाचक मान्द रूपा हेतुराप तथोक्त उपचारात् । उपचारे च प्रयोजन लिङ्गस्य दृष्टत्वे हेतु रपि दृष्टो भवत्यदृष्टत्वे चादृष्टस्वामिात शापनम् । आद्य हेतु लशयति । तन पञ्चम्पोऽन्वय यतिरेकी । रूपाणि तु प्रदेश्यन्ते । पक्षधर्मत्व सपक्षे सत्व विपक्षाद न्यावृत्तिमाधितविषयत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्त्व चेति ॥ तर तेषु त्रिविधेषु हेतुपु पञ्चरूपाणि यस्यासौ पञ्चरूपोपरित्यवाप्युपवार । तु शब्दस्त्रित्र एव हेतुरिति मतस्य निरासे | अवाति प्रमाणाविरुद्धो विषय साध्याऽयो यस्थासावबाधितविषयस्तस्य भावरतत्वम् । यस प्रतिपश्च साध्य वेन यस्थामावत प्रतिपयस्तस्य भावस्तत्वम् । पछ रूपाणि व्याचष्टे । तन सा यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी' पक्ष । सत्र व्याप्यवृत्तित्व हेतो: पक्षधर्मत्त्वम् ।। तेन च्याप्यपक्षे वृत्तियस्यासौ व्याप्यवृत्तिस्तस्य भावो व्याप्यवृत्तित्व पा धमत्वमुच्यते । न पुन पक्देशत्तित्वमित्यर्थ । ११. omits this २ ग घ e drop प्रश्यन्ते । ३. drops धर्मी। .

·चासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः २१ साध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः । तत्र सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशे वा हेतोवृत्तिः सपक्षे सत्त्वम् ॥ समानो धर्मो यस्यासो समानधर्मा । धर्मादनिच् केवलात (पा, ५॥ ४११२४) इति बहुवीही धर्मशब्दादनिच । साध्येन समानधर्मा साध्यस- मानधर्मति पश्चात्तत्पुरुषः । साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी विपक्ष. । तत्र सर्वस्मिन् विपक्षे हेतोरवृ- त्तिर्विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति ॥ साध्याद् व्यावृत्तः साध्यव्यावृत्तः। स एव धमों यस्यासौ साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा साध्यशून्य इत्यर्थः । घाँति पदेन तस्माद् वैधय॑दृष्टान्ते नेष्टो धर्मी समाश्रयः । तदभावे च तन्नेति वचनादेव तद्गतिः ॥ इति बौद्धमत निरस्याति । न हि धर्मिणमन्तरेण वचनमानाद् व्यतिरेक- प्रतीतिवितुमर्हति । धूमे सति बहिरंवश्यमस्तीति वचनमात्रादेवावयसिद्धी साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तेऽपि धर्मिणो वैयर्यप्रसगात् । यद्यपि हेतुरूमाभिधानप्रस्तावा देव हेतोरिति लम्प तथापि स्पष्टार्थे पुनरभिधानम् । प्रमाणाऽविरोधनि प्रतिज्ञातेऽर्थे हेतोवृत्तिरबाधितविषयत्वम् ॥ प्रमाणेन प्रत्यक्षादिनाऽविरोधः प्रमाणाऽविरोधः स विद्यते यस्यासो प्रमाणाविरोधी तस्मिन् प्रतिज्ञाते नित्यत्वादिधर्मके शब्दादी दृत्तिः । इतो. रिन्यधिकारात् प्रस्तावाच लभ्यते । साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः साधनस्याऽत्रिरूपत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् ।। साध्य शब्दानित्यत्वादि तद्विपरीतं शन्दनित्यत्वादि तयोरुभयोरपि साध्य- मानयोः सतोः साधनस्य कार्यत्वादेरत्रिरूपत्व पक्षधर्मत्वसमक्षेसत्त्वविपक्षाद्- १ क drops हेतोः। २ क drops हेतोः।

·२२ भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसार व्यावृत्तिलक्षणरूपरहितत्वम् । किन्वेकस्मिन् साध्य एव निरूपत्वमिति भाव । अन्वय यतिरेकिणोऽवान्तरभेद सोदाहरणमाह । स द्विविध । सर्पविदेशवृत्तिभेदात् ।। सपशे सर्वस्मिन्नेकदौ वा या वृत्तिस्तस्या मेदात् । तद्यथाऽनित्य शळ कार्यत्वादिति सपक्षव्यापक ॥ नन्वनित्यत्व नाम विनाशित्व तस्मित् साध्ये मागभावोऽपि सपक्ष ।नच तत्र कार्यत्वमस्ति । अत कथमय सपक्षव्यापको हेतु । नप दोष । विनाशी खल्वनित्य उच्यते विनाशश्वाभाव । न च प्रागमावस्याभावान्तरमस्ति । भावोत्पादेनेव प्रागभावो नष्ट इति व्यवहारोपपत्तेर्मावाभावयो सहानवस्थान लक्षणो विराध इति । अन्ये त्वनित्यत्व नाम वस्तुत्वे सति विनाधित्वम । अस्मिश्च साध्ये न मागभावस्य सपशवमिति परिहरन्ति । ननु तथापि कार्यत्व नाम प्रागसत पवादा मलामो विधीयते तचानित्यत्वशून्ये प्रत्यक्षाभावेऽप्य स्तीति चेत् सत्यम् , सामान्यवत्त्व सतीतिवक्ष्यमाणविशेषणस्यात्र स्मरणाददूप. समेतत् । अथवा स्वकारणसमवायित्व कार्यत्व, तच्च प्रध्वसे नास्ति । सामान्यवत्वे सति अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादिति सक्दे शवृत्ति ॥ इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादनित्य शब्द इत्युक्ते मनोग्रायेणात्मना नित्येन व्याभिचार इति तन्निवृत्य बाह्यग्रहणम । तथापि परमाणूना योगिनायेद्रियग्राह्यल्बमस्ति, न चाानित्यत्व तन्निरासायास्मदादिग्रहणम । सत्तासामान्ये व्यभिचारस्तन्नि रासाय सामान्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणम् । अन्न सकलमान्दपक्षीकारेऽपि बाह्ये द्रियग्राह्यत्व नाम ग्रहणयोग्यत्व विवक्षित, तच सर्वशब्दानामरित । ब्रह्म भापिताना तु दूरत्वेन श्रोरसयधामावादग्रहण न पुनरयोग्यत्वादती न सप क्षेकदेशत्तिरय हेतु किंतु मुखादावनित्येऽरि सपक्ष न वर्तत इति सपः कदेशवृत्ति । केवलान्वायनो रक्षणमाह । १ ग ४ च read सपत्तिभेदात् ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेत २३ पक्षव्यापक सपक्षवृत्तिरविद्यमानविपक्षः केवलान्वयी ॥ अबाधितविषयत्वे च अस प्रतिपक्षत्वे च सतीति विशेषणमत्रोत्तररक्षणवाक्ये चालभ्यत इति सग्रहेणोक्तम् । स च पूर्ववद् द्विविध ॥ सपक्षव्यापमपक्षकदेशवृत्तिभेदाद् द्विविध इत्यर्थ । उभयोरप्युदाहरण माह) तद्यथा विवादास्पदीभूतान्यदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि प्रमेय त्वात्करतलामलक्वत् । सैव प्रतिज्ञा भीमासकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वादस्मत्सु खादिवदिति ॥ अवाद्यो हेतु सपक्ष-यापक । द्वितीयस्तुसपक्षैकदेशवृत्ति । घरादावमा वात् । ननु मीमासकानामप्रत्यक्षत्व नाम विशेषनिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुशाविषय वा मीमासकव्यतिरिक्त पुरुषप्रत्यक्षत्व यदि हेतुस्तदा साध्यहतुत्वेऽविशिष्टे, अथ निषेधमान हेतुस्तदा शशविषाणादिना व्यभिचार । तत्र मीमासकानाम प्रत्यक्षत्वसमवेऽपि कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षवाभावादिति चेन्मैवम । मीमासकाना प्रत्यक्षानिरित प्रमाणग्राह्यत्वस्य हेतुत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात् । केवलान्ययी प्रमाण अबाधितविषयत्वासप्रतिपक्षत्वपक्षव्यापकत्वे सति सपक्ष एव सत्वात्, अन्व यन्यतिकिवत् । केवल यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह । पक्ष यापकोऽविद्यमानसपक्षो विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्त केवलव्यतिरेको । तस्योदाहरणमाह। यथा सर्ववित्कर्तृक सर्व कार्य काढाचित्कत्वात् । यत् सर्ववित्कर्तृ- पूर्वक न भवति तत् काढाचित्कमपि न भवति । यथाकाशम् ।। १ ग. धड reads करतलादिवत् । २.घ radd इति सपशव्यापक । ३ ग. ड. च. add सपढेकदेशत्ति । ४ ड adds स चाप्रसङ्गोन्नेयी प्रसहोनेयी च, ५T drops this sentence ·भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार न चाप्रसिद्धविशेषण पक्ष इति दृषण, सर्वविदादिपदार्थाना Hinari पदार्यान्वरूपवाक्यास्याप्रसिद्धत्वादप्रसिद्ध पक्ष इति चेत् तर्हि पी वटिमानिति याक्यार्यस्यानुमानापूर्वमप्रसिद्धत्यादप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वेन पूमा मानस्याप्यपामाण्यमसग । नन्वेष शदाविपाणपूर्वक्त्यमपि साध्यधर्म स्यात् सर्व कार्य शशविधानपूर्वक वादाचित्पत्त्यादिति तन्न । विपक्षे शव प्रमाणसहितस्य केवलव्यतिरविण' प्रमाणवाभ्युपगमात् सर्वबिवर्त पूर्व कत्त्वाभावे हि कार्यत्वमेव न स्यात् । तथाहि कार्ययविन्यात् कार वैचित्य मनुमीयते । कारणाना च दृष्टाना जल भूमिबीजादौना बचिवचिsi कार्यस्य फरस्य चिन्योपलम्भाद् विचित्रमहरू, कारण सिध्यती सर्वस्यापि कार्यरूपस्यादृष्टपूर्वक्त्वं सिद्धम् । तच्चादृष्टरूप कारणमचेतनत्वाः तनानाधिष्ठित दण्डादिवत्स्व कायें न च्याप्रियते । न च तद जाननरमदादिस्त प्रेरयतीति युक्तम् । अतोऽदृष्टादिकारणविषयविशिष्टज्ञानवानेव कर्ता भाचित महतीति तर्कसहितमेवेद प्रमाणम । शादिषाण पूर्वक त्याभावे च विपक्ष । किंचिद्बाधकमस्ति । तयादि शाविषाण नाम यदि शून्यमेव तदा क्य कारण स्यात् । अथातुच्छ सकलकार्यकारणभूतादृष्टाद्यामिश र प्रेरक याऽदी क्रियते तदा सशाभेदमात्र स्यादिति । कपर व्यतिरेकिण उदाह णान्तरमा । प्रसगद्वारेण वा यथा नेदं निरात्मक विच्छरीरमप्राणादिमत्त्व- प्रमगाल्लोप्यादिवदिति ।। प्रसगशब्द एव द्वारमुपाय असगद्वार तेन प्रसगशब्द चार नेत्यर्थ । कैवल्व्यतिरेकी प्रमाणमबाधितविषयत्वाऽर प्रतिपक्षत्वे पक्षव्यापकले च मति विपक्षादेव सर्वस्माद् व्यावर्तमानत्वादन्वयव्यतिरोवियत् । इदानीमनुमानपरि शुद्धावत्यत्रोपयोगिना हेत्वाभा साना स्वरूप निरूपयितुकामस्तेषा प्रसग ताव दर्शयति । एतेन हेत्वाभासानामहेतुत्वमुक्त भवति ॥ एतन हेतुस्वरूपवर्णनेन तदामासानामहेतुत्वमुक्त भवधि हेतुलक्षणरहित त्वादिति भाव । तल्लक्षणमाइ ।

·वासुदेव कृतपदपचिकया समेत हेतुलक्षणरहिता हेतुवदा भासमाना हेत्वाभासा इति ।। सम्यापेतुरपि कस्यचिदशस्याहेतुबदयभासते न पुनहें तुरेवेति । न चासो रेत्वाभास इति तनिरासायोक्त हेतुलक्षणरहिता इति ! हेतुलक्षणरहिता वटादयो भवन्ति न च ते हेत्वाभासाः । अत उभय समिलित हेतुलक्षणम्। हेतुलक्षणरहितानामपि हेतुबदबभासमानत्व पक्षधर्मान्यन्यतमवत्वेन विभजते । असिद्धविरुद्धानकान्तिकानध्यवासितकालात्ययापदिष्टप्रकरणसमाः॥ तेपा क्रमेण लक्षणमाह ! तत्रानिश्चितपक्षवृत्तिरसिद्धः ॥ अनिधिता सदिग्धा नास्तीति निश्चिता वा पक्षे वृत्तिर्यस्यासायनिश्चितपक्ष- प्रतिः । पक्षविपक्षयोरेव वर्तमानो विरुद्धः ।। न सपक्षे इति भावः । साध्य विरुणद्धीति विरुद्धः । पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनेकान्तिकः ।। एकस्मिन्नये साध्ये न नियतो न थैकान्तिकोऽनैकान्तिक. 1 न वनेना- गसिद्धोऽनूक्तः। साध्यासाधका पक्ष एवं वर्तमानो हेतुरनध्यवसित. ।। पक्ष एवं वर्तमानः केवलव्यतिरेक्यपि भवति । न चासौ हेत्वाभास इत्य- तस्तद्व्यवच्छेदाथै साध्यासाधक इति पदम् । प्रमाणबाधिते पक्षे वर्तमानो हेतुः कालात्ययापदिष्टः ॥ कालस्यात्ययोऽतिक्रमस्तस्मिन्सत्यपदिष्ट उक्तः कालात्ययापदिष्टः। सन्देह- योग्यपक्षोपन्यासानन्तर हेतूपन्यासस्य कालः । प्रमाणान्तरेण सन्देहयोग्यता- निश्चये विपरीतनिश्चये च सन्देहो नास्तीत्ययः। १. has हेतुत्वलक्षण २ प. adds ते चानेकपकाराः। ३ क and च add हेतुः ।

·२६ मासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायमार म्वपक्षपरपक्षसिद्धावपि निरूपो हेतु प्रारणसम | प्रकरणयो पक्षप्रतिपश्यो साधन सम प्रकरणसम पशुधमत्व सपक्षस विपक्षाढ्यावृत्तिरिति निरूपत्नेन । अयेषामवान्तरभेद सोदाहरण प्रमा तुकामोऽदास्यत्व तावनिरस्यति । यद्यप्येपा भेटा अनन्तत्वान्न शस्यन्ते वक्तु तथापि म्यूर इष्टिमानित्य वियन्तो भेदा क्षणोदाहरणाम्या प्रदर्यन्ते ।। शिष्यव्युत्पत्ययमिति शेष । दृदयते इति दृष्टि । आय हेत्वाभ अपचयति । असिद्धभेटास्तावत् । म्वरूपासिद्धो यथा अनित्य शब्दश्चाद पत्वादिति ॥ स्वरूपेणासिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्ध । स्वरूपमसिद्ध वा यस्यासी स्वरूपासिद्ध यद्यपि चाक्षुषत्व स्वरूपण रूपादावस्ति तथापि शब्दे धर्मिणि निर्दिष्ट चा पत्व नास्तीति स्वरूपासिद्ध न तु व्यधिकरणासिद्धम् । व्याधिकरणासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य शलः पंदस्य कृतकत्वादिति । पक्षविलक्षणमधिकरण यस्यासो व्यधिकरण म चासावसिद्धयति विग्रह विशेप्यासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य शब्द सामान्यवत्वं सति चाक्षुर त्वादिति ॥ विशेष्य चाक्षुपलमसिद्ध यन हेवामास सोऽय विद्यष्यासिद्ध । विशेषणासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य शब्दश्चाभुपत्वे सति सामान्यः त्वादिति ॥ चभुषत्व नित्ये गोत्वादावस्ताति तद्व्यवच्छदार्थमुभयनापि सामान ववग्रहणम् । १ ग घ च drop रक्षणादाहरणाभ्याम् । ० ग घ च परस्य ।

·वासुदेवकृतपटपंचिकया समेत भागासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य, शब्द प्रयत्नानन्तरयिकत्वात् ।। यद्यपि वायवीयादिशब्दानामीश्वरप्रयत्नपूर्वकत्वमस्ति तथापि प्रयत्नम सीवादिभाषानुविधायित्वलक्षण प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वमन विवक्षितम । तच्च स्वीयादिशब्दे नास्तीति भागासिद्धत्वम । आश्रयासिद्धो यथाऽस्ति प्रधान विश्वपरिणामित्वादिति ।। आश्रयस्य प्रधानस्यासिद्धत्वात् सिद्धत्वानुमानयर्थ्यमिति भाव । आश्रयैकदेशासिद्धो यथा नित्या प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरा अकृतक- दिति ॥ पक्षीकृताना मध्यात् प्रधानस्यैकदेशस्यासिद्धत्वात् । व्यर्थविशेप्यासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य शब्द कृतकत्वे सति सामान्य वादिति । व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य शब्द सामान्यवत्वे ति कृतकत्वादिति ॥ व्यय विशेष्य यस्मिन् हेत्वाभासेऽसौ व्ययविशष्य । व्यर्थविशेष्यश्वासाव दुश्चेति व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्ध । एवमितरतापि । प्रागसत सत्तासबन्ध कृत चम् । तच्च प्रध्यसे नास्तीति व्यभिचारात्तत्र सामान्यवत्त्व व्यर्थमित्यर्थ । सिद्धत्व हेतो कृतकत्वस्य मीमासक्राभिप्रायेण । सदिग्धासिद्धो यथा धूमबाप्पादिविवेकानिश्चये कश्चिदाहाऽग्नि निय प्रदेशो धमवत्वादिति।। वाप्पादीत्यादिशब्दन मपकवर्तिस्वीकार । सदिग्धविशेष्यासिद्धो यथाऽद्यापि रागादियुक्त कपिल पुरुषत्वे त्यद्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानत्वादिति । सदिग्धविशेषणासिद्धो यथाऽ. १६. has विभागासिद्धो। २ च. drops अद्यापि । म reads सति सर्वदानुत्पन्न ।

·२८ भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार द्यापि रागादियुक्त. कपिल सर्वदा तत्त्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सनि पुरुष दिति ॥ कपिलस्यापि कदाचिद्रागादियोगोऽस्ततिमिद्धसाधनता स्यादतस्तल प्रतिशायामद्यापीति पदम् । अनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानवादित्युक्ते महायो भिचार । तेषा कदाचिनुत्पन्नतत्वज्ञानत्वेऽप्यापि रागादियोगामा अतोऽद्यापीति सर्वदेति च हेतुविशेषण कृतम् । पाषाणादिना च्या परिहारार्थ पुरुषत्व सतीति विशेषणम् । ननूभयथासिद्धान्यतसिद्ध गापि स्मादसिद्धभेदौ नोदाइताविल्याशक्याह । त एतेऽसिद्धभेदा योभयवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदोमर सिद्धा भवन्ति । यदात्वन्यतरवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदाऽन्यतर सिद्धा मवान्त ।। विरुद्धभेदास्तु । सति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धभेदा. । पक्षा व्यापको यथा नित्य शब्द कार्यत्वात् ।। उभयान्तोपलक्षितस्य सत्त्वमनित्यत्वम् । न पुनर्विनाशित्वम् । तदि नित्यत्वमत प्रागभावप्रधसाभावयोरपि नित्यत्वात्सपक्षत्वम् । रवकारण बायतु कार्यत्वम । तच्च प्रागभावादिषु नास्तीति विरुद्धत्वम् । यदि रादिमत्व कार्यत्वमिप्यते तदा प्रवसेऽपि गतत्वादनेकान्तिकस्यापि । त्वमिति । विपक्षकदेशवृत्ति पक्षव्यापको यथा नित्य शब्द सामान्य सत्यस्मदादिवाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् ॥ १ and u.add विषविशेष्यासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य. शब्द., अ सति अकृत्तरत्वात् । विरुद्ध विशेषणासिद्धो यथाऽनित्य शब्द. अकृ मति अमूर्तत्वात् । २ and ग. ड read तदोभयासिद्धा भवन्ति. ३ ग, घ, omit वादि.

·वामदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेत २९ गिना परमाणवोऽपि बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यास्तत सपक्षवृत्तित्वान्न विपद्धत्व दत्यस्सदादिग्रहणम् । तथापि सामान्ये नित्येऽध्यस्तीति सामान्यवत्वे तेपदम् । माह्मत्व ग्रहणयोग्यत्व विवक्षितम् । तच्च सर्वशब्देऽप्यस्तीति पापकत्वम् । पक्षविपक्षकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्य शब्द प्रयत्नानन्तरीयक्त्वात् ।। प्रयत्नतारतम्यानुविधायित्व प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वम् । तद्वाय्यादिशब्दे नास्तीति वैपक्षकदेशवृत्तिरिति । पलैकदेशवृत्तिविपक्षव्यापको यथा नित्या पृथिवी कृतकत्वात् ॥ व्याख्यातप्रायमेतत् । असति सपक्षे चत्वासे विरुद्धा । पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथाऽऽकाश पिगुण. शब्द प्रमेयत्वात् ।। आकाराविशेषगुणत्व साध्य शब्दव्यतिरेकेणान्यत्र नास्तीति सपक्षाभाव । मुत्तरानुमानेष्वपीति बोध्यम् । पक्षविपक्षक्देदशवृत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविपशेगुण शब्द प्रयत्नानन्त फस्यात् । पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुण दो बाहोन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् ॥ ग्रहणयोग्यत्व सर्वशब्देष्यस्तीति पक्षव्यापकत्वम । अन्यत्र तु छचित्सुखादौ तीति विपक्षकदेशत्तित्वम् । विपक्षव्यापक पक्षकदेशवृत्तिर्यधाऽऽकाशविशेषगुण शब्दोऽ त्मिकत्वात् ।। मुत्तिगत पदम् । अपदात्मकत्व भेर्यादिशब्द एवास्तीति पक्षकदेशवृत्ति [1 अन चोदयति । 'ड. reads कापत्वात् ।

·मासज्ञप्रणीतन्यासार
विद्यमानसपलविपक्ष परदेशत्तियथा सर्वदयमनित्य क्रियापत्वात्।।
पक्षीकृतेष्वाकाशादिपु मियावत्वस्याभावादिति पक्षैयदेशवृत्तित्वम्। पछी
कृताच द्रव्यादन्यनामावादसाधारणत्वमिति ।
अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानःपक्ष पक्षन्यापको यथा सर्व कार्य
नित्यमुत्पत्तिमत्त्वादिति ॥
सर्वकायस्य पक्षीकारेण नित्यत्वस्य साप्यस्य सपथा आकाशादय सन्ति
न तु विपशा अनित्यस्य सर्वस्य पक्षीकृतत्वादिति ।
अविद्यमानाविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्ष परदेशवृत्तिर्यया सर्व कार्य
नित्य मावयवत्वात् ।
अपि पूर्ववत् प्रागभाग्य सामावयो संभव न पुनर्विपक्षत्वम् । अवि
द्यमानतातो विद्यमानविपश पच पापकस्लु कालव्यतिरेकी, नासाधारणो
व्याक्तिमत्वात् । अव्याप्तस्तु भवयासाधारणो यया सर्व प्रधानान्वित कार्यत्वा
दिति । नदि प्रधानान्वितत्वेन किंचिदाधकमरतीत्य याति । अनैव च
साध्ये कुपितत्वादिति भागासिद्धा वेति ।
कालात्ययापादेष्टभेटास्तु प्रत्यक्षविरद्धो यथाऽनुप्णोऽग्नि
कृतत्वात् ॥
सर्वथैव गृहीवस्य निषप्दुमशक्यत्वादुष्णत्वग्रहणमद्गीकार्यम् । प्राण च
प्रत्यभणार पादावेति प्रत्यक्षरय बलीयस्त्वम् ।
अनुमानविरुद्धो यथा परमानामनित्यत्व मूर्तस्वात् ।।
।
, ग, घ, ड, and a read उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात्
२ च adds अविद्यमानसपक्ष विद्यमानविपक्ष पशव्यापको यथा सर्व
कार्य अनिन्य उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् । अविद्यमानसपथ विद्यमानविपक्ष पक्षक
देवत्तियथा सव कार्यमनित्य सावयवस्यात् ।।
१ ग है and च read अनिया परमाणव मूर्तत्वात् ।।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः यद्यप्यनुमानमात्रेणानुमानस्य बाधो न समयांत तथापि बलवता दुर्बलो बाध्यते प्रत्यक्षेणेव । नहि प्रत्यक्षमेवानुमानस्य बाधकम् । अन्यथा हि विवादपदे- ऽलातचक्रे प्रत्यक्षमपि बाधक स्यात् । तथाह्यत्र विवादपदमलालचक्र न भवति विशिष्टालातत्वात् । अभ्रमणावस्थालातवदिति । अनुमानमेव बाधक, प्रत्यक्ष चाशुतरनमणवशाद् भ्रान्तम् । एवमिहापि परमाणुसाधकस्यामामाग्ये धर्मिण एवाभावान्मूतत्वानुमानमाश्रयासिद्ध स्यात् । प्रामाण्ये वा तस्य पारपर्येण नित्यत्वसाधकत्वात्तेन बाधिताविषयत्वामेति । तथाहि अल्पपरिमाणतरतमभावः कचिदाश्रये विश्रान्तः परिमाणतरतमभावत्यान्महत्परिमाणतरतमभाववदिति निरतिशयाल्पपरिमाणवस्तुसिद्धौ तस्योपादानकारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिः । कार्या- पेक्षयात्मपरिमाणानि खलूपादानानि यथा परस्य तन्तकः । न च परिमाणु. भ्योऽल्पपरिणाम किंचिदस्ति । अतः कारणशून्यवस्तुसिद्धावनित्यत्व धर्मिमाह- कप्रमाणबाधितमिति । आगमविरुद्धो यथा ब्राह्मणेने सुरा ऐया द्रवदन्यत्वात् क्षीरव- दिति ॥ गोडी पैटी च माध्वी च विशेया त्रिविधा सुरा। यथैवैका तयैवान्या न पातव्या द्विजोत्तमैः ।। सुरा वै मलमन्नानां पाप्मा च मलमुच्यते। तस्माद्राह्मणराजन्यौ वैश्यश्च न पिवेत्सुराम् ।। इत्यादिरागमः । न चागमस्यैवानुमानेन बाध इति वाच्यम् । पेयत्व हि सुरायाः पीताया अपापहेतुत्वं साध्यमन्यथा सिद्धसाधनत्वप्रसगः स्यात् । तन्च साध्य दृष्टान्ते क्षीरादावागमैकसमधिगम्यम् । अस्मदादेः तदप्रामाण्ये च दृष्टान्तस्यासिद्धावनुमानस्यानुस्थानप्रसगात् तस्मादत्रागमस्यैव बलवत्व- मिति । प्रत्यक्षेकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्व तेनोऽनुष्णं रूपित्वादिति ।। १. ग reads वारणेन पेय सुरादि. ३ ·भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार सर्वस्य तेजसोऽनुपण त्वसाधने परमाणुपु ज्योत्माया वारसदादीना प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्धो न समवति । प्रत्यणेक्देशविरुदो प्रत्यक्षेवदेशविरुद्ध इत्यर्थ । अनुमानेकटेशविरुद्धो यथा नित्याश्रया द्रवत्वरूपरसगधम्पर्शा नित्या अप्रदेशवृत्ति समान नात्यारं परत्वे सति परमाणुवृत्तित्वात् तद्द तैवत्वादिति ॥ परमाणुवृत्तित्वादित्युक्ते सयोगेन व्यभिचार सन्निवृत्यर्थमप्रदेशग्रहणम् । तथापि द्वित्यादौ व्यभिचारस्तत्परिहाराय समानजात्यारभक्त्व सतीति पदम् । तथापि दूपणुके व्यभिचाररतनिवृत्यर्थ गुणे सतीति विशेषणमूह्यम् । अन्न च नैमित्तिकद्रवन्धपार्थिवपरमाणुरूमादिवेव नित्यत्वमनुमानन विरुद्धयने : सासिद्धिकद्रवत्वसल्लिादिपरमाणुरूपादिप्यिति । तथाहि पार्थिवपरमाणुरूपर मगधरूपशा अमिसयोगना पार्थिवविशेषगुणत्वाद् घरस्पादिवत् पार्थिवत्तेज सपरमाणुद्रवत्व पावन पार्थिवतेजसद्रवत्वात् सर्षि सुवर्णादिद्रवत्ववत् । आगमक्देशविरुद्धो यथा सर्वेपा टेवणा शरीराणि पार्थिवान शरीरत्वादस्मदानिशरीरवदिति ॥ क्नाचद्देवानामृपीणा च शरीराणि आप्यतैजसवायवीयानि श्रूयन्ते तस्मा दागमैक्दशविरुद्धोऽय हेतु । प्रकरणसमस्योदाहरण यथाऽनित्य शब्द पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतर त्वात्सपक्षवत् ॥ एक एवाय हेतुरनित्यत्व इव नित्यत्वेऽपि समान इति । नित्य शब्द पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात्सपशवदिति । एकत्र तुल्य लक्षणविरुद्धहेतुद्वयोपनिपातो विरुद्धाऽव्यभिचारीत्येके ॥ एक इति वयमित्यर्थ । अन्ये तु मकरणसमोऽयमित्याः । भिन्नविषर हेतुमनिपातो विरुद्धाऽव्याभिचारी माऽमूदित्येकजेतिपदम् । तथापि निर १ च omits अनित्य शब्द सपक्षवत् । २च reads गगनवत् ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपांचकया समेतः शब्दः कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् गुणः शब्दः कर्मव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यवत्त्वे सति सामा- न्यवतामनाधारत्वाद्रुमादित्यनयोविरुद्धाव्यभिचारित्वं स्यात् तनिषेधाय विरुद्ध- ग्रहणम् । एवमपि नित्यः शन्दः प्रमेयत्वादनित्यः शब्दः कार्यस्वादित्यनयो- स्तथात्व स्यादित्यतस्तुल्यलक्षणग्रहणम् । प्रकृतप्रमेयस्यानैकान्तिक्त्यात तुल्य- लक्षणत्व निरूपाऽऽत्मकतुल्यलक्षणाभावादाहरति-- यथा नित्यमाकाशमभूर्तद्रव्यत्वादात्मवत्, अनित्यमाकाशमस्मदादि- चायेन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणाऽऽधारत्याद् घटादिवत् ॥ ननु वस्तुनो द्वैरूप्यासंभवादवश्यमन्यतरानुमान सुनष्टमेव ततश्चासिद्धादि- दूषणदुष्टत्वात्तेप्येवान्तर्भावो भविष्यति किं हेत्वाभासाऽभ्युपगमेनेत्याऽऽक्या- SSI सखलु पुरुषविशेषमपेक्षमाणो हेत्वाभासो भवत्यन्यतरासिद्धवदिति।। यथा पर प्रति असिद्ध हेतुं यः समर्थयितुमशक्तस्तदपेक्षयाऽन्यतरासिद्धो हेत्वाभासो भवति, यथा वा दूषणान्तरोद्भावनासमर्थन्य प्रकरणसमः तथा- दूषणान्तरोभावनायां विकलशक्तेर्चेिरुदाव्यभिचारीति । यदा स्यन्यतरानुमानस्य धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणाधमुन्द्रावयति तदा कालात्ययापदिष्टदोपदुष्ट भवत्येकमन्य- तरत्प्रमाणमिति । अन पुनरनित्यत्वसाधकानुमानमेव धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणाधि- तम् । तथाहि व्यापकमेवाऽऽकामिति प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदे समर्थितम् । अतः समानजातीयोऽआदानकारणाभावादाकाशमनुत्पत्तिधर्मक सिद्धमिति कय तद्- नित्य भविष्यतीति। हेतुमसगेन हेत्वाभासानभिधायोदाहरणाऽऽख्यमवयवमाह- सम्यग्दृष्टान्ताभिधानमुदाहरणम् । सम्यगित्यभिधानविशेषणं भिन्नं पदम् । तच्चाव्याप्त्यभिधानादोरासार्थम उदाहरणभेदमार- १४ reads अमूर्तत्वात् । २ ग, घ, and a add एवं before अनित्य ३ च reads पाहा विशेषगुण.

·भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः तद्विविधम् । साधर्म्यवधर्म्यभेदात् ।। साधम्र्यवधये एव भेदस्तस्मादिविधस्यापि सक्षणोदाहरणे दर्शयति । तवान्वयमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं साधोदाहरणं ययाऽनित्यः शब्दस्तीत्रादिधर्मोपेतत्वात् । यद्यत्तीवादिधर्मोपेतं तत्तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा सुखादीति । व्यतिरेकमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं वैधादाहरणं यथा यदनित्यं न भवति तत्तीवादिधर्मोपेतमपि न भवति यथाऽऽ- काशमिति । एतेने उदाहरणामासानामनुदाहरणत्वमुक्तं भवति । दृष्टान्तग्रहणव्यातेः प्रमाणोपपन्नत्वं सूचयितुं न पुनरवदयमुदाहरण वाच्य- मिति नियमयितु । शेष स्पष्टम् । उदाहरणलक्षणाभिघानादुदाहरणामासा निरस्ता भविष्यन्तीत्यभिप्रायेण तल्लक्षगमवावरभेद च सोदाहरणमाह । उदाहरणलक्षणरहिता उदाहरणवदामासमाना उदाहरणा- माताम्ते चानेकप्रकाराः तथा चाऽनित्यं मनो मूर्तस्वादित्येतम्मिन्प्र- योगे सर्व उदाहरणाभासा उच्यन्ते इति ॥ विस्तारभीत्यति शेषः । यन्मूर्त तदनित्यं यया परमाणुरिति साध्यविकलः ।। साध्यस्य अनित्यत्वस्य परमाणावभावात् ।। यथा कमेति साधनविकलः ॥ साधनस्य मूर्तत्वस्थ कर्मध्यभात् । यथाऽऽकाशमित्युभयविकलः ।। उभाम्या साध्यसाधनाम्या विकलः दृष्टान्तामास इति सर्वत्र सबंधः । स्पष्टम् । १५, and a read साधोदाहरण, बैधर्योदाहरणं चेति । १२ क omits एतेन....भवति । ३ ग, घ, ड, च read अनित्य दृष्ट ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः यथा खरविषाणमित्याश्रयविकले: ।। स्पष्टम् । घटवदित्यव्याप्त्यभिधानम् ॥ न व्याप्त्यभिधानमव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । यन्मूत तदनित्यमिति वचनमन्तरेण च्याप्तरप्रतीतेः । यदनित्यं तन्मूर्त दृष्टं यथा घट इति विपरीतन्याप्त्यभिधान- मिति ॥ यत्र साधनजातीयमस्ति तत्र साध्यजातीयमवश्यमस्तात हि वक्तव्यम् । अन्यथाभिधानं तु विपरीताव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । एतौ वचनदोपौ ॥ अव्याप्त्यभिधानविपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानरूमौ वचनदोरी । आद्याश्चत्वारो- ऽर्थदोषा इति भावः। यदनित्यं न तन्मूर्तमपि न भवति यथा परमाणुरिति साधना- च्यावृत्तः॥ साधन मूर्तत्व यस्मादृष्टान्ताभासाठ्यावृत्तमसौ साधनाव्यावृत्तः । साध- नान्यावृत्त यस्मिनिति वा साधनान्यावृत्तः । उदाहरणामास इतिसंबधात् सर्वत्र पुल्लिङ्गनिर्देशः। यथा कर्मति साध्याऽव्यावृत्तः, यथा घट इत्युमयाऽन्यावृत्तः, यथा खपुष्पमित्याश्रयहीन इति ॥ व्यक्तमेतत् । १ ग reads शशविषाण; I reads खपुष्पं २ क, घ, , च read हीन: ३ ग, ड, च omit यथा घट: ४ , च read न भवति ·२८ मासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः आकाशदिव्याप्त्यभिधानम् ।। यदनित्य न भवति तन्मूर्तमपि न भवतीत्यमिधानमन्तरेण च्यातेरप्रतीते: यद् मूर्त न भवति तदनित्यमपि न भवति यथाकाशमिति विपरीत- व्याप्त्यभिधानम् ॥ यन साध्यं नास्ति तब साधनमपि नास्तीति खलु व्यतिरेके वकन्येऽन्य- थाभिधान साधनात्साध्यसिद्धावई न भवति दोष एव । एतीच वचनदोषाविति ।। अव्याप्त्यभिधानविपरीतन्याप्यभिधानलक्षणो। अनायाषट् माधोदाहरणाभाप्ता.,इतरे पड्केपर्योदाहरणामासा! अन्ये तु सन्देहद्वारेणापरानष्टाबुदाहरणामासान्वर्णयन्ति ।। सन्देह एव द्वारमुपायस्तेन । संदिग्धसाध्यो यथा महाराज्यं करिष्यत्ययं सोमवंशोद्भुतत्वाद्विव- क्षितराजपुत्रवदिति ।। सोमवशोभूतत्वेन निश्रित एव राज्यमकुर्वाणो दृष्टान्तीकृतः । न चाप्ती राप्य करिष्यतीति निश्चयोऽस्त्यतः संदिग्धसाच्य एव दृष्टान्ताभासः । संदिग्धसाधनो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो रागादिमत्त्वादन्यपुरुषवदिति ॥ अगापि येनकेनचित्प्रकारेण निश्चितोऽसर्वशो रागादिमत्वेनानिश्चितो दृष्टा- न्तीकृतः। संदिग्धोमयो यया गमिप्यत्ययं स्वर्ग विवक्षित. पुरुषः समुपार्मित- शुरुधमत्वाद्देवदत्तवदिति ॥ १ च reads यथाकाश २ क and ग read यदमूतै ३ क omits यथाकाश ४ ग, घ, ड च read रय्यापुरुषः ५५. read अपरिचित देवदत्तपुनवत्

·वासुदेवकृतपढपचिकया समेत
अत्र तु सदिग्धमुभय स्वर्गगमन समुपाजिताक्लधर्मस्व च यस्य स सदिग्धो
व्य पुरुषो दृष्टान्तीकृत ।
सदिग्धाभयो यथा नाय सर्वज्ञो बहुक्क्तृत्वादविष्यदेवदत्तपुत्र
वदिति ॥
भविष्यवदत्तपुत्रे प्रमाणाभावात्संदिग्धाश्रय उदाहरणाभास ।
सदिग्वसाध्यान्यावृत्तो यथा यो महाराज्य न करिष्यति स सोमव
शोभृतोऽपि न भवति यथाऽन्यो रामपुरुष इति ॥
साध्यमव्यावृत्त यस्मादसौ साध्याव्यावृत्त सदिग्धश्चातौ साध्याव्यावृत्त
सदिग्धसाध्याच्यावृत्त सोमवशादन्यत्रोटभूतस्याऽपि महाराज्याकरणे प्रमाणा
भावात् ।
सदिग्धसाधनान्यावृत्तो यथा यस्तु सर्वज्ञ स रागादिरहितो यथा
समस्तशास्त्राभिज्ञ पुरुष इति ।।
समस्तशास्त्राभिज्ञस्य रागादिरहितत्व प्रमाणाभावात् संदिग्धसाधनाच्या
वृत्त इत्यर्थ ।
सदिग्धोभयाव्यावृत्तो यथा य स्वर्ग न गमिप्यति स समुपार्जित
शुक्रुधर्मोऽपि न भवति यथा दुस्थ पुरप इति ।।
दु स्थस्याऽपि पुरुषस्य स्वागमने शुक्लधर्माभावे च प्रमाणाभाव दति
भाव।
संदिग्धाश्रयो यथा य स स बहुवक्ताऽपि न भवति यथा
भावष्यद्देवदत्तपुत्र ॥
स्पष्टमेतत् । चतुर्यावयवस्य रक्षणमाह ।
दृष्टान्ते प्रसिद्धाऽविनाभावस्य साधनस्य दृष्टान्तापमानेन पक्ष
न्याप्तिल्यापक वचनमुपनय ॥
१ क reads सदिग्धाश्रयाच्यावृत्तो यथा

·भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसारः साधनस्य च पक्षे च्यातिख्यपक वचनमुपनय इत्युक्ते हेनुरूपवचनस्याप्युपनय- प्रसगरतनिवृत्यर्थ दृष्टान्तोषमानेनेतिपद तच्चोपरक्षणम् । तेन दृष्टान्तीपमा नेन या दृष्टान्तवैधयण या सहे.पर्यः । शेप स्वरूपक्रयनाथ । स द्विविधः॥ वैविध्य दर्शयति । तया च तीवादियोपेत' शब्द इति साधोपनय । न च तथा तीवादिधपित शब्दो न भवतीति वैधयोपनयः ।। यद्यपि दो ननो प्रकृतमधे गमयत इति न्यायेनार्यभेदो नास्ति तथाप्युक्तिः भेदादुपनयभेदः, उक्तिभेदोऽसुदाहरणभेदादिति । उपनयानन्तरम् ॥ निगमन व्याख्यायत इति शेप । तदाह । सहेतुकं प्रतिज्ञावद्वचनं निगमन तम्मादनित्य एवेति ॥ सहेतुक मिति तस्मादित्यनुदामानहेतुवामित्यर्थः, प्रतिज्ञावद्वचनामति तत्स. मान न तु प्रतिशेव । परेशानिश्चितस्य सिसाधयिषितस्याभिधान हि प्रतिशा। निगमन तु प्रतिशातार्थसाधकहत्वाभिधानेन निश्चितस्यार्थस्यामिधानमिति । एष तर्हि व्याप्तिलिंगाभिधानादेव साध्यसिद्धेर्य निगमनमित्यारक्याऽऽह ! न चेदमनर्थकम् । सान्यविरुद्धाभावप्रतिपादकप्रमाणसूत्रकत्वादम्य ॥ साध्यामनियस्वादिस्तस्य विरुदो यो नित्यत्वादिस्तस्याभावोऽनुपपनत्व तस्य प्रतिपादक यत् प्रमाण तस्य सूचक्त्वात् । तसादानित्य इत्युक्तम् । सिद्धे सत्यारमो नियमार्थ इति न्यायानित्यो न भवति, तन प्रमाणामावाबाधक सदायाचेति प्रतीतिः । तदरि फिमर्थमित्यादाक्याsss | १ च om. न च २ ग, घ. च read प्रतिज्ञावचन, घ reads प्रतिशायाः पुनर्वचन ३ after this a adds तदपि द्विविधम्-साधर्म्य. वैर्यभेदात् ४ च reads इति साधर्म्यनिगमन.

·- नासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः न च तदन्तरेण साध्यावधारणमुपपद्यते ॥ तदन्तरेण विपक्षाधकप्रमाणमतरेण माध्यत्यापधारण निश्चयो नोपपद्यत हत्यस्मिन्नर्थे सूत्रसवादमाद । तथा चोक्तम् विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपदाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः । (गौ. सू. १-१-४१ ) इति ॥ विमृश्य सशय कृत्वा निर्णयः पुरुपेण क्रियवे ! काभ्या पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्या, पक्षविषय साधन प्रतिपक्षविषय दूषणमुमचारेण पक्षप्रतिपक्षशद्वेनोक्तम् । किं च निगमनमसाधनागमिति चत्वारो(१) बौद्धस्य स्ववृत्तिविरोधा इत्याह । निगमनाभिधानमसाधनांगामेत्यम्युपगम्य बाधकं ॥ प्रमाणमभ्युपग- छतो निग्रहस्थानं प्रसज्यते निगमनार्थत्वाद् बाधकत्येति ॥ निगमनार्थत्वादिति निगमनप्रयोजनवादित्यर्थः । क्षणिकत्वादी सत्त्वादि ति साधनमाभिधाय पश्चात् " असन्तोऽक्षणिकास्तस्य क्रमाक्रमविरोधत " इत्यादिना याधक प्रमाण कुर्वतो बौद्धस्य स्ववृत्तिविरोधान्निग्रहः स्यादित्यर्थः । ननु सत्यपि निगमनपधने विप्रतिपद्यमानस्य पारितोपाभावाद्वाधकमेवा मिधीयता किमनेनेत्याशक्याह । निगमनाविप्रतिपत्ती हि बाधकप्रमाणोपन्यामो युक्तः, हेत्वर्थ- विप्रतिपत्ती तत्साधकप्रमाणोपन्यासवदिति ।। इदानी पवारपवरूपानुमानस्तुतिद्वारेण सयालक्षण पचयति । सोऽयं परमो न्यायो विप्रतिपनपुरुषप्रतिपादकत्वात्कथाप्रवृत्ति- हेतुत्वाच ॥ सोऽय पवाषयवस्मोन्यायः परम उत्कृष्टः । का पुनरिय कयेत्याशक्याह । वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः कया ॥ साधनदूषणरस्तिपक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहमात्र कथा माभूदिति वादिप्रतिवादिय हणम् । यथायोग साधनदूषणैर्वादिप्रतिवादिनोरिययः । भेदमाह।

·४२ भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्याथसारः सा द्विविधा वीतरागकथा विजिगीषुकमा चेति ।। तयोलक्षणमाह यत्र वीतरागो वीतरागेणेव सह तत्वनिर्णयार्थ साधनोपालंभी करोति सा वीतरागकया वादसंज्ञयैवोच्यते॥ यया विजिगीपुक्याया वाद इति सामान्यसशा जल इति च विशेष सज्ञा दृष्टा न तमात्र विशेषसशांतरमस्तीत्यर्थः । वादसज्ञा च सकलकथा- साधारणीति लोकव्यवहारादिशायते तथा जल्पे च त्रियमाणे वाद कुरुव इति व्यवहन्ति । वीतरागकथा वादसभवोच्यत इत्यन सूत्रकारवचन यति । तथा चोक्तम् , प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्मा सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चा- वयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वाद. (गो.सू १-२-१) इति ॥ माध्यते पक्षोऽनेन साधन, उपालभ्यते दूश्यते प्रतिपक्षसाधन येन स उपालभ इति प्रमाणेस्तकेंण वा विषयीकृवसामध्यौँ साधनोपालभौ यत्र स प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालभः ।पक्षप्रतिपक्षात्मकत्व कथाप्रयेऽभ्यस्तीति तत्रातिव्या. सिमादिति प्रमाणे त्यादिपदम् । तत्र साधनोपालभाहणेन वितण्डातो व्यय. छेदः। नहि वितण्डायाममाम्यामपि साधनमुपालमश्वोच्यते । जल्पव्यवच्छे- दतु प्रमाणतर्कमहणेन । कथमनेन साधनेन वपक्षः साधयितु शक्यः, अनेन वोपालभेन प्रतिपक्षमाधम दूपियितु शक्यामेति प्रमाणेन निश्चिततामयों तण वा विषयीकृतमामयों साधनोपालभो वादे कार्यो नान्यथति शुशामिसधित्व पुरु- पयोनियम्यते । न चैव जले सप्र कान्तपराजयावस्थाया छलादिप्रयोगस्यापि सूचकत्वात् । तया च पश्यति । सिदान्ताविरुद इत्यादि पद तु शिष्य- शिधार्यम् । सिदान्ताविरुद्ध एव वादः कार्यों न पुनः शुभतार्किकवदी- भरस्य प्रीयभ्युपगमेन । तथा स्वपक्षमापन परपसरूपण साधनसमर्थन दूपणसमर्थन गन्ददोपवजनमित्येतैः परभिरषयवैरुपपन्नः कार्यों येनाभिमत सिदिः स्यात् । अन्ददोषास्त निरर्थकातिद्वोच्चारणाप्रतिदप्रयोगादयः । स वादो विविध सप्रतिरशोऽप्रतिपसमेति । तत्रापि सूत्र दर्शयति ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः तं प्रतिपक्षहीनं या कुर्यात्प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे सति (गौ. सू. ४.२-४९) इति ॥ त वाद प्रतिपक्षविषयसाधन प्रतिपक्ष उपचारात् । तेन हानमपि वा कुर्यात् प्रयोजनार्थ तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमर्थित्वे सति । अस्य सूत्रस्य तापयर्थिमाह । प्रयोजनार्थत्वेन यथा शिप्यो गुरुणा सह प्रश्नद्वारेणैवेत्यर्थः ॥ वाद करोति न पुनः प्रतिपक्षसाधनाभिधानद्वारेणेति शेषः । विजिर्ग कथालक्षणमाई। यत्र विजिगीषुर्विनिगीषुणा सह लाभपूनाख्यातिकामो जयपराजयार्थ प्रवर्तते सा विनिगीपुकथा । वीतरागो वा परानुग्रहार्थ ज्ञानांकुरसंर- क्षणार्थ च प्रवर्तते, चतुरंगा वादिप्रतिवादिसभापतिमाथिकांगा विजिगीषुकथा जल्पवितंडासंजयोक्ता ।। जयपराजयार्थमिति स्वस्य जयाय परस्य पराजयायें परानुग्रहार्थमिति परषा शिष्यादीना वेदप्रामाण्यमोक्षादो निश्चयोत्पादनद्वारेण मोक्षशास्त्रा- दावाचार्यादौ श्रद्धोत्पत्तिद्वारेण वाऽनुग्रहः ज्ञानाकुरस्यात्मस्थस्य शिष्यात्मस्थस्य सरक्षणार्थे च बौद्धादिवृकेभ्यः । सा जल्पसशया वितडासशया चोहत्य : अब सूशसंवादमाह। तथा चाह । तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थ जल्पवितडे बीजप्ररोहसं- रक्षणार्थ कंटकशाखावरणवद् (गौ. मू ४-२-५०) इति । उभयरूपाया अपि विजिगोयुकथाया लक्षण सौत्रमेवेत्याह । यथोक्तोपपन्नछलनातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालंभो जल्पः (गो. सू. १-२-२) इति ।। १ क omits प्रयोजनायित्वेन. २ गध add लक्षण after यथोक ·मासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार - यधोके पादलक्षणे यदुपपन्न योग्य ययोत्तोपपन्न वनोपपत्र सम्रद्धो ययोत्तोपपत्र इत्येवस्योपपन्नगदस्य लोपो द्रष्टव्य सात्वात् । उपपन्न च साधनोपालभवान्मयप्रतिपश्चपरिग्रह इति प्रमाणतग्रहण त्यनुपपन गुदाभिसधिनैव जस कार्य इति नियमामावात्। सिद्धि साधन, उपारम नमुपलम , उपजातिनिप्रहस्थानेस्तु साधनोपालभो यस तयात । यद्यपि उनादीनामपदुत्तरत्वात्परमातस्तै पक्षसाधन प्रतिपक्षोपाल सश्च का न शक्यते तथापि भ्राताना साधनापालमबुद्धिजननात्सायनोपालमहेतुत्वमुक्त मिति । अथवा प्रमाणेव साधन उपालभै च क्रियमाणे दिघाताय परमयु काना इरादीनामनुहावने प्रमाणपु दूषितल्यबुदद्या साधनमुपालभन च न स्थान, उद्भावने तु छलादीन्येवासपगत्वेन प्रतीतानि साधनोपालमहेतूना प्रमाणानामगभाव मनन्त इति पारपर्यण छलादीना तदेतत्वम् । स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितडा ॥ स वादो जल्पश्च प्रतिपक्ष' स्थाप्यते यथा सा प्रतिपक्षस्थापना प्रमाण तया विशेनो वितहा, न पुन प्रतिपक्ष एव नास्तीत्यर्थ एव च वीतराग वितडा विजिमीपुवितण्डेति द्विविधा वितहा। एतच त प्रतिपक्षीनमपि वा कुर्यात् (गौ मू ४ २४९) हास सूत्रेणापि भूचितम्। अशातस्वरूपाणा छला दीना न साधनोपालमातुल्वेनापि स्ववाक्ये पारवर्जन परवाक्येपूदायन वा कर्तुं शक्षमिति नेपा लवणमाह । वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् ॥ (गो. सू १-२-१०) अर्थस्य विरुदत्वेन क्सनमयविकरूपस्तस्योपपत्त समवस्तया पचनस्य विधातो दूषण यत्त उलम् । उदाहरण तु विशेषलक्षण भविष्यति । विभागमाह। तत्रिविधम् । वाक्छल सामान्यछलमुपचारउल चेति(गी सू १-२-११) द्रविध्य रक्षणायध्यादत आद। तत्र यथाऽविशेषामिहितेऽर्थ वक्तुरभिप्रायादातरकल्पना वाक्छलम् ।। (गो सू १-२ १२) अनेकाभिधायि पद वाक्य चार विशेष , तस्याभिधानाय प्रयोग ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः तलाह एवोपचारादविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थ इत्युक्तम् । तस्मिन्सति बतुरभिप्रायादोंतर कल्पना या वचनविधाते तद्वाक्छल वानिमित्तत्वात् । यद्यपि पानि मित्त सर्वमपि छल तथाप्यन्यत्र सामान्योपचारयोः प्रधानत्वाचन व्यपदेशः। उदाहरणमाह। नवकंबलोऽयं माणवक इत्युक्ते, छलवाद्याह कुतोऽस्य नवकंबला इति॥ न्तनकबलत्वमा वक्तार्ववक्षितम् , प्रतिवादी तु नवसख्याककबलवत्व विवक्षिमित्यारोप्यासमवेन दूषयति । तस्य परिहारमाह । तस्याप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणं निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यम् । नव कंवलोऽस्येति वक्तुरभिप्रायापरिज्ञानादिति ॥ नवकलयत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वान्न वक्तुरभिप्रायापरिज्ञानमिति । " उत्तरापरिज्ञानाद्वेति" अप्रतिपत्तिलक्षण निग्रहस्थान वायमित्यनुवर्तते । दूषणान्तरमाह सत्यम् । सिद्ध माध्यतेत्युत्तरस्यापरिशानात् । विप्रतिपत्तेर्वा विपरीतज्ञानात् ।। विपरीतस्य वक्तुरभिप्रायादन्यस्यार्थस्य नवसख्यासंबाधित्वस्य परिज्ञानात् । संभक्तोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसद्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम् (गो. स्. १-२-१३)॥ ब्राह्मणादेश्चतुर्वेदाभिशस्वलक्षणो धर्मः प्रायेण सभवतीति सभवशद्वेनोक्तः। तस्यातिव्यासिसामान्यमतिसामान्य तेन योगादसद्भतार्थकल्पना यत्रवचनवि- घाते निमित्त तत्सामान्यानिमित्त वात्सामान्यच्छलमिति । अत्रोदाहरणमाह । अहोनु खत्वयं ब्राह्मणश्चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञः इत्युक्ते केनचिन्यायवाद्याह, किमत्राश्चर्य संभवति हि ब्राह्मणे चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञत्वमिति । अत्र उलवा. द्याह । न । व्रात्येनानैकान्तिकत्वात् ।। चतुर्वेदाभिशत्वे ब्राह्मणत्व लिग विवक्षितमिति मत्वानेनानकान्तिको दर्शितः । परिहरति ।

·४६ भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः तस्यापि पूर्ववन्निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यम् ।। अप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणमभिप्रायापरिज्ञानादुत्तरापरिज्ञानाद्वा विपतिपत्तश्च विष- रीतहेतुत्वस्य परिज्ञानादिति । चोदयति । कस्मात् । परिहरति । हेतुत्वनाऽविवक्षितत्वात् । किं तहिं । ब्राह्मणत्वे सति चतुर्वेदा- भिज्ञत्वमाश्चर्यकारण न भवतीत्यभिप्राय सुक्षेत्रे शालिसम्पत्ति- वदिति ।। এম্বিয়াহাৰৰষ্কাৰ विद्याचरणसपन्नः पुनर्बाह्मण इलि सर्वाप ब्राझणजाति स्तूयते तत्र श्रद्धोत्पादनार्यमवशापरिहारार्थ घेत्यर्थः । उपचारप्रयोगे मुख्यार्थकरुपनया प्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् , यथा मन्चा कोशन्तीत्युक्ते च्छलवाद्याह पुरषा क्रोशन्ति न मन्त्रास्तेपामचे- तनत्वादिति ।। क्षेत्रपरिरक्षणार्थ कृत काष्टमय श्चतु स्तम्मरूपो मञ्चः । छलचादिनी दूषणमाह । तस्यापि पूर्ववन्निग्रहस्थान वाच्यम् । उमयथाऽपि लोके शास्त्रे च शब्दप्रयोगदर्शनादिति ॥ पराभिप्रायारिज्ञानादुत्तरापरिशानाद्वाऽप्रतिपत्तिलक्षण निग्रहस्थान विप्र- तिपत्ति परेणाविवक्षितस्य मुख्यायस्य स्वीकारेण दूपणान् । उभयथा मुस्म- प्रकारेण गोणप्रकारेण लोके शास्त्रे च प्रयोगदर्शनात् । अतो गौणशब्दप्रयोगे परेण ते मुख्यार्थस्य प्रतिषेधात्स्वमनीपिकाप्रतिषेधोऽसौ न परोपालम्भ इति। जातिनिग्रहस्थानयोरक्षपमाह | प्रयुक्त हेतौ समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसगो माति । पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ प्रसग. प्रतिषेधः । स च प्रत्यक्षामासादावस्तीति न चानी जातिरतः प्रत्युके रेताविति पदम् । तस्याप्यसिद्धत्वादिप्रसगः प्रयुक्त हेवी भवती ति.

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ४७ तद्वयवच्छेदाय समीकरणाभिप्रायेणेति पदम् । असिद्धत्वादिचोदनं तु परपक्ष- प्रतिपेयाय न तु स्वपक्षस्य परपक्षेण समीकरणाभिप्रायेण । यद्यपि प्राप्यप्राप्ति- समादिभ्यतालक्षण, नास्ति तेषां परपक्षण समीकरणाभिप्रायेणाप्रवृत्तेस्तथापि बाहुल्यापेक्षयेदं लक्षण विवक्षितम् । अपक्षव्याप्त्यतिप्रसगो जातिरिति तु निर्दिष्ट सूत्रकारेण । उक्तानामनुक्ताना चानयाभैदाना निरवशेषेणानभिधान- हेतुमाह । बहवश्वानयोः सूक्ष्मा भेदास्तेषां कियन्तो भेदा लक्षणोदाहरणाभ्यां प्रदर्यन्ते ।। तेषामिति निर्धारण पछी तेषा मध्ये इत्यर्थः । साधर्म्यवैधाभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः साधर्म्यवैधर्म्य- समौ (गो. सू. ५-१-२)॥ साधम्र्पवैधाभ्यामन्वयध्यतिरेकान्यामुपसहारे साध्यस्यति शेषः। तद्ध. मस्य साध्यघमस्यानित्यत्वादेविपर्ययो नित्यत्वादिस्तस्योपपात्तेः सिद्धिस्तदर्थे तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेरिति तादध्ये पष्टीविधानात्साधर्म्यवैधाभ्यामेव समीक्रिय- माणो प्रसगी साधर्म्यवैधय॑समौ । अनयोरुदाहरणमाह । यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवदित्युक्ते जातिवाद्याह यद्यनि- त्यवटसाधात्कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्द इष्यते नित्याकाशसाधाद- मूर्तत्वान्नित्यस्तर्हि प्राप्नोति, यदि च नित्याकाशवैधात् कृतकत्वाद- नित्य इप्यते, अनित्यघटवैधादमूर्तत्वातहि नित्यः प्राप्नोति विशेषा- भावादिति । अनयोरुत्तरम् ॥ अत्रैव विकल्लोऽमूर्तत्व यथा नित्यवसाधक न भवति तथा सर्वमपि साधम्र्य वैषम्य च साध्यसाधक न भवतीत्युच्यते किंवा कृतकत्ववत्सर्वमपि साघम् वैध च साधक स्यादिति । आये पक्षे जातेरनुत्थान तस्या अपि साधम्याद्वैषम्यादा समुत्थानात् । द्वितीये पक्षे परिहारमाह । अविनामाविनः साधर्म्यस्य वैधर्म्यस्य च हेतुत्वाभ्युपगमादप्रसंगो धूमादिवदिति ॥

·४८ मासर्वज्ञपणांतन्यायसार यथा अग्रिमसाधादननिमढेघादविनाभूता मादेाऽमिमय सि ध्यति न पुनरममिमसाधर्म्यमात्रादननिमवैधादा केवलारिसध्यति तथा चेत्यर्य । अविनामाविन इत्यनेन विशेषाभावोऽसिद्ध इति सूचयति ! साध्यदृष्टान्तयोधर्मविकल्पादुमयसाध्यत्वाचोत्कर्षापावावर्य विकल्प साध्यसमा (गौ सू. १४) इति ॥ सध्य पशो विवक्षित । साध्यदृष्टा-उयोधमविक्लादुत्व पक्पविकल्प समा इत्युभयसाध्यत्वाच साध्यसम इति सबध । उत्कर्पापकर्षविक्लरान्देषु भावे पञ्, साध्यशन्दा भावे वृत्य । तदयमर्थ पक्षदृष्टान्तयोर्धमस्य विकललादेवियायदोत्कर प्रसजयति तदोत्कर्षसम , यदा चापकप तदापकर्ष समस्तथा साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मस्य मूर्त वामूर्तत्वादेषिकल्पनानित्यत्वानित्यत्वावि कल्प यदा प्रस जयति तदा विकल्पसम , यदा च साध्यदृष्टान्तयोधर्मविकल्पा दुभयस्य साध्यत्वमपि प्रसध्यत इत्यमिघाय ततो हातस्य साध्यत्वे को हतु को वा दृष्टान्त इति प्रसनयात तदा साध्यसम । उभयसाध्यसाच्चेति चका २ण धमविकल समुच्चयते हेतुहेतुमद्भावने च सपथ । सूत्र विगोति । साध्ये दृष्टान्तादनिष्टधर्मप्रसग उत्कर्षसम । इष्टधर्मनिवृत्तिरपर्प , सम इति ॥ दृष्टान्तात्सकाशासाध्ये श-दादी अनिष्टस्शाविद्यमानस्य धर्मस्य सावयव त्वादे प्रसग परेणापाद्यमान उत्कर्षसम । इष्टधनिवृत्तिरित्यापाद्यमानेति शेष । अनयो स्वरूपमा । यदि कृतक्त्वादनित्य शब्दस्तदाघटवदेव सावयव म्यात् । अथ नैवमनित्योऽपि तर्हि न स्यादविशेषात् । अश्रावणश्च घटो दृष्ट शब्दोऽपि श्रावणो न स्यादविशेपादिति । शब्दो यदि कृतकस्वानु मानेनानित्यो वर्ण्यते तदाघटोऽपि कृतकत्वानुमानेनानित्यो वर्ण्य स्यात् । १ क omits वॉवर्य १ क omits यदि ववियसो ·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेत अथानवस्थामयाद् घटस्तेनेवानुमानेनानित्यो वर्ण्यते ततः शब्दोऽप्यव- पर्यः स्यादविशेषादिति वावर्ण्यसमौ ॥ स्पटम्। अथ विकल्पसमः कृतकत्वाविशेषे यथा मूर्तत्वामूर्तत्वादिधर्मविक- स्पस्तथा नित्यत्वानित्यत्वविकल्पोऽपि स्यादविशेषादिति ॥ साध्यदृष्टान्तयोरिति वाक्यशेषः । अथ साध्यसमो यदि कृतकत्वादुभयोरनित्यत्वं तर्हि साध्यत्व- मप्युभयोः स्यात् । न वा कस्यचिदविशेषादिति ॥ ततश्च साध्यत्वे को हेतुर्दृष्टान्तस्य को वा दृष्टान्त इति प्रसगः साध्यसम इति भावः । एतेपामुत्तरं किंचित्साधादुपसंहारे सिद्धे वैधादप्रतिषेधः (गो. सू. ५-१-१ ) ॥ किंचित्साधादीपत्ताधादुपसंद्रियते यस्मिन् स उपमहारो दृष्टान्तस्तस्य सिद्धधात्सर्वया साधादापाद्यमानादप्रतिषेधः साधर्म्यस्येति शेषः । अथवा किंचित्साधादविनाभूतकृतकत्वादिलक्षणादुपसदियत इत्युपसहार. साध्य तस्य सिद्धधयोदविनाभावशून्यादप्रतिषेधः साध्यस्य । सूत्रायें सक्षेपेणाह । किंचित्साधाद्धमवत्त्वादिलक्षणासाध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पेऽपि व्यवस्था दृष्टा । तदपलापे लोकादिविरोधः सर्वानुमानाप्रामाण्यप्रसं. गश्चेति ॥ व्यवस्था वन्हिमत्त्वस्यैव सिद्धिदृष्टा न पुनर्यस्य कस्यापि दृष्टान्तधर्मस्य सिद्धिः। नापि तदसिद्धौ हिमत्त्वस्याप्यसिद्धिः । ११.omits अथानवस्थाभयात् ४ ·मासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोःप्राप्त्याऽविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्याऽसाधक- त्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राधिसमौ (गो. सू. ५-१-७) इति ॥ साध्य शाप्य शब्दादिकार्य च तद्विपयं ज्ञान हितोरिन्यस्यानन्तर साधकत्य- मगीकृतमित्युपतहारः। विक्लस्त्वय जात्युत्थाननिदाननिरूपणार्थ प्राप्त्या. चिशियित्वादमाप्त्यासाधक्श्चेति । अत्र हेतुरसाधक इति प्रतिषेधोऽध्याहार्यः । सूत्रार्यमाह। यद्ययं हेतु. प्राप्य साध्यं साधयेदुभयोः प्राप्त्यविशिष्टत्वादगुल्यो- रिव किं कस्य साधनं सायं चेति ॥ प्राप्तिः सयोगरूपा तस्या अविशिष्टत्व साधारणव तस्मात् । अप्राप्य साधको नास्ति कामाग्निवदिति ॥ नाहि काठमप्राप्य बहिर्दहति प्रकाशयति वेत्यर्थः । परिहरति । घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात्पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिषेधः (गो. सू.५-१-८) इति ।। निष्पत्तियत्यत्तिप्तिरिति र पीडन इति निमित्तसप्तमी पीडनार्थमभिचार- दर्शनात् । प्रायविशेषेऽपि कुलालादिना मृस्पिड एव घटीक्रियमाणः प्रदीपादिना च प्रकाश्यमानो दृश्यते न पुनर्विपर्ययस्तथानापी व्यर्थः । तथाs प्राप्त्यविशेऽप्यभिचारकर्म पीडन शोः कुर्वदृश्यते न विपर्ययस्तयो भययापि हेतुत्वोपपत्तरयुक्तो निषेधः । सूत्रस्य तात्पर्यायमाह । प्राप्त्यप्राप्त्यविशेषेऽपि प्रतिनियतार्थवृत्तय एवैते साध्यसाधन- स्वादयो धर्मास्ते निराकर्तुमशक्याः सर्वप्रमाणविरोधादिति ।। किंचाय प्रसगोऽपि हेतु प्राप्तः प्रतिषेपत्यप्रांतो वेत्यादिदोषः समानस्तत सेनेव स्वस्य दुष्टत्वे हेतुरदृष्ट एव । जात्युत्तरान्तरमाह । प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः (गो. सू. ५-१-१२) । १. ग. प. read प्राप्त्यविशिष्टत्वाद। २. ग. प. है. read अनयोरुत्तर before घटादि।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ५१ सोदाहरणमस्यार्थमाह । अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकस्यादित्युक्ते प्रामुत्पत्तेरनित्यत्वे कारणं नास्तीति नित्यः प्रसक्तस्तस्योत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेति ॥ अनुत्पत्त्या प्रत्यवस्थानमनुत्पत्तिसमः । परिहरति । तथामावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ उत्पन्नस्य शब्दस्य तथाभावादुलत्तिसद्भायाकारणोपपत्तेरनित्यत्वसाधक- हेतुपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः । अन्यथा प्रतिपादिवचनात्यागदुष्टो हेतरदुष्टे च दूषणा- नुपपत्तिरिति जातिप्रयोगव्याधातात् । तात्पर्यार्थमाह- अनुत्पन्न' शब्द एव नास्तीति कस्य नित्यत्वादि धर्माश्चिन्त्यते ॥ आदिशब्दादनित्यपरिग्रहः । जात्यन्तरमाह। त्रैकाल्यासिद्धहेतोरहेतुसमः (गो. सू. ५-१ १८) ।। काल्येऽसिद्धि काल्यासिद्धिरिति विग्रहः । एतदेव विवृणोति । यदि पूर्व साधनमसति साध्ये कस्य साधनम् । अथ पश्चादविद्य- मानं कथं माधनम् । अथ युगपत्तथापि किं कम्य माध्यं साधनं । वेति द्वयोस्तुल्यकालत्वात् ।। अविद्यमानमिति साध्यकाल इति शेषः । हेतोरस्तुत्वापादनाय मतिषेधो तुसम इति । परिहरति । न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेः॥ साध्यस्य कार्यस्य शाम्यस्य च हेतुत एव सिद्धकरतेप्तेश रोके दर्शन • नयुक्त प्रतिपेषः । यदि पुनरम हेतुतः साध्यसिदिनोलोक्रियते तदा प्रति- निवृत्तिभ्यामपि कस्यचिदमस्यामापनात् वयोवेयर्यप्रसगः । एतदेवार । प्रवृत्त्यादिविरोध इति सूत्रार्थः ।। १ ग. प. स. कार्यत्वात् । २४. omits अप पश्चात......साधनन् ।

·५२ भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार इतोऽपि हतो प्रतिपेघा नापपयत इत्याह । प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिश्च नैकाल्यासिद्धे ॥ यो य परेण प्रतिषेध क्रियते स कि प्रतिषेध्यात्पूर्वमुतपश्चादय युगपत् । यदि पूर्व तदाऽसति प्रतिपध्ये क्स्याय प्रतिपय स्यात् । अय पश्चादसति प्रतिषेधे कथ प्रतिषेध्य । युगश्चत् सव्येतरगोविपणियोरिव कि कस्य प्रति पेधक प्रतिपथ्य वा स्यात् । एककारत्वाविशेषात् । न वेवमस्यापि प्रतिपे धस्य त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेरिति टूपणे सत्यनवस्थाया प्रत्यापि सिद्धिर्नस्वादित्या शक्याह । म्ववचनेनेव प्रतिषेधासिद्धी हेतुसिद्धिरिति सूत्रार्थ ।। खरूपनाशक्त्वाच्च दोष एव न भवतीति भाव । एतेन सर्वोऽव्यय साधर्म्य- वैधम्यादिजातिप्रयोग स्वरूपमाप न प्राप्नोताति ताच्छयैरूहनीयमिति सूच. यति । जात्य तरमाह। एक्धमोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाऽविशेषप्रसगात्सद्भावोपपत्तिरविशेषसम (गौ सू ५ १ २३) ॥ एतदेव विवृणेति । यदि घशब्दयोरेकम्य कार्यत्वम्योपपत्तेरनित्यत्त्वेनाऽविशेष इप्यते मर्वभावाना तहि सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेष प्रमज्यत इति ।। परिहति । तवेदमुच्यते । सर्वथाऽविशेष प्रत्यक्षविराध , अनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेष स्वनुमानागमविरोध । केनचिंदविशेष प्रमेयत्वादिना सिद्धसाधनम् ॥ सर्वथाविशेष प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेश्च प्रतिषेध्यप्रतिपधयामेंदासिद्धरित्यूह्यम् । आत्मादिनित्योऽनादिवस्तुभूतत्वाद्यनित्य न भवति तदनादि वस्त्वपि न भवति । यथा घटादीत्यनुमानम् , " अविनायी वा अरेऽयमात्मा" (वृहदा. उ० ४।५।१४) त्यागमस्ताभ्या विराध । निदिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपरमादुपलब्धिसम (गौ सू ५ १-२७)। हेनुरयुक्त इति प्रतिषेध इति शेप । सूत्र विवृणोति । - ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिक्या समेत पृथिव्यादिषु कार्यत्वसिद्धये निर्दिष्टस्य सावयवत्वस्यामावेऽपि बुद्धयादी कार्यत्वमुपलब्धम् ॥ इत्यायोजकोऽय हेतुरिति । उपराया प्रतिषेध उपलब्धिसम इति । परिहरति । सपक्देशस्यापि धूमादेर्गमकल्वदर्शनादप्रतिषेध ॥ सपकदेशे वर्तमानो हेतुरल सपक्षकदश इत्युक्त , उपचारात्, मञ्चशब्दन पुरुषवत् । सपथस्यैकदेशो यस्यासौ सपक्षैकदेश इति भिन्नाधिकरणो वा बहुनाहि । अय सपक्षव्यापके हेत्वतरे सत्यव्यापकस्याप्रयोजकत्व नाव्यापक यानस्य धूमाद । इहाभूत्वाभावित्वस्य सपक्षस्य व्यापकत्वमिति तदप्य युक्तम् । द्रव्यवसाधने सपक्षव्यापकस्य गुणवत्वस्य समवायिकारणत्वस्य वा सद्भावेऽपि वायो क्रियावत्वादरपि द्रव्यत्यसिद्ध । नामि कार्यत्वेऽभूवाभाधि त्वमिति वाच्य । तयो पर्यायवादिति । इदानिमाशङ्कापूर्वक सूत्रोच परिहारमाह । क्थ तर्हि बु यादी कार्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यत आह कारणान्तरादपि तद्ध- मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेध (गौ सू ५ १२८ ) ॥ तद्व्यावहे। प्रमाणान्तरादपि कार्यत्वसिद्धिरिन्यर्थ ॥ यथा धूमाभावेऽयोगोलकादौ प्रमाणा तरादमिसिद्धिस्तयेत्यय } प्रमाण न्तरमेव दर्शयति। प्रमाण चानुपलब्धिकारणेप्वसत्सु प्रागूर्व चानुपल मांदिति ।। तथाहि बुद्धयादि कार्यमनुपली कारणेप्वसत्सु प्रागूय चाऽनुपलभ्यमान स्वात, घटादिवत् । येष्यावरणादिषु सत्सु बुद्धिघटादयो विद्यमाना अमिन गृह्यन्ते तायनुपलब्धिकारणानीत्युच्यते । अस्मिन्ननुमाने जात्युत्तर सौर दर्शयति । १. ग ड add घटवत् after अनुपलम्भात् ।

·मासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसार तद्नुपरन्धेरनुपलभाटभावसिधी ताद्वपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसम (गो सू ५ १२९) इति ॥ तावपरीतोपपत्तरित्सस्मादसिद्धो हेतुरिति प्रतिषचाऽध्याहाय । सूरमाचष्टे। सम्य बुयादिकार्यस्यानुपलयरनुपलभादमावसि दावनुपलान्धवि- परीतोपरब्युपपत्ते प्रागूर्वमपिबुध्यादे सद्भाव सेत्म्यतीति माव ।। अनुपलब्ध्या प्रत्ययस्थानमनुपलब्धिसम , उपलभ्यमानव उपलब्धिरेव स्यानगनुप ब्धिरिति भाव । परस्यात्तरमाह । अनुपलभात्मरत्वादनुपरन्धेरहेतु ॥ अनुपलान्धरनुपलमकत्वादनुपल मरूपेण प्रतीयमान वादहतु । जुयाद्यु परब्धेनाभावसाधकानुपलब्धिरित्यर्थ । अमुमवार्थमाइ । नास्तीति ज्ञानमनुपलब्धि । सा च तत्स्वभावतया प्रत्यात्मवेद्या । अतस्तदनुपलब्धिरसिध्देत्यभिप्राय ॥ यदाऽपि उपलब्ध्यभाषाऽनुपलब्धिस्तदाऽपि तस्या प्रत्या मवेद्यत्वादनु पलब्धिरिद्धा । तथाहि शास्त्रमानमपि पूर्व मास्तीदानी चास्ति शास्त्रज्ञानमपि नापरम्यत इत्यनुपलभरूपण जायते । एतेनापरफ्यमानवादुपलब्धि स्यादि त्यतत्प्रत्युक्तम् । विधिमुसेनोपर ब्धिर्यधा प्रतीयते तथाऽनुपलब्ध प्रती सभावाद । किंच परवचनस्य स्वरूपाप्रातषेधामकत्वे हेतोरप्रतिपय स्यात स्वरूप नतिषेधाते स्वयमेव स्यादिन्यलम् । नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेनित्यप्तम । ( गौ १ ३५ ) इति ॥ अस्याथमाह। अनित्यत्वस्य धर्मभ्य नित्य सर्वदा सद्भावे धर्मिणोऽपिशव्दस्य सर्वदा सद्भाव । अथानित्यत्व सर्वदा नास्ति तथाप्यनित्यत्वाभावानित्य शब्द इति ।। धर्मिणोऽपि शन्दस्य सर्वदा सद्भाव इति धर्मिणमतरेण धर्मस्यावस्था, ·वासुदेवकृतपदपाचिकया समेत. नाभावादिति भावः । नित्यत्वस्य प्रसगो नित्यसमः । परिहरति । अनित्यत्वस्य सर्वदाऽभ्युपगमे नित्यत्वविरोधः । अनम्युपगमे चासिद्धो हेतुः ॥ नित्य सर्वदा निन्यत्वस्य भावादित्ययमसिद्ध इत्यर्थः । यत्तु धर्मस्यावस्थाना. द्धर्मिणोऽप्यवस्थानप्रसग इति दूषण तत्राऽऽह । प्रध्वंसश्चानित्यत्वं न च तस्मिन्सति शब्दसद्भाव इति ॥ भावात्मको हि धर्मो निराश्रयो न भवति नत्वभावात्मक इति भावः । ननु सूत्रकारेणोक्तानामन्यासा विद्यमानानामिह कस्मादनभिधानमित्याशक्या- ह । एतेनान्यत्वस्याऽऽत्मनोऽनन्यत्वादन्यत्वं नास्तीत्यसदुत्तराणि प्रत्यु. तानि ।। एतेन कतिपयजातीना स्वरूपदर्शन परिहाराभिधानेन प्रत्युक्तानि तत्समा. नन्यायतयेति भावः। यदिदमन्यदुच्यते तस्यादन्यदुतानन्यत् , यदि स्वरू- पादन्यत्तदात्मशानादसदेव स्यात् । अथानन्यत्तदाप्यनन्यवादेवान्य न भक्ती- त्यन्यताया अभाव इतीयमनन्यसमा जातिः । कथीमय निराकृतेल्यत आह । निमित्तान्तरात्संज्ञातरे योज्यमानेऽप्यर्थे तथाभावस्य निराकर्तुम- शक्यत्वात् ॥ निमित्तान्तरात्स्वरूपापेक्षया भेदाभावलक्षणासशान्तरेऽनन्यशब्दे योज्य- माने परेणाप्य तथाभावस्य बस्त्वतगपेक्षयान्यशब्दवाच्यत्वस्य निगकर्तु- मशक्यत्वात् । यदि वा घटादौ निमित्तान्तरात्पदार्थान्तरापेक्षया भेदलक्षणास- शान्तरेऽन्यशब्द योज्यमानेऽर्थे तथामावस्य स्वरूपापेक्षया भेदशून्यत्वस्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात्पुतादिवदित्यर्थः । ननु तथापि वचनवृत्या सगृह्य जात्युत्तराणि सर्वाणि कस्माबोका नीत्याह । १. adds पृथक् before नास्ति ।

