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·International
Cooperation
in Space
by
Arnold W Frutkin
STERLING PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LTD
3640 Mori Gate
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JULLUNDUR

·INTFRNATIOVAI COOPFRATION IN SPACE
Original English language edition published by
Prentice Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey, USA
Copyright © 1965 by Prentice Ifall inc
STERLING PUBLISHERS (7) Ltd
Jullundur
695 Model Town
Delhi 6
36-40 Mori Gate
FIRST INDIAN REPRINT EDITION AUGUST 1967
Price Rs 3.50
PRINTED IN INDIA
PUBLISHED BY SH SK GHAI MANAGING DIRECTOR
STERLING PUBLISHERS (P) Ltd AND PRINTED AT
NEW ERA OFFSET PRINTERS DELHI 6

·PREFACE Presidents editors scientists, and legislators have repeatedly ez pressed the view that the exploration of man s newest frontier spaco, should be carried out by the nations and in particular by the Unted States and the Soviet Union jointly and in cooperation Cooperation is easily established as an objective but is far more difficult to implement If it is to achieve meaning in the affairs of men at must progress beyond lip service slogans and token exchanges It must go forward substantively and realistically within the existing rather than always a future political framework, and with due regard for modes and channels for first and intermediate steps and for ultimate objectives An elementary but sometimes neglected prerequisite for construc live contributions to cooperation in space whether at editorial polit ical or technical levels us some knowledge and understanding of the history and present status of the subject its failures and successes the institutions involved and the technical and political constraints which apply This small book 19 hopefully an early primer on the subject The very real achievement it suggests is the product of the work and devotion of many people in this country primarily in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of State Chief among the first group have been Dr Hugh L Dryden whose distingui hed personal role will be evident in what follows Ds Homer E Menell Dr John W Town end Mr Robert Krieger Dr Robert

·INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE
Original English laoguage edition published by
Prentice Hall, lac, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey, USA
Copyright © 1965 by Prentice Hall Inc
STERLING PUBLISHERS (P) Ltd
Jullundur
695, Model Town
Delhi 6
3640 Mori Gate
FIRST INDIAN REPRINT EDITION AUGUST 1967
Price: Rs 350
PRINTED IN INDIA
PUBLISHED BY SH SK GHAI MANAGING DIRECTOR
STERLING PUBLISHERS (P) Ltd AND PRINTED AT
NEW ERA OFFSET PRINTERS DELHI-6

·PREFACE Presidents editore scientists, and legislators have repeatedly ex pressed the view that the exploration of mans newest frontier space, should be carried out by the nations and in particular by the United States and the Soviet Union jointly and in cooperation Cooperation 13 easily established as an objective but as far more dificult to implement If it is to achieve meaning in the affairs of men it must progress beyond lip service slogans and token exchanges It must go forward substantively and realistically within the existing rather than always a future political framework and with due regard for modes and channels for first and intermediate steps and for ultimate objectives An elementary but sometimes neglected prerequisite for construc fre contributions to cooperation in space whether at editorial polit cal or technical levels is some knowledge and understanding of the history and present tatus of the subject--ts failures and successes the in titutions involved and the technical and political constraints which apply This small book is hopefully an early primer on the subject The very real achievement it suggests is the product of the work and devolion of many people in this country primarily in the National Aeronautics and Space Adminitration the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of State Chief among the first group have been Dr Hugh L Dryden whore di tinguished personal role will be evident in what follows Dr Homer E Newell Dr John W Town end Mr Robert Krieger Dr Robert ·Fellows and many others at NASA headquarters at the Goddard Space Flight Center, at the allops Island Station and elsewhere In the Department of State wree and ready support of cooperative Space objectives has been the consistent contribution of Mr Philip Farley Mr Robert F Packard and Mr Peter Thacher Mr Leonard Mecker has provided sound and ensible leadership in the definition and consideration of legal aspects of international space activity Dr Richard W Porter and Dr Hugh Odishaw, of the National Academy of Sciences Space Science Board have made fundamental and continuing contributions to the personal and institutional founda tions for cooperation in space matters The observations made and conclusions reached in the pages to follow are entirely the personal responsibility of the author and do not carry any official endorsement or approval

·CONTENTS
PREFACE
311
1
1 BACKCROUND
Ambitalence 1
Internationality of Science 10
The ICY Precedent 17
2 THE US PROCRAM 28
A Philosophy for Cooperation 28
First Steps 36
Cooperative Projects 41
Tangible Benefits 74
3 COOPERATION WITHI TIIE SOVIET UNIOV 85
Antecedents 85
NASA Eforts 89
The Dryden blagonrazov Agreements 92
The Lovell Correspondence 105
Together the loon 111
Conclusion 119
4 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 132
The European Regional Organi alions 132
The United Nations 111
Other Agencies 155
Conclusion 167
5 REPRISE
172
I\DEX
179

·EPIGRAPH
This uorld of our understanding of nature and
the pouer that it gives us taries not only urth time
but also among induiduals and institutions Tha!
one can do is beyond the grasp of another let
whatever ephemeral and elusite qualities thus uorld
of science and technology may appear to have it is
exceedingly pouerful though extremely obdurale
The possibiluies of great things are athin our
grasp and men and institutions exist by means of
htch these great things can be accomplished
J R Pierce Satellite Science and Technology
Science (July 19 1963) p 244

·1 BACKGROUND AMBIVALENCE Two months before lus death President John F Kennedy stood be fore a microphone in the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York and proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States together new po sibilities for cooperation in the investigation of outer space even to the point of joining forces in the major task of sending men to the moon and back The President said Finally in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity--the field of space--there is room for new cooperation for further joint efforts in the regulation and ex ploration of space I include among these possibilities a joint ex pedition to the moon Space offers no problem of sovereignty by resolution of thuis Assembly the members of the United Nations have foresworn any claims to territorial rights in outer space or on celestial bodies and declared that international law and the UN charter will apply Why should the United States and the Soviet Union in preparing for such expeditions become inyoha in immense duplications of research construction and exprndt ture? Surely we should explore whether the scienti ts and a to nauts of our two countries indeed of all the world-cannot wak together in the conquest of space sending some day in the decade to the moon not the representatives of a single nation - representatives of all humanity 1 The President s speech met with a thoroughly mixed 12.49 a reaction which should be highly instructive to those integet and inte ways and means of cooperation The United Nationę 21 ysime forum of international cooperation gave the Pin Date * da warm reception as might be expected The pretezroyed that proposal to explore cooperation in a lunar rioyexy et see ·2 BACKGROUND thusiastic reaction among the representatives of UN member states ? On the domestic scene, too there was considerable approbation A number of newspaper editorials praised the President s overture in one case calling it an eminently sensible suggestion in another saying whether or not there is ever any joint journey to the moon or elsewhere in space there is every reason wlly we should try now to find something that gives us more security than today's constant risk of eternal destruction - The Neu York Herald Tribune es pressed the opinion that if agreement could be reached on coopera tion in this field it would represent not only an important savings but a possible move toward international control of m sules 5 (The writer reflected the opinion that cooperation in the peaceful use of rocket power might in some way lead to the development of con straints upon its military uses ) But a contrary view was if anything even more in evidence The New York Times said that the proposal represented a shift in the strong emphasis President Kennedy has been placing since 1961 on the race to the moon and on the importance that the United States not be second in that race • Other newspapers also thought they saw such a contradiction in objectives The Wall Street Journal suggested that the Presidents emphasis on cooperation not competition in the effort to land men on the moon is likely to undercut one of the major selling points used by other Administration leaders particu larly in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to justify the priority placed on the United States own space program A similar division of sentiment became quickly apparent in the Congress Representative Pelly (Rep Wash ) introduced an amend ment to the federal space agency s appropriation bill still before the Congress at the time to prohibit the expenditure of any of its funds in the joint manned lunar program with the Soviet Union (The amendment was later modified to require only prior approval by the Congress of such an expenditure) On the other hand Senator Ful bright (Dem Ark ) drafted a joint resolution aimed at encouraging the President to go as far as possible in his efforts to develop coopera tion with the Soviet Union in space activities Pelly s amendment was 7 ·BACKGROUND 3 enacted into law but Fulbright s draft resolution was never pressed A number of Congres men thought the President had raised a basic issue between cooperation and competition, they professed privately or to the press to be confused over the basic purposes of the national space program Some observers concluded that the Presidents es pousal of cooperation could only mean that he sought relief from a difficult costly and allegedly increasingly unpopular national com mitment & Vithin a few days it was being widely suggested that the Presidents propo al would have an adverse effect on the space agency s pending budget submission for any of several reasons congressional pique at not having been consulted in advance basic opposition in some quarters to the space program itself and con fusion of the national purpose as between preeminence or coopera tion in the moon race That the Presidents United Nations proposal created surprise and confusion is clear enough Yet the proposal was entirely consistent with the specific provisions for international cooperation contained in the National Aeronautics and Space Act consistent with numerous earlier public expressions by the President of his strong personal in terest in space cooperation and consistent too with the successful conclusion only a month earlier of a bilateral space agreement with the Soviet Union That agreement had developed directly from well publicized correspondence between the President and Mr Khrushchev during the previous year But apart from the e specific precedents he essential duality of cooperation and competition in space activity should have been plain enough from the start Boib factors had had long backgrounds The President s UN proposal was only another in a long series of efforts to promote international cooperation in space as an alterna tive to the spread of the cold war into a new dimension as a device for achieving rapport among nations (especially the United States and the Soviet Union) and as a measure to minimize the world lensions whuch a covert program might provoke Indeed the space age had itself came into being in a context of cooperation across national boundaries The first effective proposals ·6 BACKGROUND In fact these in, redients were sufficient to assure a basic am bivalence in the character of the space age from its inception Sputnik Is shiny new prestige reflected not only its international scientific heritage but a strong national power rivalry as well Long before the first launching an atmosphere of competition for primacy developed fed by the press but also by occasional spokesmen for the US program The circumstances of the first launchings--the Soviet suc ceys and the American failures the disparity in the weights of satel lites placed in orbit by the two countries--contributed further to the competitive cast of things The impact of the Soviet Union s uner pected first and the dım portents of that primacy for technological leadership in the world combined to make Sputnik I a sharp spur to competition The Soviet Union was quick to trace its victory to the virtues of its social system Americans on the other hand were equally vociferous in urging strenuous eforts to catch up in order to expunge any reflection upon their own system Thus the battle was joined The Soviet Union proceeded from one spectacular space feat to another photographing the far side of the moon placing the heaviest weights and the first man in orbit then the first woman and broadly hinting the achievement of a significant maneuvering capability in space associated with the near rendezvous of two satellites In the United States space budgets beginning at some 300 millions of dollars in 1959 very nearly doubled each year until they reached an approximate levelling of figure of something in excess of five billions of dollars in 1963 Strong efforts were concentrated upon the de Yelopment of large boo ters and the achievement and advancement manned flight in order to catch up to the Soviet Union The goal of manned lunar landing and return before the end of the decade was set as the next major test of the relative abilities of the two nations Unquestionably then a clear duality dogs both the history and the prospects of international partnership in the conquest of mans newest intellectual and technological frontier On the one hand there has been the trong appeal of world cooperation made even more at tractise by the case with which scientists seem able to collaborate in ·BACKGROUND 7 and by their own fields by the absence to date of rested interests in space an intellectual challenge so vast that it seems to demand a response from all men rather than from one or two of his nations On the other hand there has been the categorical imperative of tech nological leadership with all that this might mean to each nation in economic political and military security There is nothing unique in this ambivalence in space It has ap plied for example to the nuclear field as well in the atoms for peace program of the 1950s the tender shoots of cience and peace were to be grafted belatedly upon a main trunk deeply rooted in weapons systems The nations were to be drawn back from the nuclear weapons aby ss and given an opportunity to cooperate in exploiting the peace ful benefits of atomic secrets In the case of space howeser the terrors were only vague and future the possibilities for peace and coopera tion seemingly more immediate For the space age did not dawn in the shadow of a mushroom cloud, and there were no real space weapons in View, only insubstantial portents In the broadest sense the duality of motivation experienced in pace only reflects the fundamental choices before us at every critical juncture in the postwar world However contradictory or mutually exclu we they may seem these choices are nevertheless pursued Bimultaneously Thus we hope that diplomacy and time may moderate the political systems which are hostile to us At the same time we seek to maximize pressure upon those systems through encirching political alliances and international economic pre sures We work to bring the world together in the United Nations and at the came time to buttress one half of it again.t the rest We hope that a powerful dome tic military posture will protect us from holocaut But we try to avoid holocaust also by seeking increased under tanding in the exchange of scholar farmers and musicians Inevitably this fundamental ambivalence was mirrored in the prwcipal Tresponse of the United States to the challenge of space That re ponse coming only a few months after the launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union was the creation by the Congress of a new federal agency to carry on the nation s space activity ·6 BACKGROUND In fact these ingredients were sufficient to assure a basic am bivalence in the character of the space age from its inception Sputnik Is shiny new prestige reflected not only its international scientific heritage but a strong national power rivalry as well Long before the first launching an atmosphere of competition for primacy developed fed by the press but also by occasional spokesmen for the US program The arcumstances of the first launchings—the Soviet suc ce s and the American failures, the disparity in the weights of eatel lites placed in orbit by the two countries contributed further to the competitive cast of things The impact of the Soviet Union s uner pected first and the dim portents of that primacy for technological leadership in the world combined to make Sputnik I a sharp spur to competition The Soviet Union was quick to trace its victory to the virtues of its social system Americans on the other hand were equally vociferous in urging strenuous efforts to catch up in order to expunge any relection upon their own system Thus the battle was joined The Soviet Union proceeded from one spectacular space feat to another photographing the far side of the moon placing the heaviest weights and the first man in orbit then the first woman and broadly hinting the achievement of a significant maneuvering capability in space associated with the near rendezvous of two satellites In the United States space budgets beginning at some 300 millions of dollars in 1959 very nearly doubled each year until they reached an approximate levelling off figure of something in excess of five billions of dollars in 1963 Strong efforts were concentrated upon the de velopment of large boosters and the achievement and advancement of manned flight in order to catch up to the Soviet Union The goal of manned lunar landing and return before the end of the decade was set as the next major test of the relative abilities of the two nations Unquestionably then a clear duality dogs both the history and the prospects of international partnership in the conquest of mans newest intellectual and technological frontier On the one hand there has been the strong appeal of world cooperation made even more at tractive by the ease with which scientists geen able to collaborate in ·BACKGROUND 7 heir own fields by the absence to date of vested interests in space, and by an intellectual challenge so vast that it seems to demand a response from all men rather than from one or two of his nations On the other hand, there has been the categorical imperative of tech nological leadership with all that this might mean to each nation in economic political and military security There is nothing unique in this ambivalence in space It has ap plied for example to the nuclear field as well in the atoms for peace program of the 1950s the tender shoots of science and peace were to be grafted belatedly, upon a main trunk deeply rooted in weapons systems The nations were to be drawn back from the nuclear weapons aby ss and given an opportunity to cooperate in exploiting the peace ful benefits of atomic ec ets the case of space however the terrors were only vague and future the po gıbılıties for peace and coopera tion seemingly more immediate For the space age did not dawn in the shadow of a mushroom cloud and there were no real space weapons in view only insubstantial portents In the broadest sense the duality of motivation experienced in space only reflects the fundamental choices before us at every critical juncture in the postwar world However contradictory or mutually exclusive they may seem these choices are nevertheless pursued simultaneously Thus we hope that diplomacy and time may moderate the political systems which are ho tile to us At the same time we seek to maximize pressure upon those systems through encircling political alliances and international economic pre sures We work to bring the world together in the United Nations and at the same time to buttreas one half of it against the ret We hope that a powerful dome tic military posture will protect us from holocaust But we try to avoid holocaust also by seeking increased understanding in the exchange of scholare farmers and musicians Inevitably this fundamental ambivalence was mirrored in the principal re ponse of the United States to the challenge of space That response coming only a few months after the launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union was the creation by the Congress of a new federal agency to carry on the nations space activity In ·8 BACKCROUND establishing this agency, the Congress gave full expression to the dichotomy between cooperation and competition The National Aeronautics and Space Act was expressly designed to bring world leadership in space technology and exploration to the United States. But it is an arresting fact that the Congress, while plunging the nation into competition for preeminence simultaneously provided that the space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially to cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and the peaceful application of the results thereof 29 Thus the new agency the National Aeronautics and Space Admin istration was directed to employ the tools and techniques of space research common in good part to science and the military, to ad vance the national security on the one hand and on the other to establish cooperative ties with other countries While facing up to the grim reality of competition between the great powers the Congress nevertheless elected to place some hope if not faith in the simultane ous practice of cooperation- For use almost can change the stamp of nature and master ev a the devil or throw him out with wondrous potency 14 It was with this mandate and this background that both courses of action—the competitive and the cooperative-were pursued simul taneously in the early years of the space age (Tlie parallel prosecu tion of both was of course entirely conscious NASA s Admin istrator James E Webb said on more than one occasion that space like Janus looks in two directions 15 This was only part and parcel of the age old strategy of pursuing the battle vigorously while seek ing and preparing for an armistice President Johnson put it most simply in his first message to the Congress when he said that the United States intends to carry out a manned lunar landing with the Soviet Union it possible alone if necessary And he repeated the principle more broadly soon thereafter saying The United States hall welcome any who wi h to join with us in seeking to serve the common good of mankind But if others are not willing or if they

