·पुस्तकालय
522000.go
केन्द्रीय
वनस्थली विद्यापीठ
श्रेणी संख्या
131. 45
Bu69 V
पुस्तक संख्या
अवाप्ति क्रमांक

·NYAYASARA
OF
BHÂSARVAJNA.
Wow
WITH NOTES
Second Edition
BY
VIŠE VÂNATHA P. VAIDYA, B, A., (Bombay).
BARRISTER AT LAW MIDDLE TEMPLE, LONDON; SPECIAL. MTEMBER,
THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY OF ENGLAND, SCOTAND AND
IRELAND; VICE PRECIDENT BOMBAY Braycn, ROYAL
ASIATIC SOCIETY; SOMETIME RESEARCII
STUDENT, EDINBURGII UNIERSITY,
13, Cathedral Street, Bomlity.
AIKY.
BOMBAY:
PRINTED BY RANCHAYDRE YESU STEDGE,
AT TIE 'Nirvara-SCHARNISS,
ditabran
23, KOLBTAT UNVEST
1921.
Price Rs. 2-8.

·No text on this page.

·श्रीभासर्वज्ञप्रणीतः न्यायसारः महाम्बापुरस्थविश्वविद्यालये वि. ए. इतिपदसम्भावितेन श्रीलन्दनराजधानीपुरस्थमध्यमन्दिरेतिख्यातधर्म- शास्त्रप्रवर्तकसमाजान्तःपातिना वैद्योपना- मकायुर्वेदमहोपाध्यायश्रीप्रभुराम- तनुजन्मना विश्वनाथेन संस्कृत आंग्लभाषया विवृतश्च. मुंबापुर्य्या पाण्डुरङ्ग जावजी इत्येतेषां निर्णयसागरमुद्रणयत्रे मुद्रायित्वा प्रकाशितः । शाके १८४३ दुर्मतिनामसंवत्सरे ।

·No text on this page.

·PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. While I was a student in the college, I took delight in studying the Myāya, in which I felt keen interest, especially owing to the able lectures on the subject by the late Shastri Bhimāchärya whose very deep study of the subject has resulted in his Nyāyakosha. In 1902 I was a guest of Professor Deussen in Germany and in his company I attended the Oriental Congress at Hamburgh where I made acquaintance of many able Sanskritists especially of Professors Jolly, Eggeling, Macdonell and Bendal, and found an occasion to come in contact with the late lamented Professor Cowell, whose profound knowledge of the Ngāya, the Vedānta and Buddhism has remained unequalled in the West. During my visit to him in Cambridge we twice discussed some knotty points in the Nyāya Nuktāvali and as a result thereof, be advised me to undertake an edition of a good Nyāya Work. In the month of October of the same year I visited Prof. Eggling in Edinburghi. He also adviscd me to do the same and by way of encouragement, he proposed and got me elected a research student of his University, so as to make me concontrate for an year my studies of Sanskrit literature to that subject. Since then for about an year and a half I worked over several manuscripts in the India Office Library. About the middle of 1903 I undertook to prepare an edition of F-TYHTE: of HIHAST:. I collected in all six copies of the work, four of which are in the Library of the India Office in London, and two were found in India. 1 The first, a copy only of the text in the India Office Library, is written in Nagari Character with several letters in Jainic form. These are folios, 9 in all, from 19 to 28 in continuation of Keshava llislıra's Tarha Paribhasha which is completed in the middle of folio 19. Both the works are copied by the same scribe. The portion of the Tarhaparibhāslü seems to have been very much used and studied, as appears from marginal notes made on that portion of the MIs. The portion of FrTart: has remained untouched. The Ms. is tolerably correct except in the last page whore there is a repetition of two lines and twice over of one line. It is written on very strong paper 12" x 6" with 15 lines on each page. The colophones at the end of the parichhedas aro very short and simple. They give no information as to ·. II PREFACE. vas the author except his name and he is described as q7h1914- curier HR: This shows that, by the time this MS. copied, the author was recognised as an able and much respected scholar of Nyāya Philosophy. This Ms. I have noted as B. 2 The second is a copy of the commentary interposed with tlic text. The commentary is by hera: son of 95. This was composed, according to Professor Hall in Sake year 1171 or 1252 A. D. This manuscript goes as far as the end of second Parichheda only. The Ms. is very old and very slovenly written, but it is mostly correct. Rāghava is a bold writer with flashes of originality and independence. Whenever lie differs from his author, he is clear and strong in his view. This copy I have noted as R. 3 The third MS. is that of the artarafat a commentary on न्यायसारः by जयसिंहसूरिः pupil of महेन्द्रसूरिः of कृष्णार्पिगच्छ: who seems to have flourished in the year 1037 A. D. He is known to be the author of सप्तपदी and is mentioned in the प्रवचन- परीक्षा of धर्मसागरः This copy I have noted as C. 4 Besides these three, there is a fourth copy in the India Office Library and it is known as Gaikwar's copy. This is very old in appearance but to my mind it is not so. The person who sold it to the learned collector of Mss. seems to have used the artifice of putting it in a smoky and dirty place which lias given it the oldish appearance. It is a copy of the abovo No. 3 and often incorrect. This I have noted as G. 5 The fifth copy which I saw belongs to the Library of the Deccan College and was procured for me by Mr. E. T. Giles sometime Director of Public Instruction, Bombay. I layo noted this as D. 6 A copy of this work, a very recently made, is in the Library of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society and it was kindly lent to me by the Hon. Secretary Mr. Haigh. This came in my bands very late, after almost the whole of the text was printed. I have however compared it with my text and made such use of it as was possible. I have noted it as E. 7 A seventh copy of this was seen by me at Benares in the Queen's College Liarary. I could not go through it, as in spite of the strong recommendation of Mr. E. I. Giles, the principal of the collego could not be induced to allow nje lo bring it to Bombay.

·PREFACE. TII سب The first four copies aforesaid belong to the India Offce Library of London and my thanks are due to the Librarian Mr. Thomas for allowing me the use of them in London and also procuring the same for me in Bombay on ny return. I intended to write an introduction discussing the comparative methods of reasoning used in eastern and western systems of logic and had collected some materials for the same. Engagements, over which I had no control, and several difficulties which I had not anticipated, so much hampered my work, that for years together I had either to completely put aside this work or bad to do it at long intervals only. The printing of the text and the notes had been completed for over a year and yet I have found no time to put the introduction in shape. I have therefore thought it proper to publish the work without it with a hope, however, that in no distant future I may be able to put it before the public. BOMBAY: 22 CATHEDRAL STREET, 13th September 1910. VISAVANATH P. VAIDYA.

·No text on this page.

·-
न्यायसारः।
श्रीशंभवेनमः।
5
प्रणम्य शम्भुं जगतः पतिं परम्
समस्ततत्त्वार्थविदं स्वभावतः ।
शिशुप्रबोधाय मयाऽभिधास्यते
प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्यलक्षणम् ॥
सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् । सम्यग्ग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहा-
र्थम् । तत्राऽनवधारणं ज्ञानं संशयः । स च समानधर्माऽनेकधर्मवि-
प्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिकारणभेदात्पंचधा भिद्यते । तद्यथा । समा.
नधर्मात्किमयं स्थाणुः स्यात्पुरुषो वेति । १ । अनेकधर्मादाकाशविशे-
षगुणत्वात्किमयं शब्दो नित्यः स्यादनित्यो वेति । २ । विप्रतिपत्तेरेके 10
भौतिकानींद्रियाण्याहुरन्ये चाऽभौतिकानीति । ३ । उपलव्धेः किं
सदुदकमुपलभ्यत उताऽसदिति । ४ । अनुपलव्धेः किं विद्यमानः
पिशाचो नोपलभ्यते किं वाऽविद्यमानः । ५ । अनवधारणत्वादूहा-
ऽनध्यवसाययोन संशयादर्थान्तरभावः । तद्यथा वाह्यालीप्रदेशे पुरु-
पेणाऽनेन भवितव्यमित्यूहः । किंसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष इत्यनध्यवसायः ॥15
मिथ्याऽध्यवसायो विपर्ययः । तद्यथा । द्वौ चन्द्राविति । सुप्तस्य
1 परं C, R, D. वरं B.
2 ससम्यग D.
5 अविद्यमान इति° D.
6 त्वा B. त्वाविशेषात् .
7 भावः B. भाव इति°C, D.
3.के
को B.
G, R;
4 चा". ०. च B. व D.

·२ न्यायसारः। 5 गजदर्शनं चेति ॥ स्मरणज्ञानव्यवच्छेदार्थमनुभवग्रहणम् ॥ प्रमाद्रप्र. मेयव्यवच्छेदार्थ फलाद्भेदज्ञापनार्थ च साधनग्रहणम् ॥ सम्यगनुभवः प्रमा। प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता । प्रमाविषयः प्रमेय- मिति ॥ तत्रिविधम् । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागम इति । तत्र सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम् । तहिविधम् । योगिप्र- त्यक्षमयोगिप्रत्यक्षं चेति ॥ तत्राऽयोगिप्रत्यक्ष प्रकाशदेशकालधर्माद्यनु- ग्रहादिन्द्रियार्थसंबंधविशेपेण स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् । तद्यथा । चक्षुःस्पर्श- नयोगाद्घटादिद्रव्यज्ञानम् । संयुक्तसमवायात्ताभ्यां घटत्वादिसंख्या- परिमाणादिज्ञानम् । चक्षुषैत्र रूपज्ञानम् । स्पर्शनेनैव स्पर्शज्ञानम् । प्रा- 10 णेनैव गन्धज्ञानम् । रसनेनैव रसज्ञानम् । मनसैव सुखादिज्ञानम् ।। एतेषु संख्यादिष्वाश्रितानां सामान्यानां स्वाश्रयग्राहकैरिन्द्रियैः संयु- क्तसमवेतसमवायाद्रहणम् ॥ श्रोत्रसमवायात् श्रवणेनैव शब्दज्ञानम् ।। तैदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञानं समवेतसमवायात् ॥ तदेतत्पंचैविधसंबंधसंव- द्धविशेषणविशेष्यभावादृश्याभावसमवाययोर्ग्रहणम् । तद्यथा । घट- 5 शून्यं भूतलम् । इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तथाहि तंतवः पटसम- वायवंतः । तंतुषु पटसमवाय इति । इत्येवं सर्वाश उदाहरणीयम् । 1 स्मरण B. C. स्मरणा R. यात्; समवेतसमवायात्तदाश्रितसामान्य- 2 D omits the whole #° B. phrase. 9 तदेतत् B; तत् C; एतत् D. 3 चक्षुःस्पर्शन D. 10 पंचविधि B; पंच C, D. 4 योगात् B. संयोगात् c. 11 भावादृश्याभावसमवाययोर्ग्रहणम्°C. 5 घटत्वसंख्या D. R, D. भावादृश्यते समवायाग्रहणम् B. 6 ज्ञानमिति D. 12 तथाहि ...... पटसमवाय 7 श्रोत्रसमवायात् श्रवणेनैव शब्दज्ञानम् B, D. and G omit this. R. G; श्रोत्रसमवायात् शब्दग्रहणम् B, D. | has it. 8 तदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञानं समवेत समवा 13 एवं सर्वत्रोऽदा, D:::

·प्रत्यक्षम् । समवायस्यतु कचिदेवग्रहणम् । यथा इह घटे रूपसमवायः । रूपस- मवायवान्घट:॥ योगिप्रत्यक्षं तु देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थप्राहकम् ॥ तच्च द्विविधम् युक्तावस्थायां वियुक्तावस्थायां चेति ॥ तत्र युक्तावस्थायामात्मान्तःक- रणसंयोगादेव धर्मादिसहिताऽशेषार्थग्रहणम् ॥ वियुक्तावस्थायां तु च- 5 तुष्टयत्रयद्वयसन्निकर्षाद्रहणं यथासंभवेन योजनीयम् ॥ अत्रैवार्षमन्त- भूतम् । प्रकृष्टधर्मजत्वाऽविशेषादिति ।। तच द्विविधम् । सविकल्पं निर्विकल्पं च ॥ तत्र संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबं- धोल्लेखेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं सविकल्पम् यथा देवदत्तोयं दंडीत्यादि । वस्तुस्वभावमात्रावभासकं निर्विकल्पम् यथा प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजं ज्ञा- 10 नम् । युक्तावस्थायां योगिज्ञानं च ॥ इति न्यायसारे प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ॥ 1 यथारूपसमवायवान्घटः । इह घटे 7 संशासंशं B, R, D; संज्ञादि° c. रूपसमवाय इति। 8 कल्पकम् D. 2 सहिता B; सहितात्, G, R. 9 यथा देवदत्तोयं दंडीत्यादि° B, 0%B 3 संभवेन° R, C. संभावन B. तदयं परमाणू रूपवानित्यादि R. 4 वार्षमन्त° B, C. वार्षमप्यन्त R.. 10 वस्तुस्वरूप D. 5 धर्मजत्वा C. धर्मशता B. 11 कल्पकम् D. 6 सविकल्पकम् निर्विकल्पके D.

·न्यायसारः। सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम् ॥ स्वभावतः साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरविनाभावः । स द्विविधोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकभे- दात् ॥ साध्यसामान्येन साधनसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिरन्वयः । साधन- सामान्याभावेन साध्यसामान्याभावस्य व्याप्तिय॑तिरेकः ॥ साधनं 5 लिङ्गम् । तच्च द्विविधम् दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्या- र्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् यथा धूमोऽमेरिति । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थाऽनुमापक सामान्यतोदृष्टम् यथा रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेरिति ।। तत्पुनर्द्विविधम् । स्वार्थ परार्थ चेति । तत्र परोपदेशानपेक्षं स्वार्थम् । परोपदेशापेक्षं परार्थम् । परोपदेशस्तु पंचावयवं वाक्यम् ।। 10 प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ।। तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः ।। साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतुः । स त्रिविधः । अन्वयव्यति- रेकी केवलान्वयी केवलव्यतिरेकी चेति ॥ तत्र पंचरूपोऽन्वयव्यति- रेकी । रूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षेसत्वम् विपक्षाव्यावृत्तिरबाधितवि- 15 पयत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं च ।। तत्र, साध्यधर्मविशिष्टः पक्षः । तत्र व्याप्यवृत्तित्वं हेतोः पक्षधर्म- त्वम् ॥ साध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः। तत्र सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशे वा हेतो- वृत्तिः सपक्षेसत्वम् ॥ साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी विपक्षः। तत्र सर्वस्मि- विपक्षे हेतोरवृत्तिर्विपक्षाढ्यावृत्तिः ॥ प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि प्रतिज्ञा- .. B, D. 1 अविनाभावः C,D. अनादिभावः B. 7 °विशिष्टो धमी C. G. D. 2 °विधोऽन्वय G, C. विधः । अन्वय' 8 सर्वसिन्नेकदेशे वा 0, G, D. सर्व- स्मिन् R. 3 तच्चद्वि B, D. तद्विवि° 0, R, G. 9 समस्तेपि 4 यथा अनित्यः शब्द इति D. 10 प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि°C, G. प्रमाणा- 5 Here D.. adds यथा तीव्रादि- द्विरोधिनि° B. धर्मोपेतत्वात् । 11 प्रतिज्ञातेऽर्थे° B, R, D; प्रतिज्ञा- 6 सच D. C,G. तार्थे° 0, G.

·अनुमानम् । ५ 5 तेऽर्थे हेतोवृत्तिरवाधितविषयत्वम् ॥ साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः साधनस्याऽ- त्रिरूपत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् ॥ स द्विविधः । सपक्षवृत्तिभेदात् तद्यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वा- दिति सपक्षव्यापकः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सति-अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्य- स्वादिति सपक्षकदेशवृत्तिः ।। पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्तिरविद्यमानविपक्षः केवलान्वयी । स पूर्व- वहिविधः । तद्यथा विवादास्पदीभूतान्यदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि प्रमेयत्वात्करतलादिवदिति सपक्षव्यापकः । सैव प्रतिज्ञा मीमांसका- नामप्रत्यक्षत्वादस्मत्सुखादिवदिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकी यथा पक्षव्यापकोऽविद्यमानसपक्षो विपक्षाघ्या-10 वृत्तः । स चाऽप्रसंगोनेयी प्रसंगोनेयी च । सर्व कार्य सर्ववित्कर्तृ- पूर्वकं कादाचित्कत्वात् यथाऽऽकाशे । प्रसंगद्वारेण यथा नेदं निरा- त्मक जीवच्छरीरमप्राणादिमत्त्वप्रसंगालोष्ठवदिति ॥ एतेन हेत्वाभासानामहेतुत्वं भवति । यतो हेतुत्वलक्षणरहिता हे- . 1 साधनस्यापि C, G. साधनस्य त्रि नेयी च । पूर्व अप्रसंगोन्नयिनमाह. B. साधनस्यात्रि' D, R. 9 D puts सर्व कार्य after पूर्व- 2 सर्वसपक्ष D. कम् , and यथा in the beginning 3 अनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यत्वे D. of the sentence. 4 ग्राह्यत्वात् G,O, D. वाह्यत्वात् B. 10 Dadds यत्सर्ववित्कर्तृकं न भवति 5 केवलान्वयी पूर्ववद्विविधः C,G, R. तत्कादाचित्कमपि न भवति in the स पूर्व द्विविधः B. body of the text; but it 6 Domits सपक्षव्यापकः. must be an annotation put 7 D puts of greenlacent after in by mistake of the scribe. व्यावृत्तः in the sentence. 11 D. आकाशम्. 8 D omits this from the 12 puts in वा. body of the text but puts 13 C,Gand Domit यतो'. in the marginal note viz. 14 D omits a केवलव्यतिरेकी द्विधा, अप्रसंगोनेयी प्रसंगो. .

·६ न्यायसारः। .. तुवदाभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः। ते चानेकप्रकारा असिद्धविरुद्धाऽनैका- न्तिकाऽनध्यवसितकालात्ययापदिष्टप्रकरणसमाः ॥ तत्राऽनिश्चितपक्षवृत्तिरसिद्धः। पक्षविपक्षयोरेव वर्तमानो विरुद्धः। पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः । साध्याऽसाधकः पक्ष एव वर्तमानो- 5 ऽनध्यवसितः । प्रमाणवाधिते पक्षे वर्तमानो हेतुः कालात्यसापदिष्टः । स्व-परपक्षसिद्धावपि त्रिरूपो हेतुः प्रकरणसमः ॥ यद्यपि चैषां सूक्ष्मा भेदा अनंतत्वान्न शक्यन्ते वक्तुं तथापि स्थूलां दृष्टिमाश्रित्य कियंतो भेदाः प्रयन्ते ॥ असिद्धस्तावत् । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वात्। १ । 10 व्यधिकरणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः पैटस्य कृतकत्वात् । २ । विशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात् । ३ । विशेपणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शव्दश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामान्य- वत्त्वात् । ४ । विभागाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नान्तरीयक- त्वात् । ५ । आश्रयाऽसिद्धो यथाऽस्ति प्रधानं विश्वपरिणामित्वात् 1।। ६ । आश्रयैकदेशाऽसिद्धो यथा नित्याः प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरा अकृतक- त्वात् । ७ । व्यर्थविशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् । ८ । व्यर्थविशेषणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सा- मान्यवत्त्वे सति कृतकत्वात् । ९ । संदिग्धाऽसिद्धो यथा धूमबाष्पा- दिविवेकाऽनिश्चये कश्चिदाहाऽग्निमानयं प्रदेशो धूमवत्त्वात् । १० । 20 संदिग्धविशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः पुरुषत्वे सत्यद्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानत्वात् । ११ । संदिग्धविशेषणाऽसिद्धो यथा- 1 D omits ते चानेक.."रा. 2 पक्षत्रयवृत्तिः R. 3 असिद्धभेदः° D. 4 शशविपाणत्वात्. R. 5 घटस्य D. 6 भागासिद्धो D. 7 अयं धूमो दहनजन्यः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति धूमवत्त्वाद् R. 8 °क: B. 9 °सत्यद्याप्य°C,D.सति सर्वदाप्य° B ·हेत्वाभासाः। 10 ऽद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः सर्वदा तत्त्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुष- त्वात् । १२ ॥ एतेऽसिद्धभेदा यदोभयवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदो- भयाऽसिद्धा भवन्ति । यदा त्वन्यतरवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदा- न्यतराऽसिद्धा भवन्ति । विरुद्धभेदास्तु सति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः ॥ पक्षविपक्षव्या- 5 पको यथा नित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वात् । १ । विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः पक्ष- व्यापको यथा नित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्रा- ह्यत्वात् । २ । पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीय- कत्वात् । ३ । पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा नित्या पृथिवी कृ- तकत्वात् । ४। असति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः ॥ पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथाss- काशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । १ । पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेश- वृत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः कार्यत्वात् । २ । पैक्षविपक्षकदे- शवृत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । ३ । विपक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तियथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दोऽपदात्मक-15 त्वात् । ४। ननु चत्वार एव विरुद्धभेदा नान्ये तेषामसिद्धलक्षणोपन्नत्वेना- ऽसिद्धत्वात् । नैष दोष उभयलक्षणोपपन्नत्वेनोभयव्यवहारविषयत्वात् तुलायां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारवत् ।। अनैकान्तिकभेदास्तु । पक्षत्रयव्यापको यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेय- 20 स्वात् । १ । पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । २ । पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽयं गौ- .. 1 D omits भवन्ति. 2 वाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् C, D. 3 जयसिंह puts this as second and not third and so does D. 4 D omits न. 5 पक्षकदेशवृत्तिविपक्षव्यापक: B. 6 B omits ते. 7 लक्षणोपपन्नत्वात् C, D. 8 गौरवं° D.

·८ न्यायसार: । विषाणित्वात् । ३ । पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः । सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नायं गौर्विषाणित्वात् । ४ । पक्षत्रयैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽनित्या पृथिवी प्रत्यक्ष- त्वात् । ५ । पक्षसपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा द्रव्याणि दिक्का- लमनांसि-अमूर्तत्वात् । ६ । पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापको 5 यथा नै द्रव्याणि दिकालमनास्यमूर्तत्वात् । ७ । सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा न द्रव्याण्याकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशे- पगुणरहितत्वात् ॥ ८॥ अनध्यवसितभेदास्तु । अविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्त्वात् । १ । अविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षैकदेशवृत्ति- 10र्यथा सर्वमनित्यं कार्यत्वात् । २ । विद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्या- पको यथाऽनित्यः शब्द आकाशविशेपगुणत्वात् । ३ । विद्यमानसप- क्षविपक्षः पक्षकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्व द्रव्यमनित्यं क्रियावत्त्वात् । ४ । अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा सर्व कार्य नि- त्यमुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् । ५ । अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्षः पक्ष- 15 कदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्व कार्य नित्यं सावयवत्वात् । ६ । कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदास्तु । प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निः कृतक- त्वात् । १ । अनुमानविरुद्धो यथाऽनित्याः परमाणवो मूर्तत्वात् । २ । आगमविरुद्धो यथा ब्राह्मणेन सुरा पेया द्रवद्रव्यत्वात् क्षीरवत् । ३ । प्रत्यक्षैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्व तेजोऽनुष्णं रूपित्वात् । ४ । अनुमा- 20 नैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा नित्याऽऽश्रया द्रवत्वरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शा नित्या अ- प्रदेशवृत्तिसमानजात्यारंभकत्वे सति परमाणुवृत्तित्वात् तद्गतैकत्ववत् । ५। आगमैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्वेषां देवर्षीणां शरीराणि पार्थिवानि शरीरत्वादस्मदादिशरीरवत् । ६ । 4 1 त° B. न. 0. 2 o omits 3 which is a mistake as shown by the commentary. 3 परमाणवो नित्या मूर्तत्वात् . 4 पेयं सुरादि .

·उदाहरणम् । '९ प्रकरणसमस्योदाहरणं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वा- सपक्षवत् । नित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात् सपक्षवत् ।। . एकत्र तुल्यलक्षणविरुद्धहेतुद्वयोपनिपातो विरुद्धाऽव्यभिचारीत्येके यथा नित्यमाकाशममूर्तत्वादात्मवत् । एवमंनित्यमाकाशमस्मदादि- बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणाधारत्वात् घटवदिति ॥ स खलु पुरुषविशेषमपे- 5 क्षमाणो हेत्वाभासो भवत्यन्यतरासिद्धवत् ॥ सम्यग्दृष्टान्ताभिधानमुदाहरणम् । तद्विविधम् साधर्म्यवैधय॑भे- दात् ॥ तत्रान्वयमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं साधोदाहरणं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दस्तीवादिधर्मोपेतत्वात् । यद्यत्तीवादिधर्मोपेतं तत्तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा सुखादिः ॥ व्यतिरेकमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं वैधयोदाहरणम् । यद-10 नित्यं न भवति तत्तीवादिधर्मोपेतमपि न भवति यथाकाशमिति ॥ एतेनोदाहरणाभासानामनुदाहरणत्वमुक्तं भवति ॥ उदाहरणलक्ष- णरहिता उदाहरणवदाभासमाना उदाहरणाभासास्ते चानेकप्रकाराः ॥ यथा चाऽनित्यं मनो मूर्तत्वादित्यस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे सर्वेप्युदाहरणाभासा उच्यन्ते ॥ यन्मूर्त तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा परमाणुरिति साध्यविकलः।१।15 यथा कर्मेति साधनविकलः । २ । यथाऽऽकाशमित्युभयविकलः।३। 7 D omits. एतेन भवति. 8 °दित्येतसि D. 9 Domits एव. 1 तुल्यलक्षण B. तुल्यक्षण° C. 2 नित्य B. न्यत्य C. 3 अमूर्तत्वात् B.C. अमूर्तद्रव्य- त्वात् D. 4 एवम्. B. C. omits एवम्. 5 °माणो B. °माणो c. 6p omits न. २ 10 B here quotes a pas. sage from the commentary of जयासिंह.