·५६ भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार आनन्त्यान्न सर्वाणि जात्युत्तराण्युदाहतुं शक्यन्ते सूनाणाम प्युदाहरणार्थत्वात् ॥ स्त्राणामुदाहरणार्थव च चनुर्विशतिव्यतिरिक्जात्यन्तरेणाप्यनन्यसमा दिना स्थानान्तरे सत्रकारेण प्रत्यवस्थानकरणाद्विज्ञायते । उपसहरांत । उक्ता नातिभेदाः । अथेदानी निग्रहस्थानान्युच्यन्ते । तान्यपि विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्त्योर्विकल्पानन्त्यादसख्यातानीत्यत सक्षेपण व्युत्पा धन्ते ॥ सूतोवानि द्वाविंशसिनिग्रहरधानानीहरुक्षगादाहरणान्या प्रदपर्यन्त इत्य र्थ । तथा च सूत्रम् । प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञातर, प्रतिज्ञाविरोध , प्रतिज्ञासन्यास , हत्वन्तर, अर्थान्तर, निरर्थक, अविज्ञातार्थ, अपार्थक, अप्राप्तकाल, न्यून अधिक, पुनरक्त, अननुभाषण, प्रज्ञान, अप्रतिभा, विक्षेप मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण निरनुयोज्यानु योग, अपसिद्धान्त , हेत्वाभामाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि । (गौ सू . सूत्रे वाक्यात्मकानामपि विमानपत्यप्रतिपत्तिसूचकत्वेन पराननिमि तलान्निग्रहस्थानमियुक्तम् । असमासकरणम यो पनिरपेक्षाणामेपास्वकार्यकर सामर्यप्रकटनार्थम् । सूत्रनमेण रक्षणमाह । तत्र साध्ये प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मानुज्ञा प्रतिक्षाहानि ॥ अस्या उदाहरणमाद । यदि कृतमत्वादनित्य शब्द इप्यने लर्हि आकाशवदमूर्तन्वा नित्य कि नेप्यते । एव प्रतिवादिनीचे वाचाह भवतु विनोबाध्यते । १ग गोध्यत ढगाधत ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समतः ५७ तस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमेनानित्यत्वप्रतिज्ञा हीयतेऽत प्रतिज्ञाहानि- नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवतीति ।। उपल्क्षणमेतत् । हेतुहान्यादीनामप्यनेन सग्रह' । तथानित्य शब्दः प्रमेयत्वादित्यस्य हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वेन प्रतिषेधे कृते सत्यमस्तु तहि इतकत्वा दिति ब्रूवतो हेतुहानि । अनित्ये वाङ्मनसे कार्यत्वादित्यस्य भागासिद्ध्या प्रतिषेधे भाग एव तर्हि पक्षीक्रित इति वदत पक्षहानि । एव प्रतिशाविशेष- हान्यादयोऽस्माभन्यायभूषणेऽभिहिता इति तत्रैव ज्ञातव्या । प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्तदनिर्देश प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् (गो. सू.१ २-३) । लक्षणसूतमु सहरण प्रदर्शनमुखेन व्याचष्टे । सर्वमनित्य सत्त्वादित्यस्य दृष्टान्ताभावेन प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य प्रतिषेधे धर्मो विवादास्पदीभूतत्वादिलक्षणस्तस्य विकल्प , प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य विशे पणत्वेन योजन । तदर्थ इति प्रतिषेधनिवृत्त्यर्थो यथा मशकाओं धूम इति निर्देश । विवादास्पटीभूत सर्वमनित्यमित्येतत्प्रतिज्ञान्तर निग्न हस्थान हेत्वन्तरवदिति ।। दृष्टान्ताभावेनासाधारणत्वनेत्यर्थ । प्रतिषेधनिवृत्यर्थ इत्येतेन तच्छन्दः प्रतिषेधपरामर्शी, अर्थश्च निवृत्तिगर्भितप्रयोजनवाचाति सूचितम् । ननु निर्वि शेषप्रातिशाया प्रहाणाप्रतिमाहानितोऽस्य को विशेष । न स्वरूपमानापार स्यागात्तस्यैर विशेषणान्तर समर्थयितु प्रवृत्तत्वात् । प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोध प्रतिज्ञाविरोध । यथा गुणव्यतिरिक्त द्रव्य, भेदेनानुपलमादिति ॥ नर पतध्य रिरुदिइत्याभास एवायमतो न पृथान्य इति । व्याप्ति (ग, इ add घटवत् after अनुपलम्मात् । , ·५८ भासर्वज्ञपणीतन्यायसारः ग्रहणवशाविरुद्ध हेत्वाभासे विरोधोपगमः, इह हेतुप्रतिशावचनश्रवणमात्रा देवेतीयता भेदेन पृथगमिधानम् । पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास (गोमू, ५.२.६) पक्षप्रतिपेधेऽनुप्णोऽयमग्निरित्याय प्रत्यक्ष वरोधित्वन प्रतिथे वाचाह संपश्यध्वं संपश्यध्वमहो मध्यस्थाः साक्षणो नाहनिमनुष्णं वीमी- त्यनुकोपालंभोयमित्येतत्प्रतिज्ञामन्यासलक्षण निग्रहस्थानमिति ।। अत्र प्रतिशासन्यासस्योपलक्षणत्वादशादिसन्याला अपि निग्रहहे तवो वेदितव्याः ! यथाऽमिन्यः शब्दः प्रमेयवादित्यस्यानकान्तिरत्वेन प्रतिषेधे कृते नामनिन्यत्वे प्रमेयत्व हेतु प्रवीमति ध्रुवाणस्य हेतुसन्यास इत्यादिः । समो गम्वृच्छिाच्छिरसरतीत्यादिसून (पा. १-३-२९) शेश्चेति वसत्यमित्यनन सपश्यध्यमित्यात्मने-दम् । अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिपिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरम् (गो. सू. ६-२-६)॥ विशिष्यते येनासो विशेषो विशेषण न विद्यते यस्मिन्नसावविशेषः । स चासावुत्तश्चेत्यविशेषोक्तः । तस्मिन् दिब्दश्च परार्यानुमानवाक्यात साधनभागापरक्षक । बचन सब्दस्याध्याहार. । तेन चाविशिष्टसाधनमभिधाय सद्दषणे च परोद्भावित पश्चाद्विसिष्टमाभदधतो वचन हेत्वन्तरमित्यर्थः । अस्योदाहरणमाह । यथा नित्या वेदा अस्मयमाणकर्तृकवादित्यस्य जीर्णकृपाऽऽरा- मादिभिरनेकान्तिकत्वेन प्रतिषेधे संप्रदायाविच्छेदे सतीति विशेषण मिच्छतो हेत्वतरमिति निग्रहस्थानं ।। सभवतीति दोषः । कथमित्याराक्याह् । पूर्वस्यासाधकस्योपादानात् ॥ ननु प्रतिशहांन्या हेतुहान्यादीनामुपलक्षणवत्प्रतिज्ञान्तरेग हेवन्तर स्थाप्युपलक्षण भविष्यतीति विमस्य पृथगुपादानेनान्यथोदाहरणान्तरादीना ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेत. ५९ मपि पृथगुपादानप्रसग । यथा गुणः शब्दः सामान्ययत्तास्पर्शवत्वे सत्यस्म दादिबायैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद्रूपादिवदित्यन रूपमानस्यास्मदादिप्रत्यक्षत्वाभावा- साधनविकले दृष्टान्ते दूपिते घटरूपादिवदिति वदत्त उदाहरणान्तर तथोपनयान्तर निगमनान्तरमप्युदाहरणीयम् । सत्यम् । तथापि परार्थानुमान- वाक्यस्य साध्यसाधनरूपतया तद्भेदविवक्षया पृथगभिधानम् । तेनात्र प्रतिशान्तर निगमनान्तर च प्रतिशान्तरशब्देन गृह्यते । हेवन्तरमुदाहरणा न्तरमुपनयान्तर च हेत्वन्तरग्रहणेन गृह्यत इति । प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमान्तरम् (गौ. सू. ५ २ ७) । अलान्यदित्यध्याहार्य, अर्थान्तरमिति लक्ष्यपदमेव वा ल्क्षणेऽप्यावृत्या संबन्धनीयम् । तेन प्रकृतात्प्रस्तुतादर्थात्साध्यसाधनात्तदूषणाद्वा यर्थान्तर प्रकृतेनासम्बद्धार्थमनुपयोगि तदर्थान्तरमित्यर्थ । एतदेव सोदाहरणमाह । यथानित्यः शवोऽस्पर्शवत्वादिति हेतो. । हेतुश्च हिनोतेर्धातोस्तु- न्प्रत्यये कृते सति कृदन्त पदमित्यादि प्रसक्त्यानुप्रसक्त्या प्रकृतार्था नुपयोगिशास्त्रान्तरमुपदिशतोऽर्थान्तरं निग्रहस्थानमिति ।। अस्पर्शवत्यादिति हेतुमज्ञानात्प्रयुज्यानन्तरमेव स्वयमनैकान्तिकत्वमेय जानानस्तदाच्छदानार्थमेव प्रवर्त । इति भावः । वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् (गो सू. ५ २-८) यथा नित्य शब्दः कचटतपाना गजडदबवत्वात् घझवधभवत् ।। वर्णक्रमनिर्देशो वर्णाना पाठक्रम', अआइई इत्यादिः, स इव तद्वत् । सादृश्य चानार्थशून्यत्वम् । यत्र पदार्थोऽपि नास्ति तनिरर्थकम् । वर्णक्रम 'निर्देश एवास्ति न पुनरयों यल तद्वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवदिति मत्वर्थीयो वा । परिपत्पतिवादिभ्या निरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम् (गौ.स. 1 १. adds after पद-पद च नामारव्यातोपसर्गनिपातभेदाचतु- विधामित्यादि।

·६०
भासनप्रणीतन्यायसारः
५-२-९)॥ यद्वाक्यं वादिना निरमितिमप्यप्रतीतप्रयोगाऽतिद्रुतोद्या-
रणादिना निमित्तेन परिपत्प्रतिवादिम्या न ज्ञायते तदनानसंवरणा-
योक्तमविज्ञातार्थ नाम निग्रहस्थानमिति ॥
न ज्ञायते इति विद्यमानार्थमेवार्यतो न शायत इत्यर्थः । न पुन. स्वरूप
इत्यर्थ ।
पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिसंवद्धार्थमपार्थकम् ((गो.
सू.६.२.१०)।
पूर्व विशेषणमपर विशेष्य तयोभानः पौपिय विशेषणविशेष्यभाव
स्तेनायोगोऽसंबधरतस्मात्कारणादप्रतिसबद्धोऽनन्वितोऽथों यस्य तदसबद्ध
र्थम् । तपास्ययोरनन्वितत्व उदाहरणमाह ।
यया दश दाडिमानि पडपूपा इति ।।
पदयोरनन्वितत्वे निदर्शनमाह ।
कुण्डमनाजिनमित्यादीनीति ॥
अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्रासकालम् (गो. मू. ५.२.११॥
विपयांसन बस्ययेन वचन विपर्यातय वनम् । अवयवाना विपर्यासवचनमय
यपाविपर्यासवचनम् । सूत्रस्यार्थमाह।
प्रतिक्षादीनामर्थवशात्कमस्तेषा विपर्ययेणाभिधान निग्रहम्थानमिति।
स्पष्टम् । एतच नियमस्थाया निग्रहस्थानमकथाया तु न विरोधः ।
हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् (गौ. सू.५ २-१२) ॥ साध
नामावे सायासिद्धेरिति ।।
उक्तमेतत् ।
हेतूदाहरणादिकमधिकम् ( गौ. सू. ५ २.१३) ।
स्तूदाहरणग्रहण सर्वस्याधिकस्योपलक्षणम् । अस्य निग्रहस्थानचे कारणमा।
१ ग. अन्तिभेन,

·११ वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः एकेन कृतार्थत्वादितरानर्थक्यमिति । एक एव हेतुदृष्टान्तो या मयोच्यत इति नियमपूर्विकायामतपणम् । न सर्वत्र । असंभववादिना तु सर्वदा । एतच्च न्यूनाधिकलक्षणद्वयमपि स्वस्वम- ताभ्युपगतावयवापेक्षया न्यूनत्वे चाधिक्त्वे च दूषण विशेयम् । शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् (गा.म.५-२-१४)।। एतद्वघाचटे। मार्थक पुनरभिधानमनुवादः । तद्यातिरेकेण पुनरभिधानं पुनरु- कम् । नित्यः शब्दो नित्यः शब्द इति शब्दपुनरुक्तम् । नित्यो ध्वनिरविनाशी शब्द इत्यर्थपुनरुक्तमिति ।। सार्थक पुनरभिधान यथा गोगीः कामदुधेत्यादि । पुनरुक्तान्तरमाह । अर्यादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम् (गौ.मू ६-२-१६) यथा साधम्योदाहरणेऽभिहिते वैधम्योंदाहरणाभिधानम् ।। व्याप्तिख्यापनार्य उदाहरणमुच्यते तचैकेनाप्युदाहरणेन कृतमिति पर्य- मुभयाभिधानम् । यथा यद्यत्कृतक तत्तदनित्य यथा घटादीत्यभिधाय यदनित्य न मरति तत्क्तकमपि न भवति यथा गगनम् इति । अन्वयव्यतिरेकशाप नार्थमुभवाभिधानमिति नेवम् । तापने प्रयोजनाभावाद् ब्यातिप्रती- त्यानुमानसिद्धः । चोदयति । कथं तन्निग्रहस्थानमिति ।। तादेतिपुनरुपमात्रम् । कथावसानाविरोधित्वादेकेन कृतार्थत्वादितराऽऽनयस्यादिति ॥ उजस्यारि पुनराभपानेऽरथा पप्प पेपर्यः । एतदर नियमकथा- पामेव निमाइस्थानम्, अनिम्मकपापा तु साशितयादिनारपेशागं सल्या १५.स. omit निन्यो पनिः.. .एनस्सामिति ।

·. १२ भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः स्पष्टार्थ पुनरमियानेऽपि विरोधाभावात् निरभिधाननियमाच नातिप्रसगः । तथाप्यधिकाच्चैद न मिटात शीत चेत् सत्यम् । पुनरुत्तमप्यधिक दर्शित मेव अधिकात्तु क्यिाभेदेन पुनरक्त पृथगुक्त शिष्यन्युत्पादनार्यमित्यदोषः । विज्ञातस्य परिषदा निरनिहितस्याप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुमाषणम् (गौ. सू. ५-२.१७) प्रतिवादिनो न्ग्रिहस्थानम् ॥ उपलक्षणमेतत्, यत्पतिवादिदूपणस्याननुवादे वादिनोऽपि सद्भावात् । पथमेतन्निग्रहस्थानमित्याशश्याह । अप्रत्युच्चारयन्किमाश्रयः परपक्षप्रतिषेधं ब्रूयादिति ।। के आश्रयो विषयो यस्यासौ किमाश्रयः । एतेन दूषणमालानुवादेऽप्यसमर्थ स्येतद्दपणामिति सूचित न पुनः सवानुवादः कर्तव्य इति । निरभिहितस्येत्येव दपि परिषदस्युपगमस्योपलक्षण यावत् प्रालिका अन्यतरस्यासासामर्थ्य निश्चि न्यन्ति तावदतव्यमिति भावः । अविज्ञातार्थ चाज्ञानम् (गौ. स. ५-२-१८)। चकारेण पूर्वसूत्राद्विशातस्य परिपदा त्रिरभिहितस्यापीत्येतदाकृष्यते, संदेवाहा यद्वाक्य त्रिराभिहितमपि परिपदाऽवगतार्थ प्रतिवादी प्रत्युच्चा- रयत्नापि नार्थतः सम्यगधिगच्छति तदतानं नाम मतिवादिनो निग्रह- स्थानमिति ॥ अत्रापि प्रतिवादिग्रहणमुपलक्षणम् । कथामम्युपेत्य तुप्णी मावोऽप्रतिभा वादिप्रतिवादिनो निग्रहस्थान- मिति ।। अननुमाषणे तु न तूष्णीमारवे किंवप्रत्युच्चारयन्नपि दूषणादिक्ममि दधाति । अतो नानयोरभेदः । कार्यल्यासंगारकपाविच्छेदो विलेपः (गो. सू. ५-२-२०)। भस्यार्थमाई।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः कथामभ्युपगम्य सम्थेषु मिलितेषु बवीत्यद्य मे महत्प्रयोजनमास्त तस्मिन्नवसिते पश्चात्कथयिष्यामीति ॥ यदि पुनस्सदानोमेव महत्प्रयोजन सभ्या अभ्युपगच्छान्ते तद्दर्शिनः कयाविच्छेदो न पराजय इति । न दमर्थान्तरेऽन्तर्भवतीति वाच्यम् । हेतु- प्रयोगान्तर तरनुपयोगिवचनमर्थान्त म्। अन हेतूपन्यासमपि पश्वाकर्यायच्या मीति वदत्यतोऽस्ति भेदः। स्वपक्षदोपाभ्युपगमात्परपक्षदोषप्रसंगो मतानुज्ञा (गौ सू.५-२-२१)। पक्षोऽत्र सिद्धान्तो विवक्षितः, न पुन' सिसायिपितधर्मावशिष्ट धर्मि- मात्रम् । अभ्युपगमोऽपरिहरणम् । तेन स्वसिद्धान्ते परोक्तदूषणमपरिहत्य पर सिद्धान्ते दोपप्रसजन मतानुशेत्यर्थः । तदेवाह । यः स्वपक्षे मनागपि दोपं न परिहरति केवलं परपक्षे दोपं प्रसं- नयति भवांश्चोर इत्युक्ते त्वमपि चोर इति तस्येदं निग्रहम्यानम् ॥ कस्मादित्याऽऽशक्याह। स्वयं दोपाभ्युपगमात्परेणानम्युपगमात् ॥ अप्रतिषिदमनुमत भवतीति न्यायनेति भावः । निग्रहं प्राप्यस्यानिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् (गी. सू.५-२०२२) । एतद्न्याचष्टे । पर्यनुयोज्यो नाम निहस्रोपपत्त्या चोदनीयस्तस्योपेक्षणं निग्रहं प्राप्तोऽसीत्यननुयोग ईति॥ एतच्च निग्रहस्थान फतरस्याप्र पराजय इति पृष्टया परिषदा समुद्भाव- नीयम् । निग्रहं मासस्य स्वदोषोदायनानुपपत्ते । -- १. ग. प. ८. एतदुभाम्यामनुकया परिषदा वक्तव्यम् ।

·मासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यासार अनिग्रहस्थाने निमहम्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः (गो. ६२.२३)॥ अदोपे दोपोद्भावनमित्य । एतदेवोदाहरति । यथा सावयवत्वेन पृथिव्यादौ कार्यत्वसाधने परो बृयादप्रयोनकोऽ य हेत्वाभास इति तस्येद मिथ्याभियोगरक्षण निग्रहस्थानमिति ॥ द्रव्यत्व सति द्रव्याश्रितत्व सावयवत्व न चास्य कार्यत्वस्य साधने सिद्धत्वाद्यन्यतमदूपणतास्ति । बुद्ध्यादौ सावयवत्वाभावे कार्यत्वोपलमा द्याप्यभावेनाप्रयाजकमिति चेन्न सपकदशवृत्तेधूमादेरप्यप्रयोजकत्यप्रसगात् अथ सपशव्यापके हेत्वन्तरे सत्यध्यापकस्य हेतोरप्रयोजकत्वेनाव्यापकमा त्रस्य धूमादे । अत्र तु कादाचित्कत्व सकल कार्यव्यापक प्रयोजक : सावयवत्वमिति चेन्न कार्यत्वकादाचिरकत्वयो पर्यायवात् ।अव्यापकस्याप्यसिद्ध खादिदोषरहित वेन प्रयोजकत्व केन वार्यत इत्यलम् । सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यानियमात्क्याप्रसगोऽपसिद्धान्त (गौ सू ५-२ २४)। यथा मिमासामभ्युपगम्य कश्चिदग्निहोत्र वर्गसाधन मत्याह ।क्यपुनर ग्निहोत्रक्रिया प्रध्वम्ता सती स्वर्गसाधिका भविष्यतीत्यनुयुक्तः प्राह अनया क्रिययाऽऽराधित परमेश्वर फल ददाति राजादिवदिति त स्येश्वरानभ्युपगमादपसिद्धातो निग्रहम्थानम् ॥ इति वाच्यमिति शेष । अये त्वन्यया सूत्रमाहु 'सिद्धान्तमुपेत्य कचिदा प्रतिज्ञाय नियमात्तद्विराधेन कयामसग कथाकरणमपसिद्धात' इति त युक्तमित्याह । प्रतिज्ञाताविपर्ययस्तु प्रतिज्ञाहानि पसिद्धात इति । हेत्वाभ साश्च यथोक्ता (गौ सू ५२२५) ॥ यथा येन प्रकारेण हेत्वाभासा उत्सास्तेन प्रकारेण निग्रहस्सानानि न पु प्रमाणस्य प्रमैयत्ववलक्षणान्तरेण । हेत्वाभासलक्षणेनेव यथोरोन हेत्वाभा उत्तास्तेन प्रकारेण निग्रहस्थानानि तदेवाऽऽद ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेत. हेत्वाभासलक्षणेनैव यथोक्तेन लक्षिता हेत्वाभासा निग्रहस्थानानी- त्यर्थः ।। चकारो दृष्टान्ताभासानन्वयाविपरीतान्वयादिसमुच्चये, तेषामपि निग्रहहेतु. वात् । सूनोत्तानि द्वाविंशतिर्निग्रहस्थानानि न नियमार्थानि क्तूिपलक्षणा- पानीति चाह । एतेन दुर्वचनकपोलताडनवादित्रादीमा साधनानुपयोगित्वेन निग्रह- स्थानत्वं वेदितव्यम् । नियमकथाया त्वपशब्दादीनामिति ॥ एतेनेति केषाचिल्लक्षणोदाहरणप्रपचनेन । नियमकथाया तु सस्कृतेन मया वक्तव्यम् वर्मत्यागेन वा लोकबधेन वेत्येवरूपायाम् । इति न्यायसारे पदपचिकायामनुमानपरिच्छेदो द्वितीय ।।

·तृतीयः परिच्छेदः। अवसितमनुमानमागमम्येदानी रक्षणमुच्यते । अवसित निश्चितमनुमानमिति वृत्तानुकीर्तनेनागमस्यानुमानपूर्वक त्यात क्षणानन्तरमेवास्य लक्षणायसर इति सूचयति । तथाहि समयपहणधलात गुन्दानामर्योधनसाधनत्वम् । समयग्रहण च प्रायेण वृद्धव्यवहारादनुमानरु मादेवेति । समयवलेन मभ्यापरोक्षानुभवसाधनमागम । समय सकेत पुरुषवृत्तो न पुनरविनाभावधरस्वाभाविक , स्वाभाविकन्ने हि अविनाभाविधूमादिलिगवामयतेमवार्थ बोधयन्न तद्विपरीतम् । न दि धूमो दहनमिव तदभाव जलादिकमनुमापयत्ति दहना दिशन्दास्तु पुरुषेण यत्र सक्त्याने तत्र तर यथार्थम्भव प्रतीति कुर्वन्ति, अतोऽविनाभाषासमयो भिन्न स एव पल सहकारी तेन समयरलेन । अब च समयविषयमाण स्मरण घोपचारात्समय समर्यावरण शामसहकारिणति यावत् । समीच सशयादिविलक्षणस्य परोक्षस्य परोक्षत्व जातियुत्तस्यानुभवस्य सरणविलक्षणशानस्य साधन कारण शब्दात्मकमर ब्दात्मक चेष्टारियागदि तत्सर्वमागम । तस्य भेदभाह । सद्विविध दृष्टादृष्टार्थभेदात् ॥ अयं प्रयोजन तर इष्टप्रयोजन आगमो यथा नधास्तीरे फलानि सनि गृहान्तोदकानीत्यादि, यदृष्टापस्तु स्वर्गयामो यजतेत्यादि । अर्थाऽसरपशि सर्वशन्दानामप्रामाण्यमिति रोदो मन्यते त प्रत्याह । तर दृष्टार्थाना वाक्याना प्रायेण प्रवृत्तिमामात्प्रामाण्य गम्यते।। पति कायिकी प्राप्त्यर्धा चानिष्टपरिहारार्या च, तस्या सामा तत्प्रयोजनमारकत्व, तस्मात् । अयमभिसन्धि, स्वातिशापितमय प्रापयव पक्षमनुमान ममामिात रोके प्रसिद्धवाद्यया स्वीप्रियते तददागोऽ खप्रत्ययप्रापितमर्थ मापयन् प्रमाणमित्यहाकार्यम् । अन्यया सर्वशब्दानाम गुल्पप्रे परियूयशत चर्तत इति वास्यसमत्वे शास्त्रीयलैकिवयवनानामा स्वात् ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेत , . शून्यत्वेन व्यर्थमयोगत्यान्मौनशरणमेव वाक्य स्यात् । विवादास्यामितानि राक्यानि प्रमाणानि । समर्थप्रकृत्तिकारणत्वात्, प्रत्यभादिवदिति स्थितम् । अदृष्टार्थाना पुनराप्तोक्तत्वेन ॥ पुन शब्द प्राक्तनवाक्यप्रामाण्यसमर्थनप्रकारकैलक्षण्यज्ञापने । चोदयति । कथम् ॥ अदृष्टार्थाना प्रामाण्यानिश्चय इति । अयमभिसान्धि ,न तावत् प्रहात्तसी मर्थनार्थप्रामाण्यानिश्चय , अदृष्टार्थत्वादेव । न हि स्वर्गादय इदानीमव केना पि कृतयागेन प्राप्यन्ते । नाप्याप्सोक्तत्वेन, तस्यैव निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात् । अब फथमदृष्टार्थाना प्रामाण्यनिश्चय इति । परिहरति । पुत्रकामो यनेतेत्यादिवाक्याना प्रवृत्तिमामार्थ्यात् प्रामाण्यनुमाय, तत्प्रणेतुरतीतार्थदर्शित्वेन परमाप्तत्वमवधार्य, तत्प्रणीताना सर्ववा क्यानामप्रामाण्ये कारणाभावात् , प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते ।। यद्यपि सर्ववेदवाक्याना प्रवृत्तिसामध्य न घटते तथापि तदेकदाभूताना पुलकामो यजेत, पशुकामो यजेत, कार्या दृष्टिकामो यजेतादिवाक्याना तावत् प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । न च वक्तव्य पर्तितायामपोष्ट पुनादर्शनातेवामप्रामाण्य युक्तमिति । बाहुल्येन फलोपलम्भात् । चिदनु पलम्भे तु कर्मकर्तृवैगुण्यमेव कल्प्यताम्, न पुनर्वाक्यस्याप्रामाण्यम् । किंच शान्तिकपौष्टिकादिकर्मणा वैदिकाना प्राचुर्येण फलोपलम्मात्तदमिधायि वाक्याना प्रामाण्यसिद्धस्तत्प्रणेतुरतीन्द्रियार्थद्रष्मृत्वमपि सिद्धयाति । न तत्तत्व मणा तत्फलाना वाऽपरिमिताना साध्यसाधनभावमस्मदादिरसर्वज्ञ प्रतिपत्तु मुपदेष्टु चा समर्थ । ननु बौद्धाद्यागमानामप्येकदेशसवादोऽस्तीति प्रामाण्य प्रसग इति । तत्सरिहारायोक्तमप्रामाण्ये कारणाभावादिति । बौद्धादिवास्याना तु सर्व क्षणिक शून्यमित्येवमादीना भूयसा बाधक्मुपलभ्यत इत्यप्रामाण्यमेव युक्तामिति भाव । तगातीन्द्रियैकदेशतवादस्तु वेदमूलत्वादभ्युपपद्यत इति । न च वैपरीत्यमाशइक्नीयम् । तत्रानभिहिताना शान्तिपौष्टिकादिजातिविभाग- कर्मणामनन्ताना घेद एवोलम्भात् । १ ग, घ rend before पुनकामो-कारी निर्वपेत् वृष्टिकाम. ।

·भासर्वतप्रणीतन्यायमार आपण प्रीयमाणाना बनानामुपलम्भनात् । नहि तन्मूल्ताराना रत्नाकरमहानिधे ।। नन्वेन पौरुषेयत्वात् प्रामापप्रतिपादन ' रागपादि कालुप्य पुष्पपलभ्यत ।। अतोऽग्रामाण्यवराऽपि निकल्दका प्रसवत । वदे प्रमाणता तम्मानित्यत्रनाम्युपेयताम ।। इत्याशङ्कयाह । न नित्यत्वेन ॥ नहि नित्यवाद्वेद प्रमाणमिति वन सत्यत । श्रानान्त करणादीनां नित्यत्वऽपि समविपर्ययोत्पादनदायामप्रमाणल्येनाने कान्तिकत्वात् । नित्यत्वे सति, पुराणदोषादीनामननुनवगादप्रामाण्यवादकानिवृत्ती बदमामाण्य स्वत एवे तिचेन, न । वेदस्य विशिष्टज्ञानसाधनन्ध प्रामाण्य । तच न स्सत समयग्रहमा पेशृणात् । अन्यथा व्याकरणादिव्यु पत्तिरहिताना वेदश्रयण मानादर्थप्रतिपत्ति प्रसग । अथ तजनितस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रामाश्य स्वतस्तत्रापि स्वत इति कोऽर्थ विमुत्पत्यपेपया सत्यपेक्षया बानि तारकार्यस्य कस्यापि स्वत उत्पत्तिा अथ सम्यामप्योबाघसाधारणकारणातिरिक्तानपेभुया जायमानन स्नस्य, न । प्रमाणाभागात । विपर्यय तु, प्रमाण, सम्यमियोवाधसाधारणकारणात रिक्तवारणमाईताजायते। साधारणेपु सत्स्यप्यनुत्पत्यमानत्वात् । न चाऽसिद्धो हेतु मिभ्यागानोत्पत्तिसमये साधारण कारणसद्भावेऽपि प्रमाणानुन्पादनात् । नापि स्वत एक शाति ,मनस्य स्वसवेप्रत्यासिद्ध ,भा रनभ्युपगमाच,अर्थशाक म्यान्यथानुपाया बोध सिध्यति । अथ यया ज्ञायते जान तयैव सामनया प्रमा णमित्यरज्ञायमानत्वालवत प्रामाण्यामिति, तम, असिद्धलात् । न हि यथाकथ चिदपि झायमानो बोध प्रमाण जायते मिथ्याबोधस्यापि तथाप्रतीतिप्रस इचिौधेसम्पडिमथ्या वेति सशयाच । मामाण्य परतो जायते। अनम्य स्तत्शाया सशविषयत्वात् , अप्रामाण्यवत् । अय नित्यत्वेनामामाण्यशकाया निाती पश्चाप्रतिक्षामध्येन महाजनपरिगृहीतत्वेन वा वेदस्य प्रामाण्य सिध्यतीति चेत् । एसत्सौरपेयत्वेऽपि समानम् । न घामामाग्यशकानिरा सार्थ प्रमाणान्तरयोग प्रामाण्यसाधादेवामामाव्यशकाया अपि निराससिद्धे रित्परम् । नापि नित्यत्वे प्रमाणमन्तीत्याह । गात्, ·वासुदेवकृतपटपचिकया समेत. वाक्याना हि नित्यत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । अनित्यत्वे पुनर्वाक्यत्वा- द्यनेकमनुमानम् ॥ हिशद्वश्वाथै दूषणान्तरभूचने । पदरचनात्मक हि वाक्य । न च तन्नि त्यत्वे प्रमाणमस्ति । नित्यानि वेदवाक्यानि । संप्रदायाविच्छेदकत्वे सति, अस्म र्यमाणकर्तृकत्वादाकाशवादिति चेन्न ,साधन विकलत्याद् दृष्टान्नस्य । सप्रदायावि च्छेदो हि वृद्धपरपरया यावद्वाक्यस्यानुवर्तनम् , न च ताशमाकाशस्य सम- वति । किंच 'यो धर्मशीलो जितमानरोध' इत्यादिवाक्याना बहूनामपि सप्रदाया- विच्छेदे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वमस्ति न च नित्यत्वम्, इति व्यभिचार । ननु नेदमनुमान कि त्वर्थापत्तिः । तथाहि यदि वेद पौरुषेय स्यात्तदा तदाम हितकर्मणा संध्याघदनादीना बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्यामिहोत्रादीना चानुष्ठान काले कर्तु स्मरणे सति तत्मत्ययादेव प्रवृत्ति स्यात् , नच तदस्ति , अतोऽ वक्ष्य स्मरणयोग्यस्याप्यस्मरणान्यथानुपत्या वेदाना नित्यत्वमिति । तन्न । विशिष्टवृद्धपरपरानुष्ठानप्रत्ययादेव कस्मरणेऽपि भविष्योत्तरादिष्टवृत्तचिव प्रकृत ईक्षणार्थी प्रवृत्ति । वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि । वाक्यत्वात्कालिदास वाक्यवत् , रचनारूपत्वाद्वा तन्त्ररचनावत् । पौरुषेयत्व साक्षात्परम्परया वा स्वतंत्रपुरुषपूर्वकत्व साध्यमतो न सिद्धसाधनम् । स्वातंत्र्य च तादृशरचना न्तरानुसन्धानशून्यस्य विशिष्टरचनाहेतुत्वम् । तच्च 'सर्वथा प्रतिषेध्या न पुरुषाणा स्वतन्त्रता' इतिवददि श्रोत्रियैरप्यड्गीकृतमन्यने यलम् । दूषणान्तरमाह। सर्वदोपलभ्यनुपलब्धिप्रसगश्च । विपर्यये नियामकाभावादिति ॥ वैदिकवाक्याना सर्वपदाना च नित्यत्व इति शेप । यदीन्द्रियग्रहणयो ग्यस्व, तदा सर्वशब्दाना नित्यत्वे व्यापकत्वेनेंद्रियसरधाना सर्वदोपलब्धि प्रसंग । अयोग्यस्वेन वा परिमाण्वादानामिव सर्वदानुपलब्धिप्रसग , विप र्यये कदाचिदुपलमलक्षणे नियामकस्य कारणस्याभावात् । परमतमाशड्कते। अभिव्यंजकाभावात् तदनुपलब्धिरिति चेत् ॥ भद्भावे तु कदाचिदुपलब्धिरित्यर्थ । दूषयति । न । तदनिर्देशात् ॥

·मासर्वतप्रणीतन्यायसार
आदिशन्देन चेष्टारिप्यधरयो स्वीकार वृद्धनैय्यायिकाभिमतमुपमानमन्त
भावयति ।
तर यथा गारेव गवय इत्युपमान शळेऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥
अष्टगवयेन गययार्थिना नागरिकेण बहिणक्य हीत पृष्टा बनेचर
प्राह यथा गोरेव गवय इति । एतविल वाक्य गवोपमानन गषय ज्ञापया
वृषकप्रमाणमिति, तच्चायुक्तम् ।
दीर्घग्रीव प्रयोष्टश्चतुष्पाद्विक्ताकृति ।
उष्ट्र इत्यादि वाक्यस्य पृथरमामाण्यक्तित ।।
मीमासकाभिमतमुपमानमाशड्कते ।
अनेन सदृशी मदीया गारित्युपमानमिति चेत् ॥
अटल्यामटत पुरुषस्य गोसदर्शपण्डोपलम्मा मदीया गौरनेन सहीति
शानमुपनायमान न तावप्रत्यक्ष गोपिण्डस्य तदेो द्रयासनिष्टत्वात् , नापि
स्मरण गवयसादृश्यावच्छदेन पूर्व ग्रहणाभावात् , नाप्यनुमान रिदगामावाता
इय गारनेन सदृशी, अस्य तसशत्वादिस्युभ्यते तदा व्यधिकरणासिद्धहेतु ।
अनुपपद्यमानाथाऽसमवाच्च नार्यापत्ति ।। दामावयोश्चासभवादपमानमे
वेति भाव । परस्य दूपयति ।
न । तस्य स्मृतित्वात् । पूर्वमेव हि सादृश्यविशिष्ट उपलव्धो
गोपिण्ड । कम्मात्, उपलब्धियोग्यत्वात् । अयोग्यत्वे वा न कदाचि
दुपलभ्येतादृष्टवत् ॥
भूयाऽवयवसारोप्य हि गोर्गवयेन सादृश्य । तच्चेद्रियग्रहणयोग्यत्वादाश्रय
ग्रहणकाल एवं गृहीतम् । प्रतियोगिग्रहणप्रतिमुदसस्कारस्य स्मरणमेवोत्पद्यते ।
पूर्वमेव च गवयसदृशा गौरुपलब्धा । किमिति तथा निश्चयो न भवती
त्याशक्या।
निर्विकल्पवेन तु पूर्व सादृश्यमुपलब्ध, तेन तदोपलभ्यभिमानो
न भवति ॥
१ ग adds सादृश्यस्य after योग्य वात्
२ ग घ Add प्रथमगोपिण्डोपलम्भकलिगत्योपलम्मात् ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपांचकया समेतः तर्हि निश्चयात्मिका कथ पश्चास्मृतिः स्यादनुभवाकारधारित्वास्मृतेरि- स्याह। निर्विकल्पकोपलंभाच्च संस्कारसहकारिसामर्थ्यादभावादिषु सवि- कल्पिका स्मृतिदृष्टेति ॥ इदानी जरनै ग्यायिकोपमानमनूद्य दूषयति । संज्ञासंक्षिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिरप्याप्तवचनकार्या || गोसदृशो गवय इत्यतिदेशवाक्य श्रुतवतोऽटव्यामटतो गोसदृशपिण्डदर्शना- नन्तरमय गवयनामेति सज्ञासशिसषधप्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्यमानापमानफल, गोसा. श्यविशिष्टपिण्डदर्शन च प्रमाणमित्याचार्या उद्योतकारादयो मन्यन्ते । तच्चायुक्तम् । आसवचनादेवातिदेशरूपात्पूर्वमेव सभासशिसवधज्ञानस्यात्स्य- मानत्वात् । अत्रार्थे प्रमाणमाह । तथा प्रभोत्तराभिधानादन्यप्रमाणानिर्देशाच्च ।। कथ त्व जानीये गययनामोऽयमिति केनचिदुक्तः, स तु वनेचर- वचनादिति भूते न पुनरुपमानेन जानामीति प्रमाणान्तर निर्दिशति । तत्रा- परमतमाशङ्कते। अस्य गवयशद्व. संज्ञति प्रतिपत्तावुपमानसिद्धिस्तथा शब्दाश्रव- णादिति चेत् ॥ गोसदृशो गवय इति बनेचरवचनाद्वयस्य गोसादृश्यमात्र प्रतीयते, पश्चा. सत्साहश्यविशिष्टपिण्डदर्शने सत्यस्य पिण्डस्य गवयशद्वः सजेति प्रत्तिपत्तो प्रमाणान्तरभावादुपमानमेव द्रष्टव्य । करमात् । तथास्य गवयशन्दः सझे- तिप्रकारेण शब्दस्य पूर्वमश्रवणात् । परिहर्तुमतिप्रसग तावद्दयति । एवं तर्हि गौरयमित्येव संकेते कृतेऽस्य गोशन्द जित्ति प्रतिपत्ती प्रमाणान्तरं वाच्य । समानन्यायत्वाद् । गोपिण्डान्तरेऽपि संकेत- अहणे प्रमाणान्तराभिधानप्रसंग इति ।। १ग, and u. drop सस्कार.

·मासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः दाना पदैरमिहिताना अन्वयमान वाक्यार्थः । एव च सबंधाग्रहणे पदायां प्रसिदिः तदप्रसिदौ वाक्या प्रसिद्धिरिति कय वाक्येन संबधग्रहणमित्यर्थ । एव परोक्तदूषणमनूवेदानी तत्परिवार उपमानस्योपयोगमा । तन्निराकरणार्थमुपमानं निदर्शनार्थत्वेन पृथगुक्तम् । यथा कार्यार्थिनी ऽप्रसिद्धगवयस्य प्रसिद्धगोसादृश्यमुपादायोपमानाख्येन वाक्येन संज्ञा सनिसबंधप्रतिपत्ति. क्रियते तथा किंचिन्निमित्तमुपादाय शक्राहि पदपदार्थयोरपीति तस्मादन्यार्थत्वान्न सूत्रविरोध ॥ किंचिनिमित्त सहस्राक्षत्व देवानामधिपतित्वमुपादाय शादिपदपदार्य योरपि सशासशिसबन्धमतिपत्ति नियत इत्यनुवर्तते । ननूपमानस्य पृषक प्रामाण्यामावे"अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधादुपमानासिद्धि ", (गौ. सू. २. १-४२) " प्रसिद्धिसाधादुषमानसिद्धयक्तिदोषानुपपत्ति.' (गो. म. २-१-४३) इति सूत्राभ्या सूत्रकारणाप्रामाण्यशड्यापूर्वक प्रामाभ्यसमर्थ किकृतमित्याशड्क्याह । परीक्षा स्वपत्तिवत्प्रमाणम्य सत प्रमाणेष्वन्तविज्ञापना , अमिति ॥ नन्पमानस्याप्यन्तावमाशङ्कय परिजहार सूबकार । उपमानमनुमान " प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्ध ", (गौ सू.२-१-४४) परार्थमनुमानमिति चेन स्वयमप्यध्यवसायात् , “तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानासिद्धनाविशेष", (गो. सू.२ १-४६) इति तस्मात्कथमन्तर्भावसूविरोधो न भवतीत्याशट्क्याह । अन्तर्भावात्वनुमान एवास्य यथाश्रुतोऽपि निराकृतो नागम इति ।। यथाश्रुतोऽपि निराकृतोऽपीति सबन्ध । “मनु चतुष्टुमीतह्याापत्तिसभवा भावप्रामाण्याद् (गौ सू२ २ १ " इत्यादिसूत्रेषु प्रमाणधनुष्टुश्रवणास्त्रित्व मूत्र विरुद्धमित्याशकया। चतुष्ट्राभिधान सूनेषु पञ्चत्वादिनिराकरणार्थ प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादन्तर्भावस्य न निवप्रतिष चाप, ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ७७. . परमतमागते। त्रित्वानभिधानादयुक्तमिति चेत् ॥ यदि सूत्रकारः प्रमाणत्रित्वमेवाम्युमागमिष्यत्तदा क्वचिदन्यधास्यत् । न चाभ्यधात्तस्मादयुक्तमेतदिति । परिहरति । न । अस्य सूत्रकारस्यैवस्वभावत्वासिध्दान्तमाप क्वचिन्नायि- पत्ते । यथा कृत्स्नैकदेशविकल्पादिनावपविनिराकरणे ॥ कुत एवमभिधानमित्याह । शिष्याणामूहनाशक्त्त्यतिशययुकानामधिकार इति ज्ञापनार्थम् । उपसहरति । तस्मास्थितमुपमान शन्देऽन्त मतमिति । अर्थपित्तरम्यनुमानेड- न्तर्भावः । अविनाभावबलनेवार्थप्रतिपत्तिसाधनात् ।। अनुमापकधूमवदिति शेषः । अविनामावमेव दर्शयति । अन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्युक्ते सत्येवमुपपद्यत इति लभ्यते । अयमे- वाविनाभाव इति ॥ परमतमायड्कते। यत्र सामान्याकारणान्वयग्रहणं नास्ति यथा मुल्यकारणत्वाप्रतिब. धशयोस्तवार्थापत्तिः पृथक्झमाणमिति चेत् ।। मुख्यकारणत्व नाम सकलसहकारिसाकल्य यदनन्तरमेव कार्योल्पात्तिः । सहकारिणो दृष्टादृष्टरूपाः । न च तेषा साकल्य कचिदप्यत्मदादिप्रत्यक्ष, किन्तु कार्यकसमाधिगम्यम् । तथा वड्यादीना दाहकत्वादिशक्तः प्रतिबन्धका- भावोऽविन प्रत्यक्षः । प्रतिबन्धकाना मणिमन्तादीनामनन्तत्वेन तदभावल्या. प्यसख्यातत्वात् । अतो मुख्यकारणत्वाप्रतिवन्धशक्त्योः सामान्याकारणान्व- यग्रहणाभावादनुमानासमवेऽपित्ति प्रमाणमित्यर्थः । परिहराते । न । तत्रापि केवलन्यतिरेक्यनुमानाव्यतिरेकात् । केवलव्यतिरेकी अर्धापत्तिरिति संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ -- ·भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसार प्रयोगस्तु, कार्योत्पत्ते पूर्वक्षणे कारणानि सकरसहकारिसमवेतानि सकल प्रतिबन्धकान्यानि या अनतरमेव कार्योपादकत्वात्। यानि पुनरेवन भत न वान्यनन्तरमव कार्योत्पादकानि, यथा केवलतन्तवो मणिप्रतिवद्धो बलिया । अन्वयाभावनितदनुमानमिति चेत् । न। केवलान्वयिनो हि व्यति रेकामावेन प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसगादिति ।। स्परम् । अपि च प्रत्यक्षादिभेदाना क्नचिंद्वधम्येण भेदात्मा गान्तरत्व प्रसङ्गादिति ॥ सविक्सकानीवाल कभेदेन योग्ययागिप्रत्यक्षभदन चा विविध प्रत्यनम्। कार्यकारणानुमयात्मक विविधमनुमानम् । दृष्टादृष्टार्यभेदेन द्विविध शन्द इति । उपसहति । सस्मादविनाभावदशेनार्षप्रतिपादकत्वादर्भापनिरनुमानमिति ॥ कैननित्सहसमेतदिति कथिते, यतमत्र सभवतीति ज्ञाने समवारय प्रमा णामति केचिदाई । तत्रियकरोति । बहुत्वमख्याविषयत्वे सति अल्पसस्याविषयम्य सर्वोपलम्मा नानुमानात्सभयो भिद्यत इति ॥ प्रयोगरतु, विवादपद सहस स्वसमुदायिशतवृत्त । सहस्रस्वात्पूर्वगणित सहसवत्। अमावस्य तु त्रिवपि यथासमवसन्तर्भाव । तथाहि कौरवाद्यभात्र प्रतिपत्तिरागमादिति ।। व्यासाद्याप्तवचनात् । अमावासले वक्तव्ये विप्रातपत्तेर्वहुवाध्यतया व्यत्ययेनान्तर्मायो निरूपित । आत्मादिषु रूपाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिरनुमानादिति ॥

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेत
आत्मा रूपरहितो नियमेनाचाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षल्याद्वायुक्त्। गन्धरसरहितो, रूपर
हितत्वाद्वायुवत्। सर्शरहितोऽस्मदादिमानसप्रत्यक्षत्वात्सुखादिवत् । आकाश
रूपरंसगन्धशून्य सर्शरहितत्वादात्मवदित्यागूह्यम् ।
भूतलादिषु घटायभावप्रतिपत्ति प्रत्यक्षात् । इन्द्रियन्यापारभाव
भावित्वादिति ॥
इन्द्रिय यापारस्य भाव एव भवतीत्येवशीलमिन्द्रियल्यापारभावभावित्वस्य
भावस्तत्वम् तस्मात् । तथाहि घटशून्य भूतल मित्यादिवानमिन्द्रियजम्,
इन्द्रियान्वयव्यातरेकानुविधायित्वात् , रूपादिज्ञानवत् । चोदयति ।
अन्यन तद्भावभावित्व पर्यवसितमिति चेत् ॥
अन्यनेत्याधारभूतलादिग्रहणाम् । तथा चोक्तम् ।
गृहीत्वा वस्तुसन्द्राव स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् ।
मानस नास्तिताज्ञान जायतेऽक्षानपेक्षया ॥
इति । परिहरति ।
न । रूपादिग्विव बाधकाभावादिति ।।
न हि रूपाद्याभयग्रहण एवन्द्रियव्याशर पर्यवसितो, न रूपादि
बिति युक्तम् । प्राणव्यापारे सत्येव निर्गन्ध कुसुममिाते शानमुत्पद्यते ।
न च तत्रेन्द्रियव्याशरोऽन्यत्न पर्यसित इति युक्त वस्तुम् । द्रव्यस्य चाक्षुष
शानविषयत्वात् ।
सबघाभावो बाधक इति चेत् ॥
न ह्यभावेन इंद्रियसयोग समवायो वा सभवतीति भाव । परिहरति ।
न । स्वपक्षपरपक्षयोरसिद्धत्वात् ।।
मीमासकस्य पक्षोऽत्र स्वाक्ष । एतदेव विवृणोति ।
स्वपक्षे तावद्रूपादिष्विवापरोक्षानुभवकार्यानुभयो योग्यताख्य
सबधः । पपक्षेऽपि सयुक्तविशेषणमावादिरिति ॥
आदिशद्वेन सयुक्तविशेष्यभावादौना प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदोजाना स्वीकार ।
१५. reads बोधक.

·भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार ८० सयोगसमवायरहितस्य विशेषणविशेष्यमावानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् न। विशिष्टप्रत्ययेन तसिद्धेरिति ।। गोमा धनवानित्यादिधियोत भाव । ऐतिहमन्तर्भावयति । अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृक प्रगदपारपर्यमैतिह्यमागमेऽन्तर्मुतम् ।। अनिर्दिष्टोऽनिश्चित प्रबना द्रष्टवन मूलभूतो यत्र तदनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृक प्रवादपारपयम् । सत्य चोदिति शेप । असत्य चद प्रमाणम् । एतदुदाहरति । यह वटे यक्ष प्रतिवसतीति ।। चेग नाम प्रमाणान्तरमिति काचस् । अनुमानेऽन्तभूतति चापरे । तदु भयमपि चेष्टालक्षणपूर्वक निषेधयति । प्रयत्नननिता शरीरतदवयवरियां चेष्टा । सा च नाट्यशास्त्रा दिसमयबलेन पुस्पाभिप्रायविशेषमर्थविशेष च गमयतीति नागमाद्भिद्यते, लिप्यक्षरादर्थप्रतिपत्तिवादिति ॥ प्रयत्लजनितेयनेन वाग्वादिविकारजानतहस्तादिकम्पव्यवच्छद । नाट्य शास्त्रादीयादेशब्दाहोकव्यवहारपरिग्रह । क्रियेत्युपलक्षणम् । सयोगना प्यर्थप्रतीतिदर्शन त् । हस्तमुखमयोगाविशेषाम्या पिपासाबुभुक्षाप्रातिपत्ति । सिपिरेवाक्षर तस्मादिति चेष्टाया प्रमाणान्तराभ्युपगम लिप्यक्षराणामपि प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसग इति सूचितम् । न च वक्तव्यम् लिप्यश्वरानुमिताक्षरे प्वथप्रतिपत्तिरिति कमेण, प्रमाणाभावात् ,चेष्टातो वा तयाप्रसगात्। उपसहरति। तदेव व्यवस्थितम् । एतानि सीणि प्रमाणानीति ॥ प्रमाणज्ञानमात्रमेव नापूर्वसाघन किंतु तेन प्रमेय किंचिद्वस्तुतत्त्वम् सच्च किं म्यादित्यभिप्रायेण पृच्छति । नि पुनरेभि प्रमाणे प्रमातव्यमिति ॥ उत्तरमाह। , adds after this इति तृतीयोऽयमागमपरिच्छेद ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिकया समेतः उच्यते । प्रमेयमिति 1 किलक्षणमिति ।। यद्यपि पूर्व प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयमिति लक्षणमुक्त तथापि न प्रमेयसामा- न्यापेक्षयाऽय प्रश्नः किंतु तद्विशेषापेक्षयेति न विरोधः । उत्तरमाह । यद्विपयं ज्ञानमन्यज्ञानानुपयोगित्वेनैव निःश्रेयससाधनं भवति तत्प्रमेयम् । तदेव तत्वतो ज्ञातव्य सर्वदा भावयितव्यं च । न तु कीटकसंख्यादि । तज्ज्ञानम्यानुपयोगित्वादिति ॥ अन्यशानानुपयोगित्वेनेत्यनेन प्रमाणाद्यवच्छेदः । प्रमाण ज्ञानस्यात्माद- शानोपयोगित्वेन निःश्रेयससाधनत्वात् । प्रमेय विभजते । तच्चतुर्विधं । हेयं, तस्य निर्वर्तकं, हानमात्यन्तिक, तस्योपाय इति ॥ यद्यपि सूत्रकारेणात्मशरीरेद्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषोत्यभावफलदुः- सापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् (गौ. स.१-१-९) इति द्वादशविध प्रमेयमुक्त तथापि तस्य चतुधा भाग्यमानस्यैवनिःश्रेयसनिमित्तत्वमिति शापयितु संग्रहेण चातु- विध्यमुक्तम् । चातुर्विध्यस्यापि स्वरूपमाह । तत्र हेयं दुःखमनागतम् (यो. सू. २-१६) । हेयं नामावश्य दुःसत्वेन परित्याज्यम् । तच्चानागतमेव, अतीतस्योपयु- क्तत्वाद्वर्तमानस्याप्युपभोंग विना प्रकारान्तरेण परिहमशक्यत्वाद् । हेयमपि विभजते । एकविंशतिप्रकारम् । शरीर पडिन्द्रियाणि षड् विषयाः षड् बु. द्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेति ॥ प्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वनोत्रमनांसि घडिन्द्रियाणि,गधरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दा यहि- विषया शायमानतया सुखदुःखहेतुत्वात्, मनोविषयस्तु स्मृतिसंकल्लादिरि- त्येके, निद्रालस्यकामादिरित्यपरे विपयाणामिन्द्रियाणां च पविषयत्वाद बुद्धयोऽपि पडित्युच्यन्ते । शरीरादीनां सुखदुःखादत्यन्तविलक्षणत्वात्कयं दुःखशब्दवाच्यत्यमित्याक्याऽऽह । ६ ·८२ मासर्वज्ञप्रणीत यायसार तर शरीर दुःसायतनत्वादु खम् ।। दु खस्यायतन गृह, शरीरावछिन्नात्मप्रदेो हि दु समुपद्यते नान्यत्र । एलनय च विशेषेण शायमानतया दु सहेतुभ्यो विषक शरीर पृथगुतम् । इन्द्रियाणि विषया बुद्धयश्च तत्याधनमावात् ।। दु समित्यनुवर्तत। मुख दुःखानुपगाई खम् ॥ दुखेनानुषोऽविनाभाव सुखहेतापप्यवश्य दु खहेतुत्वम् । एतेनारचा सदेव शारीरादिषु दु खशब्द प्रयुक्त इति दुखस्वरूपतया हि भाव्यमाना शरीयदय स्वविषय वैराग्यहेतवो भवन्ति । दुख तु बाधनापीडासतापात्मक मुख्यतयैव भवति ।। दुखशन्दवाच्यामितिशेप । तस्य निर्वर्तकमसाधारणकारण अविद्यातृप्णे धर्माधी चेति ॥ तस्य गौण मुख्यभेदाभिन्नस्य दु सस्य । निर्वतकमित्यस्य व्यारया असा धारणकारणमिति । यद्यपि धर्म सुखस्यैव कारण तथापि सुसस्य दु खानु पण दुसवर्गात पातित्वा सहेनुरुत्त । प्रवर्तकस्य तस्यापि हेयत्वपरि ज्ञानार्यामिति । विद्यादीना रक्षणमाह- सम्यगध्यात्मविद्भि प्रदर्शितार्थे विपरीतज्ञानमविद्या सह सस्का रेण ॥ आत्मन्यधिकृत्य वर्तत इत्यध्याम शरीरादि । सम्यग्यथा मति तया ऽध्यात्म विदन्तीति सम्यगध्यात्मविद ,ते प्रदर्शिते प्रकटीयतेऽथे- अस्थिस्थुण स्नायुयुत मासशोगितलेपन । धर्मावनद दुर्गधिपूर्ण मूत्रपुरीपयो । जराशोकसमाचिद्ध रोगायवनमातुर । रजस्वल्मनित्य च भूतावासामम त्यजेत् ।। इत्यादिना तस्मिन्चिपरीतजानम्

·वासुदेवकृतपदपचिस्या समेत
८३
अमृतस्येव कुडानि सुरसानामिव राय ।
रतेरिव निधानानि या पत केन निर्मिता ||
इत्यवरूपाऽविद्या । प्रत्याद्यवस्थाया विपरीतज्ञानाभावेऽपि पुन शरी
रागुत्पत्तिश्रवणात् शास्त्राभ्यासजनिततज्ञानतामपि रागद्धेपाभिमवदई
नादविद्याऽस्तीत्याद सह सस्कारणति ।
पुनर्भवप्रार्थना तृप्णा ॥
पुनभवस्य विशिष्टशरारादिलामस्य प्रार्थना याच्जा ।
मुखद खयोरसाधारणहेतू धर्माधर्मा ।।
सुखस्यासाधारणो मुख्या दु सस्याकारणभूतो हेतुधर्म । दु स्वस्थ पीडा म
रियासाधारणो सुखस्यानिमित्तभूतो हेतुरधर्म ।
हान दु ग्वविच्छेद ॥
दु सस्थैकाविशतिभेदाभनस्य वि.छदोहानि ।
आत्यतिर न कदाचिस्कचिद्दु खसबध इत्यर्थ ॥
न कदाचित्स्यचिद्द सविछेदसद्भावेऽपिप्या त्यतिक हानमुच्यते । विन
पाया अपि दु खव्यक्तरुत्पत्यभावेऽपि तजातीयस्य व्यक्तधन्तरस्योत्पादात् ।
तम्योपायस्तत्त्वज्ञानमात्मविषयम् ।।
यद्यपि द्वादशविधप्रमेयविषय सूत्राभिहित तथाप्यात्मन प्राधान्यशापना
धमा मविषयमित्युक्तम् । तथाहि पूर्व शरीरादिपु इययन ज्ञानोत्पादे तत
तयातिरिक्ता मानि च शुन्यादिप्रमाणनिश्चित पथात्तव ज्ञानोदालो नि
उससाधनम् । अत्र सवादिका श्रति वदति ।
तथा नोत " आत्मा वारे दृष्टस्य श्रोनन्यो निदि यासित य
उ २४५) इति ।
श्रोतन्य श्रुतिवारयेभ्यो मन्त यश्चपिपत्तिमि ।
ज्ञात्वा च सतत व्येय एते दर्शनहेतर ॥
यारान्दोऽधारणे। ते भरममननानरूपा दसनस्या मविपरसामा
कारशा तव । आमान पनि भेयसकारणमित्यत्र अति दर्शयति।
"

·भासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसारः
तरति शोकमामीवीदति (छा. उ.७-१-३) ॥
मात्मावतशानमेव नि.प्रेयससापमामिति मनिगमार्थमाह ।
स द्विविधः परश्चापरश्चेति ॥
उभावती मुमुक्षुणा ज्ञातव्यो।
तथा चोक्तम् "द्वै ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये परं चापर च ॥"
आदिग्रहणाद् द्वा सुपर्णा स्युजा सराया (मु. ३-१-१) इत्यादिश्रुतिः
'द्वाविमौ पुरुष लोके रिश्वावर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि क्टस्योऽक्षर उच्यते ||
उत्तमः पुरुषरत्वन्यः परमासेत्युदाहृतः।
यो रोक्यमाविश्य विमायव्यय ईश्वरः ।।
इति स्मृतिश्च स्वीतियते । तत्र परापरयोरक्षण तन प्रमाण चाइ ।
ततैश्वर्यविशिष्ट संसारधर्मेरीपदप्यसंस्पृष्ट परो भगवान्महेश्वर
सर्वज्ञः सकलनगद्विघाता ॥
ऐश्वर्य सकार पुरुषार्थाधिष्ठातृत्व तेन विदिष्टो युक्त । ससारधमैं रागदेष
मोहदुःरादिभिरीपदापि सर्वदाप्यसस्पृष्टः सर्वशोऽनादिरिति रोषः । गन्छति
विनश्यति लच्छील जगत्सकलस्य विनश्यतो वस्तुनो विधातेति रक्षणम्।
प्रश्नपूर्वक प्रमाण माह |
स कय ज्ञातव्य, । अनुमानादागमाच्च । तथाहि विवादास्यासित
भुपलाब्धिमत्कारणकम्, अभूत्वामावित्वाद्वस्खादिवदिति ॥.
उपलब्धिः कारणसाक्षात्कार । न च धमिविशेपस्यानिर्देश दियाभयो
हेतुरिति वाच्य | माध्यविशेषाभिधानेन यत बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकायेन विवादस्तस्यै
वाकुंगदेः पवीकारात्। अथेश्वरकारणत्वे साध्ये साध्यविषये दृष्टान्त
वस्नादावीश्वरकारणत्वासिद्धः व्याप्त्यसिदिश्च । बुद्धमन्मात्र कारणत्वे च भार
विवक्षितविशेषादिः सिद्धसाध्यता छ । संधारिमामेव धर्मद्वारेगाड्कुगदि
कारणत्वादित्यारक्या ।
१ग कर्तृकम् । व कर्तपूर्वकम् ।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपाचकया समतः . सामान्यव्याकेरनवद्यत्वेन निर कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । ततः सामान्य- सिद्धौ पारिशेप्यात्कार्यविशेपाच कर्तृविशेषसिद्धिः ॥ चित्राटिकार्य- विशेषात्कर्तृविशेषसिद्धिचदिति ॥ सामान्यव्याप्तेः याकाय तस्वकारण साक्षाकाराधारकारणकमित्येवरूपायाः। परिशिष्यते येनासौ परिशेषः प्रसतप्रतिषेधः। न वेतनरयासर्वशस्य शरी- • रिणो वाइकुराधशेषकार्ये नैरन्तर्येण हेतुत्व घटते, अतो विवादाध्यासित कार्यममारीरसर्वशपूर्वकमस्मदाद्यजन्यत्वात् । यदेवविध साध्य न भवति तदरम- दावजन्यकार्य न भवति यथा घटादीति व्यतिरकी। कार्यविशेषाधेत्यनेना- न्वयं सूचयति । तथाहि विवादपदं स्वोत्पादनप्रवीणभातृकारणक विशिष्टका यत्वाचित्रवत् । यैस्तु कैश्चिछरीरस्यापि व्यासानुप्रवेशासिद्धि. स्यात्तदसिद्धौ कर्तुरप्यसिद्धिरित्युच्यते तत्र ययादिक शरीरिवर्तृक कार्यत्वाद्वस्त्रादिदि न्युच्यते सदा प्रत्यक्षेणैक्देशविरुदो हेतुः । बबुरागुत्पत्तिसमये शरीरस्या- नुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् । न च तदसिद्धौ कर्नुस्यसिद्धिर्वाधकाभावात्, न हि *कार्यत्वेन बहुवनुष्णत्वासिद्धौ विनाशित्वस्याप्यसिद्धिरस्ति । अथ क्षित्यादिक- मकार्यमकर्तृक वा शरीरावजन्यत्वाद्गगनवादित्युच्यते, तत्राये साध्येऽकुरा- दिभिरनैकान्तिवाद् द्वितीये तु साध्ये विज्ञपनिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुशाविष यत्त्वात शरीराधजन्यत्व नाम शरीरव्यतिरिक्तहेतुजन्यत्व हेतु स्यात् । ततश्च साधनाधिकलो गगनदृष्टान्तः किं च नदीसोत पतितचम्पकरमणोऽपि पक्षीका गत् शरीराजन्यत्व भागासिद्धम् । अयेश्वरः शरीरी पर्तृत्वादरमदादिवत् । तन, आश्रयासिद्धत्वात् तसिद्धौ तद्माकरमाणाधः । ईश्वरः क्ता न भवति, सारीरत्वात्, मुक्तात्मवादित्युच्यमाने व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो हेतुः, आप्रयासिहो वा, प्रतिशापदयोापातो धर्मियाह प्रमाणयाधध। किं च चम्पकः कम्पत इत्यादावशरीरस्थापि क्षादेः कर्तृत्व भ्युपगमापरेरनेकान्तिक इत्पलम् । एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तम्थुः । य इमॉल्लोकानशित ईश- नीमिः (वे. ३-२) इत्याचागमाच ॥ भगे शालय इति दो द्वितीयाति महाशे तयारथाने सनी । --- ·मासर्वतप्रणीतन्यायसार. . ईशनीभिरिचादिशक्तिभिरिमालोकानशितेऽधितिउति । अपरात्मनो रक्षण माहा संसार फलोपभोक्ताऽपरः॥ न विद्योतः बालतो देशतः संख्यातश्चेत्त्यानन्तः । नित्यो व्यापकोs सस्यश्वेत्यर्थः । तत्सद्भाये च प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाणम् । तथा हि मनोव्यापारे सति प्रत्यात्ममद मुसी, अह दु.खीति प्रत्ययो दृष्टः, न चासौ शरीराधालम्बन , शरीराद्यमतीतावप्यन्धमारेऽमित प्रत्ययोत्पादासुखादीनां दाराधिनाथ यत्यात् । स्थूलोऽह, कृशोइमिति तु प्रत्ययस्य चशुपा स्पर्शनेन वा शरीर अहणे सत्येष मायापि हासिलबनव तथाप्यहमित्यभेदप्रत्यय स्त्र भ्रान्न एवमशरीरमिति भेदावभासेन बाधितत्वात् । प्रत्यसिद्धेऽपि प्रतिष- द्यमान पर प्रत्यनुमानमाह । स खलु वुध्दद्यादेकार्याणामाश्रयभूतोऽनुमातव्य. ॥ नुष्ट्यादिक बचिदाश्रित भावरूपकार्यत्वाद्गुणत्वाद्वा रूपादिवत् । ध्याति दई यति। न हि कार्यमनाधारकं किंचिदुपलब्धम् ।। सिद्धसाध्यतापरिहाराय भूतचैतन्य निर्धात । न चेन्द्रियाणामाश्रयत्वं युक्तम् । उपहतेन्द्रियम्य विषयम्मरणा योगात् ॥ उपहतमिन्द्रियमुपहतेन्द्रिय, उपहतस्येन्द्रियस्य विषये स्मरणायोगप्रस मात् । क्रमादित्यवाह। अन्यानुभूतेऽर्थेऽन्यम्मरण' दर्शनात् ॥ इन्द्रियमनुभवितृ न भवति, सस्कारसद्भावेऽपि सर्वदेवारमर्तृत्वात्पाषाणा दिवदस्मर्तृत्वाच्चभुराधभावेऽपि रूगदिविषये स्मरणदर्शनात् । कि चेन्द्रियाणा ज्ञानावाधारस्व एकस्मिन्नपि शरीरे नानाचतनाना कदाचिद् विप्रतिपत्ति स्यान ताई शरीरमेव चेतनमस्त्वित्याशयाह । .

·वासुदेवकृतपदचिकया समेत अत एव शरीरस्यापि बाल्यकौमारयौवनादिभेदभिन्नत्वाढत्वादम्म- रणम् ॥ यतोऽन्यानुभूतेऽर्थेऽन्यस्मरण न भवति, अत एव शरीरस्य स्मरण न संभवति, अतश्चानुभवितृत्वमपि नास्तीत्यर्थः । शरीरस्यापि बाल्यकौमारयो बनादिभेदभिन्नत्वात्। न च तत्रावस्थाभेदमानं नावस्थावद्भिन्नमिति वाच्यम्। महत्वभेदस्याश्रयभेदाव्यभिचाराद् महत्त्वभेदस्याश्रयभेदमूलत्वाकुवलयामल कबिल्बादिपु परिमाणभेदवत् । बौद्धगद्वान्तेऽपि रमरण नोपपद्यत इत्याह । एतेन पूर्ववुध्यनुभूतेऽर्थे उत्तरबुद्ध कार्यकारणभावास्स्मरणमपा- म्तमन्यत्वाविशेषात् ।। अनुभवितरमों दऽपि परस्परं कार्यकारणभावस्य विद्यमानत्वात् कारण बुद्धधानुभूतं चेत्कार्यबुद्धिः स्मरति तदोपाध्यायानुभूत च शिष्य स्मरेत् । एतषणरिहारायापर आह । कामे रक्ततावदिति चेत् ॥ यथा कार्यासयोजे लाक्षादिना कृता रक्तता भेदाविशेषेऽपि तवीजसन्तान एव पुरे फले वा रत्ततामुत्पादयति न पुनीजान्तरसन्ताने सददुपाध्याय बुद्धिजानतसस्कारस्तस्मिन्नेव सन्ताने स्मृति जनयति न पुन मिप्ये तस्य सन्तानान्तरत्वात् । तदुक्त यस्मिन्नेवहि सन्ताने आहिता कर्मवासना । फल तलैय अध्नाति कापसे रसाता यथा ।। कर्म पुण्यापुण्यरूपः कर्म चासौ वासना चेति कर्मवासना तच्चोपलक्षणमा भवननितसस्कारायाः पारदरात । न । साधनदूषणाऽसंभवात् ।। एतद्विवृणोति । .

·स् मासनप्रणीतन्यासार -- - स्मरति, अनुभवितुरन्यत्वात्सन्तानान्तर बुदिदित्यस्य हेतो कार्पासे रस्ता वदित्यनेनासिद्धवाद्यन्यतमदोपस्यानुद्भावनात् । किं च समानाना कार्यकारण भाव एवं सन्तान इति घोद्धाना कृतान्त । सादृशश्च कार्यकारणमा शिष्योपाध्यायबुद्धीनामस्तौति प्रात्तनमेव दूषणम् । दूपणान्तरमाइ । न च कर्षासेऽपि निरन्वयनाशोत्पादे रक्कतोपपद्यते कर्पासान्तरवत् ।। निर्गतोऽयय कारणपरम्परा यत्रासौ निरन्वय स चासो नाशश्व निरन्वय नाश । तस्मिन्सत्त्युत्पादो यस्य कार्यकारणभावस्य स निन्वयनाशीपाद , तस्मिन्सति सि न रक्ततोपपाते तद्वत्व नाईति यथा सान्तरे तस्मात्त नापि बीजावयवाना रकानामनुवृत्तावेध वसे रक्तो पद्यत । न च क्षणिक वादिन पक्षऽनुभवितु सस्कारस्य पानुत्तिरस्ति तदम वे स्मरणमपि न स्यादिति भाव । एतेनैव क्षणिकत्व निरस्त ॥ अनुभवितुविनारोऽन्यस्य स्मरण सर्वथा नापपद्यते। एतेन यनन "यत्सत्त क्षाणिक या जर घर सन्तश्च भावा असी " इत्यनुमानस्य तर्क पाधा दर्शिता । तथाहि सर्वस्य पक्षीकारे दृष्टान्ता भावाद साधारणो हेतु विवादा ध्यासित इति पक्षीकारे जलधरस्यापि द्विारमणावस्थायित्वासाध्यविकलो दृष्टान्त । एकदेशे प्रत्यक्षयाध दर्शयति । प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्येन च प्रत्यक्षेण म्फरिकादिष्वक्षाणिकत्व गृह्यते ॥ * स एवाय स्फटिको यो मया व सरापूर्व दृष्ट इति पूर्वापरकारकलितवस्तु आहि प्रत्यक्षशानमुत्पात इति प्रत्यक् देशविरुद्ध मनुमानम्, तथा यस्या तत्पु श्रमद्रास तस्य पौत्र पश्यामात्यात्मन्यपि प्रत्यभिपानमु पद्यते । परमतमाशङ्कते। प्रदीपादिष्विव भ्रान्तमिति चेत् ॥ पूर्वपरित विनष्टे पुनरन्येन प्रज्वलिते प्रदीप स एवाय प्रदीप इति प्रत्यभिज्ञान भेदप्रादिपुरुपेण प्रत्यण बाध्यमानत्वाश्था प्रान्त तथानापरी स्यर्थ । यदि वैकस्मियेव प्रदीप सन्ताने विषादाभ्यासित प्रदीपो नैको भिन्न कालेजनज पत्त्वात्मप्रतिपसानेकप्रदीपरदित्यनुमानेन बाध्यमानत्वात्प्रत्यभि - ·वासुदेव कृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ८९ . नि यथा भ्रात तथा क्षणिकवानुमान घिनमक्षणिकत्वा यमिशान भ्रान्तम् । षयति। ना एकत्र बाध्यत्वेन भ्रांतत्वे सर्वत्र भ्रातत्वकल्पनायामतिप्रसं- गत् ॥ । एकत्र नीलादिशानस्य बाध्यत्वेन भ्रातत्वे सर्वत्रापि तथाभावप्रसग इत्यर्थः । न च सर्वमपि प्रत्यभिज्ञान क्षणिकत्वानुमानवाधितामति वाच्यम्। अनुमानस्य प्रागुक्तयुक्त्याऽदृष्टान्तस्वात् । भ्रासमपि प्रत्यभिज्ञान बौद्धस्य न उभवतीत्याह। । अनभ्युपगमाञ्च । सादृश्यस्य क्षणिकत्वे भ्रांतिवानाभाव. ॥ भ्रातमपि प्रत्यभिज्ञान प्रदीपादौ पूर्वोत्तरप्रदीपक्षणाना सादृश्ये स्थिरे ज्येव भवति, न चास्ति क्षणिकत्ववादिनः किंचित्स्थिरम् । अतो निमित्ता गवे नैमित्तिकस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्याप्यभाव. स्यादित्यर्थ । स्थायित्ये तु मिाण क्रमकार्याश्येककारणजन्यानि कार्यवात्सप्रतिपनककालकार्यवत् । पिसहरति । तस्मासिद्धमेतच्छरीरादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा व्यापको नित्य इति मत्यत्वं कुत इति चेद् भावत्वे सत्यनादित्वाद् गगनवदिति ॥ परः पृच्छति । तदेव कयं जातमात्रे जन्मान्तरानुभवसूचकस्मरणलिंगम्य हर्षमोह- पयशोकस्तन्याभिलाषादेरुपनभात् ।। ६ जातमात्रे प्राणिनीति शेषः । तदानीमेव जातस्य मृगशावादे, स्तन्यापाना- भवो नास्तीति जन्मान्तरानुभवो शायत एव सद्योजाताना मुराप्रसादाद्य. सुमिता हदियः सुखदुःसाधनदर्शनाजायमानास्त जातीयलिंगसुखदुःख डाधनयोाप्तिस्मरणादेव भवन्तीत्यनुमातव्या' । व्यापकत्वे प्रमाण माह । धर्मादेराश्रयसंयोगापेक्षस्य गुरुत्वादिवदाश्रयांतरे वायवादी क्रिया. सर्तकत्वादणिमाद्युपेतस्य युगपदसंग्न्यातशरीराधिष्ठातृत्वाच व्यापक- वमिद्धिः ॥ -

·भासर्वक्षप्रणीतन्यायसार
' प्रयोगस्तु धर्माधर्मों स्वाश्रयसयुक्त एवाश्रया-ररे क्रिया जनयत , एक
प्याने मति क्यिारेन गुणत्याद्गुरुवात् । युरदनकरीगाटात वे प्रमाणम
तथा चोक्त पुराणे-
आत्मनो व शरीराणि बनि मनुजेश्वर।
प्राप्य योगबल कुर्यात्तश्च सर्वा महीं चरेत् ।।
भुजीत विषयान्वैश्चित्वश्विद्धन तपश्चरेत् ।
सहरच्च पुनम्तानि सूयम्तेनोगणानिव ।। इति !!
लाके युगदिति सप्रदायाद्गम्यते ! उपसहरति ।
तदेवमपरात्मतत्त्वज्ञान परलोक्सद्भावेन परलोक्प्रवृत्त्युपयोगित्वा
धर्मक्षयहेतुत्वाच नि शेयसाग मिति ।।
एतेन नित्यात्मशानमात्मनि शाश्वतस्नजननद्वारेण ससारकारभि
वदन्नो बौद्धा अपि प्रयुक्त नित्यपरलोकामावे हि
यावजीक सुख जीवनात मृगारगाचर ।
भरमी भूतस्य दहस्य पुनरागमन कत ।'
इति वदतो लोकायतिकस्येव यथेष्टच टापसगाद् अधर्मक्षयतुत्वे च तर
शोकमामविट्' इत्यागम प्रमाणम् । पामा मनानस्य नियमहर
दर्शयति ।
परमात्मतत्त्वज्ञान च तदुपासनागत्वेनापवर्गसाधनम् ।।
तस्य परमात्मन उपासनमानधन तदुपासन परमा माऽऽराधन त्या
वनांपायत्वेन ।
स नोपासनविधि ॥
आराधनप्रकार
केशर्मक्षयसमामिलामार्थमनुष्ठानम् ।।

·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेत
च
लशकर्मक्षयार्य समाधिलाभार्थ चेत्युभयत्राप्यर्थशब्दसबध । येनके
नचिदनुष्ठानेन गगद्वेषमोहाख्या देशा' क्षीयन्ते परमात्मनि
चित्तकाम्यलक्षण समाधि प्राप्यते तदनुवान परमेश्वरोपासनविधिरिति ।
अन पतीलसूस वाद दर्शयति ।
तथा चोक्तम् । तप स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिका क्रिया योगः
( यो. सू. २१ ) । केशतनूकरणार्थ
समाधिलामार्थश्चेति
(( यो सू. २२)॥
यपि पतजलिने ममाधिभावनाथ रतनूकरणार्यश्चति पाउस्तथा
पीहार्यक्रममाश्रित्यान्यथा पाठ कृत । सूत्रार्थ कथयति ।
। तत्रोन्मादयामादिदोपव्यपोहार्थमाध्यात्मिकादिदु खसहिष्णुत्व तप ।
एवमेतानि विविधानि दु सानि शान्तचित्तेन नियमपूर सहमानस्य
यदु ससहिष्णुत्व निवर्तकधर्मसचयमधर्म विनाश च कुरुते तत्तप इत्युच्यते ।
चान्द्रायणादापि चानधनादिजानिलतददु सहरूपत्वातप निवर्तक धमाच्याच
है योगप्रवृत्तिहेतु श्रद्धातिशयो भवति अधर्मनाशाच्चोन्मादयामव्याध्यादीना
यागान्तरयाणा प्रलय , ततत्तिसमाधि । तपो धर्माधमसंचय यहतरित्यत्र
प्रमाणन यादिवचनम् । तथाहि
तमामूलमिद सर्व यद्देव मानुष मुसम् ।
तपोमुख्य बुध प्रोक्त तमोन्त ददाशिम ।।
महापातविनश्चैव शेपावाकार्यकारिण ।
तमस्य तु मुच्यन्ते तसेन विल्लिात्तत ॥
विचिदेन दुर्वन्ति मनोवाहमूर्तिभिर्जना ।
तत्सर्व निदेहत्यागस्तपसच तपोधना' । इति ।
न्याभ्यायश्वरूपमाह।
प्रशान्तमन्त्रम्येश्वरवानिनोऽभ्यास स्वाध्याय ॥
ईभरवाचिन इति धुमिदिनिगमाय । प्रान्त प्राण प्रामामानधन
भारतम्यामति जापनार्थम् । भरमहणाहीतादियांगाग्वाम्मामा या स्वा
याय । मरमणिधानमा ।