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·10 BACKGROUND fessional subject matter And if they are generally effective does this apply to a particular field of interest such as space? In fact what experience has there been with efforts to promote cooperation in space matters and what is the nature of that experience? How does the Soviet Union figure in it? In view of the widespread popular criticism and unquestioned shortcomings of some international efforts what can we learn of the do s and don ts of cooperative enterprise of the channels or mechanisms which work best for particular objec tives, of the objectives to be ought and the limitations which attach or should be attached to them? Above all what practical benefits can realistically be expected from joint efforts among the nations in this field? Otherwise like the premature reports of Mark Twain s death the lıfe and prospects of international cooperation in space research and exploration may be greatly exaggerated THE INTERNATIONALITY OF SCIENCE The importance given science as a medium for cooperation among peoples is one of the unique features of our times But is science a more binding force a more plausible counter to xenophobia and nationalism than say commerce or religion? Why have governments, and the government of the United States in particular selected science as a potion for the easing of political tension? The preeminence of science as an international mortar is very widely subscribed to and especially by scientists A recent letter to Science asked What groups tribes or subcultures hare the following trails that they are a definite in group that their special tradition goes back for generations and that they are truly international main taining their language their rituals and their own purposes indul ferent countries. There are the Bohemians from the Left Bank to the bestnik, there are the Jesuits the pace, the ballet dancers the Jews and the professional naral officers But there are very few international groupe eren unorganized ones, as old as the international community of science In the organized ·BACKGROUND 11 line there are the Communists the Catholics and the UN cil service Who else? That is jus about all the organized commu nities that we have In the world we can document science is now one of the oldest distinct traditions still represented in a living comrunity 18 This viewpoint has been stated in a more directed way by a former Science Advisor to the President who said, The signifcance of international scientific activities to the re lations between nations is perhaps the most important of the roles science and scientists can play in the sense that international activities of science are part of the life blood of science but new in its potential impact on political relations For science is today one of the few common languages of man kind it can provide a basis for understanding and communication of ideas between people that is independent of political boundaries and of ideologies Science also provides a sometimes uniquc opportunity for cooperative endeavors that can contribute in a major way to the reduction of tensions between nations Others have sought to suggest explanations for these tres and their influence 10 Because of the similarity in outlook of scientists all over the world their increased influence on the national policies of different coun tries should increase the case of international communication Their greater than average capacity for abstraction and gener alization will favor policies based on long range rational planning --policies in which the enlightened sell interest of individual pa tions or political systems is bound to become coordinated with the common well being of mankind 20 There is a sense in which these views may be readily accepted in that there are characteristics of science which ease its way as a builder of contacts among acientists of all nations The pursuit of science requires the exchange of observations which in turn requires the ex change of techniques and of results Since the emphasis is upon facts, the elements of conflict are reduced to a minimum Competition does exist in science, sometimes in exaggerated degree, but generally it does not begin to approach the survival tests of commercial rivalry or the bloodletting of religious contest Careful examination of this argument however begins to uncover ·12 BACKGROUND an excessive reliance upon logic divorced from life and especially from bistory Even a casual reading of international commercial bistory reveals in international finance in cartels and trusts a com munity whose ties (as in the wars between Germany and the United States) may have demonstrated far greater solidarity under more trying conditions and exerted greater weight in the affairs of men than anything jointly carried forward through the international ties of science The notion that the scientist can play a special and peculiarly effective role in establishing and cementing improved relation hips among nations rests on old and honorable conviction We are fond of pointing out that Benjamin Franklin directed the fledgling US Navy to avoid interference with Captain Cooks scientific voyages under the British flag in the South Seas although the war between the colonies and their erstwhile British sovereign was then in progress This line of argument is carried to apotheosis in Gavin de Beer s book The Sciences 11 ere Never At Har Here it is recorded that the famous English scientist Jenner at the height of the Napoleonic wars between England and France used his influence to arrange exchanges betwcen scientists interned by the two sides we are told again of Humphrey Davy s celebrated trip to Paris during the same hostilities to recente an award and demonstrate various experiments in his hotel room there is the story of a British sea captain who lent assistance to a French scientific expedition encountered in Australian waters in the same period Two points are of interest in these accounts First many of the incidents themselves do not bear examination in depth Even as Franklin wrate out his safe conduct for the great English navigator Cook had already been killed in the Hawaiian Islands so the gesture was never put to the test De Beers chivalrous Britih captain him self later ran afoul of a less thoughtful French authority on his way home from Australia and spent the next seven years as a prisoner of war Thi» painful footnote is explained away as an unaccountable lapse in international consideration for science even though it represented retaliation for seizure (by other Briti h forces) of a French ·BACKCROUND 13 shap bearing scientific specimens of that same expedition so well treated earlier by our British captain 21 The incident in full--and others like it tell us little more than that there were gentlemen and nongentlemen in war Consideration and generosity have never been the special province of scientists and prisoner exchanges have been common among all sorts of people Second, the incidents suggesting that scientific ties withstand the onslaught of divisive war are isolated examples given without refer ence to overwhelming evidence to the contrary The viewpoint of Napoleon himself who always penetrated quickly to the core of senti mental matters is interesting Napoleon was delighted with Monge the leader of his scientific establishment in the invasion of Egypt because he represented the epitome of what Napoleon expected from a scientist to serve the fatherland seemed to him the ultimate aim of science "This point is further illustrated in our own history The development of organized science in the United States shows a voluntary responsiveness to the national interest which would have satisfied even Napoleon Most major steps in the organization of science in the United States have coincided with war-the Cul War and both World Wars When the National Academy of Sciences was brought into being by charter of the Congress in March 1863 so far from ignoring the Civil War then in progress or extending a disinterested professional hand to Southern colleagues the new Academy within a month imposed loyalty oath to the Union upon its members "3 When the first World War loomed on the horizon and George Ellery Hale set about revitalizing the National Academy and establishmg the broader Ma tional Research Council (both non overnmental in titutions), 1.8 specific objective was to help the United States in the event of * war with Mexico or Germany It is not without significance that Hala was Foreign Secretary of the Academy, responsible for relatiore! with the international scientific community He was siratas y placed to take Humphrey Davy s view that if the two counting at war the men of science are not That would indeed Lowassimar of the worst deserption we should rather, through the ingry, to izle ·14 BACKGROUND ity of the men of science solten the asperities of national hostility "34 But he did not. In the Academy he moved and accured unanimous passage of a resolution to offer the resources of the Academy to the President of the United States in the event of a break in diplo. matic relations with any other country'' (italics supplied) as In August 1916 Hale went abroad to establish lanson with the allies for scientific purposes Much of the Academy went inlo uniform even its President! With World War II the refugee scient.st., fearing that Hitler might acquire a decisive weapon could no longer rely on the solidarity of the scientific community to forestall such a calamity They recognized that German scientific circles, as those in other countries, would act from patriotic motives to give any useful product to their government and so the refugees sook ihess secrets to the side they favored the West Nor were the refugee scientists the only ones to make such a firm political commitment In 1939 Professor Percy Bridgman decided to close the doors of lus Harvard laboratory to students from nations under dictatorial rule American scientists began to impose a voluntary censorship on their publications con cerning atomic energy 527 In the period since the wars we find that among friendly nations there 19 sensitivity with regard to the emigration of scientists from the homeland to another country and that national policy to constrain such emigration is debated 28 Among cold war antagonists the gen eral alignment of scientists on technical grounds with the political positions of their governments in dısarmament negotiations has been an obvious fact In other areas too the responsiveness of Soviet scientists to political imperatives simply provokes a defensive reac tion in their western counterparts driving the latter to a far greater consciousness of nonscientific considerations in matters involving scientific organization and exchange than would be normal for thema The evidence appears to be overwhelmin, that scientists confronted with the exigenices of national need have reacted much as other pa triotic citizens professional and nonprofessional In part this fol lows from an interaction between science and government which ·BACKGROUND 15 produces a rough alignment esen in democratic countries Interna tional tres real or fancied have not weighed in the balance in any significant way The maintenance of contact, the continued publica tion of literature, personal intercessions-mthese occur in many fields and among many individuals When we say that sc enre is interna tional, we must then mean that it is international where scientific matters of essentially professional character are concerned and not really where political matters are concerned Were it otherwise, the profession would include a legion of traitors notorious in history, whereas the treasonable scientists can in fact be counted on the fingers of one hand The notion that a particular group possesses come uniquely com mon bond throughout the world is in itself rather common Charles Burton Marshall has commented on this phenomenon in amusing fashıon He notes that at various times It has been suggested that global understanding could be uniquely served by organizations of mother, (because everybody has them) nudists (who alone see us as we rcally are) international bureaucrats (because they are dis. interested ) artists (because they have an unique calling to the love of humanity), and lawyers theologians and scientists for similar special reasons 28 Our consideration of the realities of international cooperation in space, as in any other scientific field will profit of we discard senta ment and tenuous lustory It is doubtful that an international mys tique lends science special salue as a vehicle for cooperation for science is demonstrably subject to normal human limitations and nationalist constrains, science is of critical value for cooperation be cause of the critical dargers with which it is associated Just as these dangers have appeared greatest in the case of the atom and space so have the principal efforts to estaolish international cooperation mate tialized in these fields This is true too of the present impulse to. ward cooperation ID meteorology, 8 togetherness impelled by the first dum fears that separately we may come upon the ability to modify the weather This is not to deny for a moment that the subject matter of science ·18 BACACROUND No scientific program had cser engaged so many people in so many places nor had any so captured the public interest and imagination Neither the press nor its readers could be crpected to take as de tailed an interest in the auspices and organization of this vast enter prise as in its oceanographıc voyages its satellite launchings and its Antarctic traverses Certainly, they were not prime objects of alten lion in the very considerable publicity given to the IGY As a conse quence the nature of the IGY itself as well as the nature of its succes have been widely misunderstood The long looked for genie had come out of his bottle and had indeed wrought miracles but he performed his magic in quite a different fashion and with different results from those to which the bemused public testified A popular impression was that the IGY represented a unified and integrated program of cooperation among governments Newspapers hailing the IGY s success referred to special cooperative agreements among many countries and asserted that the thousands of scientists and technicians who had participated including large numbers of Russians and Americans have worked together as if there were no cold war or ideological wall dividing them 37 Unfortunately this impression missed the facts in each and every respect The IGY involved governments almost exclusively on a purely domestic basis only Its international relationships were conducted by committees of scientists representing not their governments but rather their own scientific institutions 39 These committees took care of the planning and looge coordination of scientific objectives They achieved decisions only where unanimity was possible and they had no authority as committees to implement their programs Instead the scientists took the agreements they had reached back to their national scientific institutions at home which then sought government or other support for their work An astonishing degree of such sup port was forthcoming but it was essentially self contained there was no significant integration of national programs involving gov ernmental agreement For example those nations which participated in the Antarctic programs of the IGY did so at their own bases The US and USSR Antarctic stations were separated by the continent it ·BACKGROUND 19 self a single scientist was sent by each nation to the other s principal base for each of two years but this was a very rare exception to the rule To the extent that working together suggests shoulder to shoulder cooperation this was a substantially misleading picture In short the IGY consisted of a collection of national programs inde pendently working toward purely sc entific objectives loosely coordi nated by a nongovernmental mechanism It is true that the IGY was relatively free of politics But this was largely because political considerations were not often encoun ered in the definition of scientific goals and procedures It 13 quite true to say that the IGY constructed scientific bridges across political chasms 39 But the bridges had no effect on the chasms these re mained and no traffic other than scientific crossed them For example, a dispute arose between the two Chinas over participation in the IGY Mainland China had been a full participant in the preparatory years but repeatedly stated that its participation depended upon nonadmittance of Taiwan China Taiwan, after showing little interest for four years pressed for formal adherence during the last two months before the Year was to begin and produced a small scientific program to justify the action The dispute could not be resolved or scientific grounds and Communist China withdrew 40 Other political overtones existed but generally did not obstruct the course of the program For instance the Soviet Union organized a series of ICV meetings exclusively among the Iron Curtain countries But in one respect, underlying political difficulties and military con siderations in the cold war patently restricted the scope of the IGY The brond success which characterized the scientific effort in virtually all other fields did not extend to the ICY program in space research The Soviet Unions scientific representatives stubbornly restricted IG) agreements for exchange of information in this area As a result unanimous consent to broader agreements could not be obtained And Soviet cornpliance with even the modest IGY requirements in space science was in good part pro forma Attempts to improve the situa tion though made t'ırough the international scientific machinery of the IGY were unavailing ·20 BACKGROUND In the other disciplines which were the subject of cooperative pro- Erams during the IGY--such as geomagnetism seismology iono spheric phy ics and so forth-the cooperating nations, including both the US and the USSR were reasonably forthcoming in contrib uting raw or reduced data for etorage in three great World Data Centers established for the purpose Thus moet scientific results were available to cholars in such form as would permit independent re search evaluation and critici m But in space research only the United States provided advance details of experiments, exten ivc in formation of satellite instrumentation and design telemetry patterna current orbital elements of satellites to permit preci e tracking for scientific purposes and results accompanied by critical data point The Soviet Union provided virtually no advance information of a sub tantive character regarding either its satellite or ounding rochet programs restricted agreements prescribing types of information to be exchan, ed and released only limited quantities of digested scien tific findings such as normally appear in conventional publications ? While scientist to cientist inquiries for additional information neces ary to understand in depth the Soviet scientific work went unan swered efforts were made by Sosiet scienta ts to obtain information of a similar kind from individual US scientists A notable example was the ca e of the telemetry tapes (tape record ings of coded scientific data radioed from satellites) During 1958 the Academy of Sciences of the USSR a ked for tape recordings of signals received from the first Soviet Sputniks Between 30 and 40 reels of tape were collected in the United Sates and forwarded to the Soviet Union along with a request that the Soviet Union reciprocate by ending to the US similar recordings wluch American cienti ts espected had been made of the first American satellites Explorers I and III in the Soviet Union The Soviet response was that the inclina tion of the orbits of the e satellites was o low that they did not carry over the Soviet Union The inclination of Explorer IV was consider ably higher providing Soviet technicians with an obvious opportu nity to record its signals However no acknowledgment was made to repeated requests for recordings that might have been made At the

