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·PREFACE. The treatise edited and translated in the following is one of the best known and most extensively studied of the elementary works on the Mímámsá-jástra. It closely follows--and in many passages literally agrees with the equally popular Mímámsá-Nyiya-l'rakſisa usually called tho Apaleví, which latter work would perhaps be the most recommendable to the beginner of all treatises on Míonáinsá. The Artha-samgraha las however been preferred for publication in the Benares Sanskrit Series on account of its smaller bulk. Its test has been repeatedly published before, in a lithographed edition at Benares together with a comentary and in a printed edition brought out by Pandit Jibánanda Vilyá-ságar at Calcutta. Both these editions are incorrect, especially the latter one. The Arthasamgraha is by no means an easy hook, in spite of mor as it would perhaps be more correct to say, owing to--its limited bulk in which a great amount of matter is comlensed by means of the most pregnant language being used. I ain greatly obligod to Pandit Dhundhi Raja tho able and learned Sanskrit Librarian of the Benares College for continued assistance given to mo whilo editing and translating the Arthasamgraha and revising the proofsheets. With regard to solne specially difficult points I have likewise been greatly benefitted by the advice of the distinguished Pandit Bala Sastrí, late Professor of Law in the Benares Sanskrit-Collego who combines with a perfect mastery of tho Sástrag a thorough knowledge of the Veda and therefore is entitled liko few others to be appealed to in any question counrcted with the Mímámsábastra.--A inere literal translation would have been of comparatively small value; numerous explanations have therefore boen added and the plan of insorting into the text by means of brackets rather than adding them in footnotes has been by preferenco adhered to. G. THIBAUT. BENARES : March, 1882.

·INTRODUCTORY REMAKS. An attempt at an exhaustive review and criticism of the Mimamsá-sústra would be ont of place here. A few remarks bowever on its general character will form a not unsuitable introduction to the Artha-samgraba and will, it is hoped, be of some use to those who wish to forin an adequate idea of the subject matter of this hitherto some what neglected system. The only longer essay on Mínimsá which exists--the one by Colebrooke--gives correct information as far as it goes, is however not well adapted to make the reader acquainted with the leading features of the śástra. The current accounts of the Mínámsá found in handbooks &c. merely extract Colebrooke's reniarks and are as a rule more or less vague and incorrect. The beginnings of tho Mímámsá may be traced distinctly enough in the Veda itself, the very worel (mímámsá; mímáinsate &c.) being used there to denoto doubt and discussion with regard to points of doctrine and ritual. This early Mímánısá may be designated a bona fido Mlímámsí as it tries to decido the points about which a doubt is raised by free reasoning taking into account the circumstances and exigencies of each caso without submitting itself to any authority. It originated in the time when owing to differences in tradition, belief, ritual &c. tho various Vedic éúkhás began to form themselves, a time when the whole religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmins still was in a comparatively unsettled and floating condition. --The later systematical Mímámsá on the other hand-the Mímámsá which is embodied in tho sástra—is of a more limited scope, owing to the altered circumstances of the time in which it arose. The creativo period of Brahminical religious thought was then past and the spirit of free inquiry and discussion had yielded to an implicit faith in the authority of the sarred books handed down by unbroken tradition. Difficulties with regard to questions of sacrifice and ritual still indoed presented themselves but they were not as of old difficulties arising from the nature of the things themselves and to be re·ii. moved by an independent and unbiassed consideration of all sides of the question, but rather difficulties originating in the peculiar nature of the sacred books and obstructing tho procedure of any one who endeavoured to obey the injunctions contained in them. The character of the brábmanas-that part of the Veda which more immediately concerns us here-is well known and thoro can be no doubt that any one attempting to carry ont the precepts contained in them or-if we limit ourselves to the main point-to perform the sacrifices which they describe and comment on, would soon find himself assailed by numerous doubts and misgivings as to his actions being a faithful representation of what the sacred texts intimate. The description of tho sacrifices contained in the brálmaņas is so incompleto and obscure, in the best cases so disjointed and unsystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks and comments on tho mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent acts that it would appear almost impossible for the sacrificer to fuel assured of having done exactly what he ought to have done unless he had somo other help to guidlo lim. That such a help existed at a very early time already, I mean in the timo immediately following on tho composition of tlo chief brálımaņas, is a matter which does not admit of any doubt. We can not indeed confidently inaintain that then already books of the nature of the kalpa-sútrag or prayogas existed, but at any rato there must have existed from the outset a full and circunstantial oral tradition referring to tho proper performance of the sacrifices, a tradition for which we may even, from obvious reasons, claim a greater fulness and clearness the higher we ascend into antiquity. We may thus assume that during a certain periul consequent on the composition of the brálımaņas- of whatever length that poriod may bavo Leon--acts of religious duty, whereby are meant in the first place sacrifices, were performed on the doublo ground of the text of the Veda and of oral tradition, two sources of knowledge which we may suppose to have agreed tolerably well in all essential points. But this period was as we know followed by one in which a more systematical and critical spirit began to stir, a period in which the Brahmins felt the want of thoroughly reviewing and recasting all the knowledge they were then possessing, of proving ·iv. its soundness and validity by the best possible means and of embodying it in treatises as pregnant and concise as possible. I of course allude to the sútra-period. One of the many tasks then presenting themselves was to raise the doctrine of the sacrificial performances on an incontrovertible basis. This was indedi a task for which the proper way of procedure was much more clearly defined than was the case with regard to most other departments of knowlodge. By far the greater part of the Veda directly refers to the sacrifice and the object to be held in view was therefore to composo treatises describing the different sacrificial performances which should entirely base on the text of the Veda and against which no body appealing to the latter would be able to raise any objection. The difficulties besctting this undertaking originated, as remarked above, in the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts whose object, as is well known, is to point out the symbolical and mystical meaning of the single acts of the sacrifice, not to give a clear and connected description of the latter which tho performer might follow with ease. It will suffico shortly to touch here on some few of the circumstances which rendered the task of the sútra-writer a by no means easy one. It is f. i. observed that those chapters of tho Vela which refer to ono and the same sacrifice do not immediately follow on cach other but are separated by intervening sections which treat of different matters. The fact that throughout the mantras accompanying a certain sacrifice are combined in separate sections apart from those chapters which contain the corresponding bráhmaņa is in itself a sourco of frequent perplexity.--Again it often harrens that there is an apparent contradiction between two passages referring to the same matter as when f. i. the brálımaņa-passage maintains that from out a series of sacrificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place while in the section which contains the mantras accompanying the series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act mentioned occupies the tenth place.--Or again we find that of two actions referring to the same thing the one which according to the exigencies of the case must be performed in the second place is in the sacred text enjoined before the other one. Or again the reader of the Veda may be in doubt to whom a certain injunction contaided in ·the Veda is addressed, what kind of man, in other words, is entitled to perform the sacrifice enjoined and in return to expect tho result promised in the Veda.–Or again we meet in the Veda with passages regarding which a primá facio doubt arises whether they enjoin an independent sacrifice to be performed from a special mo. tive and attended by a special result or perhaps merely a subordipate sacrificial act which contributes its limited share towards the successful performance of one of the well known great sacrifices. -Or again-and this must have been a point whose consideration very frequently pressed itself on the Brahmins at a time when the various sacrifices mentioned in the Veda were in reality regularly performed it becomes a matter for reflection and doubt in what manner one has to perform the very numerous so-called vikritis i. e. the sacrifices which are mere modifications of the few typical sacrifices and which as such tho Veda dloes not describe in detail. -It would be useless here to continue the enumeration of difficult cases of this nature as the treatise edited and translated in the following pages offers many additional examples. The continually recurring necessity of dealing with difficult cases of the kind described led to the claboration of a set of rules under the guidance of which it became possible to give an account of the sacrifice which was of real use for practical purposes and which at the same time could be mpbeld in every particular as being foundled on the Vedu. So f. i.-- to mention only the principles by means of which two of the above stated difficulties are to be solved-it is laid down that whenever the place of the mantra accompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action by a bráhmana-passage are in conflict the mantra is to liave groater wright than the brátimana because tho former being actually recited during the sacrifice is connected with it more intimately than the latter which is not directly used during the performance. -And of two actions referring to the same thing, as f. i. tho husking of rice-grains avd their cooking, the one to which the exigencies of the case assign the first place is to be done first although in the sacred text it may be mentioned only after the other one ; on the general principle that we must try to find for every individual act constituting the sacrifice a visible purpose by means of ·Vi. which it may contribute towards the outward form of the sacrifice and that only in the case of such a visible purpose not beiug traceable it may be assumed that the act directly contributes towards the supersensuous result of the entire sacrifice. In the example alluded to above the visible purpose of the ricegrains being husked first is that thereby they are made fit for being cooked while no such purpose can be discovered if the cooking is made to precede the husking. The exposition of theso rules either directly stated as in the systematical treatises of later origin or implied in the discussion of particular Vedic passages as in Jaimini's sútras forms the bulk of what is called the Mírnámsá-ýástra and the latter might therefore broadly be defined as a body of rules enabling us to construct on the ground of the Veda a kalpa-sútra or a pravoga (a treatise of the naturo of thio manuals called prayogas---cither actually written down or elso nientally conceived-forming the indispensable preliminary step for a kalpasútra which is nothing but a prayoga highly abbreviated and condensed by means of certain technicalities and conventions). It would be a by no means uninteresting task to submit a kalpusútra as f. i. Baudháyana's or Apastamba's to an investigation of this kind and to show f. i. by a comparison of tho accounts given of some primary sacrifice in the Vedic texts on one hand and in the kalpasútra on the other hand how the transition from the former to the latter can only be effected by certain rules of the Minámsá being had recourse to. Although the remarks mado in the preceding lines on the scope of the Mímímsi sufficiently characterize the matter occupying the greater part of the sästra and point out its chiefly practical character they by no means render full justice to the form in which the sástrak was finally elaborated and in which it appears in the systematical treatises a specimen of which is the Artha-samgraha. In this later form the Mímámsá is a systematic analysis of that entire part of the Veda which refers to action, preeminently sacrificial action, of the so-called Karma-kánda. This part of the Veda comprises all Vedic writings with the only exception of the Upanishads, includes therefore the entire Sambitás and by far the greater part of the brálmaņas. The investigation undertaken by ·VII. the fully developed Mímásmá las of course originated from the more practical questions above touched upon but it takes a wider scope and establishes a theory which may indeed le applicd to the decision of practical questious but which in addition has its own ini." pendent interest. The chief features of this theory will be shortly indicated in the following. The entire Veda (excluding the Upanishads) is declared to treat of dharma, i.e. acts of duty foremost among which aro sacrifices. It in the first place enjoins certain acts of duty specify. ing at the same time tho beneficial result which attends the pere formance of cach act. If it be asked on what authority these acts are enjoined and certain results stated to belong to them, the answer is that the Vela as being nityal, eternal is authoritative of its own nature and nerds no other basis to rest on. Tho proofs of the eternity of the Veda are of course by no means satisfactory and inay if closely examined be reduced to the faith of the conmunity basing on immemorial tradition. But this point really lies outside the scope of the Mímámsá which rathor presupposes the eternity of the Vedla and consequently the binding nature of the prrcepts contained throin and enters on its rral task when it begins to demonstrate that every part, in fact every line and every word of the sacred texts somehow or other refers to acts of duty incumbent on mon. To do this it becomes necessary to classify the contents of the Veda. The most general classification is to distinguish tho mantra-passages from the Brahmana-passages these two great divisions being clearly pointed out by their different form; the systematical books on Mimáinshi bowever as a rule start at once with the inore detailed division of the Vorla into injunctions (vidhi), mantras, names (námadheya), prohibitions (nisheddha) and explanatory passages (arthaváda). Ainong tliese five divisions the first place in point of importance is claimed by tho injunctions, vedic passages which-their character of eternity and authority being presupposed-impel man to perform a certain action in expectation of a certain result. As f. i. the passage "a man desirous of paradige is to sacritice" (stargakámo yajeta). Passages of this kind claim an instigatory character in consequenter of their finite verb standing in the capitative or imperative lon, bueboy the bearer or ·vill. reader is instigated to act. The difference between these optativo forms as found in the Veda and those which are employed in ordinary hunan intercourse is that in the latter case the enunciation of the optative form originates in the mind of some individual person who was the wish of making another person act, while in the former case the instigatory power rests solely in the eternal word of the Veda which has no human mind for its antecedent. If we wish to bring the matter somewhat nearer to our way of thinking we might say that the optative forins of the Veda enibody the eternal commands of God; although this would not exactly correspond to the doctrine of the Mímámsakas to whom the Veda is a self-subsistent entity. Among the numerous injunctions which are found in the Vedic texts we havo in the first place to distinguish those which in the most general terms enjoin a certain action or sacrifice and to which all other injunctions referring to details are suborilinate. Injunctions of this kind are called utpatti-ridhis i. e. originative injunctions and an example is f. i. "agnihotram juhoti”“he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation.” The very limited number of short sentences embodying injunctions of this nature constitute to the Ilindú mind the very kernel of the Veda all the remainder of which comprising among the rest the entire Samhitás bas its raison d'être only in standing in a certain relation to the utpattividhis and being useful to the person who endeavours to carry out the precapts contained in the latter. These utpatti-vidhis cannot be said to stand to each other in any necessary relation and as far as known to me-tho Mímámsakas have made no attempt to subordinate them to some principle of unity. It can only be said that the order of the sacrifices enjoined in them is a definite one the sacrificer having to proceed in regular succession from the simpler ones to the more complicated. But even from this principle of unity tho naimittika sacrifices i. e. those which have to be performed on special occasions arising would have to bo excepted. Nor can a principle of unity be discovered in the results to which the sacrifices are said to lead, as these are of the most heterogeneous nature, long life, wealth, progeny, dominion or, as in many cases, paradiso or the heavenly world (svarga). The latter is, ·IX. most probably on account of its indefiniteness, declared by tho Nímámsá to be the fruit of all those sacrificus for which the Veda does not mention a special result. These originative injunctions impressing man's mind excite in him the desire to perform the action as the result of which tho heavenly world or else some earthly possession is pointed out. The utpatti-vidhi itself as a rule intimates the result and in addition to this the general nature of the action by mouns of which the result is to be obtained, this action being in most cases a sacrifice; but in order to enable the person desirous to sacrifice to carry out his intention the special mode of procedure (the so-called itikartavyatá) remains to be stated. This is done by the second class of injunctions distinguished ly the Mímámsakas, the so called viniyoga-vidhis, injunctions of applicatioộ by means of which all the actions and things subsidiary to a certain sacrifico (tho so called angas or members of tho sacrifice) are intimated. The injunctions belonging to this class are as they supply information about all the detail of the sacrifico very mumerous and the discussion of the dilferent principles according to which they are to be combined with each other and subordinated to the utpatti-viillis is one of the most, practically perhaps the most important topic of the piúnámsá. The pramáņas which are to guilo us in suborilinating tho various objects and acts constituting the sacrifice to one another and finally to the central action are stated to be six, of successively decreasing forco and it must be admitted that the reasoning by which the relativo strength of these pramnáņas is settled shows extraordinary acuteness and an astonishing grasp of all the intricate and perplexing detail furnished by the Vedic texts. A full discussion of the matter will be found in the Arthasamyrala; here it must suffice to state a few cases exemplifying the general principleg. Above was mentioned as an example of the utpatti-vidhi the passage "agnihotram juhoti" "he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation." With this injunction now we have to connect the viniyoga-vidhi "dadhná ju- Loti" wkich as the Mímámsakas explain, in reality means "dadhná homam bhávayet" "he is to effect the oblation by means of sour milk." This passage shows us that sour milk is an anga, a subsidiary matter of the agnihotra-oblation and the special reason from ·X. which we infer the stated relation is in the present case gruti i. o. direct statement or direct enunciation, the instrumental form "dadhna” showing directly that sour milk is the means by which the oblation is accomplished. This éruti is justly declared to be the strongest of all the proofs enabling us to infer the connection of subsidiary matter and principal matter; the one of widest application however and the one which must be applied at the outset when we wish to find the link connecting the entire sacrificial action with its constituent parts is prakarana or interdependence i. e. the principle according to which we consider as referring to each other one passago which enjoins sone sacrifice in general as leading to a certain result and another wliich enjoins somo special act without naming a special result accruing from it. So f. i. when we read tho passage enjoining the carsapúrņamása-sacrifice "ho who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśapúrņamása-sacrifice" we feel tho want of other passages pointing out in what way the named sacrifico is to be performed and on the other hand when we meet with the passage referring to tho oblations called samidh "ho is to offer the samidl" wo rest unsatisfied because we do not immediately see what is to be effected by means of the samidh. The consequence is that wo become awaro of tho interdependenco of these two injunctions, tho particular action mentioned in the latter being subsurvient to the comprehensive sacrifice enjoined in the former one. Again after we have by means of the viniyoga-vidhis understood tho interior structure of the sacrifice and the successive subordination of its parts to tho whole we require, in order to become able to perform tho sacrifice, adulitional information about ono point viz. the order in which the several parts have to succeed ono another. This want is supplied by the so-called injunctions of perforinanco, prayoga-villi. It is however to be remarked that we meet only in very rarc cases with vedic passages having no other purpose than to settle tho order of the acts constituting the sacrifice. In almost all cases this order of succession is to be concluded from the various indicia given in the viniyoga-vidhis, mantras &c. so that the prayogi-viillis have rather an inferential than an actual existence. Here again there are councrated six mcaus of proof of varying ·XI. force by means of which order of succession is determined. The translation of the Artha-saigrala will be found to give the requisite details. There remains one class of injunctions to be noticeil, viz. tho so-callial injunctions of claim or qualification, adhikira-vilhi. The injunctions enumerated hitherto have taught is firstly what acts are tu lie done, secondly in what manner the acts enjoined arv tu be done and thirdly which is the oriler of succession of the subordinate acts the aggregate of which constitutes the principal act. There remains one question more to be answered vil.. who is the person to whom all these different injunctions are adressed? who is qualified to perform the sacrifice enjoined and to claim its promised fruit? and this question is settled by the adlıkára vidhis. About this class of injunctions tuo it is to be remarked that few passiges only am mere adhikára-vidhis it freqnently happening that one and the same passage is utpatti-viilli as well as adhikáravidhi. And again we must note that a great number of adhikaravidhi's have a merely ideal «sistence, as certain qualifications of the sacriticier are nowhere explicitly emamce but have to be informrad from the requirements of the cases-- So much about vidhi, injunction. If we now turn to the second of the five divisions of the Vella, the nautras, the first question presenting itself is again "in what relation do they stand to the sacrificial action in what manner (o they help the latter?" The answer here is somewhat curious. As already remarked the Mímámsakas are extremely anxious to show that every part of the sacrifice, very word and gesture are of visible use", contribute their shrre towards the proper accomplishment of the outwarılly appearing set of actions as which the sacrifice presents itself to the senses and they insist on ascribing what we miglit call a purely ceremonial character, il significance of a purely spiritual and supersensuous nature to those actions only for which a visible purpose can not by any incans be maile out.. The principle is on the whole certainly a sound one as its applicativu tends to convert the sacrifice into a well connected whole the parts of which are sulservient to each other, while the too free uso of the contrary principle i. e. of ascribing an inslependent charac·xii. ter to each individual act would resolve the whole sacrifice into a string of performances of whom no body would understand how they came to be conibined. In the special case of the mantras however the former principle appears to be carried too far. If we consider the point impartially we can bardly deny that by far the greater part of the verses and short sayings which accompany the different acts of the sacrifice can only have been meant to have a mystical, supersensuous effect, to contribute directly towards the transcendental result, the apúrva, which in a manner unknown to man is produced by the sacrifice and is the means of procuring for the sacrificer his reward. The Mírámsakas however maintain that while some mantras must be acknowledged merely to have the offect stated just now the great majority of them have the purpose of reminding the sacrificer of the different matters connected with the sacrifice, f. i. of the divinities to whon the various oblations are made. It is clear that the first position is here unduly assigned to a circumstance which is altogether secondary and accidental. While it is easy to understand why injunction ( vidhi) and mantra arc declared to constitute two of the subdivisions of the veda and again why the same position is assigned to arthavada and nishedha, it is, on a superficial view of the matter, difficult to see why námadheya, name is coorilinated with the four heads enumerated. The distinction of these four heads bases on the obvious circumstance that the many particular sentences constituting in their totality the "apautushevam vákyan" called Veda show peculiar characteristics naturally leading to the establishment of a fourfold division. The head “námadheya" on the other hand does not comprise entire sentences, but only particular words occurring in the vidhi-passages. The question of námadheya is in the Mi. mámsá regularly treated in connection with four different Vedic passages viz. "udbhidá yajeta paſukámnah" "chitrayá yajeta pasukamah" "agnihotram juhoti" "syenenábhicharan yajeta" and it night thus appear as if the quoted passages alone had given rise to the discussion. This is however by no means the case; every passage which contains the name of a sacrifice is equally implicatod in the investigation and three at any rate of the four quoted in- ·X111, junctions appear to owe their selection merely to the circumstance of the sacrifices enjoined in thenı being comparatively little known or practised so that it was in addition to the theoretical value of the question a matter of some practical interest to decide what the terms udbbidá" &c. really denoted. Passages enjoining well known sacrificesmas f. i. "darśapúrņamásúblıyám vajeta" "jyotishtomena yajeta"-might however as well be used as examples.---Tho reason now why in all such passages particular words like "udlhi. dá" "darśapúrnanásábhyám" are singled out as belonging to a special subdivision of the Vedi is as follows. According to the theory repeatedly alluded to in the above all the parts of the Vedn must be shown to be connected with the action or energy (the so called árthí bhávaná) roused in the believer by the injunctive pas- | sages. This energy requires a result towards which it tends, an instrument whereby to realize the result and the indication of the particular way of procedure. The last nained demand is satisfied by the many subsidiary injunctions, as stated above. The instruinent is implicitly mentioned in the ntpattividhis and is in fact the sacrifice itself, the verbo "vajetit" having to be interpreted as meaning" rágena bhávayet" "he is to effect or realize by means of the sacrifice", the object to be effected bring the result of the sacrifice. If we therefore transform the first of the above quoted passages in the same manner we got the following sentence "udbohidá jágena pasun bhávayet”, in which the word "pašum” indicates the result while "yágena" denotes the instrument. Thus-various hypotheses on which the word "udbytila” might be put in connection with the bhávaná having been disproved-there remains no other course but to declare that it merely serves to define or to limit the idca expressed by the word "vágena", is merely a name and as such occnpies a position by itself, which entitles it to be considered as belonging to a special subdivision of the Vedic texts. The same reasoning applies to the other passages quoted.-I fecl not quite sore whether this subtle distinction is really defensible or necessary but at any rate it is a striking proof of the thoroughness with which the Mímámsakas have carried out their analysis of the Veda. The fourth subdivision of the Veda, viz. nishedha, prohibition may be left andiscussed here, as its subject matter is not of priina- ·XIV. ry importance. It is of course intimately connected with vidhi, injunction (many nishedhas being in fact only disguised vidhis) and it is therefore unnecessary to dwell on the position it occupies in the Veda. Arthaváda, explanatory statement forms the last of the five suh- * divisions of the Veda adopted by the Mímámsá. The translation of arthaváda by "explanatory statement” is not quite adequate, as artha váda is defined as comprising all those sentences which either contain a praise of the things enjoined (by vidhi) or a blame of the things prohibited (hy nishedha). These passages can not be maintained to be directly connected with the above mentioned arthi bhávaná, as the whole action enjoined by vidlhi is carried out without any help from the arthaváda sentences, but they occupy a definite position with regard to the so-called śábdí bhavaná, i. e. the energy inherent in vidhi-passages by which the latter are able to impress man's mind and make him act. For the special mode in which the sábdí bhávaná acts (its itikartavgatá) is expressed in the arthavácla-passages, man being on one hand impelled to perform an action when ho hears it praised and glorified and on the other hand feeling disinclined to do things which others reprehepd and object to. It is thereby shown that cvery part of the Veda somehow or other contributes towards (harma and the task of the Mimáins is thus fulfilled. It will at the same time appear that a theoretical inquiry of this kind into the nature of the Veda satisfies all practical requirements as well; for if the logical comection in which the sentences of the Voda stand to each other is understood the proper way of procedure for him who wishes to act on the precepts of the Voda can no longer be doubıful. The above remarks have left many interesting points unnoticed, 80 f. i. the doctrine of the eternity of sound, the doctrine of the different pramáņas &c. A more detailed account of the system I hope to publish in another place. The Mímámsá certainly deserves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed none of the attractions which the other darśanas derivo from the speculative character of their contents; its scope is limitel and the nature of the investigations in which it is engaged ·XV. leaves no room for high flights of the imagination. But it possesses connterlalancing itvantages. Its subject matter is of a positive nature, its method is sound and its reasvuing in muost cases conviucing.