·१० न्यायसारः । यथा खपुष्पमित्याश्रयहीनः । ४ । घटवदित्यव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । ५ । यदनित्यं तन्मूर्त दृष्टमिति विपरीतव्यात्यभिधानम् । ६ । इत्येतौ व- चनदोषौ । यत्त्वनित्यं न भवति तन्मूर्तमपि न भवति यथा परमा- गुरिति साधनाऽव्यावृत्तः । ७ । यथा कर्मेति साध्याऽव्यावृत्तः । ८। 5 यथा घट इत्युभयाऽव्यावृत्तः । ९ । यथा खपुष्पमित्याश्रयहीनः॥१०॥ आकाशवदित्यव्यात्यभिधानम् । ११ । यन्न मूर्त तदनित्यं न भवति यथाऽऽकाशमिति विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । १२ । इत्येतौ वचनं- दोषौ ।। अत्राद्याः षट् साधोदाहरणाभासाः । इतरे पट् वैधयो- दाहरणाभासा इति ॥ अन्ये तु संदेहद्वारेणाऽपरानष्टावुदाहरणाभासा- 10 न्वर्णयंति ॥ संदिग्धसाध्यो यथा महाराज्यं करिष्यत्ययं सोमवंशोभू- तत्वाद्विवक्षितराजपुरुपवदिति । १३ । संदिग्धसाधनो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो रागादिमत्त्वाथ्यापुरुषवत् । १४ । संदिग्धोभयो यथा स्वर्ग गमिष्यत्ययं विवक्षितः पुरुषः समुपार्जितशुक्लधर्मत्वादपरिचितदेवद- तपुत्रवत् । १५ । संदिग्धाश्रयो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो बहुवक्तृकत्वात् 15 भविष्यद्देवदत्तपुत्रवत् । १६ । संदिग्धसाध्याऽव्यावृत्तो यथा यो म- हाराज्यं न करिष्यति स सोमवंशोद्भूतो न भवति यथाऽन्यो राज. पुरुषः । १७ । संदिग्धसाधनाव्यावृत्तो यथा यस्तु सर्वज्ञः स रागा- दिरहितो यथा समस्तशास्त्राभिज्ञ इति । १८ । संदिग्धोभयाव्यावृत्तो यथा यः स्वर्ग न गमिष्यति स समुपार्जितशुक्लधर्मोऽपि न भवति . 1 शशविषाणम् C. D; पुष्ण° B. 7 D omits इति. 2 आश्रयविकल: D. 8 अष्टानुदा B. अष्टावुदा C. D. 3 घटवदिति व्यायनभिधानम् । R. 9 देवदत्तवत् C. D; अपरिचितदेवदत्त- यद्य° B यत्त्व R. यन्नि C. D; पुत्रवत् B, 5 D omits न भवति. 10 वक्तृत्वात्..B. 6 यदमूर्त° D. 11. तोपि B..D.

·उपनयनिगमने। यथा दुःस्थः पुरुपः । १९ । संदिग्धाश्रयों यथा यः सर्वज्ञः स बहु- वक्ता न भवति यथा भविष्यदेवदत्तपुत्रः। २० ।। दृष्टान्ते प्रसिद्धाऽविनाभावस्य साधनस्य दृष्टान्तोपमानेन पक्षे व्याप्तिख्यांपकं वचनमुपनयः ॥ स पूर्ववहिविधः । तथाच तीब्रादि- धर्मोपेतः शब्द इति साधोपनयः । न तथा च तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतः 5 शब्दो न भवतीति वैधयोपेतः ॥ उपनयानंतरं सहेतुकं प्रतिज्ञावचनं निगमनं । तस्मादनित्य ए- वेति ॥ न चेदमनर्थकम् । साध्यविरुद्धाभावप्रतिपादकप्रमाणसूचक- त्वादिति । न च तदंतरण साध्यावधारणमुपपद्यते । तथा चोक्तम् ।। विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णय इति । गौ. सू. 10 १-१-४१. ।।. निगमनाभिधानमसाधनांगमभ्युपगम्य बाधकं प्रमाणमभ्युपगच्छतो निग्रहस्थानं प्रसज्येत । निगमनार्थत्वाद्वाधकस्य । निगमनार्थविप्रति- पत्तौ हि बाधकप्रमाणोपन्यासोऽभ्युक्तो हेत्वर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ तत्साधक- प्रमाणोपन्यासवदिति ॥ सोयं परमो न्यायो विप्रतिपन्नपुरुषप्रतिपाद-15 कत्वात् कथाप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाच ॥ वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः कथा । सा द्विविधा वीत- रागकथा विजिगीषुकथा चेति । यत्र वीतरागो वीतरागेण सह तत्व- 1 स बहुवक्ता न भवति C. D; सो- पादकप्रमाणाभावसूचकत्वात्. ऽवयं न वदति B; 5 B omits ग. 2 प्रतिपादकं D. ख्यापकं C. 6 °भ्युक्तो B. युक्तो C. D; 3 D. omits this whole 7 °नोः C.. R; phrase. 8 प्रतिपक्षग्रहः'Bप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः 4 Rāghava.quotes anoth-C. R. er reading viz, साध्यविरुद्धप्रति- न: B.' ..

·१२. न्यायसारः। निर्णयार्थ साधनोपालंभौ करोति सा वीतरागकथा वादसंज्ञयैवोच्यते। तथा चोक्तं ॥ 5 10 प्रमाण-तर्कसाधनोपालंभः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पंचावयवोपपन्नः पक्ष- प्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः ॥ गौ. सू. १-२-१. तं प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनमपि वा कुर्यात् । प्रयोजनार्थत्वेन यथा शिष्यो गुरुणा सह प्रश्नद्वारेणेवेत्यर्थः ॥ यत्र विजिगीपुर्विजिगीपुणा सह लाभपूजाख्यातिकामो जयपराजयार्थ प्रवर्तते वीतरागो वा परा- ऽनुग्रहार्थ ज्ञानांकुरसंरक्षणार्थं च प्रवर्तते सा चतुरंगा वादिप्रतिवादि- सभापतिप्राश्निकांगा विजिगीपुकथा जल्पवितंडासंज्ञोक्ता । तथाचाह तत्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थ जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थ कंटक- शाखावरणवत् । गौ. सू. ४-२-५०.॥ यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः । गौ. सू. १-२-२. ॥ स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा । गौ. सू. १-२-३.॥ वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् । गौ. सू. १-२-१० ॥ तत्रिविधम् वाक्छलं सामान्यछलमुपचारच्छलं चेति । गौ. सू. १-२-११ ॥ 15 यथा अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् । 20 गौ. सू. १-२-१२॥ नवकम्बलोयं माणवक इत्युक्ते छलवाद्याह कुतो नवकंबला इति । 1 प्रमाणात B. प्रमाणतर्क C. R; 2 Bomits जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्र- रोहसंरक्षणार्थ, 3 यथोपलक्षणोपपन्न B. 4 °प्रायापरिज्ञानात् B. C.

·छलम् । १३ तस्याऽप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणं निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यं । नवः कंवलोऽस्येति वक्तुर- भिप्रायाऽपरिज्ञानाद्वा विप्रतिपत्तेर्वा विपरीतज्ञानादिति ॥ संभवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छ- लम् ॥ गौ. सू. १-२-१३ ॥ अहो • खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणश्चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञ इत्युक्ते केनचिच्यायवाद्याह 5 किमत्राश्चर्य संभवति हि ब्राह्मणे चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञत्वमित्यत्र च्छलवाद्याह न व्रात्येनानैकान्तिकत्वात् । तस्याऽपि पूर्ववन्निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यम् । कस्माद्धेतुत्वेनाऽविवक्षितत्वात् । किं तर्हि । ब्राह्मणत्वे सति चतुर्वेदा- भिज्ञत्वमाश्चर्यकारणं न भवति सुक्षेत्रशालिसंपद्वत् ।। उपचारप्रयोगे मुख्यार्थकल्पनया प्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् । यथा 10 मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्युक्ते च्छलवाद्याह पुरुषाः क्रोशन्ति न मञ्चास्तेषा- मचेतनत्वात् । इति तस्याऽपि निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यं पूर्ववत् । उभयथा- ऽपि लोके शास्त्रे च प्रयोगदर्शनादिति ॥ प्रयुक्त हेतौ समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसंगो जातिः ॥ पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानमिति बहवश्चानयोः सूक्ष्मा भेदास्तेषां कियन्तो भेदा लक्ष-15 णोदाहरणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यन्ते ।। साधर्म्यवैधाभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः साधर्म्यवैधये- समौ । गौ. सू. ५-१-२. ।। यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्धटवदित्युक्ते जातिवाद्याह यद्यनि- त्यघटसाधात्कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्द इष्यते तर्हि नित्याकाशसाध-20 ादमूर्तत्वान्नित्यः प्राप्नोति यदि च नित्याकाशवैधात्कृतकत्वाद- नित्य इष्यते तर्हि घटाद्यनित्यवैधादमूर्तत्वान्नित्यः प्राप्नोति विशेषा- 1 वादिप्रतिपत्तिर्वा B. वा विप्रति. पत्तेर्वा C. D; वा विप्रतिपत्तिर्वा R; 2 न° B. C; नु R. D. 3 हेतुत्वस्या D; हेतुत्वेना B. C. 4 °तीत्यभिप्राय D; 5 त्तेः गौ. D; त्तिः B. 0. • 6 D. omits तर्दि.. 7 मूर्तत्वं तर्हि D.

·१४ न्यायसारः। भावात् । अनयोरुत्तरम् । अविनाभाविनः साधर्म्यस्य वैधय॑स्य च हेतुत्वाभ्युपगमादप्रसंगो धूमादिवत् ।। '' साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्द्धर्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाचोत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ध्यावर्ण्य- विकल्पसाध्यसमाः । गौ. सू. ५-१-४. ॥ साध्ये दृष्टान्तादनिष्टधर्मप्रसंग उत्कर्षसमः ॥ इष्टधर्मनिवृत्तिरपक- पसमः ॥ यदि कृतकत्वाद्धटवदैनित्यशब्द इण्यते तदाँ घंटवदेव सा- वयवोऽपि स्यात् । अर्थ नैवमनित्योऽपि तर्हि न स्यादविशेषादिति । अश्रावणश्च घटो दृष्टः शब्दोपि श्रावणो न स्यादविशेषादिति । शब्दो यदि कृतकत्वाऽनुमानेनाऽनित्यो वर्ण्यते तदा घटोऽपि कृतकत्वाऽनु- 10 मानेनाऽनित्यो वर्यः स्यात् । घटस्तेनैवानुमानेनाऽनित्यो वर्ण्यते ततः शब्दोप्यवर्ण्यः स्यादविशेषादिति वावर्ण्यसमौ ॥ कृतकत्वाऽविशे- पेंऽपि यथामूर्तत्वाऽमूर्तत्वादिधर्मविकल्पस्तथा नित्यत्वाऽनित्यत्वविक- ल्पोऽपि स्यादविशेषादिति विकल्पसमः ॥ यदि कृतकत्वादुभयोरनि- त्यत्वं तर्हि साध्यत्वमुभयोः स्यान्न वा कस्यचिदविशेषादिति साध्यसैमः।। 15 एतेषामुत्तरं । किंचित्साधादुपसंहारे सिद्धेवैधादप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-५॥ किंचित्साधर्म्यामवत्त्वादिलक्षणात्साध्यदृष्टान्तयोधर्मविकल्पेऽपि व्यवस्था दृष्टा । तदपलापे लोकादिविरोधः सर्वाऽनुमानानामप्रामाण्य- प्रसंगश्चेति ॥ 11 1 °पकर्षवर्ध्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यसमाः C. गौ. R. °पकर्षविकल्पसमाः B. 2 दि° B. द. C. D. 3 दि B. द. C. D. 4 तथा B. तदा ,C. D. 5 अथानेक B. 6 त B. 7 This is the reading of R and D. C. omits, certainly by mistake, श्रावणो न स्यात्' शब्दो. 8 घो° B. 0. कृतकत्वादि C. 9 साध्यत्वं तदा D. 10 C. omits साध्यसमः. 11 °द्धे वै: B. .. -- ·जातयः । 5 प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्याऽविशिष्टत्वादप्रात्याऽसाधक- त्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ । गौ. सू. ५-१-७ ।। यद्ययं हेतुः प्राप्य साध्यं साधयेत्तदोभयोः प्राप्त्यविशिष्टत्वादंगु- ल्योरिव किं कस्य साध्यं साधनं चेति । अप्राप्यसाधको नास्ति कां- ष्ठादग्निवदिति ।। अनयोरुत्तरम् । घटादि-निष्पत्ति-दर्शनात्पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-८॥ प्राप्त्यप्राप्त्यविशेषेऽपि प्रतिनियतार्थवृत्तय एवैते साध्यसाधनत्यायो धर्मा दृष्टास्ते निराकर्तुमशक्याः सर्वप्रमाणविरोधादिति ॥ प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१२ ॥ - 10 यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वादित्युक्ते प्रागुत्पत्तेरनित्यत्वे कारणं ना. स्तीति नित्यः प्रसक्तः । तस्योत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् । • तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१३ ॥ अनुत्पन्नः शब्द एव नास्ति कस्य नित्यत्वादिधर्माश्चिन्त्यन्ते ।। त्रैकाल्याऽसिद्धेहेतोरहेतुसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१८ ॥ यदि पूर्व साधनमसति साध्ये कस्य साधनम् । अर्थ युगपत्तथापि किं कस्य साधनं साध्यं वा द्वयोस्तुल्यकालत्वादिति । अस्योत्तरम् । न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धे प्रवृत्त्यादिविरोध इति सूत्रार्थः । प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेश्च त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः । स्वमतेनैव प्रतिषेधासिद्धौ हेतुसिद्धिरिति सूत्रार्थः ॥ 20 एकधर्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाऽविशेषप्रसंगात्सद्भावोपपत्तिरविशेष- समः । गौः सू. ५-१-२३ ॥ 15 . 1 परिहारम् 0. 2 °दुत्पन्नस्य शब्दस्य C. 3 °त्तेन कारणप्रतिषेधः, गौ., B. C. and D. omitन्न कारण. 4 कुतस्तस्य पक्षता इति शेषः R. 5 पश्चादविद्यमानं कथं साधनमथ C. 6 स्ववचनेन c. 7 प्रतिषेधस्यासिद्धी D. 8 B omits ए.

·न्यायसारः। यथा यदि घटशब्दयोरेकैकस्य कार्यत्वस्योपपत्तेर्रनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेष इष्यते सर्वभावानां तहिं सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषः प्रसज्यत इति । अत्रे- दमुच्यते । सर्वथाऽविशेष प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । अनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेषे त्व- नुमानागमविरोधः । केनचिदविशेषे प्रमेयत्वादिना सिद्धसाधनमिति ।। निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलभादुपलब्धिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-२७ पृथिव्यादिषु कार्यत्वसिद्धये निर्दिष्टत्य सावयवस्याऽभावेऽपि बु- ध्यादौ कार्यत्वमुपलब्धमिति । अस्योत्तरम् । सपकदेशस्यापि धूमा- देर्गमकत्वदर्शनादप्रतिषेध इति ।। कथं तर्हि बुद्ध्यादौ कार्यत्वसिद्धिरत आह । कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः । प्रमाणान्तरादपि 10 कार्यत्वसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥ प्रमाणान्तरं वाऽनुपलब्धिकारणेष्वसत्सु प्रा- गूल वाऽनुपलंभात् घटवदिति ।। तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलंभाभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-२९ ।। तस्य बुद्ध्यादिकार्यस्याऽनुपलब्धेरनुपलंभाभावसिद्धावनुपलब्धिवि- 15 परीतोपलब्ध्युपपत्तेः प्रागूर्ध्वमपि बुद्धयादेः सद्भावः सेत्स्यतीत्यमि- प्रायः ॥ अस्योत्तरम् अनुपलंभात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः । गौ. सू. ५-१-३५ ।। 1 Bomits यदि. c omits यथा- D has यथा यदि. 2 रेकस्य B. रेकैकस्य . 3 D omits one whole line from रनित्यत्वेन.........सद्भावोपपत्तेः 4 तत्रे. 5 विशेषेऽपि D. 6°षेऽनुमाना B.°षेत्वनुमाना C.D. 7 Comits आगम. 8 सावयवत्वस्य . 9 गमत्व B. 10 °दे: D. 11 °द्धिरिति . 12 कार्यत्वादि D. 13 वा B. C, चा? R. 14 C. omits this whole line. 15 विपरीतोपलब्ध्युपपत्तेः . 16 C. omits रनुपलंभा'. लब्धि। 17 बुधादिसद्भावः . 18 °दनुपलब्धेः गौ. D; लब्धिः .

·निग्रहस्थानानि । नास्तीति ज्ञानमनुपलब्धिः सा तत्स्वभावतया प्रत्यात्मसंवेद्या त- त्सदनुपलब्धिरसिद्धेत्यभिप्रायः॥ नित्यमनित्यभावादनिये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेनित्यसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-३५॥ अनित्यत्वधर्मस्य नित्यं सर्वदा सद्भावे धर्मिणोऽपि शब्दस्य सर्वदा । सद्भावः । अथाऽनित्यत्वं सर्वदा नास्ति तथाप्यनित्यत्वाभावान्नाऽनित्यः शब्द इति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् । अनित्यत्वस्य सर्वदाऽभ्युपगमे नित्यत्ववि- रोधः । अनभ्युपगमे चाऽसिद्धो हेतुः । प्रध्वंसश्चानित्यत्वं तव तस्मि- न्सति शन्दसद्भाव इति । एतेनान्यत्वस्यात्मनोऽनन्यत्वादन्यत्वं नास्ती- त्यांदीन्यसदुत्तराणि प्रत्युक्तानि । निमित्तान्तरात्संज्ञान्तरे योज्यमाने-10 ऽर्थे तथाभावस्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ॥ आनन्यान्न सर्वाण्यपि जात्युत्तराण्युदाहर्तुं शक्यन्ते । सूत्राणामप्युदाहरणार्थत्वादित्युक्ता जा- तिभेदाः॥ अथेदानीं निग्रहस्थानान्युच्यन्ते । तान्यपि विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्त्यो- विकल्पादसंख्यानि । अतः संक्षेपतो व्युत्पाद्यन्ते ॥ प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्व- न्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पु- नरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ।। 15 1 संवेद्या B. D. वेद्या... 7 D omits this. 2 तदनुपलब्धि . तत्सदनुपलब्धिःB, 8 °भ्युपगमे भ्युपगमात् B. D; 3 ते, (गो.) ति.. 9 R&c. omit. विप्रति...वि. 4 अनित्यधर्मस्य° B. अनित्यत्वध- कल्पात्. 10 न्यु B.. 5 सद्भावे B.D; सद्भावात् C. 11 असंख्यानि B, असंख्यातानि D. 6 तथाप्यनित्यत्वानित्यः शब्द इति C. 12 अधिकः 7. अधिकम् D. C. (गो.) भंस्य C. . Aw ·१८ न्यायसारः। : तंत्र साध्ये प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मानुज्ञा प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । यथा यदि कृत- कत्वाद् घटवदनित्यः शब्द इष्यते ताकाशवदमूर्तत्वान्नित्यः किन्ने- प्यते । एवं प्रतिवादिनोक्तो वाद्याह । भवतु किं नो बाधत इति । तस्य नित्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमेनाऽनित्यत्वप्रतिज्ञा हीयत इत्यतः प्रतिज्ञाहा- 5 निनिग्रहस्थानं भवति ॥ १॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य॑ प्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्तदर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ।। यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्वादित्यत्र दृष्टान्ताऽभावेन प्रतिज्ञातार्थ-प्रतिषेधे धर्मों विवादास्पदीभूतलक्षणस्तस्य विकल्पः प्रतिज्ञौतार्थविशेषणत्वेन योजनं । तदर्थ इति प्रतिषेधनिवृत्त्यर्थः । “निर्देशो विशेषणाभिधानं विवादा- 10 स्पदीभूतं सर्वमनित्यमित्येतत्प्रतिज्ञान्तरं निग्रहस्थानं हेत्वन्तरवत् ॥२॥ प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः । गौ. सू. ५-२-४ ॥ यथा गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं भेदेनानुपलंभाटैवत् ।। ३ ।। पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थाऽपनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः । गौ. सू. ५-२-५ ॥ यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निरित्येतस्य पक्षविरोधित्वेन प्रतिषेधे वा- 15 द्याह । संपश्यध्वमहो मध्यस्था नाहमनुष्णमग्निं ब्रवीम्यनुक्तोपालंभो- यमित्येत्प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासलक्षणं निग्रंहस्थानम् ॥ ४ ॥ अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरनिग्रहस्थानम् ।। 1 धर्माभ्यनुज्ञा (गौतम. better reading) धर्मानुज्ञा° R. B. D. 2 कार्यत्वात् R. 3 न चाकाश B. नन्वाकाश° D. 4 °क्ते B, D. 5 बोध्यतेति D. 6 भविष्यति -C.. 7 प्रतिशातार्थप्रतिषेधे (गौ,)-D. प्रति- ज्ञातार्थस्य प्रतिषेधे , B. 8 प्रतिशातार्थस्य.. 9 धर्मादित्वा B. 10 भूतत्वाल C. 11 प्रतिज्ञातार्थ° B. प्रतिज्ञाते° D. 12 c & D insert यथामशकाओं धूम इति before निर्देशो". 13 C. omits विशेषणाभिधानम्. 14 .C. omits घटवत्. 15 अनुष्णोनिः कृतकत्वात. 16 C. omits पक्षविरोषित्वेन. 17 प्रतिषेध B. प्रतिषेधे C. D. 18 B. omits निग्रहस्थानम्. .

·निग्रहस्थानानि । १९ यथा नित्या वेदा अस्मर्यमाणकृतकत्वादित्येतस्यै. जीर्णकूपाँऽऽरामादि- मिरनैकान्तिकत्वेन प्रतिषेधे संप्रदायविच्छेदे सतीति विशेषणमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरं निग्रहस्थानम् । पूर्वस्याऽसाधकस्योपादानात् ॥ ५ ॥ प्रकृतादादप्रतिसंबन्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् । गौ. सू: ५-२-७ ॥ यथा नित्यः शब्दोऽस्पर्शवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । हेतुश्च हिनोतेर्धातोः तुनि प्र-5 त्यये सति कृदन्तं पदमित्यादिप्रसक्तानुप्रसत्त्या प्रकृतार्थाऽनुपयोगि- शास्त्रान्तरमुपदिशतोऽर्थान्तरं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ ६ ॥ वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-८ ॥ यथा नित्यः शब्दः कचतटपानां गजबडवत्वात् घझढधभवत् ॥ ७ ॥ परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यतीतमविज्ञातार्थ ॥ यथा य-10 द्वाक्यं निरनिहितमप्यप्रतीतप्रयोगाऽतिद्रुतोचारितादिना निमित्तेन परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां न ज्ञायते तदज्ञानसंवरणायोक्तमविज्ञातार्थ निग्र- हस्थानम् ॥ ८॥ पौर्वापर्याऽयोगादप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमपार्थकम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१० ॥ यथा दशदाडिमानि षडपूपाः कुण्डमजाजिनमित्यादिः ॥ ९ ॥ अवयव विपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-११॥ प्रतिज्ञा- दीनामर्थवशात्क्रमस्तेषां विपर्ययेणाभिधानं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ १० ॥ हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१२ ॥ साधना- भावे साध्यसिद्धेरयोगात् ॥ ११ ॥ । 15 1 °दित्यस्य D. 7 शास्त्रान्तरम्. C. D. शास्त्रार्थ B. 2 पो° B. कूपारामा C. D. Ra 8 अधिशातं (गो.) 'ghav explains आरामादिभिरुपवनैः. 9 °गातितोच्चा B. 3 D. inserts हेतो. 10 हीनमप्यंतिमेनावयवेन C. हीन- 4 ता. B. मन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन B. D. गौ. 5 शब्दोस्पर्श C. 11 साधनाद्यसिद्धरयोगादिति B. D. 6 पदं च नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपातभेदा- साधनाभावेसाध्यसिद्धरयोगात्. . . चतुर्विधमि D.

·२० न्यायसार: . हेतूदाहरणाभ्यामधिकम् ॥ एकेन कृतत्वादितराऽऽनर्थक्यादिति ॥ १२ ॥ शब्दार्थयोः. पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१४ ॥ सार्थकं पुनरभिधानमनुवादस्तव्यतिरेकेण पुनर्वचनं पुन- 5 रुक्तम् । यथा नित्यः शब्दो नित्यः शब्द इति शब्दपुनरुक्तम् ।। अ- दापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम् । साधोदाहरणेऽभिहिते वैधोदाहरणाऽभिधानमिति । कथं तन्निग्रहस्थानम् । कथावसानवि: रोधित्वादेकेन कृतार्थत्वादितरानर्थक्यात् ॥ १३ ॥ विज्ञातस्य परिषदा बिरभिहितस्याऽप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुभांपणं प्रति- 10 वादिनो निग्रहस्थानम् । अप्रत्युच्चारयन्किमाश्रयः परपक्षप्रतिषेधं यू- यादिति ॥ १४ ॥ अविज्ञातार्थ चाज्ञानम् ॥ यच्च वाक्यं त्रिरभिहितमपि परिषदाऽ- वगतार्थ प्रतिवादी प्रत्युञ्चारयन्नार्थतः सम्यगधिगच्छति तदज्ञानं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति ॥ १५॥ 15 कथामभ्युपगम्य तूष्णींभावोऽप्रतिभा वादिप्रतिवादिनोनिग्रहस्था- नम् ॥१६॥ कार्यव्यासंगात्कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः । गौ. सू. ५-२-१६ ॥ क- थामभ्युपगम्य सभ्येषु मिलितेषु ब्रवीत्यद्य मे महत्प्रयोजनमस्ति त- स्मिन्नवसिते पश्चात्कथयिष्यामीति ॥ १७ ॥ स्वपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात्परपक्षदोषो" मतानुज्ञा ॥ यः स्वपक्षे मना- 6 20 1 c. & गौ. omit भ्याम्. 2 कतकत्वात्. B. 30 and D add here नित्यो- ध्वनिरविनाशीशब्द इति पुनरुक्तम्. 4 - कृतार्थत्वात् D. कृतत्वात् B. 5 d. inserts here नाम. 6 ब्रूयात् (वा०)0: कुर्यात्. B. D. 7 अविज्ञातार्थमज्ञानम्. B. .'' चाज्ञा- नम्. C. D. अविज्ञातं चाज्ञानं (गो.) 8 cand Domit भवति. 9 स्वपक्षे° C. स्वपक्ष B. गो. 10 परपक्षं B. C. परपक्षे. (गो.) 11 दोपो C: B. दोपप्रसंगो. (गो.)