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·22 BACKGROUND without regard to territorial claims and without benefit of treats their national stations were from the outset established in territory claimed by other countries Moreover the treaty provided only for deferring, rather than permanently settling the political problems of the continent Would the treaty weigh in the balance against the revival of nationalistic claims if economic or strategir interests were to emerge in Antarctica 244 Nevertheless it remains most important to recognize that those who molded the IGY were probably far freer from disabling political considerations than would have been the case of governmental repre sentatives had attempted to frame a similar program The srientists were not normally obliged to negotiate with reference to govern mental positions extraneous relationships and commitments which must properly concern the political representative It seums fair to say that the work of the IGY proceeded remarkably well in its proper business science that the participants were forced to yield to political realities on those relatively rare occasions when these were encountered and that no s.ngle significant political 195LC was solved It is closer to the truth to say that science benefitrd from the near absence of politics than it is to say that science contributed to the resolution of political 19sues during the IGY Indeed where there was an interplay between science and politics the political real stres tended to constrain scientific objectives in some degree In these few comments upon the most significant international program of cooperation in science the International Geophysical Year enough has been said to suggest that international science is as com plex as any other tool for peace that it is not necessarily successful and that its successes may be more limited in character than has been assumed Indeed if international programs for scientif c purposes are to succeed even in their own terms, the conditions mu t le correct in depth The ICY was not a mere inspiration for were its programs created out of whole cloth It was in good part an intensification of effort already existing in each of its scientific disciplines Perhaps most important there had been a previous history of cooperation and exchange among peophysicists stretching back 150 years and ·BACKCROUND 23 including the expenence of two earlier and clo ely related Intr national Years 45 Over five years had been spent in planning for the IGY, its objectives were extremely concrete and detailed and a guit able and highly developed organizational complex to plan and im plement the program already existed and krew its business well ** Finally and of great import, many of the scientific objectives of the IGY program-such as oceanographic surveys sono pheric experi ments, and space research-Were of significant practical interest o the governments which were asked to foot the bills thus lending more sold interet to the enterprise than is commonly appreciated None of this gainsays the fact that the ICY played a remarkable role in achieving its scientific goals and in contributing to general understanding in an intangible but nonetheless real manner This 19 not unlike the contnbutions made toward international understand ang through other links between peoples commercial religious and cultural—but the great scope and support given to the IGY clearly Lifted it to an unusual level giving special inspiration and stimulation to the brlief that people could work together Its indirect and long term effects are certain to be of increasing significance Without question, it brought new public and governmental support to science not only in the Soviet Union and the United States, but in developing countries like India as well " the consequences of this latter fact for intellectual and political purposes in the long run may be undoubted It would not be far off to say that the IGY was a notable element. among the forces which gave the US national space program its peculiar shape when legislation for that program was considered in 1958. NOTES September 20 1963 ? The Evening Star Washington, DC (Sept. 1963) The adhington Posz Bept. 21 183) The Flariford Courant (Sept 22, 1963) The New York Herald Tnbune (Sept. 21 1963) "News of the Week in Review" (Sept 22, 1963) ·21 BACKCROUND 1 The Wall Street Journal (Sept 23 1963) # The New York Times (Sept 21 1963) The Washington Post (Sept. 24 1963) The World Committee for the International Geophysical Year (CSAGI) met in Rome in 1954 establishing a Rocket Group for the first time Among its recommendations were the following (2a) It is urged that as many countries as possible undertake programs of small rocket soundings and in addition that currently planned small rocket programs be expanded but with no diminution of effort in the large rocket programs (20) CSACI recommends that the geographic coverage of the largerocket sounding programs, now planned by the Usued States and France be extend d at least during the IGY by the participation of other nations ("8) In view of the great importance of observations during extended periods of time of extra terrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere and in view of the advanced state of present rocket techniques CSIGI recommends that thought be given to the launching of small satellite vehicles to their scientific jostrumentation and to the new problems associated with satellite ciperiments such as power supply zelenetering and orientation of the vehicle 10 The American announcement made by the Prestdent, Presy Secre tary on July 39 19 5 was as follows ·BACKGROUND 25 a 13 National Aeronautics and Space Act July 29 1958 (Public Law 85 568 85th Congress HR 12575 [72 Stat 426] Section 201 ) 14 Hamlet Act III Scene IV lines 168 ff 1 James E Webb address before the Institute of Foreign Affairs (Jan 24 1963) 16 President Johnson remarks at dedication ceremonies of the Na tional Geographic Society The Washington Post (January 19 1964) P A6 17 Hailsham Science and Politics p 28 18 Michael Amrine Scientists and Jesuits Gypsies and Jews letter Science (November 15 1963) P 913 19 George B Kustiakowsky Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April 1960 p 115) Eugene Rabinowitch from an essay in 1956 quoted by Daniel Bell in The Washington Post Book Week (January 5 1961) p 4 21 Gavin de Beer The Sciences Here Nerer at War (Thomas Nelson & Sans London 1960) pp 112 121 Capt Matthew Flinders in the In vestigator Surveying the coast of Australia in 1801 encountered a French expedition under Nicolas Baudın in the ships Le Geographe and Le Naturaliste First preparing for action but then exchanging experi ences and scientific findings he assisted the French to reunite their separated hips and provided and for their badly afilicted crews The distress of the French navigators had indeed been great but every means were used by the governor {at Port Jackson) and the principal inhabitants of the colony to make them forget both their suf ring and the war which existed between the two nations De Beer terms at one of the har h ironies of history and a black page in the records of Anglo-French cultural relations that Flinders was interced for seven years when he stopped at Isle de France on his way home ignorant that war had again broken out But it is equally ironic that this grievous lapse by the French was de Beer says occasioned by an unaccountable British error in eizing one of Baudin s ships Le Naturaliste on us way home with the specimens gathered during the voyage and in violation of a safe conduct ► J Christopher Herold Bonaparte in Egypt p 168 23 Thi and the subsequent related material are based upon A H Dupree Science in the Federal Gouernment (Belknap Press Harvard Univer ity 1957) Regarding the Academy » civil war loyalty oath Du pree says The lone reporter of this incident, the geologit J P Le ley indicated that the discussion got even deeper into the realm of the relation of the Academy and through it science to the government "Someone I will ingly forget who argued that we would lose government patronage un less we bd for it with the oath I suspect it was only an unfortunate way of slating a bu_ber truth that we are children of the government ·26 BACKGROUND and the academy is the creation of the government and owes it an oath of allegiance as its first duty (p 143) 4 de Beer p 204 25 Dupree p 309 Dupre and Lakoff Science and the Nation Policy and Politics Prentice Hall 1962 p 92 Durre and Lakoff p 92 28 During 1963 the emigration of senior British scientists especially to the United States became a matter of national concern (See Emi station of Scientists from the United Kingdom Report of a Commuttee appointed by the Council of The Royal Society 1936 ) During Febru ary 1953 prospertive emigrations became so numerous that press ac counts suggested the subject might be discus ed by the Prime Minister during his vi at of that month to President Johnson 9 Charles Burton Marshall Render Unto Caesar Johns Hopkins Magazine (May-June 1962) 30 Warren Weaver A Great Age for Science in Goals for Ameri cans (1960) 81 Thornstein Veblen, The Place of Science 22 Modern Cırılı ation (1906) * The material relating to US support of the International Research Council after World War I is drawn from A H Dupree op cul p 330 83 An account which stresses what is here cited as token recognition across national lines is contained in the Herald (Vestnik) of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR October 1963 pp 86-90 This is 8 Burvey of the long tradition of scientific relations between Americans and Russians dating back to the middle of the 18th century listing Americans elected to the then St Petersburg Academy of Sciences re porting certain scientific collaborations attempts by the young Soviet to establish contact" with American scientists reciprocal visits and finally the current exchanges organized by goverpments on a cultural level As is discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters the forms of exchange and cooperation must be distinguished from the substance $t Hugh Odishaw in an address before the National Press Club Washington DC. (December 4 1958) 35 Odi haw "International Geophysical Year-A Report on the United States Program Science (Jan. 17 1958) 26 Ibrd 27 €.8, an editorial in The Washington Star (Jan. 10 1959) 39 See Ronald Fraser Once Round the Sun PP 97-102 for a graphic description or ine organization of the IC'i 19 Walter Sallıvan Assault on the Unknown p 417 40 For an authoritative account of the IGY dispute between the two Chinas see Sullivan op cum p 36 fi 41 Sullivan op cu., pp 403-407 See also Homer E Newell "IGY ·BACK CROUND 27 Conference in Voscow Report on the Organizational Setup and on the Set Pre-entation of their Rocket and Satellite Work Science (Jan 9 19 ) p 79 and Lloyd V Berkner Ed Vanual on Rockets & Satel liten Innals of the International Geophysical Year pp 453-473 + D taik of the information which the Soviet Union mı hed from olmeners of its atellite signals (but would not supply to the United States) may be found in Berkner op cit p 472 where a notice publi lcd in a Soviet Journal Radio 19 reprinted 17 Je up and Taubenfeld Controls for Outer Space (Columbia Uni ver lly Pre New York 1939) especially pp 155-172 41 Je up and Taubenfeld op cit., p 187 4" The International Polar less of 1882 and 1932 16A very alle di cussion of the pre exiting and solid foundation of the ICY is contained in Hugh Odishaw "International Cooperation International Science and Technology prototype 1 sue p 28 ** I am indehted to Profe or AP Mitra for an account of the ad vance in public and official regard for science in India occasioned by the ICY ·2 THE US PROGRAM A PHILOSOPHY FOR COOPERATION in When the formulation of a national space program was under debate the spring of 1958 the Congressional committees then conducting hearings on the matter were exposed to a remarkable parade of wit nes es--generals admirals educators industrialists scientists--who urged almost unanimously that the nation s new space agency should foster international cooperation in the spirit of the International Geo physical lear then at its peak A brief sampling suggests the char acter and weight of their views Admiral Rickover who said of space that you cannot separate its military aspects from the purely scientific' nevertheless argued that we should take advantage of this new element to help bring about peace to use it as a brid, e for peace And he added definitely would be for complete exchange of information in this field with every one * Rear Admiral John T Hayward Assistant Chief of Naval Operations was a ked what he thought of the suggestion that the United States open its laboratories to scientists from all over the world thus converting the emphasis from space war to a conquest of space and further that the United States should unclassify a great portion of its present material lle replied “I agree with that " Dr Fred Whipple Harvard College Ob ervatory said I feel that this National A tronautics Agency can indeed cover many of the functions of the Icy and its cems to me that ome of the re march we are doing in the ICT should be continued in the spare studies ly nur National A tronautics Agenty's ·29 THE US PROGRAM krafft Ehricke, Convair Corp San Diego Califomia, made thus tement Preudent Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized this country 8 desire to join with other nations in the peaceful exploration and utilization of space When Russia had the sole lead in spacecraft Mr Khrushchev proposed a race into space I believe the Soviets have missed a fine opportunity here of showing that they are willing to utilize new areas of human exploration for cooperation I think now that we are a spacegoing nation also we should take a better approach and through our civilian space agency when it is established invite other nations into a cooperative effort in this matter Dr Lee A DuBridge President California Institute of Technol ogy said I would like to urge then again the creation of a civilian space agency to do the civilian space exploration to collaborate with other nations on international scientific exploration of space and to take care of all of those aspects of space exploration which do not have direct and immediate military applications ? Later he added We should take the lead as the President has done in proposing international collaboralıon in peaceful satellite and space explora lion 8 Dr James Van Allen State University of Iowa who was that same week to announce his discovery of the radiation belts surrounding the earth and now bearing his name said Mr Chairman may I remark that one special feature of civilian management in the United States is that it provides immediate possibilities for international cooperation For example at the present time we have IGY atellite oh prving statenus desteiluted over the world in at lezet twenty coun trics Both practically and diplomatically this is a very fine under taking but it is not at all clear how uch arrangements can be man aged if sprcc is a military undertaking I think it is rather difficult to imagine let us say the United States Air Force and the Souict Air Force collaborating on any undertaking but I can ea ily imagina our national pace e tablı hment collaboraling with the corre pond ing civilian e tabli hment in Ru :7 for mutunl benefit and will the other countries involved in the ICY ? Indeed it was the official po i ·30 THE US PROGRAMI tion of the Department of Defense that the so called pure scientific information should be made generally available in the exchange of ideas and information to stimulate overall progress in the basic sciences 10 Mored perhaps equally by the captivating character of the IGY and the pervading hope that an extension of the cold war into space might yet be avoided the Congress did indeed stamp the u age of the IGY upon the new legislation And so it was that the National Aero nautics and Space Act provided that the space adfivities of the United States shall be cond acted so as to contribute materially to cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this act and the peaceful applica tion of the re ults thereof 11 The linkage was not surpring As we have alsсady seen the space age was itself born out of the ICY and the United States and Soviet programs followed announcements by both nations that they would contribute their first satellite launchings to the IGY let the space program had been the least successful of IGI cooperative enter prises One mught ar uc that the Congress objective may liase been a purely notional one or that it inay not have been informed of the actual Jimitations wluch attached to IG} space actuaties But in erther case the American action and the projects which later followed frora it furnish perhaps the most siguficant evidence of the indirect eflectiveness of the IG! far more significant than the direct political values often attributed to at The bill to create a new civilian agency for the purpo e of achier ing national leadership in space in a framework of pesceful purpo es and international cooperation has sined into law lny I resident Eisenhower on July 1938 llc maile one uls tantas comment lle took note of the fact that Section 2013 of the Act rays that the new agency "may" enter into cooperate a prenients with the aduce and consent of the Senate this he said was a permis le poroszynon al lown the space agency to seek Senate advice and con ent where this was appropriate but pot precluding erecutie srcements willir ut recourse to the Senate Exsenhoner ob ensed that tu interpret Sertin ·THE US PROCRAM 31 12 205 otherwise would be to raise serious constitutional questions This interpretation had practical and philosophical implications for the future cooperative program of the new agency Its pace was to be faster and its procedures far simpler than would otherwise have been the case NASA s international program was thus immediately dis tinguished from that of the Atomic Energy Commission which under its legislation was required to obtain approval of its international efforts from the Congress The civilian character and international mission of the Atomic Energy Commission were however important ingredients in the mix of considerations before the Congress and later the Space Agency in delermining the shape and character of the space program The Atomic Encrgy Act of 1954 was probably the first major govern mental deci ion in history consciously to employ science on a broad scale to foster international understanding 13 The programs which followed from the Act s declared policy to encourage international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy included over 50 bilateral agreements between the United States and other countries and contributed to the e tablı hment of an international atomic energy authority Revicked after five years for the Joint Congres sional Committee on Atomic Energy the e experiments with inter national cooperation in the desclopment of the peaceful uses of atomic energy did not appear to have been uniformly succesful Great expectalions had been raised Lut realization was slow and dis appointing The principal difficulty of course was that after the trumpets blared and the curtain went up the star of the show eco nomical nuclear power failed to appear on the stage An Inter national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been established but it had few takers for its wares and East West frictions frustrated its enterpri es The peaceful u cs of the alom had not yet brought a rapprochement between the Eat and the West and there was no sig nificant diversion of activities or materials from military to peaceful es Perhaps most serious for the ultimate objectives of the program domestic authorities and the press had been more successful in con Sincing Americans of the nations genero ity with the secrets of ·34 THE US PROCRAM project by project basis The space agency therefore declined to enter into open ended programs promising collaboration of an undefined character This precluded generalized international agreements which might mean different things to different people and whose imple mentation might prove controversial or impractical NASA was soon forced to establish criteria for the recognition of foreign agencies with which to deal in cooperative space projects For it became quickly apparent that internal struggles were under way in most interested countries to determine which agencies would obtain control of space planning and operations Engineer based groups contested the matter with science based groups and military with civilian and industrial Certainly NASA would not wish to Lecome embroiled in this process or be u ed by any of the contest ants Basic to the answer was NASA S own character as a civilian agency who e international activities were intended to demonstrate the peaceful purpose of the United States in space re carch and ex ploration It was virtually axiomatic that the agency s space activi ties abroad should be conducted with authorities of the same stanıp It was obvious too that government sponsorship would be necessary abroad as here to ensure the necessary funds and facilities Accord ingly interested countries were asked to designate a central civilian and government sponsored if not governmental authority to deal with NASA It was further necessary because of the high technical content of space projects that NASA should be able to deal directly with the entral agency designated for that purpose by the cooperating coun try In this matter the Department of State cooperated generously tn I sympathetically lo difficulty was encountered in providing that the task of negotiation should fall to the technical agency but that it should be carried out with the full knowledge and concurrence of the diplomitic authority in order to assure consistency with relevant foreign policy considerations 16 How much guidance or direction was to be gren to cooperating countries many of which inquired about the paths to follow in the carly stages of their thinking on space activity Maximum independ