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·अर्थसङ्ग्रहः। श्रीगणेशाय नमः। वासदेवं रमाकान्तं नत्वा लौगाशिभास्करः । कुरुते जैमिनिनये प्रवेशायार्थसंग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥ अथ परमकारुणिको भगवान जैमिनिर्धर्मविवेकाय द्वाद- शन्न क्षणी प्रणिनाय । तबादौ धर्मजिज्ञासा सूत्रयामाम अथा- तो धर्मजिज्ञामेति । अत्राथशब्दो वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यवचनः । अनःशब्दो हि वेदाध्ययनस्य दृष्टार्थत्वं ब्रूने। स्वाध्यायो ऽध्येतव्य इत्यध्ययनविधी तदध्ययनम्यार्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थकत्वेन व्यवस्था- पनात् । तथा च वेदाध्ययनानन्तरं यतो ऽर्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थक नदध्ययनमनो इनोधर्मस्य वेदार्थस्य जिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति शेषः। जिज्ञासापटस्य विचारे लमणा । अतो धर्मविचारशास्तमिद- मारम्भणीयमिनि शास्त्रारम्भसूत्रार्थः ॥ १ ॥ अथ को धर्मः किं तस्य लामिति चेदुच्यते। यागादिरेव धर्मः। ननाणं वेदप्रतिपाद्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थो धर्म इति । प्रयो- जने ऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय प्रयोजनवदिति।भोजनादातिव्याप्ति- वारणाय वेदप्रतिपाद्य इति । अनर्थफलकत्वादनर्थभूने ज्येना- दावतिव्याप्तिवारणायार्थ इति । न च चोटनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्म इति सौबतनशणविरोधः चोदनापदस्य विधिरूपवेदैकदेश- परत्वादिति वाच्यम्। तत्रापि चोदनाशब्दस्य वेदमात्रपरत्वात्। वदस्य सर्वस्य धर्मतात्यर्यवत्वेन धर्मप्रतिपादकत्वात् ।

·। ( २ ) स च यागादिर्यजेत वर्गकाम इत्यादिवाक्येन वर्गमुद्दिश्य पुरुषं प्रति विधीयते। तथा हि। यजेनेत्यत्रास्त्यंशयं यजिधातुः प्रत्ययश्च । प्रत्ययेऽप्यस्त्यं शवयमाख्यातत्वं नित्वं च। तत्राख्या. तत्वं दशलकारसाधारणं नित्वं पुनर्लिङ्मात्रे । उभाभ्याम- प्यंशाभ्यां भावनैवोच्यते । भावना नाम भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितापारविशेषः ।सा विधा (१)शाव्दी भावना प्रार्थो(२) भावना चेति । तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूनो भावयितुापारविशेषः शाब्दी भावना। सा च निङशनोच्यते। लिङ्शवणे ऽयं मा प्र. वर्त्तयति मत्प्रवृत्त्यनुकूनव्यापारवानिति नियमेन प्रतीतः । य- द्यमाच्छब्दान्नियमतः प्रतीयते तत्तस्य वाच्यम । यथा गामानये- त्यस्मिन्वाक्ये गोशब्दस्य गोत्वम् । स च व्यापारविशेषो लौकि- कवाक्ये पुरुषनिष्ठो ऽभिप्रायविशेषः। वैदिकवाक्ये तु पुरुषा- भावान्जिङादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव । अत एव शाब्दी भावनति व्यवयिते । सा च भावनांशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधन- मितिकर्तव्यतां च किं भावयेत् केन भावयेत्कथं भावयदिति। तत्र साध्याकाङ्क्षायां वक्ष्यमाणांशत्रयोपेता आर्थी भावना साध्यत्वेनान्वेति । एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेन समानाभिधानश्रुतेः । सं- ख्यादीनामेकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वे ऽप्ययोग्यत्वान्न साध्यन्वेनान्वयः । साधनाकाङ्गायां लिङादिज्ञानं करणत्वेनान्वेति । तस्य च क- रणत्वं (३) न भावनोत्पादकत्वेन तत्पूर्वमपि तस्याः शब्दे सत्त्वा- (२) ख ग पुस्तकयोः द्विविधा । (२) व घ पुस्तकयोः शब्दभावना अर्थभा० । (3) तस्य च भावनाय करणत्वमिति पाठः स्व पुस्तके ।

·त् । कि तु भावनाजापकत्वेन शब्दभावनाभाव्यनिर्तिकत्वेन वा । इतिकर्तव्यताकालायामर्थवादज्ञाप्यप्राशस्त्यमितिकर्त- व्यतावेनान्वेति। प्रयोजनेच्छाजनितक्रियाविषयव्यापार प्रार्थी भावना। सा चाख्यातत्वांशेनोयते । श्राख्यातसामान्यस्य व्या- पारवाचित्वात् । साप्यंशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधनमितिकर्तव्य- तां च किं भावयेत्केन भावयेत्कथं भावदिति । तत्र माध्या- कालायां स्वर्गादि फन्न साध्यत्वेनान्वेति । साधनाकाङ्गाया यागादिः करणत्वेनान्वेति । इतिकर्तव्यताकाक्षायां प्रयाजाद्य- गजातमितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति ॥ अथ को वेद इति चेदच्यते । अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः । स च विधिमन्त्रनामधेयनिषेधार्थवादभेदात्पञ्चविधः ॥ तत्राज्ञानार्थ ज्ञापको वेदभागो विधिः । स च तादृश (१) प्र- योजनवदर्थविधानेनार्थवान् यादृशं चार्थं प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्त विधत्ते । यथा ऽग्रिहोत्रं जुहुयात्वर्गकाम इति विधिर्मानान्त- रेणाप्राप्तं स्वर्गप्रयोजनवडामं विधत्ते । अग्रिहोत्रहोमन खमें भावयेटिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। यत्र कर्म मानान्तरण प्राप्तं तव न- दुद्देशेन गुणमात्रं विधत्त। यथा दध्ना जुहोतोन्यत्र होमस्यानि- होत्रं जयादित्यनेन प्राप्तत्वाद्दामोद्देशन दधिमात्रविधानम् । दना होमं भावयेटिति । यत्र भयमप्राप्तं तत्र विशिष्टं विधत्ते यथा मोमेन यजेनेत्यत्र मोमयागयोरप्राप्तत्वात्मोमविशिटया- गविधानम्। मोमपदे मत्त्वर्थलक्षणायासोमवता यागनेटंभावये. दिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। न चाभयविधान वाक्यभेदः। प्रत्येकमुभय- (१) स च प्रयोजनोत पाठः ख ग पुस्तकयोः ।

·(१) स्थाविधानात किंतु विशिष्टस्यैकस्यैव विधानात्। न च "ज्यो- तिष्टामेन वर्गकामो यजेते"ति विधिप्राप्तयागोद्देशन सोमरू- पगुणविधानमेवास्तु सोमेन यागं भावयेदिति किं मत्वर्थनाण- येति वाच्यम् । तस्याधिकारविधित्वनोत्पत्तिविधित्वासंभवात् । ननिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यस्येव ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्यस्याप्युत्पत्त्य- धिकारविधित्वमस्त्विति चेन्न। दृष्टान्त उत्पत्तिवाक्यान्तराभा- वेन अन्यथान पपत्त्या तथात्वाश्रयणान। किं च ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्य- स्योभयविधित्वे ऽनेनैव यागस्तस्य फलसंबन्धो ऽपि बोधनीय इति सुदृढो वाक्यभेदस्तदरं सोमपदे मत्वर्थलक्षणया विशि- एविधानम॥ विधिश्चतुविधः । उत्पत्तिविधिविनियोगविधिरधिकारविधिः प्रयोगविधिश्चेति ॥ नत्र कर्मखरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरुत्पत्तिविधिः । यथा ऽनि- होत्रं जुहोतीति । अत्र विधौ कर्मणः करणत्वेनान्वयः । अग्नि- होत्रहोमेनेष्टं भावयेदिति। ननु यागस्य हे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च। तथा च रूपाश्रवणे अमिहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः । अग्रिहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्पख्यन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न। रूपाश्रवणे ऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात । अन्यथा रूपश्रवणाना जुहोतीत्ययमेवोत्पत्तिविधिः स्यात् । तथा चाग्रिहोत्रं जुहोती- ति वाक्यमनर्थकं स्यात् ॥ अङ्गप्रधानसंबन्धबोधको विधिर्विनियोगविधिः । यथा ढना जुहोतीति । स हि टनीयया प्रतिपन्नाङ्गभावस्य टनी होमसं- बन्ध विधत्ते । दना होमं भावयेदिति । गुणविधौ च धात्वर्थस्य ·साध्यत्वेनान्वयः । कचिदाश्रयत्वेनापि । यथा दनेन्द्रियकामस्थ जुहुयादित्यत्र ढधिकरणत्वेनेन्द्रियं भावयेत। तच्च किनिष्ठमि- त्याकाणायां सन्निधिप्राप्त होम आश्रयत्वेनान्वति ॥ एतस्य विधेः सहकारिभूतानि षट प्रमाणानि । अतिलिङ्गवा- क्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यारूपाणि । एतत्मकतेनानन विधिना- ङ्गत्वं परोद्देशप्रवृत्तकृतिमाध्यत्वरूपं (१) पारार्थ्यापरपर्याय शाप्यते ॥ तत्र निरपेठो रवः श्रुतिः । सा च त्रिविधा । विधात्री अभि- धात्री विनियोलो च । तबाद्या लिङाद्यात्मिका । द्वितीया ब्री- धादिश्रुनिः । यस्य च शब्दस्य श्रवणादेव संबन्धः प्रतीयते मा विनियोनी । सापि त्रिविधा विभक्तिरूपा एकाभिधानरूपा एकपदरूपा चेति । तत्र विभक्तिश्रुत्या अङ्गत्वम्। यथा ब्रोहिभि- यजेतति हतीयाश्रुत्या प्रीहीणां यागाङ्गत्वम् । तदपि पुरोडा- शप्रकृतितया । यथा पशोहदयाटिरूपहविष्प्रकृतितया यागा- त्वम् । अरुणया एकहायन्या गवा मोम क्रोणातीत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये भारुण्यस्यापिटतीयाश्रुत्या क्रयाङ्गत्वम्। नदपि गोरूप- द्रव्यपरिच्छंदवारा न तु साशात् । अमृतत्वात् । बोहोन्प्रोक्षाती- नि प्राशणस्य बीहाङ्गत्वं द्वितीयाश्रुत्या । नच्च प्रोठाणं न ब्री- हिवरूपार्थम् । तस्य तेन विनाप्युपपत्तेः । किं त्वपूर्वमाधनत्व- प्रयुक्तम् । बीहोनप्रोक्ष्य यागानुष्ठाने ऽपूर्वानुपपत्तेः । एवं सर्वे- ध्वङ्गेप्वपूर्वप्रयुक्तमङ्गत्वं बोध्यम। एवमिमामगृभ्णवशनामृतस्य- त्यश्वाभिधानोमाढत्तइत्यत्र द्वितीयया श्रुत्या मन्त्रस्याश्वाभि- (1) रूप यानादिकमान स्व ग पुस्तक योः ।

·(६) धान्यङ्गत्वम् । यदाहवनीये जुहोतीत्याइवनीयस्य होमाङ्गत्व सप्तमोश्रुत्या। एवमन्यो ऽपि विभक्तिश्रुत्या विनियोगो ज्ञेयः। प- शुना यजनेत्यत्रैकत्वपुंस्वयोः समानाभिधानश्रुत्या कारकाङ्ग- त्वम । यतेत्याख्याताभिहितसंख्याया प्रार्थभावनाङ्गत्वं (१) समानाभिधानश्रुतेरेक(२) पदश्रुत्या च यागाङ्गत्वम्। न चामू- तयास्तस्याः कथं भावनाङ्गत्वं वाच्यम। कर्तृपरिच्छेद दारा त- दुपपत्तेः । कर्त्ता चाशेपन्नभ्यः । श्राख्यातेन हि भावनोच्यते । सा च कर्तारं विनानुपपन्नेति तमाशिपति । सेयं श्रुतिर्लिङ्गा- दिभ्यः प्रबला। लिङ्गादिषु न प्रत्यको विनियोजकः शब्दो ऽस्ति किंतु कल्प्यो, यावच्च विनियोजकः(३) कल्प्यते तावत्प्रत्य- छया श्रुत्या विनियोगस्य कृतत्वेन तेषां कल्पकत्वशक्ताह- तत्वात् । अत एवेन्द्या निङ्गानेन्द्रोपस्थानार्थत्वम । किं तु ऐ- न्या गाईपत्यमुपनिष्ठतइत्यत्र गाईपन्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्या गाईपत्योपस्थानार्थत्वम् ॥ शब्दमामर्थं निङ्गम् । यथाहुः । सामर्थ्यं सर्वशब्दाना निङ्ग- मित्यभिधीयते । सामर्थ्यं रूढिरेव । तेन समाख्यातो नाभेदः । यौगिक शब्दसमाख्यातो रुढ्यात्मकलिङ्गशब्दम्य भिन्नत्वात् । (8) तेन बईिर्देवसदनं दामीति मन्त्रस्य कुशलवनाङ्गत्वं न बन्नपादिन्नवनाङ्गत्वम्। तस्य बहिमोतिलिङ्गात्तजवनं प्रका- (१) संख्याया आर्थी भावना, इति पाठः क पुस्त के । (२) श्रुतेरेव । पदभ्रुत्यांत पाट: ख ग घ पुस्तुकेषु । (8) कः शब्द इति ग घ पुस्तकयोः । (४) यौगिकेत्यारभ्य भिन्नत्वादित्यन्तो मन्थः स्व ग पुस्तकयोपिलभ्यते ।

·(७) शयितुं समर्थत्वात् । एवमन्यत्रापि निङ्गादिनियोगो द्रष्टव्यः । तदिदं लिङ्गं वाक्यादिभ्यो बनवत् । अत एव स्योनं ते सदनं कृणोमीति मन्त्रस्य पुरोडाशसदनकरणाङ्गत्वं । सदनं कृणणे- मीति लिङ्गान् न तु वाक्यात् ॥ समभिव्याहारो वाक्यम । समभिव्याहारश्च साध्यत्वादिवाच- कहितीयाद्यभाव ऽपि वस्तुतः शेष षिवाचकपदयोः सहोच्चा- रणम। यथा यस्य पर्णमयो जुहूर्भवति न स पापं श्लोकं टणो- तीत्यत्र पर्मताजुद्दोः समभिव्याहारादेव पर्णताया जहङ्गत्वम् । न चानर्थक्यम, अन्यथापि जहाः सिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम् । जुछ- शब्देन तत्साध्यापूर्वन्नशणात् । तथा च वाक्यार्थः । पर्णतया ऽव- तहविर्धारणाद्वारा जुहपूर्व भावयेदिति । एवं च पर्णतया यदि जुहूः क्रियते तदैव तत्माध्यमपूर्व भवति नान्यथेति गम्यतइति न पर्णताया वैयर्थ्यम(१) । अवत्तविर्धारणाद्वारेति चावश्यं वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा सुवादिष्वपि पर्णतापत्तेः । सयं पर्णता अ नारभ्याधीतापि सर्वप्रकृतिवेवान्वेति न विकृतिषु । नत्र चोद- केनापि तत्प्राप्तिसंभवात्यौनरुत्यापत्तेः। यत्र समग्राङ्गोपदेशः सा प्रकृतिः। यथा दशपूर्णमामादिः। तत्प्रकरण सर्वाङ्गपाठात्। यत्र न सर्वाङ्गोपदशः सा विकृतिः । यथा मर्यादिः । नत्र कतिपयाङ्गानामनिटेशन प्राप्तत्वात् । अनारभ्यविधिः समान्य- विधिः । नदिदं वाक्यं प्रकरणादिभ्यो बन्नवत । अत एवेन्द्रामी इदं हविरित्यारेकवाक्यत्वाद्दर्शाङ्गत्वं न तु प्रकरणादर्शपूर्ण- मासाङ्गत्वम् ॥ (२) एवं चेत्यारभ्य वैयद्यमित्यन्तः पाठो घ पुस्तके उपलभ्यते ।