·निग्रहस्थानानि । २१ 5 - गपि दोपं न परिहरति केवलं परपक्षे दोष' प्रसंजयति । भवांश्चोर इत्युक्ते त्वमपि चोर इति । तस्येदं निग्रहस्थानम् । स्वयं दोषाभ्युपगमात् ॥१८॥ निर्ग्रहप्राप्तस्याऽनिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ॥ पर्यनुयोज्यो नाम निग्रहोपपत्त्या चोदनीयस्तस्योपेक्षणं निग्रहप्राप्तौ सत्यामननुयोग इति। एतदुभाभ्यामनुक्तया परिषदा वक्तव्यम् ।। १९ ॥ अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्याऽनुयोगः ॥ यथा सावयवत्वेन पृथिव्यादेः कार्यवसिद्धौ परो ब्रूयादप्रयोजकोयं हेत्वा- भास इति । तस्येदं मिथ्याऽभियोगलक्षणं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ २० ॥ सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्याऽनियमात् कथाप्रसंगोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ यथा मी- मांसामभ्युपगम्य कश्चिदग्निहोत्रं स्वर्गसाधनमित्याह । कथं पुनरग्नि-10 होत्रक्रियाध्वस्ता सती स्वर्गस्य साधिका भवतीत्यनुयुक्तः प्राह । अ- नया क्रिययाऽऽधितो महेश्वरः फलं ददाति राजादिवत् । तस्येश्व- रानभ्युपगमादपसिद्धान्तो निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थविपर्ययस्तु प्र. तिज्ञाहानि पसिद्धान्तः ॥ २१॥ हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः । हेत्वाभासलक्षणेनैव यथोक्तेन हेत्वाभासा15 निग्रहस्थानानि ।। २२ ।। एतेन दुर्वचनकपोलताडनवादित्रादीनां साधनानुपयोगित्वेन निग्र- हस्थानत्वं वेदितव्यं । नियमकथायामपशब्दादीनामपि ॥ इति न्यायसारे द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ।। 1 दूपणम् . 2 C. D. add here परेणानभ्यु- पगमात. 3 निग्रहं B. निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्य (गौ). 4 नोदनीयः B. C. D. चोदनीयः(वा). 5 c. omits this line. 6 अनुक्तया R.D.अनुयुक्तयां B.C.(वा). 7 °दो B. दा' R. D. (वा.) 8 °त्वासिद्धौ B. 9 पुरो C. 10 योगोलक्षणम्. C. 11 तया . 12 क्रियाया B. 13 °तःपरमेश्वरः R. तो महेश्वरः I Vidha ·२२ 'न्यायसारः । अथावसितमनुमानमागमस्येदानी लक्षणमुच्यते ॥ समयवलेन स- म्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनमागमः ॥ स द्विविधो दृष्टाऽदृष्टार्थभेदात् । तत्र दृष्टार्थानां वाक्यानां प्रायेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्प्रामाण्यं गम्यते । अदृष्टार्थानां पुनराप्तोक्तेनेति ॥ कथम् पुत्रकामो यजेतेत्यादि वाक्यानां प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्प्रामाण्यमनुमायं तत्प्रणेतुरतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शित्वेन परमा- प्तत्वमवधार्य तत्प्रणीतानां सर्ववाक्यानामप्रामाण्य कारणाऽभावात्प्रा- माण्यमनुमीयत इति ॥ न नित्यत्वेन वाक्यानां हि नित्यत्वे प्रमाणा- ऽभावात् । अनित्यं पुनर्वाक्यत्वाद्यनेकमनुमानं । सर्वदोपलव्ध्यनुपल- ब्धिप्रसंगश्चेति विपर्ययो नियामकाभावात् । तदनुपलब्धिरिति चेन्न तैद- 10 निर्देशात् ।। वायुसंयोगविभागाविति चेन्न सर्वशब्दानां युगपदग्रहणप्र- संगात् । कथम् । श्रोत्रं तावत्समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यसमानदेशसमानधर्माप- नानी प्रहणाय प्रतिनियतसंस्कारसंस्कार्य न भवति इन्द्रियत्वाचक्षुर्वत् ।। शब्दा वा प्रतिनियतसंस्कारसंस्कार्या न भवन्ति समानेन्द्रियग्रा- ह्यत्वे सति युगपदिन्द्रियसंवद्धत्वात् घटादिवत् । उत्पत्तिपक्षेप्ययं स- 15 मानो दोप इति चेन्नै मृत्पिडप्रदीपदृष्टान्ताभ्यां कारकव्यंजकवैधर्म्य- सिद्धेरित्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेनेति ॥ 1 अथवसितं B. अवसितं . 2 दृष्टार्थानां D. दृष्टानां B. 3 गम्यते B. C. अवगम्यते D. 4 अदृष्टानां B. 5 इत्येवमादि D. 6 मीयते तत्म B. 7 प्रामाण्याभावात् C. 8 श्च B. 9 विपर्य° D. 10 अभिव्यंजकाभावात्तदनु°C,D. 11 युगपदग्रहण B. युगपत्यहण C.D. 12 °पन्नानामर्थानाम् . 13 संस्कार्य°B.संस्कारसंस्कार्य.0. D. 14 संस्कार B. संस्कारक C. D. 15 समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे B.समानेन्द्रिय- ग्राहसमानदेशसमानधर्माऽपन्नत्वे c. 16 संबंधत्वात्. C. संवद्धत्वात्. B. 17 तम् B. न मृ° c.

·त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानि । एवमेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानीति ॥ एष्वेवोपमानाऽर्थापत्तिसंभवा- ऽभावैतिह्यादीनामन्तर्भावः । तत्र यथा गौरेवं गवय इत्युपमानं शा- ब्देऽन्तर्भूतम् । अनेन सदृशी मदीया गौरित्युपमानमिति चेन्न तस्य स्मृतित्वात् ॥ पूर्वमेव हि सादृश्यविशिष्ट उपलब्धो गोपिण्डः । क- स्मात् । उपलब्धियोग्यत्वात् । अयोग्यत्वे वा न कदाचिदुपलभ्येता- 5 ऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ निर्विकल्पेन तु प्रत्यक्षेण पूर्व सादृश्यमुपलब्धं तेन तदु- पलव्ध्यभिमानो न भवति । निर्विकल्पकोपालंभेऽपि संस्कारसहकारि- सामर्थ्यादभावादिषु सविकल्पका स्मृतिदृष्टेति ।। संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिरथाऽप्तवचनकार्या । तथा प्रश्नोत्तराभिधा. नादन्यप्रमाणाऽनिर्देशात् ॥ अस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञेति प्रतिपत्तावुपमा-10 नसिद्धिस्तथाशब्दश्रवणादिति चेत् । एवं तर्हि गौरयमित्येवं संकेते कृतेऽस्य गोशब्दः संज्ञेति प्रतिपत्तौ प्रमाणान्तरं वाच्यम् । समान- न्यायत्वात् ॥ गोपिंडान्तरेऽपि संकेतग्रहणे प्रमाणान्तराभिधानप्रसंग इति ॥ तथाशब्दानभिधानेऽपि प्रतिपादकप्रतिपाद्ययोरेवमेवाभिप्राय ईदृशस्य सर्वस्य गोशब्दः संज्ञेति सामादेवं प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेन्न । 15 समानमेतदत्रापि गोसदृशो गवय इति शब्दादुभयोरेवाभिप्रायो गो- . 1 तत्र य B. तद्य D. 2 शाब्दे B. C. शब्दे° D. 3 स्मृतित्वात् B. स्मृतत्वात् 0. 4 'मेव B. मेवहि D. C. 5 गौरुपलब्धः D उपलब्धो B. C. 6 "त्वात् B. °त्वात्सादृश्यस्य D. 7 D omits न. 8 अदृष्टवत् C. D. अदृष्टत्वात् B. 9 तु C. पुन:-D. च B. 10 D insterts here गवयदर्शनात्. 11 तदोल. पदो° B. तदु D. 12 D inserts प्रथमगोपिंडोपलंभ- कलिंगत्वोपलंभात् before निर्विकल्पक. 13 °पलंभ C. B. 14 C. D. omit संस्कार. 15 C. D. omit कृते. 16 प्रतिपत्रों B. प्रतिपाद्ययो : 17 °देवं B. 18 चेत् B. चेन D. 19 °रेवामि° B, रेवमभि. D. द्वैधं .

·२४ न्यायसार। सशस्यार्थस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञेति सामर्थ्यादेवं प्रतिपत्तिरिति ॥ न च प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽर्थे संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिरप्रत्यक्षेऽपि शक्रादौ संज्ञासं- ज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् ।। सूत्रविरोध इति चेन्न प्रमाणनिग्रहस्थानाभ्यां दृष्टान्तहेत्वाभासादी- नामिव प्रयोजनवशेन पृथगभिधानादिति । तर्हि प्रयोजनं वाच्यमु- च्यते । शब्दप्रामाण्यसमर्थन प्रयोजनम् । कथम् । केचिदाहुः प्रत्य- क्षानुमानविपयत्वे शब्दस्यानुवादकत्वमेव । अनुवादकं चाऽप्रमाणम् । तदविषयत्वे च संबंधाऽग्रहणादवाचकत्वम् पदार्थस्याप्रसिद्धत्वान्न च पदेन संबंधग्रहणमितरेतराश्रयत्वात् । वाक्यार्थस्तु प्रसिद्धार्थानां पदा- 10 नामन्वयमांत्रमिति ॥ तन्निराकरणार्थमुपमानं निदर्शनार्थत्वेन पृथ- गुक्तम् । यथा गैवयार्थिनाऽप्रसिद्धगवयस्य प्रसिद्धगोसादृश्यमुपादा- योपमानाख्येन वाक्येन संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिः क्रियते तथा कि- 'चिन्निमित्तमुपादाय शक्रादि-पदपदार्थयोरपीति । तस्मादन्यार्थत्वान्न सूत्रविरोधः ॥ परीक्षा चार्थापत्तिवत्प्रमाणस्य सतः प्रमाणेष्वंतर्भावज्ञापनार्थम् । अंतर्भावस्तु यथाश्रुतोऽप्यनुमान एवास्य निराकृतो नाऽऽगम इति ॥ चतुष्वाभिधानं सूत्रेषु पंचत्वादिनिराकरणार्थ न त्रित्वप्रतिषेधार्थ । प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादतर्भावस्य ॥ नित्वाऽनमिधानादयुक्तमिति चेन्नाऽस्य 15 1 तर्हि B. एवं तर्हि° D. 2 त्वमेव D त्वात् B. 3 This phrase is found in D. B and c omit it. 4 अप्रसिद्धत्वात् B, अवसिद्धत्वात D. 5 °श्रयत्वात् B. °श्रयत्वप्रसंगात D. 6 प्रसिद्धानामु°B. प्रसिद्धार्थानामु°D. 7 B here inserts the phrase वाक्यं तु पदानामन्वयमात्रमिति. 8 गवायार्थिना B कार्यार्थिनो.. 9 प्रसिद्ध B अप्रसिद्धD. 10 D omits सूत्रेपु. 11 °त्वादिनिरा B, त्वनिरा.D. 12 c omits त्रिल...र्थ.

·आगमविचारः। २५ । 3 सूत्रकारस्यैवं स्वभावत्वात् स्वसिद्धान्तमपि कचिन्नाधत्ते । या कृत्स्नै- कैदेशविकल्पादिनाऽवयविनिराकरणे विशिष्टानामूहादिशक्त्यतिशययु- क्तानामेवात्राधिकारः । तस्मास्थितमुपमानं शब्देऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥ अर्थापत्तेरप्यनुमानेऽन्तर्भावोऽविनाभावबलेनार्थप्रतिपत्तिसाधनत्वा- त् । अन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्युक्ते सत्येवोपपद्यत इति लभ्यतेऽयमे-5 वाऽविनाभावः ॥ यत्र सामान्याऽऽकारेणाऽन्वयग्रहणं नास्ति यथा मुख्यकारणत्वाऽप्रतिबद्धशक्तयोस्तत्रार्थापत्तिः पृथक्प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । तत्रापि केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानोऽव्यतिरेकात् । केवलव्यतिरेक्यर्थाप- त्तिरिति संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ अन्वयाऽभावान्नैतदनुमानमिति चेन्न केव- लान्वयिनो व्यतिरेकाऽभावे प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् । अपि वा प्रत्य-10 क्षादिभेदानां केनचिद्वैधर्येण भेदात्प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगः । तस्मादवि- नाभावबलेनैवार्थप्रतिपादकत्वादापत्तिरनुमानमिति ॥ बहुसंख्याविषयत्वे सत्यल्पसंख्याविषयत्वस्य सर्वत्रोपलब्धत्वान्नानु- मानात्संभवो भिद्यत इति ।। अभावस्य तु त्रिष्वपि यथासंभवेनान्तर्भावः । तथाहि । कौरवाच-15 भावप्रतिपत्तिरागमात् । आत्मा दिपु रूपाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिरनुमानात् । 8 प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् D. °न प्रमा- णान्तर स्यात् B. C. - 1 Badds here यत्. 2 प्रश्नै° B, कृत्लै C. D. 3 अवयवि° C. D. अवयव B. 4 युक्तानामेवात्राधिकारः C. युक्ता- धिकारज्ञापनार्थम्. B. 9 च C. D, वा B, 10 बहुत्वसंख्या C. D. बहुसंख्या B. 11 विपयस्य C, D. विषयत्व B. 12 कौरवाय D. कैरेवाद्य B; C. omits this whole phrase. 5 बलेन B. C. बलेनैव D. 6 लभ्यते C. D. लक्ष्यते B. 7 °मानाऽव्य C. मानादव्य° B.

·२६ न्यायसारः। भूतलादिषु घटाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यक्षात् । इन्द्रियव्यापारभावभा- वित्वादिति ॥ अन्यत्र तद्भावभावित्वं पर्यवसितमिति चेन्न रूपादि- ष्विव बाधकाऽभावात् ॥ संबंधाभावो वाधक इति चेन्न स्वपरपक्षयो- रसिद्धत्वात् स्वपक्षे तावद्रूपादिष्विवापरोक्षानुभवकार्यानुमेयो योग्य- 5 ताख्यः संबन्धः । परपक्षेऽपि संयुक्तविशेषणभावादिः ॥ संयोगसम- वायरहितस्य विशेषणविशेष्यभावानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न विशिष्टप्रत्ययवशेन तसिद्धिरिति ॥ अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारंपर्यमैतिह्यमागमेऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥ यथेह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति । 10 प्रयत्नजनिता शरीरतदवयवक्रिया चेष्टा सा नाट्यशास्त्रादिप्रसिद्धा समयबलेन पुरुषाभिप्रायमर्थविशेषं च गंमयंती नाऽऽगमाद्भिद्यते । लिप्यक्षरादर्थप्रतिपत्तिवदिति ॥ तदेवं व्यवस्थितमेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमा- णानीति ॥ किं पुनरेभिः प्रमाणैः प्रमातव्यमित्युच्यते । प्रमेयम् । किं लक्ष- 15 णम् । यद्विषयज्ञानमन्यज्ञानानामुपयोगित्वेनैव निःश्रेयससाधनं भवति 1 प्रत्यक्षात B. प्रत्यक्षत्वात् D. 8 एतानि त्रीण्येव B. एतत्रीण्येव C. 2 D omits संबन्धः. 9 D here inserts इति तृती. 3 °द्धेः B. °द्धि: 0. D. योऽयमागमपरिच्छेदः. 4 जनिता C. D. जन्या B. 10 °तव्यं । उच्यते C. B, तव्य- 5 सा नाय्य C. D; अनादि B. मित्युच्यते D. अनायशास्त्रादिसमयवलेन C. 11 विषयं ज्ञानम् C.D. विषयज्ञानम् B. 6. पुरुषाभिप्रायविशेषम् B. पुरुषाभि- 12 ज्ञानामु B. ज्ञानानुप° C. D. प्रायविशेषमर्थविशेषम् C. पुरुषामिप्रायमर्थ- 13 निःश्रेयसांगं . निःश्रेयससा- विशेपम्° D. 7 गमयंती B. गमयती D. धनं B.

·प्रमेयविचारः । तत्प्रमेयम् । तदेव तत्वतो ज्ञातव्यम् सर्वदा भावयितव्यं च । न. की- टसंख्यादिवत् ज्ञानस्यानुपयोऽगित्वात् ॥ . : तच्चतुर्विधम् । हेयं तस्य निर्वतकम् हानं तस्योपाय इति ॥ तत्र हेयं दुःखमनागतमेकविंशतिप्रकारकम् । शरीरं षडिन्द्रियाणि पति- पयाः षड्बुद्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेति ॥ तत्र शरीरं दुःखायतनत्वाइ:- 5 खम् । इन्द्रियाणि विषया बुद्धयश्च तत्साधनभावात् । सुखं दुःखानु- पंगादुःखम् । दुःखं च बाधना पीडा संतापात्मकं मुख्यमेवेति ॥ तस्य निर्वर्तकमसाधारणं कारणमविद्यातृष्णे धर्माधर्माविति । स- म्यगध्यात्मविद्भिः प्रदर्शितार्थविपरीतज्ञानमविद्या ॥ सहसंस्कारेण पुनर्भवप्रार्थना तृष्णा ॥ सुखदुःखयोरसाधारणौ हेतू धर्माधर्माविति ॥10 हानं दुःखविच्छेदः । आत्यन्तिकमिति न कदाचित्कथंचिदुःखसंबंधः।। तस्योपायस्तत्वज्ञानमात्मविषयम् ॥ तथा चोक्तम् । आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यश्चेति । श्रोतव्यः श्रु- तिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्वोपपत्तिभिः । ज्ञात्वा च सततं ध्येयः एते दर्शनहेतवः । तरति शोकमात्मविदिति ।। स द्विविधः । परश्वापरश्च । तथा चोक्तम् । "द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये परं चापरं चेत्यादिः ॥ तत्रैश्वर्यविशिष्टः संसारधमैरीषदप्यसंस्पृष्टः परो भगवान्महेश्वरैः सर्वज्ञः सकलजगद्विधाता । स कथं ज्ञातव्यः । 15 1 °नुपयोगात् C. नुपयोगित्वात् B. D. 8 च B. तु C. D. 2 तत् प्रमेयम् . 9 प्रार्थना B. प्राधेनम् C. 3 विनिवर्तकम् B. निर्वत्रिकम् c. 10 D has तथा चोक्तम्. B निर्वर्वकम्. D. (जयसिंह). omits it. 4 हीनं B. हानम् C. 11 °संस्पृष्टः B. D. स्पृष्टः C. 5 प्रकारकम् B. प्रकारम् C. D. 12 D inserts after महेश्वरः, 6 तत्साधने भावाद्दुःखम् D.तत्साधन- and before सर्वशः, परमैश्वर्यविशिष्टः भावात् B. संसारधमैं रागद्वेषमोहदुःखादिभिरीपदप्य- 7 सुखम् B. C. सुखमपि D. स्पृष्टोऽनादिः.

·२८ न्यायसारः । 5 अनुमानादागमाच्च ।। तथाहि विवादाध्यासितमुपलब्धिमत्कारणकमभू. स्वाभावित्वाद्वस्त्रादिवदिति । सामान्यव्याप्तेरनवद्यत्वेन निराकर्तुमश- क्यत्वात् । ततः. सामान्यसिद्धौ पारिशेषात्कार्यविशेपाच कर्तृविशेष- सिद्धिः चित्रादिकार्यविशेपात्कर्तृविशेपसिद्धिवत् ।। एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थुर्य इमान्लोकानीशित ईशिनी- भिरित्यागमाचेति ॥ संसारभोक्ताऽनन्तोऽपरः । स खलु बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामाश्रयभूतो- ऽनुमातव्यः । न हि कार्यमनाधारं किंचिदुपलब्धम् । न चेन्द्रिया- णामाश्रयत्वमुक्तमुपहतेन्द्रियस्य विषयस्मरणाऽयोगात् । अन्यानुभूते- 10र्थेऽन्यस्य स्मरणाऽदर्शनात् । अत एव शरीरस्यापि बाल्यकौमारादिभे- दभिन्नत्वादस्मरणम् । एतेन पूर्वबुद्ध्यनुभूतेथे उत्तरबुद्धेः कार्यकारण- भावात्स्मरणमपास्तमन्यत्वाऽविशेपात् ॥ कसे रक्ततावदिति चेन्न साधनदूपणाऽसंभवात् । अन्वयाद्यभावान्नसाधनमसिद्धत्वाद्यनुद्भाव- नान्न दूषणमिति । न च कर्पासेऽपि निरन्वयविनाशोत्पादे रक्ततोत्प- 15 द्यते कर्पासान्तरवत् । एतेनैव क्षणिकत्वमपास्तम् ॥ प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्येन च प्रत्यक्षेण स्फटिकादिष्वक्षणिकत्वं गृह्यते । प्रदीपादिष्विवः भ्रान्त- मिति चेन्नैकत्रवाध्यत्वेन भ्रान्तत्वं सर्वत्र तत्कल्पनायामतिप्रसंगात् । अनभ्युपगमाच सादृश्यस्य क्षणिकत्वे भ्रान्तिबीजाभाव इति । तत्सिद्धमेतच्छरीरादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा व्यापको नित्य इति । 1 संसारभोक्ता B. संसारफलोपभोक्ता कार्पसे C. D. 2 अन्यस' P. अन्यस्य स D. 3 °न B. तु D. 4 अन्यत्वावि B. अन्यत्ववचनात् 0. 5 कासे C. D. B. 6 दूपणाऽभावात् B. •7 °नान्न B. नाचन D. 8 अपास्तम् B. निरस्तं शेयम् .. 9 प्रदीपा B. प्रतीप C. D. 10 तदेतत्सिद्धम् C. तत्सिद्धमेतत् B. अन्यत्वात् D.

·आत्मविचारः । २९ 5 नित्यत्वं कुत इति चेदनादित्वात् । तदेव कथम् । जातमात्रे जन्मान्तरा- नुभवसूचकस्मरणलिंगस्य हर्षभयशोकमोहंशून्याभिलाषादेरुपलंभात् ।। धर्मादेराश्रयसंयोगाऽपेक्षस्य गुरुत्वादिवदाश्रयांतरे वाद्यादौ क्रिया- कर्तृत्वादणिमाद्युपेत्तस्य युगपदसंख्यातशरीराधिष्ठातृत्वाच व्यापकत्व- सिद्धिः ॥ तथा चोक्तं पुराणादिपु- आत्मनो वै शरीराणि बहूनि मनुजेश्वराः । प्राप्य योग्यं बलं कु- र्यात् तैश्च सर्वां महीं चरेत् ॥ मुंजीत विषयान्कैश्चित् कैश्चिदुग्रं तप- श्चरेत् । संहरेच पुनस्तानि सूर्यस्तेजोगुणानिव ।। तदेवमपरात्मतत्वज्ञानं परलोकसद्भावेन परलोकप्रत्युपैयोगित्वाद- धर्मक्षयहेतुत्वाच्च निश्रेयसांगमिति ॥ परमात्मज्ञानं च तदुपासनांगत्वेनापवर्गसाधनम् ।। स चोपासनाविधिः क्लेशक्षयसमाधिलाभार्थमनुष्ठानम् । तथा चो- क्तम् । तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिकाक्रियायोगः केशतनूकरणार्थ- समाधिलाभार्थश्चेति ॥ तत्रोन्मादकामादिव्यपोहार्थमाध्यात्मिकादिदुःखसहिष्णुत्वं तपः ।। 15 प्रशान्तमन्त्रस्येश्वरवाचिनोऽभ्यासः स्वाध्यायः ॥ परमेश्वरतत्वस्य प्रब- न्धेनानुचिंतनमीश्वरप्रणिधानम् ॥ समासतो रागद्वेषमोहाः क्लेशाः स- माधिप्रत्यनीकाः संसारापत्तिद्वारेण क्लेशहेतुत्वात् ॥ 10 परलोके B. 1 जातमात्रे B. मात्रस्य जन्तोः D. 8 योगं B. योग्यं D. जातमात्रे प्राणिनि C. 9 परलोकं D. 2 cand o omit HIE. 10 प्रभ्यु' D. प्रवृत्यु B. 3 °गा C. D °गो° B. 11 चोपासना B. च तदुपासना D. चा' c. p वा B. 12 केशक्षय° B. केशकर्मक्षय D. 5 कर्तृत्वात् B. कर्तृत्वदर्शनात् C D. 13परमेश्वरतत्वस्या.परमेश्वरस्यतत्वस्यD. 6 युगपद C. गुणवद° B. 14 अनुचिंतनम् 3. अनुचिंतनपर्या- 7 व्यापकत्वसिद्धिः ,व्यापकासिद्धिःB लोचनम् D.