·भासर्वतप्रणीतन्यायसार परमेश्वरतत्त्वस्य प्रनन्धेनानुचिन्तनमीश्वरप्रणिधानम् ॥ प्रय धेन नैरन्तयेणाचिन्तन स्मृति । पुष्पादिमिर्वाऽऽगन सर्वकमा परमगुवाचार्याणा था। सोऽय तप स्वाध्यायेश्वरणिधानादिप्रिया योगा धनत्याद्योग इत्युच स च प्लेशानुकरणार्थ इयुत । अत शरवरूपमा समासतो रागद्वेषमोहा वेशा । समाधिप्रत्यनीक्समारापत्तिद्रा रेण देशहेतुत्वात् ॥ आसहि लक्षणो राग , कापणे दप , मिथ्याशान माह । समाधिपत्पनीक त्यादिना शशब्दवाच्यत्वे निमित्तमुत्तम । व्यस्तु लमो दु समेव । राग दया हि समाधिविगोधरवेन ससारापादनद्वारेण पुरुष प्लेशयन्तासि प्लेय उत्ता । समासत इति पद शुसारयमनिरासाय । तेहि अविद्यास्मिता रागद्वेषामिनिवेश केशा (यो स् २-३) इति ब्रुवाणा पदलेशन भ्युभागमन् । तच्चायुक्तम् । अस्मितामिनिवेशयारपया तावात् । तथारि दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेका मतवास्मिता (यो सू २-८) दृच्छति पुरुष दर्शनशचिवुद्धि , तयोमिनयारेका मक्तयाऽमैदने प्रतिपत्तिमाह एव । तर स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽाप तयारूढाऽभिनिवेश (यो सू २~१)मरण नासन नत सर्वदाह भूयासीमति योऽय सकल स चामनिवेश सचानादिमरण नि दुसानुमयारूढवासनाजन्य वात् स्वरसबादीयुक्त । सोऽपि यया य तमुदा दृश्यते तथा ज्ञातपरस्य विदुषाऽपि रूढ प्रतायत स च माह एव 1 २८ भाधिनि मरणे सदा मया भूयासाम येय ज्ञानस्सान्यथाप्रत्यय वाद्विदुष मप्या तरदापा माहो दृष्ट । यथा सूर्योदयादारानुमिदिग्भारश्या दियाह इति । यथा तप रच घ्यायश्वरप्रणिधानादक्यिा योग विना हेतुस्तथा यागागान्यात तानि दर्शयात । तथा यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणा यानसमा धयोऽष्टा गानि ( यो सू २ २९) अनुष्टयानीति शेष 1 अगानि कारणानि | यमादीना ह ·वासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः ९३ पणत्यात् । समाधेस्तु योगात्मकस्याप्युत्तरोत्तरस्य समाधिनिच यस्य हेतुत्वा इगत्वमिति । आदावुद्दिष्टान्यमाना । तत देशकालावस्थाभिरनियता पुरुषस्य शुद्धिवृद्धिहेतवो यमा अहिंसाब्रह्मचर्यास्तयादयः ।। आदिशब्देन सत्यापरिप्रहयोः परिग्रह शुद्धिरधर्ममदमानादिक्षयः । इद्विधमापचयः । तदंतवो ये देशादिभिरनियता अहिंसादयः, सर्वरिमन्देशे सर्वस्मिन्काले सर्वस्यामवस्थायां न हिस्यामि ब्रहाचर्य चरामि न चोरयामि नासत्यं वदामि नापि परेभ्यो गृहामीति सक्ल्पपूर्वकास्ते यमा' । यदि पुनस्तार्थादो नो हिमम्मि ब्रह्मचर्य चरामीति देशादिनियतास्तदा नियमा एवन यमाः। देशकालावस्यायपेक्षिणः पुण्यहेतवः क्रियाविशेषा नियमा देवता- प्रदक्षिणासन्ध्योपासनमपादयः ।। देशविशेषापेक्षि देवताप्रदक्षिणम् । बालविशेषापोक्ष सन्ध्योपासनम् । जानिया शुद्धावस्थामात्रापेशिणी । पुण्यविशेर देशविशेषापेक्षिणी च,अनन्तं शिपसमिधाचित्यादियवनात् । अन्येऽपि देशादिविशेषाधिक क्रियाविशेरा नियमा येदितव्या. { पातसलास्तु निवृत्ति- लक्षणा यमा इत्याहुः । तथा चोक्तम् । अहिंसासत्यारतेयनमर्यापरिप्रदा यमाः (यो. सू. २-३०)। शोचसन्तोपतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः (यो. स. २-३२) असत्यरचननिनिरिह सत्य विभितम् । आसन टायति। योगमविरोधिोशनयार्थः करणवन्ध आसनं पद्मकम्वस्तिकादि ।। करणानांन्दारीरावययानां पदादीनां पन्धः समम प्रस्यत्तिकायनेक. अफारः। प्राणायामोपयोगी पादासन सिर मुरां योपवेशनमित्यर्थः। सप योगप्रियपगाधनी ये शालेयातयो व्याघारतेषां जयायों विना- शाति प्रयोजनोपन्याप: । प्राणायाम शांत । कोष्ठ्यस्य बायोगतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामो रेचकपूरककुंभरपशरः।

·भासर्वज्ञपणीतन्यायसार काष्ट शरीरा नदो भव' काठयो वायु श्वासप्रश्वासरूप ,तस्य या गातार च्छेद स प्राणायाम सच विविधो रेनकादिभेदेन ! तनातर्गतस्य वायोहि नि सारण रेचक । बाह्यस्य शरीरपूरण पूरक । पूरितम्य नगरीरातधारण कुमक । वायुवशीकरणोपायमाह । स च शनै शननेंतव्यो वनगनेद्रवत् ।। यथा गजेद्र शनै निरुगयेन वशीयमाणो महातमुपकार कराति ग्लादप्रयोगेण गृह्यमाणस्त विनाशयति तथा वायुराप शनैर्धियमाणो महान्त मुपकार नि शेष रागादिम व विनाश्य समाधि प्रापयात 1 अप्रयोगण बला झियमाणस्तु वातो गुल्मायनयमच जनयताति । प्रत्याहारमाह । समाधिप्रत्यनीकार्थेभ्यश्चताल समन्ताद्द्यावर्तन प्रत्याहार । समाधे प्रयनाका विराधिनो ये पुत्रकल्पादयस्तेभ्य समन्तात्सर्वेभ्यश्चे तसो व्यावर्तन ध्यावृत्ति प्रत्याहार । प्रत्याइते चेतनि बाह्येद्रिय ण्याप प्रत्याहतान भवात चेतोऽधीनन्याप वृचे । प्रयाहारेणैव च धारणलाम । देशवधश्चित्तस्य धारणा (यो सू ३ १)। गरीरावयचो नाभ्यादिदेश इत्येके, बाह्यसूर्यमण्डलादिरित्यपरे, परमात्म वान देशो विवक्षित तदाराधनप्रवृत्त वा मोक्षार्थिन इत्याचार्या । तत्र दे चित्तस्य मनमो वध प्रयनेन धारण निश्चलीकरण यत्सा धारणात । तत्र प्रत्यर्थकतानता ध्यानम् ( यो सू ३२)॥ तन्त्र धारणादशे प्रययस्य ध्येयाल्बनस्यैक्तानतासदृशप्रवाहो म प्रत्यया तरेणापरामृष्टो घ्यानम् । तदेवार्थमात्र निर्मास स्वरूपशून्गमिव समाधि ( यो सू ३३) तदेव ध्यानमेव ध्येयाकारमात्रनिर्मास स्वरूपेण प्रत्ययामकेन न्यामि द् ध्येयम ध्यायामीति भैदैन ज्ञानय यदा मवति तदा समाधिरि युच्यते एतदेव यदा- ·। वासुदेवकृतपढपचिकया समेत ध्यानोत्वनिवाताचल प्रटीपावम्यानमिवेक्लेव चेतसोऽवम्यान स- माधिरभिधीयते ॥ उपसहरति । एवमेतानि योगागानि मुमुक्षुणा सर्वेषु ब्रह्मादिस्थानेप्वनेशप्रकार दुखभावनयाऽनभिरतिसक्षित पर पैराग्यमह बरेच परा भक्तिमाश्रित्या त्यन्ताभियोगेन सेचितन्यानि ॥ अनेकप्रकारेण स्वविमवातिशयितविभयदारीतक्षयभावनया जानतानि पानि तेपा भावनया प्रहादिस्थानेष्वनभिरतिरपेक्षाभावस्त सात तत्स्वरूप यत्तस्पर वैराग्यम् । योगागसेवाया फल्माह । ततोऽचिरेणव कालेन भगवन्तमनापम्यस्वभाव शिवमावितय प्रत्य क्षत पश्यति । त दृष्ट्वा निरतिशय श्रेय प्राप्नोति ॥ निर्गतोऽतिशयो यस्मात्तनिरतिशय श्रेयो मोक्ष, शिवशानादेव मोर इत्यत्र प्रमाण दर्शयति । तथाचोक्तम् यढा नर्मवढाकाश वेष्टायप्यन्ति मानवा । तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दु खस्यान्तो भविष्यति ।। (श्वे उ.६.२०) तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमनि (थे. १८, १५)। तरति शोषमात्मविदिति ॥ (घा.) चव चर्मयत् । यथा धर्म वेष्टयान्त तथाऽऽकारा यदा येध्यन्नि मानया तदा शिवं परमात्मानमविणाय सर्वस्य दु सम्पान्नो भविष्यति । उपस हरति । तम्माच्छिार्शनान्मोक्ष इति ॥ मोलस्वरूपे वितिपतेषिधमानत्वासमपर्यय परिषमतमादी दराति । + पुनरयं मोस । एके नारयन्ति समस्तविशेषगुणोठे महारावम्यायामागशवात्मनोऽत्यन्नावम्यान मोक्ष इनि ।। । है

·९६
भासनप्रणीतन्यायसार
अत्यन्त सर्वदारस्थानमिर नेम प्रत्यायम्याने विशेषकथनम् । वैशेषि
प्रति कनिचोदयति।
कस्मात् ।।
मुसार्थव प्रेक्षावता प्रवृत्तिन स्यात्, अव सुग्पमात्रानुमाऽगीकार्य ।
भाव । पर परिहरति ।
सुमदु स्योरविनाभावित्वेन विवेवहानानुपपत्तरिति ॥
मुखहेतूनामवश्य दु खजनक त्वविनाभाविस्वम् । मोशे प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्ते
त्यस्य परिहारमाह।
न च सुखार्थ एव प्रेक्षावता प्रवृत्ति । कर यादिजनितदु खपरित
रार्थत्वेनापि प्रवृत्तरपलभात् ॥
इदानीमाचार्य स्वपक्ष दशयितुवामो शपिक त दूषयति ।
मोहावस्थात्वान्मूछाद्यवस्थावदर विवविना प्रवृत्तिर्न युक्तत्य
,
रन्ये ॥
वैशेषिकेन्योऽन्ये वयमिति भाव । दुसपरिहारार्थमेव प्रवृचिनॉय
इति दर्शयति।
दुखे सति सुखोपभोगस्यासभवात्क्टकादिदु खपरिहारो
मुखोपभोगार्थ एवेत्यसमो दृष्टान्त ॥
स्वमते यद्यपि मुमभूणा प्रवृत्ति सुखानुभवाविवेक प्रवृत्तित्वात्म
पत्रप्रवृत्तियदित्यनुमानमुक्त व्यापि प्रकपूर्वक मार मप्रमाणमाद ।
कुतो मुक्तस्य सुखोपभोगबुद्धिरिति चेत् । आगमात् । उक्त
सुखमात्यन्तिक यन बुद्धिग्राह्यमतींद्रियम् ।
त वै मोक्ष विनानीयाद्दष्पापमकृतात्मभिरिति ।।

·चासुदेवकृतपदपंचिकया समेतः तथा-आनंदं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच मोक्षेऽभिन्यज्यते । विज्ञानमानंद ब्रह्मेति ( वृ. ३-९-२८) ॥ दुःखाभावेऽत्र मुखानन्दशब्दावुपचारेण प्रयुक्तो, यथा भाराभान्तस्य वाहिकस्य तदभावे हि सुखी जातोऽहमिति प्रत्यय इत्याराकायामार। मुख्येऽये नाधकामावानोपचारकल्पना । किं च भाराफ्रान्तस्य तदपाये वाय्यादिसपवासुसोत्पादे सत्येव सुस शब्दप्रयोगः । न पुनःखामावेन चासंवेद्यमानो दुःसाभाषः प्रवृत्त्य गमिति मुख्यमुतस्याभावे मोक्षप्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । सुख परोक्तमारयते । सुखसवेदनयोर्नित्यस्यान्मुक्तमंसारापर योरविशेषग्रसग इति चेत् ।। परिहरति । नाचक्षुर्घटयोः कुडयादेरिय मुखतसंवेदनयोविषयविषयिभावसंवध- रत्यनीकस्याधर्मदुःखादेः संसारावायाया सद्भाय त् । तन्नाशे च मुक्ता. स्थायां भवति सुखसंवेदनयोः संबंध कुड्यादिनाशे चक्षुर्घटसर्वधव देत्यतो नाविशेषः ।। संबंधप्रतिबंधकत्वमामेण कुख्यादिकमनोदाहृतम् । पुनःडयादेरिया वर्मादेवधायकत्व सभाते, अमूर्तत्वात् । पुनः परमतमासकते । संघस्य कृतकरवेन कदाचिद्विनाशप्रसंग इति नेत् ।। मुसतावेदनशस्य विनाशे मुतस्य सत्तारिवसा इति चेत् । परिवति । न । प्रध्वंसानकान्तिकावात् ॥ पियादाप्यासितः सरपः कदाचिदिनदयाल वादाविलासाद६२३दिस्य तो सपना कान्तिावादिस्ययः । परमतमापते । वस्तुत्वे सतीति चेत् ॥

·पासर्वज्ञप्रणीतन्यायसार:
संवधो द्रव्यगुणकर्म सामान्यविशेषसमवायेग्यो बहिर्भूतस्तदन्तर्भूतो वेति
विकल्प्य पक्षद्वये दूषणमा ।
न । द्रव्यादिप्वनन्तर्भावेन तदसिद्धत्वात् ।।
तस्य वस्तुत्वस्यासिद्धत्वात् ।
तदर्तभावे वा समवायादिभिः सह तत्सवेदनस्य संबधो न स्यादिति ॥
द्रव्यादिषट्पदार्थातर्भूतो हि न समवायस्याभावस्य वा संबंध इति भावः ।
पुन' परमतमाशकते।
अष्टादिवशात्कर्मकारक विषयस्तजनित ज्ञानं विपीति चेत् ।।
परिहरति ।
न । ईश्वरज्ञानस्य निन्यस्यार्थैः सह संबंधाभावप्रसंगात् ।।
अस्मदादिज्ञानस्याप्यतीतानागतादिषदायः सह सबधो न स्यात् । अती
तादिपदार्थस्य कारकत्वसमवात् इत्यपि शेयम् ।
उपसहरति ।
तस्मात्कृतकत्वेऽपि नित्यसुखसंवेदनसंबंधस्य विनाशकारणाभावा
नित्यत्वं स्थितम् । तसिद्धमेतत् । नित्यसवेद्यमान सुखेन विशिष्टा
ऽऽत्यतिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्ष इति ॥
इति काश्मीरिक सूर्य सूनुवासुदेवाविरचिलायां न्यायसारपदाधिकाय
मागमपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ।
मायभूषणमहाम्बुधौ बुधा येऽगमाविचरितु न जानते ।
तहते तिरिय मया कृता न्यायासारपदपचिकामिधा ।।
भद्र पश्येम पंचरेम भद्रम् ॥

·PREFACE. I scarcely thought when last year the text and commentary More published, that the text required any notes or that I should write them But from experience in the class room, I felt hos difficult it is for students to grasp the subject er en though the author presumes to teach the bare elements of Nyāya, yet hus manner of treatment is so concise, hic reasoning so compressed, and his style at times so cryptic, elliptical and dilemmatic that for even more than an average student, help of some kind or other as a real necd This book is intended to meet this demand It greu out of my notes for class-lectures, and I have drawn upon various sources of information on the subject in their preparation Prominent among the Nyāya Sutra of Gautama with the scholtum 0 Vatsyāyana, Athale's Tarhasamgraba, Keshavamishra's Tarhabhūshū, Jayasimha's commentary on the Ngāyasăra published by Vidyabhūśana, Sapta prduthu edited by the Tite Dr Ghäte, Keith's Indian logic and atomism as also hi, Karma-mlmāms, and Samkhya, and the book on media ial logic by the late Dr Satischandra Vidyabhushana. 1 cannot express how greatly I am indebted to these different authorities tliese are But above all, to my Guru, Vahāmahopadhyāya Vasp- Jevr Shīstn Abhyankar, I owe a debt which it would be eXtremely ungrateful not to achnowledge. To bim I one

·WIDYA BTT
3}
1127721 d.fi
thu cxplanation of many technol subtletes
cult points which unarded wire formudabic indeed In fact
all the ment that the book may have is due to bom
Lastly, I must thank Vir N N hulham a student of mine
tor going through the proofs and I'r G Sardesai, LV!
S for his readiness to undertakt th publication of this sorh
FERCUSSOY COLLEGE
5th March, 1923
CR DFYADIR
N
LIBRARTE

·NOTES ON THE NYAYASĀRA sini First Parichheda (V B all references to Pagination &c refer the edition of 1922 of Nyayasara by the same author ) प्रणम्यशम्भम् Etc From the early Bhashyakıras to the later compilers of the Syncretist School we have clear evidences of the very defi nitely religious tinge of the votaries who professed one or the other of the systems of Nyaya and Visheshika According to Raja Ś khara--the folloners of the Vaisheshikz are "lar in their religious aspect to those of Nyaya---with the only difference that the rdherents of the Nyaya are called Shuvas and those of the Vaisheshika are called Pashupatas He falso describes the ascetic practices of those sectarians which equate them to the ordinary votaries of Śiva The antiquity of this connection is attested to by the tra lition stich 1» preserved by Prasi z tapa a that it was Siv. Ir the shape of an owl who reyali to Kara ith Vaishe- A coring to Pehastapadt gain he crea toria Waheshwar 2 choice in which neca har llyful to see a delibu.sate preforinre for thư view that the true God is Sisa Similarly of Udjotak zra wé 12ye express evidence of the Nyayı Vartohes that he ***s 2 Pishapata Thesit in the Nyaya is shown to be recognized by Vatsyāyana as WLII It will be found inter that Bhiasara ajni lys stress on the necesity of the recognized kinds of mental concentm lion which at last will yn ld the direct vision of Suvi Cdya m the chicl cxponent of the theam of the systems de monstrates the God 75 Siya The silence of handa and Gautama on these points is te slut 1 sysieni ·Hari I] NOTES 3 1S as are of upprehension { अनुभव ) defined { स्मृतिभिन 117474) all knowledge otlier tiian rumembrance vhile Remembrance is described as knowledge produced from mental impressions alone Thus the difference between Remembrance and Apprehension is that the cognitions received through Remembrance more less repetitions of fomcr cognitions where all cognitions Which are rewis acquired and not repetitions of toriner ones Apprehensions proper Further these cognitions may be either truc or false 1 true cognition is one in which we have the knowledge of an object as pos sessed of attributes which iri in accord with the stal nature of the thing whilc the case where we cognizt in object as possessed of attnbutes which in reality it does not possess ut be false cognition Thus on analysis 4 hryn बुद्धि , cognition are port स्मृति Remembrance अनुभव Apprehension d I यथार्थ अयथार्थ यथार्थ ( प्रत्यक्ष अनुमिति शाब्द) अयथार्प- ( सशय विपर्यय ) purpu Thus it will be clear that in Instrument of knowledge # (44191) being associated with correct apprehension we havo morto exclude all apprehensions that partake of the nature of kawfulsity Tience the word en It will thu, bu found to Boh excludc doubt und Frror the two fundamentul divisions of reper rroneous apprehensions ( 91T or 4941 ) according ***o our outhor qarTTU ETT 94-Cognition which devoid of certitude in doubt Tlus defimtion sous to have been taken from the Bhishya of Vatsyāyana, and from the illustrations of the five kinds of doubts wlueh are given by 15 ·4 MYAYASARA (Pari 1 our author, Ke need male no doubt as to the source of the portion in the Nyayasāra being the same luminous scholium 99 yarayi It will be highly instructive to compare with this, the original Sutra of Gautama It is a uniam प्रतीपतरूपलव्य नुपलव्ध्यव्यवस्थातच विशपापक्षा विमर्श सरय (गा सु 9937) Doubt which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object arises from the recognitior of properties common to many objects or of properties not common to any of the objects from conflicting testimonis and from integularity of perception and non perception There are two ways of interpreting the Sutra, in the first View there are three kinds of Doubt those that owing to irregularity of perception and non perception arise from eithe an object possessing 2 generic quality or an object possessin a specific quality or from conficting testimony On the secom View however we get five kinds of doubt, forth ( उपलभ्यनुपलपव्यवस्था ) irregularity of perception and non perception which was recognized as a cause of doubt conut to the three tatierus is 101 recognized as in itself in 1 dependent source of doubt thus we get five varieties in all The scholiast is responsible for this interpretation and following him our author has given us five hinds doubt P3 तद्यथा समानधर्मात्-Etc When we see at a td store an indeterminate object--which possesses qualities gether! in character we are presented with two alteratives who He lnon possess those quautics Jor instances se han that the object at a distance is tall This tallness is a qual which is shared by a pole or a motionless ascetic judgment about the object will vary between the two alter natives as long as we have no assurance in favolir of rithe of the alternatives अनेकधर्मादाका etc This is interpreted in Thus ou ·Parı 2 NOTES 5 -- different ways अनेकस्माद् व्यावर्तक .. असाधारणो धर्मthe doubt arises from an object possessing a specific quality This sound is the specific quality of ether we cannot thereforu decide whether sound is eternal or non eternal because thert are no determining factors to guide our judgment Sound is found nowhere else--nesther in things eternal or things non-etemal--but only in ether If for instance this quality N23 shared by many objects thert would have been available to us some presumptive evidence favouring either of the alternatives So that a specific quality gives rise to doubt It should be ni mumbered that in the present cisl the doubt S stated to be about the specific quuity itself But Vätsy Tya a und Keshvamishngre ino her instance in which the doubt is about the thing possessing the specific attribute Thy we do not know whether arth is eternal or non eternal naturally cnough we try to sc whether the qualities that Ox_long to carth are shared by objects eternal or non cteml it may be that some qualities an, shared by tłungs cternal and some by thunys noi -eternal So that the conclusion w arile it is not decisive We further took to the pacific quality of earth nimely ( 147 ) Smell now we find hert a quilty which is neither slurred by things cturnal or non eternal So that we are confirned u the doubt 2 to the precise clinrncter of the eurthi Thus 1 specific quality gives 11%, to doubt concerning itself or corulmıntiit thin, of Wluchu it is an attribute Tho commentator lucrc 13 ingeniously difunded the expres zon 625 If saya means ATTULIP why 11at says an objcctor, put the word Granu a straight rather than resort to such a confusing and umbiguous term? The answer is that the author hilse following Grutama is pur posely wnbiguous, for ile wants to include the cases of doubt when an object possesses many quuities or erae Thus ·3 NYÀYASÁRA [Part 1 for instance Wt find that mind is active and intangible Now generally activity is found with objects that are corporal whereas intangibility is invariably found with incorporeal substances, but mind has both the qualities So that we are not able to say positively that mind is either corporcal or it corporeal P 4-विप्रतिपत्ते Etc When two opinions are held by rival schools in regard to an object it becomes very difficult for one who does not belong to either of the schools to de cide between the two alternatives Thus the Nyaya schoo declates that the fire senses are evolved out of the five ele ments while according to the Samkhya school of plulosophy the senses are evolved not out of the elements but out of gia Thus we cannot until we come to know the truth, declare in favour of either of the views Similarly of the etemality of sound The Mimāmsalas hold that sound is eternal whereas the Maijasthas refute them by pointing out that such a doctrine is untenablı So long therefore as a third party bus not known the truth himself his judginent will waier between the two alternatives उपरब्धे etc Jayasinha explains — समानधर्मानानयार्भेद इति चना समानधर्मस्य झयस्थत्वादनाच ज्ञातृस्थत्वान्महान्भेद । and he quotes Bhushankara whose explanation runs thus -4 उपलाध मात्रण शब्दै स्थायित्वमनुपराधमात्रेण सर्ने श्रादीनामसख चच्छन्ति तन्मतप्रतिक्षपार्थमुपलव्ध्यनुपलच्या पृथक् सराय grat Exactly this viegy is expressed by Vāsudeo It 15 plausible that Jazasınha might be here quoting from the Nyāyabhushana of Vasudeo and the author of Njaja bhushana fumsclf borrowed from Vatssāyana of a MATTA कश्च धर्मो इयस्थ । उपररुप्यनुपन्धी पुनज्ञातृस्य एतावता विशेषण पुनर्वधनम् । the point to be remembered in the present instance is that the species of doubt mentioned previously are also caused by Jafo and 9771 or apprehension and non apprehensior ·an t] NOTES 7 : Ir 111 the stock example Fargar 979791 the doubt is caused y the apprehension of the generic qualities outstretched- Less' "tallness" etc and the non apprehension of the dezitive qualities of either of the alternatives What then is he difference? It is this that in the previous case the loubt was caused by an external object possessing generic attributes for was MRT ). The doubt was about the nature of the object ( or $4 ) while in the present instance the doubt has its origin in some irregularity of perception in the persc" lumself The object the water as seen in mirage is present to the doubter and as such the exterral object does tot raise 2 doubt offering various alternatives, it is Only when the doubter thnks for himself that the mere ap rehension of a thing is no sufficient testimorv for the exis. tence of a thing but that the apprehension of the thing night I be caused by some rregularity in perception that therc ariscs in his mind the doubt as regards the existence of the Xternal object Thus the doubt is TIFT Examples are the apprellension of water in a muage and the non apprehension of a spuit or a ghost This form of doubt is mentioned to defeat a rival view Thus the Munāmsakas hold that sound is eternal or indestrucable because there is the recognition " this is that very word Now how can we recognize the word uttered at one time to be the same as the word uttered at another time unless on the assumption that the word once uttered remains ? This 39967 or apprehension of a word is therefore a proof of the eternality of sound The retort of the unit is that Uus 398/21 is the source of doubt, since from merc sao we cannot ascertain anytlung We have thic 3 of water in a mirage, but yo know that it is merely Juusion Sınılarly they deny the existence of God because there is the BOYITOT or non-apprehension of God, but mere non-ap- ·S NYAYASĀRA (Parir prehension is 10 proof that there is no God We for instance, have the non apprehension of water in a radish or cucumber, but we cannot therefore come to the conclusion that there is no water there but rather the reserse is true Thus उपलब्धि and each have to be regarded as sources of doubt autrumas etc Sinoc conjecture (571) and indeterminate ness (972ht7 )partakc of the nature of incertitude they are not separately reckoned by us but included under doubt Il for instance we see at a distance an indeterminatc object which we corclude must either be a man or fole that is doubt f Headrance to the stage at which we decide tentatively and without assurance in favour of its being a man con jccture is reached Indeterminateness 15 exemplif ed by the uncertainty which one may have regarding the precisc spccies of a tree It is therefore a modified and limited form of doubt मिथ्याध्यवसायो विपर्यय etc Doubt shares falsity in virtue of the fact that the knowledge of the object tut only in an indeterminate mancr Error is ab-olutely false as it consists in the certainty of the opposite of the truth the object presenting itself with attri butes which are repugnant to those which it possesses in reality Doubt if the doubter decides in favour of the wrorg alter natre becomes crror but that is only when certainty though in the wrong sense has replaced the former doubt According to Bhatarajna then bar or false knowledge or अप्रमा can be classified as- अप्रमा 1t 15 संशय(माय 5 fold उहामनध्यवसाय) विपर्यय(Includes स्वागजादिदर्शन) YA 0717 ctc According to the commentator the latter example is given by Bhāsarvajna in order to controvert the ·Pan 1] NOTFS View of the opponents who regard 59457 as something different from सशय विपर्यय and प्रमिति Thus the divison proposed by ITFTY and found in essence in IT IS अप्रमा १ ૨ सशय विपर्यय अनध्यवसाय Fag Pramā is correct apprehension- P 6 प्रमाश्रय प्रमाता and the subsrate of this knowledge is the knower and the object of knowledge is Prameyr atau-A serious divergence of view between the Njaya and Vaisheshikz regarding the number of means of proof They are प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान उपमान and शब्द according to Nyava while the ages refuse to zccept the separate validity of comparison of word which they reduce to inference Buddhas lehewise do the same Bhāsarvajna s division of means of proof as also of the Jains and Sankhyas and Yoga is a means of proof) 819118 (Direct) Tu (Indirect) PETET (Perception) 43A 7 (Inference) TG(word) P 7–7 AT 127 etc Perception is the instrument of di rect apprehension which is correct It is two fold the tmie cendental or Super normal and normal of these the normal (477) perception is the instrument of the knowledge of objects capable of being perceived fee 081 HIACTICHETE $172 ) through the peculii contact of the organ of sense per çeption and object and helped by the farourable circumstances of sign light (or the right attitude of mind or its wint of inattention) time and space and mert ( 1 ) etc ·Part 1] 11 NOTES conditioned by the cavity of the car Chus of the four clements the earth water, light and wind, the corresponding products are the sense of smell of taste, of sight and of touch, while of the last element ether the sense of hearing is ilut a product but rather a conditioned fornt Thus therefore the fourth mode of contact (समपाय ) is simple intimate union of inherence P8- मनसैव सुखादिज्ञानम् Etc as already remarked mind was reduced to a quasi sense by 91769f9et in the process of perception for the mind mediates between the senses and the self, but further it also plays the part of an internal sense It has thus a double function to perform (7) It mediates betsees the senses and the self and (2) plays the part of an in- ‘ernal sense having for its object the working of the mind Teelings lle puin and pleasure and all volitions and cog 11t1015 are regarded by the Naiyayikas as properties (70) of the soul and these are perceived by contact of mind and oul The mind and the soul are both of them is or ubstances and husce a direct contact of them is possible, put the workings of the mind-thinking willing and fecling-- being regarded as the properties of the Soul inhere in the Soul by Samui āya hence in the cognition of pleasure ind pain and such the mode of contact 15 ET4714 P 10-ala and #89 - Tho categories of inherence ou non existence both are held by Nyaya to be perceptible hile the the restricts thus concr to non existence and Sveits that inherence is a matter of infcrence in either ss the contact of predicato and subject is held to apply on the All that inherence and non-existence having no autonomous xistence can be perceived only as attributes of some objects hich these are found plus sixth form of contact consists of tuo distinct linds of minding to the divergence in the form of the proposition inaitenti ·12 YAYASARA (Part 1 17 2 सर्वर le negation may lxs regard 71 75 21 31rbau of that which is in contact 2 in 72191497 YTPR of n 6711on as in ing qualı find try that which is un contact us in mit IMEI But this foren of Ontart is usually called by thic combined name (47711-T04 asspile of DNCT cncin the form if propo ition imployed the resulting Colontvin is of the sein nature. I atical I urther thus mode of contact 1 Cena nt 1 fomoſ contact as pointed out to the com m ntator it is hy the merat courtesy that it is caller! It u nt Ary for a try is one in ridas in to (fam) * ftTTTT is in the first place not online at 15 nuit Or the form rs11 in on occt an 1 thu ferit in znother legia it is not inlcuinnt be a THY or a further we have to recognize the quality of this form of contrt for instanc in the progmition Ti 97979 TETT 7 is concold as a 1972 of 7177 which is in contact with thc etc thus in the hands of 1977 tko relation* are employed (717WT a combined with th joms of contact or threr in the case of HTIT 111 116 11 to the cognition of अभाव or गमवाय 17 1 समत्र यस्य तु कायदव ग्रहणम् coinmentatorst tarious cxplanat10zs of Fire here Before we proceed to colder tlıcm lit in first consider 1 Samtas It is d sina ay अयुतायेद्धयो सबध समवाय while an अयुत सद्ध । ययायोरसमदि नस्यदरातमवावातरत हावयुतसिद्धी It (अयुमिद) denotes thrice one of which is always depndent on the other is a piece of cloth on its threads or a quality on the substance these arc five such pairs of eynia and 50 a Samayāya is waar विनो गणगुणनो रियाकिय तो जालव्ययस्यो नित्यद्रव्यविशेषयोच संघध समवाय The intimate Tetation between these pours Santya ya or Inlicrence or intimate union This camiya is further regarded as one and fart und the RAIS proved by the argument that all positive products 15 ·Pari 1] VOTES 13 cause (rapris ) arc generated in their material by #914 relation 1 Samuvāyr if produced will require another sam vāyr and so on nd infinitum Samavāya has therclorc to be regarded as unproduced ind hence face, the diffcrence betucen सयोग and ममवाय 1s that the former Is अनित्य wule the latter is face and secondly whereas conjunction fusts in things normuy sepinte Inherence is one ind consists of 21 ctemul relation between things which cannot euist scpartak Thicre is I crious dr crience of victv but een the two schools of \1757 ud anneski ilgarding the perception of Sumuay th laiks tre of opinion that it is obue mall lirik whil 11 Vusheshilas hold tint it is not pureoptill on the far and that a connec tion in pxcrceptibil only wil 111 teel things y purceptible will Simulajat often kvists Ixtween things Orke of whuch inzy be imperceprubk is in the cue of sound which itself is perceptible but the scule of h ving with which it is 1l. intimate union is not pere prible and hence on their tien Samaya is prored by inference only What is possibly meant by (7 sechs then for to be this thirt Sumāya is pura ptibli in some cises only as in the case of a jr and its fomni of colour Hurc both the colour ind the jar txtween which the relation of Suraya (\115 in perceptible lnnot Samanya also in this case is rura ptibl. while in other cases such as th Samiayn of Sound und ether it is merili 1 matter of inference Thic other vic is thnt wat means that out of the five moxics of contict only thind ein he employed in the perception of kamay 137, has "cxcuse Samaj 012 r1 colour ( 44 ) IN ? 127 12t is in contact with slir uju ( ago) or the Samasty of रूपल घटाए (रायुधममवते) or the Samaya of 57 in 77 (14āat ) The 10 remaining modes of contact संयुजगमवेतसमवाय ud समवेनसमपाय not ·NYX YASĀRA 14 available to us since 198717 tisolf 13 the object of perception P19- T 97991 I things remctc by distance, bi tini or by their very nature are lowever perceived by the yogur through TITUITECTET ( ascetic perception) We cannot per celle a distant object or a thing of the past, or a thing ble an atop which is in its very arturl remote to us Accord ing to Nyāya an atom is the minutest possible part of any substance, an irreducible minimum, and hence it is not gTOSS OF FESTarryt Perception requires that object perceived 15 gross or as thus we cannot perceive an atom The ascetics however enjoy super normal perception TA TEE4191 Etc This Perception of ascetics is twofold the first when the mind is concentrated (49ETTI) and the second when it is not so concentrated The former is the power of seers to perceive in an intuitive vision the whole of truth A contact of mind and soul together with the merit (ERITE Nart) which the ascetic has acquired is the exact cause of thi: form of supernormal knowledge The second and lower form of this supernormal knowledge differs very little from ordinary Perception It is by a contact of four or three or two-that perception results as in the ordinary casc according to the character of the thing known Thus in the perception by the sense organs of smell taste 1 ISLONI, and touch four things--the object percenved the sense-organ, the internal organ (mind) and the soul have to be in contact witly each other In the perception of sound by the carthe contact of the three-Ear mind and soul is a pre requi site since sound inheres in Ear Wule in the perception of qualities lika pun and pleasure a contact of two only of mind and soul takes place since these qualities inbert in the soul P 13- ala Lte The pouce escribed to gects of intui trely knowing all things, according to Bhāsarvajna is to ·Part 1] VOTES 15 be included under the perception of the Yogis since both are derived from high merit (REUYÀS) There is a differ ence of opinion between Nyâya and Vaishechika on this point Prashastapäda for instance du des Ar into four linds as under प्रमा प्रत्यक्ष अनुमिति स्मृति आप but according to Nyāja ujo is not different from all 1978. Pages 13 14 सविकल्पकम् and निर्विकल्पका Perception further is twofold Detenuinate and Indeter minnte The former is the cause of the apprehension of an object comprehending its connection with name and such like attributes while the latter gives the bare existence of an object unconnected with attributes such as name and form This twofold character of Perception has to be recognised on the necessity that the perception of an object as possesscd of a certuin character which di-tin guishes it from other objects is 7 complex process since it compreliends the cognition of the object itself and its chimic ter te cunot be brown oz he font. qira itself is known so that at first there is the recognition that an undefined something exists, upon which later on when the determining character of the thing is noun determinate perception is built up सविकल्पक in later Nyya defined as नामजात्यादि- विशेषणविशेष्यसबंधावगाह ज्ञानम् knowledge which comprehends the relation of the qualified and the qualifications such as name, class etc Thus it first when 1 thing comes with the range of our sight weapprehend it as an undefined something. then follows the recognition of ats attributes, and these combined gue us determuate perception If indetemunte perception ( alert%AFTET) is denied and only determinate ·16 MALASARA [Part 1 gxiulption (AFT74 ) is accepted such an assumption would involve an ad infinitum regress, for me know that determinate perception is nulz -ed into the knowledge of the tlung itself and the knowledge of its attributes, the knox ledge of the thing itself and its attributes is therefore a necessary preliminary to detetlinate perception Terst ne hnow the 1957 18 unconnected with its roots then the Faqats theniselves and then only b synthetizing these impressions we have determinate perception If however, the px rccption of my object or any quality is at once a deterininite knowledge then such a perception beng determinate knowledge (ITFETT) will comprehend the knowledge of the विशेषण and विशेष्य The knowledge of घट will be of the form 479393 Then the perception of gec itself being determuate it will comprehend the hnowledge of घटव and its प्रकारता or विशेषण घटवाव and in this way there will be अनवस्था To avoid this difficulty it is necessar to regard that first sų have the indeterminate perception of an object and quality and then only by an act of imagination thert is the synthesis of these into one combined determinate perception The later Nyaya insists that the existence of this indeterminate perception is knowth by inference wlercas according to Bhasaryajna this mdeterminate form is no mere inference though not obsessed it can bu scen in any acquisition of knowledge 'The latest desclopment of the text approaches the psychological con ception of sensation as opposed to perception Pig The perception of the Yogis klica the mind is concentrated as aho indeterminata perception because as the commentator says in that ecstatic condition the mind of the Yogin apprehends an object in the abstract (EFTER मात्रम् ) ·Second Parichheda सम्यगविनाभावेन-It is this अविनाभाव (invarnable concomitance) which distinguishes अनुमान from शद्ध for both are परोक्षानु भवसाधन This invariable connection (erfaanra) is described as the natural accompaniment of the middle term (reason) by the major term (conclusion) What is meant by FRITECT > The commentator pomts out that this universal accompaniment must not be arbitrarily conceived but must be in the very nature of things Thus in the stock instance of the unit ersal accompaniment of smoke by fire we know that there is causal relation between smoke und fire and hence there is a thorough ly convincing rcason for believing them as ever together for the cause is bound to be there where the effect is But on the other hand just the inverse of the auf will not come true (viz या या वहि तत्र तत्र धूम) There is no doubt causal relation between fire and smoke but still we know that whereas an effect cannot be conceived without a cause a cause can be conceived as without an effect Smoke cannot be with. out fire but fire m y gue rise to smoke or may not give rise to smohe its effect To make this accompaniment of fire and smole, in the latter instance (7747 al 17 9 ) an variable one we have to seek certain conditions present case if the fire is an TEATTET then we have reason to say that the FTIIN 1797 a lie आन्धनजवनि) 87 A, is correct Thus we find that this ma is correct under certain conditions only or that it depends for its correct. 2 a In the ·18 MAYASARA [Part 2 ness on a certain condition or air technically called, so that tus अविनाभाव 19 not a स्वाभाविक संबंध but an उपाधिप्रयोज्यसवध, for a true च्याप्ति the सबंध or अविनाभाव must be ana. tural one not one that is assumed for the time being, nor one that depends upon some conditione 111 P, 17 28-Hour are we to make ourselves sure of this Punca? What is in fact the means of arriving at and the test of determining this invariability of concomitance? By the repeated observation of the association of fire and smolc or in other words by the accumulation of numerous astances in which this association is found But all this will not suffice to touch for the uticality of the mi Since the generalization is based upon a limited number of instances the possibility of a contradiction still re mains So it is pointed out that in order to know a E4119, not only is it necessary to observe the association of smoke and hic in numerous instances but there must not also be a sitigle instance luch sinoke is found dissociated from fire साहचर्य and व्यभिचारझानविरह are therefore the tag causes of the knowledge of child This absence of contradiction can be established by the reductio ad absurdur process Thus if the च्याप्ति यत्र यत्र धूम, तत्र तत्र वद्धि true then its contradictory, mohe is sometimes no accomparųed by fire, must be truc Then in those case where smoke is found without fire it must have for its caus something else Hence fire is not the invariable anteceden of smole and it cannot therefore be its cause The conclt sion we alle at that fue is not the cause of moke is howelt contradicted by actual experience le now for certat that fire is the cause of smole and so our conclusion bent absurd, the assumption from which it was dented must al bu wrong and its contradictoryour original ema must be rigti Is not ·Pari 2] NOTES 19 views to 2 on 2 What is YEAR? There are different According to come it is That according to others it is लिट्रज्ञान, ac cording to a third view it is af of these our author seems to favour the last view though he has not definitely put at so This परामर्श 1s also called लिङ्गपरामर्श or तृतीयलिङपरामश In an inferential judgment the mental process might be re presented by the following three steps (1) The first is the knowledge of smoke as associated with fire in the kitchen room (2) The second is the perceptive knowledge of smoke on the mountain (3) The third is the complex and derived know ledge of the same smoke as invariably connected with fire The propriety of these three steps will be clear when one bears in mind that an all inferences one rises from 7 particu instance general 12 and from that general law again descends to a particular instance Thus in the stock instance of the inference of fire mountain we observc batchen fire and kitchen smoke is in variably associated So long then as we have not risen to the general law of the invariable connection of fire and sinohe and not any particular fire and any particular smoke ve shall not be able to proceed to any inference Secondly sup posing that we rise to this knowledge of a general law if we do not perceive smoke on the mountain we shall not be able to make any predication about the mountain We must there fore have the perceptive knowledge of smoke on the moun tain Thirdly supposing we know the general law or Eng and perceive smole on the mountun still so long as we do not con nect this general law with the particular instance of smoke we shall not arrive at any conclusion Hence लिङ्गपरामर्श as the hnowledge of smoke on the mountain which is aficante or invariably connected with fire is necessary CE commentator p 18 top as also Keshavarnishra ·O NYAYASARA [Part 2 अथवा द्वयमनुमाना व्याप्ति पक्षधर्मना च 1 तत्र व्याप्रयाऽमिसावसिद्धि । परधर्मतावाच नियतधामसंबंधलक्षणविशेपसिसि । P 18 TZ, UMATI T-The perceived and the generally per. clied The lonner 15 the form of inference whetc the middle erm and consclusion 10 not heterogeneous and the latter where they are so and the result depends on an idea common to the reason and conclusion The distinction is evidently bet ween matters of inference that fall under the sphere of sense perception and those which escape that test and thercfore must rest on abstract reasonung Thus in सामान्यतादृष्ट we deduce the nature of an invisible thing a matter of infer ence which does not fall within the sphere of sense perception) from a general law previously known suche & as the law of causahty or the IT& TT Soul for instance is in visible and is proved to exist by the necessity that gia (cogni tion) and other qualities must reside in a substance according to the general law that every quality must have 2 substratum P 19 स्वार्यानुमान and पराथानुमान-17holly unknown Gautama and hanada a distinction which is accepted by the synctetust school though not adopted by TEIT and दावस्पतिमिश्र स्वार्थानुमान 1s informal and represents the mental process through which an individual passes when he arrives at an inferential judgment When however a conviction is sought to be produced in the mind of another se shall have to set out in words the premise. This arraigai? 18 based upon team The premises which are discemed by one man and imparted to another through the mediu of language are likely to be misunderstood of misconstried and therefore require to be stated svath formal precision Thus धोत्तराचार्य has painted out in his न्यायविन्दु-परानुमान शन्दा स्मर्क, स्वाथानुमान तु झानारमकमेव The first Is न्यायप्रयोज्य the to ·Pari 2] NOTES 21 second -4141 IST 1, 2, 7910 or a syllogism is essential to a परार्थानुमान but not to a स्वार्थानुमान If then परार्थानुमान ! शब्दात्मक why should it not fall under शब्दप्रमाग ? But (कारणे कार्योप- ARIT) we say that the words are indeed helpful in m parting knowledge in the present instance, but they are the ause of the judgment in inference only in a secondary sense Words are the cause of conveying to the hearers mud लिशान which leads to अनुमान It is in fact a process induced by another's words in the hearer's mind, and is thus a mental process (FR) which is the real inferential operation 1944 art is the five-membered syllogism the five members are respectively (1) proposition (11) reason (111) example (1) application (1) conclusion A proposition is the statem nt of the subject with a desire to establish something else ( 77 ) regarding it This desure may be for one » own sale or for the sake of others, and it does not matter that we have the same knowledge from another source, so long as we have the desire to establish it by inference. P 20 साधनस्वरव्यापक etc It is the statement of the reason as capable of being the instrument ( of the conclusion inferred) It is threefold -(1) Positi e-negative (11) purely negative (121) purely positive तमसाध्यधर्म 987: 1 772...... ah 1 The subject is one that has the major term as its attribute The peria- SIOR of the subject by the middle term is me. It will thus be found that the definition of art as guen by Bhăsarvajña is rather defective in so far as it anticipates the conclusion for instance, in the stock example that is the qy; according to this definition the subject ma is one that has fire (a thing as yet to be proved) for its attribute. If.