·(८) उभयाकाझा प्रकरणम्। यथा प्रयाजादिषु ममिधो यजती- त्यादी वाक्ये फन्नविशेषस्यानिर्देशात् समिद्यागेन भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं किमिति उपकार्याकाङ्क्षा। दर्शपूर्णमासवाक्ये ऽपि दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्ग भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं कथमित्युपका- रकाकाना। इत्यं चोभयाकाझ्या प्रयाजादीनां टर्शपूर्णमासा- त्वम् । तच्च प्रकरणं द्विविधम् । महाप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणं चति । मुख्यभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणं महाप्रकरणम्। तेन च प्रया- जादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वम् । एतच्च प्रकृतावेव, उभयाकाङ्गा- याः संभवान्न तु विकृतौ । तत्र प्रकृतिवडिकृतिः कर्त्तव्येत्यति- देशेन कथंभावाकाङ्काया उपशमेनापूर्वाङ्गानामप्युभयाकाक्ष- या विनियोगासम्भवात्। तस्मादपूर्वाङ्गानां स्थानादेव विकृत्यर्थ- त्वमिति । अङ्गभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणम् । तेन चाभिक्रमणादीनां प्रयाजाद्यङ्गत्वम् । तच्च सन्दशनैव ज्ञायते । तदभावे चाविशेषात्सर्वेषां फनभावनाकथंभावन ग्रहणप्रस- ड्रेन प्रधानाङ्गत्वापत्तेः । एकाङ्गानुवादेन विधीयमानयोरप्य- गयोरन्तराले विहितत्वं मन्दंशः । यथा ऽभिक्रमणे । तत्र हि "समानयत उपभृतस्तेजो वा" इत्यादिना प्रयाजानुवादेन किं चिटङ्गं विधाय तदनन्तरमपि प्रयाजानुवादेन (१) “यस्यैवं (२) विदुषः प्रयाजा इज्यन्ते प्रेभ्यो लोकभ्यो भ्राटव्यानुदते ऽभि- क्रामं जुहोत्यभिजित्यै” इत्यनन्तरं “यो वै प्रयाजानां मिथुन वेदे"त्यादि किं चिदङ्गं विधीयते ॥ (१) यस्यैवंविदुष इत्यारभ्य तरमित्यन्तो अन्धो ग पुस्तके नोपलभ्यते । (२) प्रयाजानुवादेन प्रयाजत्वं यस्यैवमिति पाठो ग पुस्तके | ·( १ ) अतः प्रयाजागमध्ये ऽभिहितमभिक्रमणं सदनमा प्रयाज- रपूर्वं कृत्वा यागोपकारं भावयदिति ज्ञाने कथमेभिरपूर्व क- व्यमिति कथंभावाकालायाः सत्त्वात् । सा च संदंशपठिनैर- भिक्रमणादिभिः शाम्यति। न चाङ्गभावनायर्या कथंभावाकाङ्क्षा- भावः । भावनामाम्येन नत्रापि तत्संभवात् । तदिदं (१) प्रक. रणं क्रियाया एव सामाडिनियोजक द्रव्यगुणयोस्तु नहारा। मथा हि। यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र फलभावनायो कथंभावाका- शायां सन्निधिपठिताश्रूयमाणफलक क्रियाजानमुपकार्याका- नयेतिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति । क्रियाया एव लोके कथंभावा- काङ्गायामन्वयदर्शनात् । न हि इस्तेन (२) कुठारण छिन्यादि- त्यत्र कथंभावाकाहायामुच्चार्यमाणोऽपि हस्तो ऽन्वेति किं तु हस्तेनोद्यम्य निपात्येति उद्यमननिपातने एव । हस्तश्च न- हारैवान्वेतीति सार्वजनीनमेतत् । इदं च स्थानादिभ्यो बल- वत । अत एवातै व्यनि राजन्यमिति देवनाटयो (३) धर्मा अभिषेचनीयमन्निधो पठिता अपि स्थानान्न तदङ्गं किंतु प्रक- रणाद्राजमयाङ्गमिति ॥ देशमामान्य स्थानम । तद्दिविधम् । पाठमादेश्यमनुष्ठानसा- देण्यं चेति । स्थानं क्रमश्चेत्यनर्थान्तरम । पाठमादेश्यमपि दि- विधम् । यथासंख्यपाठः सन्निधिपाठश्चेति। तन्द्राममेकादश- कपालं निर्वपद वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपाल निर्वपेदिन्येवंक्रमविहि- तेषु इन्द्रानी रोचना टिव इत्यादीनां याज्यानुवाक्यामन्त्रा- (१) यदि दमिति पाठो “ग च" पुस्तकयोः । (..) हस्त कुटारेनि पाठः क पुस्तके । न हि कुठारेणेति घ च पुस्तकयोः । (3) विदेवनादय इति पाठः ख ग च पुस्तकंषु टीकायां च ।

·( १० ) णां यथासंख्यं प्रथमस्य प्रथम द्वितीयस्य द्वितीयमित्येवंरूपो विनियोगो यथासंख्वपाठात् । प्रथमपठितमन्त्रस्य हि कैमर्थ्या- काकायां प्रथमतो विहितं कर्मैव प्रथममुपतिष्ठते समानदेश- स्वात् । एवं द्वितीयमन्त्रस्यापि । वैकृताङ्गानां प्राकृताङ्गानुवादेन विहितानां संदंशपतितानां विकृत्यर्थत्वं सन्निधिपाठात् । यथा श्रामनहोमानाम्। तेषां हि कैमर्थ्याकाङ्क्षायां फलं विकृत्यपू- मेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते उपस्थितत्वात् । स्वतन्त्रफलकत्वे वि- कृतिमन्निधिपाठानर्थक्यापत्तेः । पशुधर्माणामग्रीषोमीयार्थत्व- मनुष्ठानसादेश्यात् । औपवमध्ये ऽहि अनीषोमीयः पारनु- ष्ठीयते तस्मिन्नेव दिने ते धर्माः पद्यन्ते। अतस्तेषां कैमर्थ्याका- शायामनुष्ठेयत्वेनोपस्थितं पश्वपूर्वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते । त- च्च स्थानं समाख्यातः प्रबलम। अत एव शुन्धनमन्त्रः साना- व्यपात्राङ्गं पाठसादे श्यात्। न तु पौरोडाशिकमिति समाख्यया पुरोडाशमात्राङ्गम् ॥ यौगिक शब्दः । सा च द्विविधा वैदिको लौकिकी च। तत्र होतुश्चमसभशणाङ्गत्वं होटचमस इति वैदिकसमा- ख्यया। अध्वर्यास्तत्तत्पदार्थाङ्गत्वं लौकिक्या प्राध्वर्यवमिति समाख्ययेति सझेपः ॥ तदेवं निरूपितानि सझेपतः श्रुत्यादीनि षट् प्रमाणानि एत- महकृतेन विनियोगविधिना समिटादिभिरुपकृत्य दर्शपूर्ण- मासाभ्यां यतेत्येवंरूपेण यानि नियोज्यन्ते तान्यङ्गानि वि- विधानि सिद्धरूपाणि (१) क्रियारूपाणि चेति । तत्र मिद्धानि (१) सिद्धानि इति पाठ: "ख ग घ च" पुस्त केषु । समाख्या ·जातिद्रव्यसंख्यादीनि तानि च दृष्टार्थान्येव । क्रियारूपाणि च विविधानि गणकर्माणि प्रधानकर्माणि च एतान्येव मनिपत्यो- पकारक्राणि अारादुपकारकाणि चोच्यन्ते । कर्माङ्गद्रव्याद्य- द्देशन विधीयमानं कर्म सन्निपत्योपकारकम् । यथा ऽवघात- प्रोक्षणादि तच्च दृष्टार्थमदृष्टार्थ दृष्टादृष्टा चेति । तत्र दृष्टा- र्थमवघाताटि। अदृष्टार्थं प्रोक्षणादि । दृष्टादृष्टार्थ पपुरो- डाशादि । तद्धि द्रव्यत्यागांशनैव अदृष्टं देवतोद्देशेन च देवता- स्मरणं दृष्टं करोति । द्रव्याद्यनुद्दिश्य केवन्न विधीयमानं कर्म आरादपकारकम । यथा प्रयाजादि। पारादुपकारकं च (१) परमापर्वोत्यत्तावेवोपयुज्यते । मनिपत्योपकारकं तु द्रव्यदेव- तासंस्कारद्वारा यागस्वरूपे ऽप्युपयुज्यते । इदमेव चाश्रीय कर्मेत्युच्यते । तदेवं निरूपितः सर्वोपतो विनियोगविधिः ॥ प्रयोगप्राभावबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिः। स चाङ्गवाक्यै कवाक्यतापनः प्रधानविधिरेव। स हि माझं प्रधानमनुष्ठापय- विनम्बे प्रमाणाभावादविनम्बापरपर्यायं प्रयोगप्राभावं वि- धत्तोन च तदविलम्ब ऽपि प्रमाणाभाव इति वाच्यम । विलम्बे त्वङ्गप्रधानविध्येकवाक्यतावगततत्माहित्यानुपपत्ति । विलम्बेन क्रियमाणयोः पदार्थयोरिदमनेन सह कृतमिति साहित्यव्यव- हाराभावात् । स चाविनम्बो नियते क्रम आश्रीयमाणे भवति। স্মঘা হি জিননননননননন নি যা- गविशेपापत्तेः । अतः प्रयोगविधिरेव स्वविधेयप्रयोगाभा- वसिद्ध्यर्थ नियतं क्रममपि पढार्थविशेषणतया विधत्ते । अत ए- (१) कर्म आरादपकारकम् । तश्चेति पाठो 'ग' पुस्तके ।

·। ( १२ ) वाङ्गानां क्रमबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिरित्यपि लक्षणम्।न क्रमो नाम विततिविशेषः । पौर्वापर्यरूपो वा । तत्र षट् प्रम णानि श्रुत्यर्थपाठस्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्त्याख्यानि । तत्र क्रमपरं वच श्रुतिः । तच्च विविधम् । केवलक्रमपरं तविशिष्ट पदार्थपरं । ति। तत्र वेदं कृत्वा वेदिं करोतीति केवलक्रमपरं वेदिकरण देवचनान्तरप्राप्तत्वात् । वषटकर्तुः प्रथमभच इति तु क्रम विशिष्टपदार्थपरम् । एकप्रसरताभङ्ग भयेन भक्षानुवादेन क्र ममात्रस्य विधातुमशक्यत्वात । सेयं श्रुतिरितरप्रमाणापेशर बलवती तेषां वचनकल्पनदारा क्रमप्रमाणत्वात् । अत एवा विनग्रहण त्य पाठक्रमात्तृतीयस्थाने ग्रहणप्रसक्तावाश्विनोद शमो गृह्यनइति वचनाद्दशमस्थाने ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । यत्र प्र योजनवशेन क्रमनिर्णयः मो ऽर्थक्रमः । यथाऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोति यवागू पचतीत्यग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकयोः । अत्र हि यवाग्वा हो मार्थत्वेन तत्याकः प्रयोजनक्शेन पूर्वमनुष्ठीयते । स चायं पा उक्रमाहनवान् । यथापाठं झनुष्ठाने क्रमप्रयोजनवाधे ऽदृष्टा र्थत्वं (१) स्यात् । न हि होमानन्तरं क्रियमाणस्य पाकस्य वि चिदृष्टं प्रयोजनमस्ति । पदार्थबोधकवाक्यानां यः क्रमः स पा उकमः । तस्माच्च पदार्थाना क्रम पाश्रीयते । येन हि क्रमेष वाक्यानि पठिनानि नेनैव क्रमेणाधीतान्यर्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति यथाप्रत्ययं (२) च पदार्थानामनुष्ठानम् । स च पाठो विविधः मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठश्चेति । तत्राग्नेयानीषोमीययोस्तत्तद्दा. (१) बाधो ऽदृष्टार्थत्वं चेति ‘स्व ग च' पुस्तकयोः । (२) यथार्थप्रत्यपमिति पाठो 'गच' पुस्तकयोः ।

·( १३ ) क्यानां याज्यानुवाक्यानां (१) पाठाद्यः क्रम आश्रीयते स मन्त्र- पाठात् स चायं मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठाइन्नीयान् । अनुष्ठाने ब्राह्मणवाक्यापेक्षया मन्त्रपाठस्यान्तरङ्गत्वात् । बाह्मणवाक्यं हि प्रयोगाइहिरवेदं कर्त्तव्यमित्यवबोध्य कृतार्थम । मन्त्राः पुनः प्रयोगकाले व्याप्रियन्ते । अनुष्ठानक्रमस्य स्मरणक्रमाधीनत्वा- त् तत्क्रमस्य च मन्त्रक्रमाधीनत्वादन्तरङ्गो मन्त्रपाठ इति प्रयाजाना समिधो यजति नननपातं यजति इत्येवं विधिपा- ठक्रमाद्यः (२) क्रमः स ब्राह्मणपाठक्रमात् । यद्यपि ब्राह्मणा- वाक्यान्यथं विधाय कृतार्थानि नथापि प्रयाजादीनां क्रममा- रकान्तरस्याभावात्तान्येव क्रमस्मारकत्वेन स्वीक्रियन्ते ॥ स्थानं नामोपस्थितिः । यस्य हि देशे यो ऽनुष्ठीयने तत्पूर्वनने पदार्थ कृते स एव प्रथममुपस्थितो भवतीति युक्तं तस्य प्रथम- मनुष्ठानम। अत एव साद्यस्वे अमीषोमीयमवनीयानुवन्ध्यानां सवनीयदश सहानुष्ठाने कर्त्तव्ये आदौ सवनीयपशोरनुष्ठान- मितरयोः पश्चात् तस्मिन्देशे आश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयस्यैव प्रथममुपस्थितः । तथा हि । ज्योतिटोमे त्रयः पयागा अग्री- षोमीयः सवनीय आनुवन्ध्यश्चेति। ते च भिन्नदेशाः । अनीपो- मोय औपवसथ्ये ऽहि सवनीयः सुत्याकाने आनुबन्ध्यस्वन्ते। साद्यस्को नाम मोमयागविशेषः । स चाव्यक्तत्वाज्योतिष्टोम- विकारः । अतस्ते त्रयो ऽपि पशुयागाः माद्यम्के चोटकप्रा. (१) स्तत्तद्याज्यानुवाक्याकमायः कम आश्रीयतइति पाठः 'स्व ग' पुस्तकाः । स्तनद्याज्यानुक्याक्रम आश्रीयते इति 'च' पुस्तके ।। (२) इत्येवंविधवाक्यक्रमाद्यः इति 'स्वग' पुस्तकयोः । इत्येवंविधिवाक्यक्रमाद्य इति 'च' पुस्तके।

·(१४ ) ताः । तेषां तत्र साहित्यं श्रुतं सह पटनालभन इति । तच्च साहित्यं सवनीयदेश तस्य प्रधानप्रत्यासत्तेः स्थानातिक्रमण- साम्याच्च । सवनोयदेशे धनुष्टाने ऽग्रीषोमीयानुबन्ध्ययोः स्व- खस्थानातिक्रमो भवति । अग्नीषोमीयदेशे ऽनबन्ध्यदेश वानु- ष्ठाने त्रयाणामपि मध्ये दयोः स्वम्वस्थानातिक्रमः(१) । तथा च प्रकृतावाप्रिवनग्रहं कृत्वा विवृता यूपं परिवीय सवनोयं पशु- मुपाकरोतीत्याश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं मवनीयो विहित इति सा- द्यस्वे ऽप्याश्विनग्रहणे कृते सवनीय एवोपस्थितो भवत्यतो युक्तं तस्य स्थानात्प्रथममनुष्टानमितरयोस्तु पश्चादित्युक्तम् ।। प्रधानक्रमेण योऽङ्गानां क्रमः म मख्यः क्रमः । येन हि क- मेण प्रधानानि क्रियन्ते तेनैव क्रमेण तेषामङ्गान्यनष्ठीयन्ते। तदा सर्वेषामङ्गानां स्वैः स्वैः प्रधानैस्तुत्वं व्यवधानं भवनि । व्यु- क्रमेणानुष्ठाने केषां चिदङ्गानां स्वैः प्रधानरत्यन्तमव्यवधानं केषां चिदत्यन्तव्यवधानं स्यात्तच्चायुक्तं प्रयोगविध्यवगतमा- हित्यबाधापत्तेः । अतः प्रधानक्रमो ऽपि अङ्गक्रमे हेतुः । अत एव प्रयाजशेषेणादावाग्नेयहविषो ऽभिघारणं पश्चादैन्द्रस्य दनः आग्नेयैन्द्रयागयोः पौर्वापर्यात । एवं च योईयोरभि- घारणयोः स्वस्वप्रधानेन तुच्यमेकान्तरितं व्यवधानम् । व्युत्क्र- मेणाभिधारणे स्वाग्नेयहविरभिधारणाग्नेययागयोरत्यन्तम- व्यवधानम् । ऐन्द्रदध्यभिधारणेन्द्रयागयोन्तरितं व्यवधानं नच्चायुक्तमित्युक्तमेव । स मुख्यः क्रमः पाठक्रमाहुन्नः। मुख्य- क्रमो हि प्रमाणान्तरसापेठाप्रधानक्रमप्रतिपत्तिसापेक्षतया वि. (१) मपि स्वस्वेति पाठः 'च' पुस्तके | ·( १५ ) लम्बितप्रतिपत्तिकः । पाठक्रमस्तु निरपेशवाध्यायपाठक्रममा- वसापेशतया न तथेति बलवान् । स चायं मुख्यक्रमः प्रवृत्ति- क्रमाच्च बलवान । प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमा- नुष्ठितक्रमापेशा बनामङ्गानां (१) प्रधानविप्रकर्षान्मुख्यक्रम तु सन्निकर्षात् ॥ सह प्रयुज्यमानेषु प्रधानेषु मनिपातिनामङ्गानामावृत्त्या ऽनु- ठाने कर्तव्य द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमानुष्ठितपदार्यक्रमाद्यः क्रमः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । यथा प्राजापत्यपश्वङ्गेषु प्राजापत्या छि वैश्वदेवीं कृत्वा प्राजापत्यश्चरन्तीति वाक्येन हतीयानिशात्से- तिकर्तव्यताका एककान त्वेन विहिता अतस्तेषां तदङ्गाना चोपाकरणनियोजनप्रभृतीनां माहित्यं संपाद्यम् । नच्च प्राजा- पत्यपाना संप्रतिपन्नदेवताकत्वेन (२) युगपदनुष्ठानादुपपद्यते। नटङ्गानां चोपाकरणादीनां युगपटनुष्ठानमशक्यम् । अतस्तेषां साहित्यमव्यवहितानुष्ठानासंपाद्यम। तच्चैकस्योपाकरणं विधा- यापरस्योपाकरणं विधेयम । एवं नियोजनादिकमपि । तथा च प्राजापत्येषु कम्माञ्चित्यशारारभ्य एक मर्यं सर्वत्रानुष्ठाय (३) द्वितीयादिपदार्थस्तेनैव क्रमणानुष्ठेयः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । सो ऽयं श्रुत्यादिभ्यो दुर्बनः । तदेवं संक्षेपतो निरूपितः पडविधक्रमान- रूपणेन प्रयोगविधिः ॥ कर्मजन्यफनम्बाम्यबोधको विधिधिकारविधिः । कर्मज- (१) बलवान् । प्रयनिकमाच बलवान् । प्रवृनिक में हि बहनामङ्गानामात पाठो 'ग' पुस्तकयोः ॥ (२) देवनाकालत्वेनेति पाठः कषु चित्पुस्तके वासीदिनि टीकालेख तो ऽवगम्यते । (3) एकं सर्वत्रानयान पाठः 'स्व ग च' परत के पु ।

·(१६) न्यफन्नखाम्यं कर्मजन्यफलभोक्तत्वम् । स च यजेत वर्गकार इत्यादिरूपः । वर्गमुद्दिश्य यागं विदधता ऽनेन वर्गकामस यागजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । यस्याहिताग्नेरमिहान दहमो ऽग्नये शामवते ऽशकपालं निर्वदित्यादिनाग्निदाहा दो निमित्त कर्म विदधता निमित्तवतः कर्मजन्यपापक्षयरूप फन्नखान्यं प्रतिपाद्यते। एवमहरछः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यादिन शुचिविहितकान्नजीविनः सन्ध्योपासनजन्यप्रत्यवायपरिहार रूपफलखाम्यं चोद्यते। तच्च फलस्वाम्यं तस्यैव यो ऽधिकारवि शिष्टः । अधिकारश्च (१) यदिधिवाक्येषु पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन श्रूय ने। यथा काम्ये कर्मणि फलकामना नैमित्त कर्मणि निमित्त निश्चयः । नित्ये सन्ध्योपासनाटी चिविहितकानजीवित्वम अत एव राजा राजसयेन खाराज्यकामो यजेतेटनेन विधि वाक्येन खाराज्यमुद्दिश्य विदधतापि न स्वाराज्यमात्रकामा तत्फन्नभोक्तन्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । किं तु राज्ञः सतः स्वाराज्यकाम स्यैव राजत्वस्यापि अधिकारिविशेषणत्वेन श्रवणात् । कचि पुरुषविशेषणत्वेनाश्रुतमप्यधिकारिविशेषणम्। यथाध्ययनादि धिसिद्धा विद्या क्रतुविधीनामर्शज्ञानापेक्षणीयत्वेनाध्ययनविति मिद्वार्थज्ञानवन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवमग्निसाध्यकर्मसु आध नमिद्धाग्निमत्ता। अग्निमाध्यकर्मणामान्यपेशवेन तविधीन माधानसिद्धाग्निमन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । अ ख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां गक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात् समर्थ ! त्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं निरूपितो विधिः ।। (१) अधिकारश्च स एवेति 'स्व ग च' पुस्तकेषु ।

·( १ ) प्रयोगसमवेतार्यमारका मन्त्राः। तेषां च तादृशार्थस्मारक- त्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वम् । न तु तदुच्चारणमदृष्टार्थम। संभवति दृष्टफल- कत्वेऽदृष्टफन्नकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । न च दृष्टस्यार्थस्मरणस्य प्रकारान्तरेणापि संभवान्मन्त्राम्नानं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । मन्त्रै- रेव स्मर्त्तव्यमिति नियमविध्याश्रयणात् । नानासाधनसाध्यकि- यायामेकसाधनप्राप्तावप्राप्तस्यापरसाधनस्य प्रापको विधिनिय- मविधिः । (१) यथाः। विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्त नियमः पाशिक मनि। तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्त परिसंख्येति गीयतइति। अस्यार्थः। प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिरपूर्वविधिः। यथा यजेन ख- काम इत्यादिः। स्वर्गार्थकयागस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्यानेन विधानात्। पो ऽप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिनियमविधिः । यथा प्रोहीनवहन्तीत्यादिः। कथमस्य पशे ऽप्राप्तप्रापकत्वमिति चे. दित्यम् । अनेन घवघातस्य वैतुष्यार्थत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते ऽन्व- यव्यतिरेकसिदत्वात् । किं तु नियमः। स चाप्राप्तांशपूरणम् । वैतुष्यस्य हि नानोपायसाध्यत्वाद्यढा ऽवधानं परित्यज्य उपा- यान्तरं गृहीतुमारभते तदाऽवघातस्याप्राप्त त्वन नदिधानना- मकमप्राप्तांशपूरणमेवानेन विधिना क्रियते । अतश्च नियमवि- धावप्राप्तांशपूरणात्मको नियम एव वाक्यार्थः । पडा ऽप्राप्ताव- घातस्य विधानमिति यावत् । उभयोश्च युगपत्प्राप्तावितरव्यावृ- त्तिपरो विधिः परिसंख्याविधिः । यथा पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति । इदं हि वाक्यं न पञ्चनखभक्षणपरं तस्य रागतः प्राप्त- (१) साधनद्वयस्य पक्षे प्रामावन्यतरसाधनस्याप्राप्ततादशाया यो विधिः स नियम- विपिरित पाठः 'च' पुस्तके ।