·न्यायसारः। ३० यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावंगानि॥ तत्र देशकालावस्थाभिरनियताः पुरुपस्य शुद्धिहेतवो यमाः । अहिंसा- ब्रह्मचर्यास्तेयादय इति ॥ देशकालावस्थाद्यपेक्षिणः पुण्यहेतवः क्रिया- विशेषा नियमाः । देवताप्रदक्षिणसंध्योपासनजपादयः ॥ योगकर्म- 5 विरोधिक्लेशजयार्थः करणबंध आसनम् । पद्मकस्वस्तिकादीनि ॥ को- श्यस्य वायोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः । कुंभकर्पूरकरेचकप्रकारकः । से शनैः शनैजेंतव्यो वनगजेन्द्रवत् ॥ समाधिप्रत्यनीकार्थेभ्यः समं- ताञ्चेतसो व्यावर्त्तनं प्रत्याहारः ॥ चित्तस्य देशबंधो धारणा ॥ तत्र प्रत्ययकतानता ध्यानम् ॥ तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव स- 10 माधिः । ध्यानोत्कर्षान्निवाताचलप्रदीपावस्थानमिवैकत्रै चेतसावस्थान समाधिरभिधीयते ॥ एवमेतानि योगांगानि मुमुक्षुणा. सर्वेषु ब्रह्मादि- स्थानेष्वनेकप्रकारदुःखभावनयाऽनभिरतिसंज्ञितं परं वैराग्यं महेश्वरे च परां भक्तिमाश्रित्यात्यंताभियोगेन सेवितव्यानि ॥ ततोऽचिरेणैवे कालेन भगवंतमनुपमस्वभावं शिवमवितथं प्रत्यक्षतः पश्यति । तं 15 दृष्ट्वा निरतिशयं श्रेयः प्राप्नोति । तथा चोक्तम् यदा चर्मवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः । तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दुःखस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥ तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति ॥ नान्यः पंथा विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥ तस्माच्छिवदर्शनादेव मोक्ष इति ।। .. . 1 Dadds योगस्य. 8 Domits एव. 2 D omits अस्तेय. 9 चेतसा B. चेतसो C. D. 3 Different copies men- 10 Comits मुमुक्षुणा here tion in different order. but inserts after अभियोगेन, 4 स च शनै°C. D. स शनैः B, 11 D omits एव. 5 देशबंधः B. D. देशसंबंध. C. 12 प्रत्यक्षतः B. C प्रत्यक्षेण D. 6 प्रत्ययैकतानता. B.C.प्रत्ययैकाग्रता 13 o and Domit the last 7. अर्थनिर्भासमात्रकम् D. मात्रम् 0. | line of the verse. अर्थमात्रनिर्यासकम् B.

·मोक्षः। कः पुनरयं मोक्षः । एके तावद्वर्णयन्ति समस्तविशेषगुणोच्छेदे संहारावस्थायामाकाशवदात्मनोऽत्यंतावस्थानं मोक्षः ॥ कस्मात् । सु- खदुःखयोरविनाभावित्वेन विवेकहानानुपपत्तिः। कंटकादिजनितदुः- खपरिहारार्थत्वेनाऽपि प्रवृत्तेरुपलंभादिति । मोहावस्थात्वान्सूर्छाद्यव- स्थावदन विवेकिनां प्रवृत्तिर्न युक्तेयाहुरन्ये । दुःखे सति सुखोपभों- 5 गस्याऽसंभवात्कंटकादिपरिहारोऽपि सुखोपभोगार्थमेवेत्यसमो दृष्टान्तः।। कुतो मुक्तस्य सुखोपसिद्धिरिति चेदागमात् । उक्तं हि ॥ सुखमायन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् । तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयाहुष्प्रापमकृतात्मनि ॥ 10 तथा- आनंदं ब्रह्मणोरूपं तच्च मोक्षेऽभिव्यज्यते । विज्ञानमानंदं ब्रह्मेति च ॥ मुख्याथै बाधकामावान्नोपचारकल्पना ॥ सुखसंवेदनयोनित्यत्वा- न्मुक्तसंसारबद्धयोरविशेषप्रसंग इति चेन्न । चक्षुर्घटयोः कुड्यादेरिव 15 सुखसंवेदनयोविषयविषयिभावसंबंधप्रत्यनीकस्य दुःखादेः संसाराव- स्थायां सद्भावात् । तन्नाशे च मुक्तावस्थायां भवति सुखसंवेदनयोः संबंध इत्यतो नाविशेषः ॥ सस्य संबंधस्य कृतकत्वेन कचिन्नाशप्रसंग इति चेन्न प्रध्वंसेनान- कान्तिकत्वात् ॥ 20 1 °त्यंभवत्यंताव B. 5 संभवात् C. सद्भावात्. B. 2 संसारबद्धयो. B.संसारिणो:C.G.D. 6 D omits भवति. 3 विषयिविषयसंबंधप्रत्यनीकस्य C. 7 कचित् B. कदाचित् C. D. विषयविषयीभावसंवंधप्रत्यनीकस्य B. 8 अनैकान्तिकत्वात् D. अनैकान्ति. 4 धर्मदुःखादे: B. अधर्मदुःखादे: D. ! कत्वभावात्° B, अनैकान्तात् C.

·३२ न्यायसारः। वस्तुत्वे सतीति चेन्न द्रव्यादिष्वनन्तर्भावेन तदसिद्धत्वादन्तर्भावे वा समवायादिभिः सह तत्संवेदनस्य संबंधो न स्यात् ।। अदृष्टादिवशात्कर्मकारणं विपयतजनितं ज्ञानं विपयीति चेन्न । ईश्वरज्ञानस्य नित्यस्याथैः सह संबंधाभावप्रसंगात् । तस्मात्कृतकत्वेऽपि 5 नित्यसुखसंवेदनसंबंधस्य विनाशकारणाभावान्नित्यत्वं स्थितम् ॥ त- सिद्धमेतन्नित्यसंवेद्यमानेन सुखेन विशिष्टाऽऽत्यंतिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्षः॥ इति परमाचार्यतार्किकसार्वभौमश्रीभासर्वज्ञप्रणीते न्यायसारप्रक- रणे तृतीय आगमपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ॥ समाप्तं चेदं न्यायसाराख्यं प्रकरणम् ॥ 10 ·NOTES. P. 1. L. 2. शम्भुम्न The author is a devotee of Shivri. As will be seen in the last part of this work, that the author, though lie discusses several definitions of Moksha, is neither a follower of Shankarachārya school nor of any other of the wellknown six schools. P. 1. L. 5. FAMA CAFFE-Gautama and his commentators base their theory of Nyāya on twenty-four Padārthas, the existence of which they take for granted.. Bhāsarvajna strikes a new path, holding that there is one Padārtha only and that one is Pramāna. All the other Padárthas discussed by Gautama and his followers are, according to our author, different divisions nad subdivisions of the one Padártha, Pramana. Jayasinha, the Jain commentator of our author, says that this taking of one Padārtha only as the object of discussion is a reply to the theory of Sadgurus’ishya. P. 1. L. 6. AFINITEHT19APramāna is the cause of correct experience. Rāghava in this connection annotates on the definition of Pramāna by 574arari and his followers. According to them, a thing incidental to Pramā or knowledge is THITH. In that way, says Raghava, even at: will be a Prancānam. aa (प्रमाणम् ) हि प्रमाणसंबंधित्वमित्युदयनादयः । एवं जनकत्वेनेंद्रियादाविवाश्रयत्वेनेश्वर- स्यापि प्रमासंबंधित्वमस्तीति सोऽपि प्रमाणमिति तन्मते तात्पर्य तन्निषेधार्थ प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणपदादेवाऽऽगतं प्रमाणसामान्य लक्षणमाह ।। राघवः॥ P. 1. L. 6. ETTEVİ-Rāghava discusses also the significance of the word Art Prabhákara Bhatta and his followers, according to Raghava, think that there is nothing like असम्यक् or मिथ्याऽनुभव: or incorrect knowledge. The word 7727therefore in the definition of JATUT is unnecessary. Rūghava says that Bhisarvajna differs from this view and thinks that #4 is necessary to exclude संशयः and विपर्ययः from true knowledge. P. 1. L. 1. अनवधारणम्-निश्चयात्यन्ताभावविशिष्टज्ञानम् (राघवः). T AFTER--As Rüyhara remarks, this classification of T: is according to Viitsyāyana. The sutra of Gautama mentions only three cases of #74: and Raghava sticks to that opinion.

·( 2 ) P. 1. L. 10. विप्रतिपत्तिरेके-परस्परविरुद्धार्थवाक्ये विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यर्थः राघव: Righava says that by the word of the author means the Naiyagikas, but he does not say who are meant by the word 27. According to Jayasinha the word 32 is used for the followers of Sänkhya philosophy and in support of his view he quotes the तत्वकौमुदी. This संशयः is आगमिका us it is based on the different आगम of the two schools. P. 1. L. 11. उपलब्धेः किं-The question is wether the samshayas based on Upalabdhi and Unupalabdhi are not included in the samānadharma sanshaya. Rāghara, though he discusses these two sources of saņshaya, is decidedly of opinion that they are not independent sources of sanshaya. Jayasinha holds a different view and explains it tius : समानधर्मान्नानयोर्भेद इति चेन्न समानधर्मस्य शेयस्थत्वांदनयोश्च ज्ञातृस्थत्वान्महान्भेदः। In support of this view Jayasinha quotes भूषणकारः whose explanation runs thus-य उपलब्धिमात्रेण शब्दे स्थायित्व- मनुपलब्धिमात्रेण स्वर्गेश्वरादीनामसत्वं चेच्छन्ति तन्मतप्रतिक्षेपार्थमुपलव्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योः पृथक्पृथक्संशयहेतुत्वम्. P. 1. L. 13. अनवधारणत्वात् अत्र संशयादर्थान्तर्भावः पार्थक्यं न भवतीत्यन्वयः अनवधारणं नामानिश्चितज्ञानत्वं तेनाविशेपस्तौल्यं तस्मात् । (जयसिंहः). ननु सम्यग्ग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहार्थमिति न वक्तव्यं किन्तु संशयोहानध्यवसायविपर्ययापोहार्थमिति (राघवः) Rāghava always tries to be very concise. But here he does so at the sacrifice of clearness. Bhāsarvajna takes one: and अनध्यवसाय: as not different from संशयः, P. 1. L. 14. वाह्यालीप्रदेशे-यत्र वाहा वाह्यन्ते तत्क्षेत्रं वाह्यालीत्युच्यते (जयसिंहः). This is an instance of ऊहः which is the same as तर्कः तत्र (वाघाली- प्रदेशे) तु प्रायेण स्थाण्वादेरसंभवात्कमप्यूर्व दविष्ठं दृष्ट्वा दृष्टा-इति ऊहते मन्येऽहमत्रानेन केनाप्यूलतमेन पुरुपेण भवितव्यम्. As to अहः see the sutra of Garutemat. अविज्ञाततत्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्वज्ञानार्थमूहस्तकः । १-१-४०. This sutra gives a distinction between a afi: and ap 56: A question raised to ascertain an objeot which is not till then known or ascertained is ऊहः. A. तर्कः which may be an अहः is a question rnised in a case when the object is either unascertained or already ascer. tained. This very author' in his भूषणम् says वादादिप्रवृत्तिविशेषार्थ तर्कः पृथगुक्तः॥ P. 1. L. 16. मिथ्याsध्यवसायो विपर्ययः । विपर्ययः is incorrect knowledge. Rāghava and also Jayasinha say that, as illustrated in the text, this is incorrect knowledge. Quoting a similar passage from Bhosarojna's Bhushona, Raghava says यत्त स्मरणज्ञानेति पाठान्तरं तिष्ठति तत्पंडितमन्यपाठकदोषादित्युपेक्ष्यम् । भूपणे तु भासर्वज्ञैरज्ञानस्य योगादेरिति व्याकुर्वद्भिरीदृश एव पाठः कंठतोऽपि प्रतिष्ठित इति.

·( 3 ) P. 2. L. 2. फलाझेदज्ञापनार्थम् --सम्यगनुभव एव प्रमाणफलमिति प्रमाणफलयोरैक्यं प्रयोध्येत तथा तत्परिहार एव प्रयोजनमित्याह (जयसिंहः ). The knowledge is the result but GATOT is the source of that knowledge. The word #1994 was also necessary in the definition to show the distinction between the cause and the effect, P. 2. L. 3. प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता-प्रमाया आश्रयः समवायीकारणं प्रमाता भवतीत्यर्थः (जयसिंहः). P. 2. L. 4. aaaa#-Both the commentators agree in saying that #179 is only one and not three or four as suggested by the author of the Sutras and other writers. This author's view is that is only oue but owing to three different operations employed, it is of three kinds. Bhāsarvjna thus admits the unity of knowledge. P. 2. L. 5. सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम्:-This definition of प्रत्यक्षम् is peculiar to Bhäsarvjna. Rāghava in bis commentary discusses the difinition of प्रत्यक्षम् given by Gautama which is इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षों- त्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् १-१-४.. If we adopb this, it gives the knowledge (TIFF) acquired in a particular way as the definition of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् . But, as has already been dicussed, a 310 is not the result but the cause of that result viz. knowledge. The THTATOTH is the instrumental cause (F1477 or iTUFF) of the direct or immediate and right cognition. If wo adopt the definition of Gautama, says the commentator, we excludo from प्रत्यक्षज्ञानम् the direct cognition acquired by the योगिनः which is undoubtedly a FETESTI777 and yet it is not produced by the connection of the object and the senses (frostAfHica). The word 37927 in the definition is explained by Rāghava by patais GRİ-the knowledge which is not produced either by 7:or forth which are instruments of knowledge in 2017 and agina: respectively. Rāghava vould thus divide into adq7 and 274774(mediate and immediate). The latter is acquired by the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. The परोक्षज्ञानम् is acquired by one of the two methods. Firstly it may be acquired by the help of a 175778 which means literally a characteristic and stands in the position of what wo call a middle term in the western logic. In this case the cause of cognition is the HATIR1977. The other method is that of the प्रमाणग, wherein शब्द: is the cause of knowledgc. P. 2. L. 6. Sverig #1 EPET-It is doubtful if Rūghava had this phrase in bis copy. In his commentary he explains only the words स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् in the definition of अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्. Even Jayasinha, although he oxplains this phrase, distinotly says that FysTÅTTE I ·( 4 ) · is the principal part of the definition of authTTANH. 419, !, etildi, #: and others aro taken as common causes (-HTEROVIT FITOTTA) of the effect. The author of Tirant, and authors who are of his view, mention scveral common causes, but 127: does not appear in their works as one of them. Raghava does not mention the phrase and has not therefore any explanation to give, Jayasinha explaius it as 77t aquesta: (a lamp or other light); This seems to be a very gross meaning to be attached to the Tord. Do we not acquire knowledge even in dark? This reminds one of the dialogue of Janaka and lājnavalkya in the Upanishad where the prince Janaka asked the sage Yajnavalkya, "What is that light by which all this is known' The sage began with the apparent source of light, the sun, and on that being doubted, said the lamp light in the absence of the sun; the sound in the absence of both and pure intelligence in the absence of all of them. I think Bhūsarvajna by 551T:, meant intelligenco as one of the common causes with space, time, duty and others. P. 2. L. 7. इन्द्रियार्थसंबंधविशेपेण- By later writers the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् is defined as a trabahº Grej $117. Thus they do not seem to make distination between the योगिप्रत्यक्षम् and अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् unless they take #a: as one of the organs of senses. There are various kinds of connections (संबंधाः) as mentioned here, vis. योगः or संयोगः, संयुक्त- समवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः and विशेष्यविशेषणभावः. The instruments of direct cognition are the senses which are recognised to be five viz. the eye, the nose, the ear, the skin, and the tongue. The knowledge acquired through the ear is not considered to be by a very immediate process and the knowledge acquired by the nose, the skin and the tongue comes under one class of the sense, of touching. Bhūsarvajna therefore says that "an object (e. g. a pot) is known cither by the eye or the touch. These are the two instrumeuts to acquire knowledge of a corporeal object. P. 2. I. 8. संयुक्तसमवायात्ताभ्यां घटत्वादिसंख्यापरिमाणादिज्ञानम् -To under stand properly the phrasc, one has to know the various nameablcs 'given by Kaņād in his . Vaisheshika-Sutras. He enumerates them as substance ( 5897), quality. ( J07:) action :( siff), genus (FIAFTA), differentia (:), and concomitlance (F7974: ). Nonentity ( 31879: ) is an additional nimcable given by the later writers of the school. After explaining how the immediate cognition of substance is arrived at, tlic author, from this phrase down- ·Jards discusses, how the knowledge. of quality and other baweables is arrived nt. This knowledge is also acquired by the eye and the touch, but not directly i.c. not by the one process of connection (hat:) but by the twofold process of connection (gl) and concommittance (919). For an explanation of concommittance (समवायः) see तर्कसंग्रहः, The समवायः is an eternal connection between an object and its inherent qualities without which the object can not exist. Thus, in the language of the Naiyayikas, a pot (az:-) can not exist witliout the aggregate qualities whiclı go to make a pot (2). It is 'a matter of controversy what this a 19: is. Is it a quality? It is very difficult to say. Some authors try to show that it is a quality, but it is not so according to Kanāda. He puts it in the nameables as one distinct from the quality ( 1107:). We canuot call it a connection ; because in that case it would become one of the qualities. Vido the enumeration of qualities (Tor:) in lanāda's Vaisheshiknu Sutras. In this place the word is used for a sort of connection which is different from eart: (connection which is enumerated as one of the qualities). When we want to know the genus of an object (c. g. 87279) ve do so by a twofold process. The eyes or any other sense which is in operation to know our object, comes in direct contact with the object, and by our intuitive knowledgo that the genus ( 72697) resides in the object, we know the genus. Similarly we come to know the qualities of the object under operation. Jayasinha in this connection enumerates the twenty four gunas mentioncd in the Paisheshik Sutras. P. 2. L. I. qfami-Jayasinha explains this phrase by atomegtay:. All this time we have been discussing the cognition of objects either by the sight or by one of the senses of touch. But there are those objects which though recognised by one of the five senses have the necessity of this second kiud of operation, P. 2. L. I. ang-The colour, he says, is known only by the eye, touch only by the skin, taste only by the tongue, smell by the nose and pleasure &c. by the mind. To know colour one has to knot the object in which it is inberent, that is, one knows the colour of an object by first knowing the object. The same process takes place in acquiring the knowledge of the smell. It is understood that smell never exists by itself, but exists always with an object. That objeot, in which a smell, resides, is not known by the sense of spelling, but by either the ege ·(6) cr the touch. It may here be doubled, if the knowledge of the object is at all necessary for the knowledge of the smell. Often we do seem to experience smell without the knowledge of the object from which it emanates. Here again we have to go by the theory of the Naiyayikas, which presupposes an object for the smell to reside in, and holds therefore that knowledge of the object is essential for the right understanding of the smell. Then follows the discussion of knowledge of the taste by the tongue and that of the pleasure or pain by the mind. In almost all the schools of philosophy in India, mind is taken as an organ of knowledge. It is never taken as one and the same with the soul. P. 2. L. 10. HÀ Jalfe 19h. We mark here one distinction between different illustrations of symATATUT. In the case of the cognition of qualities, the four senses of the sight, the nose, the tongue and the skin receive qualities which reside in external objects, but the mind receives qualities which are inherent in the soul ( 3TTERT). One more point should be noted here which Jayasinha discusses. As has been already said, according to Indian Philosophers, the mind is not one and the same as the soul. The reason is plain enough. The soul (BTHT) is always accepted as all-pervading and consequently must be all-knowing which it does not appear to be. The difficulty is solved by accepting the mind as an organ which is neccessary for a particular or specific knowledge. We come across here, several qualities and the processes of knowing them. P. 2. L. 11. ag terifey—This is a further development of im. mediate cognition ( FRTEE). The Vaishcshika recognise a nameable known as FTAFETT which is aptly translated into English by the word genus. This nameable is accepted to be residing both in the substance (77) and in the qualities ( 1077:). The genus residivg in the (Foto) substances is known by the operation known as संयुक्तसमवायप्रत्यक्षम् but not so the genus residing in the qualities ( Tºr:). The qualities (Jor: ) thenıselves are known by #TifaTETTET and we have therefore to go a step further to know the genus of the qualities. This further process is that of संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः. Take for example the process by which संख्यात्वम् is known. संख्या is a quality residing in a substance and cannot therefore be known unless the substance is known. The substance is known by fietat: of the eye or the sense of touch with the object and the right of this substance; being a ·(7) quality thereof and residing therein by Fhar44:, is known by FrytinaTTTET. Erat is in party with real and the operation to know this genus is that of संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय प्रत्यक्षम्. P. 2. L. 13. aèaciafax:--Jayasinha thus explains this line- पूर्वोत्ताः । संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायश्चेति पंचसंबंधास्तैः संबद्धा ये अस्तैिः सहाऽभावस्य समवायस्य च यो विशेषणविशेष्यभाव स्तरसंबंधवैधयेण सन्निधिविशेपोऽन्यथा तस्य प्रतिनियताश्रयवर्तित्वेन द्वित्वरूपानुपपत्ति- स्तरमादभावसमवाययोनिम् । It is to be remarked here that Bhasa sajna, who never mentions the sereu nameables of Kanada, and according to his commentators limits himself to the discussion of the nameables mentioned by Gautama in his Sutras, mentions several things which are not alluded to in thiose sutras. This passage again refers to the knowledge of 249tq: and 3771a: both of which fiud no place in the Padārthas of Gautama. One more point to be marked is, that although Bhisarvajra seems to be aware of the seven nameables of Kanāda he discusses the modo of knowing five of them only, leaving out the action ( 57 ) and the differentia ( fara:). Differentia (ATT) as understood by Kanada resides in the atoms only and they being out of the provinoe of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्, differenta may vell be omitted from the consideration of 7749917. It is the opinion of several Naiyayikas that the action ( f) is known only by inference. This explains the absence of these two nameables from their discussion in this chapter. The explanation of Aragatay19: is very important. Abhāva of a substance, that is non-existence, is cognised by the senses. When there is no book on the tablo We can know the absence, of the book, on the table. But there are many things which are not on the table, and how do yo mark this one particular absence of the book and not of other things. Here comes in the importance of fastanlastesia: If there is this knowledge of the qualified and the qualifier in the table and the book, we can know the absence of the book from the table. This GITT can be arrived at only by this method and no other. P. 2. L. 15. तथाहि तंतवः...पटसमवाय इति--There is a difference in the reading of Rāghava and the three other MISS. Raghava rends as it is put in this text before and Fait! This reading is more correct than the other, as without it the paragraph is certainly incomplete in as much as that will omit the consideration of समवायः। This विशेषणविशेष्यभावः is applicable in five different ways ·( 8 ) as shown by Righava who says ननु किं संयोगविशिष्ट एव विशेषणविशेष्य- भावादभावसमवाययोमा॑नम् । नेत्याह । सर्ववेत्येव विशिष्टसंबंधविशिष्टेष्वित्यर्थः । तथाहि रूपं रसत्वशून्यं रूपे रसत्वं नास्ति । तथा रूपरूपत्वसमवायवद्रूपे रूपत्वसमवाय इति । अथ संयुक्तसमवेतसमवेते । तथाहि &c. P. 3. L. 1. Fharter I Fafaa TER-The meaning of the word E fa in this phra e is very doubtful. One explanation given by Rūghava is that the cognition of 1919: by THAT is not accepted dy all the schools of philosophy but only by the Naiyāyikas. The particle q however suggests that this mode of cognition of phare: is not taken in all the five different connections as in the case in 37719:. P. 3. L. 3. योगिप्रत्यक्षं तु-Having so far discussed the अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् the author now comes to FIAT FITRAT by which the Yogi acquires knowledge of objects without any regard to space, time or nature. One natural question which arises liere is that to a Yogi, by his powers, every thing is kuown and consequently further discussion as to any mode of acquisition of knowledge is useless. Rāghava explains it a Fay by quoling:- लौकिकी प्रतिभा यद्वत्प्रत्यक्षाचनपेक्षिणी । न निश्चयाय पर्याप्ता तथा स्यायोगिनामपि । This TATTTH is again of two kinds, one, when the person is in ytett, and the other when, he is not so. P. 3. I. 4. 77 filterai-This is clearly the case when the Yogi is in युक्तावस्था, that is in समाधिः, i. e. when his अन्तःकरणम् is incessantly connected with his soul, whioh is the result of his #: or religious practices. In that state he is supposed to be able to know anything and everything. P. 3. L. 5. faragni--When the Yogi is not in samadhi, the knowledge is acquired by not only the connection of the sense and the object, but it is either by fourfold, threefold, twofold or single connection as the case may be. The fourfold connection is, first the connection of soul with the mind then of the mind with the organ of sense and lastly of that with the object. By this he acquires the knowledge of any outward object. The object comes in connection with the oye, the eye with the mind and the mind with the soul who receives the impression of the object. For the instance of threefold connection we take the sound which being in wart: with the car is taken identical with the ear which comes in contect with the mind and the mind does so with the soul. Feelings such as pleasure and pain which are merely functions of the mind are known by the soul by his connection with the mind,

·( 9 )
process of
P. 3. L..6. अत्रेवार्षमन्तर्भूतम् --Some writers suppose that आर्पज्ञानम् is a
third
प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. Arsha knowledge is the same as
revelation which, Bhāsarvajna says, is included in 1974 and
it is the result of a higher Dharma.
P. 3. L. 8. तच्च द्विविधम्: -Bhāsarvajna mentions a classification of geta
Et on another principle which has been laterly adopted by
Vishvanath Panchanana and his followers. It is into सविकल्पम्
and निर्विकल्पम्. For explanations of these terms I had better
refer the reader to the elaborate notes on them by Mr. Athlye*
in Tarka Sangraha. The following table shows how Bhisarvajna
divides प्रत्यक्षम्.
..
प्रत्यक्षम्,
योगिप्रत्यक्षम्
अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्.
इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्पजन्यम्.
पंचविधः सन्निकर्षः
युक्तावस्थायाम्.
वियुक्तावस्थायाम्.
• .
Tarka Sangraha annotated by Mr. Athlyo and Mr. M. R. Bodas, Bombay
Sanskrit Series pp. 216-221.
2