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·38 THE US PROGRAM consultation between NASA ad_130rs and National Academy dele gates and staff produced the first public statement of NASA s desire to enter into cooperative projects with other countries 18 COSPAR served essentially as a means for communicating this offer to the national members The heart of the NASA offer was the following The United States will support COSPAR by undertaking the launching of suitable and worthy experiments proposed by scientists of other countries This can be done by sending into space either single experiments as part of a larger payload or groups of experi ments comprising complete payloads ' 19 The full text of this offer was so specific and tangible in charac ter that it could not be shrugged off as a token gesture Nor was its potential lost upon the practicing scientists present for British and Canadian delegates wasted little time in putting into motion the numerous domestic actions required to place themselves in a po ilion to take advantage of it Soviet delegates present made no move either to recognize or match the US action The immediate effects of the US proposal appeared to be these The future of international cooperation in space exploration was rai ed at a stroke from the token to the real The character of COSPAR as a meaningful forum--Important to attend constructive in facilitating bilateral or multilateral programs going beyond COSPAR s own scope—was also considerably enhanced A new flexi bility was intrnduced into COSPAR permitting those nations so desiring to prxceed beyond the limits set by the least forthcoming member ! Jlly the intrusion of politics 21 into the meeting was countered in some degree by this purely technical proposal of an inherently generous character without trings The use of COSPAR for introduction of the US program further recognized its unique role as convener of precisely those individuals and national agencies best situated to motivate a positive response by their governments-even though COSPAR was not itself a governmental body (It has been pointed out that in the nuclear field the scientific com munity as such was not utilized in generating an international program Rather a special international governmental authority was ·THE US PROGRAM 39 eventually establi hed for the express purpose of facilitating inter national collaboration the International Atomic Energy Authority 22 Of course special considerations attached to the transfer and han dling of nuclear fuels and radioisotopes but it remains an interesting question for speculation as to what might have been the character and course of cooperation in the nuclear field had scientific channels rather than a political structure such as the IALA been utilized ) Becau e each potential cooperator faced the considerable tash of organizing support at home in order to take up the US offer it was nece sary to remain patient and further to confirm and emphasize the US position In September 1959 NASA officials spent a month in Europe meeting with the potential leaders of space activities re peating the message ghen to COSPAR and painstakingly spelling out the governing philosophy The po sıbılıty of assı tance in placing experiments in space had been bruited about though often in garbled form Throughout the special community of interest individuals and organizalıons sought to determine from the NASA representatives what the precise limits of collaboration might be in this process at becamc quite obvious that past involvement in very different Amer ican programs disposed suine of the prospective collaboralors to cxpect financial support for quite ill defined projects It was alo apparent as had been correctly anticipated Dr Hugh Dryden, MASA Deputy Administrator that the multiplicity of interests in space was already giving ri e to significant competition for primacy within certain countrie In this competition an appearance of sup port ly MAS I could become a valuable a set The Houses for financial upport and the competition for VASA endor ment were lothi ca ily niet by the principle of soltantuse Creperation without exhme of fund and the requirement for a inele ondern authority to deal with in eich country Tl.sx points requires repetition oser and over in an almo I nearsome refrain To have departed from the e luming rules during the early and fallos period in order to get tunge moving a bit la tet and thus may hase ernied a great tema,tation But if t. cetiam that artificially aided projects would hase proceded wib demon trate propre ·40 THE US PROCRAM 3 insufficient thought and preparation, as well as resources, in many cases and that the effort to organize for space programs would have been complicated and retarded The conversations in the Fall of 1959 began at Aachen on the occa sion of an AGARD 3 meeting there were carried forward elsewhere in Germany in France and in Italy but opportunity for discussion with scientists of many other countries was also had At this stage there was little idea in Europe as to the projects that might be advanced for cooperation with NASA (One exception discussions in Aachen with officials of the French Centre National d Etudes Telecommunica tions led ultimately if through several stages of development to a joint satellite project between NASA and a French space agency then not yet in existence ) Advice was sought by many but Dr Dryden again demonstrating deep wisdom responded generally that at would make little sense for foreign scientists to direct them elves to projects of particular interest to the United States At the very beginning of the art in Europe such projects might be wholly arti ficial, imposed upon a scient, fic community which might be neither prepared nor motivated for them Instead European scientists were advi ed to review their space related talents and interests and to con sıder which of these they wished to develop toward propo als which might then be of mutual interest Thus a sound başıs was established for expresion of the peculiar talents and interests of an entirely competent scientific community drawing on its own traditions and capabilities The general pattern of these conversations was repeated at the next COSPAR meeting in Nice in January 1960 - broadening beyond the European field to include Japan Latin America and still other com munities and on an increasing scale and frequency at sub equent meetings of COSPAR at annual meetings of the International A tronautical Federation and in the rour p of numerous foreign visitations to NASA headquarters in Washington DC Slowly re ult legan to materialize More and more countries establi hed national space committees for the planning and coordination of new and exiting capabilities for the conduct of space re earch (llowhere 19 an inte ·THE US PROGRAM 41 grated operating agency established as in the United States ) The dominant characteristics of these new committees generally estab Iished in close relation hip to the principal national scientific bodies may be attributed in some part to a desire to fit the conditions for cooperation with the United States Complementing the formal crea tion of the necessary bureaucratic machinery there developed the first cooperative projects for operational flight programs with the United States COOPERATIVE PROJECTS There is relatively little awareness today of the extent to which space cooperation has already developed Cooperation has in fact been ex tended to (1) the launching by the US of atellites prepared by scientists of other nations (2) the competitie selection of individual experiments submitted by foreign scientists of other nations for in clu ion in large US satellites (3) joint sounding rocket project. utılızıng small (non orbiting) rockets to carry out a variety of ex periments high in the atmosphere (4) ground based activity overseas in connection with orbiting experiments in satellite communications meteorology ionospheric research and other fields (5) accommo dation and often joint operation of major US tracking and data acquisition facilities oversea end (6) research and training arrange ments to assist personnel of cooperating nations to gain technical competence necessary for cooperation More recently some very limited initial steps have been taken in the direction of cooperation via commercial exchanges in a more sensitive area of space research the development of large space rockets 25 It has already proved po suble then to extend international cooperation to virtually all aspects of the national space program al though an analysis of the total lı t of cooperatie projects published semi annually by MASA`s indicales that emphasis has been placed upon cientific projects rather than on ifie deselopment of space technology let an oversunplified di tinction between cience and technology is to be as olded The intimate working and training Tela * ·42 THE US PROCRAM tionships required to implement many, if not most of MASAS CO operative projects with other countries extend necessarily to the instrumentation directly and indirectly used to conduct experiments Broadly speaking this includes spacecraft (satellite) technology, payload in trumentation data reporting systems (telemetry), ground equipments for receiving data for tracking and so forth Rocket boo ter technology on the other hand is hedged about by the re strictions which derne from the involvement of such technology in military programs The joint projects worhed out in the course of MASA s interna tional programs deserve some de cription necessarily limited here to a few examples As we have seen the first projects invited by NASA were satellite experiments which micht be prepared abroad for launchup from thic Umuted States In London Profes or (now Sır) Harrie Massey pressed the Royal Society to take up the invita tion extended on behalf of NASA in 1959 In close collaboration with the government of the United Kingdom the loyal Society e tablished a British National Spare Committee under Professor Mas ey with the responsibility for preparing propo als to be ubmitted 10 MASA Drawing from the experience of British scientits in the u c of mall and large wounding rockets in vertical probing of the carths atmos phere during the International Geophy ıcal Year and Lx lore a pro gram for three cooperative satellite projects was pre ented to NISA during the summer of 1939 Since it requires roubts to you prepare a mall satellite the program would nece sarıly exicu oxer a period of years po sibly beyond the tenure of the agency ofirinls msolved \ucordin.ly the amrerment pas placed on a puternimeni! to gostruinent la is -Iliat it was ultimately confirmed in ju er channe of noten Ixtiteen the British Forcig Ollier and the US Dmiunt of Stile the lake upret munt was quite imple It noted thic joint desire of the ind tourine to engage in cooperation in space it emnih jau vdal for thiret atellite project designated the Iritele Alli na Sic Commitee and NISI as the cooperating arrecapar met Iml m rilation to iliem (Sul -queut dreenipafnith oth serni:43 to ·THE US PROGRAM 43 were more detailed than was this prototype in specifying the respec tive responsibilities of the two sides ) Implementation of the agreement began with the establishment of a Joint Working Group including the British scientists who were to prepare the in trumentation necessary for their experimental objec tives and the American project engineers, who were to engineer the satellite structure and electronics (By the time development of the third British satellite was undertaken the United Kingdom was ready to assume full responsibility for the satellite including its engineer ing and Power and telemetry subsystems in addition to the direct instrumentation of its experiments ) The importance of the Joint Working Group is easily overlooked It must be understood as an intimate association of project personnel at the working level from both sides Collectively it bore responsibility for successfully carry ang out the thousands of tasks which ultimately produce a total satel Ite and launcher system to be directed into space carry out its intricate functions perfectly bring new information to the experi menters and reflect credit on the participants The infinite detail of these myriad tasks was fully laid out before the Joint Working Group for its consideration, for the identification of problems the determi nation of solutions and the implementation of decisions Here was the heart of the cooperative enterprise in a substantive project Here was the close contact the mutual dependence and assistance the give and take which alone could engender the intangible benefits of working together - Named Ariel by the British this first international satellite wag Launched in April 1962 from a NASA pad at Cape Canaveral 29 It was a complete success combining certain measurements for the first time in one satellite to produce new data of ionospheric effects and conditions 30 The value of the satellite was sigaificantly enhanced by the fact that it happened to be operating during high altitude nuclear tests and so obtained data of the ionospheric effects of these tests (Contrary to many reports, the satellite was not knocked out by these tests while its functions were partially impaired it con tuued to produce useful data untul more than two years later ) ·42 THE US PROGRAM tionships required to implement many of not most of MSA cooperative projects with other countries extend necessarily to the instrumentation directly and indirectly used to conduct experiments Broadly speaking this includes «pacecraft (satellite) technology payload in trumentation data reporting systems (telemetry) ground equipments for recen ing data for tracking and so forth Rocket boo ter technology on the other hand is hedged about by the re strictions which derive from the involve ment of such tochnology in military programs The joint projects worked out in the course of MASA s interna tional programs deserve some de cription necessarily limited here to a few examples As we have seen the first projects invited by NAS 1 were satellite experiments which might be prepared abroad for launching from the United States In London Professor (now Sır) Harne Alussey pressed the Royal Society to take up the invita tion extended on behalf of NASA in 1959 In close collaboration with the government of the United Kingdom the Royal Society e tablished a British National Space Committee under Professor Mas py with the re ponsibility for preparing proposals to be ubmitted 10 MASA Drawing from the experience of British scientits in the 1 c of mall and large vunding ru hels in vertical probing of the carth atmos phere during the International Geophysical Year and l, ſore a pro gram for three cooperative satellite projects was pre ented to MISA during the summer of 19,9 Sunt it requires tou bly iwe your to prepare a mall atellite the program would nece sarily extend oxir a period of years possibly beyond the tenute of the agency officials involved Iccordin-ly the a reement as į laced on a ivernin nt to postontient basis that i it was ulumately confirmed inner chang of notes Intern the British Foreign Office and the US D , utonil of State I la re du Tee itse mit 8535 quite simple It nr tel tlie, int d-re of the (wo countries to engage in cooperation in space for urili sulal for three atellite project desenated the Inte le Null nal Sejar Committee and \151 at the cooperating groue bea unit ml at natation to them (Sul jurnt a ternirnt sthall count * ·launched in April 1962 from a NASA pad at Cape Canaveral tinued to produce uselul data until my ten tyler was the close contact the mutual dependence and assistance, the give and take which alone could engender the intangible benefits of Named Anel by the Briti h, this first international satellite was and conditions 20 The value of the satellite Was ngmrbrauch by the fact that it happened to be operating dorzech nuclear tests and so obtained data of the jonosytaxt citer tests (Contrary to many reports, the satellite vastu THE US PROGRAM 43 were more detailed than was this prototype in specifying the respec tive responsibilities of the two sides) Implementation of the agreement began with the establishment of a Joint Working Group including the British scientists who were to prepare the in trumentation necessary for their experimental objec tives and the American project engineers, who were to engineer the satellite structure and electronics (By the time development of the third British satellite was undertaken, the United Kingdom was ready to assume full responsibility for the satellite including its engineer ing and power and telemetry subsy tems, in addition to the direct instrumentation of its experiments) The importance of the Joint Working Group is easily overlooked. It must be understood as an intimate association of project personnel at the working level from both sides Collectively it bore responsibility for successfully carry ing out the thousands of ta.ks whuch ultimately produce a total sate! lite and launcher system to be directed into space carry out its intricate functions perfectly, bring new information to the experi menters, and reflect credit on the participants The infinite detail of these myriad tasks was fully laid out before the Joint Thorking Group for its consideration for the identification of problems the determi nation of solutions and the implementation of decisiong Here was the heart of the cooperative enterprise in a substantive project. Here working together *28 It was a complete success first time in one satellite to produce new data of ionosphere combining certain measurements for the ·4A TEE US PROGRAM Perhaps of equal significance was the fact that the project had been carried out entirely within the framework of the governing philosophy described in the previous chapter The ideas for the experiments had been British the instrumentation was designed funded, and prepared by the British Americans engineered and funded the satel lite with its power and telemetry equipment and provided the launch ing The data was acquired at US and British ground stations turned over to the British and analyzed by them The British experimenters then reported publicly on the results of their own experiments No funds changed hands throughout the exercise NASA agreements for cooperative launching of thirteen interna tional satellites exist at this writing including four already launched successfully The second international satellte was Alouette instru mented and fully engineered in Canada It was launched in Septera ber 1962 and is still functioning as the longest lived data gathering satellite to date An exchange of letters between US and Canadian agencies was sufficient to constitute the agreement for this satellite which ultimately cost Canada three to four million dollars plus the cost of special ground stations end data reduction The concept for the Alouette experiment was regarded as more advanced and interest ung than an existing American plan for the same purpose (Alouette was designed to sound the ionosphere from above by means of radio impulses sweeping through a range of frequencies and to receive the returning echoes in the satellite Alouette was the first satellite to conduct such an investigation of the character of the ionosphere from above) So successful has been Alouette scientifically and technically that the parties agreed in 1963 to enter into a second and far more ambi nous series of joint efforts Under a program designated ISIS (for International Satellites for lonospheric Sounding) Canadian agen cies and industry have teamed up to prepare four more satellites for American Idunching The ISIS series will carry forward a compre hensive program of ionospheric investigations during a full swing of the regular cycle of solar activity from minimum to maximum a period of about six years Thus the Canadians have voluntarily ·THE US PROGRAMI 45 assumed a major role in the total ionospheres program of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration To permit Canada to enter into this program, its Cabinet recommended authorization of an expenditure of some $9 million Here then, is an example of an initial cooperative program so successful and rewarding that it has led to a second generation cooperation in which an already planned program is extensively shared A second British and third international satellite Anel II was successfully launched by NASA in March 1964 The third UK effort, scheduled for 1966 will be fully engineered by the British. The remaining cooperative satellites already brought under agreement are at this writing prospective (See Table I) In each the total experimental flight package has been conceived and designed and will be funded, engineered and tested by the foreign cooperating agency The French program will constitute another unique con tnbution to the NASA ionospheric research effort The Italian pro gram is of unusual public and technical interest since it calls for the launching of a satellite at sea directly into an orbit in the equatorial plane For this purpose, the Italian National Space Commission has obtained and modified platforms normally used for oil drilling and vaguely resembling Texas Towers” except that they are towable. The platforms will be towed to a suitable location in extraternitorial waters on the equator, probably off the east coast of Africa their retractable legs will be lowered to the ocean bottom and securely anchored and the satellite launching will then proceed 31 Of special international interest is the satellite agreement with the European Space Research Organization 82 Under this agreement, NASA will launch two satellites which have been proposed by this organization of European governments The satellites will be en gineered by European industry supervised by a new regional lab oratory The data obtained will be forwarded to a new regional center in Darmstadt for analysis The preparation of a satellite 19 a considerable project requring two or more years and up to several million dollars for its comple tion. The US international program would have been severely limited ·TABLE I COOPERATIVE SATELLITE PROJECTS Country Name Fehlelo Launch Site & Date & Orbit Spacecralt Responsibility Experimenlets Experiment Description Canada . Alouette Thor Agena B DRTE Canadian Telecommunications Establishment (DRTE) Sound 1000sphere from abovo (Top side Sounder) to measure hour to hour electron densities of 10nosphere. Tacirc iesilo Rango Near Polar 80 Circular 1000 KM Determine electron density at height of satellite Sra 29 1960 Monitor YZF Nouse in Range of 1 to 10 AC/a Canadian National Measure primary cosmic ray particles Research Counca) (NRC) outside the earth o atmosphere. DRTE and NRC Samo Canadian axperiments as Alou Alouette 11 Thor Agena D DRTE ette Pacific Minulo Range 2965 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Near Polar Apogee -500-3000 M Pence 500 Improved Delta Determino electron temperature in v cinity of orbitung spacecraft. DRTE DRTE • Isls? (Interne trond Satellite for lonorrhero Soud aa) Snept and fixed frequency topside sounders supplemented by eight ad dational experiments threa Canadian and five US ear Polo Apogeo 3300 KM # 1000 m 1%7 ·Topsido Sounder plus other experi ments to be determined DRTE .Ios 2 DRTE, NRC, and NASA Funded US. Experimenters Improved Delta Near Polar Apogee at least 2000 AM Improved Delta To be determined To be determined. DRTE Isus 3 To be determined France • FRI Scout National Center for Space Studies (CNES) National Center for Telecommunications Studies (CNET) Simultaneously measuro the electric and magnetic components of very low frequency (VLF) radio emissions and measure electron densities. Pacific Missile Range Near Polar Circular 800 KM Early 1965 Italy . Project San Marco Scout Italian Space Commission School of Acrospace Engineering University of Rome Determine local density of equatonal upper atmosphere by measuring tho instantaneous acrodynamic dragon the satellite Towable Platform In Indian Ocean Equatorial Waters Inclination 0-3 Near Circular 250-300 KM University of Florence Ionospheric propagation studies (Fara day Rotation Technique) using beacon 1966 or 1967 Preliminary Stages of Program: (1) Principal elements of the satellito payload have been fight tested by Shotput sounding rockets from Wallops Island (5/63 and 8/63) (2) A prototype satellite was launched by a scout rebiclo from Wallops 11.-1 !_ 1.2. It ·TABLE I (Continued) Country Name Launch Site & Dato Vehicle & Orbit Spacecraft Responsibility Experimenter Experiment Descripton Unued Kingdom . Ariel I Delta GSFC Imperial College London Measuro spectrum of caergies of pri mary cosmic rays and us yanato, with Cerenkor detector Atlantic M2891) Rango Inclination 54 Apogee 1200 KM Perigee 400 MM April 6 1962 University of Birmingham Measuro local electron density with RF impedance probe. University College, London Measure electron temperature und den sily with Langaar probe. Measure foa masa composition and temperature with mass spectrometer Measuro energy spectrum of solar hard X Raya • Ariel II Scout GSFC Measuro solar ultra violet emissions (Lyman Alpha) Measure atmospheric ozono with fil tered photocella and spectrometer Wallops Island Meteorological Office UK Air Ministry Inclination 51 Apogea 1350 KY ·Measure galactic radio noise. March 27 1964 Perigee 290 KM Mullard Radio Astronomy Observatory University of Cambridge Nuffield Radio Astronomy Labora tories, Jodrell Bank Meteorological Office, UK Air Ministry Measure micrometeoroid Auz by opti cal detection of boles formed in a this metallic flm Measure vertical distribution of me locular oxygen in earth s atmosphere. Scout . UK Satellito #3 (S-53) Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough Measure large scalo pola sources in galaxy Wallops Island Inclination 60 Circular 550 KM Millard Radio Astronomy Observatory 1'uzversity of Cambridge Lato 1966 Measure intensity of VLF radiation. University of Sheffield Radio Research Station Slough Measuro intenuty and geographical distribution of sources of optural ter Testnal Boise. Measuro electron denuity and temporada University of Butaingham atur.