·(१९) त्वात् । नापि नियमपरं पञ्चनखापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य युगपत्प्राप्त पशे प्राप्त्यभावात् । अत इदमपञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तिपरमिति भवति परिसंख्याविधिः । सा च द्विविधा । भौती लामणिकी चेति। नवाब होवावयन्तोति श्रौती परिसंख्या। एक्कारेण प- वमानातिरिक्तस्तोत्रव्यावृत्तेरभिधानात्। पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति तु लाक्षणिको। इतरनिवृत्तिवाचकपदाभावात् । अत एवं. षा त्रिदोषग्रस्ता। दोषत्रयं च श्रुतहानिरश्रुतकल्पना प्राप्तबा- धश्चेति। तदुक्तम्।श्रुतार्थस्य परित्यागादश्रुतार्थप्रकल्पनात्। प्रा- प्तस्य बाधादित्येवं परिसंख्या विदूषणा इति श्रुतस्य पञ्चनख- भक्षणस्य हानाद् अश्रुतापञ्चनखभशणनिवृत्तेः कल्पनात्याप्त- स्य चाऽपञ्चनखभक्षणस्य बाधनादिति । अस्मिंश्च दोषत्रये दो- षड्यं शब्दनिष्ठम् । प्राप्तबाधस्वर्थनिष्ठ इति दिक । येषां तु प्र. योगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वं न संभवति तदुच्चारणस्यानन्यगत्या ऽदृष्टार्थकत्वं कल्प्यते इति नानर्थक्यमिति ॥ नामधेयानां च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतया ऽर्थवत्त्वम् । तथा हि। उद्भिदा यजेत पाकाम इत्यत्रोनिच्छब्दो यागनामधेयं तेन च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदः (१) क्रियते। तथा हि । अनेन वाक्ये- नाप्राप्तत्वात् फन्नोद्देशेन यागो विधीयते । यागसामान्यस्यावि- धेयत्वाद् यागविशेष एव विधीयते । तत्र को ऽसौ यागविशेष इत्यपेशायामुनिछब्दादुझिद्रूपो याग इति विज्ञायते उद्भिदा यागेन पर भावयेदित्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्येन नामधेयान्चया- त । नामधेयत्वं च निमित्तचतुष्टयात् । मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयादाक्य- (१) भाभिषेयार्थपरिच्छेद हात 'ब' पुस्तके।

·( १९) भेदभयात्तत्पस्यमा गचातापदेशादिमि ॥ तबोशिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोनिच्छन्दस्य यागनामधे- यत्वं मत्वर्थलणाभयात् । तथा हि। न नावटनेन वाक्येन फन प्रति यागविधानं तं प्रति च गुणविधानं युज्यते । वाक्यभेदाप- तेः। उनिछब्दस्य गुणममर्पकत्वे च यागस्याप्यप्राप्तत्वागणवि- शिष्टकर्मविधान वाध्यम । उदिता यागेन परं भावयदिति । विशिष्टविधौ मत्वर्थलक्षणेत्युक्तमेव ॥ चित्रया यत पाकाम इत्यत्र चित्राशब्दस्य कर्मनामधे- यत्वं वाक्यभेदभयात्। तथा हि । न तावदव गुणविशिष्टयाग- विधानं संभवति । दधि मधु पयो घृतं धाना उदकं तपडनाः तत्संसृष्टं प्राजापत्यमित्यनेन गुणस्य विहितत्वाप्ताहि शिष्टयागवि- ध्यनुपपत्तेः । यागस्य फलसंबन्धे गुणसम्बन्धे च विधीयमाने वा- क्यभेदः । तस्माच्चित्राशब्दः कर्मनामधेयम् । तथा च चित्रायागेन पभावयेटिति सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयान्न वाक्यभेदः । प्र- कृतहरनेकद्रव्यत्वेन चित्राशब्दवाच्यत्वोपपत्तिः । अग्निहोत्र जुहोतीत्यवाग्रिहोत्रशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं नत्प्रख्यशासात् । तस्य गुणस्य प्रख्यापकस्य प्रापकस्य (६) शासस्य विद्यमानत्वाद- निहोत्रशब्दः कर्मनामधेयमिति यावत। नन्वयं गुणविधिरेव कु- तो नति चेन्न । यद्यगौ होत्रमस्मिन्निति सप्तमीममासमाश्रित्य होमाधारत्वेनाग्निरूपो गुणो विधेयस्तदा यदावनोये जुहो- नीत्यनेनैवानः प्राप्तत्वात विधानानर्थक्यम् । अनये क्षेत्रमिति चतुर्थीसमासमाश्रित्य अग्निदेवनारूपगुणो ऽनेन विधीयतहति (१) तस्य प्रख्यापकस्येति पाठः 'मम' पुस्तकयोः ।

·( २० ) चेन्न । तद्देवतायाः शाबान्तरण प्राप्तत्वात् । किं तछावान्तर- मिति चेत् । यदनये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीति के चित् । अपरे त्वनिर्धोतिर्यो तिरनिस्वाहेति मन्त्रवर्ण एवानिरूपदे- यताप्रापकः । नन्वनेर्मान्त्रवर्णिकत्वे प्रजापतिदेवताया वाधः स्यात् । मन्त्रवर्णस्य चतुर्थोतो दुर्बलत्वात । यथाहुः ॥ नद्वितेन चतुर्थ्या च मन्त्रवर्णेन वा पुनः देवताया विधिस्तत्र दुर्बलं तु परंपरमिति ॥ चेन्न । यदनये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीत्यत्र न केवलं प्रजापतिविधानम् । किं तु मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमग्रिमनूद्य नत्ममुच्चि- नप्रजापतः । एवं च न बाधः केवलप्रजापतिविधानाभावात् । न चात्र समुचितोभयविधानमेव कथं नेति वाच्यम् । समुच्चितो- भयविधानापेक्षया ऽन्यतः प्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितप्रजाप- तिमात्रविधाने लाघवात् । एवं च प्रयाजेषु समिटाढिदेवताना समिधः समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्त्वित्यादिमन्त्रवणेभ्यः प्राप्त- त्वात् । समिधो यजतीत्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्पख्यशाम्ला- कर्मनामधेयाः ॥ ज्येनेनाभिचरन् यजतेत्यच श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं त- उपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति याव- त्। तथा हि यदिधेयं तस्य स्तुतिभवति । यद्यत्र ज्येनो विधेयः स्थान नदार्थवादैस्तस्यैव स्तुतिः कार्या । यया वैयेनो निपत्या- दत्ते एवमयं द्विषन्तं भ्राटव्यं निपत्यादत्त इत्यनेनार्थवादेन श्येनः स्तोतुं न शक्यः । श्येनोपमानेनार्थान्तरस्तुतेः क्रियमाणत्वात् । नमध्येनोपमानत्वेन स एव स्तोतुं शक्यते। उपमानोपमेयभा- ·( १ ) वस्य भिननिष्ठत्वात । यदा तु श्येनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते त- ढार्थवादेन श्येनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कत्तुं शक्यनइति श्येनश- दः कर्मनामधेयं नापटेशादिति । उत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणवन्नीयस्त्व- मपि पञ्चमं नामधेयनिमित्तमिति क चित । यथा वैश्वदेवेन यजेतत्यादी। अत्रोन्यत्तिशिष्टाग्न्यादीनां बनीयम्वाद्वैश्वदेवश- ब्दस्य विश्वेदेवदेवताविधायकत्वं न संभवतीति कर्मनामधेयत्व- म। वस्तुतस्तु तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रादेवास्य कर्मनामधेयत्वम् । प्रकृत- यागे विश्वेदेवरूपगुणमंसिपनशासस्यार्थवादरूपस्यैव मत्वा- त। यद्विश्वेदेवाः समयजन्त तद्वैश्वदेवस्य वैश्वदेवत्वम् ॥ पुरुषस्य निवर्तकं वाक्यं निषेधः । निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतु- क्रियानिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वात । तथा हि । यथा विधिः प्र- वर्तनां प्रतिपादयन स्वप्रवर्तकत्व निर्वाहा) विधेयस्य यागाटेरि- एमाधनत्वमाभिपन षुरुषं तत्र प्रवर्तयति तथा न कन्ननं भवा- येदित्यादिनिषेधो ऽपि निवर्तनां प्रतिपादयन स्वनिवर्तकत्वनि- हाथ निषेध्यस्य कलञ्जभक्षणस्य परानिष्टमाधनत्वमाशिपन पुरुषं ततो निवर्तयति । ननु निषेधवाक्यम्य कथं निवर्तनाप्रति- पादकत्वमिति चेदुच्यते । न तावत्र धात्वर्थस्य नार्थेनान्वयः अव्यवधाने ऽपि तस्य प्रत्ययार्थभावनोपमर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितः । न छान्योपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितमन्यत्रान्वेति । अन्यथा राजपुरुष- मानयेत्याढावपि राज्ञः क्रियान्वयापत्तः। अतः प्रत्ययार्थस्यैव नत्रर्थनान्वयः । तत्रापि नाख्यातत्वांशवाच्यार्थभावनायास्तस्या लिङशवाच्यप्रवर्तनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितः। किंतु निङशवा- घशब्दभावनायास्तस्याः सर्वापेच्या प्रधानत्वात् । नत्राश्चैव ख- ·( २२ ) भावो यखममभिव्याहतपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्वम्। यथा घटो नास्तीत्यादौ अस्तोतिशब्दसमभिव्याहतो नञ् घटसत्त्वविरोधि घटासत्त्वं गमयति तदिह निङ्समभिव्याहतो न निङर्थ- प्रवर्तनाविरोधनों निवर्त्तनामेव बोधयति। विधिवाक्य श्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रतीतेः (१) । तस्मानिषेधवाक्यस्थले निर्कनैव वाक्यार्थः । यदा तु प्रत्ययार्थस्य तत्रान्वये बाधकं तदा धात्वर्थ- स्वैव तत्रान्वयः । तच्च बाधकं द्विविधम । तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमी विकल्पासक्तिश्च । तत्राद्यं नशेतोद्यन्तमादित्यमित्यादौ तस्य तमित्युपक्रम्यैतडाक्यपाठात् । तथा चात्र पर्यु दासाश्रयणम् । तथा हि। व्रतशब्दस्य कर्त्तव्यार्थे रूढत्वात्तस्य व्रतमित्यत्र स्ना- तकस्य व्रतानां कर्तव्यत्वेनोपक्रमात् । कि तत्कर्तव्यमित्याका- शायां नेोतोद्यन्तमित्यादिना कर्त्तव्यार्थ एव प्रतिपादनीयः । अन्यथा पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । तथा च न- अर्थेन न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः । कर्तव्यार्थानवबोधात् । विध्यर्थप्रव- नाविरोधिनिवर्तनाया एव तादृशनमा बोधनात् । तस्याश्च कर्तव्यार्थत्वाभावात्। तस्मान्नेक्षनेत्यत्र नना धात्वर्थविरोध्यनी- क्षण मंकल्प एव लशणया प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य कर्त्तव्यत्वसंभवात् । आदित्यविषयकानोमणसंकल्पेन भावयदिति वाक्यार्थः । तत्र भाव्याकाङ्क्षायां एतावना हैनमा वियुक्तो भवतीति वाक्यशेषा- (१) प्रतीतेरित । प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतेरित्यर्थः । यद्रा यजेत स्वर्ग काम इति विधिवा- क्यश्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रवर्तनापतीतिवन्न कल जं भक्षयदित्यादिनिषेधवा. क्यश्रवणे ऽप्ययं मां निवर्त यतोति निवर्तनाप्रतीतोरत्यध्याहारण, विधीत्यादिहेतुवा- स्पं दृष्टान्त दान्तिकविधया योजनीयमिति टीकाग्रन्धः । एतदनुसारेण क चित्पुस्तके पाठभेदोऽपि ॥ .

·(१३ ) वगतः पापचयो भाव्यतया ऽन्वेनि।एवं च पूर्वोत्तरयोरेकवाक्यत्वं निर्वइत्येव । न चात्र धात्वर्थविरोधिनः पदार्थान्तरस्यापि सं. भवात्कथमनोशणसंकल्पस्येव भावनान्चय इति वाच्यम् । तस्य कर्तव्यताभावेन प्रकृने भावनान्वयायोग्यत्वात्। दिनोयं यज- तिषु ये यजामहं करोति नानुयाजेम्वित्यादी अत्र विकल्पप्रस- तौ च पर्युटामाश्रयणात । तथा हि यद्यत्र वाक्ये नार्थे प्रत्य- यार्थान्वयः स्यात्तदानुयाजेषु येयजामहमिति मन्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधः स्यात् । अनुयाजेषु येयजामई न कुर्यादिति । स च प्राप्तिपूर्वक एव प्राप्तस्यैव प्रतिषेधात् । प्राप्तिश्च यजतिषु येयजामहं करोती- ति भाखादेव वाथा शाखप्राप्तस्य च प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव न तु बाधः । प्राप्तिमूनरागस्येव तन्मून्न शाखस्य शाखान्तरेणा बाधायो- गात । न च पदे जुहोतीति विशेषशास्त्रेणा हवनीये जहोती- नि शाखस्येव नानुयाम्वित्यनेन यजतिषु येयजामहं करोतो- त्यस्य बाधः स्यादिति वाच्यम। परस्परनिरपेक्षायोरेव शासयो- बाध्यबाधकभावात् । पद शाखस्य हि म्वार्थविधानार्थमाहवनी- यभाखानपेश्शणानिरपेशवम । प्रकृते तु निषेधशाखस्य निषे. ध्यप्रमत्त्यर्थं यजतिषु येयजामहमित्यस्यापेठाणान्न निरपेक्षत्व- म। तस्माछाखविहितस्य शाखान्तरण प्रतिषधे विकल्प एव । स च न युक्तः । विकल्पे शाखस्य पाशिकाप्रामाण्यसंपानात् । न हनुयाजषु येयजामहमित्यस्यानुष्ठाने नानुयाम्वित्यस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति । श्रीहियागानुष्ठाने यवशाखस्येव हिरदृष्टक- रूपना च स्यात् । विधिप्रतिषेधयोरपि पुरुषार्थत्वात् । अतो नाच प्रतिषेधस्याश्रयणं किंतु नमो ऽनुयाजसंबन्धमाश्रित्य ·( २४ ) पर्युदासस्यैव । इत्थं चानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेषु यजतिषु येयजाम- इमिति मन्त्रं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। नमो ऽनुयाजव्यतिरि- तलागणिकत्वात । एवं च न विकल्पः । अत्र च वाक्ये येयजा- महइति न विधीयते यजतिषु येयजामह इत्यनेनैव च प्राप्तत्वा- न। किंतु सामान्यशास्त्रप्राप्तयेयजामह इत्यनुवादेन तस्यानु- याजव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वं विधीयते । यद्यजतिषु येयजामई क- रोतीति तदनुयाजव्यनिरिक्तवेवेति । नन्वेवं सामान्यशाखमा- तस्य विशेषे संकोचनरूपादुपसंहारात्पयुदासस्य भदो न स्यादिति चेन्न । उपसंहारो हि तन्मात्रसंकोचार्थः । यथा रोडाशं चतुर्दा करोतोति समान्यप्राप्तं चतुर्दाकरणम् । श्रा- मेयं चतुर्दा करोतीति विशेषादाग्नेयपुरोडाशमात्रे संकोच- ने । पर्युदासस्तु तदन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इति ततो भेदात् । कुत्र चित् विकल्पप्रमतावप्यनन्यगत्या प्रतिषेधाश्रयणम् । यथा ना- लिरात्र षोडशिनं गृहातीत्यादौ । अत्र हि अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृहातीति शाखप्राप्तषोडशियणस्य निषेधादिकल्पप्रसक्तावपि न पयुदासाश्रयणाम्। असंभवात् । तथा हि । यद्यत्र षोडशिप- दाथन नमान्नयस्तदातिरावे षोडशिव्यतिरिक्तं गृहातीति वाक्यार्थबोधः स्यात्म च न संभवति । अतिरात्र षोडशिनं गृ- छातीति प्रत्यक्षविधिविरोधात् । यदि चातिरात्रण पदार्थेना. न्वयस्तदातिरावव्यतिरिक्त षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति वाक्यार्थबोधः स्यात्मो ऽपि न संभवति तविधिविरोधात् । अतोऽत्रानन्य- गत्या शाखप्राप्तषोडशियहणस्यैव निषेधः । न च विकल्पप्रस- तिः तस्याप्यपेक्षणोयत्वात् । इयांस्तुविशेषो यदिकल्पादेकप्रति- ·पंधे ऽपि प्रनिषिध्यमानस्य नानर्थहेतुत्वम् । विधिनिषेधोभय- स्यापि कन्वर्थत्वात् । यत्र तु न विकल्पः प्राप्तिश्च रागत एव प्र. तिषेधश्च पुरुषार्थः तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वम् । यथा न कलज भशयेदित्यादौ कलचभक्षणादेः। नत्र भक्षणनिषेध- स्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वात् । न च दीक्षितो न ददानि न ज़होतीत्यादी शास्त्रप्राप्तटानहोमादीनां निषेधादिकल्पापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । खतः पुरुषार्थभूतदानहोमादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावे ऽपि (१) निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात् यथा रतौ खखीगम- नादेः। तनिषेधस्य क्रत्वर्थत्वेन तस्य क्रतवैगण्यसंपादकत्वात् । प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः । तस्य च लक्षणया प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसानम। तथा हि। अर्थवादवाक्यं हि स्वार्थ- प्रतिपादने प्रयोजनाभावाविधेयनिषेध्ययोः प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितन्वे लक्षणया प्रतिपादयति । स्वार्थमानपरत्वे आनर्धक्यप्रसङ्गात् । आम्नायस्य हि क्रियार्थत्वात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः । स्वाध्यायो ऽध्ये- तव्य इत्यध्ययन विधिना सकनवदाध्ययनं कर्तव्यमिति बोधय- ता सर्ववेदस्य प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसायित्वं मूचयतोपातत्वेना- नर्थक्यानुपपत्तेः । स डिविधः। विधिशेषो निषेधशेषश्चेति । मत्र वायव्यं भवेतमालभेत भूतिकाम इत्यादिविधिशेषस्य वायुर्वे क्षपिष्ठा देवतेत्यादविधेयाथप्राशस्त्यबोधकतयार्थवत्त्वम् । क- हिषि रजतं न देयमित्यादिनिषेधशेषस्य मो ऽरोटीद्यदरो- ढोत्तमुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वमित्यादेनिषेधस्य निन्दितत्वबाधकतयार्थ- वत्त्वम् । न च प्राशस्त्यादिबोधस्य निष्प्रयोजनत्वन नार्थवाद- (१) पिकत्वर्थवेनान पाठो ग पम्न के ।

·( २६ ) स्यार्थवत्त्वमिति वाच्यम् । आलस्यादिवशादप्रवर्तमानस्य पुंमः प्रवृत्त्याटिजनकत्वेन नहोधस्योपयोगात । स पनखेधा । तदुक्तम् । विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादो ऽवधारिते। भूतार्थ- बाढस्तद्वानादर्थवाढविधा मत इति । अस्यार्थः । प्रमाणान्तर- विरोधे सत्यर्थवादो गुणवादः । यथाऽऽदित्यो यूप इत्यादि। यपे आदित्याभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वादादित्यवदुज्ज्वलत्वरू- पगुणो ऽनेन लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते। प्रमाणान्तरावगतार्थबोध- को ऽनुवादः । यथा ऽग्निहिमस्य भेषजमित्यत्र हिमविरोधि- त्वस्याग्नी प्रत्यक्षावगतत्वात । प्रमाणान्तरविरोधतत्प्राप्ति(१)- रहितार्थबोधको वादो भतार्थवादः । यथेन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुद- यच्छदित्यादि । एवं च यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादि निखिलवेदस्य साक्षात्परंपरया वा यागादिधर्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् । सो ऽयं धर्मो यदुद्दिश्य विहितस्तदुद्दशन क्रियमाणस्तहेतुः । ईश्वरा- पणबुड्या क्रियमाणस्तु नियमहेतुः । न च तदर्पणबुद्यानुष्ठाने प्रमाणाभावः । यत्करोषि यदनासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत। यत्तपस्यमि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणामिति भगवद्गीतास्मृते- रेव प्रमाणत्वात् । स्मृतिचरणे तत्प्रामाण्यस्य श्रुतिमूलकत्वेन व्यवस्थापनादिति शिवम् ॥ बालानां सुखबोधाय भास्करण सुमेधमा । रचितोऽयं समासेन जैमिनीयार्थसंग्रहः ।। इति श्रीमहोपाध्यायलागाक्षिभास्करविरचितपूर्वमीमांसा- र्थसंग्रहनामकं प्रकरणं समाप्तिमगात ॥ (१) प्रमाणात विरोधतः स्तुति हात पाठो ग च पुस्तक योः ।

·TRANSLATION. Reverence to Krishiņa.- Having shown his reserruce to l'úsundera the husband of Rama, Laugikshi --Bhi-kam composes the Artia-Simgrala as an introduction to the doctrine of Jaimini. The highly binolent reverend Jaimini has composed a book in twee adhvavas for the discriminative hnowledge of duty. At its beginning he speaks of the desire of knowing duty in the following aphorism “est therefore a desire to know duty". In this aphorison thr word "A" express the immediate consecution of the desire of knowing luty) on the reading of the Vedla. The world "therefore." expresses the circumstance of the reading of the Veda having a visible purpose (and not merely tending to produce an unseen result as f.i the performanor of the sacrifices dors)., as the passage enjoining the reading of the Verlit (viz. "one is to read the Veda ") settirs that this reailing has for its visible purpose the hoonkolor of the son of the Vola. (For a piropor understand ing of the aphorism quoted above) we have therefore to complement, the aphorism as follows "Because the reading of the Vedalias a visible purpose which consists in the knowledge of its seronco, fur this reason, after the reading of the Voda, the desire of knowing duty which latter is the purport of the Vela has to be entertaind. The phrase "desire of knowing" implies the idea of enquiry, sot that the aphurisin actually refers to the beginning of the (Mimamsá —-) sústra and means "this Sci-tra whose matter is the enquiry into duty is to be began.” (1) Here the question arises :—What is duty? what is its distinct.! ire character (its definition)?--To this we reply: Sacrifics etc. only(?) are duty; and we define duty as that matter which has a (1) For a full discussion of the 16t very important question of the meaning of atha and atas sec Jaimn. Nr:iya M V. pp. 11 12. (2) The word "only herues to exclude quani--religious acts like the worship of challjas which are uot taught in the Veua.