·( 10 ) P. 4. L. 1. सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम्-The constru tion of this sentence with which the author begins his discussion on the second kind of a viz. inference, is a matter of controversy between the commentators.. Rāghava says that the word सम्यक should be construed with the phrase परोक्षानुभवसाधनम् and not with fattar as some authors do. Rāghava mentions and adversely criticises one Rambhatta, an author not much known. Jayasinha, who follows an old writer, says that 745 should be construed with अविनाभावेन. To understand the construction clearly let us compare the four definitions given by Bhūsarvajna where this word is used. HATTE is defined as सम्यगनुभवसाधनम् . प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् as सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनम्. अनुमानम् is defined as सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनम् , and the definition of आगमप्रमाणम् is समयबलेन सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनम्. In all the definitions except that of the 370#1714 the word water qualifies, without doubt, अनुभवसाधनम्. प्रमाणम्, for example, is an instrument of correct ( 778798) knowledge. This correct knowledge in the case of 978971 is ( TTTTTT) immediate, but in the case, either of the अनुमानप्रमाणम् or आगमप्रमाणम् it is mediate or परोक्षम्. I think therefore that Rāghava is correct in construing a feleti with परोक्षानुभवः in this definition, and not with अविनाभावेन as Jayasinha does. Beqarita: is a qualification which distinguishes अनुमानप्रमाणम् from आगमप्रमाणम् which is also a source of सम्यग्प- रोक्षानुभवः, but is to be arrived at by समयबलम् which means पुरुपकृतसंकेतः or conventional signs adopted by people. The distinction becomes very clear. In the first place an instrument of knowledge (प्रमाणम् ) is defined as the source of correct knowledge ( सम्यगनुभवसाधनम् ). The knowledge is either immediate or mediate (अपरोक्षम् or परोक्षम्). The mediate knowledge is either by constant concomitance (अविनाभावः) or by the help of signs of human convention (पुरुपकृतसंकेतः ). प्रमाणम् प्रत्यक्षम् अप्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानम् आगमः In this way, it is altercars which distinguishes the 94194101 ·( 11 ) from the 377777771 and 311979: both of which have the olcmout of परोक्षत्वम् in them. सम्यक्त्वम् which permeates in the definition of all the three Pramānas is a part only of the definition of 1977. (fatura: ) Constant concomitance, distinguishes aquar from आगमः which latter, though it is सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनम्, is not so by constant concomitance, but by the force of human convention. Jayasinha and other authors whom he follows, hold the different view and say that gretera qualifies affa71777: by which they would render the definition of what as the instrument of mediate knowledge by (the help of) good concomitance, Jayasinha defends his interpretation by explaining that if the word सम्यक is not construed with 37ania: any sort of concomitance sliould be able to give knowledge. But, as he thinks, that is not so. The concomitance, to give knowledge, must be of the correct order. This stretching of the meaning is certainly unnecessary and incorrect, when we see the explanation given of acara: in the following line of the text. @ana: does not mean, as Jayasinha thinks, the concomitance of any two objects, but necessarily and naturally that of the Feza and the 1977. Jayasinha notices the view of Bhäsarvajna in his 727471401TT, that area is introduced in the definition to avoid ya:--delusionbcing mixed up with h. How this supports Jayasinha's interpretation of the definition of अनुमानम्, I fail to see. Bhūsaavajna is correct in putting 7727 with the object as explained by Jayasinha. The very definition of ght given by Bhisarvajna in this work (See P. 2. L. 2.) is very clear on the point, but there even सम्यक् goes Tith अनुभव Rāghava laughs at these authors and says that their interpretation does not bear out the construction of the sentence. Both the commentators agrec to say that the definition is aimed at the views of the Churvākas who recognise no other प्रमाणम् but the प्रत्यक्षम् . P. 4. L. 1. स्वभावतः साध्येन साध्यस्य व्याप्तिरविनाभावः-A साध्यम् is the thing to be proved and corresponds with the major term of the western system of logic. साधनम् is the लिंगम् or हेतु: or the middle term. The literal meaning of aanta: is "being together.' FEAT means without, and arg: means the state of being without, afata: is the state of 'not being without,' or the state of being together. The technical meaning given to this awkwardly formcd word is the state of being together of the major and the middle terms by their nature. Such a state would occur between the cause 6 ·( 12 ) and the effect, such as the clay and a pot, the smoke and fire &c. Both the commentators, while discussing the word 1973197, bring in the discussion of 3qra: which means an accident. What they want to say is, that this concomitance between the major and the middle term is very often the result of an accidental oiroumstance, in which case the connection is not affilia:. This concomitance of the major and the middle terms (FTTETT and #1977) is expressed in two ways. One way is by an affirmative general proposition and the other by the negative general proposition. In the first, the generality of the middle term is asserted as concomitant with the generality of the major term. Take for example the typical syllogism of the Naiyāyikas gant are HT-YHTE which when expressed in strict syllogistic form would be : प्रतिज्ञा-पर्वतो वन्हिमान् हेतुः-धूमात् उदाहरणम्-यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वन्हियथा महानसे उपनयः-वन्हिव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वतः निगमनम्-तस्मात्पर्वतो वन्हिमान् Here the third member of the syllogism gives the affirmativo general proposition known as 277epozila:. The proposition affirms that all cases of smoke are cases of fire. The same proposition when converted gives an instance of व्यतिरेकी-अविनाभावः .. यत्र यत्र वन्ह्याभावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभावः . e. all the cases of the absence of fire are the cases of the absence of smoke. One has to bear in mind that Sanskrit logicians always manage to put their propositions into universal affirmative although in meaning they may be either negative or even particular. The elasticity of the language makes it easy to do so. This explains the definitiou of at: which is the concomitance of the absence of the generality of the middle term with the absence of the generality of the major term, The middle term is the sign (fan-TT: ) by which we arrive at the conclusion. This middle term is again of two kinds being either दृष्टम् as सामान्यतो दृष्टम् . Rāghava says that affatuta: is the same as outfì:. The latter term is the most common one used by later writers, while Harata: is mostly found in the old yorks. P. 4. L. 4. साधनं लिंगम् --The साधनम् is the sign which leads to the ·( 13 ) दृष्टम् . By conclusion. This sign is of two kinds दृष्टम् and सामान्यतो the di FT477 is meant the middle term, which perceptibly coexisting with the Frezh brings the knowledge of the same, One has to cleatly mark the two senses in which the word FT44 is used in this paragraph. The word #1474 is the definition of अनुमानम् (P. 4. L. 1.) is identical with अनुमानम्, but in the phrase under note and in the two following lines it means the 'middle termi.e. लिंगम्. It may be remarked here that the word कारणम् , so very commonly used by later writers, has not become prominent in the time of Bhāsarvajna. Nor do we find Bhāsarvajna enlarging on the theory of causation which led later writers to distinguish between terms like कारणम् करणम् , and व्यापारः. P. 4. L. 5. Fear The commentators, in the explanation of this phrase, and in the one following in the next paragraph viz. Tegala ay hopelessly mix up things, so distinctly kept apart by Bhāsarvajna. The word ag in this expression refers to 1977 or för the middle term and not to Bra#177 as Rāghava thinks. na in the second phrase refers to 264174 and not to fős77 as Jayasinha explains it. As has already been said the middle term is of two kinds the gen i, e. the apparent one, and whilaçet i, e. seen commonly. The first one is not difficult to understand but the second requires explanation. रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेरनुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टं SITT. The knowledge of colour, is a sign by which one can infer that he has the sense of seeing. P. 4. L. 5. a 7 TEETTTTTTTT#1425 727 atsa:--Rāghava in annotation on this line gives the interpretation put upon it by those whom he calls afar: i.e. the ancient writers. The interpretation given by them is अरमदादीन्द्रियग्राह्यग्राहकम् .. receiver of what could be received by the senses of people of our type. This is too narrow an interpretation. The test is not based on the capacity of the cognizor, but on the fact whether the thing to be known is fit to be known by means of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. The author means to Say that if there was a prior concomitance established by THE 10TH i, e, if the व्याप्तिः or अविनाभावः of the साध्यम् and the साधनम् was established by 9241941077, any future perception of the 14t, gives a knowledge of the Heqy by inference. On the same line the author goes on to explain the definition of सामान्यतो दृष्टम्, which is not what the ancients called अस्मदादीन्द्रियाऽग्राह्यग्राहकम् .e.a साधनम् which enables one to infern thing, which can not be known by & person by his owu senses, but it is a #F# which is reputed to be in a ·(11) coustitui concomitance with the gencrality of A1E43. Rūghara very boldly says इत्यचतुरमेव प्राचीनाचार्यमतमिति मन्तव्यम्. The commentator in support of his view cites the vicw of one Paulindra, a fellow student of his who says कर्पूररूपकार्यसाक्षात्कारः कर्पूररसस्य साक्षात्कारजनकद्रः व्यजन्यः कार्यत्वे सति रूपसाक्षात्कारत्वात् । प्रदीपसाक्षात्कारवत् || Righera is not very happy in the elaborate quotation from his fellow student in the explanation of a very simple phrase of Bhāsarvajna. P. 4. L. 8. gegarafat_The two inferences given here are only two different processes of the inference, It is in fact onc process, bub in tro forms. They are स्वार्थमनुमानम् and परार्थमनुमानम्. The first, THA177, is a process of reasoning which one goes through for his own conviction. No one says what that process is, but one can understand that it can not be any other than that of the syllogism either of five or of three members. The process is so very swift that sometimes it is reduced even to tto members, giving only the conclusion and the ground for it c. q. qaat afkarra. This mode of expressing syllogisms is often adopted by Shankarī. chūrya. The data and på modes of inferences are not the same as the discovcry and instruction given by Jerons in his work on logio. Discovery as explained by him is a process of induction, which, though not differently treated by the Indian logician, forms a necessary part of their syllogism viz. the third member of the syllogism which is commonly known as ErTETUT but which involves व्याप्तिः or अविनाभावः. The third member is in fnot a conclusion arrived at by induction. It gives expression to . generalization arrived at by the knowledge of particulars. HTH17T as explained here is a converse method. There we arrive at a particular conclusion by the application of a general proposition. Thus both the 1975 and quria1741 are deduciro syllogisms, the only difference being, that in the latter we go regularly step by step through all the five members, while we do not necessarily do so in the former, परार्धमनुमानम् , being परोपदेशा- Wat may be the method of instruction mentioned by Jevons. The स्वार्थमनुमानम् being only a shorter form of the परार्धम् no further discussion is given thereof by the author, who now begins to discuss the five members of qrühgata which are necessary for the proper instruction of the person to whom an argument is addressed. P. 4. L. 10. A falêGTETTUTTT74 farthalragat:-This enumeration or tlıc five members of a syllogism is bodily taken from Gautama (SCC ht. 7. 8-2-32) It is interesting to know that the number of these ·( 15 ) different members of a syllogism was not originally fixed to five Even Gautama does not expressly say that these members are five and five only, although he does not mention more than five. The Aimärsakas admitted only three and the Vedantins made use, very often, only of two. The later Naiyayikas stick to five members but the logicians, who flourished before Gautama, had as many as ten. The five others, besides those montioned in this Sutra, are given both by Vālsyayan in his Bhäshya and by Udyotkara in his Nyaya-Vartika. They are SITAT, FETT:, 7749a:, प्रयोजनं and संशयव्युदासः. Very plausible explanation is given by Udyotkara in his Nyāya-Vartika as to why the latter fire were not included in the Avayavas by Gautama and his followers. According to him, a complete argument forms one whole sentence, and the different members of an argument are component parts of the sentence uttered by one person and one only. #tq: and other members, dropped by the later Naiyaikas can not form parts of one and the same sentence because all of them taken together are to be spoken by more persons than one. It may be said that taken as a whole all these ten members, mentioned by the early logicians, form part of a controversy, which begins with a desire to know (FEFTAT) on the part of one, who wishes to instructed and ends with the removal of his doubt ( ÅETTEYETE:). The other three vis. संशयः, शक्यप्राप्तिः and प्रयोजनम् are intermediate steps to discuss the assertion of doubt, possibility of coming to right conslusion and the object of the controversy. These are certainly parts of a debate and need not have a place in a single argument. Gautama, who in this part of his Sutras deals with logic proper, and nothing else, tries not to enter into questions of a debate and its rules, but sticks to the consideration of strict rules of reasoning. Further on in the last portion of his work, Gautama does deal with the question of fallacies and tricks used in debates by debators, but that portion stands in a separate chapter altogether. The five members of a syllogism, adopted by Gautana and copied from him by our author are gratuit, ia:, BETÉTOTT, उपनयः and निगमनम्. When interpreted in English they would be an assertion, the ground, (for it) the illustration (or the instance), the application and the conclusion, P. 4. L. 11. aagfafarefal TATTTTT TAST-This is the definition of the first member of the syllogism. It is a statement of the najor term (98) with the desire of asserting (something) of it. The example given is atsast:- the sound is uneternal. In this ·( 16 ) case, 'the sound' is the major term of which "uneternity' is to be established. This should not be confounded with a 77, the conclusion. Although in both the propositions, the statement is the same, the first proposition (gal) sounds of a question while the other is the conclusion. The sense of questioning is borne out by the word grafogrefaqat in the definition of gast. The definition given by Gautama of gast is very short. Herz--a statement of that which is to be established, which is very obscure unless we supply the phrase qet प्रतिपिपादयिपया as our author does, or tho irords पक्षे सिसाधिपया as is done by the later writers on the subject. P. 4. L. 12. Algarasini faqaa it: The second member of the syllogism is the expression of the ground which leads us to the conclusion tu be arrived at. Translated into literal English the plirase means a statement of a sign which expresses the nature of the reason. Bhāsūrvajna becomes more methodical than Gautama, who gives two Sutras to explain & hetu but our author gives one phrase explaining the general nature of the Tielii, and then gives its three classifications and disousses thepi in detail. There is some obscurity about this phrase explaining the her. The Iletu in the first place is a statement of the sign. One has always to bear in mind that a regular syllogism is expressed in the form of a sentence, and a hetri, is, like others, a clause in that sentence. Hetu then may be expressed either in the instrumental or ablative case, mostly in the latter. ana6471977, as it stands in the phrase, would in the ordinary grammatical construction, qualify the words tota 977 but the construction would not be proper. The proper interpretation is that the hetu is a statement (929) of the sign (177) which expresses ( 769197771 ) the cause-the instrument (Frat). Of all the five members of a syllogism, the helu is the most important and difficult to be understood and treated. It is of three kinds, or to say more correctly, can be expressed in three different ways. It may be an affirmative, or a negative or it may be a hetu which can be expressed both affirmatively and negatively In this connection Rāghava explains the two senses in which the word Sūdhana is used. The reader will find the word used firstly in L. 5 P. 4, and secondly in this phrase. In the former sentence it is used as meaning an instrument and identical with hetri but of two kinds. In the latter also it is identical with the ·( 17 ) hetu but is expressed to be of three kinds. Jayasinha is silent about it but Rāghava explains it thus:-यद्यपि साधनं लिंगमित्यस्यानंतर- मेव साधु त्रैविध्याभिधानं तथापि तत्रावान्तरविप्रतिपत्त्यपाकरणायापरथा दैविध्यमेव af19f 1 The phrase is not very happily worded. What he ineans to say is, I think, that although the author in the very first instance, should have said that 1997 is of three kinds, to avoid a side misunderstanding, he mentioned there, of two kinds. wanted there to show, that the linga which leads to conolusion is of two kinds. I think the justification given by Rāghava was not necessary. The ideas expressed by Bhasarvajna in the two phrases under discussion, are quite clear. In the first i. e. finy f, the author explains, what a linga is, and how it is classified. In the second phrase साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतु:-the author explains the hetre, and not the linga. The hetu as distinguished from the linga is a statement-an expression of the linga, and is not the same as the linga. This expression of lingo, the author says, is of three kinds. P. 4. I. 13. 77 0769tragetragen-This hetze has five requisites. 4759: does not mean 'of five kinds.' The word Eq: is misleading and should be properly interpreted and understood. The five requisites are enumerated and discussed hereafter. P. 4. L. 16. aa PET fa fare: 99:-To understand very clearly the five requisites of a hetu, it is necessary to understand the Vyapticoncomitance as understood by the eastern logicians. Take the most typical and oft-quoted syllogism, gaat afEHTYATT. In this argument 799:-is the 987:-the subject, of which are ca firyness is predicated. 789:-in the logical phraseology of the West is the minor term and afthmat is the major terin. The hetu is धूमात्- because there is smoke. Smoke is the foot or the middle term. is the quality of concomitance of the hetu and the minor term. I may mention here that very often the word hetue is used for the linga. The distinction between the two is already explained, but they are used indiscriminately. The one word quar or 987 is a prelude to the explanation of the theory of Vyapti which, in short, is the explanation of ererything we mean by induction in the Western system of logio. 984: is defined here as an object which has the quality ( 963 ) of the major term (FET). The explanation thus given of 78: looks like anticipating the conclusion. As far as we are treating the process of reasoning, it is neither unimportant nor anticipating. In fact a minor term 3 ·( 18 ) (987: ) cannot be a minor term unless there is the corresponding major term. It is interesting to note, in this connection, the definition given of the minor term by Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha. He says संदिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः. He seems to have felt the same difficulty of anticipating the conclusion and puts therefore the definition in a different forın altogether. In spite of the great elasticity of Sanskrit phraseology, to give a very correct and appropriate definition of a term of logic is a difficult task. P. 4. L. 17. ENTRATTUAT UHF AT87:-In detecting a formal fallacy it is important often to know a Sapaksha-a term similar to the minor term. It means an object in which, the proposed major term is known to exist. In the syllogism qaat afgart FATIT, महानसः - kitchen-is the 77987: of पर्वतः, which the 999. Annanbhatla defines सपक्षः as निश्चितसाध्यवान्. А 1987: is one on which the major term is ascertained. In the case of a kitchen the predicate 'fire' is an ascertained thing. The second requisite of a good hetr is that it should exist in a सपक्षः (सपक्षे सत्वम् ). It may happen that the common quality may appear in the whole or only a part of the 92. The reading printed in the text as adopted by Jayasinha is also to be found in the Deccan college Ms. Raghava has सर्व स्मिन् only. I see no reason why the reading of Jayasinha should be rejected and yet I feel that Rūghava's was the reading in the text. It is uncertain how the reading was changed and who did it. P. 4 L. 18. ATET METAI ETH 799:-A @99 is an object whiclı hag a quality, not to be found in the inajor term. If an objeot is not seen in concomitance with another, the latter is said to be Tyuritta of the first. In the case of fire and smoke, the smoke cannot be in concomitance with that which is devoid of the major term. In the case of the syllogism of smoke and fire, the smoke, which cannot be in concomitance with a pond of water, is said to be Vyavritla of the pond of water. The third requisite therefore is the absence of the hetu from Vipaxa. In this case hetu must be absent from the whole of the Vipaxa, and not only from a partof it. P. 4. L. 19. Thufatiafa &c.--This reading, as found in C, and G, seems to be better and more correct reading than that in B which may be a mistake by the copyist. Rāghava explains the last two words of the definition only and we therefore cannot make oub what reading he had before him. When the hetu resides in an object without contradiction from authority it is earfiah938971 which is the fourth requisite of a proper 87729 inference, ·( 19 ) P. 5. L. 1. साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः &c.--This is the fifth requisite for a good अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः. The helu must not fulfil the first three conditions in the major term to be established and also in some other term. This requisite is called असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्. In short the same hetes should not prove the contrary of the conclusion. P. 5. L. 3. a fafat:-Having explained the five requisites for a good अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः the author gives the two kinds of this sort of heths. The principle of division adopted is the nature of the hetu found in a 79. The hetu may be good of the whole of the 998: or only of a part of it. As an instance of the first he examines the syllogism---शब्दोऽनित्यः । कार्यत्वात्. When expanded it becomes:- प्रतिज्ञा-शब्दोऽनित्यः. हेतु:-कार्यत्वात्. उपनयः-यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्राऽनित्यत्वं यथा घटे. उदाहरणम्-अनित्यत्वव्याप्यकार्यत्ववानयं शब्दः. निगमनम्-तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः. In this argument qz: is the सपक्षः and कार्यत्वम् is true of the whole of the matter known as qz:. As an instance of the second kind he takes the same syllogism with the same conclusion but with a different netu which when expanded becomes:- प्रतिज्ञा-शब्दोऽनित्यः हेतुः-सामान्ये सत्यसदादिवायेंद्रियग्राह्यत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र सामान्ये सत्यस्मदादिवायेद्रियग्राह्यत्वं तत्राऽनित्यत्वम् । यथा घटे. उपनयः-अनित्यत्वव्याप्यसामान्यत्वे सति......... ................ग्राह्यत्ववानयं शब्द: निगमनम्--तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः, In this syllogism the expression of the middle term is worth under. standing. शब्दः is the पक्षः and घट: is taken as the सपक्षः. The phrase used as the heti-a long sentence as it were of five different phrases is one from which, even for brevity's sake we cannot omit a single syllable. The process is thus explained. We have to prove the अनित्यत्वम् or non-eternity of Vords'. अनित्यत्वम् or noneternity is a term which includes, according to some schools of philosophy, erery created object or say every effect of a cause. There is no difficulty therefore, in findings सपक्षः शब्द: for any object, which can be sloirn to be an effect and which will suit the middle term, will serve the purpose. This is an instance of a व्यतिरेकी हेतुः. To : for ·( 20 ) explain the distinction between tliese two hetus it is nocessary to know what is pay: and wliat is off, and in connection with these, what is saifa:. Vyapti is shortly concomitance. To put in simple clear and short phrase it is TCAT FCFT. When a thing exists on the existence of another there is sifa: between the two. This is however अन्वयव्याप्तिः. The व्यतिरेकच्याप्तिः being the non-existence of the one on the non existence of another. In the common aria: of : and arfa: 3779484fa: is 97 9612 af: and this is a true propositiou. But the A 19tfa: is not true if the terms are used in tho same order. It is false to say यत्र धूमाभावः तत्र वन्यभावः । e.g. in the hot iron, there is the absence of smoke but there is not the corresponding absence of fire. But the conversion of this is truc. It is quito true to say 77 gram 1962 YAT:119: 1 This is true universally, understanding of course in the belief of the ancients that smoke is the concommitant effect of fire and fire only. This shows that in a omfattonifa: when it is true, the helu or middle term resides in a part only of the सपक्षः which is any thing liaving fire. It is seen in one thing having fire be a kitchen and yet not scen in a red hot iron, although it is one of the FTETT:. It is therefore now soen that in an अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः, the हेतु: may reside in the whole of the सपक्ष: or only in a part of it. The spiagonaltag: is one which can enable us to arrive at the conclusion by two ways. It may be either by giving an अन्वयी उदाहरणम् of by a व्यतिरेकी उदाहरणम्. अन्वयः is always to general affirmative proposition. The state is a particular proposilion. None of them seem to be negative propositions. The hetru used here is not truc of all the 79&TT: i. e, all the non-eternal objects; but of a part only. The commentators analyse this helu thus. It is neoossary to give this lengthy plirase, as it will not do to say PancerT; for even God is Tiu by inference through mind, an इन्द्रिय, but He is not अनित्य. This result is avoided by prefixing बाह्यम्. This even will not do, as, according to eastern philosophers, thie aloft can see even atoms by their physical organs, and atoms according to Naiyayikas are eternal. To avoid this second result, tho word hegrea: is inserted, which avoids the physical organs of tho yogis by limiting the result to the organs of common people liko us. But even tho physical organs of common people are able to cognise the eternal सामान्यानि (genuses.). शब्द: has a सामान्यम् yet boing itself not eternal, the gonus to which it belongs is not taken to be eternal. To avoid the oternal Samanyas the phrase intro. duced is सामान्यत्वे सति, which means 'although there is सामान्यम्।'