·Country Namo Vehício Leanck Sko & Dato & Orbit TABLE 1 (Continued) Spacecraft Responsibility Experimenters Experiment Description European Space Research Organizatros (ESRO) ESRO I Scout ESRO Denmark Technical University Pacific Mosilo Rango Near Polar Eccentno France University of Paris Norway University of Oslo 2967 Study high latitude particles and their effects on the sono sphere including optical heat Ing jonization and large scale dynamic effects involung cur rends and magnetic perturba (10ns, Satellite also to carry beacon for measuring total electron content between satel lite and ground observers UL. Sweden Kiruna Geophysical Observatory UL. Queens University (Belfast) UK Radio Research Station (Slough) University College (London) Franco Saclay Cen er for Nuclear Physics Netherlands Sterrewacht (Ultrecht) ESRO II Scout ESRO Pacific Missilo Rango Near Polar Eccentno Uh, 1967 Mea uro solar and comic ra drations ancluding Rays. IIE II Joe Lyman Alpha trapped radiation solar and Van Allen Belt protons, cos mic ray protons, alpha parti cles and high-eactsy elec ITORS Imperial Collego (London) University Collego (London) University of Leeds UK U.K. UK University of Leicester

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·Coop Nemo Vehiclo Launch Site & Date & Orbit TABLE 1 (Continued) Spacecraft Re ponsibility Experimentera Experiment Devription European Space Research Organization (ESRO) ESRO I Scout ESRO Denmark Tecbolcal Vairesity Pacific Misalo Rango Near Polar Eccentrio France Voitersity of Puis 1967 horway University of Oslo Gudy high latitude particles in their efects on ite 100% opbese ucod.rg ortical real ang bonusties and large scale dyramic Arts into'ntr cur reoli dicerc perturb 11081 Sa ellite also to carry beacon fet rear niet tetal electron co erat lewereld I te and grow.deleners Sweden Airons Crophytical Observatory Uh. Queen. Lairenisy (Belfast) U.LT Razia Research Station (Slough) UL. University College (London) Franco Seclar Cet er for Vucleu Physics Netherlands Sterrewacht (litrecht) .ECRO II Scout ESRO Pacific Musilo Range Near Polar Ecceptnc U.L. Mea ure solar and corrales diation, laclairs Rayo NIE 11 lune Lymin Alpha trappeal radsatson, solar und la Alien Thelt rrotoss Cou mic thy protor, als es parts cles, and high-energy elec trook 1967 Imperial College (London) l'pirenity College (London) University of Leeds University of Leicester UL. U.K. U.K.

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·TABLE II FOREIGN EXPERIMENTS ON NASA SATELLITES Spacecraft Responsibility Experimenters Experiment Description Country Nama & Dato Vehicle & Orbit France Two Experments . Polar Orbiling Thrust Augmented Geophysical Thor Agena Observatory (OGO-C) Inclination 82-90 Apogee 912 KM 1965 Perigee 256 KM Measure Aurglow at 6300 A, 5577 A, 3914 A, and in the near ultra violet region with photometer Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Service D Aeronomie, National Scientific Research Center (CNRS) GSFC (Co- Experimenter) Measure self reversal of the Solar Ly man Alpha spectrographic line. CNRS GSFC Delta Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO-E) Inclination 33 Circular 480 KM 1955 CSFC University College, London United Kingdom Seen Ezpenments • US fixed Scout Frequency Top bide Sounder Near Polar (S-48) Apogee 1375 KM Summer 1964 Perigee 925 KM Measuro 1on mas composition and temperature with ion mass spectrome ter (Similer esperiment on Ariel L.)

·Atlas Agent GSFC • Orbating Astronomical Observatory (OAO-C) Uaiversity of Leicester and University College London Study tho X Ray emission of stars and nebulao and obtain information on the interstellar absorption of HE and the heavier elemento Inclination 32 Circular 780 KM 1967 Orbiting Solar Ob crvatory (OSO-D) GSFC Measure distribution of total solar X Ray emission over a wido band. Delta Inclination 33 Circular 480 KM (1) University of Leicester and University College, London 1965 (2) University College London Study solar HE II resonanco emission (304 A) Delta GSFC Measure solar X Ray fox with spectroheliograph. Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO-E) University of Leicester and University College London Inclination 33 Circular 480 KM 1965 Thor Agena B GSFC Direct Measurement Explorer (DME-A) University College London Measure ion mass composition and temperature with spherical lon mass spectrometer (Sumila experiment on Ariel 1) 1965 Inclination 80 Apogee 2500–3000 AM Perigee 500 KM (Piggyback with Alouette II) Measure electron temperature with planar electron temperature probe ·TABLE III COOPERATIVE SOUNDING ROCKET PROJECTS Country an! Cooperating Agency Number Nocket and Launch Site Fxperiment Alptude and Date Lxperimenter and Project Description fraentina Argentine National Commission for Space Rencarch (CIF) 2 Nike Cajon Above % AM Chamıcal Argentina late 1961 National University of Tacuman Measure D and Ere 51on electron density and temperature and ion density Australia Department of Supply 4 Skylark 200 KM Woomera Australia Sept /Nov 1961 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Measure stellar and nebular ultra violet radiation in southern skics. Compare wath northern hemi phere dala Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Or ganization Measure VLF radio noise in the sono phere 2 Aerobea 150 A Above 120 V Wallops Island Apr/Ilay 1963 Commonwealth Cientific and Industrial Re carch Organization (CSIRO) Canada SS Various U.S Canadian Research Agencies Fort Churchill Canada 1958-1963 Various US experimenters u e Fort Churchill facilities for launching sounding rockets in auroral zone to study various atmospheric and ionospheric phenomena. (30 per year projected) 6 Black Brant 100 Wallops Island June/ Dec. 1962 Canadian Research Agencies Determino vehicle flieht performance characteristics and obtain engineering data on effectiveness of instrumentation, Cosmic Ray sen or and magnetometer included. (Fort Churchill facıl ties Doperative during this period due to fire danige ) ·France French National Center for Space Research (CNES) 2 Aerobce 150 Above 280 KM WaVops Island Oct 1963 National Center for Telecommunications Studies (CNET) Study uregularıties in the ionosphere through simultaneous measurements of VLF field strength and local electron density CNES-NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Simulta neously measure charged particle and neutral gas tem peratures in the sonosphere. 2 French Dragon 2 French Centaure Hammaguir Algeria April 1964 Germany Ministry for Scientific Research 1 Aerobce 150 A White Sands NM late 1964 Max Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics and NASA AMES Research Center German scientists provide spe cial sampling surfaces to be used in project luster in which lunar dust particles will be sampled directly India Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) of the Department of Atomic Energy 4 Nike-Apache 150 KM Thumba India Nov., 1963 Jan. 196+ Physical Research Laboratory Ahmedabad Measure upper atmosphero winds by ground photography of alluminated sodium vapor released from rochet 4 Nike Apache 150 KM Thumba, India Jan. 1964 University of New Hampshire Investigate the equa torial electrojet at the geomagnetic equator by means of magnetometer instrumentation INCOSPAR Meteorological rocket soundings (CHAFF) supplementing the Indian Ocean expedition 30 Judi Dart Thumba India 1964 ·TABLE III COOPERATIVE SOUNDING ROCKET PROJECTS Country and Cooperating Agency Number, Rocket and Launch Site Experiment Altitude and Dato Crperimenter and Project Description Argentina Argentine National Commission for Space Research (CNIE) National University of Tucuman Measure D and Ere gion electron density and temperature and ion den ity 2 Nike Cajun Abosc 90 KM Chamical Argentina late 1964 Australia Department of Supply 4 Skylark 200 KM Woomera Australia Sept /Noy 1961 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Mea ure stellar and nebular ultra violet radiation in southern skies. Compare with northern hemisphere data Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Or ganization Measure VLF radio noise in the sono phere 2 Acrobea 150 A Above 120 KM Wallops Island 4 pr / May 1963 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Re carch Organization (CSIRO) Canada Canadian Research Agencies 55 Various US Fort Churchill Canada 1958-1963 Various US etperimenters use Fort Churchill facilities for launching sounding rockets in auroral zone to tudy various atmospheric and ionospheric phenomena. (30 per year projected) 6 Black Bract 100 KM Wallops Island June/ Dec 1962 Canadian Research Agencies Determine vehicle flight performance characteristics and obtain engineering data on effectiveness of instrumentation Co mic Ray sensor and magnetometer included. (Fort Churchill facilities inoperative during this penod due to fire damage) ·France Freach National Center for Space Research (CNES) 2 Aerobee 150 Abovo 280 AM Wallops Islend Oct 1963 Nat onal Center for Telecommunications Studies (CNET) Study wregularities jo the ionosphere through simultaneous measurements of VLF field strength and local electron density CNES NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Simulta neously measure charged particle and peutral gas tema peratures in the zonosphere. 2 French Dragon 2 French Centaure Hammaguir Algeris April 1964 I Acrobee 150 A White Sands NM late 1964 Germany Ventry for Scientific Research Mar Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics and NASA AMES Research Center German scientists provide spe cial sampling surfaces to be used in project luster in which lunar dust particles will be sampled directly Physical Research Laboratory Abmedabad Measure upper atnaosphere winds by ground photography of illuminated sodium vapor released from rocket 4 Nike Apache 150 KM India Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) of the Department of Atomic Energy Thumba India Nov., 1963 Jan 1964 4 Nike Apache 150 AM Thumba, India Jan. 1964 University of New Hampshire Lavesugate the equa torial electrojet at the geomagnetic equator by means of magnetometer instrumectation INCOSPAR Meteorological rocket soundings (CHIAFF) supplementing the ladian Ocean Expedition, 30 Judi Dart Thumba India 1964 ·TABLE III (Continued) Country and Cooperating Agency Number Rocket and Experiment Alutade Launch Site and Date Experimenter and Project Description Jtaly Italian Space Commission 8 Nike Cajun and Nike ASP 80-200 KM Sardinia Jan/ AprullSept 1961 Dec., 1962 Italian Space Commission Measuro upper atmosphere winds by ground photography of Illuminated sodium vapor released from rocket, Japan Japanese Radio Research Laboratones 3 Nike Cajun 100-130 KM Wallops I land Apr/May 1962 Japanese Radio Research Laboratories and NASA God dard Space Flight Center Combine Japanese swept Ire quency resonance probe with GSFC Langmuir probe for electron density and temperaturo determination. 2 Aerobeo 150 A Abovo 130 KM Wallops Island Sept., 1963 1 Javelin Above 200 KM Wallops Island 1964 New Zealand New Zealand National Research Committee 1 Arcas 70-80 KM Birdlings Flat, N.Z. May 1963 University of Canterbury New Zealand Measuro wiad drift and turbulent diffusion in the cosphere by ground based photography of illuminated aerosol re leased from rocket. Correlato data with low frequency radio scattering 2 Arcas 70-80 KM Birdlings Flat N.Z. 1964 ·Nork/Denmark Norwegian Committee for Space Research 1 Nike-Cajun 1 Nike-Apache 2 Nike Cajun Above 90 KM Wallops Island Dec 1961 June 1962 Mar Apr 1963 Royal Technical University of Denmark NASA GSFC with Norwegian participation (Wallops launchings) Norwegian Defense Research Establish ment and Royal Technical University of Denmark (Andoya Launchings) Measure D and E region elec tron and son density and electron collision frequency by radio absorption experiment, Faraday Rotation Experi ment and RF Impedance and Conductivity Probes. Lyman Alpha monitor (Wallops) and energetic parti cles experiment (Andoya) alsa included Andoya Norway Aug /Dec 1962 Sept 1963 March 1964 3 Nike Cajun 1 Nike Apache 3 Nike Apache Above 90 KM Pahıstan Pakistan Upper Atmosphere and Space Research Committee 2 Nike-Cajun 125 A Sonmiani Beach Pakistan June 1962 Pakistan Upper Atmosphere and Space Research Com mittee Measure upper atmo phere winds by ground based photography of illuminated sodium vapor re leased from payload 1 Nike Cajun 80-125 KM 2 Nike Apache 125-200 KM 16 Jud. Dart Sonmiani Beach May 1963 Sonmiani Beach April 1964 Sonmrani Beach 1964 Pakistan Upper Atmosphere and Space Rescarch Com mittee Meteorological rocket soundings (CHAFF) supplementing the International Indian Ocean Expedition.