·( 2 ) purpose and is to be accomplished according to the Veda. The phrase "which has a purpose" serves to exclude from the things comprised in the definition matters which are themselves of the nature of a purpose (as f. i. the different results of the sacrifices viz. paradise etc.).— The phrase "which is to be accomplished according to the Veda” serves to exclude from the definition matters like the act of eating (which is performed not on the authority of the Veda hut on the prompting of a natural instinct). The word " matter” (artha ; which includes the idea of goodness or usefulness) serves to exclude actions like the sacrifice called “Śyena”, wbich are to be considered as bad things (anartha) on account of their having a bad result (viz. the death of some enemy, for the bringing about of which the sacrificer himself will bave to go to hell).(1) Hero it might be olnjected that this definition of duty is in conflict with the definition given in the Mímámsá-Sútras where it is said (I. 2) “Duty is that matter the distinctive character of which is instigation"; in which latter definition the word "instigation" denotes only that one part of the Veda which has the form of injunctions (vidhi).-To this we reply that in reality the two definitions are not conflicting because in the Sútra also the word "instigation” denotes the Veda in general as the whole Veda on account of its aiming at duty serves to express the accomplishment of duty. (If now we be asked to point out in detail the appropriateness of our definition of duty we proceed:) Acts of duty as sacrifices etc. are enjoined with reference to man by vedie sentences (as f. i.“he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice") in which paradise etc. is pointed out as the result. The particulars are as follows. The word "yajeta" "he may sacrifice" contains two constituent elements viz. the root yaj (yaji) and the suffix. The suffix again contains (1) Cp. Jain. Nyáy. M. V., pp 14. 15. But why then--might it be asked-are Sacrifices of the nature of the Syena taught in the Veda ? --To this question the : Sabara-bhashya (p 5 ) answers : (Ratham pusar anarthah kartavyatayopadiśyateuchyate) naiva syenadayah kartaviá vijnáraute-yo hi himsitum ichchhet tasydyam abhyupayaḥ-iti hi teshám upadeśaḥ-syenenábhicharan yajeta iti hi samémanantina abhicharitavyam iti.

·( 3 ) two elements as it expresses as well the property of a verb as the property of an optative. The property of expressing a verb is common to the suffixes of the ten moods and tenses (all of which when added to a root turn the latter into a verb ); the property of expressing an optative exclusively belongs to the optative sutlixes.--- Both elements express a creative energy (bhávaná) only.(i) By bhávaná (“creative energy" or "productive enervy" or "tendcney to realize something") we understand the particular activity of some productive agent (bhávayitri) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to buy (bhavitri; which is capable of futuro existence). Such productive energy is twofole being either verbal (śälula) or actual (artla) -- By "verbal bhavana" we understand the preuliar activity of somo productive agent which tends to make a person act; it is expressed by the optative element (of words like " vajetit"); for if some person hears a verb with an optativo termination there arises in his inind the exclusive notion "le (the speaker) instigates me to act; he is engaged in an energy tending to make me act." (la this explanation of the element which rapresses the blúvaná wo proceeil) according to the general rule that whatever is exclusive ly understood in consequence of some word being uttered is expressed by it (is the sense of the word ); as f. i. in the sentence " bring the cow” the general character of cow (gotva) is the senso of the word "cow." The peculiar activity (which has been mentioned above in the definition of bhávaná) is in the case of a sontence belonging to ordinary worldly language some particular intention dwelling in the mind of a speaking person; in vedic sontences on the other hand where there is no speaking person it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. For this reason this bbávaná is called verbal Wháraná. This bhávaná requires three constituent elements; the matter which is to be accomplished the result; sádlya); the incans by which the result is effected (the instrument; sádhana); and the mode in which the result is effected (itikartavyatá); according to the three questions (suggested by each bhávaná): what is to be ef- (1) The word "only" is meant to exclude the agent (kartri) etc.

·( 4 ) fected? by what means is it to be effected ? how is it to be effected ? - Here now the want of a result to be accomplished being felt there steps in the actual bhávaná (árthi bhávaná) with its three constituent elements which we shall explain further on and fills the place of the wanted result, since here takes place a samánábhidbána- Śruti i. e. a direct statement of the intimate connexion of two matters by means of the two being expressed by the same word, (the bábdí as well as the árthí bhávaná being expressed by the one optative form). (To supply the arthí bhávaná—i. e. the peculiar energy of a person to which the sábdí bhávaná instigates—as that which is to be accomplished is more natural than to supply anything elso as f. i. the sacrifice itself, because the optative form of words like “yajeta" expresses both bhávanás, from which circumstance the intimate connexion of the two is readily inferred). It might perhaps he remarked by some one that other matters too, as f.i. number (i.e. singular, dual, plural) and time (present etc.) are expressed by the one optative affix and that therefore number, time etc. likewise occupy the place of sádhya with regard to the verbal bhávaná. But such an assumption would be erroneous as number, time etc. are not fit to fill the place of the thing to be accomplished.-If the want of an instrument (of the verbal bhávaná) arises, the place of such a one is filled by the knowledge of the optative form etc. The instrumentality of the optative does not lie in its producing the bhavana--for the latter exists in the word even before the knowledge (by some person) of tho optative form—; but rather in the circumstance of the optative form expressing the bhávaná or its tending to bring about the result to be effected by the verbal bhávaná (which result as remarked above is the actual bhávaná).-If finally the want of a mode (of the verbal bhávaná) presents itself, the place of such a one is filled by the praise or glorification (of the acts of duty) which is found in the arthavadapassages. Actual (árthi) bhávaná is to be defined as the peculiar energy of some person) which refers to some action (as f. i. a sacrifice) which energy is engendered by the desire of some object. This actual bhávaná is-in words like yajeta-expressed by that element of the ·( 5 ) word which denotes the verb; for tho verb in general (independent of the different moods and tenses) expresses an energy.--This bhávaná too requires three constituent elements, the matter which is to be accomplished,--the result; the means by which the result is effected the instrument; and the mode in which the result is effected; according to the three questions (suggested by the actual bhávaná as well as the verbal bhávaná): what is to be offereted? by what means is it to be effected? bow is it to be effected? If the thing to be accomplished is asked for, results of the nature of paradise step in as the things to be accomplished ; if the instrument is asked for, actions like the sacrifice present themselves as the instruments (by which the result is obtained); if the mode of action is asked for, all the subsidiary matters as f. i. tho pravájas (which form a part of the sacrifice) present themselves and point out the mode of action. If now the question is asked "what is the Veda", wo answer : sentences not produced by man. The Veda is fivefold, being either injunction (vielli) or sacrificial formula (mantra) or (nímadheya) or prohibition (nishedha) or explanatory statement (arthavádli). That part of the Veda which intimates a thing not known (by other means) is called “Injunction.” Injunction has a sense in consequence of its enjoining a natter : having a certain purpose in as far as it enjoins the matter as not established by any other means of proof("); as f. i. the vedic passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the agnihotra ;" which injunction enjoins an oblation having for its purpose (the attaining of) paradise which is not settled by any other incans of proof; so that the sense conveyed by the passage is "he is to realize paradise by means of the Agnihotra-oblation". When on the other hand the (sacrificial) action is already settled by some other means of proof, an injunction merely enjoins somesecondary matter ( guna) i with a view to that action. As is f. i. the case in tbe passage "he is to perform the oblation by ineans of sour milk.” Here, the oblation itself being already established by the injunction "he is to NAMIC (1) This appears a somewhat clumsy way of stating what is more clearly expressed in the following words of the Apaderi: Sa cha vidhihprayojula vadarthavidhíocuártbavín sa chápráptam artbem vidhatte.

·(6) offer the Agnihotra", there is only enjoined sour milk with a view to the oblation ( as the material to be used for the oblation ); so that the sense is “he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk."—Where both things are non-established (i. e. in the case of neither the sacrifice nor any secondary matter pertaining to the sacrifice being established by a previous injunction), the injunction enjoins something particularized (or specialized; višishta ); as f.i. in the injunction “he is to sacrifice by means of soma”; here, the soma as well (which is the material of the sacrifice) as the sacrifice itself not being established (by any other injunction), there takes place the injunction of that sacrifice which is particularized by soma ( as its material).-Nor is it to be objected that (the passage being interpreted in the aforesaid manner) there takes place a split of the sentence (vákyabbeda) the word somena” enjoining two things; for there are not enjoined two separate things, but only one particularized thing (viz. that particular sacrifice for which soma is used).-Nor again is it to be objected that the pagsage "somena yajeta” merely enjoins soma as the material of that sacrifice which itself is already established by the other passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice by means of the jyotishţoma," so that the sense of the injunction would be "he is to realize tbe sacrifice (the jyotishțoma) by means of soma"; it being pleaded for this interpretation that it allows us to dispenso with the assuinption of possessive indication (matvartha-laksbaņá; by which term is understood the denoting a thing by something else connected with it, as a quality etc.; as when the word soma” is made to denote a sacrifice in which soma is used). For the passage referring to the jyotishţoma is an injunction intimating a claim (adhikára-vidhi) and this cannot be taken as an originative injunction (utpatti-vidhi; if the passage about the jyotishțoma could be taken as the one containing the primary, original injunction of the soma-sacrifice, the passage somena yajeta” might be taken as a guņa-vidhi and thus "i somena" would not have to be explained as meaning "somavatá yágena; but as the purport of the passage about the jyotishțoma is not simply to enjoin the soma-sac- | rifice but to intimate the claim which the sacrificer has to the fruit of the sacrifice, we are compelled to take “ somena yajeta" « ·( 7 ) as the originative injunction of the soma-sacrifice and therefore to explain "somena" by "somavatá vágena").—To this reasoning it might be objected that the passage about the jyotislițoma may be taken as comprising an originative injunction as well as an injunction intimating a claim as this is aroweals the case with other passages as f. i. the passage he who desires cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid." But we answer: It is not so. In the apparently parallel case which you adduce (viz. the passage about the udbloid) we assume the double nature of the injunction because such an assumption is unavoidabile, there being no other statement originative of the sacrifice ( while in the case of the sonia-sacrifice there are two injunctions; the instances are therefore not parallel).- And morcover it we explain the passage about the jyotishfoma as containing two injunctions it would have to be taken as intimating the sacrifice itself and its connection with its fruit and this would be a manifest split of the sentence ; better than which is the ussumption of the passage onjoining something particularized (a sacrifice particularized by soma), by means of our attributing to the word soina the power of possessive indication.-- Injunction is of four different kinds, being either originative injunction (utpattividhi) or applicatory injunction (viniyogavilbi) or injunction of a claim (adlikáravidli) or injunction of perforniane (pravogaridhi). That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called originative injunction as f. i. the pratusige "hio is to offer the agnihotra-oblation". In injwetions of this kind the sacrificial action itself occupies thr place of the instrument, no that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the object of his desire by means of the agnihotra-oblation."-But, it may be objected, the two forms ( aspects; rúpa ) of a sacrifice are tho material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation", in which neither of these two forms is mentioned be considered an originative injanction, the word "agnihotra" (which spemingly indicates the divinity of tlie sacrifice viz. agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of the existence of another scriptural passage ) declaratory of it; (which ·( 8 ) principle will be explained in the chapter on námadheya).- To this objection we reply: The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the agnihotra ) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (viz. the material) and then the passage “he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation" would be purposeless. That injunction which intiinates the connexion of some subsidiary matter with some principal matter is called applicatory injunction (showing how the subsidiary matter is to be applied to the principal matter ). As f. i. the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk” which enjoins the connexion, with the oblation, of sour milk the subsidiary position of which is intimated by the third case-affix (the case-affix of dadhná showing that sour milk is to be used as an instrument and therefore is merely subsidiary to the action whose instrument it is). So that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk”.-In injunctions of some secondary matter (guna) that which is expressed by the root (as “juboti" in the above example ) occupies the position of the object to be accomplished (so that "juhoti” is properly explained by “homam khávayet.-In an utpatti-vidhi and an adhikáravidhi on the the other hand the root denotes the instrument; agnihotram juhoti = agnihotra-homena ishtam bhávayet). Sometimes the root expresses the abode of an action as f. i. “he is to perform the oblation for him, who is desirous of strength of the senses, by means of sour milk”; where the sense is “he is to realize strength of the senses by the instrumentality of sour milk”; and if now the question arises "wherein does it ( the instrumentality of sour milk) reside ?" the oblation which is mentioned close by steps in denoting the abode. Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, viz. direct statement (śruti); power (linga); sentence or syntactical connexion (vákya); interdependence (prakaraņa); place or order (sthána); name (samákhyá). Applicatory injunctions assisted by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation ; the ;

·( 9 ) subsidiary position of something consists in its being accomplished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of some other result ( so f. i. the prayajus are performed by a sacrificer offering the newmoon-sacritice with a view to obtaining paradise); the same subsidiary position is expressed by the term "párárthya" "existing for the purpose of something else." (We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the above mentionod six means of proof). Direct statement (sruti; literally "text") we define as irrespective or independent words (words which intimate their sense directly without any interinediate steps of the nature of those required by the other means of proof). Direct statement is of three different kinds being either injunctivo (viilhátri) or denotativo (ubhidhátri) or applicative ( viniyoktrí). To the first class belong the direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optativo furin directly indicating the bhávaná). To the second class belong statemeuts as those about the rice-grains (viz. sentences liko "vrihin avalanti” “vrihin prokshati" etc., where the word "rice-grains" directly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its connexion with the bhávaná). If finally from the more hearing (tho mere statement) of a word a connexion (between some primary and some subsidiary mattor) is understood, we have an applicatory Sruti. Sruti of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct statement by means of case-attixes or direct statement by means of one denotative word (or element of a word) or direct statement hy means of one pada (in the restricted grammatical sense). Direct statement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subsidiary, as f. i. in the passage “he is to sacrifice by means of rice grains" where by the direct statement of the third case-affix the subsidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. This subsidiary relation is bere brought about by the rice-grains forming the original substance out of which the cake is made (which latter stands in direct subsidiary relation to the sacrifice); in the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) stands in subsidiary relation to the saerifice in consequence of its being the original substance from which the parts actually offered ·( 10 ) viz. the heart etc. are taken.- In the passage "he is to buy the soma by means of a tawny, one year old (cow)" the quality of being tawny is by the direct enunciation of the third case affix shown to stand in subsidiary relation to the act of buying; this subsidiary relatiou takes here place by (the quality's) defining a substance viz. the cow, not directly; the latter not being possible on account of the immateriality of a mere quality.–Again in the passage “he sprinkles the rice-grains with water" the sprinkling stands in subsidiary relation to the rice-grains, as appears from the direct enunciation of the second case affix. And, it is to be observed, this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains considered in themselves as they would be perfect without the sprinkling, but has the purpose of bringing about the transcendental result (apúrva), which would not be brought about were the sacrifice performed without sprinkling the rice grains with water. In the same manner it is to be understood with reference to all subsidiaries that the subsidiary relation has the purpose of contributing towards bringing about the transcendental result.-Let us tako another passage. I seized this bridle of the right; with these words he is to take hold of the bridle of the horse." Here the direct enunciation of the second caso affix shows the mantra to stand in a subsidiary relation to the bridle of the horse.(1) .Or another passage. “ When he offers the oblation in the ihavaniya-fire." Here the seventh case affix shows that the áhavaniya stands in auxiliary relation to the " Thus (1) The abovo quoted example seems hardly to fall under the category of śruti but rather under vákva; which opinion as we see from the commentary was actually held by some teachers. The commentary says "some teachers maintain that the application (of tho mantra to the action of taking the bridle of the horse) is founded on vákya. Others however object to this assumption and maintain that, in consequence of linga having greater force than vákya, liága would settle the mantra's standing in subsidiary relation to a bridlo in general before vákya could establish its exclagive relation to the bridle of the horse. Those however who suppose the application of the mantra to be founded on vakya defend their opinion by maintaining that the mantra does not point to a bridle in general but to the bridle of the right i. e, the horso which is an instrument to bring about the right and that therefore the mantra is to be applied to the taking of the lus.rsc's bridle in consequence of the vakya "asvábhidhaním ddatte" which is merely assisted by linga.--The author of the text (i. c. Laugikshi-Bhaskara) however does not admit that a lióga in the mantra points to Bonto peculiar kind of bridle (rather thau to the bridle in general).

·( 11 ) offering.-Thns in other crises too direct statement by means of case-attises points out the proper application (of subsidiary matters). (We now procred to the two other kinis of viniyoktrí śruti). In the sentence "pabuna vajeta" "ho is to sacrifice by means of an animal" direct statement liv means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which singularity and masculinity stanil to the káraka; while again direct statement by means of ouo denotativo worl points out the subsilary relation in which tho number expressed by the verbal terruination of "yajeta" stunds to the whávaní. On the other hand wirect statement by means of one jada points out that this number stands in sulsidiary relation to the sacrificial action (fix the sacrificil action as well us thu singular number is expressed by the one pada "yajeta.") Nor is the following olujection to be raised "how can thr immaterial number staned in subsiiliary wlation to the blivana?"; for this is possible in consequency of the number defining an agent. Tiis agent again is to be soppwire by interence. For the verb expresses the whívanú only; Imut the bhávaná can not take place without an agent and therefore it leads to the inference of the latter. Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive powor flinga) and the other proofs (by which usw tuing is shown to be subsidiary to another); for in casroy where the subsidiary relation is established by suggestive power there is no verkxıl statement to be found which would directly teach the application (of a secondary matbor to a primary one), but such a statement has to be formed (viz. from the sentenco containing the ling); and in as fir as in the latter cilso an applicatory injunction has to buy assumed while in the case of direct enunciation such a one is already actually existing, the power of linga etc. which is fuuwled on an assumption is set aside by the power of the direct enunciation. For this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (i. c. a verse containing a mentiou of Indra's name or one of his attributes etc.) is really to lw used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same timo a direct enunciation as f. i. " with a verso bearing Indra's mark lie addresses the Gárhapatya" that in consequence of the direct euan- ·( 12 ) ciation of the second case termination (gárhapatyam) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the Gárhapatya-fire.(1) Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out something) is called liága. As it is said “the power of all words is named linga”. By power the same thing is understood as by the technical term rúdhi (conventional meaning ; i. e. a word has the power of denoting that thing as whose name it has been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore not be said that linga does not differ from samákhyá (name); for linga which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different from name (samákhyá) which consists in words the meaning of which is to be made out from the meaning of their constituent parts. Therefore the mantra "I cut grass for the seat of the gods” can only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of kusa-grass and not to the cutting of ulapa-grass and other kinds of grass, since from the power residing in the words "I cut etc.” it appears that the mantra is able to declare the cutting of kuśa-grass only.(3) In the same manner in other places too the application of a subsidiary matter is to be learned from suggestive power. Power (linga) has greater force than syntactical connexion (vákya) and the following means of proof. Let us take for an example the following mantra "I make a pleasant seat for thee, I make it very lovely with a stream of ghee; on this, the immortal one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded o marrow of the rice-grains”. Here the first half of the mantra (I make a pleasant seat-ghee) is to be considered as subsidiary to the act of making (1) The quoted șik is "sometimes thou art not hurtful, Indra, but comest to the worshipper" etc.; & verre which as mentioning Indra would be considered as connected with the worship of Indra, were it not for the direct statement referring it to the adoration of the Gárhapatya. The decision in favour of sruti as possessing greater force than linga rosts on the principle that on the basis of linga an injunction may be constructed containing a direct statement in the above case" aindramantrena indram upatishthota); that howover & direct statement actually found in the text (aindryk gárhapatyam upatishthate) has greater force than one constructed. (3) The example of lińya given in the text does not come in very appropriately after the remark on the difference of linga and samákhyá as samákhya has nothing whatever to do with it.- The passage is discussed as giving rise to a doubt in the Mím. Sútr.; but the doubt is wether words like barhis are to be taken in their mukhya (primary) sense only or also in their gauna (socondary) or derived senso.