·NYAYASĀRA (Pan 7 therefore at the outset fire is recognised as an attribute of the subject where is the necessity of proving its existence on the mountan by the process of inference ? Thc defini tion given by later writers is therefore an improvement सदिग्धसाध्यवान् पक्ष - a subject is one on which the existence of the conclusion (major term) has to be proied ararunia- धर्मवन्वेन उपात्तत्व पक्षत्वम् । It as something of which the predi cute to be inferred is doubtful Thus a mountain is a qu bxcause it is a matter of doubt whether it has fire or not In the case in which we know positixcly that the mountain has got fire but we wish to prove the same to another by meus of a llogism the mountain ccases to be a for Hint of doubt To remove this objection it is said that euen a desire to prove (f&erartur) even though there be no doubt IS Suthcient to make a thing 937 1964— the first place the reason must be present in the subject otherwise as in the tøstance - 19218 GANT 4297 the reason will be inconclusive for the reason qara is not at all found in the subject to secondly it must b present in all that are included under the minor terin otherise as in agza co2 7978917 the reason TATTA 15 found only in part of the minor term 97991 while it is not niet with in 3719 17 and aty so that it is void of any conclusion similarly in Erzierit Fresh 477, the reason cannot prove the predicate (farczany of the subject (घटाकाशी) as it is found only in आकाश and not an घट This reason is therefore if P 21 साध्यसमानधर्मा—etc A सपक्ष is one which is possessed of an attribute that is homogeneous with the predicate (arz) e g the kitchen (महानस) 1s such a सपक्ष because it possesses an attributc (fire) which is similar to the fire (14) that is to be predicated of the mountain सपक्षसत्व is the second रूप of the अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतु The ·Pari 2] VOTES 23 of iron Teason must be present either in all simular examples (798) or it some of them In the stock example all ficry things ore सपक्षः The reason (धूमवरव) is not present in all सपक्षा but in part of them it is wanting in procesa a red hot ball But if it is found tliat the reason is present only in the rey or the subject and not present in any of the art or the similar examples it becomes fallacious gara (void) as un भूनिया गधवत्त्वात् the reason (गधवत्व) is present only in earth() and not anywhere in similar instances (899) like the ether the Atman the mind etc The later definition of 1 सपक्ष निश्चितसाध्यवान् सपक्ष FLETEATAR-etc a dissimular example (faqah) is a thing that is possessed of attributes that are heterog neous with the redicite < & the lake () is possesse of attributes which are different from the attribute (fa) that is pre dicnted of the mountain In no dissimilar instance must the rerson be found otherwise 2s n शब्दो नित्य प्रमयत्वात् व्योमवत् । the reason प्रमयत्व is found in विपक्षs like घट पर etc 1 c in अनित्य things and hence it is fallacious wartara426-It is the presence of the reason in the sub ject of the proposition which is not contradicted by ficts thus in अग्नि अनुष्ण कृतकत्वात् घटवत् the reason कृतकत्व Is present in yh the subject of the proposition in the which is contradicted by actual fr ts (BA1T some one of the means of truc knowledge, here 1872) Date--There are two conceptions in regard to the nature of this condition the ont is expressed her by Bhīsaryjn1 and the other is the conception of later yaya which is pissingly referred to by Bhºs ir ana under fart व्यभिचारी According to Bhasarv ayna असत्प्रतिपक्षस्व means that the rezcan ought not to fulfil the first three prerequites of a valid Hetu (पक्षधर्मल, सपक्षेसत्व विपक्षाव्यावृत्तत्व) if it is such that it can prove a conclusion as well as a counter ·24 NYAYASĀRA [Pari 2 conclusion Thus in the following शब्दो नित्य पक्षसपक्षयारन्य. तरत्वात् we find that पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्व Is विरूप and that the same reason can prose the face of 76 as it is possible to argue -शब्दोऽनित्य पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वान् । असत्यतिपक्षाव liter ally means—not being counterbalanced by a rial reason as in शब्द। नित्य अनित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् the reason अनित्यधर्मरहितत्व has annal an नित्यधर्मरहितत्व which can predicate अनित्यत्व of शब्द as in the proposition शब्द पनित्य नित्यधर्मराहतत्वात् , thus here are two reasons नित्यधर्मरहितत्व and अनित्यधर्मरहितश्व which prove mutually contradictory conclusions in regard to one and the same subject This is the later conception of which is however wide enough to embrace the earlier one as a reason can be regarded as itself its own rival if it proves two mutu ally contradictory conclusions of the same subject P 22 सद्वविध । सपक्षैक्दशवृत्तिभेदात् । The reason is further two fold as it is present in all similar instances or only in a sec tion of them Thus tha is a reason which pervades all 994$ (which are all of things in the present instance) los an objector points out that this reason is not 799 व्यापक but सपक्षक्देशवृत्ति for this reason is not present in प्राग भावं which is a सपक्ष since प्रागभाव is not eternal Before how ever we proceed to meet this objection let us make clear the conception of प्रागभाव It is defined as अनादि सान्त प्रागभाव It is non existence which has no beginning but which has an end Thus the Arts of a jar would be that state of it before clay was fashioned by the potter into a jar One does not know how long the jar was in this pre-nascent state In fact it can be said of a particular object that it was in this state of non existence from the very beginning of the world it was when the object was created that this its antecedent state of non-existence ceases to be But what is meant by saying that I THIT ceases to be > Or that there is the MTT of THE ? Nothing sare that an object has come into ·Pari 2] NOTES 25 existence, for we cannot conceive of the non existence (814779) of a non existence (SITA) So that the abole objection can be met with by pointing out that since it is hard to concene of the अभाव of प्रागभाग, प्रागभाव can by 20 means be the 998 in the present instance There is also another way of meeting the objection for which vide commentary page 22 सामान्यवस्वे सति etc Here the whole phrase upto ग्राह्यत्वात् 15 the T Let us consider the propriety of the several words in the phrase If it were said that sound is non eternal becausc it is इद्रियग्राह्य then the soul which is also इंद्रियग्राह्य Will have to be regarded as non eternal which it is not Thus there is no universal association of इद्रियग्राह्यत्व and अनित्यत्व Hence the qualification बाह्य Soul is अन्तरिद्रियग्राह्य and thus it will be excluded Yet the atoms which are योगिवाह्येद्रियग्राह्य are known to be eternal which will if the concomitance of बायेंद्रियग्राह्यत्व' and अनित्यत्व were true become अनित्य So the further qualification अस्मदादि Still according to the Nyāya, येनोंद्रियेण या व्यक्तिर्गृह्यते तेनैव तद्भता जातिर्गृह्यते a generality is अस्मदादिवायेदियग्राह्य so that it will have to Tegarded as non eternal whereas a generality is eternal Το exclude जाति therefore is the further restriction in the हेतु सामान्यवत्वे ata For a generality (Fra) can never be the substrate of another generality or that it can never be warya If it were so then there would be a multiplication of such generalities ad infinitum one generality residing in a second generality, this in a third and so on So to atoid such a regressus ad infinitum the rule is given that a generality can never be the substrate of another generality We have thus a faultless rcason अस्मदादि etc This हेतु 15 सपक्षकदेशवृत्ति because some अनित्य things like सुख, दुख-etc are not सामान्यवत्वे सति अ- FERITILAH For uc know that they are percened by the contact of mind and soul, and that it is an internal Cigan 'Mind' and not any external ore that perceives ·26 NĀTASIRA [Part 2 thein Thus the given is present ir a part of the 1985 (अनित्य objects) P 23 अन्वयव्यतिरीको केवलान्वयी and वरध्यतिरकी-The conco mitance between reason and conclusion can either be post tilt or regative and in a norm 1 state it is possible to establish both relations Thu in where there is sinohe there is fire seve positive concomitance to which there is the negative counterpart where there is no fire there is no smoke This twofold nature of concomitance is attributed to reason and thus we get thres varieties of reason th t ir regard to which we can state the concomitanco in a positive as well as negative form, that in which we can state the con comituce in the positise form onts and that in which we can stato the concomitance in a negative for only The first hind us already discussed the fire conditions which the zanaat is required to fulfil are sath dur illustrations fully expalined Of these file conditions (975T) 77197 is required to fulfil tour the condition facara Tez is by the very nature of the case excluded for as a matter of fact the conclusion in such a case is co-extensive with all exi tence and thus no faqe can be found Thus in the stock propo itin परोऽभिधेय प्रमेयत्वान् we find that the साध्य (cor clusion) fuga hgs an extersion that colers all existence so that we carnot meet with a dissimilar cisc where such a conclusion is found wanting So that the test of a rady reason is that it is not possible to point to a ATT The al or purely negative reason sirlarly ? required to fulfil four for in this case the condition 9997 cannot be 1171 posed as in fact no 492T (similar case) exists In the stock example जीवच्छरार सात्मक प्राणादिमत्वात् Living organisms have souls since they possess animal functions there can be a negatise concomitance only since the am यत्र यत्र सात्मकत्वाभाव तत्र तन प्राणादिमत्वाभाव can be illustrated ·Parı 2] NOTES 27 by the Ise case of 3 pot whereas the positive proposi tion यत्र यत्र प्राणादिमत्वं तत्र तत्र सात्मकत्वम् cannot be illustreted Since the conclusion (FIFA.cat) has precisely the same extension as the subject at STCIT If however we say जीवत् देवदत्तशरीरं सात्मक प्राणादिमत्वात् it will be possible to adduce a probative example such as fra USCITEIT to illustrate the proposition यत्र यत्र प्राणादिमत्व तत्र तत्र सात्मकत्वं since the subject has a less extension than the (012) conclusion कस्याचित् प्रत्यक्षाणि---Thus the essence of a केवलान्वयी हेतु consists in the ry being co-existent with all existing things If however it be said that कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षख the साध्य in the present case is not conterminous with the whole class of existing things since there are many things in the unit vhich are un nown to us and which we cannot know (cg शविपाण) the answer is that the कस्यचित्प्रक्षस्व 1s not the one letermined by our own limited capacity, it is an object of he omniscience of God ATATERTIARTERIT, etc vide the interpretation of the commentator According to Nyāya theories pleasure, pain, nerit demerit etc are known directly through perception, ome of them are perceptible to us such as pleasure and pain, some are perceptible to the Yogis such as a sty. ind some other things though imperceptible to us or to the Yogis are perceptible to God So that there is not one thing in the world which is not in a The Mimāmsakas howzver hold that pleasure, pain, merit, demerit are not perceptible but either inferable or taken on verbal authority. Thus in the present judgment all ITTETET objects are the 5798> hich include 97, 42 and such, as also pleasure, pain and such. The da under consideration, however (HAI- सकानामप्रत्यक्षत्व) is present in some of the सपक्षमुख, दु.ख and such, while it is absent in 92, 92 etc, so that it is 98STERT ·28 NYAYASARA (Pan 2 प्रसंगद्वारेण-the देवल्व्यतिरेवी हेतु can be stated in the differ ent ways with the usual ablative ending of the words indicating the reason or by appending on to the word expressing the reason Thus we find tuo different says of stating a proposition as under जीवच्छरीर सारमर्क प्राणादिमत्वात् । and प्रमगद्वारेण as इद जीवच्छरीर न निरामक अप्राणादिमावप्रसगात् । A is a contingency that is fatal to known facts in the above proposition of a living organism is assumed to be with out soul (fac 75) it will involve tir further contingency of the living organism being without animal functions (MITAT) thus the assumption of ATT#777 points to a con clusion BOTTITE 714 which is contradicted by actual facts for we know that a living organism cannot be a living orgaDESIT. if it is without animal functions It will bu found that this is a kind of a hypothetical reasoning in which the first simple process of reasoning is implicit Thus expanded we have नंद जावन्छरीर निरामकममाणादिमवप्रसगाल-किंतु इद जीवच्छरीर सा रमकमेष प्राणादिमत्वात् । हेत्वाभास- P 25 JUTTI etc Virtually the same definition as ghen by the Bhasliv?bara If any one of the raquisite con ditiors of a true Hetu is not complied with by the reason liiged in an argument the reason is only app rently Of the şiv kinds of fallaces the first the futile or the un teal (Mac) is the one when the presair of the middle tern in the mor tem 1 doubtfui th second-tile contrar (fa) is that where middle term is present in the min! term and in Olssimilar ur etarce (faqi e that which 1 net homogene i s with the major term th discrepint (HUFTEN occurs where the mnidale term is present the inincs term the simlar instance and the d asimilat instance a reas the red ·Pari 2] NOTES 29 cascn (wala) is found only in the minor term and is ncapable of proving the conclusion the contradicted (151 491 the mistimcd) is a reason which is present in a sub ject that is contradicted by means of and ther proof the ount-rbalanced ( 19 (UHA literally equal to the question) is the one that proves conclusion and a counter conclusion and yet complies with the first three or nditions of a valid rcason We shall discuss cach of these fallacies along with its subdivi ions P 26 of --The many sub varieties of the unrcal reason which our uuthor has gren can be reduced to txo broad dim 1010- the fatig ond thi TRTUTE lor it will le found that thc trnetles-व्यधिकरणासिद्ध विशेष्यासिद्ध विशेषणा सिद्ध भागासिद्ध व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्ध व्यावशेषणासिद्ध सदिग्धासिद्ध सदि- ग्धविसध्यासिद्ध, सादग्धविशेषणासिद्ध-ultumnt lyrrolve themselves into the gentral characteristic that the red on is absent" in the subject of th three principal divisi ns of this fallacy in later Nyaya-स्वरूपासिद्ध, आश्रयासिद्ध, व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध-our author gives the first two only rejecting thr third which seem to have been regarded by Iam as cqun alent to the discrepant (nafax) The three spx cics of later Vayr rest is the three factor involved in the reflection (ref) which is the proumate cruise of inferential judgment viz the subject tlc relation of th' middle term to the subject and the relation of the iniddle term to the major term If the subject itself unreal the reason becomes inconclusive for wint of a ub- This is oro ur unnt al as regards the substratum Exemplifi d in the stock mstance गगनारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्दस्वान् wice the sks Iefus is wholly inaginary and lience unrcal MEV (the unreal in itsell) in the flason which does rot pust in the subject are thercre connot afford tl class of ony rasoning Thus in the instanca offre 7, TK AIT we find that ITT IS not present in the subject. Tect ·30 NYAYASĀRA [Pan : while it is essential that the rcason is apprchended as an at: tributc of the subject The third vonety appeare (unrea in regard to concomitance) occurs where either concom tance des not exist, or where the concomstance is condi tional (श्रीपाधिक) Thus in शब्दः क्षणिक सत्त्वात् we find that the व्याप्ति, यद्यत् सत् तत्तत् क्षणिक, does not present itsell to be in anable or inevitabla, alue in gaat 48917 alçaratat chu व्याप्ति, यत्र यन बहि तत्र सन धूम will be true only if the fre is produced trcm Wet ſuel According to our author the after occurs where the ptosence of the middle term ir the subject is doubtſu! (antara पक्षवृत्ति ) : e where the first condition of a true hetu (पक्षधर्मव) is violatok AS unrcal oing to presence in ? different substratum for E4 or as another reading gives Is YTET , the reason is present in a substratum that is altogether different from the subject सामान्यवचे सति चाक्षुषत्वात्--Here the reason has to parts the विशेषण (सामान्यववे सति) and the विशेष्य चाक्षुषत्वात sound is GRFT but is not 180, hence the reason fauls in respect of the rate The fat is the restrictite attribute and the विशेष्य 15 a word that is thus limited by a restrictie attribute the distinction rest on purely grammoucal conceptions In चाक्षुपये सति सामान्यवत्वात् the relation of principle and subordinate (fazity and faxined is changed by a variation in the syntax and case relation P 27 until ---The reason 57617447499 19 not present in all kind of sounds but only in Sume of them Our subject is sound in general and not particular sounds, so that the reason is partly rcal and partly unrcal A true reason onght to be present in the whole of the subject *74-77 OF or primordial matter is a concepe top of the Samkhya philosophy, it has no real existenc.