·( 21 ) part of the P. 5. L. 6. पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्तिः-A. Kerala'nvarji hetu is that which is concomitant with पक्षः (minor term) and resides in the Sapasca, and has no Vipava. This again is of two kinds as shown before. The author says that, as shown in the previous note, सपक्षवृत्तिः may mean either that the hetu resides in the whole or only & सपक्षः and consequently the two syllogisms. P. 5. L. 7. विवादास्पदीभूतानि-This is an instance of the first kind of केवलान्वयी which when put in syllogistic form becomes :- प्रतिज्ञा-अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि. हेतुः-प्रमेयत्वात. उदाहरणम्-यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षत्वम् यथा करतलम् . उपनयः-प्रत्यक्षत्वव्याप्यप्रमेयत्ववदिदमदृष्टम्. निगमनम्-अदृष्टं कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम्. In the first place this is only an arazit da: for if we convert the व्याप्तिः of the उदाहरणम् it will be found that the व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः is not correct. यत्र न प्रत्यक्षत्वम् तत्र न प्रमेयत्वम् is not true because even where there is not प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, प्रमेयत्वम् is seen to exist. In this case the hetn प्रमेयत्वं resides in the whole of सपक्षम् vis. करतलम्. P. 5. L. 8. सैव प्रतिज्ञा-Let us now take the same assertion and the conclusion proving it with a different heti which in syllogistic form stands thus. प्रतिज्ञा-अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि. हेतुः-मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्र कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम् यथा अस्मत्सुखादिः, उपनयः कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षत्वव्याप्यमीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्ववन्ति अदृष्टादीनि. निगमनम्-तस्सात् अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि. As it is, this is a very queer argumentand at first sight looks a faulty one. It is intended to prove that seekor the unseen (future) is visible (directly) to some people (the yogis). The reason given constitutes the queerness. It is so, lie says, because they are directly noncognizible to the Mimansakas. Here we have to take for granted that the yogis know several things by direct mode of cognition, (प्रत्यक्षम् ) which the fimansakas (who are not yogis) do not know. Here the 799: is 3 Hergelg: which according to the argument should be 37979: to the limansakas. The reasoning is this. The Beggia are pratyaxa to some because they are apratyava to the limansahas as is the case with weigerentlich though pralyaza to us are apratyava to the llimansanas, 'Let us ·( 22 ) examine this argument first by the definition of केवलान्वयी हेतुः. The hethu मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वात् must be पक्षव्यापक . e. it must reside in the 987: which in this case is अदृष्टादिः. This is true according to the theory of the Mimánsakas. The ac: then must be found in the 1987: which is Belg: which is also true according to their theory. The third condition is, that there should not be a ftet:. Now under this assertion viz. the future is cognized directly by some; the predicate is such that there cannot be any thing which is not cognized by some directly i. e. even by the yogis; and therefore there cannot be a विपक्षः. But even the सपक्षः, अस्मत्सुखादिः is a part of it because all the human happinesses are not pratyara, P. 5. L. 10. 99 gottaan TET-A kevalavyatireki helr is that which is 196: in the minor term, which has no 799, and which is distinct from faqe. This is again of two kinds which the author names of अप्रसंगोने यी and प्रसंगोनेयी. As an instance of the first kind he gives an argument which can be thus put in syllogistic form. प्रतिज्ञा-सर्व कार्य सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकम्, हेतुः-कादाचित्कत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र यत्र सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वाभावः तत्र कादाचित्कवाभावः यथा आकाशे. उपनयः-सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वाऽऽभावव्याप्यकादाचित्कत्वाऽऽभावव्यापकं इदं न. निगमनम् - तस्मात् सर्व कार्य न सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकाभाववत्. This areasoning is absent from many later works but the next is the one often found there. I do not sec the necessity nor understand the utility of dividing götateatea: into two parts. Both tho argumonls cited here are interesting so far as the first is aimed at the thiost and the second against the latter's doctrine, that a body has no soul. P. 5. L. 14. gaa THIEM THÈTES Hafa.-The author now proceeds to discuss the lIcivabhāsas or fallacies which, according to him, have merely, the appearance of the hetu. The line following this phrase, which gives the definition of a helvabhūsa merely explains the term. This definition of hetvabhūsa is taken from the Bhashya of Vatsyāyana on Gautama's Sutras. According to Gautama, there are five hctvabhascs. They are Hogan:, :, प्रकरणसमः, साध्यसमः and कालातीतः. According to our author, they are six, namely असिद्धः, विरुद्धः, अनैकान्तिकः, अनध्यवसितः, कालात्ययापदिष्टः and 07:. We can mark that thrco of these are in meaning the same as those giveu by Gaulama. Tho Bit in our work ·( 23 ) stands for FTA: of Gautama, wafan: for yofanart:, and कालात्ययापदिष्टः for कालातीतः, विरुद्धः, and प्रकरणसमः are common to both. Our author gives one more 377 araa: which is not to be found in Gautama. According to the Vaisheshikhas, there are only three hetvabhasas, e.g. विरुद्धः, असिद्धः, and संदिग्धः, संदिग्धः corresponds to a cifrafi: of our author. The other two are common. According Shanker mishra, अनध्यवसितः is the same as अनुपसंहारि- Hanifan: mentioned by the later writers. Buddist autor of the Ters follows l'anāda in classifioation of hetval hasas. The commentator Jayasinha is silent as to the exact number of the hetvabhasas ; Raghava Bhatta, however says that really speaking there are only five but Bhasarvajna splits one of them into two. He is not very clear as to the one which has been so slipt up. A very portinent question occurs to & student of Nyaya Shastra, which is how far the helvabhasas correspond with the fallacies of the Western Logic. Aristotle and his followers would divide fallacies into formal, and material and would say that a material fallacy can hardly have place in formal logic. The distinction is not clear even in Gautama's logic but taking his syllogism to be purely formal, the hetvabhasas are also of that type. P. 6. I. 3. aastal area File :-In understanding a fallacy, one has to keep in his mind that the hetu to be a correct one must fulfil the five conditions already explained. A breach of any one of these conditions gives rise to a fallacy. The first of these conditions is that the hetu must co-exist with the q: or the minor term, Let us examine the argument gire by our author to illustrati this fallacy. शब्दोऽनित्यः चाक्षुषत्वात. A word is non-eternal :: A word refers to the eye. Here the very first requisite is not complied with. The debator forgets that there can be no connection between the eye and the word. Raghava Bhatta in bis commentary gives this explanation of SS, but at the samo time, he supports the view of Vatsyayana, and the author of न्यायवार्तिकम् that असिद्धः is identical with साध्यसम:- .P. C. L. 3. qerfaqeruita asarat fare: When a helu is to be found in the qa; and faqe: only and not in 98: we get the hetrābhasa ·( 24 ) fars:. To remind the reader, the first three requisites of a good hetu are (1) that it must be found in the 999 (2) it must be found in the 997: and (3) that it must not be found in a feqe:. The argument cited in illustration is at Gat: l'ala. In this syllogism 7:is the 987, the 1987: of शब्दः as it is to be नित्यः we take to be ईश्वरः. The विपक्षः of शब्दः which must be अनित्यः may be EZ:. Here the reader will understand that straia (because it is an effect) is to be found in 3727: i.e. 92, but is not to be found in सपक्षः 2. e. ईश्वरः and it resides in a घटः i. e. विपक्ष: which it should never do. Here the hetri, if properly worked out will give us a conclusion contrary to our gaat. Putting the syllogism in its proper from it ruus thus:- प्रतिज्ञा-शब्दो नित्यः. हेतु:-कार्यत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वम् तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम्. This is a false only: because we cannot find an illustration to support it. Let us take the oqatacaifa: which will run as follows: प्रतिज्ञा-यत्र यत्र अनित्यत्वम् तत्र तत्र कार्याभावत्वम्. This gifh is also unsupported by any illustration. The correct ontfù: would be यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वम् तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम् This is supported by the illustration qui ez:. The rogular conclusion (निगमनम् ) drawn from this will be शब्दोऽनित्यः which is a contradiotion of the प्रतिज्ञा. When we put this syllogism in English from it becomes. All cases of etenity are cases of effect. Sound is a case of effect Sound is enternal. This is clearly a fallacy of undistributed middle term. P. 6. L. 4. पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः-When a hetat is found in all the thrse visn पक्षः, सपक्षः and विपक्षः, the hetvabhasa committed is aàaffaq:. It;violates the rule that the hetu shall not be fouud in the face. The argument cited in the illustration is her: शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात्. in the पक्षः अनित्यत्वम् is the साध्यम्, qa: may be taken as the 987: and fat: being eternal may be taken as the faqat: 479647 (the quality of being known) is the In this case शब्द:

·( 25 ) hetu. All the shastrês aim at knowing FTT:. YH therfore, resides in $t:, which is contrary to the rule of five requisites to be found in a good syllogism. When put in regular form, the argument becomes: प्रतिज्ञा -शब्दोऽनित्यः हेतुः-प्रमेयत्वात्, उदाहरणम्-यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वम् तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् ( This is false ). उपनयः-अनित्यत्वव्याप्यप्रमेयत्ववदयं शब्दः ( false) निगमनम्-शब्दोऽनित्यः ( false) In English it would be All objects of knowledge are non-eternal Sound is an object of knowledge. ... Sound is non-eternal. In this case the major premise is false, and it is a case of undistributed major term. P. 6. L. 4. TETSat: &0.-A hetu which does not establish the HEYTT (major term, ) but is found only in the qet: (minor term) is a fallacy called अनध्यवसितम्. This हेत्वाभासः is not mentioned by the Sutras nor by any other schools of philosophy. The aggregate of the definition is that it is not proved by the hetu i. e. both the condition (1) being in the #4: and (2) absent from 4: are not complied with. Quite independent of the existence of 99 and ager: the hetu is found only in the gen. This is mentioned by शंकरः.* The instance given of this is Hi Fara. Here på being the 78: there can neither be a 981: nor a fage. There is nothing therefore to test the gife: which cannot be mentioned. The hetu is therefore unable to prove the साध्यम् of the पक्षः though सर्व is residing in the पक्षः, Hof, which it does according to Vedant theory. P. 6. Is. 5. THIUTAT &c. The hetu which exists in a q: but which is disproved by another प्रमाणम् is कालात्ययापदिष्टः. The very prominent instance is अनुष्णोऽग्निः कृतकत्वात्. Here the very प्रतिज्ञा is false because, we know by perception (977) that fire is not cold. The hetu though it may be found in the 48: is false and proves nothing. P. 6. L. 6. fastafa &c. A hetu which fulfils the three conditions in the a: is called TAH:. This is a case of a dilemma and is called in later works सत्प्रतिपक्षः. * vide p, 30 note p. 8 I. S. 4 ·( 26 ) P. 6: L. 6 यद्यपि चैपों &c. These हेत्वाभासा: thus classified into six broad divisions, can be further divided innumerably: but in the following pages the author gives a few of them only. He begins with twelve Assiddhas many of which are quite easy to understand. We will discuss one or two leaving the others to be dealt with by the reader. P. 6. 1. 9. स्वरूपासिद्धः ॥ शब्दः अनित्यः चाक्षुषत्वात्. Keeping in mind that the hetu must fulfil the five conditions, and examining hetu we find that 7784294 has nothing common with 7. It is not appertaining to a ag: nor is it received by a चक्षु असिद्धः though not mentioned by name in the Sutras is the same as FETHA: mentioned and defined by Gautama in Sutra 1-2-8. साध्याविशिष्टः साध्यत्वात्साध्यसमः. The explanation is that the hetu itself being not true of the साध्यम्, it requires to be proved. The author of न्यायवार्तिकम् says that this is the same as असिद्धः and divides it into three classes. सोयमसिद्धस्त्रेधाभवति । प्रज्ञापनीयधर्मसमान आश्रयासिद्धोऽन्यथासिद्धश्चेति । (न्यायवार्तिकम्.) The illustration given by Vatsyāyana of this fallacy is द्रव्यं छाया गतिमत्त्वात्. Here छाया is पक्षः, द्रव्यं is साध्यं and गतिमत्वम् is the hete. It is not certain that JATHTH is concomitant with 3141. Thus we see that Vat'sya'yana who flourished in the fifth century A. D. is satisfied with keeping on the name of साध्यसमः explainingit by the word असिद्धः. Udyotkara, the author of a fait who lived about the eighth century A. D. mentions three divisions of the stating that it is the same as साध्यसमः, Our author mentions about 16 different instances of HTHS: giving different names to each, but without strictly classifying them; the striot classification begun by उद्योत्करः and followed by most of the later writers is not to be found in our author. He may have lived before senteti: or so very near his time as not to have been informed of this writer. (1) स्वरूपासिद्धः- शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वात्. शब्दः, i पक्षः, सपक्षः is घटः and विपक्षः is ईश्वरः. The हेतुः चाक्षुषत्वम् breaks three conditions vis. पक्ष- धर्मत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्वम्, and विपक्षाव्यावृत्तिः. (2) व्यधिकरणासिद्धः शब्दोऽनित्यः पटस्य कृतकत्वात्. This also violates the first three conditions. (3) विशेष्यासिद्धः शब्दोऽनित्यः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात् is equally faulty.

·( 27 ) more (4) विशेपणासिद्धः शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् is again faulty. These first four instances are mere different shades of ono and the same fallacy called out and all of them necessarily violate the primary conditions required for a valid syllogism. (5) fatur: is one in which y: does not exist in a part of the 997: The distinction between this and the first four is, that in the latter the hetu does not exist in the whole 9:, while in the former it is not found in a part only of the 48. Jayasinha goes into the theory of the production of शब्दः held by the नैयायिकाः or correctly by the वैशेषिकाः which is thus explained. भागे पक्षकदेशेऽसिद्धः भागासिद्धः। प्रयतः शब्दजनको व्यापारः । तत्प्रयत्नानंतर 99: saiatzt: 1 There he goes on to explain, the further 346 which he thinks does not exist, but on which depends the further production of sound. According to him प्रयतम् is the cause of the first wave of sound, which qat is absent in the second wave and therefore there is an absence of an: in the whole of the 31:. This would come under FTES: and therefore in fact, we have five illustrations of स्वरूपासिद्धः. (6) आश्रयासिद्धः यथाऽस्ति प्रधानम् विश्वपरिणामित्वात्. Here the hetu stands in the position of आश्रितः and आश्रयः with the पक्षः. 98: is stater and affect is FETT, the ag: being fra TRUNA ( because it has characteristic of resulting into fast). Here the author makes a thrust at the Sankhya philosophers who hold that an is the result of 77. But the farcit: say that it is a fallacy because it is not true that there is that relation between TTT and fa, and the hetu therefore fails to prove the existence of Tr. This is a very good and yet peculiar illustration of this fallacy. Later authors give us very common instances as for example Tarfars fa-arreta. Here the a: is qualified by an adjective which makes the very qu: non-existent and much less therefore fragrant. In the illustration of our author one thing is attempted to be proved by another which itself is not knotn to bo affirmed of thi other. The hetu is as uncertain as the 3r. This illustration gives a clear explanation of the name : given to this fallacy by Gautama. · ·( 28 ) (7) Orspiegatifea : is explained in a similar way. (8-9) The next two are far care und व्यर्थविशेपणासिद्धः are quite unnecessary divisions. Rāghava says that these are instances of CATHE: which according to later writers involves a case of sarfy: but in the instance oited here there is no case of उपाधि. Porhaps Raghava's illustrations were different as appears from one found in the MS. with me. It seems to me that the illustration noted is not the illustration given by Bhasarvajna and it may be that the copy used by Raghava was one tempered with by & subsequent copyist. It is worth noting that Rūghara, gives five classes of असिद्धः which he calls स्वरूपासिद्धः, पक्षधर्मत्वासिद्धः, BITARTIRE, operating and reti. He further goes on grouping the twelve in these five and suggests sevoral inore of his own. The copy in this part of it, as also in several other parts is badly written and although the letters are clear, it becomes very difficult to gnthor tbo author's meaning. He jumbles up together, the views of Gautama, bis commentators and himself and also perhaps of some one of his immediate predecessors. (10-11-12) Afruth: is an important fallacy. If some one with. · out ascertaining whether the phenomenon in sight is smoke or mist says, अयं प्रदेशः अग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात् he commits this fallaoy. If we look to the definition of a fia: it says that in that there is the uncertainty of the letu existing with the Paxa. This is not a purely formal fallacy violating one of the conditions of a true syllogism. The fault lies in the wrong observation, which leads to that violation. The fault has its origin in the doubt. In the two following fnllacies the doubt exists in the qualified to: or the qualifier. These three may be classed in one group of HTIHE:. P. 7. L. 5. face GIET &c. Eight fallacies known by the name of farina are given by Bhāsarvajna. Tour of these occur when there is a : and four more when there is not a 7987. In a विरुद्धः the hster resides in the पक्षः and विपक्ष: only and not in सपक्षः. This shows that if the hets resides in the विपक्षः and not in सपक्ष: the conclusion inust be contrary to the gastr. This is very well borne out in the definition givon by Gautama viz. foto ·(. 29 ) मप्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः । G. S. 1. 2. 6.. A still simpler definition is given by Lougaxi Bhāskar in his fiyat where he says FRETE भावव्याप्तो हेतुविरुद्धः. The four illustrations given by our author are the modification of one and the same, शब्दो नित्यः कार्यत्वात्. Here 799: should be gat: in which hetu prirata cannot reside. विपक्षः is घट: in. which it does reside, which is contrary to the rule. Thus it violates the condition विपक्षाव्यावृत्तिः. To make it clear let us expand the syllogism. प्रतिज्ञा-शब्दः नित्यः हेतुः-कार्यत्वात्. यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्र नित्यत्वं. This is falso as there is no illustra- व्याप्तिः-tion: or यत्र नित्यत्वाभावः. (अनित्यत्वं ) तत्र कार्यत्वाभावः. This may be false as in ez: or true as in 39SITT. उपनयः-कार्यत्वाभावव्याप्य अनित्यत्ववानयं शब्दः. निगमनम्-शब्दः अनित्यः. In this way all the other instances given by the author could be worked out. P. 7. L. 16. ननु चत्वार एव &c. A question arises that there are nob more than four विरुद्धाः, as those in which the हेतुः resides in पक्षक- देशः are already mentioned in the असिद्धः. The author says, that it does not matter as they can very well be included in both. P. 7. L. 20. अनेकान्तिकभेदास्तु &c. Gautama defines this as सव्य- भिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः. Bhāsarvcjna's definition is पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनै- grafi. Thus we see that the fault lies in the hetu being concomitant with @99. This vitiates the third condition of a valid syllogism. Bhūsarvajna proceeds in a very systematic way and naturally by considering the position of helu as to Paxa, Sapaxa, or Vipava makes as many divisions of the fallaoy as could be made mathematically. In a previous portion he has shown tendency to split up consideration of 98: into that of the whole and of the part of it. If the hetu is to be found or not found in a 42: it may either be not found in the whole or in a part of it. The same may be said equally of 99 and f987: He thus enumerates eight different classes of this हेत्वाभासः which are- 1 पक्षत्रयव्यापकः 2 पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षकदेशव्यापकः 3 पक्षसपक्षन्यापकः विपक्षकदेशव्यापकः * पक्षविपक्षन्यापकः सपक्षकदेशव्यापक 5 पक्षत्रयैकदेशब्यापकः .

·( 30 ) } is 6 पक्षसपक्षकदेशवृत्तिविपक्षव्यापकः 7 पक्षविपक्षकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापकः 8 सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः पक्षकदेशव्यापकः Let us now examine one of the instances, प्रतिज्ञा शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्द: पक्षः अनित्यत्वम् is साध्यं हेतुः प्रमेयत्वात्. उदाहरणम्-यत्र प्रमेयत्वम् तत्र अनित्यत्वम् This is correct as in घटः प्रमेयत्वम् is हेतुः or यत्र अनित्याभाव: (नित्यत्वम् ) तत्र प्रमेयत्वाभावः This is false as in आत्मा. घट: is सपक्षः आत्मा is विपक्षः, उपनयः will bo false with विपक्षः. निगमनम् must therefore be false. Let us put it in Aristotalian form. Wherever there is an object of knowledge, tlicre is non-eternity. i. c. All objects of knowledge are non-eternal. Sound is an object of knowledge. .:.Sound is non-eternal, This is an instance of the illicit process of the major terin. It may be noted that Raghava's eight names of tågolfra: are somewhat different. The whole of this part in his commentary seems to have been very badly copied and is full of mistakes. It may be that the copist made an unpardonable mistake in mixing up lines from other pages. P. 8. L. 8. अनध्यवसितभेदास्तु &c. As already remarked this हेत्वाभासः is mentioned by Bhāsarvajna alono, except by Shankarmishra who, about the 17th century, says that it is the same as अनुपसंहारी-अनैकान्तिकः which latter did not take its name and form in the time of Bhüsarvajna. This is not found in Gautama nor in the Bhashya on his Sutras. Unless we find out that some other author mentioned it before Bhūsarvajna we must say that he was the first to suggest it. As it is, it is not a very important addition in the हेत्वाभासा:. He defines it as साध्याऽसाधकः पक्ष एव वर्तमानोऽनध्यवसितः. In classifying this, again he follows the same method of going on very systematically. Although the hetu in this case resides in the पक्षः only, पक्ष: may either have or not the सपक्षः or विपक्षः. That then makes two broad divisions of having or not having सपक्षः and 94:. Next division is by the hetu being found in the whole qat: or in a part only. This brings it to four. Then he gives a further division where there is no विपक्षः but there is सपक्षः.. This ·( 31 ) adds four more to the number. The breach of condition is, in not finding eg: in the 799: Mere quitatis not sufficient because that does not prove anything. The conditions violated are yet सत्त्वम् and विपक्षाव्यावृत्तिः । Let us examine one example:- प्रतिज्ञा-सर्वमनित्यं (सर्वम् being पक्षः there is neither सपक्ष: nor विपक्षः.) हेतुः-सत्त्वात, व्याप्तिः-यत्र सत्त्वं तत्र नित्यत्वम् There is an absence of CIETUIH beenuse there is neither #98: nor faqat In Aristotalian form it would be All real things are non-eternal. All things are real things. ..All things are non-eternal. This is illicit process of the major term, Rāghava raises here a very good question. It may be shown that there oannot be a व्याप्तिः in अनध्यवसितः and in that case this fallacy is only a case of ons: and need not be separately mentioned. But, says Rāghava, this is a different feature of the fallacy and may be separately treated. P. 8 L. 16 TIETOGIÀTIE &c. The definition already given is प्रमाणवाधिते पक्षे वर्तमानो हेतुः कालात्ययापदिष्टः. This fallacy is known in Íater works as aifea. It is interesting to note that the word used as definition by Gautama in the Sutra (1.2.9) is used here as a name of the fallacy. According to later writers diretaa: is the name of the fallaoy. Jayasinha thus explains Filoftetif:. प्रमाणानुपहतपक्षोपन्यासाऽनंतरं हेतूपन्यासस्य समयः कालः तदत्ययेऽतिक्रमे सत्यपदिष्टः कालात्ययापदिष्टः. Raghava explains it, thus:-कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः इति कालात्यये कालाभावेऽपदिष्टः कधित एकदेशो यस्य हेतोः स तथा । तथाच यस्य कस्याप्यर्थः किंचित्कालसंबंधी यस्य पुनरर्थो न कसिंश्चित्कालेऽस्ति स कालात्ययापदिष्टो बाधामिधान इति सूत्रतात्पर्यार्थः. It is clear that this is the fallacy known in later works as area. The instance given by Vātsyāyana is very interesting though not so easy as that given by Bhāsarvajna. He says नित्यः शब्दः संयोगव्यंग्यत्वात् रूपवत्. Here, the hete is concomitant with 197 which is seen in an object by its connection with light. At in which wer: ought to exist, is not so seen. The sound is the result of the connection of a drum anda stick but the connection (an: ) is not concomitant with the sound. By the time we hear the reg: the at: has disappeared i.e. संयोगः has passed (अत्ययः) at the time when it should have beeg a :. I fail to see how this if the same as anfaati or 914: of .