·( 13 ) common a seat for the sacrificial cake, on account of the power of the words "I make a seat", and (the decision to what act the different parts of the mantra are subsidiary) is not to be made according to syntactical connexion (In the above mantra the two halves form one syntactical whole, the connexion being effected by the word "tasmin" (on this) beginning the second half. It might therefore be maintained that the whole undivided mantra is subsidiary to one act, either the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cako on the seat; or else that both nets are to be accompanied by the whole mantra. But here linga steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placing of the cake). By sentence or ayntactical connexion (vákva) we understand mployment and by this term we understand the connected enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to ench other in the relation of principal and subsidiary although this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly indicating the one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc. (which relations are directly indicated by vibhakti-śruti etc.) Take f. i. the passage "he whoso sacrificial laulle is made of paro1-wood hears no evil sound." Here wo see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of parna-wood and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter. Nor is it to be said that the circunstance of being made of parņa-wood is purposeluss as the ladle could be made also in a different way (i.c. from some other kind of wood). For the word ladle intimates at the same time the peculiar transcendental result to be accomplished by it (hy a ladle made of parọa-wood). So that the sense of the passage is " By its being made of parna-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle, hy means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (hy availána). As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of parna-wood then the transcendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in any other case the circumstance of its consisting of parna-wood is not purposeless. The phrase "by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel hy avadana" (i. Ⓡ. the ·( 14 ) ANM, . last clause of this phrase) is necessarily to be used as otherwise the quality of being made of parna-wood might be extended to gruva, sruk etc. also ( for these implements also might be denoted hy the word “juhu"-explained as a yaugika "húyate'nayá "and in them also the oblation is carried, but not when it has been taken out of the vessel in the manner called avadána). This quality of the ladle of being made of parņa-wood although it is given in the text in a detached rule (anárabhyádhíta ; a rule which stands hy itself, out of connexion with some particular sacrifice to which it might be referred; so that it must be considered as a general rule) is to be referred only to all the fundamental forms of the sacrifice (prakriti) not to their modifications (vikriti); for with regard to the latter it is already settled by an express rule (viz. by the general principle that a modification is to be performed in the same way as the fundamental forn of which it is a modification) and thus there would be a useless repetition (if we directly referred the statement about the ladle having to be made of parnawood to the modlifications also). A fundamental form of the sacrifice (prakriti ) is that one where we find a set of direct rules extending over all the subsidiary things (requisite for the sacrifice). Of this naturo is f. i. the darśapúrņamása-sacrifice, in immediate connexion with which we find all the requisite subsidiary matters stated in the text.-A mere modification (vikriti) on the other hand is that form of sacrifico where there are no direct rules with regard to the subsidiary inatters, as f. i. the oblation made to Súrya ( sauryam charum nirvapet ); there some of the subsidiaries are settled (not by direct rules given for this special sacrifice but) by transfer (atideśa; by transferring or exteuding the rules given for the fundamental form to the modification). Detached injunctions are injunctions of general validity (while rules which are not detached but under the influence of some prakaraṇa refer to that particular sacrifice only with which the prakaraṇa connects them). Syntactical connexion as a means of settling subsidiary relation is of greater weight than prakaraña and the rest. Thus f. i. with regard to the mantra (forming a part of the súktaváka ) "o Indrágní you accepted this offering eto". This whole mantra is on ac- ·(15)) hount of its forming one syntactical whole to be taken as subsidiary to the newinoun-sacrifice only and not, on account of prakarana, as subsidiary to the fullmoon-sacrifice is well. (The siktaváka belongs by prakaraņa to the darxa-sacritice as well as to the púrnamása-sacrifice. It lowever contains mantras which by their linum are marked as belonging to either of these two sacrifice's exclusivoly; so f. i. the mantra "imdrágni idan lavir ajusdictám avivſidhetáin malo jyáyo'krátám“ which box the word " indragni" is shown not to be applicable to the púrnnınási-sucrifice. It might however be inaintained that it is sufficient to leave out the ono word "indragni" and that then the remainder of the mantra is to lo iased at the púrņamása-sacrifice too, with which it is connected by prakarapa. This opinion however is impugned by the Minámsists who maintain that the syntactical connexion binding “indrhyni" to the remainder of the mantra is stronger than prakarışı and that consequently the whole mantra has to be left ont at the purņaincar-sucriticc.) l'ra karana means intrrependence (whlavákánkulk; mutnal desire; mutual want of a complement). An (xample is afforded boy the following passage connected with the pravájay "le is to offior the sumidli". As in this passage no special fruit (of the offiring) is mentioned, the sunse merely being " be is to realize by means of offering the sumielli”, there arives the question "what (is be to realize )?" originating in the want of something to which the offering of the samilli might contribute. Amaguin after the passingo about the darsitpúrnamása-sacrifice has given rise to the idea "Lo is to realize paradise by means of the darkupúrņamásı" there arises the question “ how ( is he to realize paradise)?" originating in tho want of sunething which may contribnte towards bringing about the desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subsidiary relation in which the pravájas stand to the darśapírņamáks is established. This prakarapa is of two kinds, great pirakurana (maháprakarara) and included prukarana (avántam-priharana ). By the furiner is to be understood that kind of prabarani which refers to the principal bhávaná (i.e. the "ray foreluctives of the fruit of the entire sacrificial action. Tloin mitt puitkarina establishes f. i. the subsidiary relativu in which thu pravajus ctc.

·( 16 ) stand to the darśapúrņamása. Great prakarana takes place with reference to the fundamental forms ( prakṣiti ) of the sacrifice only, as there only the relation of interdependence or mutual want is found (viz. if a fundamental form of the sacrifice is enjoined there arises at once the want of subsidiaries by means of which the sacrifice can be accomplished ; at the same time statements regarding subsidiaries give rise to the question to what sacrifice these subsidiaries belong). The case is different with regard to the modifications ( of the fundamental forms). For there, by the principle of transfer expressed in the words "a modification is to be carried out in the same manner as its fundamental forin" the want of something indicating how the action is to be performed is already satisfied and it is therefore impossible that the proper application of the new subsidiaries() should be settled by interdependence (there being in this case no mutual want, but a want on one side only viz. on the side of the subsidiaries.) Therefore the application of the new subsidiaries is in the case of a modification settled by place (sthána ) only, not by prakaraņa.-By included prakaraña is to bo understood prakaraña connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice. Included prakarana f. i. establishes the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping forward (abhikramaņa ) stands to the oblations called prayájas. Prakaraña of this kind is only known by the circumstance of an injunction being inserted in the middle of two others (sandamsa; the inserted injunction being grasped as it were by the two encoinpassing injunctions as by the two limbs of a pair of tongs). For if this peculiar position is not found all the subsidiaries mentioned ( among them the stepping forward) would be taken as expressing the mode of action of the energy productive of the general result (of the sacrifice) and would then be subsidiary to the principal action ( as the prayájas are). By the term sandamba is to be understood the position of an injunction between two subsidiaries enjoined with reference to some one gubsidiary. An example is furnished by the act of advancing (towards the ábavaniya; which forms a part of the sacrificial action of offering the prayájas). For (1) Apurva in this context means simply "now"; the subsidiaries which do not boloog to the prakriti but to the vikriti only.

·( 17 ) there at first a matter subsidiary to the pravájas is mentioned in the words " he is to pour (the butter) out of the upabhrit ( into the juhú); for splendour etc."; (after that comes the passage "he for whom knowing this the prayájas are offered pushes his enemies out of these worlds ; stepping forward he is to offer thein for victory"); and after this passage again a matter subsidiary to the pravájas is enjoined in the words "be who knows the coupling of the prayájas ete". For this reason the stepping forward which is mentioned in the middle of two things subsidiary to the prayájus is to be considered as itself subsidiary to the latter.() For after the idea has arisen that a contribution towards the sacrifice is to be made by means of bringing about a transcendentul result by tho prayájas, there arises the question "bow is the transcendental result to be brought about by means of the prayńjas ?" and this want of something teaching the mode of action is satisfied by the stepping forward etc. which actions are enjoined in the middle of matters subsidiary to the pravájas. Nor can the objection bo raised that the productive cnergy connected with the subsidiaries does not stand in need of a node of action being pointed out; for such a need actually exists this particular kind of productivo energy participating in the general nature of productive energy. Prakarana directly teaches the application of actions only, und only hy means of the latter the application of materials, qualities (which are connected with the actions). Wlen f. i. with regard to the energy tending towards the realization of a cortain fruit expressed in the passage "he who desires paradise is to sacrifice" the want of some mode how to bring about the result arises we have to take the set of actions which are mentioned in the sacred text in proximity to the above passage and with regard to which no fruit is mentioned (for if some special fruit were mentioned the set of actions could no longer be considered subsidiary to some other action); this set of actions which stands itself in need of something towards which it might contribute is to be connected with the above passage as indicating the mode of action. (1) For a different argumentation with regard to the same pastage see J. N. M. V. p. 100.-The practical issue of the decision is that only the person concerned with the prayájus has to stop forward and not all those engaged in the darśapúrpamára.

·( 18 ) That actions only can satisfy the want of the mode of procedure is a inatter of common experience. For if with regard to sentences like " the hand is to cleave by means of the axe” the question is asked "how (is the cleaving performed)?", the proper answer does not lie in the word "hand" although enunciated, but rather in the raising and lowering of the axe, the sense being “he is to cleave by raising and lowering the axe by means of the hand”; and thus the hand is connected with the act of cleaving only by ineans of the raising and lowering as is known to every body. l'rakarana has greater weight than position (thána) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like dicing etc. which are enjoined in the passage “he is to play at dice with a Rájanya" are, although they are read in the holy text in proximity to the abhishechaniya-ceremony and therefore would on the ground of position be subsidiary to the latter, in reality subsidiary to the rájasuya-sacrifice on the ground of prakarana. By position (sthána) is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (páthasádlesya) or equality of place according to the performance (anushthána-sádlesya). The term "krama" (order of succession) has the same meaning as sthána ( position). Equality of place according to the text again is of two different kinds, being either text according to number or else text according to proximity. An example of text according to number is offered by the following passages " he spreads a cake on eleven potsherds to Indragní" and "he spreads a cake on twelve potsherds to Visvánara". With regard to these passages which are found in the text in the given order the application of the vájyá and anuvákya mantras (indrágni rochaná divah etc.) is settled according to "text according to number" i. e. the first mantra is applied to the first sacrificial action, the second mantra to the secoud action. For if with regard to the mantra road in the first place the question arises “to what purpose does it serve"?, the sacrificial action enjoined in the first place presents itself first as they both occupy corresponding places. And so with regard to the second mantra also.--That things subsidiary to a modification, which things are enjoined with refer- ·(19) ence to subsidiaries of a fundlanırntal forn and stand in the midhlle of two injunctions, belong to the modification is to live concluded from "text according to prosimity." Sotii. in the citse of the oblations called amanahomas (Taist. S. 11. 33, 9). For als with regard to them the want of something to which they may refer arises, the transcendental result consequent on a certain molitiet form of the sacrifice naturally connects in self is truit (with the en oblations), because this movlitical form rralily presents itself (the modified form of the sacritice which is mentioned in the holy test close by the amana-homas in the hamvaliti the originativo injumetion of which is contained in the worils vaisuudesim námgralnim nirvaput grámakámab"). If on the other hand instead of the named oblations being considered subsidiary 10 at crrtain mwadification ) an independent fruit were assumed for them (they luing considered to produce a special apúrva of their own) blir being mentioned in the sacred test in immediate proximity to some mund ified form woull be purposedexs..-- Equality of place according to the performance shows f. i. liat the different details slated with regard to the sacrificial animal refer to the animal sacrificed 10 nishoman ; for the sacrifier of the animal offered t. Aynishoman is performed on anasthya day and on the we day (i. c. among the description of the cerimonies to be puerformed on that day) the details concerning the animal sacrifice are stated. And now there arises the want of something towards which these details might contribute the transcendental result produced by the animal sacritice whick pirra sents itself as something to be achieved naturally connects itself as that which is to be realized (liy means of the details ). -- !'rnition (sthána) is of greatris wright than sumáklivá (tiene). For this reason the mantra about purification (sundhadhvain dairtási karmane etc.) stands in subsidiary relation to the sámnás vir-faxwell only as it is read in proximity to the vessels, and does Best on account of the title "paurodásikam" (i. e. referring to the sacrificial cake ; the name of that chapter which treats of the offering of the sacrificial cake) stand in subsidiary relation to all the vessels connected with the sacrificiul cake. By "name" (samákhyá) are to be understood words the meaning of ·( 20 ) which is found by decomposing them into their elements (yaugikah Sabdaḥ).-It is of two kinds belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language. An example of the former kind is furnished by the vedic term "hotſichamasah", from which we conclude that the hotři stands in subsidiary relation to the drinking of (the contents of) the cup called chamasa. (The term “chamasa" which has to be derived from the root cham "to sip” and signifies the cup from which the soma is drunk shows that the soma contained in the cup is to be drunk by the hotşi ; for which circumstance a more direct rule is not given). The word "ádhvaryava” on the other hand which belongs to common language points out that the adhvaryu stands in subsidiary relation to different things ( mentioned in the adhvaryava káqda.)(0) This is a short statement of the power of samákhyá. Thus we have shortly explained the six means of proof, direct enunciation etc., assisted by which injunctions of application—as f. i. he is to offer the darśapúrņamása-sacrifice contributing towards it with the samidhs etc.--teach the proper application of subsidiary matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accomplished things or actions. By accomplished things we understand species (játi), substances (dravya), nunbers (samkliya) etc.(>) All these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again of two different kinds, being either secondary (gupakarma) or primary ( pradhánakarma). These same two classes of actions are also called actions contributing ( towards the general result of the saorifice ) through an intermediate step (sannipatyopa káraka) and actions contributing towards the general result) immediately or directly (árádnpakáraka). By actions of the former kind we understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance etc. which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action. Of this kind are f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (in order to detach them from the husks), sprinkling with water etc. These actions (1) By "common language" we have to understand the technical terms used by the ydjnikas, in 80 far as they are not found in the text of the Veda itself. (9) Species as f. i. the generic character of an animal which is offered as a sacrifice ; substancos liko rice-grains etc.; number as f. i. the singularity, duality etc of the things ased for the sacrifice - All these contributo towards the accomplishment of the svarópa, tho outward form of the sacrifco.

·( 21 ) are either such as have a seen effect or such as have an unseen effect or such as have a seen as well as an unseen effect. To the first class belongs f. i. the bearing of the rice-grains (the effect of which is their bring detached from the husks ); to the second class belongs f. i. the sprinkling with water (which does not produce a visible effect on the rice-grains); to the third class belong (the actions referring to the animal, the sacrificial cake etc., for these actions produce an unseen result in as far as they compriso the offering of a certain material (viz. the material offered in the sacrifice), while at the same time in as far as they are performed with regard to a certain divinity they produce a visible result viz. the remembrance of the divinity.(1) By an action contributing directly (árálupakáraka) we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As 1. i. the prayájas. Such actions are of use only in originating the highest transcendental result (paramápúrva; the transcendental result produced by the sacrificial action in its totality ); while the actions contributing through an intermediate step are of uge also for the outward form of the sacrifice by means of their producing a modification ( samskára) of the material of the sacrifice and of the divinity (whereby they produce the so-called utmatty-apírva ).(2) The same kind of actions are also called inherent actions (ásrayikarma ; viz. inherent in some substance, divinity etc. )---- -Ilerewith we have given a short account of the injunctions of application. Prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, is that netion which intimates sperdiness of performance. This kind of injunction (is not a separato one, there being no passages which are merely prayogavidhi and nothing else but) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action ( as f. i. "he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśaprirņamása-sacrifice") P. 37. (1) For the sacrifice is the parting with a certain substanca (dravyatyáva) with a view tomor aiming ai-a certain divinity (devatoddesena) - Kegarding the relation of the different kinds of actions to the apúr va cp. J N. MV. (2) On the different kinds of apúrva see--in addition to J N. M. V. p. 57.- the instructive article अपर्व in Goldstückes's Sanskrit Dictionary It is however hardly correct to render "apúrva", As G. doe«, by the unseen or transcendental power of a religious or sacrificial act which produces the desired result at another time etc."; for spårve is not the power of prodacing a result but a result itsell.

·( 22 ) which forms one syntactical whole with the sentences enjoining subsidiary things (the prayájas etc.); for this (injunction of the main action etc.) causing the execution of the main action with all its subsidiaries enjoins speediness of the performance which latter expression means as much as absence of delay (or pause ), as there is no special means of proof for delay. Nor must it be objected that there also is no special ineans of proof for the absence of delay. For if (the things enjoined in the different injunctions were to be done ) with delay, they could not be dono connectedly (together; saha) and that they are to be done connectedly is understood from the circumstance of the injunctions referring to the chief action and its subsidiaries forming one syntactical whole. Just as we see that in common life two things which are done with delay ( asf. i. the one thing to-day the other to-morrow) are never said to be done "together" (or “connectedly"). This absence of delay is obtained when a fixed order is followed ; for otherwise there arise doubts regarding the order of consecution of the different actions and the whole performance is spoiled. Therefore an injunction of performance enjoins, for the purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it enjoins, at the same time a fixed order which order is to be taken as a special attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as a more attribute of the things enjoined but as an independent thing the prayogavidhi would be open to the reproach of vákyabheda). For this reason “injunction of performance” is also defined as that injunction which teaches the order of the subsidiaries. By “order” (krama) we understand a particular kind of extension or rather (extension being applicable to coexistent things ton) the relation of (different things ) being earlier and later with regard to each other. For settling this order of succession (of different actions ) we have six means of proof, viz. direct enunciation (śruti), sense ( artha), text ( pátha ), position (sthana ), principal matter (mukhya), procedure (pravșitti). By direct enunciation (śruti) we understand any passage whose purport it is to intimate order of succession. It is of two kinds, liaving either the purport of intimating merely order of succession or the purport of intimating something particulariz- ·( 23 ) ed loy order of succession. An example of the former kind is the passages having prepared the weddat he is to prepare the vedi"'; this passage merely has the purport of intimating an order of Succession; for the fireparation of the veli is already taught by another passage. ( The sruti in the above quoted passage is contained in the suffix krvá ot kriisi -- Fram kritt verdim karoti. The frisse Contains the stillipsient of the relative order of preparation of venda and verli, in the way of annáva to those other passages which have the pom possips of onjoining the preparation of the two mentioned things independent of their relative order in time! On the other land the passage " the first daught belongs to the Vusland-kartri" bias the prerpose of onjaining a thing (viz. drinking i particularized liv al comtin oriler ; for it can not be taken as enjoining order only with sefirence to the drinking le- Call me this would involve a break of the unity of syntactical construction. (The passagen must be taken as containing information of a double nature as there is no other passage onjoining the act of drinking by the vanhat-kartri. might now be mintained that it conjoins 1.30 altogether wittirent things, firstly the cluinhing, sccends the place of thivart with regard to other acts. But is this istupition would involve vákyabbeda, it is thought 110pc proper to declare that the passage anjoins only one things particularized by a sproud One'.- (g. the analogous case of “ somena vajuta"). Diunt mumciation has greater welt than the other means of focul, luccall the latter obtain their authority only by means of a direct statement founded on them being constructed. For this reason the cupcevoted to the asvinan is offres in the tende place among the cups offered during the Jyotishtoma , because there is the direct statent " the cup for the Asviman is to be offered as the truth"; although one might think that is to be ottired as the third according to the order in which the cups are mentioned in the sacred trxt. (Starting from the aindravárave grahu we tind the ásvina graha mentioned in the third place, Taitt. S. I 4. 1; ; VI. 4.9, so that arcording to pátha it ought to be offered in the third placr; but the direct statenient contained in the word "tenth" of the passage quoted above is stronger than pátha and settles the oriler of performance. The ·( 24 ) principle according to which the order of precedence of the different means of proof is determined in the case of krama is the same as the one followed in the case of the means of proof assisting viniyoga-vidbi. In the present example f. i. we might, on the ground of the áývina graha being mentioned in the text in the third place, construct an injunction containing a sruti viz. "he is to offer the áśvina grala in the third place ", the silent presumption being that such an arrangement would not be impossible, not against artha, which latter must be satisfied before we can pass from pátha to śruti. But this constructed injunction would be met and invalidated by an injunction found ready in the holy text viz. "the cup for the aśvinau is offered in the tenth place").—That order of succession which is settled according to the demands of the purpose (for which different actions are performed ) is called order according to the sense. As f. i. the relative order of the agnihotra-offering and the cooking of rice-gruel; to which actions the two passages "he is to offer the agnihotra" and he is to cook the rice-gruel” refer. For as the rice-gruel serves the purpose of the agnihotra its cooking, according to the demands of the purpose, is to be accomplished first. This order of succession according to the sense is stronger than order of succession according to the text. For if, the purpose as a means whereby to settle order of succession being set aside, the actions were performed according to the order of the text the cooking of the rice-gruel could merely have an unseen purpose, for if done after the oblation it could not serve any visible purpose. (But this would run counter to the general principle of never assuming an unseen purpose when a visible one can be established; hence the decision ).—The order of succession of sentences which intimate certain things is called order of succession according to the text and according it the order of succession of the things themselves is settled. For the sentences following upon each other in the text in a certain order produco when being read the ideas of the things (of which they treat ) in the same order and according to the order of the ideas the order of the execution of the things is settled. -- This text (pátha ) is twofold, text of the mantras and text of the Brahmaņa-passages. The order f. i.