·60 TIE US PROGRAM understanding of the peculiar meteorology of the Indian Occan basın ma problem requiring synchronized soundings in which they are cooperating Why should countries with other immediate needs enter into the csoterica of space research? It was reasonable enough to conclude that countries should certainly not be pressed to divert energies and resources to space activity The decision to do so must be their own and NASA requirement that they do so without financial aid en sured that the decision would be made on the ments Even so why sbould that decision be made in the affirmative? A chief science advisor of the Pakistanı government Professor Abdus Salaam a widely known physicist who spends much of his time at University College London has supplied an interesting answer To Professor Salaam one of Pakistan s great needs in common with other develop ing countries is to interest her able young people in careers in technology The problem is how to attract enough of them away from the traditional preparation in the classics Because space flight re search is highly visible and carries with it an air of compelling interest, it can help to attract young university people into electronics work materials research meteorology ionospheric studies and so forth Thus a developing country may enter into cooperative sound ing rocket work as well as other space research not because it has grandiose notions of the scope of its eventual participation or con tribution but because the activity is an effective stimulus to tech nological interest study and occupation In this sense one may suggest a small exception to the judgment that The people of the emerging countries have not the means to go shopping in what Pro fessor P M S Blackett has called the Supermarket of Science they cannot even afford the bargain basement Perhaps as important is this general observation pertinent to scien tific cooperation by developing countries Even though indigenous scientific research may be relatively un important as a means of solving technical problems 1 13 smportant as a means of promoting style and a sense of values of a sci caufic world also a developing country gains self confidence of his ·THE US PROGRAM 61 nationals play & part, however modest, in the advancement of Science, 34 Sisll more direct is a statement by the Chairman of the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR), Dr Vikram Sarabhar, who has kindly allowed me to use it It is clear that the economic development of a nation 19 intimately linked with the understanding and application of science and tech nology by its people It has sometimes been argued that the application of technology by itself can contribute to economic growth This is certainly true as an abstract proposition but fails in practice. Witness the state of development and social structure of countries in the Middle East and Arabia where for decades natural resources have been exploited with the most sophisticated technology History has demonstrated that the real social and eco nomic fruits of technology go to the who apply them through understanding Therefore, a significant number of citizens of every developing country must understand the ways of modern science and of the technology that flows from it. This means the ability to ask the basic question why and where for? This requires train ang involved in probing the frontiers of science whatever field one may be engaged in whether it is Biology Genetics Atomic Science or Space Research It is obviously necessary for each country to provide facilities for its nationals to do front tank re search within the resources which are available It is equally necessary having produced the men who can do research to organize task-oriented projects for the nation s practical problems Pursuit of cosmic rays and space research does not requre an apology in a developing nation provided the activities are within a total scheme of priorities in the allocation of national resources Many of us who are engaged in pure scienre are also involved in the organization and condurt of education, of planning and of Industrial development in fields such as electronics and chemicals I am actively interested in the application of science for the im provement of agricultural productivity and in the implications of science to society and the problemas of security 35 Sounding rocket programs have grown to the point where a signifi cant percentage of NASA 8 own projects are carried out in the co operative category, perhaps one third per year and the proportion may well grow Much of the activity is conducted at overseas launch ing sites prepared entirely by the foreign participants often because of geographic factors of special interest for scientific research ·62 THE US PROGRAM A particularly interesting example of a cooperative effort in this Category with far reaching implications as the case of the sounding rocket range at Thumba in India The fir t objective here was a modest bilateral cooperatue sounding rocket project between NASA and the India Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) The suggestion was then made to Dr Vikram Sarabhai, Chairman of INCOSPAR, that the range be offered for use internationally and that UN sponsorship be sought The US then introduced into the Tech mical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peace ful U es of Outer Space a resolution for UN sponsorship of sounding rocket ranges in scientifically critical locations the ranges would be available to member nations interested in using them for open projects The resolution received unanimous support in the UN Sub committee its parent Committee and ultimately in the General As sembly In the course of this procedure India formally offered its proposed range at Thumba on the geomagnetic equator for sponsor ship under the resolution Considerable skill effort and intelligence were devoted to developing the facilities In January 1964 a special committee went out to the range to determine its compliance with the conditions of sponsorship So compelling were the technical and nontechnical reasons for participation in support of the range the French space agency had already entered into a tripartite project with INCOSPAR and NASA and the Soviet Union had according to the committee s report, begun discu ons with INCOSPAR for a joint sounding rocket effort Both France and the Sonet Union had promised equipments for use in connection with the range It may be assumed that the United Kingdom and other countries also are in terested in a ociating them lies with the range Thus what began as a bilateral elfort with relatively narrow technical objectives has grown throu h a process of anczorable technical and politiral appeal to the point where major nations including the Soviet Union find It important to join in The result is the first actinity in which tech niciars of cal and weet may actually meet in the context of spa e flicht proglams and operations ~which must be open to all Morrere rechange of data or personnel could exercise a comparable that ·THE US PROCRAM 63 effect. The compelling force of the Indian program derives from its substantive character from the physical e-tablishment of a range in a region of strong scientific interest, its outfitting with neces ary equipments the planning and conduct of actual flight projects and the tangible participation of two or more nations Unquestionably, too the element of UN sponsor hip contributed significantly to the Etature of the project and the attractivene s of membership Also important was the fact hat az unequivocal wet of requirements for "joining the club was established one that could not be met by lofty sentiments alone The fourth category of NASA s cooperative international programs enlists still broader participation and contribution abroad In this category there is no joint effort in experiments destined for space fight in satellites or sounding rockets Here the participation is essentially ground based, it consists of activities that suitably equipped «cientists can carry out in more or less conventional ways virtually anywhere in the world in order to complement enhance indeed make possible NASA s own satellite experiments Perhaps the bet example is the cooperation that made possible the first trans atlantic television broadcasts by satellite In this case NASA required claborate overseas ground stations capable of handling TV and other radio tests which would be transmitted over the Atlantic Ocean by satellite It was possible to request permission to build a US station in Europe for thus purpose Instead it was decided to offer the com munications agencies of England and France an opportunity to Participate in the experimental program for demonstrating the feası bility of communications satellites their price of admission so to speak was the erection of suitable ground stations at their own ex pense Both countries readily as ented 3Almost immediately other nations asked to participate and were nelcomed in every case on the same terms The total number eventually rose to eleven each country making its own arrangements for a suitable ground facility the cost ranging from less than one million dollars to something close to ten million dollars depending upon the character and capability of the instrumentation A valuable aspect of the project was the establish ·64 THE US PROGRAM ment of an International Ground Station Committee composed of representatives of all the cooperating international agencies and the NASA contractors under NASA chairmanship This Committee provided an expert forum for the selection of suitable radio frequencies, the definition and scheduling of transmissions tests and consideration of the interests of each and all of the participants The program was completely successful and had considerable impact in demonstrating to the world the technical promise of communications satellites. Moreover it testified to the sincerity of US advocacy of global cooperation in the establishment of a commercial sy tem of communica uong founded on satellites (It is of some interest that the Soviet Union was later invited to participate in this multilateral communications satellite testing program by correspondence from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev The Soviet Union was negative to this proposal) Little noted but no less important was a second ground based" project of global cooperation Recognizing the intense interest in many areas of the world in improved weather forecasting and rescarch NASA sought and obtained partnership of the US Weather Bureau in "internationalizing" NASA , TIROS weather satellites Member countries of the World Melcorological Organization Over one hundred were invited to conduct special observations of local cloud cover u ing aircraft balloons special cameras and other con ventional techniques these observations were synchronized with the ps «es orerhead of the TIROS satellites which photographed cloud cover on a much larger scale and from a great altitude Over 35 coun tres participated in this effort laying a basis for interpreting the naw atellite *ather data in terms of olrerved local conditions As in all of Asis programs three projects went forward without financual a tance from the United States MASA and the US rathne Baresu then intiled the participants to attend an Interns tioral Work hop in Balindon on the ly of weather stellte data for freearch and forecastis- 3* There were strong doules that forein enrol-1 ts would aliard the forkshop withoct financial ***** Barr feitbordila e! from 30 countries including some of the ·THE US PROGRAM 65 smaller African and Caribbean nalions, making this a very rare type of international conference in the United States, indeed Other forms of ground ba ed cooperation have been organized (See Table IV) These generally involve foreign scientists in making various measurements or ob ervations in order to assess local con ditions or phenomena complementing the data recorded by satellites in their immediate environment In some cases such observations are indispen able for the total success of an experiment This form of cooperation 19 generally established through correspondence without formality, although national space authorities are informed and con sulted in the organizing process Undergırding all of NASA s international cooperative activity 19 a variety of opportunities for training It countries new to space research are to enter into meaningful projects some such training and orientation is required for this purpose NASA offers a threc faceted program To permit foreign graduate tudents to advance their specific competence in the field NASA established a fellowship program in US univeraitieg 38 Consistent with its basic philosophy NASA meets only the university costs and travel in the United States an appropriate agency abroad must sponsor the student and provide for his travel to and subsistence in this country Thus the sponsoring agency is motivated to consider carefully its participation in the pro gram its election of trainees and perhaps most important its plans for future utilization of the trained personnel If such costs deter & country from arranging for training for its young students obviously it cannot mount a space efort of enough consequence to employ the finished trainee A second program provides for more specific training where required for immediate participation in cooperative projects which have been already defined and agreed In this case the training is done at NASA field centers where work similar to that entailed in the joint effort goes on This may involve training is small rocket launch ing tracking payload design and preparation processing and anal ysis of data and so forth The length of training depends in part on the particular subject matter, but if laboratory training is required ·TABLE IV COOPERATIVE GROUND BASED PROJECTS International Participation Project . Meteorological Satellites TIROS (Television and Infrared Observation Satellite) obrains Televson pictures of cloud formations and pat terns and measure the absorption and reflections of infra reu solar radiation by the earth and its atmosphere Launch Nominal Orbus Aame Date Inchnahon Circular TIROS I 401-60 48 700 AM TIROS II 11-23-00 48 700 AM TIROS 111 7-12-61 48 700 AM TIROS IV 2-08-62 48 700 AM TIROS V 6-19-62 58 700 KM TIROS VI 9-18-62 56 690 KM TIROS VII 6-19-63 58 660 AM TIROS VIII 12-21-63 58 425 AM NASA and the US Weather Bureau have provided an opportunity for two types of direct foreign participation in weather satellite operation (1) Foreign weather services were invited to perform ground based observations synchronized with satellite pbotography Somc Forty Weather Sertices have taken part in this program using TIROS II through TIROS VIII (2) The first Automatic Picture Transmission (APT) subsystem (launched on TIROS VIII on December 21 1963) provided an opportunity for direct read out of local cloud cover pic tures using relatively simple ground equipment Sets purchased in the US were operated in France and at the IIOE Head quarters in India Australia Canada Denmarh Hong Kong Indonesia and the UX U ed equipment designed and built locally based on APT technical data supplied by NASA Communications Sarcilites Projects RELAY TELSTAR and SYNCOV bave been designed to determ ne the feasibility of tran oceanic com munications via active repeater satellites These satellites pick up and amplify signals received from ground stations and then retransmit them back to earth. Launch nominal Orbits Date Inclination Apogee Perigee TELSTARI 7-10-62 45 -600 KM 950 M RELAY 112-13-62 47 7425 KM 1320 MM In 1963 telephone telegram and high speed data communications experiments were conducted among ground stations in the U.S England, France Italy Japan, Bra l and Germany (the first five stations al o participated in intercontinental television experiments) Nigeria participated during this period in project SYNCOM by supporting the USNS Kingsport in Lagos harbor as the African terminal for this project President Kennedy and Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa formally inaugurated SYNCOM communications directly between North Amer ca and Africa on August 23 1963 by conducting the frst live telephone conversation via sat ll te between heads of go ernment In May 1964 Spon entered the network by Name ·TELSTAR II 5-0-6 SYNCON I7-76-63 RELAY 1-21-64 32-5 46.5 10555 RAL 925 KM 35900 AM 30791 KM 7400 KM 2129 V conducting narrow bnd e periments wth the US In the late pun mer of 1964 Denmark Torway and Sueden plan to have a joint facility operational on a receitrag basis. la 1065 Canada intends to complete a ground station capable of conducting narrow band and television experiments lonosphere Topside Sounder Satellites (Alouette and S-19) In addition to numerous US and Canadian station tuenty three stations in fourteen countries have taken or are taking ground soundings coordinated with satellite soundings which permit com parison of top and bottom side ionospheric profiles Alopette uses a swept frequency sounder system and S-48 wilt uc 2 fixed frequency system to measure ionospheric electron density di tribution and study its variations. Name Launch Date nominal Orbits Alouette 9.99-62 Near Polar Circular 100 M S-68 1964-65 Near Polar 1375 - 725 AM The radio research station of the lnited Kingdon department of Scientific and Industrial Research is staffing and operating three telemetry stations for the acquistion of data from NASA Canadian topside sounder satellites The RRS work which includes data re ductson and analysis will continue through the ISIS program . Ionosphere Beacon and Laser Track & Søsellue (5-66) S-66 prondes the means for synoptic study of the iono phene hr grourd based observations of radio ignals trans mitted from the satellite and for experiments in satellite tracking by Joser beams directed to S-66 and returned to ground based receivers by special reflectors Name Launch Date Nominal Orbit S-66 Summer 1961 Near PolarCircular 1200 MM Ground stations in tuenty seven countries currently plan to carry out Faraday rotation scintillation and doppler differential experi ments in order to measure the integra ed electron den ity in a ver tical plane from the satellite to the ground slation below and its variations as a function of latitude season and diurnal time The U and France plan to participato in the Laser tracking experi ment Brazylian Project RAS 4 Three ground tations spanning the geo magnetic equator have been established by the Brazilian Space Commission (CNAE) for pecial studies of the equatorial iono sphere using Faraday rotation differential doppler and group de lay tecliniques of analyzing signals from the sono phere beacon (5-66) and other US satellites ·68 THE US PROGRAMI trainees are asked to remain long enough so that they are of some value to the laboratory, in return for the training given Again they must be fully supported by their sponsoring institutions at home A third program offers resident research associateships at cer tain NASA centers for post-doctoral scients to (citizens or foreign) of recognized achievement Since the principal benefit of these as sociateships is to NASA liberal stipends are provided and the ar rangements are entirely individual 39 By July 1961 these three programs had brought some 41 graduate fellows 176 trainees for cooperative projects and 92 post doctoral associates to the United States The second program in particular hes brought home to NASA centers and their adjacent communities come of the flavor of international cooperation At NASAs allops Island launching ite in Virginia Paki tani and Indian trainres have worked side by sidr Townsfolk in the nearby communities have grown accu tomed to Moslem viitors who on more than one occasion have approached tartled homcorners to ask permission to place a prayer rug on the front lawn at the hour for prayer The townsfolk have al«o accepted the fact that Italian techniciany training at allope are very likely to walk off with their contract bridge prizes NASA, technical staff have been much intrigued by their international ** sociation, and have welcomed them as a source of technical and social enrichment of their own work day Some mention should be made too of NASA s policy of openness to brief 1913 by foreign nationals consistent with the requirerents of it Act for such opennes and yet within the relatively few con straints impoud by security considerations Since MASA was estab Risha I in late 1943, almnat nire thousand foreign scients to sretni clans press and srdu try represntative and government obrisis Havers le sits of an hnur lo a day to NASA installasjons irelo' . the leares : ut a: Cape hennedy and at tallopa Islan! Virginis Tel!) In all the fun buen decite tere 1o far VASI Burrian! eru oral secratione in oring to propor ! In the Cerita al mindset crear » vt forth in the ADX ' ·TABLE V PERSONNEL EXCHANGES Cumulative Participation Purpose Program 92 Postdoctoral and senior postdoctoral grants for sensor foreigo scientists administered for NASA by the National Academy of Sciences provide for participation in research at NASA centers for one year Foreign Nationals from Countries Resident Research Associateships 25 44 International Fellowships Theoretical and experimental training in the Space Sciences provided to foreign graduate students at US Universities for one year with possibility of renewal for a second year on a shared cost basis Program administered for NASA by the National Academy of Sciences and designed to contribute to the capabilities of cooperating countries Fellows from Countrica Universities 13 20 Foreign Nationals 176 from Technical Training Countries 17 Technical training available to foreigo technicians and scientists at NASA centers in support of agreed cooperative programs and ground facility ope rations Length of training from several months to one year (Training of tracking station personnel under the direction of Goddard Space Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory Other training principally at GSFC, Langley and Wallops Station ) Approx. 8400 19ts Olficials and scitati is from foreign countries vi&it NASA facılıties in pro gram demonstrating open peaceful character of US civilian space effort and the opportunities it provides for particip tion by other countries Visitors froma Countries 95. * Includes the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) ** Includes ESRO and the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) ·STATION OPERATION United States Jofat Foreign NASA LNTERNATIONAL STATION AGREEMENTS WA VYED SCIENTIFTC OPTICAL TLIGHT SATELITE 42 Argentina ri Australia Austry Australia Crecto mur Canada Chle Ira Casary is 24 Ecuador Co Ltd JAPA Edad Peru xi. Hy Wal zur Republic South Africa Moda Pra Spela Nigers Souts Alriet DATA NECTOS DEEP SPACE MONITORING ACQU'DITION Inda tada ·THE US PROGRAM 73 the space race, cooperation is not thought meaningful unless and until it embraces the Soviet space program. This viewpoint is super ficial and even pernicious If followed to its logical end it would lead us to Deglect our friends until we had become friendly with our principal adversary Moreover, this viewpoint overstates the technical value of cooperation with the Soviet side while it understates this aspect of collaboration with the other advanced countries Generally speaking, Western Europe is far stronger scientifically and tech nologically than the USSR and the Western Europeans are rap adly closing ta on us If present trends continue it will be only a matter of a few years before they achieve supremacy' 10 Thus we may have more to learn in a basic sense from our friends than from our adversary in the pervading technologies that underlie space research Again in the political arena, the US program of cooperation in space activity reaches a scientific, technical and official elite in the strug gle for minds It sets up a bighly visible contrast between an open and constructive program on the one hand and a closed self-centered and dimly threatening program on the other The very existence of NASA s cooperative programs operates to nudge the Soviet Union toward a more forthcoming posture in the world Those who have attended meetings of COSPAR and of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have witnessed the impact of the recitation by member after member of his country s joint activities with the United States The absence of any counterpoint testifying to Soviet cooperation 18 inescapable At the June 1963 meeting of COSPAR in Warsaw for example, twenty member countries (exclud ing the United States and the USSR) reported upon their space activities of the twenty seventeen referred to sub tantive programs undertaken with the United States Only three mentioned the Soviet Unon one being anticipatory one reporting joint balloon ob erva tions, the third merely noting the referral of visual satellite abserva trons to the USSR The US report noied activities involving over sixty other countries (including the USSR)' The Soviet Union : report mentioned no other country41 One can only assume that there is a pressure here which contributes with other factors to the increasing ·75 THE US PROCRASI ellosis of the USSR to ge ert the disposition and a-sume the appear ance of cooperation In sum our cooperation with other countries has sndirect as well as direct technical and political importance Quite part from its pousible impact upon our problems with the USSR the program of cooperative activity which has been described in this chapter has intrinsic values of its own They menit a briel exposition TANGIBLE BENEFITS International cooperation as a general good enjoys virtually universal acceptance and support much like motherhood Its values are usually described in the abatract and its benefits are noted under intan gibles Unfortunately thus leaves the case for cooperation some what vague At best it may fail to quiet secret doubls and at wort it may inspire trong cynici m Undoubtedly there are intangible benefits to be derived from international cooperation indeed they may in the long run be the mo é important ones and they should recente most serious consideration But the case for cooperation among the nations 19 inuch more persuasie of attention is directed to its prac tical and tangible benefit (A by product of attention to the practical values may be better cooperative prograin ) At the very least there should be an end to endorsing international collaboration in uch generalities as to suggest that nothing more specific exi ts We have seen that the very brief history of pace research and exploration has already produced a considerable degree of coopera tive activity The practical values of this cooperation are scientific and technical operational economic political some repetition of the material in the previous ection the e values are be t demonstrated in terms of the cooperative projects de cribed there Tangible scientific and technical benefits have been numerous Unique and superior experiments have been introduced into the overall space re earch effort hy foreign contributor Canadian satellite Alouette repre ented a concept for topside ound the mi k of Thu the