·Pari 23 NOTES 31 ous प्रधानपुस्पेश्वरा -The subject comprises of three प्रधान पुरुप and part of these the first 15 apre al so that the Hoty is in part un real व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्ध-The distinctior between विशष्यासिद्ध and व्यर्थविशष्यासिद्ध and विशेषणासिद्ध nd व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्ध is this in the former esther the farv or the 9 of the bety is tctus ?bsent in the subject while in the latter they art superflu in कृतक वे सति सामान्यवत्वात् ue find that the lisheshana कृतकत्व सति is sufficient for our purpose and that सामान्यवत्वात् the Visheshya has no purpose to serve Both the Visheshana and Visheshyo are present if the subject but there sun necessary limitation cf the reason The two varieties cute विशेपणासिद्ध व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्ध might be regarded as cases of च्या The Here we find that the superfluous (274) Visheshana or Visheshy a docs not make the r asor fale and the or gument will in spite of it be valid Simil rly in th stock example पवतो वाटिमान् नीलधूमात् olthough th adjective नाल 15 superflui us it does not make the hetu actually false and the argument will be correct in spite of the superfluous adjective Hence the nioderns regard this not is a Hetid bhasa but only as a fault of lingunge called ( The rezon why this is regarded 7 23ytajthg is that the addition f 1 qualification is conveys by implication that unqualifit I H is not in zrihly concomitant with arc but that 11 is the limitntion is gig that makes concomitance between धूम and पति invunmbl But such is not tlic case for we know that unqualified smoke and fire invariably 75sociated It will be stadıly seen that the definition of eft& (ofa fwarzęêt) 811 en by our author is not applicable to theme Tor we know that spite of the superfluous eshan a or Visheshys the reason is formen uit In the position भनिल शन्द कृतकावे सति सामान्यवत्वात् though the агс 10 coses ·32 NYAYASARA (Pan. reason Visheslaja AATTEIT is superfluous Set the reason and सति सामान्यवत्वान् Is present in the subject शब्द--forशब्द मृतक ard सामान्यवान् perioWhere there is doubt about the n turc of the Thus if a man is not sure that he sees Smoke on the mountain and not unist then it will not be possible for him to drau any correct inference from such a doubtful reason In दिग्धविशेष्यासिद्ध and सदिग्धविशेपणासिद्ध either the Visheshya part of a rcason or the Visheshant part of it presents a doubt any way reflection (RAT) is impeded and hence ny correct inferenc can be drawn अद्यापि अनुत्पमतत्वज्ञान व । 1 character of the reason which cannot be positiicly attributed to kapua, the Hence the reason is unreal a vaschet ets --If these varieties of the untral are acceptable to both the parties to a dispute then these will be called unreal for both the disputants ' f again these are 200s pial} to any one of the disputants they will be called unroal to one of the disputants Thus in the proposition अनिस्य शब्द चाशुपत्वात् both the limamsaka (the शब्दनिस्यत्ववादी) and the Wajaytha accept that 757 is not a194 and therefore the reason Teja T 13 urreal according to both But in the Propo ition TT ATT TIL, the reason 77 vill not be accepted as an attribute of the subject tot by the Vunamala while the Vajiaytha will maintain that are 15% so that th reason कृतवत्व will be unreal (असिद्धी to the slimātsha and real to a \ayāyiha It is thercion orgariera Ar-The contrary is described by our author as the middle tem which is found in the subject and dis Similar caample (विपक्ष) further he divides it into the tuto broad divisions सतिसमक्ष and असातसमक्षे!e when the reason tean अन्वयम्यतिरेकी and when it is a दलण्यतिरेको For as alcady explained it ·Pari 2) Notes 33 a a purely nzrlive reason (Tata)) the second condition (सपक्षेससंम् is us hypothest excluded since no सपक्ष exists, the subject (7) and thu predicate (PET) having an equal extension. The contrary reason is so called because it scrves to prove erictly the opposite of the conclusion it is adduced to establish Thus in the argument "Sourd is eternal, because it is a product," the reason that it is a product does not prove that sound is cternal but just the opposite that it is nonctemal पक्षविपक्षन्यापक-- the hetu कार्यत्व is present in the whole of the पक्ष (शब्द) and also in the whole of the विपक्ष (... अनित्य objects). विपक्षकदेशत्ति पक्षव्यापक सामान्यवत्त्वे सति अस्मदादिवाह्योंद्रियप्रायत्वात् The hetus पक्षव्यापक since all sounds are सामान्यवत् (. gencrality such as 1076 resides in them, and are perceptible to our senses. But it is present in part of the fame because we know that all अनित्य objects are not सामान्यवत्त्वे सति अस्मदादि- चायेद्रियग्राह्य since the qualities of the soul सुरा, दुख, बुद्धि etc. arc perceptible to our internal sense and not to our external Senses P 29. 46117(1992 is a hetu which is present in a part of the subject T since some sounds (such as the soughing ol sind through the branches of trees) are not the product of any body's effort. Similarly all are objects (the firs) are not प्रयन्नान्तरीयक but only ame. The प्रयत्न 5 to be understood as tbe ellort of an animate being, as otherwise 774m bring the antecedent of all, the letu will be 1146. पसैकदेशति. विपक्षम्यापकः-The hetu कृतक्त्व Is found in a part of the 97 (real) since there are the atoms of carti vluchi are unproduced, and as such are not 77% It is present in the whole of the farmer i e. fic objects since all non-eternal things arc known to be products. 3 ·NYAYASARA {Pan 2 पक्षपिपलव्यापक etc मर्मयत Knowability as present nail sounds (T) and also present in the whole of the farat e everything that is not an argu. Man - This netu is present in some sounds and nat in other, thus it is r , similarly it is present in some of the 69 as in 7, E and not present in others, 5 दिक, काल आत्मन् , आकाश etc and thus it is विपक्षकदरावृत्ति a SAITE-- This betu as present in the whole of the solu ject since all sounds ate sensible to the ear, while at is present in a part of the face like 92, etc and not present im part of it like मुम्ब, दुख ete Tus tt is पक्षव्यापकविपक्षकदेशपत्ति TT1999 is a hetu wuch is present in the whole of the विपक्ष, for घट पट आत्मा etc all these objects that comprise the विपक्ष are not पदात्मक but अपदात्मक of the subject शब्द we Inow some sounds to be 718475 and others not s For a 715 a word which ends with a nominal or verbal afix Obviously the sound of a druin, cannot claim to be T17 P 30 7 Tat te etc Of the eight carieties mentre ned there are four in which the hetu is 917 at Now in heta is पक्षकदशवृत्ति it becomes असिद्ध and in fact we have recognised this character «f a betu under #MTÊT How is it then that these are also regarded as vaneties of free and enumrrted under it? 377&TUTTERIT etc This hoxever is no objection for since the lietu has the character of both fat and more this heta might be mentioned under both Thus a balance when at serves as an instrument to weigh becomes a mule when one tests its currectness the same balance becomes 3 with So that one and the same object is called by different namas, even so one and the same hetu might be called by tho different names after ard ar TAG-The discrepant the muddle term is present in the tabject, in the example and in the counter-example, it ·Pari. 2) NOTES 35 » does is a cow, therefore violates the second condition (Paquinarrat:) Thus in sici faraforcain the hetu" the possession of inns not prove a particular animal to be a cow, since we know that a buffalo also has hons. Hence the conclusion, this ceases to have any certainly and rumains an object of doubt. Thus however is not fear or the contradictory, since in it the conclusion that is deri cd through the icason is directly opposed to the desired conclusion (ART) as a 76: नित्यः कृतकत्वात् where the reason कृतकत्व screes to be the tasisal the conclusion that sound is not eternal, which conclusion is in direct opposition to the Fry that sound is eternal But in a discrepant hetu, many conclusions are parsible anul - one particular conclusion can be inentioned as inusitable and invariable; thus from the hetu feruira for basis we can infrs several things, that the animal before us Berthier a cow, or baltolo, or an antilope and so on, ur rannot ar definitely that it is a cow and no other. The fundamentum divisoms is the some employed in the divisions of the fact, with this difference that here is a combination of threes and not of this as in the formet P. 31 पक्षयकदेश etc The reason प्रत्यक्षत्व Is prescnt only in part of the gat (gluet) since the atonis of wrth are not perceptible; similarly it is present in part of hogy since some like qe qz are perceptible while others the gags are imperceptiblc; (according to Nyāja the 1975 are non. eternal but imperceptible to our senses), and it is present in part of 77783 (r.c. Parry things), since it is met with an a Scherzity whil it is not found in cther (ra) CITI --This lietu is not found in 47: which is a part of the ; for inind is atomic, hence it is also TETT fatgift:--since of the Dri vas, some like the earth, are si whic others like आमा, आकाश are अमूर्त; while अमूतत्व is Present in the whole of the विपक्ष ic. the अदम दम्य ·MA1 ASÁRA (Part 2 व्यतिरिकपदार्थ the remaining six categories गुण, कर्म, सामान्य, विशेष समवाय and अभाव क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहित वात्--This imselses the explanation ot some of the Nyaya ductristes According to Ngāya there are twenty four qualities which are counerated in the following versus tremoriales अथ गुगा रूप रसो गन्धस्तत परम् ।। म्पर्श सख्या परिमिति पृथस्व च तत परम् । सयोगश्च विभागश्च परत्व चापरलकम् ॥ बुद्धि मुख दुःखमिच्छा द्वेपो यस्नो गुरुत्वाम् । दवले स्नहसस्तारावदृष्ट शब्द एव च।। On these the specific qualities (विशेषगुणs ) are --- बुद्धयोदपटू स्पर्शान्ता स्नह सासिद्धिको द्रव । अदृश्भावनाशब्दा अमी वैशापका गुणा ॥ Now it is believed by the folloxers of Ngaya that th- quals ties of the coul (बुद्धधादिष्टम् } are momentary in character (re प्रिक्षणावस्थायिन ) similarlv sound is क्षणिक (विक्षणावस्यायी) as soon 1 Sound u pro luced it dien and is replaced by another So that the आपकविशेषगुण- are present in the soil and the ether (आकाश) and now here csc _Hence the hetu क्षणिकविशप गुणराहत व सपक्षविपक्षव्यापक and पक्षकदशवृत्ति 772 Tal-It is described as a reason that is found to be present only in the minor tern and nowhere else and further it is incapable of proving the required conclusion (YAN) This distinguishes it from the purely negatne reason (irafa रेकी) for a purely negative reason is also present only in the minor term and now here clse but unlihe a void reason मन ययासित) it is perfectly valid and proves a required con clusion fost writer, on vaja nie rejected the void as 2 Sepmrate fallacy and have classed it under अनेकान्तिक In the syneretist school, Ior instance, the अनेकान्तिक 19 of three Jindst the too general reason (साधारण) the too restricted ·YOTES reason (WANTT) and the non-exclusiic reaxon (994). 01' these the first is treated by Bhāsarvajña under fate proper, while the latter two are put by him under अनध्यवसित. na rasi pala-Here the subject is so extensive ds to admit neither of examples or counter-examples In fact all things are included in the subject, and nothing is left out side the sphere of the Paksha that can be denominateci either as Sapalsha or Vipasho Hract ihu 'ture of a forbids the possibility of the secondi (á) and the thud Tur trait ) of the conditions being complied with ATEITI-Obviously this reason is predivt in part of the subject 'all' since we know that many things in the world are not products विद्यमानसपक्षविपक्ष-ete Here the tason being s Putlfic quality of ether" is found only 11 tht subjut 'tound" and neither in a Sapaksha (things non-eterual) nor in .. Vipaksha (things eternal) This is thic too restricted TP201 (4771- ru). It offends against the second condition (799 9797) since it occurs nowhere outside the subject itself Here its absence from counter-ewunplus (957a4igiēt") is rertuly a favourable circumstance, but its absence from . Sipakshat invalidates the conclusion which therefore remains a matter of doubt. P. 32 क्रियावत्व is always भ्याश्रित Hence the reason is toorestncted Secondly, it does not occur in all the Dravyas but in some and so it is पक्षकदेशवृत्ति. The Dravyas are पृथिव्यप्तनो- मट्योमकालदिदेहिनो मनः । द्रव्याणि । of these व्योम (ether), फाल, FE, TIC: (souls) are day and are incorporeal, so that fullat cannot reside in them सर्व फा...उत्पत्तिमत्वात्-llere the साप्य 1s नित्यत्व; the Vipaksha therefore would be any things-but they are included in the subject at srit and therefore the reason does not allmut ·38 NASASARA (Pan. 2 reason of any counter-example (Vipaksha), the reason SAATT occurs only in the subject and is thus the toorestncteſ renson TYT3-This agair is the too restricted sin e it is found only in the subject or Prü, further it is not coestenske sath the Paksha but nama since some froducts like the qualities of the soul, pleasure pain ctc. which are produced in the soul, being of an abstract and incorporeal suature, cannot fare parts (877485) F1247 As the commentator has well pointed out (supra page 25) this is a reason which is mentioned when the proper time of mentioning it has passed away (1999 @th af147 ) for it is inopportune to adduce 2 reason tu prose a conclusion the negation of which is ascer tuncd by another and presumably a stronger evidence The 27 of the subject is contradicted by means of another praof which definitely proves the negation of the consequence Will he reason is intended to establish Thus in अभिरनुष्णः IT know tłırough perception that fire is you and lerce since there is no doubt as to whether fire is gto or dows f're loses the character of a Pakslia TALET ALATALARETH ctc An atom is un perceptiblt. to us at, custence froncier i proved by the necessity that in the da non of ins sub tince thert. must be 1 certain Imut Ikind with there can be no division in parts All substances thus will be reduced by diu ision to their infine tesımal parts (Titu) If it is said thirt such a division can le continued 1d infinitum ju that case ne will have to equrte mount Meru with 3 mustard seed for the part of the mountain are infinite and 20 an the parts of a mustard seed, they then for are equal which is absurd Hence in thc dission of a thing into parts we will hue to stop some- Whare 11d that is the tont Non the cry argument which proses the existence of an atom alo insolies the propf ·Part 2) NOTES 39 of its eternalty, for if it be regarded as transitary it would mein that it came into existence without a material cause wlucht absurd, and hence as the commentator points out it is not a product (तस्योपादानकारणाभावात् अनुत्पत्ति) Here therefore the inference which proves the existence of an atom also proves its eternalty Hence when one says परमाणव: But that is a self contradiction since the very fact of one s having accepted an atom as an existing thing involves also the acceptance of its eternality P 33-T991-Here since wine is a drink it is certauly पेय, Hence by पेयत्व we have to understand पेयत्वं नाम सुराया पीताया अपापहेतुत्वम् । Häät etc Moonlight for instance 1» etges but fire or the heat of the sun is 30T and lience the conclusion SIRET is contradicted in part of the subject by perception P 34-निसाश्रया द्रव्यरूप etc According to Nyāya TT is a quality of पृथिवी आप तेज ind वायु रूप and दर of पृथिवी थापू, तेज रस of पृथिवी and आप् and गन्ध of पृथिवी only Il is believed by the Nassivkys that these qualities are even In the atons of cirth पाकज or आमरायाग, and hence भ निस Similarly the quality द्रव in thc atom of 5 is 7# and so eine This is proved by inference for whick vido commentary Hence of the subject factXT 69 रसगन्धपी some are known to be free through infer ence so that are in regard to these is contradicted by inference The propriety of the sercral qualifiertions of the is pointed out by the commentator Thus there Cargador does not ensure that the quality is eternal, for at is a quality residing in an atom and is sct non eternal hence अप्रदेशवृत्ति which excludes संयोग which is only प्रेदशवृति and not $479* Set is a quality which resides in aroms and in parvasise in charcter but it is non-eternal; co ex clude thus the further qualification समानगात्स्यारमक्ते सति. Dua reason ·40 NYAYASARA [Paru 2 ity does not preduce something that is homogencous vath itself for when tuo atoms welch are imperceptible to the sense come together they form a 27% The duality in the two atoms prod ices were in the 479 Duality thus does not produce a quality which is homogeneous with ateell In the instance (47 all these qualities are found it is a it is व्यापक or अनदेशवृत्ति ind it prod aces oneness which is homogeneous with itself प्रकरणसम -अनिल शब्द पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यनरत्वान् | Here the reason fulfils the first three conditions of a valid Hetu for sound 5 YHTEUTRA as in fact it is the Pal ha 2) 277 things fre the Saprksha and the lietu is similarly present in them whula a Vipalsha (all law things) is obviously not 404 TISK But in the same way it can be shown that the sanie rcason can įrove fun of sound thus fare here are TETTIIN, and can be shown to be fire in this latter argument also विधाय्यभिचारी the contrary but non discrepant occurs where in one and the same subject can be shown the presence of two hon ogencous and mutually contrad ctory In निल शब्द प्रमेय वात् and अनित्य पान्द कार्यत्वात् , the reasons are not hormogeneous (तुल्यलक्षण) since प्रमेयत्व ।। discrepant and 74 in A Hence this is not a case of PIR Secondly the reasons must be contrasse proving mutually opposite conclusions (परिमय भमिनि प्रेसप्यादिना समलक्षण मियो विरुद्ध चतुद्यमुपनिपतति स विरुदाव्यभिचारी ।। This idea of all us shghtly different from the later Satpratipaksha in which a reason is counterbalanced by another opposed to at «hich is of equal weight but which need not necessanly b homogeneous or GRIGO स सह पुरषाविषम् etc But this like 877 is a fallacy that depend upon the peculiar character of the person addressed Ieasons ·Part 2] NOTES . In the example given, ether is shown to be both eternal and non etemu), obviously it cannot be both, so that one of the two reasons given must be wrong if however it is not possible for a person to detert the fault o erther of the arguments, and if in his eye both arguments seem to be correct, then since one and the same ether cannot be eternal and non eternal what he can say is that the arguments are fallacious as the reasons are counterbrlanced This will be an instance of Pathar i to such a person, but to cthers the fsst of these two arguments will be a correct argument while the second (अनित्यत्वानुमान) will be अनुमानविरुद्धकालारामापदिष्ट as the inference that proves the existence of ther also proves its fternality SEIT - This is the third constituent of a syllogism, it consists of the statement of concomitance and a similar instance P. 36 a farq It is further twofold accordme as one states a positive concomitance or a negative onc An example before the time of the Buddhist logician Dignāga served as a mere familiar case which was ated to help the understanding of the listener, as in gaat altta yataratan HE77654T- Dignaga however converted it into a universal proposition, expressing the universal concomitance of the middle tcrm and the major term Both Dignāga and Dharmakirti havc treated the fallacies of the example, the latter 61ving me varieties of the fallacies of the homogeneous example, and as many of the lcterogeneous example Oi author has closely followed Dharmakırti in this respect Pra Void of conclusion, for an atom eternal: void of reason, since an action is not corporea (8) 1-od of season and conclusion, , since ether > neither corporeal nor non eternal ·MYAYASARA (Parte 2 P 37–3 101d of substrate : ¢ unreal estat TT-where an example is cited without first stating the Vyapti as in अनिसं मन मूर्तत्वात् पटवत् this can be tery well regarded as a fact, the deficient (1) Pernama 2014--the rule already pointed out is that the reason should be first stated and then the conclusioa (orado म्यापकस्य तत परं ॥ मन्वय) This is a fault of statement (पचनदोष) whereas those previous to this are faults inherent in the things themselves Similarly of the heterogeneous example we have fallaues like HETTI MAT & Dohexdosno of the resort non-exclusive of the conclusion and s) p. 1 counter.example ought to be exclusive both of the fe25011 and con Jusion as in the stock example यो यो बडिमान् न भवति, स धूमवान् अपि न भवति यथा हुद The counter-example इद 1s neither possessed of smoke nor of fire P 38-FTAR-etc in the concomutance of the negation of reason and conclusion the rule is that negation of con cluston should be stated first as it becomes Vyapya (ol less extents and ti negation of the reason next as it Lx.com Syapaka साध्याभावाऽन्यथा व्याप्य व्यापक साधनालय । सदेहद्वारेष etc Light more varieties of the fallaces of examplo are given by some four arising from doubt as regards the presence of the reason or conclusion or both in the example or as regard the real character of the example in the homog noous and for arising from doubt as regard> the occlusion of reason or conclusion or both from the exunple or as regards the real character of the example in the hetemogeneous विवाशतरागपुत्रवत्-This is the सदिग्धसाध्य for we do not kaore for pertain whether this particulat prince will be unitetsal sovetesen ne it is not possible for us to foresee events of the fubire 1 ·Part 2] NOTES 43 374-Application is the establishment by means of conparison with the example of the presence in the subject of the reason which is known to be invariably concomitant (with the conclusion) in the example From thus it will be clear that the mental operation corresponding to Parāmarsha 1 denoted by Upanaya. for in 247 te compare the subject and the example and declare that the subject ts व्याप्तिविशिष्ट P.40 any Tlus application is twofold the affirmative and the negatisc, a division which corresponds with the disision of the cumple as homogencous and heterogeneous Para the conclusion, to the establishment of the pro position containing statement of the retson The word महेतुकम् (s to be understood as अनूधमानहेतुक for in तस्मात् तथा trie word TETT rcfers to the Ketu and 15 equal to UR साध्यच्याप्महेतुविशिष्टत्वात् । न चेदम् etc Thc author considers objections to the last premise (Nigamana) It will be seen that both Vpznasa and Mgamana are the repetition of the hetu and the Iratilā for the Upanayn is no other than a particular applı ction of the hetu while the conclusion (Nigamana) is the Same as Pratijai Hence tlie Mimiisakas recognized three menibers Pratija, Hetu, Událiaram uute another school re cognized Hetu Udsharani and Upanay: The Vedantins hhcwise recognize three premises only but they are not parti cular as to whether the first three or the last three should bx talen The general opinion outside Ny 712 ind Vauheila Inclines towards the accept rice of the three-memlered Sg logistit साध्यविस्वाभाव etc As the commentator finels points out since the process of inference is complete with tlic statement of the reason and the unisersal concomitance, the Totatement of the conclusion is with a view to show the ·NYA YASĀRA '[Par ? absence of a counter-conclusion in the subject. (Fm आरमोनियमाथ. इति न्यायात् ) P 41 तथा चोक्तम् etc Ascertainment is the derronstration of a thesi» by an examination of both sides Our author bas very ingeniously pressed into his service this Gautama aphorism In his view therelore the Upanaya, 79_o prat a roa sets forth a reason that is favourable to the thesis (This Pr ), while the Nigamana akhirt ET ETEZ sets forth the reason for the non acceptance of the counterthesis (शब्दो नित्य ) The first therefore Is साधप्रमाणापन्यामार्थ the second वाधकप्रमाणोपन्यासार्थ निगमनाभिधानं etc We have thus shown that a Nigamana serves the purpose of 7 counter argument, and thus is a no cessary part of the syllogism Those, however, who cject Nigamana as a part of syllogism, and yet adduce a counter argument for the demonstration of a thesis are open to reproof by their opponents The occasion for reproof (fisie- FR) is THT, since their position is that Nigamans is superfluous and yet they make use of a counter argument which is the same as Vigamana in the demonstration of 1 thesis निगमनाविप्रतिपत्ती etc Besides the proper occasion for 1 counter argument is when dissentient views ate expressed in regard to the conclusion A conclusion is not completely established before the fifth premisc the Nigamana ; it will therefore be premature to state a counter argument disprov ing objections to the conclusion When there is conflict of opwon in regard to the reason being present in the subject, He ere arguments to show that the reason is present ju the subject Even so after the fifth premise has estabbsheu a Konclusion, all objections to the conclusion are removal by mans of counter argunients ·l'an 2] NOTES 154-This Syllogism is of the highest importance inasmuch as it serves to convince an opponent and helps discussions वादिप्रतिवादिनो etc A controiersy is onc where a disputant and an opponent tahe different sides It is further divided into वीतरागकथा and विजिगीषुकथा The first is a cern ous dehatc carried on by those who seek to establish truth by means of a thesis and a counter thesis The latter is a passionate contest where triumph in argument is the aim P 42 Vaata etc 1 controversy where a dispassionate sculer of truth holds debate with one of a like intention to establish truth by pointing out arguments in fatour of 111s thesis (19) and others that utiatı the counterthesis (1997) is called discussion (AR) 1791 171-Discussion is the opposition of a thesis and a counter thesis, which either in demonstration or reſuncion 1 based on means of proof and rules of logic which does not contrasene the principles of the school (GTAEG) and which is couched in the Syllogistic for llere, for instance, is the thests of a Maijāyik? MET STICIT His opponent a Buddhist will opp»»e it by a counter thesis नास्ति आत्मा Thub it is necessary that the conflict of opinion regards one and the same topic (ufa) Otherwise as in farct AT and often git there is no opposition of thesis and counter thesis Secondly, the demonstration of the thesis or tlıc rcfutation of the counter thesis must be supported by Pramana or means of valid knowledge and by Tarha 1 c. favourable arguments, thurdly, in thc exposition of the thesis the disputant must not advance any argument that contra Iches anv principles of the school to which he belongs Tor jostance, in proving the existence of God to a Mimāmsahan the Naistyrka ought not to proceed by assuming that God 125 a body If he does so, he wall be contrarening the prin ·46 VIAYASARA [Part 2 dum process ciple of his school (the Nyaya School) that God is bodiless Lastly, the Syllugistic form of argument is to be tised in carrying on such a controversy Tuki has tuo diflerent senses the one is the latet vies that it represents the reductio ad absurdum process; so that In this sense it is pointed out that it is of use in eluting the counter thesis, in the Sutra therefore Pramāna is connected with 797 and Tarka with 4 so that it means that the the is as demonstrated by means of proof and the coun ter thesis is shown to be untenable by the reductio ad absur This interpretation however, is rather lar fetched Tarka is as explained by the Bhashyakára a kind of hypothetical reasong by means of which the real charac ter of an unknown thing is established out of vancus alter natives that the unknown thing offered It is therefore said तको न प्रमाणान्तरम् । प्रमाणानामनुप्राहक तत्वज्ञानाय परिकल्प्यते। In this latter sense then both Pramāna and Tarka are to be con nected wnth साधन and उपालभ Thus the demonstration and relatation are based upon means of knowledge (Pramăna) and upon other favourable arguments (Tarka) P. 43 slayte af ctc In case of necessity, hower for the scarch of truth discussion may be held without in opposing side Thus in the discussions of a teacher and bts disciple, the latter asks many questions to lus teacher to kno the truth Here is therefore a discussion that is carried on without the opposition of a thesis and counter thesis * fafting etc opposed to the above is the passionate con test which leads to victory or defeat and in which the sol aim is either some gain honour of fame and not search for the truth as in a dispassionate argument The contest usually between persons who seek trumphs in controversy but soinetimes a dispassionate socker of truth (Vitarása may enter the lists to oblige others and to safeguard trull ·Pan, 2] NOTES 47 from the attacks of such sophists. It is carried on by the disputant and the opponent in the presence of the president (Sabhāpati) and the judges (Prāshnkas) It is further divided into two classes the point of distinction being, whether or not there are both thesis and counter thesis In the former case we have wrangling (169) in the latter cavilling (forseel) The necessity of such contests which are manifestly mislead ing or at least not meant for truth is pointed out by the Sūtrıkāra Wrangling and cavilling are necessary to ke p up our zeal for truth as a fence of thorns is necessary to safeguard the growth of seed Taratat etc Wrangling is the demonstration of one s these and the refutation of a counter thesis by means of quibbles, futilities, and reproofs, and such other means previously stated as are in place in wrangling 1999 as explained by our commentator (vide page 44) means in wranghing the demonstration or refutation is not based upon Pramtida and Tarka and hence they are 03499 in the pre sent case, while what is 3494 or proper is the opposition of thesis and counter thesis (94fatalne) and the demonstration and refutation of the thesis and the counter thesis res. pectively Whereas in a serious discussion (Vida) there are excluded all the means which appertain to sophistry such as quibbles futile objections and occasions for reproof, in Jalpa and 10 Vitanda one may make use of whatever logical or illogical scipon comes to hand They are the stock in trade in these latter P.44 f3t-Cavil consists in more attacks on the oppo site sidc The opponent here does not seek to establish his vicw, hc merely attacks the thesis of the disputant In 767 however, there are both thesis and counter-thesis, each one of ·48 NYAYASĀRA [Pan. 2 the disputant and opponent trying to cstablish his vicw" and refuto that of the other Thus we have कया विजिगीषुक्या वीतरागक्या or वाद वितण्डा. a is the opposition offercd to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning It is threefold, in respect of words, in respect of genus and in respect of the secondary use of words (or metaphor) Of these consists in wlfully taking a term in a sense other than that intended by the speaker who has happened to we it ambiguously P 45 ARTISTIT etc If an opponent resorts to quibbling in this fashion, the Occasion for reproof called lamint should be pointed out to him he is open to reproof cither because he has not understood the intention of the speaker, or because he does not know what proper answer to give (TTTTTTTT, etc) and so resorts to quibbling in the last sesort or because he wilfully misunderstands his opponent through mutual opposition (feafargret) Tasika etc quibbling in respect of a genus consists in asserting the impossibilitv of a thing which is possible, by connecting it with a wide genus Some one exclaims " Herc 19 a learned Brahmin knowing the four Vedas" The Ngāyavādın, however, points out that that is nothing unusual with Brahmins, whereupon a quibbler says " Nol it is not so, for there are the माय (सरकारहीना ब्राह्मणा) Brahmurs who do not know them. The qubbler here assumes that the Nya. yavidia has given Ardura as 4 reason (लिड़) of चतर्वेदामिल ·Pati 21 NOTES 49 and thus he points out that there is no invariable concomi tance of ब्राह्मणत्व and चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञत्व for there are the व्रात्या who are Brahmins and yet are devoid of the knowledge of the four Vedas The Hetu therefore is Annikantha While therefore the Nyayavadın was speaking of a Brahnun in particular and of Brahmins in general the quibbler has understood him as speaking of the whole class of Brahmins Thus he has connected the Brahmin with the whole class (1) and thus shown the impossibility of the know ledge of the four Vedas in Brahmins by pointing out the Vrā tyas as an exception to the rule The same occasion for reproof (paqla) should be pointed out to him for the point of the speaher was that it was no wonder that one especially a Brahmin should know the four Vedas rich rice crops in an excellent nice-field are not a matter for wonder P 40 JYTTET etc Quibbling in regard to a meta phor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking at literally as when a person has said 121 the quibbler points out that it is the people (scated on those scaffoldings) that are crying loud and not the scaffoldings themselves as they are inanimate things He is open to the sume kind of reprool (Glasfa) for in ordinary usage as well as in learned discourses (Shastra) ve find that words are tis et both * 255 in their primary sense and also in a secondary sense जाति-Gautama defines at as साथम्यवैषम्याभ्या प्रत्यवस्थान जाति । Tutility consists in offering objections founded on mere simu larity or dissimilarits record ng to Bhasartajna it is the opposition offered by an opponent after the statement of the reason by the disputant with vick to put the disputant on a par with humsclt As for instance after the disputant has stated the grounds of his infcrence in the proposition शब्दोऽनिल पृतकत्वात् घटवत् । The opponent not seeing any 4 ·50 NIALASARA [Pari 2 weak point in the argument tries to raise futile objections by pointing out that if sound is not a temal like a pot es en like a pot it must be corporeal and so on Here the totisc of the opponent is to make the position of the disputart equally heak If you (the disputant) arc unwilling to concede my (opponent s) point (he) I can show that your position (reis) is equally weak RAFT-an occasion for reproof is a statement that will lead to one s own defeat In argumentation of a man makes a statement that as fatal to his position here he him self spoils HIS OWII case P47 बहवधानयो etc There are 11 fact twenty four kinds of such futile objections which are cnunciated in a 499) out of which Bhasartajia here considers only six teen kinds साधम्यधाभ्यामुपसहारे etc If against a conclu sion based upon similar or dissimilar example one offer a counter-conclusion based upon the same hind of example the opposition i called Balancing the similarity or dissimilarity In the ptoposition शब्द अनित्य कृतक्त्वात् घरवन् the opponent says that the conclusion (fr) vas arrived at by an argument that was based upon the similarity of शब्द with पट in point of 506 it is possible to come to an opposite conclusion (147) by an argument based upon the similanty of शब्द and आकाश in point of अमूर्तत्व or in the same proposition the conclusion ( ofta) kas atried at by an argument based upon the dissimularity of cand TETT it is possible to arrive at an opposite conclusion (foret #1) by an argument based upon the dissmlarity of go and o for one is 017 and the other is and hence both are unlike each other since घट 15 known to be अनित्य शब्द which is unlike it must be fase Taraq etc. This however is no objection since ·Pari 2] NOTES 51 2 reason only such similarity or dissimilarty between the subject and example as exhibits a universal connection between itself and the conclusion can be in argument In the proposztion शब्दोऽनित्य कृतकत्वात् घटबद-~-it is not any point of similarity between the subject to and example q that can be the basis of any inference but the point of similarity which can lead to a conclusion is ehty, because it is found to be universally associated with the conclusion (अनित्यत्व) In the stock example पर्वतो वहिमान धूमवत्वात् महानसंवत्--our inference of fire on the mountain is based upon a which is common to subject (948) and example (HEMA) and which we know to be uninversally connected with fire P 48 साध्यहष्टान्तयो etc Owing to varying attributes of subject and example or owing to both (subject and exam ple) standing in equal need of proof we get six varieties of futile objections-उत्कर्षसम, अपकर्षसम, वर्ण्यसम, अवर्ण्यसम विकल्पसम, साध्यसम Here as pointed out by the commentator the Sutra has mentioned two grounds of such futile objections (1) after (u) उभयसाध्यत्व , of these धर्मविकल्प is the ground of the first five varietics and SHTATT is the ground of the last kind THA---This is opposition based upon ascribing to the subject an undesirable attribute of the example while 87979 is excluding or denying a desirable attribute of the subject Thus in proving the non eternality of sound by its comparison with a jar in point of 2009, the objector says that since ble a jar sound is filed, so even like a jar 1$ ata If, however you do not admit that it is a 79 then we too cannot admit that it is free Here then he ascribes to the subject (sound) an attribute (Herr) of the cample which in fact does not belong to the subject ·50 NIATASARA [Part 2 weak point in the argumeut tries to rise fatile objections by pointing out that if sound is not eternal lihe a pot even like a pot it must be corporeal and so on Here the motive of the opponent is to make the position of the disputart equally weak If you ( the disputant) are unwilling to concede my (opponent s) point (Taifa) I can show that your position ( 77 ) is equally scak farin occasjon for reproof is a statement that will lead to oncs own defeat In argumentation of a man makes a statement that is fatal to his position here he hun self spoils his own Case P 47 ववश्वानयो etc Ther are in fact thenty four kinds of such futile objections which are enunciatod in its 499) out of which Bhasarvajna here considers only six teen kinds साधम्यवधम्याभ्यामुपसहारे etc If against a conciu ston based upon similar or dissimilar clample one offers counter-conclusion based upon the same kind of example the opposition 1e called Balancing the similarity cr dis similarity In the proposition शब्द अनित्य कृतश्वात् घटयन the opponent says that the conclusion ( utca) 13- at by an argument that was based upon the शब्द with घट in point of it is poss an opposite conclusion (fata) by an the similarity of शब्द and आवारा in the same proposition the cond] at by an argument based ? MT6737 It is possible to art a) by an argument b घट for one Is अमूत and unlike each other cince & which is unlike it must be first भविनाभादिन etc This however us f 1 ·Pan 2] VOTES 53 Is सिद्ध m the दृष्टान्त it is likewise सिद्ध in the Paksha (शब्द) So that there is no necessity of any CHA based upon genta The Takt comes in in this way when the proposition is stated शब्दोऽनित्य कृतकत्वात् घटवत् the opponent says that the दृष्टान्त घट is equally with the subject शब्द व वर्ण्य or that of which us has as yet to be proved So the disputant states another proposition घटोऽनित्य कृतकत्वात् पटवत् to prove the after of E, still the opponent points out that the 2177 E is likewise a quel and so on, so that there will be no end to such a series of propositions In Thu the opponent points out that just as spite of the similarity of and in point of clothing there is scope for difference between them as one is red and the other even so spite of their similanty in point of Satira there is scope for difference between them in point of VECT, one may be firry and the other fact Thus since there is an alternation of other attributes (merce in the one and indica in the other) even so there is an alternation of these attributes as well-if घट 15 अनित्य, शब्द may be नित्य साध्यसम differs very little from वयंसम If both are अनित्य because both are fit, why cannot afaca be erat in both cases Why say that the दृष्टान्त 15 सिद्ध and the पक्ष 18 साध्य Regard both as apa e that the character of Tit is to be proved in regard to both Te and W If the disputant says शब्दो अनित्य कृतकवान घटवत् the intilist points out घटो अनित्य art, no inference will thus be arrived at since the subject and prample are made to interchange their character Warga etc Thus, however, 15 110 opposition because there is a difference betisccn thc subject and cxample, although a conclusion is drann from a certain equality of their characters All these futile objections are based upon the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and example ·54 NYAYASARA (Part 2 Lat Though there is an equality of subject and example in cer tun characters there is indeed a great difference between them 10 other characters Yet spite of variation of attributes of the mountain (981) and kitchen (2) we find that it is possible to draw correct inference (of afet) from their equality in one particular character (act) If the futilast denies that anv conclusion could be drawn from an equality in a particular chincter he will be contradicting general experience and will have put an end to all kind of inference P 50 TH – If the reason is co-present with the predi there is no difference between reason and predicate 0% ng to their mutual presence if they are not co-present there will be no inference Owing to the mutual absence Thus the futilist asks--In the stock proposition at alarm and ar do you regard that the stason smohe proves the conclu con fire by being in contact with fire or by not being in ontact with fire? If the first why then regard fire as the साध्य and smoke as the साधन't can as well be sand पर्वतो धूम वान् वामन्वात् since both वहि, and धूम are co present on the mountain thus there will be obliteration of all distinction between reason and predicate If on the other hand it is said that the reason not co-prosent with the conclusion (Trepara) then in such a case there will not be any inference at till just as there will bou no fire if it is not in contact with fuel घटादिनिष्पत्ति etc This objection however is futile since we bross that in a jar both effect and cause are co present and yet we have the effect (jat) and in oppression of persons by spells uc know that the cause (spells) and the effect (15) are nol co-present and get the effect (15) takes place Thus it is cicar tfiat a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cau e being in contact with the effect or by its not ·Part 2] NOTES 55 being in contact with effect Tlius whether the cause and effect are mutually present or absent, the characters of effect and cruse are peculiar to particular things, so that there will not be any obliteration of distinction between Frs and WITH as the futilist has shown, the character of th as the TYT in reference to fire and the character of arg as the in reference to T are fixed once for all otherwise there will be contradiction of all means of knowledge SITTÀ ET2797 etc --If one opposes an argument by pointing out that the reason could not have been an attribute of the subject before its production the opposition is called अनुत्पत्तिसम P डा Thus to the argument 'शब्दोऽनित्य कृतकत्वात् the futist s objection is that (767) the reason had nat any connection with the subject (16) before the latter was produced, and therefore the latter (1) before it was produced, was not i product wis eternal The answer is that we are here dealing with re only when it is produced ind not before it is produced in fact a kord does not at all exist before it is produced, so that to say that word is far because it is not a before it is produced is simply absurd I etc --s opposition which based on the rui on being shown to be imposible at all three times Thus the futilist asks, if the reason precedes the predicate, how can you call it a reason in the absence of the predicate ? If the reason comes subsequent to the predicate how can it which does not exist (when the conclusion is being proved) be the reason? (If it succeeds the predicate what could be the use of it if the predicate existed alrendy ?) If they exist simultaneously how will it be possible for us to determine which is the reason and which the predicate established by the reason since both are found together? Thus he has ·56 NYAYASARA [Pan 2 shown the reason to be impossible at all the three times be cause it cannot be prior to, subsequent to or simultaneous with the predicate IEC –Thus cannot be any objection because a predi cate is always established by a reason The objection was based on the ground that since Sadhya and Sadhana are relative, a Sadhya cannot be a Sadhya in the absence of the Sadhana, and a Sadhana cannot be a Sadhana in the absence of the Sadhya , similarly if both are present there will be no evidence to prove whuch us which, so that there is no such thing as a Sadhana or a Hetu The answer however is that experience teaches us that a Sadhya whether it is a product or a thing that is knowable, is produced or known by means of a pro (material cause or perceptual cause) प्रवृत्यादिविरोध ---If it is maintained that there is no such thing as a Sadhana or betu, there will not be any activity on the part of people In accomplishing ones purpose, one always looks to ways and means, if, however, there are no waysand means--all activity will at once stop प्रतिपेभानुपपत्ति -Besides the objection that is " the impossibility at all three times (त्रैकाल्या- सिद्धि) is itself open to काल्यासिद्धि Thus the Siddhantun retorts Well i Sis your objection raised before the statement objected to or after it ou simultaneously with it? If the objection is prior to the thing objected to it cannot be an objection, u the objection is subsequent to the thing objected how can that be a thing objected to in absence of the objection ? If both are simultaneous, there is nothing to prove that the one is the objection and the other the thing objected to ana—Thus by your own argument you have shown the impossibility of the objection, and admitted the existence of the Hetu P 52 based upon ·Pan 23 NOTES 57 अविशेषसम --If the subject and example are regarded as non different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the Teason, then all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every quality on account of their haying in common existence' Thus if a jar and sound are regarded as non different in respect of non eternality on account of their both being products, then all objects will have to be regarded as mutually non different, inasmuch as they share one coinnon attribute--that of existence (Fra) सर्वथा etc The answer 15,- If non difference in all respects is maintained, such a position is untenable since it is contradicted by actual facts or by Pratyaksha If it is maintained that all things are non different in respect of non eternality it will be opposed by inference and Verbal authority, if however, they are maintained as non different in some particular like knowa bility such an argument will be futile since it will be proving what is already proved The objection is based on the faise assumption that if two things are similar in some one particular they are similar in any other particular But such an argument is fallacious We cannot maintain that all objects are non different in respect of any character whatsoever since clearly on empirical grounds we know objects to be different If the aim of the opponent is to show that they are non-different in respect of non-eternality, we know from inference as also from Shruti texts that there are things that are cternal and things that are non eternal And if the opponent wants to prove that all objects are similar in some such character as know ability it is no opposition, since such an argument is acceptable to us as know ability has an extension equal to that of existence उपलब्धिसम occurs where an opposition is offered on the ·58 VYAYASĀRA [ Part 2 ground that we know the character of the subject even without the aid of the reason The futilist's argument is that the reason 1era is hardly neressary to prove that a particular object is a product since it is not invariably present in all products and since cven without it objects are known to be products, cognition is a product in which have is not found since cognition is incorporeal P 53 6767 etc Thus, however, is no opposition since a rtason lihe smohe is seen to be valid even though it is pre sent in part of the Sapaksha Similarly in the present ase the reason is present in a part of the Sapaksha and absent from a Section of it uhe "cognition etc But that does not mean that it is incapable of proving the required conclusion क्थ तर्हि ete If it to be asked how then are cognition and such like proved to be products > The answer is that their character (being a product) can be ascertained through other means as well and the means of proving cognition to be a product is thus-that in the absence of any causes for its non apprehension it is not apprehended either before or after its production Here therefore We could adduce different reasons to prove the same conclusion since it is not necessary that an effect will have one and one cause only P 54 stiyojatan occurs where against an argument proving the non existence of a thing by its non perception, one offers an opposition alming at proving the contrary by the non perception of the non perception The opponent argues the non perception of cognition both before and after its production proves its non-existence, then the non apprehension of this ngre apprehension prore the non-existence of its non-existence, so that it will follow from the preceding that there is the non-existence of the ·Pari 2] NOTCS 59 n-clistence of cognition 1.c that cognition exists both ore and after its production, which conclusion will be fatal the view that cognition is a product (fr) HYPHI etc. The seasoning through non-apprehension is I sound because non apprehension is merely the negation apprehension नास्तीति ज्ञानं etc Non-apprehension is the knowledge the negation of an object--this knowledge by its very ture bras a positive character 25 ciery one well 21201 ince the non-apprehension of non-apprehension is con- I able There are internal perccptions of such form "I hnos" "I do not know.' "I have a doubt," etc. iting that we can percente che non-eustence of knowledge its existence Non-perception itself is perceptible--and such there no non-perception of non-perception HARTEA-I one oppose an argument by attributing mnity to all non-cternal things on the ground that noninility is eternal the opposition will be called stati The dilemma is of tlus form--does non-eternality abrde in und eternally or for a time only --if the quality of nonmality abydes in its substrate sound for ever, then since a ality does not exist without its substrate, it follows that ind is ott mal. If on the other hand it is said that the ality of non-eternality does not reside for eser in sound, en the conclusion is obvious that when non-eternality does I reside in sound sound eternal P. 55 Hotectc. By accepting non-eternality to for cher present in sound you have admitted sound to be A non-cternal The eternal and the non-tternal are atually incompatible; you are, therefore, precluded from sing thrt sound is cternal since you have admitteti it to be Teucr non-eternal 24-l'our argument to prove the eternality of ·60 NYÁVASARA [Part 2 was sound was शब्दो नित्य अनित्यत्वस्य सर्वदा सद्भावात् Now if you say that non-eternalty is not for ever present in sound (Safarer 27 arraila) then clearly enough the reason that you have advanced to prove the cternality of sound viz EAGARI TGT Tant is one that is denied of the subject seund so that since the reason is unreal (1119) we cannot arrive at the conclusion that sound is eternal 19 etc --The argument of the futilist that since non-eternalty is an attribute of sound and is itself eternal it follows that sound also must be eternal as the substrate of an eternal quality From the eternalty of the attribute he argues to the eternality of the substrate But it is not right to reason thus For non-eternality as of the nature of negation (977) so that its presence does not prove the presence of sound its substrate As the commentator has well put it (भावात्मको हि धर्मों निराश्रयो न भवति न स्वभावात्मक a 77 ) a positive attribute does indeed require a substrale in which it resides but a negative one temain with out a substrate एतेन etc In this manner (by the exposition of a few types of such futile arguments) it is possible to refute al futile arguments like the following the notion of otherness (97) cannot be maintained since otherness itself is not different from an object (आत्मन अनन्यत्त्वात् DICHT stands for वस्तुस्वरूप) We have upto now dealt with vanous futile argument many of which were dilemmas and a few trilemmas 11 shall consider one more dilemma The Jatuvadı aşks 1:1 do you mean when you say that a 97 is different from Is this difference (3774) distinct from a ez or identica with it? If this ta is identical with a then clearl enough tre does not exist separately and the notion ( difference between objects therefore cannot be maintainer can heri ·NOTES 61 on the other hand at be said that is distinct from a then it will mean that STIET I 374 from Cie to we shall have to interposo an State between Street and Then agan this net अन्यत्वll be अन्य from घट and us 1 nes Brie is interposed between the first interposed o and and in this way there will be an ad infinitum Tess so that it is not possible to say that 7 7 15 974 om a e The dilemma is set forth in a slightly difierunt manner by ir commentator, for wluch vidi pige 55 fifahr-Though according to varying need ue aply different nanies to an obiect jet on thut accuunt it is ot possible to dens fil naturi of an object Thus the utilist starts with the query यदिद अन्य व उच्यते तत् स्वरुपात KRYT 57.5770967 riders to slion the alternruzes irc unacceptable The answer is unit walther you say that is 977 in respect of utsli 974799) \ct it will be MR in respect of a rz, or whether sou 5.25 thrt a 2 is FT in Texct of 197 jut it is 774 in fact of itself So that cyen though according to urz ing circumstance a FT IS 37 or pH. Sct its ruil tuturu can never be denied thut in respect of itselt it will be Twars i wlule in spect of 1 TE ll be umys ry P 56 TT-Th Jans are too numerous to tllus trate, eset ihe Sotrz do not exhaust them, the twenty four vanullos seno s srames only fauterTliese alus un muntless in number oxing to numerus was in whudi 1 conflict of opinn my wise or owing to numerous forms of norince TETTA - Spoilers tri propunition accurs where orc muhen during uimi sion of the chirarter of a counter rxample 17 one s subjret In the clumple fiset in the lett thic lādin admits that ·02 NYAYASARA (Pari 2 ar) 5 of since sound is incorporeal like cthier, it is cternal ishc ether thus by thus admission of ctemality which is an attıbute of the counter-example in his subject (sound) h« spoils his case, for he wants to prove that sound is non-eternal 57 प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् -"Shifting the proposition when a proposition being opposed, one trics to remove the opposition by importing a new character to the subject o introducing a new characteri n the proposition When the argument CAFE TATT 15 opposed on the ground that no similar instance could be pointed out as the nature all " precludes such a possibility, the Vādın tries to narrow down the sphere of the Paksha by introducing a ner character in the proposition and he says that by " 411' he means वादास्पदीभूत Tare not anything and every thing whatsoever, but cery thing that is the subject of discussion This virtually means that since his orignal proposition could not stand he had to present it in in altered for तदर्थ इति-the words तदर्य in the Sutra mear प्रतिपेनिवृत्यर्थ e for ilmoving the objection on the analogy of the id मशकाओं धूम where the words मशकार्य mean मशवनिवृत्य smoke for flies 1 e smoke for keeping off flies sagilery- Opposing the proposition OCCUS het proposition and the reason urged are mutually opposed In the proposition a substance is different from a because they are not found separately the reason is directly opposed 10 the proposition This however is not an example of the contrary reason (fataHT) because in this case the contradiction is hrown as soon as the proposition as d the season are set forth while in the latter the contrary charac ter of the Hetu is realised only when one has known the Vjāpti P 58 mfan4R-A Proposition bcing opposed, if one . qualiti ·Pan 2] NOTES 63 sition" 13 IS an totally disclaims it, it will be called "renouncing the proso- FH- reason of a general character being opponed af one attaches a special character to it, it will be called shifting the reason." P. 59 37017 — The irrelevant consists in setting aside the topic under discussion and introducing one which is not relevant F*** The meaningless is an argument which consists of a serial combination of letters Pages 59-60 Ruciane etc The unintelligible argument which although repeated three times is understood neather by the audience nor by the opponent in argument becomes ununtelligible esther because the disputant uses exitof the way words or he cnuncrates the argument too tied 1 , thus series him as a cloak to hide his ignorince and henc lic deserves the reprimand of the audience 391747" The Inonherent ts in an umunt »ch can lejs no connected meaning on acrompt of the words buong uuduth utan syntactical order STACKETCA-"The inopportune Is an arguinent the posts of such are mentioned without duc coquc 077-" The defectat is an argument which lacks ans ore of it proper parts, whil" the superfluous Consts of more than onc tencon of emple P. 61 9704-"Repetition 15 an ugument i wouls c\apt in the case of frinculcation the word of the mciniz is pated again Repetition is not a fult then it is done for the sake of assertion or emphasis as सभ्यर प्रयुषा स्मयंते पुर्य Dandın 1 6 9919704The redundant occurs wher wut is implu 35 un statel in words; as for instance, in an Antasaristreh letu, cicry body know that it is possible to a duce 132 in गांगी कामदुपा ·G4 NYAYASARA [Pari 2 both a similar or counter example and hence the mention of one does imply the mention of the other In discussions breuity and precision should be the rule If one goes on multiplying examples or enters into inclcrant duagations there will be no end to the argument P 62 विज्ञातस्य परिषदा etc Mon repetition 15 an OC casion for rebuking an opponent when he does not repeat the argument of the disputant although the latter has repeat ed it thnce within the knowledge of the audience When a person wishes to refute an argument he must first restate at and then proceed with his criticism if however he begins his criticism immediately after the disputant has stated his VICW it is cry difficult to know the drift of his attack since he has not stated the argument against which his polemic is directed अविनातायम् etc Ignorance 15 in occasion of rebule which anses from the non understanding of a proposition. क्यामभ्युपत्य etc Non ingenuity consists in ones accept ing a challenge for disputation of an aduersary and yet me maining silent when the d sputation is begun कायन्यासगात् etc Evasion arises if one stops an argument under the pretext of a pressing business P 63 #CITO– The admission of an opinion consists in charging the opposite side with a defect and yet admitting that the same exists in one s side as well पयनुयाज्योपक्षणम् Aeglecting the censurable not rebuhing a person who deserves rebuke P 64 PROSTISET — Reprimanding the non-cerisurable consists in reprimanding 7 person s ho does not deserve the reprimand अपसिद्धान्त Deviation from the tenet consists in a person s departing from an accepted tenet in the course of his disputation The Mumamsahas do not adnut the Godhead. Consists in ·Pan 2] NOTES 165 Hence in argument a Mlimāmsaha must not depart from this accepted tenet of his school if he says that a sacrificial rite is gratifying to God who grants you your desire when so gratificd-hc is clearly open to rebuhe on the ground of his deviation from the tenet of his school P 65 ans etc —The fallacies of reason also are Occasions of rebuke, they have been alrcady discussed gaa- from tlus it should be infurted that words of foulabuse, or a slap in thu face or playing upon musical instruments being of no ust in disputations proper—lay 1 person open to the reproof of his opponent In the fytyt both the parties to the dispute bind themselves that they would carry on the dispute in Sanskrit or in scisc and so on 3997€ or a grammatical crror in such a case will be an unhappy mistake for cither of the parties Third Parichheda P 66 9990 It is the means of indinct right apprelicnsion, through the force of coni ention 1 here means समयज्ञान or समयस्मरण It is held that cach nord has a significance wluch is the convention made by man or God that such and such a meaning should be understood from such and such 1 word (FITIETOTEUTTI 14 fa) It is knowledge of this contention, or its remembrance which is tlic proximate cause of verbal knowledge in inference it is the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the middlı form and the major term which leads to infercntual judgnient, and thus connection of muddle tem and major tcrm is in the nature of thing (FTTT) and cannot be altered by man But the relation between the conscntion of a word and object agnifier is not a natural and thereforc unalterable relation it may happen that one word might siguy altogether a different object of setting aside the old so ·64 MY YASĀRA [Part 2 31 Is an oc both a similar or counter example, and hence the mention of one does imply the mention of the other in discussions brevity and precision should be the rule If one goes orl niultiplying examples or enters into irrelevant divagations there still be no end to the argument 62 विज्ञातस्य पारेपदा etc • Non repetition casion for rebuking in opponent when he does not repeat the argunient of the chsputant although the latter has repeat ed it tbnce within the knowledge of the audience When a person wishes to refute an argument Le must first restate it and then procced with his criticism, 1f however, he begins his criticism immediately after the disputant has stated hts view it is very difficult to know the dnft of his attack since he has not stated the argument against which his polemic is directed अविज्ञातार्यम् etc Ignorance is an occasion of rebule which arises from the non understanding of a proposition क्यामभ्युपेत्य etc Non ingenuity consists in one s accept ing a challenge for disputation of an adversary and yet remining silent when the disputation is begun कार्यव्यासगात् etc Evasion arises if one stops an argument under the pretext of a pressing business P 63 HATC— The admission of an opinion consists in charging the opposite side with a defect and get admothing that the same exists in one s side as well पर्यनुयोज्योपक्षणम् ' Neglecting the censurable' not rebul.