·( 25 ) which is settled for the cake offered to Agni and the cake offered to Agníshoman by means of the order in which the vajvá and anuvákva mantras are read in the text, is founded mpou mantratext. (The injunction referring to the agnishomiya-cake is found in the second anuvákır of the Taittiriya-hrálmana, while the pingsaye enjoining the amneya cako occurs in the third annváka. From this it might be concluded that at the fullmoon-sucritico the agníshomiya cake is to be offered before the lunga cake. The oriler huwerter of the mantras accompanying the two oflerings, in fund in the mantra-hindu, establishes the contrary.) Mantria-text is of greater weight than briliman:-text, lecanso the mantra text is more intimately connected with the actual presformance of the sacrifice than the brahmanil-text. For the latter gives to understand that such and such a thing is to be lunes, outside of the sacrifice (during which the brálımaņa-text is not itself of actual use) and lias thereby accomplished its purpose. The mantras on the other hand are actually employed at the time of the performance of the sacrifice the order of the performance depending on the order in which the single parts of the worfornia auch are remembrored and as the oriler of remembranco grain drapoends on the order of the mantras (whose property it is to remind one), the mantra-text forms an essential part of the performance of the sacrifice.-Theoriler of succession of the pravajus which is derived from the orilor of the text of certain injunctions (viz. "he offers the samiillis" "be offers tanúnapát" (e.) in besed on the order of the brihmana-trst. For although the borilmaņa-passages may be said to have fulfilled their purpose by onjoining a certain thing, nevertheless-in the absce of some other passage pointing out the order of succession of the prayájus (tei, the same liráhmana-passages are to be accepted au pointing out the order of the succession as well(1).-By "position" (sthina ) is to loo understood jirruentation, presenting one's self (thiti) for if at the place of something (as f. i. in the example given bylow at the place of the savaniya) sonothing else is performed (as f. i. the ag- (1) lhe coinnentury horretakes a different view & in munca.94, AS I Alcare night ly, that the orver of successivu of the prassijus in fullmic on mantra-text, uot brákmana-text ·( 26 ) níshomíya and Anubandhya in the sacrifice called sádyaskra), that mentioned something (f. i. the savaniya) presents itself first after the thing by which it is regularly preceded (f. i. the ásvinagrahaņa) has been performed and it is therefore proper that it should be performed first. For this reason in the soma-sacrifice called sádyaskra where the three animal sacrifices viz. the agníshomiya, the savaniya and the anubandhya have to be performed together (i. c. in immediate consecution) in the place of the savaniya (i. e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the fundamental form—the agnishțoma--the savaniya alone is offered) tho savaniya animal has to be offered first, the two others afterwards, as in that place after the offering of the áśvina cup the savaniya first presents itself to the mind. For to the jyotishțoma (of which the sádyaskra is a modification) belong three animal sacrifices, the agníshomíya, the savaníya and the anubandhya. These three have different placos, the agníshomíya being offered on the upavasatha-day, the savaníya at the time of the pressing of the soma and the ánubandhya at the end of the sacrifice. Sádyaskra now is the name of a particular somasacrifice which on account of its indefiniteness (i. e. on account of no special divinity being mentioned with regard to it) is to be considered as a mere modification of the jyotishţoma. Therefore the three animal sacrifices are established for the sádyaskra also by the original injunction (which establishes them for the prakriti-form i. e. the agnishiţoma and which has to be transferred to the different vikritis also). That there they have to be performed together (not on different days) is seen from the direct statement "he offers the animals together.” This common sacrifice of the three animals has to be performed at the place of the savaniya (i. c. at that point of the sacrifice where in the case of the agnishtoma the savaniya alone is offered) since that placa is near to the principal sacrificial action (of all somasacrifices viz. the pressing of the soma) and since the fault of some of the animal sacrifices being removed from their proper places is the same (on whatever day they may be performed together). For if the three sacrifices are performed at the place of the savaniya, only the agníshomíya and the anubandlıya are removed from their proper places; while in the case of the three sacrifices being performed ·( 27 ) either on the day of the agníshomiya or on the day of the knubandhva all three are removed from their proper places (for if they are performed on the day of the agnishoniya pasar the latter itself can not be sail to have its propur place as it thereby is removed from the pressing of the soma proximity to which becomes indispensable as soon as the injunction of all the three sacrifices having to be performed together is observed; the sans reasoning if ipplied to the suuhandhya-pasu shows that the sinubandhra-lay is not the proper onr).(1) As we inw read in the description of the fundamental form (of tins sidvaskra j. e. the įvotisitom:) “having done the ásvina cup and having tied round the sacrificial post with a thrier-twisted string he leadis on the sunniva praside" and thereby so that the sacrifice of the savaniyir pasu is ongoined after the taking of the aśvina cup, the szvaniya fuents itself to the mind also in the widyaskra imnediately after the taking of the assina cup and thus, according to position (utháda) it is proper that it should be performed first. The two other animal sacritices have to be purformed afbres the savaniya in the manner explained (viz. in the first pácla of Adhy. V of thir Mimmsii, where the commentators state that the agnishomiya has to precede the inubundlova).--By order founded on the principal matter (mukhya) we understand the order of the subsidiary matters bu:- longing to some prorformance in as far as it is settled by the order of the principal matters. For in whatever order the principal mattors are performed in the same uriloos idees sub-sidiary main boelonging to them are performeri, siner in this muur all subsidiary matters are distant from the principal nxuttrr's in the same degrin. If on the contrary the subsidiary matters were performed in an inverse order (comparrd with the order of the principal matters) the consequence would be that some subsidiary matters would be (1) For the detai's of the lengthy and animportant dincunglon referring to the albianátikramasamya ree ene conmentary on the Arthasangrabu 10 llic lithophead Benares elition (It is to be remarked that the text of tho mula «of the prisbhaye is very incorrect in the lithographod edition a piece of the commentare havia et mixed up with it) in the Jamm. N. MV. the pradhanasoin apratyávatti is the only--and quite suficient-reason for the three animals being sacriticed on the sutyri-day- Golstücker's edition of J. N. 11. V. p. 224 1. 3 read "21417184 ·( 28 ) as near as possible to their principal matters and others again ag far away as possible; and this would of course be improper, as it wonld interfere with the connectedness of actions intimated by the injunction of performance. Therefore the order of succession of the principal things determines the order of the subsidiaries as well. Thus f. i. a part of the (ghee which is the) remainder of the prayájas is at first poured over the oblation to Agni and after that another portion over the sour milk offered to Indra, because the sacrifice to Agni precedcs in tiine the sacrifice to Indra. In this manner the two acts of pouring ghee are separated from the principal actions to which they belong (viz. the offering of the two oblations) in the same manner viz. by one intervening act (1. pouring of gheo on the ágneya oblation 2. pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation 3. offering of the Suneya 4. offering of the aindra); while in the case of the reverse order being adopted for the pouring of gheo the pouring of ghee on the ágneya and the offering of the ágrove would follow on each other immediately and on the other hand the pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation and the offering of the aindra oblation would be separated from each other by two intervening acts (viz. tho pouring of ghee on the ágneya and the offering of the ágneya); and this, as already remarked, would be improper. Order founded on the principal matter is weaker than order according to the text (páthakrama); for the former determines the order ( of the sacrificial acts) in a retarded manner only because it depends on the determination of the order of the principal actions which determination itself depends on some other means of proof. Ordor according to the text on the other hand is of a different kind as it merely depends on the order of the text as it is found in the Veda, which latter order is independent of anything else; it is therefore of greater weight.-On the other hand it is of greater authority than order founded on procedure (pravșitti); for in the case of order founded on procedure many subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matter while they are near to it in the case of mukhya krama (about pravritti-krama see further on). If in the case of several principal matters (or actions) being performed together and the subsidiary actions connected with ·( 29 ) them having to be performed seriatim, the order of succession of the second, third etc. subsidiary actions is regulated according to the order of the subsidiary action performed first, that order of snccession is called order according to procedure (pravritti). So f. i. in the case of the subsidiary actions connected with the animal sacrifices offered to Prajapati (uring the vajapeya whero seventeen animals are ottirul 10 l'rajapati), with regard to which we real "having otfired the vaisva leva oblation they proceed with the animals for Prajápati". In this sentence the animals meant for l'rajapati are, als pointed out loy the third case termination, onjoined, together with the actions constituting the mode of procedure', als having to be offered at one time. ('sequently they (the sacrifices of the animals) as well as the subsidiary actions commeetril therewith as the leading on, the tving to the sacrificial pot aten (of the victims have to lwp forned to ther (or conectedly, sala). This performing together becomes, with regard to thics actual sacrifice of) the prájápat vi animals, possible boy performing the actual sacritice (of all of thon) at the same time is one divinity (viz. l'rajiti) istisne (for all of theun).(0) On the others hand it is impossible to purform all the subiidiry artions as the leading on, the tying to the surridicial post rota, at the same timo and the only method of performing them together is therefore to rm them in such a manner as tu sriparate the subsidiary tions to the Irast jmosillo degree from the principal actions for this end one performs at first the leading on of on anii and after that the leading one of the second and follows the same order with regard to the tuing to the post otc. And thus selecting from among the animals about to be offered to Prajapati al certain oni, one begins with it and performs the same subsidiary wtion with regard to all animals; after this one performs the second subsidiary action on the same animal on which the first one back born performed and again proceeds following the same order with regard to all other animals. The order of succession determined according to this principle is called order of succnasjon according (1) The Comm. romarks that another reading is " bumperutipanoulevalikalatvena", and that the time nieant is the time after the performance of thc vuisvudoví while tho divinity is Prajapati.

·( 30 ) to procedure. It is of less weight than order of succession founded on direct statement etc.--Herewith we have given a short account of injunction of performance by defining the six different kinds of order of succession. By injunction of claim or qualification (adhikáravidhi) we understand that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership with regard to some result which is brought about by some action, By "ownership" we understand the position of one who enjoys the result.---To this class of injunctions belongs f. i. the passage “ho who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice”; which passage while it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to para lise intimates the state of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by him who is desirous of paradise.---Another example is the passage “he whose houses Agni should burn down after he has constructed tho holy fires, is to offer to the merciful Agni a cake on eight potsherds." This passage enjoining a certain sacrificiul action on the occasion of a conflagration etc. intimates the ownership of him who acts on the mentioned occasion with regard to a result which consists in averting a calamity and which is produced by the sacrificial action. In the same way the passage “he is daily to perform the sandhyá” intimates the ownership of him who leads a pure life, observing the proper times for all his duties, with regard to a fruit viz. the avoidance of disaster which ensues on the proper performance of the sandhyá. This kind of ownership with regard to some result belongs to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualification (adhihára). By qualification we understand that which, in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of the person ( whom the injunction concerns). This is, in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for the fulfillment of a certain wish, the wish for the particular result; in the case of the sacrifices performed on a special occasion the ascertainment of the occasion; in the case of acts of permanent obligation as f. i. the performance of the sandhyá the circumstance of the man leading a pure life and observing the proper times for all his duties. For this reason too the passage "a king who is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world ·( 31 ) is to perform the rajasuya-sacrifice" notwithstanding its enjoining (the rájasúva) with a view to the kingrship of the heavenly world does not intimate that the enjornunt of the result will be obtained by any one who desires the kingsleipe of the heavenly world, but only by him who being at the same time a king is desirons of the kingship of the heavenly worki; for the passage contains a clear statement of the kingly dignity brings a necessary attribute of the qualified person. --Sometimes a 18cessary attributo of the qualified person is to be anderstood although it may not be directly stated as an attribute of the person. This is the case f. i. with regard to the knowledge stopwonent on the injunction enforcing the study of the Vedli. (This knowledge is a necessary qualification for any one who wishes to perform sacrifices, ) since all the injunctions of sacritices as they require a knowledge of the matters (used in the sacrifice) are given for those only who have acquired a knowledge of these matters in consequence of complya ing with the injurmotion inculcating the study of the Vaular. In the same manner the quality of being provided with the sacred tires-- which quality is obtained by the first construction of the fires --- is a necessary qualification for all sacrificial 2014 which are to be effected by means of the holy tires; for as all these sacrifices can not be performed without the fires the injunctions prescribing them can be given for those only who by the construction of the fires have acquired the attribute of being owners of the sacred fires. In the same mamer capability (to perform the adults is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and bralth, mental power etc.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words "power (of understanding on the part of the bearer ) (- operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense." (the vorbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it.)-Herewith we close the discussion of that part of the Veda which is denoted by the name “Injunction". “Mantras" serve to recall to memory the matters connected with the sacrificial performance. By this their property of recalling to memory the matters mentioned they have a purpose and it is not to be supposed that their cuunciation merely teuds to produco ·( 32 ) Bome unseen result, as it would be improper to assume merely an unseen result while a visible result (in this case the circumstance of the performer of the sacrifice being reminded of certain things ) exists. Nor can it be maintained that the recitation of the mantras is purposeless because the visible end of reminding one of cortain things can be obtained by other means also (as f. i. by the brálmaga-passages of the Veda which would point out the divinities etc. of the sacrifice even without being combined with the mantra-passages ); for (the exclusive use of tho mantras for the purpose) is founded on an injunction of a necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi) according to which the mentioned matters are to be recalled to memory by means of the mantras only (not by any other means). By an injunction of necessary arrangement is to be understood an injunction which, in the case of one particular instruinent being established (by some other means of proof) with regard to an action which can be performeel by various instruments, establishes the use of some other instrument which is not yet established (by other means of proof). As it is said "An injunction takes place when something is alsolutely non-established; an injunction of necessary arrangement when one alternative is already establishcd; when both alternatives are already established, (the injunction required) is called limitation (parisamkliyi).” The sense of this passage is as follows.--That kind of injunction which establishes something not established by any other means of proof is called an injunction of something new (apúrva-vidhi) (or simply "injunction" as in the quoted sloka). Such an injunction is contained f. i. in the passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice”; for it enjoins a sacritice for the purpose of obtaining paradise which is not established by any other means of proof.—That kind of injunction which establishes something that is partially (i. e. on certain occasions) non-established is called an injunction of necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi); as f. i. the passage "he is to beat the rice-grains.” If it is asked how this passage can be said to establish something partially non-established, we answer: in the following manner. The passage does not intimate that the beating of the ricegraips has the effect of clearing them from the husks; (for a special passage intimating this would be altogether unnecessary) ·( 33 ) as that circumstance is well known from positive and negative instances (it being a matter of common observation that the rice. grains if beaten are freed from their husks while the hushs reminin attached to the grains when the latter are not beaten). But tho passage has the pirproses of a nivama whereby is to be understood the supplying of a purt (hitherto) non-established. For as tho freeing of the grains from the husks can be effected by moro than one means, one might leave aside the heating and begin to mako use of some other means (f. i. of the finger-nails); for this case now the beating being non-established the above quoted injunction effects the supplying of the non-established part, viz. the injunction of the beating. Thus in a so-called injunction of niyama tha purport of the sentence is a necessary arrangement which consists in a non-established part being suppliect. And this in the quoted example) means as much as the injunction of the partially non-established beating of the rien-grains.--That kind of injunction which has the purpose of excluding one of two alternatives both of which are established by some other sucans is called injunction of limitation (parisamkhya-vulhi). As f. i. the paso “five animals from among the animals laving five nails may eaten (are lawful for fuorl)” This paysage bas not the patirpuso of establishing the cating of animals having tivo nails (is therefore not an apúrva-vidhi), as their being used for food is already established (without any special rule) by the natural appetite of man. Nor has it the purpose of a necessary arrangement, as the cating of animals having five nails and the cating of animals not having five nails is established sinultaneously (the two not excluding mach other) and it can therefore not be said that the rating of animals having five nails is partially non-established. For these reasons of the passage must be to exclude the cating of animals not having five nails and it therefore is an injunction of limitation. Injunctions of this kind are of two different kimes, the limitation being either directly stated (Sranta) or implied (lákshapika). An example of the former kind is afforded hy the passago " for there only they sing"; for here the directly enunciatrd) word only” intimates the exclusion of all stotras cxcept the paramána. An example of implied limitativu is afforded by the mentioned bo the purpose 66 ·( 34 ) passage "five animals having five nails may be eaten"; for this passage does not contain any word which directly expresses the exclusion of other animals. For this reason merely implied limitation must be admitted to be affected with three different imperfections. These are firstly, setting aside of what is directly mentioned (in favour of something implied only), secondly assumption of something which is not directly stated and thirdly rejection of something already established (by other means). As is said in the śloka "on account of setting aside the matter directly stated and assuming a matter not directly stated and rejecting something established limitation is affected with three vices.” (In the quoted passage the details of the three shortcomings are as follows). The thing directly stated which is to be set aside is the eating of animals with five nails. The matter not directly stated which is to be assumed is the exclusion of the eating of animals not having five nails. And the matter already established which is rejected is the eating of animals not having five nails (the mcans by which it is established being man's natural appetite). Two of these three imperfections lie merely in the words while the rejection of something established lies in the matter itself. (Finally it must be remarked that) Those mantras which do not possess the power of reminding one of the things connected with the sacrificial performance must, since no other alternative is left, be assumed to contribute towards the unseen result by the mere circumstance of their being uttered and they are therefore not purposeless. “Names" (as forming one of the constituent parts of the Veda) have a purpose by their defining (or limiting) the matter enjoined. So f.i. the word "udbhidá" in the passage "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid (i. e. is to perform the sacrifice called udbhid).” In this passage the word "udbhid" is the name of a sacrifice and effects the limitation of the matter (the sacrifice) enjoined. This is to be understood as follows. The passage by pointing out a certain result enjoins a sacrifice not established elsewhere. As it does not enjoin sacrifices in general ( that it does not do this is shown by the fact of a special result being mentioned) it must be assumed to enjoin a special sacrifice. If now the ·( 35 ) question arises what special sacrifice is meant, we learn from the word "udbhid” that the sacritico called udbhid is intended. Ud. bhidá taken as a name fits into the sentence by means of the rolation of inhering in the same abode or coordination (sániánátthikar, apya), the sense of the whole passage being “he is to realize catty by means of udbhid the sacritice" (in which senteuce the two words "udbhidá" and "yágena" are courdinates). That coriain words found in the Voda have to be considered as names appears from one or the other of four reasons 1. from the danger of possessive indie' cation 2. from the danger of split of the sentence 3. on account of anotber scriptural passage declaring it 4. on account of the comparison with it (for the details of which reasong see the following ). In the passage already quoted viz. "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid" the word "udbhida" must be 14- sumed to be the name of a sacrifice on account of the danger of possessive indication. This appears from the following reasoning. (If udbhid did not denote a particular sacritice, the only other alternative would be to assume that it denotes a certain instrument hy means of which the sacrifice is performed; an explanation which might appear to be founded on the etymology of the world.-- But then the following difficulties present themselves) in the first place it is not proper to suppose that the passage contains the injunction of the sacrifice with a view to the result and at the same time the injunction of some secondary matter (an instrument) with it view to the sacrifice ; for this assumption would involvo at spise of the sentence (two different matters being enjoined in one scutence). In the second place (if sonicbody should propose an other explanation free from the mentioned defect) if the word "udblidá" is supposed to express merely a secondary matter (an instrument) it would have to be said as the sacrifice itself is not established by any other passagem-that the passage enjoins a sacrificial action distinguished by a certain secondary matter, 80 that the sense would be "he is to realize cattle by means of a sacrifica distings nished by the uslbhid.” But in all such injunctions of sacrifices distinguished by some secondary matter the assumption of porses sive indication has to be made, as already explained. (It is therefore preferable to take udbbid as the name of a certain sacrifice).