·( 32 ) the Inter writers. I am oven much more perplexed to see, that Bhūsarvajna gives instances of atta: under the heading of कालात्ययापदिष्टः. Mr. Athlye in his annotations on तर्कसंग्रहः says that carorata: or TETETTer is the same as a fun:. There is another reason why this cannot be the same as af:. Pätsyāyana who does not even mention either वाध: or वाधितः, says that the fault in terata: occurs in non-similarity of the illustration as shown in the syllogism given by him. It may become interesting to find who first thought that कालातीतः or कालात्ययापदिष्टः is the same as वाधितः. It is not done by वात्स्यायन:. It is not also in न्यायवार्तिकः as seen from the passage quoted in the Benares edition of area यनः nor in the तात्पर्यटीका of वाचस्पतिः. The very first instance given by Bhāsarvajna clears his meaning of the fallacy, though it does not appear how he gets it and why he drops Gautama's meaning. अनुप्णोग्निः कृतकत्वात्. Hereby प्रत्यक्ष- SATO fire is known to be hot. This accordingly violates the fifth condition of अबाधितविषयत्वम्. Here the hethu कृतकत्वम् does not reside in the sfisari: which is coldness of fire, because that coldness is not प्रमाणाविरोधी but it is विरोधी of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. A. question is rightly raised viz, whether this is a brata:. The fault does not reside in the da: but rather in the 92. Jayasinha answers this difficulty by suggesting that it is tha: because when the recipient is faulty you may accept the fault even in the object received. The argument is not very sound. This much can be said, that this does not seem strictly to be a formal fallacy, except that it violates the fourth condition. This fallacy can ocour even when a Heart: is proved of the : by another T: by BTHETH. If it is the same eg: it becomes a case of प्रकरणसमः. P. 9. L. 1. प्रकरणसमः-This cannot be the same as सत्प्रतिपक्षः because in this case the freq: is proved by the same hetu and not by another which is the case in सत्प्रतिपक्षः. P. 9, L. 3. The author mentions Postourart. This may be the same as अनुमानकालात्ययापदिष्टः. P. 9. L. 7. EGTETUTH. Having treated the first two members of the syllogism viz. vlasy and Tg: we now come to the important third member उदाहरणम् which is the most essential member in the argument. It is worth remarking here that the word aufà: which plays so important and necessary a part in an gCTETUTH and on the importance of which later writers dwell at very great length- ·( 33 ) had not acquired that importance at the time when Bhuisarvajna wrote. Even the definition given by Bhāsarvajna'of EGTETTE is not logically correct. It gives only a synonymous term. BİHE: , the wellknown manual writer, does not define it in his text of तर्कसंग्रहः but in his gloss over it, he defines it as व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं उदा- ETUTH. So also does Laugākshi Bhāskar in his armiyat, where he says ÀÄ TER 999CTETUI. Mr. Athlye, however, points out that Laugūkshi Bhāskar in his 24 HGTFAHg1127: has the courage to say that the employment of the instance is purely conventional and not necessary. We saw that neither Gaulana nor Vatsyāyana mentions व्याप्तिः. Mr. Athlye says that even न्यायविंदुः the wellknown Bauddha work on logic is silent on this point, It is thus very conspicuously absent from the earlier works. Raghavc explains it as सम्यक्त्वं व्याप्तिपुर सरम्. The prominence of ifa: is already felt by 199: in the 12th century. Bhūsarvajna does not mention the word calfa: but he has the necessary form of th: in his उदाहरणम्. This may throw some light on the date of our author. He does not belong to that class of authors, who are very early in date, and who do not admit, recognise or even mention the sala:, and whose third member is a naked उदाहरणम् Nor does he belong to the later writers who recognise the importance of, and insert aztfa:, as a necessary member of a good syllogism, and make the mention of scieTTH as a part of affa:. As long as there is no aqila: the inference is necessarily from particular to particular; and in the Sutra wo do not see any attempt at generalization which becomes a prominent feature in the later yorks. The very words अन्वयः and व्यतिरेकः on which hangs the idea of fa: are not to be found either in the Sutras or in the Bhāskya. SGTETUTA is of two kinds being either by similarity or dissimilarity. We however see in this work that, although in this connection the author does not mention the word nie, he gives the form of the sentence which is adopted by subsequent writers as व्याप्तिः. P. 9. L. 12. gaalgiE PUTTHATHTH-The author as well as the cominentators think that by mention of CTEUTH tho EITETUHTAT: are excluded or discarded. Why such an interpretation should be put upon thic toxt I cannot understand. In this way we should also expect 99 THT: and HFNTT: tshich do not, and if it: be correct, cannot exist. This feature of GTECUTTET: is a novel one and docs not exist in the Sutras or in the Bhashya, and not cveu.in subsequont writor's, 5 - ·( 31 ) These are again of various kinds, only eight of which aro mentioned here in connection with ono syllogism which is मनः अनित्यम्. मूर्तत्वात्. Here यथा परमाणुः is the SGTETOTHTH:. The GGTETUTAIF: marks a state of transition in the developmont of logical science. The old process of reasoning appears to be from the particular premises to a particular conclusion. Later on comes the idea of generalization with 1: as the instru. ment. The same process is visible in the western system of logic. Even Aristotlo began with inforing a particular from a particular proposition. The idea of ora: which aims at gone. ralization is not to be seen in the Sutras nor even in the Bhashya. In their viow a TIH: would only mean concomitance which may bo of two particular objects only. To be clear, 77 72 aft: according to carlier writers would mean, Here there is smoko and with it fire' and FETTH: be the place where the concomi. tance is seon. According to later writers it is 45 22 CARTA DET afia: meaning wherever there is smoke there is fire: a general or universal proposition, HETTA: being one of such universal cases. Thus the idea of 3CTETUITHTA: signifies that by this time the idea of generalization was coming into prominence but was not so thoroughly complete and the writers were feeling the awkwardness of finding correct generalization, as they often met with false illustrations which did not suit the surfa:. But if the generalization is complete or correct the illustration must tally with it. In plain words, if the CIETUTE is incorrect, it can never tally with the wife:, as it is only one of tho in dual instances which go to form the general rule. P. 10. L. 1. Taking eft: as Err: we get this syllogism. प्र. मन:-अनित्यम् है. मूर्तत्वात् घटवत् This is an instance of अध्याप्त्यमिधानदोषः which is an उदाहरणाभासः. I do not see why this should be a दोषः. Rāghava says यन्मूर्त तदनित्य- मिति व्याप्तिमनभिधाय यद्धटवदिति दृष्टान्तामिधानं सोयं व्याप्त्यनमिधानं नाम साक्षा- दृष्टान्तवचनदोपः तत्र साधनविकलत्वादेरनुपजीव्यत्वात् । Jayasinha has been following न व्याप्तेरमिधानमव्याप्त्यभिधानं नाम दोषो भवति । यन्मूर्त तदनित्यं दृष्ट- मिति व्याप्तिमविरचय्यैव घटदृष्टान्तोपादानात् । This does not say that व्याप्तिः cannot be cxprossod, and if it can be expressed why should it ·( 35 ) be a दोषः only because it is not expressed. The next दोषः is also equally unintelligible. There Raghara says यदनित्यमिति । दृष्टमित्यत्र यथा घट इति पूरणीयम् । अन्यथा तेनैव दुष्टत्वं स्यात् । यद्यप्यत्राऽव्याप्त्यभिधानवत्व संपूर्णत्वान्न दोषः साध्यसाधनवत्तया दृष्टान्तस्याभिधानात्तथापि व्याप्तिमत्साधनतया दृष्टान्तस्यानभिधानादसंपूर्णमेवेति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ नहि यदनित्यं तन्मूर्तमित्यत्र मूर्तत्वं व्याप्त्याधारतया निर्धार्यत इत्यलं वाचालतया ॥ Now these two the fifth and the sixth faults are only वचनदोषौ .. e. committed by the speaker by slip of tongue or by haste in speaking, omitting one phrase which should have been spoken, or it may be by speaking it in an irregular way. The first six of these faults are by साधर्म्यम्. The remaining six are by व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः and therefore by वैधर्म्यम्. The other six उदाहरणाभासाः by वैधर्म्यम् can be easily understood after one has understood the previous six. Even in these latter six the last two are 997atat and cannot really be called faults. P. 10. L. 9. अन्ये तु-Some other writers suggest eight more उदाहरणा- HIFT:. Rāghava Bhatta says that 37 means fortafileri: and his followers. It may or may not be that this factan: lived before areas. But he did live before 1995. These eight SGIETOTHTAT: are by the instrumentality of doubt, which may be either in the साध्यम् साधनम् or in both: Let us take the first instance, प्रतिज्ञा-अयं महाराज्यं करिष्यति, हेतुः-सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वात्. व्याप्तिः and उदाहरणम्-यत्र सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वं तत्र महाराज्यकरणत्वं विव. क्षितराजपुरुषवत् ।। Here again we have a व्याप्तिदोषः. All the persons of सोमवंशः may not be महाराज्यकारकाः. Had the idea of व्याप्तिः been completely and correctly understood this fault should not have happened. There is no सामानाधिकरण्यम् in सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वम् and महाराज्यकरणत्वम्. This and the following seven i. e. in all eight उदाहरणाभासाः are based.on doubt existing (as to the concomitance) between the gèra: and the other members of the syllogism: namely the साध्य and the साधनम् both of them, firstly by 317974: or by way of साधर्म्यम् and then by way of वैधर्म्यम्. P. 11. L. 3. दृष्टान्ते &c. The उपनयः is the sentence expressing concomitance of the साधनम्, which is known to have concomitance in the illustration, with the 997: by way of a metaphor of the illustration. This is again of two kinds, being either.by साधर्म्यम् or the or ·( 36 ) or by pin. This in later works would be according as the व्याप्तिः is by अन्वयः or by व्यतिरेकः. Here again we see that the later and the very clear form of उपनयः 'तथाचायं चन्हिव्याप्यधूमवानयं,' has not come into existence. राघवभट्टः in his commentary does not discuss this definition at all; but he rather discusses the definition given in Gautamū's Sutra viz. JCIETOTINETETACITIERT AT तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः उपनयः. It is the expression of the minor term either by 37794: or cat: dependant on the illustration. It is the same definition as that of Art: put in a very concise form. P. 11. L. 7. 397riata &c. Now we come to the last member of the syllogism viz. FAAH which comes after 5974: and in the expressions of the the coupled with the :. Its form is तस्मादनित्य एवेति. Gattama defines iti as हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् ॥ १-१३-९. It is quite natural that the usefulness of this may be questioned and consequently the author says that it is not useless. The reason is that it suggests that there is authority for proving the absence of the contrary of the FETT. When we begin to argue, the first question which suggests to us is that there may bo proof for the contrary. When wo go through the process we come to the conclusion that there is the absence of the contrary. This latter step is not complete unless the fat is put in a clear expression. Rāghava says that the expression here भाव...(L. 8.) shows the कार्यम् of निगमनम् and नचतदंतरेण...(L. 9.) shows the sets of finnah. In adatot, no means the früh expressed in the previous sentence. It cannot be said that in making an inforonce another contrary or contradictory inference is not suggested; because such a suggestion is essential to the moving of the inference in band. This Sutra is so held even by Gautama whose 1-1.41 says that huig: ( conclusion ) is arrived at after considering the arguments for and against. P. 11. L. 12. AS Thalifa &c. It may be said that the expression of निगमनम् is not a part of साधनम् or हेतुः and is therefore unnecessary. If we admit this, we shall have to admit that there is a बाधकप्रमाणम् which gives rise to a निग्रहस्थानम्. The latter is defined as विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ १-२-१०. which in short means that when there is either contrary proof or no proof there ooours a HEEFTTH because then the : becomes the निगमनम् or the निगमनम् has the form of a बाधकप्रमाणम्.

·( 37 ) 1 P. 11. L. 13. निगमनार्थविप्रतिपत्ती-In case we dispute the निगमनम् that will be the proper place to state the atya HIITT as the contrary inference. In the same way if one doubts the èg: he lias to state the साधकप्रमाणम्. P, 11. L. 15. AT THE Etat... This is the best mode of arguing; because it convinces the person who has doubt, and also because it leads to a disputation. Mark the meaning of the word F14T peculiar to the science of logio. This is not mentioned in any of the known dictionaries. P. 11. L. 17. tert. Taking in (or receiving ) of the thesis of the disputant and adducing argument in answer thereof by the opponent is called it. This is again of two kinds ric. 14T and fantasty 41. P. 12. I. 1. The first patient is known as are discussion. This takes place between two persons who do not have any worldly expectation but only have a desire to find out the truth. Tor that purpose one person makes an assertion and the other objects or finds fault with it. The FETTIRT: defines वादः as comprehending the thesis and expressing it by a syllogism of five members not opposed to the truth but beset with reasons and objections based on inference and doubt. This may again be with no desire to prove the opposite view, as is in the case of a pupil and a teacher by way of question by the pupil and reply by the teacher to instruct the former. P. 12. L. 6. Ti fa frontgià froitgutt F &c. When a person having a desire to win meets another who has a similar desire or has the desire of some gain, TFT-worship or reverence or fame, that disputation is called for fority 14T. Rāgava says that it may be said that the Fit: did not mention atteet but it is not so. Our author says that he has mentioned it by the word ar:. Again this forming it may be held even by a farm: to convince others and to keep up the seed of knowledge. This is fourfold, being started either by a arci (debator) by a gaarai, disputant, or opened by the leader in a moeting or by a neutural or independent thinker or what we may call, a man with open mind. This विजिगीपुकथा may be either जल्पः or वितंडा. P. 12. L. 9.791 TIF. The author quotes Gautama's definition of : and faster as given in his Sutra 4-2-50 which by a metaphor explains the objects of जल्पः and वितण्डा. जल्पः 2nd वितण्डा are for ·( 38 ) the protection of the unchanging truth, just as a fence of thorns is for the proteotion of the budding seed. A 984: 18 mero talk which is of the same form as ara: (discussion) but then there is support and opposition by छलम् , जातिः and निग्रहस्थानम्. The same sort of discussion but with no intention of establishing the opposite view is a Tust ( fallacious controversy ). P. 12. L. 15. agafàarat &c. This brings us to the discussion of छलम् , जातिः and निग्रहस्थानम्. It is छलम्, when there is विधातः- destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning. It is of three kinds viz. PTFEDTSH, AMETEETH and उपचारच्छलम्. छलम् can be rendered by the word trick. It is a fallacy but it is better to render it by trick and thereby avoid confusion of meaning. The trick may be by expression or by implication, P. 12. L. 19. fata &c. A trick in an expresion occurs when there is attaching of a meaning different from one intended by the speaker, by the use of a word with two meanings. 7afiat माणवकः. This inay moan either that Mānavaka has a new blanket or that he has nine blankets. Here the fallacy (ASTERITA) is of the nature of want of comprehension. This result from the nonappreciation of the object of the speaker who wants to say that this man has a new blanket. The trick is the result of the speaker's not knowing the reply or his miscomprehension of his false knowledge. P. 13. L. 3. vaate--The common trick happens when there is an application of a wrong meaning on account of the very commonness of a possible meaning. Oh this is a Brahmin knowing four Vedas.' When some one said this, the Futyaret says, 'What wonder there is. It is possible that one who knows four Vedas is a Brahmin.' Then the disputant says, 'Not so; because then we commit the अनेकांतिक: fault and include a नात्यः (a Brahmin deprived of the freFit:). Here even there is fallacy as before P. 13. L. 10. gert att &c. To apply to a sentence the primary meaning when the speaker has used it in a secondary meaning is उपचारच्छलम्. When a person says Beds cry' the disputant ( 30carat ) says it is the men (on the beds ) who cry out and not the beds. They cannot do so as they are inanimate objects. Here even you must understand the fallacy as before; because this sort of expression is common to tho people and also to'shastras.

·(39) P: 13. L. 14. nyt tät do. Ibis is the definition of gra: taken from वात्सायनः who says प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसंगो जायते स जाति: which, literally translated, means, an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker. Bhāsarvajna improvos upon arera: and adds the words atout. Gautama's definition is shorter even than Vatsyayand' s but is clear. साधर्म्यवैधा- भ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः॥ गौतमः ॥ प्रयुक्त हि हेतौ यः प्रसंगो जायते स जातिः । स च प्रसंगः साधर्म्यवैधाभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानमुपालम्भः प्रतिषेध इति । वात्स्यायनः॥ प्रयुक्त हेतौ समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसंगो जातिः । भासर्वज्ञः॥ Bhäsarvajna's definition means to say that when one ground is put forth in an argument by a speaker and when thc disputant (Haaret ) tries to argue that his argument is similar to that of the first speaker, the case is of जातिः. P. 13. L. 14. पराजयनिमित्तम्-The cause of defoat is the निग्रहस्थानम्. Raghava says समीकरणाभिप्रायेणेत्यनेन जल्पवितण्डयोः सदुत्तराऽपरिस्फूर्ती साम्या- पादनाय जातिरपि प्रयोक्तव्येति प्रतिपादितं । एकान्तरपराजयाद्वरं संदेह इति न्यायात् ।। It in an argument a disputant cannot find a proper reply, he, instead of courting complete defeat, may give a partial one by जात्युत्तरः-by showing the futility of the opponents argument-by showing the similarity of his argument with the other's equally fallacious. This author does not give the proper definition of निग्रहस्थानम् which is defined by गौतमः as विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च | It is either misaprehension or non-apprehension. Now these Jatis and Nigrahasthanas are innumerble but the author mentions, as Jayasinha says, twenty four Jatis and twenty Nigrahasthanas. These are mentioned by Gautama as साधर्म्यवैधम्योत्कर्षाऽपकर्षवावर्ण्यवि- कल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसंगप्रतिदृष्टान्ताऽनुप्तत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोऽपपत्त्युपल- ब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमाः॥ गौ. सू. ५-१-१॥ The twenty two Nigrasthanas are enumerated as प्रतिज्ञाहानिःप्रति- शान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थमप्राप्त. कालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाः (गौ. सू. ५. २-१) The last two sections of the last chapter of Gautama's Sulras deal with the Jatis and Nigrahasthanas. P. 13. L. 17. gera greithIGTHER-When with the object of proving a proposition, we fix upon the similarity of things and have at the same time the apprehension of the contrary being proved, the Jati is FTPFH:. Similarly when with the object of proving a proposition we fix upon the dissimilarity of things and ·( 40 ) have nt tho same time the apprehension of the contrary being proved, the Jati is वैधर्म्यसमः. The instance cited by the author is as follows:-- The mover says : शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात् घटवत्. The disputant replies शब्दो नित्योऽमूर्तत्वादाकाशवत्. Both these syllogisms are dealt with by साध्यय॑म् or by अन्वयव्याप्तिः. In the same way we can have two syllogisms proving opposite conclusions by वैधर्म्यम् that is by व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः. Jayasinha says that this is not that:. cf. ari ghat ofta oqini- विकलत्वेनाऽतुल्यबलत्वादित्यर्थः । अमूर्तत्वस्य नित्यत्वेनाविनाभावाऽभावात् । P. 14. L. 3. TEZEgit: This is Sutra 5-1-1 of Gautama giving six more futile arguments (जातिः). They are उत्कर्षसमः, अपकर्षसमः, वर्ण्यसमः, अवर्ण्यसमः, विकल्पसमः and साध्यसमः and Gautama gives one definition for all of them. When there are several qhi: in the gere: and when we apply these different yi: to the auctit te get any one of these six false reasonings. Let us take them in order:-- When there is an occasion of an unintended : of the दृष्टान्तः being applied to the साध्यम्, there is उत्कर्षसमः. If शब्दः is अनित्यः because of कृतकत्वम् as in घटः there is also सावयवत्वम् in घटः which will शब्दः is Araya:. If it is not fraza: then it will not bo even अनित्यः because of the similarity. Again when an intended 3: disappears from the path by the above process it becomes a case of अपकर्षसमः. If शब्दः is अनित्यः because it is an effect liko zi, thon like : it would also bo nonaudiblo which is not truc; bccausc in thcsc two cases tho result gocs contrary to 72789771977. Similarly when कृतकत्वम् is the common ground thorc may bo cithor haar or art and in that casc, thicro may bo oithor नित्यत्वम् or अनित्यत्वग्. This is called विकल्पसमः जातिः. Again if both साध्या and दृष्टान्तः that is अनित्यत्वम् and घट: ard अनित्याः because thorc is कृतकत्वम् then both of them would become साध्यम् and thus it becomes साध्यसमः. Nor all these aro answerod by Sutra 5-1-5. When the thing to be provod is proved by taking some similarity, there is no disproving it by a dissimilarity. P. 15. L. 1. प्राप्य साध्यम्-Fither the हेतुः roaches tho साध्यम् or i. doos not. If it does l'cach, then thoro is distinction betweon हेतुः and साध्यम्. This tho caso of प्राप्तिसमः. If it dous provo that ·( 41 ) not reach then there is no relation like ETET and g: and there is no साधकम्. This is the case of अप्राप्तिसमजातिः. In the explanation, Bhūsarvajnya gives the illustration freella. Just as of two fingers, when brought together, neither of them can be said to be the supporter of the other, so the साध्यम् and #147 cannot be so said, by their mere joxtaposition, if they do not support or are not supported by one another. If they do not reach each other then like the fuel and the fire, there cannot be tura. Sutra 5-l-8 is a reply to this. In the case of qz:, when there is the fifa: of instruments the result : appears. Here the jextaposition of the gz: and the wet clay is clearly seen. But it requires HISAH (pressing ) which is not visible to the eyes (i. e, there is a fa: of it) yet the result is seen. The author says that without any distinction as to sa: and अप्राप्तिः, all these धर्माः of साध्यम् and साधनम् aro known to be constant and we cannot avoid them, because, if we do, all the modes of knowledge will be obstructed. P. 15. L. 10. HyCqÀ: FITUTTHIETT &c. Where there is no cause for a quality of an object before it is produced there is the fallacy of Thr: The illustration of this is the sound which is said to be non-eternal because it is an effect. The other side argues that before the very production of #: viro sound, there was no ground for non-eternity, and the sound therefore is eternal. If it is eternal the very idea of production cannot be maintained. The next sutra of Gautama is a reply to this. He says 77Taytara i.e. if the ga: is 37977: (a production) the produced T: should have a cause and therefore there cannot be an objection to In fact there is no sound which can be said to be not produced and we cannot therefore apply admit to any sound. P. 15. L. 16. काल्यासिद्धेः &c. It is अहेतुसमः when the हेतुः cannot be shown to exist at any time (past, present or future). The argument is thus explained. The question is whether the ta: exists before the neth or after it or at the same time with the साध्यम्. It cannot exist before, because if it does, there is no साध्यम् whose साधनम् it can be. it can be. If it co-exists with the Ezt one cannot say which is the साध्यम् and which the साधनम्. The third case is not mentioned by Bhásarvajna; but the HIGHITT: notes it thus. अथ पश्चादसति साधने कस्येदं साध्यम्. When there is not the साधनम् whose साध्यम् it be. A reply to all these is given by the Sutra 5-1-19. On: ATTACÀ PISTSfafe: Which 6 the cause. can ·(42) as means that there is no mattis because the very existenca of 7777 presupposes at:. By Sutra 5-1-20 Gautama gives another reason which coupled with one in 5.1.19 forms two answers of त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः. At this point it may be mentioned that three copies out of the four collated by me do not mention 3791991: Jayasinha does not mention it in his commentary. It may be that he followed a copy which dropped it. Rāghava mentions it; but he, while professing to comment on pragt: really discusses the sutras of Gautama. It cannot therefore he clear whether the copy he håd, did or did not mention BYTTA:. At the same time we cannot say that parast: purposely omitted it as he mentions all the other Har: and in the very order in which they are mentioned in the sutras. It may be that the copy, which Rāghava used, had this Jati mentioned therein but subsequently by mistake of the scribe the whole paragraplı was dropped. Yiyligh: is a Jati where the contrary of the FITETET is proved by अर्थापत्तिप्रमा- णम्. It is possible that as Gautama refused to recognise autofa: an independent # Bhasarvajna omitted this Jati based on that प्रमाणम्. P. 16. L. 5. ARCHITTOISHIFT &c. This pict: occurs when there is cognition of the result even when there is no cognition of the When proving pricati (effect) of heat (earth), even though the cause सावयवत्वम् is absent, the कार्यत्वम् is understood. The author says that this is not a a79. The cause may be apparent in a part of the g: and then the cause is there apparent for the effect. Here the author raises a question; "How is it then that the effect ( Freit) is understood." He answers ( 217 BITE ) by the Sutra 5-1-28 that this is no difficulty: The same result can be obtained by other causes also. This he explains by saying that the result is known by some other प्रमाणम्. Jayasinha illustrates it thus:-यथाऽगारावस्थायां धूमाभावेऽपि प्रमाणान्तरादान्हिसिद्धिः. The author of न्यायसार: puts in here a new inference and further says that there may be another source of the same inference even though there is no cause which should obstruct cognition of the effeot and the cause is not so easily discernible. P. 16. L. 12. 3799AA: The definition of this Jati is bodily taken from Gautama's sutra 5-1-29, and is construed thus by the 'भाष्यकारः. तोषामावरणादीनामनुपलब्धिनोपलभ्यते अनुपलम्भान्नास्तीति अभाव cause, ·( 13 ) - अस्याः सिद्धयति. अभावसिद्धौ हेत्वभावात् तद्विपरीतमस्तित्वमावरणादीनामवधार्यते &c. Bhāsarvajna's explanation differs from this. . By the first syllable no he means frighi. The meaning seems to be this. Then there is the effect which is not known and when because it is not known, it is held to be non-existent, and when although it is so held to be non-existent, it happens to be cognizable, the दोषः is अनुपलब्धिः. This fault is explained by अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात् &c. 5-1-30 ausfo: means that there is a knowledge of nonexistance. This very strofe: is cognizable, which fact makes the existance of 3546feq: improper. P. 17. L. 3. FARIEF: This Jati may be interpreted by the word riddle. It is explained thus:-Suppose the thing to be proved is "Sound is non-eternal ( fr )." The question arises whether non-eternity is present in sound for ever or for a short time only. It cannot be for a short time because in that case when non-eternity disappears sound will be shown to be eternal, which disproves the proposition. Suppose that this non-eternity is ever existent in sound i. e, this non-eternity is eternal in sound. The qualificr ( : ) being eternal the qualified (#1-77:) must also be eternal. This is a fallacy.-The objector makes the mistake of believing that a qualifier (#:) exists in the qualified (69) in such a way as to change the (f). This is not necessarily true. A quality may be of wider or longer existence than the object. In a red pot, the pot may come in existence at one time and disappear at the other. The redness is ever existent but is exhibited in the pot only during the existence of the pot. This completes the list of Jatis mentioned by Bhūsarvjna but Gautama mentions and so does Patsyāyana many more. Those not mentioned by Bhāsarojna are वर्ण्यः, अवर्यः, प्रसंगः, प्रतिदृ- प्टान्तः, संशयः, प्रकरणम् , अापत्तिः, अनित्यः and कार्यः. All these are fully discussed in chapter 5-1 of Patsyāyana and need not be gone into in detail here. Bhūsarujna does not omit any of the RATE FITTIÊ which are given by Gautama and they are mentioned in the same order. We have already explained the description of the fallacy known by this name. But now we give and discuss the defini. tion as given by Gautama which is agraiferenta diferent. It is either false apprehension or nonapprehension. Both Gautama and Bhūsarvajna gire twenty instances mentioned by so many difforcnt names.