-.-. P 64 rable con the il ripiand अपसिद्धान्त Deviation from the tenet consists in a person s departing from an accepted tenet in the course of his disputation The Blımāmsalas do not adnut the Godhead consiste in ·NOTES, 265 Pari 2] Hence in argument a Mlimamsaha must not depart from thus accepted tcnet of his school if he says that a sacrificial ſite is gratifying to God who grants you your desire when so gratified-he is clearly open to rebuke on the ground of his deviation from the tenet of his school also are P 65 ETH! etc --The fallacies of reason occasions of rebuke, they hate been already discussed Enter-fions thus it should be inferred that words of foulabuse or a slap in the face or playing upon musical instruments being of no use in disputations proper---lay a person open to the reproof of his opponent In the fun both the parties to the dispute bind themselves that they would carry on the dispute in Sanskat, or in verse and so on TTEC OT a grammatical error in such a case will be an unhappy nistake for either of the parties Third Parichheda P 66 On It is the means of indirect nght apprehension through the force of contention 3 here means रामयशान or समयस्मरण It is held that each word has a Sigmficance which is the convention made by man or God that such and such a meaning should be understoort from such and such a word (HETERTESTETIT Pa) It is knowledge of this convention, or its remembrance which is the proximate cause of verbal knowledge in inference it is the knowledge of insanable concomitance between the Huddle term and the major term which leads to inferential judgment, and this connection of middle term and major form is in the nature of things (FM) and cannot te altered by man. But the relatiou between the conventuon of a word and object signified is not a natural and therefare unalterable relation it may happen that one Kord might Segtuly altogether a different object ư setting aside the old 5 SO ·66 NYAYASĀRA [ Pari 3 convention a new one is established Thus अविनाभाव differs from समय, and consequently अनुमान from शब्द It is two-lold--one where the thing signified is perceptible and the other where it is not so friamittaa is a sentence Which significs what is imperceptible while for a man is till now the authority of sentences that signify what 15 perceptible is established by their power to inate men to action As knowledge gained through perception is prosed to be right by means of the very object perceived so the knowledge gained through verbal authonty is proved to be right by nicens of the things igrufied For instance when a person say's Toretta at the knowledge gained through his words will be proved to be correct when another person that was thus addressed by him 50% to the river bank and finds fruit Poy अदृष्टार्थानाम् etc In the case of दृष्टार्य आगम the truth will be vouched for by facts as we find them But in the case of अदृष्टायागम is the sentences स्वर्गकामो यजेत etc we do not know whether the knowledge gained through such a sentencc is correct or otherwise as it cannot be ppt to the test of experience in such cases where the truth of the sen tence cannot be vouched for by the testimony of facts the reliability of the person uttenng the words is the proof of the correctness of the knowledge gained through his words Thus sentences like a ta are known to be authoritative since it is found that a son is born to a person when he has performed the required sacrifice from this we know that the person who spoke those words is throughly reliable since he could prophesy things unseen Therefore in the absence of any reason to the contrary-all words spoken by him are inferred to be authoritative Pages 63-69 The authonty of word is thus known througti mference It cannot be argued that words are authoritative ·Part. 3) NOTES 67 because they are eternal for in the first place there is no rule that because a thing is eternal it is authoritative We know that the sense of hearing and the internal sense(the mind) are eternal and yet on that account we cannot say that the knowledge gained through these is correct and authoritative for they are known to produce incorrect hnowledge and doubt Secondly it cannot be proved that words are eternal-by any of the means of proof But there are many inferences to prove just the contrary te that words are non-eternals Thus the inference वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि वाक्यत्वात् कालिदासवाक्य. 4 proves that we can claim human authorship of the Veda as of ordinary words—and hence that words are produced and is such are non eternal सर्वदोपलब्धि etc If words are eternal they will be ever apprehended or never apprehended for if it is granted that words are perceptible by the auricular sense then words being eternal are pervasive and therefore will be ever in contact with the auricular sense they will thus be everapprehended , if on the other hand it is said that they are imperceptible to sense organs like atoms then it will follow that they will never be apprehended So that words will be apprehended eternally or will never be apprehended at all No reason can be pointed out as to why they should be apprehended only for a time अभिव्यंजकाभावात् etc If it be argued that we do not apprehend words because the mamfesting cause (अभिव्यजक) of words is absent that we reply is not true since such a manifesting cause is not mentioned The Mimāmsaka insists that words are eternal, and to explain why words are only for a time apprehended he invents a manifesting cause of words This just as an objcct though existing will not be known to us in darkness but the same will be manifested to us in the presence of a manufesting cause such as light, even on the ·08 NYAYASARA [[Part's same analogy, words though eternally existing are not apprehended by us in the absence of a manufesting catise Hence the argument that word will be apprehended for ever or no apprehended at all falls to the ground To this the Naivā jika replies that this will be true only if such a manifesting cause is concert ble P70 चायुसयोग etc If it is argued that contact with Waxes of wind is the manifesting cause of sounds er en that He reply will not be right since in that case att sounds 11:ll be simultaneously perceived धोन तावत् etc For in the perception of objects that are proximate in space ind capable of being percented by the same organ of sense perception tile ear buing an organ of sense like the ete is not susceptible to certain fixed imprce ons only If there are five or six objects before us whuch arc capable of bung percensed by the eye all these fise or sy objects will be revealed to the eve by a manifesting cause such as light und not that only one of these will be pereche Tien so there is 120 Teason to say that when all sounds are pre sent to the ear why only one puticular sound be rei caled by the manifesting cause (contact with wind) to the car P 71 TEST ctc or sound are not susceptible to fired impressions since they are simultaneously in contact with the organ of sense perception and are perceptible by the same отzan of sense-perception This virtually proves the same as the preceding inference Since there is no reason to bene leve that the mamfesting cause will reveal only particulit sounds to the car it follows that all sounds will be simultaneously present to the car TËSF etc. If it be said that the same defect can be pointed out in the view which holds that sound is a product Mc reply that it is not trie sineg as is shown in the familiar ·Pari 3) NOTES 69 cases of a lump of carth and a lump there is difference between a manifesting cause and a creative cause The objector then asks since waves of wind (ar) are the cause of word, how is it that the waves of sind produce a puticulır sound, and not all sound, ? The answer is that it is possible to producc a desired sound thiough waves of wind and not all sounds A lump of earth is the material cause of a jar, so that it is possible to produce from it a particular jar of desired size and volume but a lump is the mufesting cause of a ju, so that it is not possible that the lamp will reveal only that particular jar und no other thing in the Iven so when it is said that वायुसयोग is the 1 of sound, it 15 possible to make use of it for the production of a particular desired sound only But if are is regarded as 1 manifesting cause of sounds (37) then there is no reason to believe why it will reveal a particular sound and not all sounds duk room एवमेतानि etc It is probably under the influenee of Jain logic that our author rejects comparson as a separate means of knowledge herein he differs from the normal Nyāya view as expressed by the Sutrakāra The number of means of proof varies between one to ten in the different schools of thought At one end we find that the Chārvahas reduce all means of proof to perception alone the Vaishesik as accept two, perception and inference Bhāsarvajña the Jains Samkhya and Yoga accept three The Nyāya as represented by the Syncretist school adds comparison The Munāmsaka and the Vedānta view add presumption to the four of Nyāya and save Prabhākara also non rception (Abhāva) Tra dition (Aitzh: a) and Inclusion (Sambhava) were regarded as valid by the Paurānikas who thus raised the number to eight. A ninth Gesture was added by the Tantrikas whula ·70 NYAYASĀRA [Pan. 3 a tenth one elimination (Parishosha) was also regarded as a separate means of proof by some Mimāmsā authoritics P 72 FT The author here considers three different viens reçarding the precise nature of analogy or comparison first of the Vridhanaiz ajtha the second of the Mimamsaha 2s also of the Vedantin and the third of the Jaratgaiyāyzhi including Udyotakara The word Upamana 19 used rather loosly meaning both analogy as an instrument of knowledge (Pra mana) and the resulting Judgment is (Upamıtı) Agrita 1794 -A person is told by a forester who is wor thy of credence that a Bos Gavacus is like a cow On entenng a forest the person sees a strange anual and rem embering the words of the forester realizes its similarity to the cow The knowledge of semblance is the result but this scarcely requires a separate means of proof as the words of the forester could give the same knowledge hence if this were set up as a separate means of knowledge because it expresses a compartson then usery sentence owing to the peculiar cza Tacter of the judgment that it expresses will have to be re garded as a separate Pramana 32 Teff etc The Mimamsa view dispenses with the previous information as to the likeness of a cow and a Bos Gavaeus The judgment armed at is The cow in my house is simlar to the animal I non sec The distinction between the former and thus latter view is obvious In the former hare गोनिरूपिनगवयविषयक सादृश्यज्ञानम् whilc hase गवयानरूपितगोविषयक सादृश्यज्ञानम् бг that co relatives of compan on are reversed low this is not per ception since the con is not presented to the sense at the time the judgment is formulated nor is thus verbal testi mony for this involves only the perception of seniblanco nor is thus inference or mere memory as the mental process involved is different and as the semblance is not remembered. We 111 tve this the ·Pan 3] NOTES la FET ---This however is no other than remembrance for the perception of the cow also involves the perception of her semblance to the unknown animal for the semblance is inhcrent 11 the cow When therefore the cow is known the semblance also is known The seinblance is not produced in the cow when the Bos Gavaeus is secn und known but the already present semblance becomes more defined at the sight of the animal If there werc 110 sem blance in the cow then there would not have been the cogni tion of semblance of a Bos Gavaeus to a cow निर्विकल्पेन etc When we perceived the COWY percerved her likeness but this knowledge of liheness is one wherein one of the correlatives of the likeness is unknown Now FIER IS 7 relation between two objects there will therefore be 720 knowledge of semblance until actually both are nown How can it be said that there was knowledge of Similarity when one of the objects remains unknown? The answer is that the knowledge is farratea or abstrict Ena प्रतियोगिसवधपूर्वकम् । : wherein the प्रतियोगी of the relation is un known and hence it is that when at the sight of the familiar COX rc perceive semblance in the abstract ko have no cognition of the apprehension (547) of the un known animal P73 निर्विकल्पकोपलम्भात् etc The author now considers an objcction When we saw the cox we had know icdge of sem blance in the abstract When we go to the forest and see the strange anal have determinate (सविकल्पक) knowledge of the semblance since now both the correla tives 1re known to us Remembrance is the revival of an impression already received The impression received 175 the impression of abstract similarity while thicknow lelge that we have is the knowledge of actual similarity This Lnowledge of actual similanty is thus altogether nok 11 ·72 NYAYASARA (Pari 3 snowledge and not the revival of an old impression This new knowledge is therefore, not fit and will have to he looked won as knowledge that is derived through analog The answer is that spite of thus difference it is no other than Fula since in other cases we know that from 1 AMICITEITA We have a faretarda Thus when we sisit a house we observe that there are some five or six persons in the house When we are asked by any one whether Devadatta was onc of the company or no se remember that he was not hen we visited the house we marked that some five or Sit were present and others absent Here then the actual perception is that others were absent and not that this particular indi vidual was absent And yet we say that Devadatta was absent Is this new cognition or revival of an old one? Evidently this is revival of an already received impression Thus whereas we had the knowledge of absence in the ab stract (amatFTITITHIR) and not of this individual or that yet the remembrance of it takes the form Devadatta was absent which is सविकल्पक अभावस्मृति ( देवदत्त प्रतियोगिक-अभावस्मृति ।" सज्ञासझिसंवध —etc The third view of Udyotakara and also hekl by the authors of Tarkabhasha Tathakaumudi and Tarkasamgralıa according to which the resulting judgment is the assertion that the animal perceived bears the name Bos Gavaeus Thts ve v resembles the first in that this process of knou ledge involves two factors the perception of the strange animal and the remembrance of the words of the forester But the difference is in regard to the resulting judgment which in the present view is the knowledge of the relation of name and object sigrufied by the name between the word Gavaya and the animal Bos Gavaeus But this according to our author is the result of the know ·Part. 3] NOTES 73 tr ledge imparted by the forester and therefore does not require separate means of proof तथा प्रश्नोत्तराभिधानात् etc For when a person is asked how he knows that the strange anumal bears that name he replies that it is known to him through the words of the forester, he does not say that he knows it through analogy or through any other means of knowledge From this the conclusion is inevitable that the knowledge is derived through the words of the forester i e through verbal testimony अस्य गवय etc Yet the cognition we have is of the form This is called a Bos Gavaeus While the words of the forester were " The Bos Gavaeus is like a col so that the above cognition could not be derived through the words of that person and therefore we set up comparison as a sepa Tate means of knowledge. hare-To this the author's ans er is this \Vith relerence to a particulır animal we make the convention This 15 a cow' , now when we have the cognition of the form " This bears the nume cow " we will have to regard that this cogni tion is not derived through the knowledge of the original convention but through some other means of knowledge Similarly when the name" cow" is given to another animal of the same species that will require another means of proof since the original convention was made in reference to a different animal of All this, however, is absurd We now that although the ultimate cognition takes a different for from thic origin contention yet that cognition is derived through the original conscntion and through no other means Lien so in the present case the knowledgeof thename of that animal is denied through the words of the forester P 74 TYT 7 Tras ctc Just as when a coniention is made in regard to an animal there is an implicit understanding between the speaker and the hearct that the that species ·NYAYASARA [Part 3 nut tamapplies to all animals of the same species even so in the present case there is the implication that an animal that resembles a cow bears that particular name 7777#-If however an objection to this view is raised on the ground that there can be no connection of name and object signified by the name until the latter is actually per cened we reply that it is not necessary that this connec tion of nine and object requires the perceptive knowledge of the object for we know that although Shakra is unpercened by us yet we know the connection between the name Shakra and the Gd Shakra Although therclote at the time the forester told us that a Bos Gavaeus is like a caw, the Bos Gavaeus was unperceived by us yet we could connect the name Gajaya and the animal Bos Garaeus सूरविराध etc Here comes a hard to crack and sye find in what a hopeless quandary our author finds himself in his anxiety to reconcile the view of the Sutrahara to his own The ingenuity that our author shou's simply amuses us and fails to produce any conviction In Gautama Sutra I 13 (प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दा प्रमाणानि) the Sutrakatra has stated in unequy ocal terms that there are four distinct means of proof But out author maintains that Upamana is included under word even in the view of the Storahara and that we have to seek soine deeper motre of the Satra hara in this separate mention or Upamāna He argues from analogy We know that time and ath are included under gri and fatheir respectively and yet we find thems separately mentioned a independent categories in the first Sutra Does it mean then that they are distinct fron ATT and Area > Obviously not They are mentioned sepa rately o ving to their importance Similarly Upamana 18 mentioned by Gautama with some special motit es VIOLI And it ·Part 3] NOTES 75, is thay that it serves as an illustration to establish the validity of verbal authority P 75 747 --The objector then asks If that WCTC rcally the motive of the Sutrahara is it not natural to ex pect Gautama to make use of it in his answer to the polemic of the Buddhas against the vahdity of verbal authority ? This point however is not answered by our author But he considers a different objection (Tor the argument of the Buddha and the defence of Gautama sido commentary under क्यम्) Waac etc Some say that verbal testimony is merely Corroboratory of the knowledge that is derived through Perception and inference and in itself it is not infallible If flowever it is said that verbal testimony is of use where pxerception and inference fail that is impossible since loow ledge through word pre supposes the knowledge of the con nection of a word as the name and the object is the thing significd be such an me which connection is hard to establish Wierbo tlic object itself is not known either through perception or incrunce Tor instance when we say fist the knowledge of fire is already gied by us through perception or inference (as in the case of the inference of fire on the mountain on observing smole) and therefore the word firc does not con 3 any new knowledge but simply corroborates what is plus lously known to us Ind seconds the word fire could signiy to us a particular object incause we know the olject and we know the convention that a particular word signifis that object But the word T* cannot conse) any linos ledde since no connection is known to us as the otject itsell is une a 977 ctc If it lxr said that the cons ntion is known to Is through the word such a statement 1$ dilemmatic. Ordi Barily thic Anonledge of an object as the cause of the conca ·76 1 YIYASIN [Part 3 tion on the word and the knowledge of this contention on a word is the cause of the knowledge of an object through that word Here however both the knowledge of object and the knowledge of convention depend upon word which is absurd since it involves a mutual dependence Thus in this case the knowledge of convention on a word depends upon the knowledge of the object through that word and the know ledge of object through word depends upon the knou ledge of convention on the word ca cause is the effect of its effect and an effect is the cause of its cause ! (तथा हि पदन पदार्थ प्रसिद्ध सति सवधग्रहणम् । सबधग्रहणे व सिद्ध पदेन पदार्थस्य प्रसिद्धिरिति--अन्योन्याश्र यस्य प्रकटदोपरवात्) FR-A sentence cannot establish the relation of name and object signified by such a name since comarunicates the knowledge of the relation between the senses of words signifying known objects P76 तनिराकरणार्थम्-To refute this View the Sutrakara has enumerated separately Upamāna by way of an ilustra uon Just as the relation of a name and thing signified by that name is established by a sentence expressing comparison through the semblance of the unknown object (Gavayı) to a familiar object (the cow) even so in the case of objects that are beyond perception and inference it is possible to esta blish the relation of name and thung signified by such a nume through some sign or other A Gavaya is unknown to us yet through the words of a reliable man who has pointed out to us that a Gavaya is like a cow it is possible for us to fashion a Garaya in our imagination and thus establish the relation of name and thing signified by the name between Gavaya and the imagined object , even so in the case of the word Indra it is possible for our imagination to shape a God through some sign of other (that he is thousand-eyed or that he is the leader of ·Pari23] * NOTES says, doc the heavenly host) and thus establish the relation of name and thing sigmfied by that name between the word 'Indra' and the god 'Indra' that our shaping fancy has for us created. It cannot, therefore, be said that it is hard to conceive of objects that are beyond perception and inference, or that words are meaningless if they signify such objects LIETT 1-As to the inquiry whether Upamāna is valid or otherwise, our view is that it is made to show that analogy 15 valid like presumption and that like it, it is included in the means of knowledge and is not distinct from them In Gautama Sūtra 2-1-42 (vide commentary) the view is cxpressed that Upamāna is not valid and immediately after, this view is shown to be incorrect. But this, our author, not mean that the Sūtrakära regards Upamana as distinct from other means of knowledge Does not the Sūtrahăra defend presumption as valid agunst objections ? And yet he has distinctly stated that it is included under in ference (गी सू २२ शब्दे ऐतिह्यानान्तरभावादनुमाने अर्थापत्ति- सम्भवाभावानामनयाँन्तरभावाचाप्रतिषेध) even so of Uparmana STATTHÍTET-But says the objector the Sätrahāra lias expressed the view of some that Upamāna is included under inference and has refuted the view and shown that Upamāna is distinct from inference (vide commentary), tits no doubt Is truc The Sætras object to the inclusion of Upimina under inference, but now here has the Satrahāra shown any objections to its inclusion under scrbal testimony चष्ट्वाभिधानम् - -Why does then the Satrakāra refer to the Pramonas as four in number? (in L. 2131975 etc,) that is becausche wants tomuntan that there are not five or more mins of knowledge. For since as shown by us, there are strong reasons to regand Upamina as included under word, ·78 NYIYASIRA [Part 3 the Sutrakāra could not have referred to the Premanas as four with a view to show that they are not three! P. 77 BARTH-If that were true, why docs not the Sutrakāra say that in his view there are only three P'ramāras? 71 MRT-But says our author that is the way with our Sūtrakāra--that in some places he has not taken carc to state carefully his own view! Thus in the refutation of the idca of the whole by the alternaties of the whole and the part, the Sutrakāra has not carefully expressed his view The reference here is to Gautama Sutra 4 2-7 TRIERE PETEFIAT 11 The whole cannot exist since the parts cannot reside in it either as a whole or partially The Buddhist opponent asserts that it is not possible to main tain the reality and distinct character of a whole Thus he asks does a part reside in the whole in its totality? or, Does reside in the whole partially? A part does not occupy the whole in its totality because of the difference of their dimellsions, and also because in that case it will lose all connection with other parts (If one part occupies the whole as a whole then there will be no space left for the other parts of a whole and hence there will be no mutual connection of parts) Secondly, if a part occupies the whole only partially, that would mean that the whole itself has parts There will be therefore the further questions whether these parts of the whole are different from the Avaz avas or identical with them? If the latter then it would mean that the Avayavas reside on themselves which is absored, if the former then there would be an ad infinitum regress, for it would be asked do these parts of the whole reside in the whole in its totality or only partiality? If the first there will be no mutual connection of parts; if the second then the whole again will have parts and there will be the further altemative of the parts being identical with these latter parts of their being separate from ·Pan 31 NOTES 79 thesc latter In this way there would be Anarastha Both ways therefore the idea of a whole cannot be maintained "The answer given is that a whole is something oscr and above its parts which stands to it not in a spatial relation but in a uniquc relation of inherence Tuff-Presumption is regarded by the Mimāmsahas as a separate means of knowledge The nature of premption lics in the assumption of a fact to reconcile in appa Tent inconsistency between two equally certain facts in the stoch instance 999 fa a we find that there is a discrepancy between the fitness of the man and his abstaining from food by day so that since both 18 true the discrepancy between them must be an apparent one and is to be reconciled by the presuniption that the man tahan food by night (arapata747597277 379 Fat) The Ayuya on the other hand includes presumption in the purely negi tue inference but the Mimānsă could not acopt ths 1er since it totally rejected the purely negative form of inference अधिनाभाव cte Hence the author says that presumption Is included in inference since here 1 fict is assumed bs fason of invanable conconut ncc अन्यथानोपपयते etc To say that it is other 19e inconsatent is tantamount to saying that if the fact is granted it will ex. ul night, and this is no other than invitable concomitance "Thus in the stock instance when st 1 said that he से नोपपद्यत It is equal to saying रात्रिभोगनमारत चेत् पानसमुपपद्यते 1. पत्र या दिवाजाने राति पौनत्वं तत्र रात्र रात्रिभोजनम् nich is clearlअविनाभाव या सामान्यापारण etc To this the opponent would ay that in those cases where the relation of insanable connection is not realized to be of a general character presumption will have to Ir cmplared as for instance, in the case of the totality of causes or in the case of an obtncling arcurslanen ·82 ALL ASARA [Pari 3 the present instance and not the absence of a jar) we reply that that is not true स्पादिष्विव etc for as in the case of colour so in the present case there is nothing contradictory to the supposition that the activity of the sense can be extended to the perception of the absence as well When we perecive a jar ve also perceive its colour, size, generality, etc Thus the activity of sense is not exhausted in the perception of an object, but can be further extended to the perception of its attributes , even so in the present case the activity of sense gives us the knowledge of the particular spot of ground as also of the attribute of the spot, and Abhāva being an atrribute of the spot of ground is thus known by sense The commentator has given a fine evainple to contradict the view that the activity of sense cannot be of use in the perception of Abhāva When we formulate the judgment the flower has no smell" (Farina $147) obviously the activity of the sense of smell could not be directed to the perception of smell as in fact there is ro smell, this is therefore plaints a caso where the activity of sense is directed to the perception of Abbāla and nothing else संवधामावो etc As already pointed out the follower of Kumārıla would say that the absence of - Jar could not be the object of direct perception for want of any connection betu cen sense and the abhāve of the jar नास्वपक्षपरपक्ष etc The Nyāya answer is, that the reason urgéd viz the absence of any relation (apa) is not ad missible to both the parties or technically it is EIGE Har te does not contradict our siew, fores en the Mimām sakas have accepted that it does not prevent the cos Tution of ET The school of Kumārıla denues inherence, so that the different modes of contact are reduced in his school to simple conjunction (trüTT) and identity with what ·Pan 3] VOTES 83 Iult is in conjunution The jar 13 in contact with the ide und hence the knowledge of jar is derived through this connec tion, the colour of the jar, however is not in contact with the eye and set its know ledge is derived through (og Tact) its identity with the jrr that is in conjunction with the sense Thus though there is absence of any relation between a and the eye, yet tlus does not prevent the know ledge of घटरूप through the sense Even so though there is no rela tion between er ind the eye yet this is no reason why the knowledge of the fonnt la dured through the latter स्वपक्षे तावत् etc Just as in the Vimaria स्विपक्ष) the relation of capability is to live inferred from the direct perception of colour ctc even O in our cw He 1111 con celled of the relation of erg manat is already pounted out, since the Nimamsalas of this school rejected the doc trine of wherence they could not print out what connection there was between a jar and its colour ud therefore they said that in the colour of ji tli ri the capabiliti of 165 being perceived by tlie cyc just as therefore, they he wet up this fictitious relation of Tirana, tu centre and the eye er en so there is no reason why the Ngāya 1701 of a orgo faTorty should not claim similar consideration p80 सयोretc If it is said that the relation of subject and predicate (or the quuifitr ind the qualified) is inconceiv able in the absence of cother contact or inherence we reply that it is not truc since thus relation > establishel through the qualified cognition The opponunt says that since there is ncitrier contut nor inherence between TST and op the Telition of the qualifier and the qualia is inconcuble the ansuer is that it is not necesary for this shition that the tuo objects between which it exisla slould be in contact or in Isrence, we have qualified cognitions of the form via STT ·84 NYAYASARA [Part 3 use etc. and yet the person is not in contact with his line or inherent in them Met7174 etc Trudition is an assertion which has come from one to another without indication of the source from which it first originated, this hou ever is to be included in Agama, so also gesture, since it conseys the intentions of a person through the fora of conscntions of dramaturgy and Similar arts P8यद्विपयम् etc A Prameya is one the knowledge of which directly leads to emancipation without lạeing of fer the acquisition of any other kind of knowledge Thus it b distinguished from the Pramanas for the knowledge of the Pramānas is ancillary to right knowledge which leads to Moksha , they are therefore intermediary means of Moksha, while the hnowledge of Prameja is directly instrumental I thic attainment of that supreme end तचतुर्विधम् —That commentator says that the twelve 111 ettes of Prameya in tlie Gautma Sutras are reduced to i forfold division is only in that way its knowledge leads to Moksha The truth setms to be that in this and the following section our author show's 1 strong predilection for the Yog and faith in the doctrines of that school तत्र हेयम् etc What is to be shunned is pain not yet since what has been is prstand what is, is incapable of being avoided it is only pain not yet come that is to be shunned शरीरम् etc The gur--the objects are divided into six kinds according as they bccome the objects of the set senses, similarly cogmtion (TCT) are also divided into six kinds correspordu g to the six senses through whuch they arc derived 16 87 *5*1117 ete Pleasure is pain by close contact come ·Part 3) VOTES $5 with pain af faarina-Tlic cuise of this pain its spcculåfic Cuse is ignorince desire merit and demerit सह सस्कारेण अविद्या includes सस्कार or impressions for is the commentator remarks we hear that though in tho state of dissolution (prlaya) there is no filst, knowledge yet aftur wards 7 soul recrts to life again which is rooted in ignorance, the obvious explanation is therefore that though in pralaya there is no false knowledge jct there are the impressions of fale knowledge which become the source of life after pralay? P 83 Bilufts-The cessation of misery should be absolute so that the soul would not come at a time and in any way in contact with pain P84 तनैश्वर्यविशिष्ट etc The absolute self in the highest, possessed of all powers not subject to the limitations of Sim sarn the omniscient Maheshwar the creator of the whole unuvuse तयाहि विवादा etc The subject under consideration (क्षिलड्डुरा- 147) must huc an intelligent agent because it was nought and his now come into cxistence like a piece of cloth उप- लन्धिमत्कारणकम् or the second reading उपलब्धिमत्कतकम् -means that the agent must be intelligent must have knowledge of the muins We are proving that God is the artificer he must know the proper instruments and material to be used Pig Throat ctc -By the previous argun ent we have proved in 7 general way that cvery product has an intelli gent agent The argument is perfectly frultless und as such there is no gunsaying it Then by elimination und by the peculir character of the most we prove the cyistence of 1 supreme ngent, as for instance through the peculiar character of 1 work such as painting we infer that there must be some agent who is fu above the common By the process of elimination we exclude the insensate, the ignonnt and t embodied from being such an artificier , ·NYATASARA ( Parı 3. that hence the creator of the unii crc is one who is intelligent, omniscient and without body The commentator has met the 11•1128 objection that the syllogism does not prove the result 1 potter in addition to the knowledge of his material, his desirt und lus action must have a body to bring about the risult and so God too must havc i body which is contrary to our observation The commentator has given several arguments and has shown that the real point in question is not the meri possession of body but rather the knowledge of and the power to use instruments to bring about a result which an unembodied being docs possess P 86 Trei ctc The lower self is the enjasor of the fruits of this truscant life स खलु etc It is to be infurred on the cessity cognition and such like (* & pleasure pain, desire, aitriod, olition) being products require a substrate, this the body cannot be nor the senses is llu shall show , and thercfore the soul is to be regarded as the cat of consciousness and such like qualities TEAMTctc The su 11se org ins cannot be the substrate, for in that cise if a serise organ ik destrazed we shall not 11718 the ri collection of the thing < \penenced by its aid, this is, ho e xiọt trt to facts blind man docs recottect objects scen before he is struck blind Tot etc Iperience teaches us that an object per* ceived his ont will not be remembered by another 5310 that even though one strise-organ is mutilated there are set other sense organs ard therefore remembrance of 2 object percened by the mutslated sense organ as possible, reply that this is contrary to experience Th of an object and its remembrance must have the same subse trate It is impossible that the eye perceives and the ear or any other sensc-organ remembers If it be perception ·Part 3) NOTES 87 P 67 3a Ta In the same way the fact of remembrance goes against the view that consciousness is a mere function of the body since the body is continually changing from in fancy to boyhood and from boy hood to manhood If the body is the substratum of cogrutions how on this supposi tton can a man remember in youth what he saw in his infancy, for his body is completely changed ? 177.This also disproses the claim that an object hrown by 4 prior cognition is remembered by a subsequent cognition since they are related as cause and effect for even though they are so related they are yet distinct Otherwise a son should know the experiences of his father or a disciple those of his Guru! The doctrine of the Buddhists is that there is nothing le soul (Maratmza) and that cognition is momentary and self cognizing We have thus a fleeting series of such cognitions related one to the other as cause and effect hence the uniformity of our experience This vey lowever as shown above is contradicted by memory TTTg tar etc The Buddhist points out that the quali ties of the effect arc derived from the qualities of the cause 15 in tlie instance of the crimson colour of the cotton when a cotton seed is smeared in a crimson colour we find that tho cotton from that seed also gets that colour even so sinte a prior cognition and a subsequent one are related to each other by causal scquence it is possible that experience gained in a prior cognition is transferred to a subsequent one and in this way there is nothing contrary in the supposition that a subsequent cognition remembers what is known by a prior cognition नासाधना etc This however is of no aral since the in stance does not prove your case nor sen es to coniute the yaya standpoint Taart etc There is neither positive nor negatic con ·88 VYAYASĀRA (Pari 3 comitance nor have you shown fallacies like asıddha in the Nyāya argument Herc by his usual logical subtlety our author exposes the weakness of the Buddhist argument i ज्ञानानुभूत उत्तरज्ञान स्मरति । कार्यकारणभावापनत्वात् । कापासे रक्कतावादिति । In this argument the instance that is given is quite beside the ruarksince the An ayavyapti यन यत्र कार्यकारणभाव तत्र तत्र स्मरण। is not illustrated by such an instance for obviously memori the sadhya in the argument cannot belong the redness of cotton and thus this is a साध्यविक्ल उदाहरणाभास Besides both kinds of vyaptı cannot be shown to be valid there is no nyatiable connection between a causal sequence ( HTT) and memory or between their negations Similarly the Nyaya positron पूर्वयुद्धपनुभूतार्यमुसरचिर्न स्मरति । अनुभवितुरन्य 5917 is not shown to be untenable by means of this fam liar instance ror the reason अनुभवितुरन्यत्व 1s not shown to be untcal or to be fallacious in any way P 89 न च कापासेऽपि etc nor can the redness of thi. secd be transferred to its fruit as it cannot be transferred to any other tree on the theory of absolute destruction According to the Buddhist View all objects last for but one moment and are immediately destroyed—the destruction being absolute When therefore the cotton-seed grew to a cotton tree the seed was absolutely destroyed and along with at its redness so that the cotton fruit cannot be red law of causality cannot be held since on the theory of absolute destruction a cause is completely destroyed and th11 only docs an effect come into existence, how therefore can there be causal continuity between objects which are in no way rulated to cach other) एतेनैव etc Thus the doctrine of momentarının cannot be held The commentator remarks that the word refers to the argument of the Buddhists TI TT ATT ETTEL eta which on grounds of reasoning is shown to be fallacous. rsen the ·Part 3) NOTES 89 IS for in सर्व क्षणक सत्वात् । यत् सत् तत् क्षणिक यथा जलधर -- If for the us the subject of the proposition then clearly enough the reason is void or Anavidhyasıta If by सर्वम् । meant Pain 4 then since a cloud is seen to last for tho moments or more the instance of a clou > void of the conclusion (FT) Seartsu etc Secondly this doctrine is contradicted wy perception also as when a crystal is recognized as the same that one had seen formerly The recognition of the crystal bead as being the same crystal bead will not be possible on the supposition of its momentariness Pages 88 89 seiner etc If it be argued that this recognition is erroneous like the recognition of a lamp flame as being the same lamp flame se reply that cten though the recognition of alump-flame is erroneous yet that does not prove that the recognition of a crystal bead ulso is erroneous, for then it would mean that when any onu perception is shown to be crroneous all other perceptions are erroneous which is absurd A lamp fimc is changing csery moment sincc Naiyayık 7 points out the cause of the lamp flame the wich and oil is every moment changing This the recognition that the same lamp is burning for an hour or so is clearly erroncous But to argue that beczuse one recognition is shown to be crroncous thicrefore any other recognition is erroneous is not reasonable TR--Besides recognition itself is impossible on your theory since similarity being momentary the very cause of crror is sunting You prove that the recognition of the crystal is erroneous like the recognition of 1 limp But how can you tall af u erroneous recognition ? 411 recognutions Test upon the bleness of two objects but since likeness itself is momentary how is it possible for you to say that one 'ob 3S the ·90 YUXSARA [Par 3 ject to like another Thos eren in the instance of a lamp- Aame you cannot talk of an erroneous recogmtion since the very root of this entor (likeness) is non-existent, sare at the risk of der antion from the tenet of your school for मिद्धातहानि) CHÀ THUC cte According to Nyaya the fact of instinct confirm the Lakel in a past birth how untaught can & nek born child know sucking or jou or pain or fear or crying er cept on the supposition that these are reminiscences of & previous birth and indicate that the child remembers expericnct, of its just? The self therefore is ctcmal the body of man the fruit of previous merit or demurit ind this makes neath in a series of embodinients of the sell, for $110€ 1t 1» mconcris able that either the body or the merit and do merit url unctured we have to grant that here *s an endless chun of cause and effect as in the series of seed and shoot (PIT) The soul therefore is compelled to transmigrate but is ont und eternal through all this flux of birth and the birth In tinct proses that though the body is destroyed yet experiences kun their impressions on the self as impulses and potentialıurs of our nature धमादराथय ctc The all part ading character of the sell 29 patibili lud on these grounds merit and other qualities like frauts Tequin conjunction with their sulmtrate before they coul! le the spring of action in wind and such other objects and sucondli ilc ingin that is possessed of the eight Siddhts anima ete is noun to occupy countless bodies at on time wluch is inconcis able except on the all gerne? sive character of the self The grass of a fruit acts upon a layer of dust on the frut because the layer is in contact with the fruit echt a picasant breeze of uand cannot be caused bus the ment of a person except on the assumption that the sell of the perang ·Part 31 NOTES 91 and wind an, in contact According to Nyāya every object *hich is the source of pain or pleasur, to a person becomes so by the ment or demerit that inheres in his self How can these merit and demerit which dwell in the selt as its attrı butes act upon an cxtraneous object > Thegravityof afruit acts upon the fruit and not on any other object of however another object like the layer of dust is in contact with the fruit. then the gravity of the fruit will act upon the layer of dust also Similarly tha merit and the demont of the self can act upon extrancous objects if the self ia in contact with all reality and hence perasite P90 स चोपासनविधि etc The author lays stress upon the recognised kinds of Yogic prictices which destroy pain und actions and lead to Samadhi Por 1114 etc Ioga (the prictical part of concen tration) is self mortification self recitation and abstmct meditation on the Lord ঔথর etc The words of the Sutra are disturbed here deliberatels to suut the context It is for the purpose of ex tenuating pw and for the attainment of concentration Ma etc --Tapas is the power to bear pan of all kind that helps in purging away infaturtion and desire and such other cvtls pain of all kinds : the sea and the. आध्यात्मिक P 32 FAITHE - In briei according to Yoga Sutra (23) there are five kinds of afflictions but our author gases only thiret kind and includes the other two in the three that lie hins gis en hence TATAK vide commentary for details ar tafar, etc The following eight ve the ads to Yoga restraint religrou obsery ances postures suppression of breath abstraction nttention contemplation and medita. 110n P 93 AATETT Restraints are those like harmlessness, ·MAYASARA [Part 3 continence, non-stealing which lead to the purification and enlightenment of a person and which have no regard to time or place or condition देशकालावस्था etc Religious Olsscrvances are peculiar acts that lead to righteousness and have regard to time and place and circumstance, like going roumd (a deity) the twilight prayers and holy muttennys Our author differs from the author of the Yoga Sätra for which vide com nentary STYTH etc --Restraint of the breath is the cutang short of of breath and consists of expiration inspiration and retention P 91 TET--Abstraction consists in withdraping the mind froin all objects that hinder concentration UTCOTT--Fixing thr mind on a place is attentiin On a place sp at the circle of the navel or on the ocb of the Sun etc -Contemplation consists of the concentration of the unclastanding or the year antara tad mot place - The same is concentration in which there 15 knowledge of the bare existence of the object of contempla tror without consciousness of its real nature There is know ledge of the object but without distinction of subject and object P 95 mm-Our author does not seem to be satis fied with the definition in the loga-sutras and afferent one of his own START--These aid to Yoga should be practized with great perses crance and with supreme des otion to Mahes wara and with an attitude of complete dispassion induced by the thought that the Brahmaloka and other higher worlds are fraught with various miscries # ARE TRT etc. Somcdescnbe that it is the absolute con dition of the self like the absolnte condition of ether in dissolu g11cs 7 ·Pallo 31 NOTCS 98 tion when all the specific qualities of the self are destroyed. The self has mine specific qualities viz. cognition, pleasure, pam, desire, aversion, voltion, ment, demerit, impression (Samskāra); these are lost to the soul in that state of release. P. 96 Negerit: etc. Pleasure ang pain being invanably associated, it is not possible to distinguish the one from the other, and abandon (the latter) 772 yaraf etc nor do intelligent persons endeavour ta Securt pleasure and pleasure alone, for experience shows that cfforts are directed for the removal of pain such as that caused by a thom The author is considering the Vaseshika view of Moksha ; to the objection that I final release is the state When the self loses its specific attributes all without exception, then it is a state that no body wil desire, the Val- Scshika answer is that it is wrong to suppose that men desire happiness and happiness alone, men are seen strying to remove pain of all kind HEITETI ctc --No reasonable person will strive for such an cnd which is a state of unconsciousness as in a swoon. This is the author's view If Moksha is a state of the self in wluch there is no consciousness and no joy-then no thinking person will himself seed such a consummation Fie -Nor is the example to the point, as even the removal of pain caused by a thurt is for the enjoyment of pleasure since in the preschce of pair na pleasure as possible. etc. The author supports 1115 view that final release is a state of cternal pleasurable consciousness by citing Agama... P.97 YESË etc If the opponent says that in the above citations the words मुख and आनन्द are secondary sense to meni g: 1119, that we contend is not right since the literal sense of the words cannot be shown to he incompatible In the stich instance whiTa nc finet that will cannot be taken in its literal sense and lienice tre to be taken in a ·94 VYĀYASĀRA [Pan 3 resort to Upachära having in view the irascible temper of the person Thus when the literal sense of words is shown to be ursuitable we construe them in a secondary sense not otherwise सुखसवेनदयो etc The opponent puts a dilemma. pleasure and its consciousness are the attributes of self in that state of release, are these attnbutes eternal or non-etcmal of the latter then when they cease to be a Muhta will come back to mundane existence and therefore Muhti itself will be noneternal in character, if the former, then since they are eter nal they are present in an unliberated self as in the liburated one and there will thus be scarcely any difference between the state of release and the state of bondage to life चभुर्वटयो etc The answer is that plezsure and its com ciousness are eternal in character but in Sinsira there are present demerit and pain that obstruct the relation of subject and object (quatura) between consciousness and pla sure in the same way in which a wall obstructs that same tu lation between the eye and the jar Just as the knowledge of a jar becomes impossiblu cuen though the jar and the eye are existing when they are in terposed by a wall so that connection between them t» sovered evin so though conscioustess (the subject) and plcasure the object) arc eternal yet the requisite connection betneer their is suvered by demerit and pain etc and hence there is no cons ciousness of pleasure in Samsāra The word Vishaya, Vishati are loosely used by our author thus in the Drstānta the Vishaya is the jar and the Vishayi is the cyc (the instrument of knowledge) while in the case of pleasute and its conscious ness, the former is the Vishaya and the latter (1 e conscious wcss or knowledge itself) is the Vishay? The point is that in Samsfira the Vishayapleasure and the Vishaji consciousness and not related and therefore there is no consciousness of pleasuru ·Pan 31 VOTES 95 सधस्य etc The objector further rises the question the relation of subject and object between Samvedina ind Sukha IS ON your own statement 2 relation that conies into eustence in final liberation and it is this relation that makes all the difference between Samsāra and Moksh1 But since this relation is a product (875) it is natural to suppose that it may have an end some time or other so that when this to lation of subject and object between Samedanz and Sukha is lost there will be an end of the state of release and the soul will again revert to this life of troubled strivings न। प्रध्वसन etc The answer is that adnuttedly this rela tion is a product but it is a relation which once produced endures eternally There is no universal 179 that tety pro duct has an end we know that 71777 IS 7 product and yet it is never destroyed when once produced So thint thc reason Fire is a discrepant reason अवसs described as सादिरनन्त प्रध्वसाभाव that is non existence that has a beginning but no end When 1 jis broken to yieces this posterior non existence of the jar comes iąta cxistenct and this state of posterior non existence (9 HTATE) of the jar has no end Even so the relation of sub ject and object between Sumedana and Sukha has no doubt ? beginning in Moksha but has no end akira ata etc The Vaiseshikz persists in contending that the relation of subject and object being product will perish This relation is positive and therefore though the could be pointed out as an exception to the rul. 77747 16 तत्र तत्र विनाशिवम् yet when the rule is modified as under यत्र या वस्तुत्व सति कृतफवं सत्र तत्र विनाशित्वम् then no с\ception can be pointed out that invalidites the above rule The fargfatfruta between pleasure and consciousness of it, is a Vastu and comes under the above rule hence it is noneterna ·96 NYAYASARA [Pari 3 P 98 fanley etc. The answer is that can hardly bear since this relation (1994aau) does not fall under the Skx positive categories The answer is most ingenious and rests upon a technical subtlety Our author wants to show that the relation of pleasure and its consciousness as-Vishaya and Vishayı is an eternal relation so that when once produced it abides eternally in the soul and precludes the possibility of the Souls again reserting to Samsara Admittedly the rule that every positive product is perishable holds good under all circumstances but what grounds have sou to say that this relation is positive in charrcter? It is not a Vastu For it is not included in the first six categories substanoc quality activity generht prticulants and inherence तदन्ताव वा etc If however this relation of subject and object comes under the first six categories then such a supposta tion will render impossible any relation betsteen mherence and such de noneustence) and their knowledge It is an accepted doctrine of the Sincretest school that all things in th world fall under seven categories the six positne and one negative The former alrezdy mentioned are arranged on the principle of Adhara and Adheya thus the first Dravya can become the substrate of all the remaining categories the second quality is found residing only in Dravya and not in itself or on any of the succeeding categories , si cılarly the third Activity is found in Dravya and not residing on itself or any of the succeeding a Gencralty resides in the first three categories and not on itself or on the succeeding categories particulariti resides in Travja (in the atons and the other five eternal substances and not on Samas 3} which follows it and Samata is found in the preceding fic cutegories and never tresides on itself. The rule to be act duced from this is that a category resides on one or morc of them categories wbuch IT protoks to it in the enumeration ·Part 3 VOTES 97 and neier on the succeeding one and also excepting Drayza never on itself : e a quality never resides on quality a Generality on Generality of Samatāya on Samavāya etc Nou we know that all these categories are know able that is they become the shaya of Inowledge (Facom the Vishaus) Thus the Vishaya Vishaji relation is a relation which resides on all the sia categories It therefore cannot be Dravya which does not resides in any of the succeedung categories whereas this relation resides on all siv nor can this relation be Guna or karma of Samavaya or Viết slia for the same rea son that all these categories reside on one or more of those that precede and not on those that follow Nor can this be Samavaya because if it fell under Samasaya then in that Case it would not reside on it but we know that the Vishaya ishaya relation resides on Samavāja since Samarāya itself becomes the Vishya of the Vishayı knon ledge Thus this relation does not fall under the six positive categories and hence it is not a Vastu or Bhāva अदृष्टादि etc The opponent now shifts the point of objec tion in object becomes the cause of the act (the act of know Ing} through ment and dement and the knowledge thus produced becomes the subject ( ishayı) The opponent here shows that the relation of subject and object depends upon Adréta and therefore is a relation which will last only so long 76 Adrsta exists, and will perish when the latter perishes Adrišta is the unseen principle compris ing merit and demont which mould mans destiny final release (Volshn) lies in the separation of the self and the body without entering another body in the absence of merit and dumerit which yould produce a subsequent embodiment In Voksha therefore merit and demerit cease to be, and consequently wo this relation of subject and object so that there will be no con cousness of pleasure in th t state ·98 NATASARA Part 3 release but only absolute cessation of pain (2017 मोक्ष इति). ENTF etc. If that is the case then the knowledge possessed by God, which is eternal, will have no relation with objects If an object becomes the Vishaya of know jedge through Adrišta then since God has no Adrsta it will not be possible that any object will have connection with the knowledge possessed by God, so that God will not have knowledge of objects and God will not be omniscient which is clearly absurd. तस्मात्कृतक्त्त etc From all this it is clear that spite of its being a product, this permanent relation of pleasure and its Consciousness is, for want of an cause of its destruction an eternal relation Henice Sloksha is the absolute cessation of pain characterised by the eternal consciousness of pleasure