·( 36 ) 1 PA In the passage "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the chitrá” chitrá is to be taken as denoting a certain sacrifice, because not doing so would entail a split of the sentence. For it would not be legitimate to assume that the passage enjoins a sacrifice distinguished by some secondary matter (on which assumption the sense would be "he is to realize cattle by means of a sacrifice connected with some secondary inatter called chitrá); for the secondary matter is already enjoined by another passage--viz. the one which runs "sour milk, honey, milk, ghec, grain, water, rice, all this mixed is offered to Prajápati"--and it is therefore impossible to consider the above passage as enjoining a sacrifice distinguished by the secondary matter (for the consequence of the latter assumption would be that the secondary matter is enjoined twice). And again if we assumed that the passage enjoins at the same time the connection of the fruit with the sacrifice and the connexion of the secondary matter with the sacrifice, the consequence would be a split of the sentence. For these reasons the word "chitrá" is to be considered as the name of a sacrifice and if we thus explain the passago as meaning "he is to realize cattle by means of the chitrásacrifice" no split of the sentence takes place as the word chitrá then fits into the sentence in the way of gramınatical coordination. The name "chitrá" for the oblation in question is quite proper as it consists of various substances. In the passage "he offers the agnihotra" the word "agnihotra" must be taken as the name of a sacrifice, on account of (another) scriplural passage declaring or establishing that viz, the secondary matter belonging to the sacrifice. But—somebody might ask-why should the passage not contain the injunction of a secondary matter?-We reply that this cannot be admitted. For if you should assume that the word agnihotra is a compound the first part of which has the sense of a locative so that it would mean that sacrifice in which an oblation is made into the fire and that therefore the passage enjoins the fire as a secondary matter viz. as the place of the oblation, we point out that such an injunction would be useless because the fire as the place of the oblation is already established by another passage viz. “when he offers the oblation in the áhavaniya.”—If on the other hand you say that the compound is to be explained by 7 ·( 37 ) mcans of a dative viz. the sacrifice in which an oblation is made to Agni so that the passage would enjoin the divinity Agni as a secondary matter we reply that this too is inadmissible because the divinity of the sacrifice is already established by another passage. To the question what that passage is different answers are given. Some maintain that it is the following one "tlint he offers an oblation in the evening to Agni and I'rajipati." Others say that Agni as the divinity of the oblation is established by the mantra "Agni is light, light is Ayni, svala." But-it might be reumarked-if Agni is established by the mantra-text, lue is refuted by I'rajápati (i. e. to be set aside in favour of l’rajapati) is the livinity of the sacrifice, according to the rule that a mantra has less power (to establish the divinity of a sacrifier) than a dative (noch as in the for mer of the two passamins quoted above cestablishes I'rajapati). As it is said “a divinity is established either liya tadhallita-formation or by a dative or by a mantra, the power of these three means of proof decreasing according to the order in which they are nuntioned.” To this we riply that the caso lives differently. The passage " that in the evening be offers an oblation to Agni anıl Prajapati" does not merely 'njoin Irajápati but m:kes an additional studement about Ayni who is already established by the mantra ("Agni is light" etc.) and enjoins in addition to him l'rajápati; thus, l'ite jápati not bring enjoined alone, the passage dues not refute Agni. -Vor can it be said that the passages contains an injunction of two divinities combined (instead of containing an "anuváda" with regard to one and an injunction of the other). For the explanation according to which the passage enuing Prajapati only while it merely contains an additional statement referring to Agui already established by another passage is casier and more natural than the other one according to which it enjoins two divinities combined. --(To return to the general matter and to givo another (xample of námadboyatvam being proved by tatpraklıyásástra). In the samo manner the pieces of firewood called samih and other things are established as the divinities of the prayája-oblations by means of the mantras "the samidhs may jurtake of the butter etc.” and therefore the words " samniill” etc. which occur in the injunctions "he sacrifices the sanidh" etc. are to be taken as names of certain ·( 38 ) sacrifices (not as denoting secondary matters) on account of another scriptural passage declaratory of it. In the passage "he is to sacrifice attacking with the syena" the word syena is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice (and not as denoting the material of the sacrifice) on account of “the comparison with it (on account of the comparison of the sacrificial act with a falcon, which comparison is contained in an arthaváda-passage) as this comparison can not take place in any other way (but on the assumption of Syena denoting a certain sacrifice). This appears from the following reasoning. Whatever is enjoined (in an injunction) is glorified in the corresponding arthavada-passage). If now the injunction was meant to enjoin the falcon (as the material of the sacrifice), the arthaváda-passages would have to contain a praise of the falcon. But the arthaváda-passage "for as the falcon swooping down seizes his prey thus he (the sacrificer) swooping down seizes his hating enemy" can not be used as a praise of the falcon as it clearly effects the praise of something else by means of comparing it to a falcon. Nor can the falcon be praised by its being conpared to itself, as in each comparison the quality of being that to which something is compared and the quality of being that which is compared to something reside in different things.--If on the contrary the passage enjoins a sacrifice named śyena then the arthaváda-passage is able to effect the praise of the sacrifice by comparing it to a falcon. Thus the word śyena must be taken as denoting a sacrifice on account of the " parison with it." (In addition to these four determining reasons which oblige us to explain certain words as names of sacrifices ) Some assume a fifth determining reason of this kind viz. the greater weight of the secondary matter as taught in the originative injunction (utpatti). As an example of this they quote the passage "he is to sacrifice with the vaišvadeva" and declare that the word “vaiśvadeva" is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice and is not meant to enjoin the Viśve-devas as the divinities of the sacrifice, on account of the greater weight of the divinities Agni etc., which are already enjoined by the originative injunctions referring to this sacrifice (which are contained in the passage "ágneyam ashtakapálam nircom- ·(39) vapati, sanmyam clarum etc").-- But in reality (it is unnecessary to assume this fifth determining reason ) as the circunstance of "vaisvadeva" being n name already follows from the third of the four reasons detailed above. For with regard to the sacrifice under consideration there is found a statement, in the shape of an arthaváda which establishes the l'iśvedevas as a secondary matter, viz. "that all the gols (visvederás) sacrificed together that is the visvedeva-quality of the vaišvadera." (It therefore appars that tho passage quoted above has not the purpose of pointing out the Virvedevas as the divinity of the sacrifice and consequently the word "vaiśvadera" is to be taken as a name). By prohibition (nishedha) we understand sentences turning off man (from some action ); for the purpose of sentences of prohibition lies exclusively in their effecting (man's ) turning way from actions which would be the cause of some disadvantage. The details are as follows. In the same manner as an injunction conveying an instigation in order to give effect to its instigatory power intimates that the thing onjoined f.i. the sacrifice is the instrument for obtaining some desired result and thereby insti. gates the person towards it, in the samo nianner a prohibitory passage as f. i. "he is not to eat kalauja” con roving the idea of turning off' (froin some action) in order to give office to its power of turning off intimates that the thing prohibited as f. i. the enting of kalaìja is the instrument of bringing about some biglily undesirable result and thereby turns man off from it. If it is 110W asked how a prohibitory sentence conveys the idea of turning off from something, we answer as follow.. The Brºn] *c of the word "not" is not connected with the sense of the root (of tho verb in the prohibitory passage); for although the two words stand in immediato proximity the sense of the root presents itself as stanling in subordinate relation to the actnal creative energy (arthi bhávani) which is expressed by the suffix (of words like bhakshayet). For something which presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to one thing can not be connected with something else. Otherwiso in the sentence "bring the king's man" (lit. the king-man, rájapurusha) the king himself would enter into relation with the action (while in reality the king only stands in relation to his servant, tho ·( 40 ) latter in his turn being the object of the action expressed by "bring"). Therefore the sense of the word "not" stands in relation to the sense of the suffix only and here again not to the árthí bhávaná which is expressed by that element (of the suffix) which denotes the verb--for the árthí bhávaná presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the instigation expressed by that element which denotes the optative—but to the verbal bhávaná denoted by the optative element of the suffix, the verbal bhávaná occupying the chief position of all. Thus the nature of the word "not" is to intimate the thing opposite to the thing with which it (the word "not") is logically connected. As in the sentence "the jar is not" the word "not" standing in connexion with the word “is” intimates the non-existence of the jar which is the opposite to the jar's existence, in the same way here (in prohibitory passages) the word "not" standing in connexion with tho optative exclusively intimates the turning-off (from some action) which is the opposite to an instigation towards what is expressed by the optative. For as on hearing an injunctive sentence a person has the idea “ that ono (the speaker) instigates me", a person on hearing a prohibitory sentence has the conception of a turning off i. e. of an energy tending to produce in him (the hearer) a cessation of activity; which idea may be expressed in the sentence "he is turning mo off." Therefore in the case of a prohibitory sentence the exclusive sense of the passage is a turning off. Where there is however an obstacle in the way of the word "not" being connected with what is expressed by the verbal suffix, it is connected exclusively with what is expressed by the root itself. Such obstacles are of two kinds 1. the beginning with the phrase "his vowed observances are as follows” and 2. the contingent probability of a vikalpa (option). An example of the former kind is f. i. found in the following passage “he is not to look at the rising Sun" as this sentence is read after a commencement has been made with the words "his vowed observances are as follows." For this reason a paryudása (not a pratishedla) is to be assumed here.(1) For as the word (1) In the case of "1100" being connected with the kriyá the sentence is called a pratishedha, while it is termed a paryudása if the "not" negatives a odmau or the KAN ·( 41 ) "vrata" (vow or vowed observance) has the settled meaning of something which is to be done, the clause "bis vowed observances are as follows" begins the enumeratiou of the vowed observancos of the Snátaka as things to be done. If now the question arises "what are the things to be done!", sentences like "ho is not to look at the rising sun" must taken as intimating somethiug to bo dune. Otherwise the syntactical unity of the former and lattor sentences would be destroyed. Thus the sense of the verbal suffix is not to be considered as connected with the sense of the word "not", as in that case the passayo could not be undorstood as cxpressing a thing to be done. For a "not" of that kind (i. o. & "not" cunnected with the sense of the verbal suttix) would express only a turning away (from sumo action) which is the contrary of tho instigation conveyed by an injunction ; and such a turning away does not express something to be done. Therefore in the sentence he is not to look at the rising sun" the word "not" exprosses by indication (lakshaņá) the vow of not looking wbich is the opposite of what is expressed loy the root (in fksheta); for not-looking may be taken as something to be done. So that the whole gentonce has to be explained as follows "ho is to effect (bhavayet) hy means of the resolution of not-looking which (resolution) lias for its object the sun. Aud if it is asked “what is ho to effect thereby?" the destruction of evil which is intimated by the complementary sentence "from so much sin he becomes separates” connects itself (with the bliávaná) as the thing to be affected. And in this manner tho syntactical unity of the former and the latter sentences (which was spoken of above) is established.-Nor must hero the objection be raised that there is no reason for tho resolution of not-looking only being connected with the bhávaná as there aro different other things which are opposite to the sense of the root; for these different other things are not things (or "the things") to be done and can thereforo in the case under consideration not be connected with the blávaná.(1) dhátvartha ; in which cases the "da" might bu replaced by the of a compound word as "abráhoảņa. (1) The commentary on this passage runs as follows: But as many things might be done contrary to the luuking which is the nose of the ruot how in it that with regard 1 A 6 ·( 42 ) mar The second (kind of obstacle to the negative particle being co nected with the verb ) applies to passages as the following one" is to say ye vajámahe (the biginning of) all yájyás, not att anuyájas." For bere too we must assume a prohibition of the ki called paryudása as otherwise there would be the probability an option (optional procedure, vikalpa). The reason for this as follows. If in the quoted passage the verbal suffix were c nected with what is expressed by the particle "not", the "ye yajámahe” would be prohibited in the case of the anuyájas, sense being "at the anuyájas he is not to say ye yajámahe." a prohibition (pratishedha) must be preceded by an establishn (by some incans or other, of what is prohibited) as only a ma previously established can be prohibited. This establishment only be found in the scriptural passage “he is to say ye yaján at the yájyás” (for there is no other means by which the em ment of this mantra could be established). But if something viously established by a scriptural passage is prohibited, (b: other scriptural passage) only option (vikalpa) can take place not complete sublation (bádha) (of the foriner passage by th er) because the scriptural passage on which it (i. e. the em ment of the mantra) bases is not capable of complete sublatii means of another scriptural passage as this is the case with sion forming the base of the establishment (of some act.-P: may instigate a man to the murder of a Brálmaņa which act is therefore said to be established by passion ; bere lo scriptural passages like "a brábmana is not to be killed "$ to the quoted passage the resolution of not looking alone is accepted as capable the instrument of the bhávani ? _The answer to this objection is : Although other things as f. i covering the eyes with a cloth might be considered as ! opposites of the looking which is the sense of the root, nevertheless, the sen conveying the idon of any particular energy of the body or of speech while at time mental activity is not prohibited. there is left only a particular mental er the rosolution of n t looking ( as the instrument of the bhavaná). The reaso is given in the clause of the text “fur thesc etc." Because these different oth as f. i. covering the eyes with a cloth can not be meant as that which is to only something else opposite to the looking which is the senso of the root ar ing to all actions is fit to be connected with the bhávand. For this reason t tion of not looking which is opposite to the sense of tho root is fit to be with thc bhávaná as it (viz. the resolution) exteads to all actious.

·( 43 ) same Wily and by their superior anthority completely sublate the dictates of passion. On the other land one scriptural passage can not come pletely sublate another as it has no claims eo superior autority).- Nor must it bo objected that as the general scriptural passage oblation is made into the áhuvaniva-tire" is sublated by the spee cial passage " he is to make the oblation on the foot-print", in the the pissage "not at the myájas" sublates the preceding passage " he says ye vajámahe at the vajvás"; for only such seriptural passages as are independent of each other sind in the relintion of that which is sublated and that which sublates. For the quotid passage about the home to lie made on the footprint dues not, in order to enjoin its purport, stand in need of the 12:1stige out the áhuvaniya and is therefore independent. But in the case under consideration the prohibitory pissage (na innyújeshau) stunds, in order that the thing to be prohibited may be established, in need of the preceding passage "he is to say the ye yajámaho it the yájyás" and is therefore not independent. For this reason in the case of a thing onjoined by one scriptural passage being prohibited by another only option (vikilpa) is possible (and not complete sublation of one rule by another). But to assume option is not proper, because its consequence is the partial non-authorilativeness of scriptural passages. For if the yo-yajámade is employed with the annyájas the authoritativeness of the claus: “nut with the amuynjas" is not uphele, in the same way as the authoritativeness of the pid-singe enjoining the use of barley for the manifico is not upheld when the sacrifice is prerformed with rice. Aloreover the assumptiou of vikalpa would involve the assumption of a double unscen result as the injunction as well as the prohibition are for the benefit of man (purushártha.--The employment or non-employment of the ye-yajámahe do not contribute anything towards the svarúpa of the sicrifice, are not kratvartha; an adộishita has therefore to be assumed as the result of each). For these reasons the passage under consideration cannot be explained an containing a pratishdha (where "not" negatives the worls) but wo must consider "na" as connected with the word "anuvajas” rund take the passage as a paryudiisa. So that the proper understanding of the scuse of the passage is as follows "lic is to use the ·( 44 ) en - mantra pe-yajámahe with the yájyás other than anuyájas", as the particle “na” conveys by indication the notion of those yájyás) which are different from the anuyájas. And thus option has not to be admitted. And this sentence (i. e. the sentence constructed out of the words na anuyájeshu viz. “he is to use the ye-yajimahe with the yájyás other than anuyájas") does not enjoin the use of the ye-yajámahe as the latter is already established by the preceding clause, viz. "he is to use the ye-yajámahe with the yájyás”, but merely enjoins with reference to (as an anuváda to ) the ye-yajámahe already established by a general text its (the yeyajámahe's) belonging to those yájyás which are other than anuyájas. So that the sense of the sentence is "the ye-yajámahe which is uttered with the yájyás is to be uttered with thuso only which are other than anuyájas.” But—it might be objected—according to the above explanation a paryudása-prohibition would not be different from a so-called upasamhára whose purport is to restrict to some particular case something established by a scriptural passage of general application. To this we reply that it is not so. For an upasamhára has the purport of restricting to that only (i. e. to that which is mentioned in the upasamhára-passage); as f. i. the fourfold division (of the sacrificial cake) which is established by the general text “he is to divide the cake into four parts” is restricted to the ágneya purodása exclusively by the special text "he is to divide the ágneya purodása into four parts." A paryudása on the other hand has the purport of restricting something generally established exclusively to what is different from the special thing (mentioned in the paryadása.) Thus it appears that paryudása and upasamhára are different.—Sometimes, no other possibility being left, a simple pratishedha has to be accepted although thereby the probability of a vikalpa arises. Thus f, i, although from the prohibition of the taking of the shodasin-cup which (prohibition) is established by the passage "at the atirátra he is not to take the shoqasin-cup” the probability of a vikalpa arises (i. e. the optional taking or not-taking of the shodasin-cup at the atirátra), nevertheless the passage can not be taken as a paryudása (whereby option would be precluded) because this is impossible. For the following reasons. If the word "not" were connected ·( 45 ) with the word "the shodasin-cup", the sense of the passage would he “at the atirátra he is to take the cups other than the shodasin"; but such an interpretation is impossible as it would be in open conflict with the express injunction contained in the other passages "at the atirátra he is to take the shod: sin." If on the other land the word "not" were connected with the atirátra the sense of the passage would he "he is to take the shodiusin at the sacrifices other than the atirátra" and this explanation again is impossible as it would be in conflict with the injunction of the shodiasin (for the atirátra). For these reasons, no other possibility being lott, pasmo Bagr can only be explained as a prohibition of the taking of the shodasin-cup which is established by another scriptural passage. And to this explanation it must not be objected that it involves a vikalpa, because a vikalpa too is to be acknowledged (descertain circumstances). The following ditforence (between the several cases where a pratishedha has to be acknowledged) is however to be noted. In the case of a pratishedha of one thing arising from vikalpa (in the case of one thing established by some scriptural passage being prohibited hy some other scriptural passage onjuining the contrary) the thing probibite is not the cause of any disodvantage (anartha) because in that case the injunction as well as the prohibition aro merely for the sacrifier's sake (kratvarila; not purushártha.--In the example given above the taking as well as the not taking of the shodasin are kratvartha, contribute to the outward form of the sacrifice). On the other hand in those where there is no vikalpa and the establishment (of whiat in subsequently prohibited by a scriptural passage) ltspy on the ninturat passion of man only, and the prohibition is for the sake of unan, there the thing prohibited is the cause of disadvantage as f. i. the eating of kalanja which is prohibiwd by the passage " he is not to eat kalanja" ; for here only the prohibition of eating is for the sake of man.--Nor is it to be objected that in the saine way a vikalpa would result from the prohibition of things established by scripture as giving, making offerings etc. which prohibition is contained in the passage "the man who has undergono initiation is not to give, not to make offerings etc."'; for in this case although the proliibition of giving, offering etc. which things are of their own C'ass ·( 46 ) The reason nature for the purpose of man is not for the purpose of man the forbidden thing is the canse of disadvantage to man. of this is that the prohibition of these things being for the purpose of the sacrifice they (i. e. giving, offering etc. if done by the díkshita) would destroy the power of the sacrifice. An analogous case is presented by the prohibition of approaching one's wife at thie proper season (approaching one's wife at the ritu is generally enjoined but would in spite of that be a cause of disadvantage to the díkshita because it would destroy the efficacy of the sacrifice). (The result of which is that in the two last mentioned cases thero is no opening for vikalpa). Sentences whose purport is either praise ( glorification) or blame are called arthavada. Such sentences effect a matter with a purpose by indication (lakshaņá; the sentences tuken by themselves not being able to effect any purpose). For the arthaváda-sentences, there being no purpose in their conveying merely their own sense, by indication convey praise or blame of matters to be cujoined or prohibited, as they would be open to the reproach of purposclessness if their only object were (to convey) their own sense. (This latter statement is based on the sútra I. 2. 1.) "on account of the whole) veda referring to actions" (if the arthavádla-passaves were taken as merely intimating their own sense without being connected with the passages expiressive of injunctions and prohibitions they would be purposeless as the whole Veda avowedly refers to actions, things to be done. The arthavádas are therefore to be taken as containing praise or blame of the actions enjoined or prohibited in the vidhi-and nishedha-passages). Nor is it possiblo to assume purposelessness (of the arthaváda-passages), as the latter is rendered impossible by the arthavádas being comprised in the injunction of study contained in the passage "svádhyayo' dhyetavvalı” which gives to understand that the whole Veda is.to be studied and notifies the whole veda's effecting matters having a purpose. Arthavada-pitssages are of two different kinds being either complements of vidhi-passages or coinplements of nishedha-passages. Thus the passage "Váyu indeed is the swiftest divinity etc."-which forms a complement of the injunctive passage “he who is desirous of prosperity is to offer a white animal to Váyu ·( 47 ) ctc."-has the purpose of intimating a glorification of the matter enjoined. On the other hand the passagen "he howled; that he howled (arolít) that is Rudra's Ruratva ote"which forms it complement to the prohibitory passage “silver is not to be given on the sacrificial grass etc."-us a purpose by intimating the blame worthiness of the matter prohibited. Nor must one raise the olojection that the arthuváda-passages are ( nevertheless ) purpose less because the idea of praise worthiness or blame worthinews is of 10 practical use. For these ideas have a dreidelis locates they porno mote the activity of man who from laziness or other reasons dors not set to work (to perform what is enjoined in the vidhi piawaingers.) Ayain arthavada is of three different kinds as it is sail in the Sloka "in case of contradiction it is gravida; in case of asseveration it is amváda; in case of the absorder of both it is bolútárthavádar; thus artha váda is of three different kinds." The sense of this ślukil is as follows. An arthavádla is guna vána i.". statement. of some quality, if it contradicts some other means of proof. Ay f.i. the passage "Xilitya (the sum) is rupie ( the sacrificial post)." There as the sameness of tho yupa and the sun is contraddicted by perception, the passage establishes by indication (lah. Haní) tho quality ( of the yupa ) being shining like the sun.--- Irelansarda if conveying a sense already established by another means of proof is called anuváliu, reiterative statement. Auf. i. the passage "Ayni (the fire ) is it remely against cold"; for hire the quality of fire being opposite to colil is already known from sensual desempen tion.-A statement conveying something which is neither ostallished by another means of proof nor in contlict with such a ono is called a bútárthaváda, a statement regarding something which has bappened. As f. i. the passagen "Indra raised the thunderbolt, against Vșitra." Thus we have established that the cutire prodla which cousials of sentences like "he who isdesirous of paradise is to sacrificante." immediately or mcliutely efiets duty (iharına ) consisting in Macrifices etc. Such (acts of ) (uty if done with a view to that (result) with a view to which thry are conjoined are the cause of that para ticular result; if clone with the intention of making of them an offerin; to God (išvara) they are the cause of the highest bcatitude.

·( 48 ) Nor can it be said that there is no authority for performing such acts with the intention of making of them an offering to God; for the following passage of the Bhagavadgitá furnishes the required authority "whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you give, whatever you do in way of penance, Kaunteya, do it all as an offering to me.” And the authoritativeness of Sințiti is established in the páda treating of Smriti (I. 3.) by the argument of its being based on Śruti. For the easy understanding of young students the wise Bháskara has composed this succinot compendium of the subjects treated in the Jaiminiya-Śástra. Herewith is finished the compendium of the Púrva-Mímámsá which is entitled “Artha-samgraha" and which was composed by Mahopadhyaya Laugákshi Bháskara.

·ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.
Transl. p. 1. 1. 22: so that the beginning aphorism (i. e. the
first aphorism of the Mímámsá-darśann) means etc.
P. 0. l. 12 after material" add : so that, by means of tho
possessive indication contained in the word soma, the sense of the
sentence is “he is to effect the desired result by means of the
sucrifice distinguished by soma."
P. 48. 1. 10: succinct.