·(14) . P. 18. L. 1. The definition given by Bhūsarvajna of glastreta: is. Freqt- प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मानुशाः Gautama says प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते which is as obsoure as the definition given by Bhāsarvjna. If अभ्यनुशा according to Vaidya's dictionary means admission in argument प्रतिदृष्टान्तः is a दृष्टान्तः which agrees with a contrary धर्मः as qualification. Thus when a statement is going to be proved by an illustration and an opponent puts in another illustration which has a qualification which disproves the original statament, and the proposer admits the new qualification (479: ) he commits this fallacy as he virtually gives up his original statement. This is the syllogistic form of the illustration given in the text, प्रतिज्ञा. शब्दोऽनित्यः हेतु:. कृतकत्वात्. उदाहरणं. घटवत्. उपनयः कृतकत्वव्याप्याऽनित्यत्ववानयं शब्दः. निगमनम् तस्माच्छब्दोऽनित्यः. प्रति-वादिना उच्यते ननु. शब्दो नित्यः. अमूर्तत्वात्. आकाशवत्. prietena 97. Here by this admission the original argument and therefore the conclusion falls to the ground. Bhāsarvajna has expressed this in a very general way without fixing the fault to any one particular membor of the syllogisna. Pātsyāyana is clearer in the illustration. ऐन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो घटवदिति कृतेऽपर आह । दृष्टमैन्द्रियकत्वं सामान्ये नित्ये कस्मान्न तथा शब्द इति प्रत्यवस्थिते तमिदमाह यधैन्द्रियकं सामान्यं नित्यं कामं घटो नित्योस्त्विति । स खल्वयं साधकस्य दृष्टान्तस्य नित्यत्वं प्रसज्जयन्निगमान्तमेव पक्षं जहाति पक्षं जहत्प्रतिशां जहातीत्युच्यते प्रतिज्ञाश्रयत्वात्पक्षस्येति. This shows that the fault exists in the th: of the terra: and not in the :. In this connection Rāghava mentions several kinds of प्रतिशाहानि: which are also mentioned by Udayanacharya. P. 18. L. 6. प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्. This is the second निग्रहस्थानम् defined both by Gautama and Bhāsarvajna by the same words. When & proposition is objected to by the opponent, on the strength of a different दृष्टान्तः or on the ground of absence of दृष्टान्तः the proposer by referring to a qualification apparent in tho 987: commits this fault. When one party makes an assertion e. g. सर्पमनित्यम्', he makes it so very broad that he has no illustration ·( 45 ) साध्यम्. to give and has to take another instance which may have an illustration either suitable or not. But the point is that the 984: is too general not to be covered by the The objector therefore instantly objects and the proposer immediately changes ground by making the same 78: qualified by an adjective as in the instance given in the text. In this way he changes the original Sant where the text: was an unqualified all. This kind of trick is very common among debators. Rūghaga thinks that this is the same as itu. Jayasinha however tries to show that this is not the same as far ataTA: which we have already discussed. P. 18. L. 11. प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोः &c. The third निग्रहस्थानम् is प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः where the ht: (the middle term) is inconsistent with the प्रतिज्ञा. P. 18. L. 13. sfare-ATA: is that a BOEFTRİ in which an assertion is made by the proposer, which is obviously false and when the opponent points it out, the proposer withdraws his argument saying that he never made that assertion. When a man says that sfa: (fire) is glor: (not varm) the opponent says that it is contrary to experience (FETE) whereupon the former says, that he never made the assertion and thus withdravs. Jayasinha says that in fase: the glass is abandoned by admitting a uf mentioned by the opponent. In ASTERIIA: the proposer gives up the argument altogether when the other objects to it. P. 18. L. 17. arfasteit. Wheu an unqualified grouud given by the proposer is objected to and he takes up another qualified ground (हेतुः) the निग्रहस्थानम् is called हेत्वन्तरम्. P. 19. L. 4. अर्थान्तरम्. This is tv निग्रहस्थानम् where the person while arguing one thing enters into the discussion of a subject which has nothing whatever to do with the subjects under discussion. When the proposer arguing that नित्यः शब्दोऽस्पर्शत्वात् इति हेतोः enters into a long discussion as to the grammatical formation of the word हेतुः the fallacy is अर्थान्तरम् . P. 19. L. 6. निरर्थकम् is a mere childish way of arguing P. 19. L. 10. अविज्ञातार्थः is a निग्रहस्थानम् where, the meaning of the argument of the proposer is so obscure, that even though he · repeats it three times neither the opponent nor the assembly, ·10 ) . understand him. It may be, that there is nothing in the argument and to conceal tho ignorance of the proposer, it is put in a very obscure language. P: 19. L. 14. 37Teff occurs where mere substantives are used without a predicato. P. 19. L. 16. 379 is a name given to an argument where the different members of syllogism are used in improper order. Why should this be a fault? It is an irregularity which may provo only a temporary obstacle in rightly understanding the conclusion. P. 19. L. 18. occurs when any one of the members of the syllogism is absent from the argument. When converse is the process, that is when more than necessary members are interposed, there occurs a fault called 37f77. P. 20. L. 3. gai. This fallacy ocours when tho words in au argument are unnecessarily repeated. But it is no fault if it is Bratą: which is described by Bhīsarvajna as prati gati 4TH i. c. repeating with some purpose. This is a very common explanation. Gautama's explanation of अनुवादः is विधिविहितस्यानुवचन- Hilar: (2-8-84). It means repetition of words or of sense but of course with an object. Thus repetition without its being 379912: is a fault. The same is the fault when one and the same sense, is repeated although with different words. The reason why this is fault is that it brings no end to the discussion and also that when one ground is sufficient the other becomes redundant. P. 20. L. 9, अनुभाषणम् The word means 'no following in speech, When the proposer has thrice spoken out his subjeot and the opponent does not take up the argument it is a fault of thie opponent. Distinct from this is the next fault अज्ञानम् where the opponent, though told thrice does not understand the thing and therefore does not argue. P. 20. L. 15. Hafar. Dullness or want of ready wit. This may be the cause of the two preceding viz. अननुभाषणम् and 375TFT This fault is possible to both of the parties. Of, Gautama's definition: उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा. (५.२-२८.) P. 20. L. 17. It is arid: when the discussion is dropped on account of some other engagement. One cannot say that this is a fault ·( 47 ) censure. unless it is purposely orented by one of tho partics to avoid tho discussion, P. 20. L. 20. 198719T:~When a person while attributing a fuult to the other side admits luis own, the fault in the argument is called मतानुज्ञा. When a person says to another you are a thief' and the other in reply says that 'you are also a thief' virtually the first speaker, admits that he himself is a thief although the other may also be one, P. 21. L. 3. निग्रहं प्राप्तस्य &c. पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् means abandoning on When one is censured for his argument he is made to abandon his position. The abandoning is pressed by the assembly who discriminate between the two. The reading Bayar Raat ineans, by the assembly who is questioned or appealed to. Mūtsyāyana says that the party himself, one or the other, vould not admit his fault. It is therefore the assembly who has to decide. Rāghava seems to have for his reading water as he explains it by अनुक्तया परिषदा. P, 21. L. 6. 3AETH &. When there is no ground for myk: and yet a party attaches निग्रहः to the other it is निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः. P. 21. L. 9. feratūT &c. When, once a discussion is started on a basis to give up that basis and wander about without any rule, it results in the fault of 2017: When a fiam: who does not admit the existenoe of est: argues that area:-fire sacrifice is the means of attaining heaven and the opponent objects on the ground that a sacrifice which only burns things cannot give heaven, the High: turns round and says that the sacrifice pleases fat: who gives heaven. By this argument the Higins: commits this fault. The sacrifice, which only burng, cannot be the cause of heaven. The first replies that by the sacrifice the god is pleased and gives the fruit as does the king, Now this is contrary to the principle of the Hit:. The author says that this is different from gaaf: where the प्रतिज्ञा is changed. P. 21. Is. 15. Thus he says all the ankar: are WESTFIR and he further says that even undesirable words used by way of arguments are also निग्रहस्थानानि. + ·( 48 ) root गम् P. 22. L. 1. 9afqaz The third Pramāņa discussed by Bhūsarvjna, is Writers differ in giving a name to this 917, some BTTTTH: calling it goa: and the others 247TH:. cf: 347ayat: 37: (11. 7. 8-2-6) and Vätsyāyana's Bhāshya on the same tiparazita: (..) विज्ञाताच्छब्दात्पदार्थाभिधानद्वारेण यद्वाक्यार्थविज्ञानम् तच्छाब्दं नाम प्रमाणम्. ( शा. afar P. 276. Benares Ed. ) These writers, it seems, consider the words 7: and 27: as inter-changeable. Later writers of Purānas have used the word 671978: in a very technical sense meaning the Vedas. Comparing the definitions of 5: by Gautama on the one hand, and of 3577: by Dhāsarvajna on the other, we find that the two words as used by these two authors bear different meanings. Firstly na: as used by the writers of Puranās would be the same thing as taan or tradition which is one of the Pramānas mentioned but at the same time discarded by Gautama. The literal meaning of the word 357#: would be the same. Tho word is derived from the with 3 meaning to come. The Vedas which are taken ils having no human source, may very aptly be called 35TH:. Gautama, decidedly, disregards any such knowledge. The word 31177#: perhaps did not acquire this meaning in his time which it did in the time of Bhūsarvjna. Even if the word did acquire the meaning in which it is used by the Purānas in the time of Gautama the later authors on Fry: may have rejected this word on that very account. Bhāsarnjna's definition is "समयबलेन सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनमागमः. This definition is quite independent of Gautama who defines Tog is 31T19.7: 379: covering a narrower space of knowledge than what is done by the former definition. Bhäsārvjna's definition includes also aifahrt called #er. It goes further and includes statements uttered by any person whose veracity the hearer has no reason to doubt. These are things of very common occurence in every day life, very common to be met with in our courts of law. A very disreputable man may go in a witness-box and make a statement which a judge may believe, if he thinks that lie sees no reason why that witness should not have told the truth. 369 necessary for the definition of 370: is absent in this case and yet there is the true knowledge created by a statement, or a Taar. Of the six orthodox schools of philosophy of philosophy five recognise they Taisheshikas and the un-orthodox philosophers such as ·( 49 ) :: "the Bauddhas and the Chārvākas do not give any importance whatsoever to the pramana. Of the orthodox schools, the two Mimūnsa schools give prominence to the Vedās, which are the only Agamas according to later Paurūnic writers. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaisheskikas who more than others deal strictly with reason, treat of Tag: logically and without any partiality towards the speaker of the word except as to its reliabiliy. According to Bhasarujna 3mATATE is the instrument of right mediate knowledge acquired by convention. That a particular word sliould be used in a particular sense is a point to be decided not by logic but by rhetorios. But once a sense is attributed to the word, logic comes in to examine the truthfulness or otherwise of what is expressed by that word. This instrument of knowledge is classified into द्रष्टार्थागमः and अद्रष्टार्थागमः. P. 22. L. 3. 1 triar: -The authoritativeness of sentences whose meaning is open to the senses is clear by the action one takes on hearing the sentence. For such a knowledge one does not require to be told by any qualified person. Suppose a child is asked by the parent to take up a toy lying on the table. There is that conventional knowledge in the child acquired by long usage that the word toy means an object of a particular form and of a particular use. The word toy, coming out from the mouth of the parent with the instruction accompanying it, makes the child active to put in operation the knowledge he has acquired by the words of his parent. He has understood the word toy and has understood the word bring in the sense given to it by convention. The child's movement gives an indication that he has acquired the correct knowledge. The aiTA: here was gett: as the object intended to be known was quite clear. But there are objects which are not so very clear. A man had gone over a long travel and returned. He narrates his experiences, describes things which are quite foreign and unknown in his country and which he has seen in a distant land, The persons, to whom this information is imparted, cannot personally see these things to make sure of the correctness of their knowledge. They have to depend on what the gentleman, ylio has gone to those countries, says. Here comes in the necessity आप्तत्वम्. The man must be one who is reputed to be telling the truth. Gautama deals with this class of knowledge only, and his definition of To: is, therefore, narrower than given by of 7 ·( 50 ) Bhāsarvajna. Our author cites the instances of authoritative sentences from ancient works, whose authority in things not within reach of our senses is to be upheld on account of the BITA- त्वम् of those ancient writings. P. 22. L. 7. marcha. The proper construction of this sentence should be वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यम् नित्यत्वेन न भवति तेषां नित्यत्वे प्रमाणाऽभावात्. It should not be said that a sentence is authoritative because it is eternal. There is no proof to show the eternity of a sentence, This is that old stereotyped instance of the middle age logicians of India who held disputations to prove that a word was noneternal. We may with no disadvantage omit discussing the ilsefulness of such a disputation in understanding the simple rules of logic. The student, who is interested in this subject may be referred to Vitsyāyana's commentary on Gautama's Sutra's Adhaya II Anhik II Sutras 13–33. P. 22. L. 10. वायुसंयोगविभागाविति. शब्दः, the objector says, is only conjunction and disjunction of air. This, the other man replios, is not true; because all the words are understood by a man simultaneously and instantly they are uttered. Just as the eye, being an instrument of knowledge is accustomed to acquire the knowledge of the whole thing coming within its vision, so does the ear acquire the kuowledge of the whole collection of words. P. 22. L. 13. For at. Can it not be said, says the objector, that the words, 75T:, can become the object of being taken in by the ear in the same way as the other objects are taken by other organs of sense. Different sounds strike the ear individually and not collectively, just as in the case of 4:, different parts are put in one after another individually. The other man replies that the analogy is not correct. The case of qz: is a question of parti: (producer). In the case of 37:, it is the question of stai: (exhibiter) just as it is in a lamp. शब्द:. It P. 23. L. 1. Tahafar stoera TATOTT. Bhūsarvajna maintains that there are only three Pranānas. Gautama maintained four Pramānas viz. प्रत्यक्षम्, अनुमानम्, उपमानम् , and seems, however, that there are other Pramānās which, though not recognised, are mentioned by Gautama in Sūtra 2-2-1. They are according to him ऐतिह्यम्, अर्था पत्तिः, संभवः and अभावः Bhāsarvajana also mentions tihese four with Sarah as Pramâņas which according to hinı need not be mentioned separately, 57 according to some is ·( 51 ) another form of #19 and the slightest consideration of different members will show that it is so. But Bhāsarvajna says that it can be included in शब्दप्रमाणम् which can be expressed in the form 'it is 794: just like 11:. P. 23. L. 2. 79 TortTag. From here down to line 3 on page 24 we have an interesting discussion as to the HTHIUT which having been objected to has to be accounted for by Bhāsarvajna, as in no way different from one of the three Pramānas already discussed by him. Several authors before and after him have suggested that B471977 is in no way different from WATTH. In this passsge Phāsarvajna tries to refute the theory, and to explain that J4H16TH is included in TCHATH. As already explained the reader will again see that Bhāsar. vajna is indifferent in using the words 37: and 2:. Readers of Tark-kaumudi will remember the distinction drawn by Laugakshi Bhaskcera between प्रमाणम् and स्मृतिः, स्मृतिः is the result of impressions left by the knowledge acquired in the past. # is the result of the present operations to acquire that knowledge. Bhāsarvajna thinks that when a man says that this is a 74: because a 74: is similar to sit:, the knowledge is not the result of any present operation but only of the impressions left on the mind by knowledge acquired in the past by the similarity of गौ and गवयः. Bhāsarvajna further says that the present knowledge अस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञा is the result of आप्तोपदेशः. He would therefore include उपमानम् in शब्दः. The result, according to him, is arrived at by putting two words together which are in the capacity of the qualifier and the qualified. He further goes on discussing that it cannot be included even in the प्रत्यक्षम्, because there is not that immediate recoption of the knowledge of the object which is essential in प्रत्यक्षम्. In उपमानम् we have to depend on something more for that knowledge which, according to him, is the statement of a reliable man, which becomes the last step in the operation. P. 24. L. 4. faste fa. l'rom here down to P. 25 L. 4 ve find an instance of the old-type discussion explaining how our author does not differ from Gautama, although he holds that there are three pramūnās only and not four as Gautamu says in his Sutras. P. 25 L. 4. अर्थापत्तेरप्यनुमानेः-This is a discussion of the अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणन्. The author says that this is included in the #17. The ·( 52 ) अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणम् is the result of Bajura: (concomitauce). If there is no concomitance, the essential step in BCH197, tbere would not be the form of reasoning which we call 3y1qf:. The mode of arguing is by coming to an inevitable conclusion, Vatsyāyana's instance is असत्सु मेवेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति सत्सु भवतीत्येतदादा- ged. This instance is not a very happy one, because as Vätsyāyana himself explains that are weat Taw-sometimes even when there are clouds there is no rain. Patsyāyana, following Gautama, explains that 37infeti is not a 77101 at all. Gautama says that अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात् । २-१-३॥ Later writers do take note of apyjafir: but they say that it is another form of 2017TA1077. This autualue is introduced in the science of reasoning by the Alimūnsakas and the later writers of the Naiyāyika and Vaisheshika schools have tried to explain it away by taking it as another form of अनुमानम्. The typical instance of these writers is पीनो देवदत्तः दिवा न भुंक्तेऽर्थात् रात्रौ भुक्ते। This would not be an BTH197 acoording to the Mimūnskas but the Naiyayikas explain it by putting it in syllogistic form as देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुंक्ते, दिवाऽभुंजानत्वे सति पीनत्वात्. Our author goes further and says that this is another name of केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानम् and nothing more. P. 25. L. 15. संभवः is an additional प्रमाणम् mentioned but rojected by Gautama. This is explained by the phrase'' whole includes the part. This is also another form of Art and not an independent प्रमाणम्. P. 25. L. 15. 312: is another 781074 mentioned by our author, which also, he says is not a separate 410but one which can be included in any of the three Pramūnas according to the three circumstances under which it is used. P. 26. L. S. TRATĘ is the next pamāna about which I have already spoken in the beginning of this chapter. It is heresay evidence. P. 26 L. 10 ggr is another pramāna not recognised by the Naiyū. yikas who mention it as a kind of action which forms a function of शरीरम्. चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् । १-१-११ ॥ The Tantrikas consider this as a separate pramāņa but, as our author says, it is only a form of expression substituting a kind of action for words. It is in no way different from 37777H:.

·( 53 ) a P. 26. L. 14. The result of the discussion of several modes of reasouing brings us now to the object which is to be proved or established. This object ( IT) is defined as the knowledgo of a subject which by way of being useful for further knowledge becomes the source of the highest good. This should be known and always to be thought upon. P. 27. L. 'T. The प्रमेयम् is of four kinds, known as हेयम् , तस्य निर्वर्तकम् , EITT and 3914:. In these Prameyas TT is the principal subject to be known and the remaining three are appertaining to that principal one. हेयम् is explained as हीयतेऽवश्यपरित्यज्य इति हेयम् , thing which is necessarily to be abandoned. Here again Bhāsarvajna strikes out a new line of division of the Pramcyas. Gautama mentions twelve Prameyas which are enumerated as आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् १-९॥Bhāsar'- vajna says that there are twenty-five Prameyas in all which can be grouped into four broad classes as mentioned. The first of thom is szeramat, which is further stated to be of twenty one kinds. Jayasinha says that a Heya is future misery to bo avoided; because it is useless to consider of past sufferings and as to the present, they have to be suffered because they are the result of past deeds which cannot be aroided. The twenty one future miseries to be avoided are (1) the body (2-7) the six Indriyas (8-13) the six objects of senses (14-18) the six conconsciousnesses of the objects (19), pleasure and (20-21) the two pains of restraint and torture. The body is said to be one of the miseries to be avoided, because it is the home of niseries. If there had been no body the miseries enumerated would have had no place to manifest themselves. Our author does not enumerate the sis Indriyas but, if wo follow Gautama they are only five घ्राणरसनचक्षुरत्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः १-१-१२ ॥ Vaisheshilsas however enumerate (मनः) mind with the Indriyas and the later Naiyāyika writers like Laugakshi Bhaskara and Vishvanāth Panchānana have adopted that view. Jayasinha also follows that view and enumerates the six Indriyas in the same order as these writers. Corresponding to these six senses there are the six objects of senses vis, smell, tasto, colour, touch, sound and thought. The final l'eception of these, consciousness of them, are the six Buddhis montioned by our author. Pleasure is mentioned as one of the ·( 54 ) miseries because it is the source of future pain. Besides tbese miseries there is the further misery of actual pain of torture and restraint. P. 27. L. 8. ner fra The next point considered is the cause of these miseries which are mentioned to be seen and 2007 on the one hand and #: and 39: on the other. It is curious that #: by which is meant here the observance of religious duties, should be mentioned as one of the causes of misery. Jayasinha feels the impropriety and explains यद्यपि धर्मः सुखस्य हेतुस्तथापि सुखस्य दुःखाऽविनाभावित्वादुःखहेतुरेवोक्तः ॥ The definition of अविद्या given is the ordinary one we find in Vedāntic works. The word is purely Vedāntic and is very common in the Upanishads. cu means & desire for rebirth with impressions of previous life. This word got its prominence in Buddhistic literature. These two and the religious performances and irreligious conduct result in the lucyas or things to be abandoned, that is the muiseries. The word waadaan means according to Jayasinha 74977-producer or cause. P. 27. 1. 11. When we know the two sets or things viz. the wiseries and the causes thereof, the third thing to know is the complete destruction of them. The word craw used here is peouliar one not to be found in dictionaries. One can understand tbat though this is mentioned here as one of the Prameyas it is the highest aim of all philosophy. P. 27. L. 12. The last Prameya is tbe remedy for the end of all misery. This is the knowledge of Atma (self). Hero the author cites passages from the Upanishads which say that the self should be seen, heard about, thought of' and contemplated upon. P. 27. L. 16.7 g fara:--This self, so to be known, is again of two kinds or rather manifests himself in two forms known as the para and the apara. The para self is that manifestation of Him which though not affected by any quality of this world is all-knowing and the creator of the universe. This para self is to be known by Anumīna and by Āgama. P. 28. L. 7. Thisaraitaat: -The Apura self is endless and the one who enjoys this world. This is to be known by Anumiru as being the support of the work of intellect. The author further goes on explaining the effects of intellect, low these are to be understood as being supported by this apara self.

·- ( 55 ) ...... P. 28. L. 19. afere.-The author ultimately comes to the conclusion that this Apara self is separate from the physioal body, all pervading and eternal. In the next two paragraphs the author explains how that self is all pervading and eternal. P. 29. I. 9. तदेवमपरात्मज्ञानं. .ft:97#-The knowledge of the Apara self is a step toward the highest good. That knowledge is useful for the attainment of groten: and it leads to the destruction of sin ( 79: ). P. 29. L. 11. OTHTHTTÄ 7. Tho knowledge of para self is the cause of the highest good, led to it by 39149T which is further described as the practice for the destruction of misery and tho attainment of complete concentration, From P. 29 L. 14. The author explains 39149T and its different forms and the various practices whicb go'to form it. Here he enters in the details which are foreign to this subject but which shows an insight of the author in the Yogashāstra. At p. 30 L. 17 be cites a Shruti which explains that by the knowledge of llin one avoids death, there is no other way to attain that state. Our author, therefore says that by the knowledge of Shiva ( which name he attributes to para self ) a person attains the highest good ( absolution-#14: ). P. 31. L. 1.4: TARI #127:-The natural question arises as to the meaning of AT:. What is this hær? The author discusses one definition which attributes to Hu: that state of things where there is nothing but the self standing by itself like Akasha at the time of final destruction of all general and particular qualities. This is objected to by some philosophers on the ground that that state of things is like a swoon which a philosopher should not desire for. One feature of this Ate: is that there should be happiness because so say the Upanishads. Even Brahma, the highest being is explained as apris aut 747. Thus two things are the necessary for H19. They are the absence of misery and the presence of happiness. The author after descussion comes to the conclusion that: P. 32. L. 5. तसिद्धमेतन्नित्यसंवेद्यमानेन सुखेन विशिष्टाऽऽत्यंतिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः 969er HTAY:. The hta: (highest good-absolution) of a person is that ever conscious happiness which is accompanied by csmplete absence of pain.

·No text on this page.

·INDEX. The figures in Nâgari refer to pages of the text. The other figures refer to pages of the notes. "Oraok उपनयः ११:33 उपमानम् ३३; 51, उपलब्धिः १;1; उपायः २७, उपासनाविधिः २९: ऊहः २७ अनध्धावसायः १७ अनध्यवासितः ६; 25: अनध्यवसितभेदाः ८:30. अनवधारणम्: 1: अनुपलब्धिः १: अनुमानम् ; ४: अनेकधर्मा संशयः १; अनैकान्तिकः ६; 24; अनैकान्तिकभेदाः ७; 29; अन्वयः ४, अन्वयव्यतिरेकीरेतुः ४, 17; । अपवर्गसाधनम्. १९; अबाधितविषयत्वम्. ४: 193 अभावप्रमाणम् २५; 52. अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् २ अर्थापत्तिः २५; 51 अवयवाः ( अनुमाने ) ४; अविनाभावः ४; 10; 11; असत्प्रपतिक्षत्वम् ५; 19; , असिद्धः ६, 23 असिद्धभेदाः ६; 26-27-28; ऐतिचं प्रमाणम् २६; 52, कथा ९१; 37, कालात्ययापदिष्टः ६; 25%8B कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदाः ८; 31; केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः ५; 21; केवलान्वयी हेतुः ५; 21; चेष्टा २६; 48; 52; छलम् १२; 38; छलभेदाः १२; 38; जल्पः १२; 37; जातिः १३; 39, 40, 41; जातिभेदाः १५, १६, १७, दृष्टं साधनम् ४; आगमः २२; 188 आगमभेदाः २२; 49 आत्मा ( परः-अपरः) २७, २८, 54, आर्षम् 9; निगमनम् ११; 36; निग्रहस्थानानि १७-२१; 40-47. निर्णयः ११ निर्विकल्पं प्रत्यक्षम्. ३ उदाहरणम् ९: 32 उदाहरणामासाः ९: 33: पक्षः ४, 17;

·II INDEX. विप्रतिपत्तिः १;1; विरुद्धः ६; 24; विरुद्धभेदाः ७; 24; विशेषः 7; न्यतिरेकः ४, 1; पक्षधर्मत्वम् ४ परिमाणादिः 73 परार्थसाधनम्. ४;.14; परोपदेशः ४: पंचावयवं वाक्यम् ४: 14. प्रकरणसमः ६-९; 25-323; प्रतिज्ञा ४; 15%; प्रत्यक्षम् ३; 3; प्रमा ३, प्रमाता २; 3; प्रमाणम् १-५, 1950 प्रमेयम् २; 52. 1 शम्भुम्. सपक्षः ४: 18: सपक्षे सत्वम् ४; समानधर्मा संशयः १;1; सम्यक् १७ सम्यगनुभवः १; 1; सविकल्पं प्रत्यक्षम् ३, सामान्यतो दृष्टं लिंगम् ४: संभवः २५; 52. संशयः १ स्वार्थ साधनम्. ४: 14. मोक्षः ३१, 32, 55, योगिप्रत्यक्षम् ३: 8; लिंगम्. ४: 12. वादः १२; वाह्यालीप्रदेशः २; वितण्डा १२; 37; विपक्षः ४; 18; विपक्षाध्यावृतिः ४, हानम्. २७, 54; हेतुः ४: 17; हेत्वाभासा ५; 22: हेयम् २७; 58 हेयस्य निर्वर्तकम् २७; 54 विपर्ययः २