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·76 Tie US PROCRASI simultancous launching of sounding rockets from Greenland 10 Ant arctica, or on the day and night sides of the carth or around the periphery of the Indian Ocean basın cannot be done at all without cooperation among the nations The fact that sounding rockets are restricted essentially to vertical sampling of atmospheric and other conditione puts an obrious premium on multiplying and coordinat ing such vertical profiles in many locations Even satellite experiments scemingly self-contained may require the participation of scientists in far flung regions using instruments of their own to provide supplementary local observations or in dispensable data points for satellite cxperiments The ionospheric Invca igations of MASA S 66 satellite for instance cannot be complete in themselves without the help of scient is equipped with suitable ground instruments in many countries These cooperating scientists observe the satellite s radio emissions as they are affected in the course of their travel to earth through the ionosphere to meas ure scintillation rotation polarization and other cliccts thereby supplementing the measurements made by the satellite atself in its own immediate vicinity Again the initial tests of long distance satellite communications could not of course have so clearly demonstrated the future of this service without the cooperation of British French, and other nations in providing the overseas ground tations for completion of inter continental transmissions This joint enterprise helped in an indirect way to unite many nations in selecting certain radio frequenies in advance of negotiations conducted on this subject in the International Telecommunications Union s Extraordinary Conference of October 1963 Most important perhaps the program tent substance to the US position that it wished to enter into the commercial exploitation of communications satellite service only on a global basis in partner ship with other nations A final note on the technical benefits To do a thorough job of tracking and acquiring data from its satellites controlling deep space probes and monitoring manned flights NASA has had critical requirements for overseas sites for a complex network of tracking and

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·78 THE US PROGRAM sums are insignificant compared even to the space sciences portion of the total US space effort Yet the cost is less to each side than if the program did not exist at all Even more important, there is a base upon which to build as foreign capacity in the space area grow. If the momentum of the cooperative program can be maintained the curve of foreign participation and contribution should be an ascend ing One It is of some interest that a significant proportion of the total foreign investment occasioned by joint space projects has been ex pended in the United States Perhaps 45 percent of the total has been spent here Small as it is this sum represents a gold inflow rather than outflow As such it virtually exculpates the international space effort from a criticism commonly lodged against cooperative enter prises-that they dissipate the national treasure without apparent מן return On the political side tangibility is more difficult to demonstrate Yet there are grounds for believing that US dedication to peaceful purposes through open programs contributed directly to the success ful acquisition of needed space tracking and data retrieval sites in certain areas abroad 43 We know too that the cooperative program has been a common denominator or a catalyst for sentiment in sup port of US objectives on the subject of outer space in United Nations forums It has without question lent credibility to our posture and contrasted sharply with our competitor s performance in which the language of cooperation has been used with little substance The space program has a further potential for support of US foreien policy objectives in that at lends itself admirably to cooperation with multilateral organizations in Europe buttresses the image of the US as an open society ready to join with all of good will and in par ticular demonstrates the relative openness of this country with one of its greatest national assets--advanced technolo-y The attractive ness of space research its broad base in national life--for the sciences and technologies are deeply rooted in the main stream of industrial and academic work carries with it even a healthy potenual for jaspiring other countries to narrow the tech space ·TAF US PROGRAM 79 nological gap" between themselves and the two leading nations rather than to allow it to grow The emphasis here upon the tangible benefits of space cooperation cientific technical economic and political --15 not intended to surgest that intangible benefits do not exist or that they are less im portant The Congressional mandate which prompted NASA s in ternational program was itself stated in terms of the intangibles cooperation in the broad sense peaceful uses and the benefit of all mankınd—without distinction between friendly and unfriendly na tions and without regard to short term benefit Presidents Eisenhower Kennedy and Johnson have all repeatedly endorsed cooperation in space research in broad terms It is a personal conviction neverthe less that the surest path to greater intangible benefits is through demon trably useful projects which reassure the participants at any And every point that they are indeed progressing and in the night direction Without such assurance confidence in cooperation cannot grow and we awing painfully and ineffectively from action to re achon from allusion to disillusion As it stands then the NASA international space program has established for itself a practical philosophy encouraged the develop ment of space activity in nations willing to make contributions of their own provided a basis for practical cooperation with more than half the rountries of the world attracted significant contributions to our own ongoing space research and exploration efforts enjoyed & modest but positive balance of payments in so doing and contributed in some degree to the political interests of the United States and the cooperating nations NOTES ? This ampling is drawn from leanngs before the Select Commutee on Astronautics and Space Exploration 85th Congress Second Session on II R 11881 (April 15-18 21-25 28-30 May 1 5 7, 8 12 1958) 2 Hearings p 259 ·80 THE US PROGRAM (Chap 1 Sec & program of >Hearings p 260 • Hearings p 287 Heanngs p 380 • Hearings p 617 1 Hearings p 781 8 Hearings p 819 Hearings p 871 10 Hearings p 1496 11 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 Section 201 12 Statement by President Eisenhower Upor Signing the National Aeronautics and Space Act (July 29 1958) Documents on Interna tional A pects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1951-1962) Staf Report prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences United States Senate 88th Congress Ist Session (May 9 1963) Document No 18 13 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 states that it is the policy of the United States that the development use and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace (b)) In Section 3 the Act states that the policies enunciated shall be effectuated through program to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes internalional cooperation to promote the common defense and security and to make available to cooperaling nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy and programs with international arrangements and with agte ments for cooperation 11 Robert Mckinney Relieu of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the Unued States (October 1960) especially pp 55-7* 15 This discussion and the remainder of the chapter represent an es tension of various remarks describing the philosophy of NASA s inter national program by Dr Hugh L. Dryden Deputy Admin trator of NASA particularly in testifying annually on NASA programas before the cognizant Committers of the House and Senate and by the author in various published artı les and addresses 10 la particular tho e responsible in the Department of State at various times for direct liaison with NASA merit the greate t commenda tion for their intelligent and sympathetic support of this aspect of NASA. program philosophy Me Philip A Farley then Special A? sistant (to the Secretary of State) for Atomic Fnergy and Space Wat ters is no deserving for the first year or more of the program and Wr Robert F Packard Chiel Outer Space Affairs Section of ce of Inter Dational Scientific Affairs for the following years 17 An unpublished analysis prepared by the author early in 1959 for the National Academy of Sciences (which in turn made it available to NASA and the Deparmert of State) discounted an cnerational sol for ·THE US PROGRAM 81 the United Nations in space research and exploration at least for the foreseeable future At the conclusion of the first meeting of the United Nauons Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 10 March 1962 its chairman Ambassador Maatsch of Austria stated for the record a consensus that the Committees functions would not be operational in character (Verbatim Record of Ninth Meeting March 29 1962 ) 18 Dr Homer E Newell then Deputy Director for Space Flight Programs NASA conferred with Dr Richard V Porter the US Academy s Delegate to COSPAR communicated with Dr Hugh L Dryden by tele phone from The Hague to Washington then with the assistance of Academy staff principally Dr Hugh Odishaw and the author produced a written statement of NASA s readiness to cooperate The statement was tran mitted to COSPAR by Dr Porter on behalf of NASA 19 Letter of March 14 1939 from Dr RW Porter to Professor Dr HC Van de Hulst, President Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) The Hague The Netherlands ** It is beliesed that French representatives approached Soviet sci entists informally to explore the possibilities of a matching offer from the Soviet Union They were met with noncommittal response and sub Bequent inaction 21 See Chapter III 22 Dr Hugh Odishaw has pointed out this contrast in International Cooperation in Space Science a chapter in Outer Space ed by L. Bloomfield for the American Assembly Prentice Hall Inc p 116 Odishaw speaking of the NASA program says "One of the most significant aspects of thus bilateral govern dent pro gram has been its operation within the non governmental COSPAR framework As in the IGY COSPAR does not undertake to nego tiate bilateral arrangements. It does however encourage such arrange ments and provides a contial forum for the discu şion of ciperimental Ideas The presentation of such offers within COSPAR in its If treates an international environment for the expe went and for the scientists keeping the expenmental work that many ensue within an intemational framework not only for discussion purposes but for the Interchange of data, and results The NASA procedure compares favorably to that in the analagous area of atomic energy Alihoogh the International Atomic Energy was Dot established for cooperative scientific efforts, it was authorized largely to assist in application of nuclear energy to conduct the sale of uranium fuel under safeguards as to their possible military diversion, and to develop safety standards. But even before as well as alter the agency way established, both the Soviet Union and the United States entered into arrangements for the sale of uranium fuel at costs below those which the Agency could rocet arrangements which are wholly bilateral in nature and seriously happer the ability of IAEA to promote internat onal agreements in tonic energy NASA on ibe other band ·82 THE US PROGRAMI has endeavored to establish its bilateral arrangements within the inter Dalional framework or spirit of COSPAR 23 AGARD 15 the Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and De velopment a committee of NATO It was not involved in the discussions described here the AGARD meeting was simply utilized as a convenient occasion for these discussions 24 Principal oficials of NASA participating in these informal discos- Bions were Dr Abe Silverstein then Director of Space Flight Programs, Dr Homer E Newell then his Deputy and the author then Durector Office of International Programs 25 Arnold W Frutkın International Cooperation in Space Research " in Astronautics and Aerospace Engineering (March 1963) p 100 26 International Cooperation in Space a semiannual report of the Office of International Programs National Aeronautics and Space Ad ministration 21 This exchange of notes was consummated long after the actual in itiation of the first Uk/US joint satellite project but ensures the continuation of the cooperative effort for its full course Text of the agreement and exchange of notes may be found in US Treaties and Other International Agreements Dept of State Vol 12 Pt 2 (1961) P 1223 28 In this first Joint Working Group the American representa.. " was provided principally by NASA 3 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) which was to carry the major burden in this and subsequent cooperative programs A happy blend of professional and human quality of the very highest calibre contributed enormously to the Goddard Centers success in this and later programs Very great credit 18 duc Dr Harry Goett Director of GSFC Dr John W Townsend As i tant Director Space Sciences in whose area the implementation of much of NASA S International programs has fallen and in the case of the fir I British satellite Mr Robert Bauman Project Manager 29 Ariel was planned originally for launching by means of a NASA Scout vehicle However the particular orbital requirements for the Ariel experiments the final weight of the satellite and developmental uncertainties in the Scout rocket at the time combined to persuade NASA to shift the satellite to the larger Delta vehucle 30 At this writing plans exist for the British Ariel experimenters to provide a definitive account of their results in Nature Interim reports bave been given at COSPAR and Goddard Space Flight Center Sym posla 31 An Italian satellite was launched from Wallops Station in an in terim step in this program in December 1964 3 ESRO is treated at greater length in Chapter IV 33 Sounding rockets are generally smaller rockets intended to carry instruments into a nearly vertical trajectory to a desired altitude in the ·THE US PROGRAM 83 earth s atmosphere then drop back to earth They are not intended to place satellites in orbit but rather to make or permit measurements along their flight path sometimes telemetering this information to earth sometimes permitting optical or sound measurements sometimes re turning a package to earth for recovery and examination They are quite as important as satellites since their measurements are normally made at altitudes below those at which satellites can orbit but above the heights at which balloons can fly * Professor Ritchie Calder Earthlings in the Space Age“ The Ad tancement of Science (May 1962) p 16 35 Sır Eric Ashby in a review of Caryl Haskins The Scientific Reyo lution & World Politics Science (21 August 1961) p 803 3* The necessary agreements negotiated by the author and Mr Leo nard Jaffe then Director of Communications Satellite Programs NASA were signed in London and Pans in February 1961 They were subse quently made the occasion of a confirming exchange of notes by the respective Foreign Offices and the US Department of State an arrangement requested of the Department by NASA in order to make the Eu ropean commitment upon which NASA was to depend as binding as possible Sir Robert Harvey Deputy Director Ceneral of the Bratı h Post Office and M Pierre Marzın Director of the Centre National d Etudes Telecommunications were the chief negotiators for the UK and France respectively 37 This International Meteorological Workshop was held in November 1961 with representatives of some 30 countries attending Those prin cipally respon ible for its implementation were Dr Morris Tepper and Dr William Stroud of NASA and Mc David Johnson of the US Weather Bureau *8 The fellowship program is conducted on behalf of NASA by the National Academy of Sciences under a grant for the purpose Some twenty US univer Ities are participating offering theoretical and experi mental work in laboratories who e directors are normally involved in ** As in the case of the above program the Resident Research Associateship program is administered by the National Academy of Sci ences under grant from NASA A prime mover in initiating and conducting the program was Dr Robert Jastrow Director Theoretical Institute Goddard Space Flight Center NASA 10 PHA (Dr Philip H Abelson) International Competition in an editorial in Science (May 17 1963) 41 This compatron is based upon an analy w of mayonal reports pre sented to COSPAR (the International Committee for Space Re earch) at its June 1963 reunion in Warsaw and publi hed in the COSPAR Information Bulletin Number 16 December 1963 The Soviet Union report to COSPAR at its May 1964 reunion in Florence included ma NASA programs Science ·82 TAE US PROCRAM has endeavored to establish ito bilateral arrangements within the inter national framework or spirit of COSPAR. 3 AGARD 19 the Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and De velopment a committee of NATO It was not involved in the discussions described here the AGARD meeting was simply utilized as a convenient occasion for these discussions - Principal officials of NASA participating in these informal discus sions were Dr Abe Silverstein then Director of Space Flight Programs Dr Homer E Newell then his Deputy and the author then Director Ohce of International Programs -5 Arnold W Frutkin International Cooperation in Space Research in Astronautics and Aerospace Engineering (March 1963) p 100 26 International Cooperation in Space & semi annual report of the Office of International Programs National Aeronautics and Space Ad 27 This exchange of notes was consummated long after the actual in itiation of the frst UK/US joint satellite project but ensures the continuation of the cooperative effort for its full course Text of the agreement and exchange of notes may be found in US Treaties and Other International Agreements Dept of State Vol 12 Pt 2 (1961) ministration p1223 29 In this first Joint Working Group the American representa.. was provided principally by NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) whuch was to carry the major burden in thts and subsequent cooperative programs A happy blend of professional and human quality of the very highest calibre contributed enormously to the Goddard Center & success in this and later programs Very great credit is due Dr Harry Goett Director of GSFC Dr John W Townsend Asistant Director Space Sciences in whose area the implementation of much of NASA s international programs has fallen and in the case of the fir! British satellite Mr Robert Bauman Project Manager my Ariel was planned originally for launching by means of a NASA Scout vehicle However the particular orbital requirements for the Ariel experiments the final weight of the satellite and developmental uncertainties in the Scout rocket at the time combined to nersuade NASA to shift the satellite to the larger Delta vehicle 50 At this writing plans exist for the British Ariel experimenters to provide a definitive account of their results in Nature Interim reports have been given at COSPAR and Goddard Space Flight Center Sym Posia 31 An Italian satellite was launched from Wallops Station in an in terim step in this program in December 1964 3 ESRO 13 treated at greater length in Chapter IV u Sounding rockets are generally smaller rockets intended to carry instruments into a dearly vertical trajectory to a desired altitude in the ·THE US PROCRAM 83 earth e atmosphere then drop back to earth They are not intended to place satellites in orbit but rather to make or permit measurements along their flight path sometimes telemetering this information to earth sometim s permitting optical or sound measurements sometimes te turning a parkage to earth for recovery and examination They are quite as Important as satellites since their mea urements are normally made at altitudes below those at which satellites can orbit but above the heights at which balloons can fly 31 Professor Ritchie Calder Earthlings in the Space Age The Ad vancement of Saence (May 1962) p 16 ** Sır Eric Ashby in a review of Caryl Haskins The Scientific Revo lution & World Politics Science (21 August 1961) p 803 28 The neces ary agreements negotiated by the author and Mr Leo nard Jaffe then Director of Communications Satellite Programs NASA were signed in London and Paris in February 1961 They were sub e quently made the occasion of a confirming exchange of notes by the respective Foreign Offices and the US Department of State an arrange ment requested of the Department by NASA in order to make the Eu ropean commitment upon which NASA was to depend as binding as possible Sır Robert Harvey Deputy Director General of the British Post Ofice and M Pierre Marzın Director of the Centre National d Etudes Telecommunications were the chief negotiators for the UK and France respectively 87 This International Meteorological Workshop was held in November 1961 with representatives of some 30 countries attending Those prin cipally responsible for its implementation were Dr Morris Tepper and Dr William Stroud of NASA and Mr David Johnson of the US Weather Bureau NASA programs 88 The fellowship program is conducted on behalf of NASA by the National Academy of Sciences under a grant for the purpose Some twenty US universities are participating offering theoretical and experi mental work in laboratories who e directors are normally involved in *9 As in the ca e of the above program the Resident Research Associateship program 19 administered by the National Academy of Sc ences under grant from NASA A prime moser in initiating and conducting the program was Dr Robert Jastrow Director Theoretical lostitute Goddard Space Flight Center NASA “A (D Philip H Abel on) International Competition in an editorial in Science (May 17 1963) 41 This comparison 1s based upon an analysis of national reports pre sented to COSPAR (the International Committee for Space Re carch) at its June 1963 reunion in Warsaw and publi hed in the COSPAR Information Bulletin Mumber 16 December 1963 The Sonet Union report to COSPAR at its May 1961 reunion in Florence included a Science ·84 THE US PROGRAMI terial on the bilateral cooperation which had by then materialized with the United States as well as other material ** These costs include the capital costs of foreign ground stations for communications satellite tests the purchase of sounding rockets instru mented payloads ground test facilities the direct development of satel lites as well as the purchase here of satellite telemetry and power systems solar cells design studies training and travel of personnel, but it does not include expenditures for other basic facilities abroad ever though stimulated or required by obligations undertaken for cooperative programs 4% NASA sites in Nigeria and Mexico are examples As noted in a previous section the station in Mexico is understood to be the first such accommodation of the US by that nation since before World War I ·3 COOPERATION with the SOVIET UNION ANTECEDENTS The prospects for cooperation with the Soviet Union in space re search in the course of the International Gcophysical Year were substantially frustrated from the beginning IIardly had the two Governments announced their intention to launch the first satellites as contributions to the IGY when their scientific representatives be came hopelesly anarled in efforts to provide for the very simplest exchange of the information and data expected from the two programns As we have seen only a tolen exchange arrangement may be said to have been worked out in the otherwise very succes ful IGY let for a long time from the formative years of the IGY 10 1951-55 until 1962--this limited nongovernmental mechanı m of the in ternational scientific community remained the only fornial channel for exchanges between the two space powers Midway in the period consideration was given to placing the IGY on a permanent footing at leat in three of the mo t sub tant al pro gams engendered by this great international scientific effort the Antarctic oceanographic and space research programas In the ca e of space the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) asked Dr Homer E Newell of the United States to convenc a meeting in London in November 1938 to organize an International Committee for Space Re earch as a special committee of ICSU In attendance nore delerates of scientific societies in the United States the Systet Vnion the United Kingdom, France and other countries which had participated in IGT space projects together with delegates of the major international scientific unions. A consentional charter typ:

·86 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION cal of the arrangements for establishing such groups was drafted and unanimously adopted H C Van de Hulst a young but long famous radio astronomer from the Netherlands representing the In ternational Astronomical Union was elected President Before the delegates scattered to their own countries they were entertained at lunch by the Royal Society The Society - President in a salute to the committee dryly noted that its abbreviated name COSPAR Counded like the title of a Poush opera As subsequent events sus gest the remark was more apt than at first appeared Reas embling in The Hague in March 1959 with somewhat amplı fied representation ? COSPAR was abruptly involved in charges that its membership totaling 17 national and professional society dele gates was loaded 16 to 1 in favor of the We! The charges came from the Soviet Academy s delegate who demanded that the COSPAR charter be reu ed to provide for more balanced representation of other geographic areas The resue placed aquarely before the meeting was whether the charter of a cientific society hould be drawn on political ground- Various delegates tared the Soviet representative with the repon: bility for introducing political considerations into a scientific forumi He responded that his interest was not polinical but rather the esen handed representalion of science throughout the world Western dele fates rejoined that the invitations to participation in the organization and activities of COSPAR had folloned demon trated interet in space remarch activities that is the launching of satellites or sound 10g rockets or the tracking of satellitrs Thir preponderantly Weet repre entation from the profesional societies they arcurd was ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 87 ment made by the minonty of one and by his own example, raised COSPAR well above mere expediency The compromise subsequently worked out was unique in organized science and while it has worked it has continued to be unpopular in the West Essentially it provided that there should be two Vice Pre idents of COSPAR one each from the United States and Soviet Academies Moreover, a specified number of additional members of the Committees executive council were to be elected from slates of fered by the US and USSR representatives Thus a political bu polarity was introduced into COSPAR and theoretically veto power la certain actions might be exercised by the Soviet side In fairness it must be stated that the normal basis for achieving & consensus in forums of thus type is unanımıty Thus there was little practical effect as a precedent was established for political organization of scientific and other international bodies Indeed as expected the Soviet Union sought to represent the COSPAR formula as a precedent for a Troika * which it was seeking at that time to introduce also into the United Nations and other areas The President of COSPAR how ever was not from a neutral nation and so the precedent did not accord with the Soviet objective of tripartite direction of interna tional forums by a neutral chauman with deputies from East and West The political difficulties which arose at COSPAR s first meeting left little time for business The Western hope was that subsequent meetings might be employed to enlarge the slım area of cooperation in spare research iad out during the IGY The Soviet approach ap peared to be one of serving the forms of cooperation without sub stantive commitment Even as late as the third meeting of COSPAR (in Mice in January 1960) progress was confined to very small par ticulars For example the Soviet Academy delegate stated for the first time that the Soviet Union would announce specified orbital ele. ments of its satellites after launching and give advance notice where the particular characteristirs of a planned launchung were distinguish able in scientific interest from other launchings Such data was required for simple ground based experiments by scientists of other ·3 90 COOPERATIOV VITIT TIE SOVIET UNION ing the launching of the first lughly visible American satellite the Echo I balloon satellite Shortly after the launching the International Astronautical Federation convened its annual meeting in Stockholm At a social function attended by hundreds it was reported that Echo I was visible from a small garden Dozens of the celebrants gurged into the garden to observe the satellite passing high overhead Stand ing next to Academician Blagonravoy the author reminded him of the possibility of conducting voice communications over long distances by reflection from Echo I The technique had already been successfully demonstrated at the conference then in sesalon by means of a tape recording of a message from President Eisenhower The author suggested that the two countries communicate with each other by means of the satellite in a gesture of frendliness and a step to ward cooperation Blagonravov readily agreed In discussing this prospect further it became evident that the satellite was not high enough to provide mutual visibility for communications purposes directly between the US east coast and the Soviet Union Dr William F Pickering Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, also present, suggested that the US utilize the Jodrell Bank radio telescope in Eng land as its terminal This was readily agreed and it was left to the Americans to make the arrangements with Jodrell Banks director, Dr Bernard Lovell and to provide the necessary information of frequencies and orbits to Blagonravor This was promptly done fol lowing the Stockholm meeting an answering cable was then re ceived from Blagonravov indicating that unspecified difficulties had an en and that it would not be profitable to pursue the matter in Siew of Echo Is brief orbital expectancy The matter appeared ended with the US response noting that Echo I was now believed to have quite a long future and so would be available if the difficulties should disappear This brief catalog does not begin to represent a full account of US efforts to bring the Soviet Union to cooperation Numerous privale and semi official approaches were also made in IAF committees in the annual Pugwash meetings and through Academy and uni versity channels Any of these might have been given little weight by

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·92 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION THE DRYDEN BLAGONRAVOV AGREEMENTS The first change in the Soviet position came in the course of corte spondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev in February and March 1962 As in the case of preyloue manned A_hts on both sides Khrushchev sent his congratulations to Pre ident hen nedy on the occasion of the fir t orbital flight by an American John Glenn In his congratulatory telegram, Khrushehev remarked If our countries pooled their efforts-scientific technical and ma terial-to explore outer space this would be very beneficial to the advance of science and would be acclained by all peoples who would like to see scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for cold war purpo es and the arms tace While unexceptionable these sentiments were not unusual Such re marks had accompanied the public statements of both sides before What was different was the character of President Kennedy s prompt respon e In this he stated I am instructing the appropriate officers of this Government to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate projects of common action and I hope that at a very early date our repre, sentatives may meet to discuss our ideas and yours in a spirit of practical cooperation 10 This move to translate sentiment and generalization into concrete action was President Kennedy s first and very great contribution to the cause of international cooperation in space Thr job of supplying specific proposals to be advanced to the Soviet Union fell naturally to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (On this matter NASA worked principally with the Department of State al though all interested agencies reviewed the material to be sent to the Soviet Union ) To this task President Kennedy brought a second contribution of critical importance He made it quite clear that the objective was in fact to be cooperation rather than the scoring propaganda gains (In fact his correspondence with Khrushchev was so handled that letters reached the Soviet Union before they were made public in the US a more significant tactic than may appear ) of

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·9-1 COOPERATIOY WITH THE SOVILT UNION lunar surface or definition of a detailed investigation of Mars or Venus step by step including manned Qight. Chairman Khrushchev replied in kind again within two weeks 13 He provided his own shopping list of proposals, noting that some of them are also merlioned in your message' If the two letters are to be contrasted howeser Khrushchev a is longer le s specific and contains what as to western eyes a curious mixture of technical legal, and political matters Mr I put first the question of coopera tion in long distance communications by satellite second coopera lion in world wide weather prediction by means of satellites and thud, a joint program for radio and optical observation of lunar and planetary probes Then came a proposal for an international agreement for the rescue and recovery of fallen spacecraft Returning to the technical he concurred in the plan to map the earth s magnetic field by satellite and in the exchange of space medicine data Finally referring to action then going forward in the United Nations he suggested that space experiments which could complicate other na Lions space efforts should be the subject of preliminary international agreement .Thus Mr Pre ident do we conceive of-shall we sayheavenly matters Khrushchev concluded with expression of a sincere desire to conquer space hand in hand' but then observed that rockets for military purposes and spacecraft launched for peaceful purposes are based on cominon scientific and technical achieve a fact which must limit peaceful space cooperation until an agreement on general and complete disarmament 13 achieved Joint construction of lunar and planetary space vehicles for example could come only after that time Here disarmament was posed as a condition only for advanced cooperation no longer as a prerequisite for any cooperation at all Mr Khrushchev confirmed that his rep resentatives would be available at the United Nations meeting later that March to discuss the possibility of joint projects The President appointed Dr Hugh í Dryden Deputy Adminiş trator of NASA as his representative and Dr Dryden with col leagues met with Academician A A Blagonravov on the appointed occasion in New York These meetings were essentially exploratory ments ·COOPERATION WITA TRE SOVIET UNION 95 and preliminary in character, but the American side did present four brief papers expanding upon its four initial proposals The Soviet group promised to study the papers and to respond with papers of their own at a subsequent meeting-which was in fact held in Geneva toward the end of May, on the occasion of the first meeting of the Technical Subcommit e of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses ol Outer Sace (There was no connection between the US/USSR bi lateral negotiations and these UN space meetings the principal nego trators simply took advantage of their presence at the latter to pursue the former However their private efforts were known to the UN body which in each case took official notice of them and expressed satisfaction and hope for a possible rapprochement between the two great space powers ) The Soviet negotiators suggested that agreement be sought to out law sure llance by satellite and to provide for internahonal consid eration of space experiments which might interfere with other space research Dr Dryden made it quite clear that his authority was limited to technical matters and more specifically the negotiation of joint projects of space activity and that he could not discuss legal or political matters Acadernician Blagopravov accepted this position philosophucally not raising such 199ues again At the Geneva meetings the one initiative taken by the Soviet side was a paper proposing joint exploration of questions associated with the commercial future of communications satellites a matter con sidered by the Americans as reserved for attention by commercial interests and the International Telecommunications Union Since the Soviet side had backed away both from the US proposal for an exchange of tracking stations and Khrushchev s own proposal for cooperation in deep space tracking the three remaining primary sug gestions of the US became the focus of these negotiations Weather data exchange and satellite coordination mapping of the magnetic field and testing of communications satellites (Academician Blagon favov had opened the New York discussions in a generous and courtly display by stating that he first wished to discharge his two year old "promise to the author by arranging for mutual tests by means of ·96 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION the Echo satellite Echo I by then having deteriorated considerably the US side shifted thus prospect to Echo II scheduled to be launched at a later time) All in all the negotiations were congenial direct and almost im mediately fruitful a tribute to the good sense and judgment of both Dr Dryden and Academician Blagonravay and to the situatave of the United States side An interesting contretemps developed at the last moment, however when the first agreement was receiving its final review Provision had been made (by the American side) for signa ture by the two principals But a Soviet advisor objected to any signalures The Americans protested vigorously that the catire nego tiation would be meaningless unless evidence of agreement were forth coming Moreover the document specifically provided for its review by the two governments before it could go into effect Academician Blagonrivov finally worked out a simple solution and signed a cov ering note which incorporated the attached agreement by reference This first agreement embraced three joint projects following the US proposals on meteorology and geomagnetism very closely and reflecting Blagonravov s interest in the Echo experiment in satellite communications Briefly it provided for a two phase approach to cooperation in satellite meteorology in the first and experimental phase (1963-64) a joint working group would set up a conventional full time communications link between Washington and Moscow for the two way exchange of selected weather data obtained by satellite the cost to be shared and the link initiated when the US and the USSR were able to exchange data of approximately equivalent in terest in the second and operational phase (1961–65) the two countries would each launch weather satellites on a coordinated basis exchanging the data in real time (virtually as Teelved) and disseminating it further with consideration to recommendations by the World Meteorological Organization A joint working group was to commence planning for this second phase early in 1963 In public reports this second phase has often been slıghted or omitted entirely despite the fact that it represents by far the most important and prom ising element of the entire agreement for it does no less than provide ·COOPERATION WITIL THE SOVIET UNION 97 for the US and USSR to share the central responsibility and cost of providing an operational weather satellite system, on a global basis and for the benefit of all men The econd project under the Dryden Blagonravov agreement called for each country to launch a satellte equipped with magnetom eters during the period of the International Years of the Quiet Sun (beginning in 1965), coordinating their orbits and in addition facılı tating the exchange of magnetic field data obtained by ground instruments Here too a joint working group was to move imple mentation of this project along On the third project it was very simply agreed that the two sides would cooperate during 1962-63 an experiments utılızıng the next US ECHO gatellite Further they would consider experiments with active communications satellites (ECHO 15 a passive reflector con taining no communications instrumentation) and discuss at some future time possibilities for experimental space communications sys. tems involving other countries 13 The agreement provided for a two month grace period during which changes might be made by erther side Neither proposed such changes Then in accordance with the provision for referral to the respective governments and after an exchange of notes between the American Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Ministry of Forrign Affairs indicating approval by both governments President heldysh of the Soviet Academy and Mr James E Webb Administrator of NASA exchanged letters which established the agreement at an agency to agency level 15 To accelerate the establishment of the agreed joint working groups Dr Dryden and Academician Blagonravoy met again in Rome in March, 1963 and in Geneva in May of the same year accompanied by various advisors and experts A highly detailed and extensive im plementing agreement was reached termed a First Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space Agreement of June 1962 15 An excellent portrait of the character of the Rome negotia tions is available in the transcript of a press conference held by Dr Dryden on his return to NASA 16 From this it is clear that the details ·98 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION of the weather satellite data and launching program were filled in with relative ease that some limitations were encountered in the communications satellite project and that more significant difficul ties were met on the magnetometer satellite experiments In the last case, no agreement was reached in Rome and it was necessary to pick up the threads again in a subsequent meeting in Geneva (May 1963) Since ECHO II s altitude did not afford mutual visibility between radio terminals in the eastern US and the Soviet Union, it was necessary to enlist the assistance of Sir Bernard Lovell to pro vide for tests between his Jodrell Bank radio telescope and the Soviet terminal at Gorky State University An example of the care taken to ensure a meeting of minds in the execution of these cooperative projects may be seen in the provisions governing characteristics of the weather data to be exchanged On the single issue of the brightness les els of cloud cover photographs it was provided that these should have six to ten levels of gray at the satellite receiving stations five to six levels at the end of the com munications link used for their exchange and that some original photographs should be mailed to the receiving country for interpre tation purposes As might be expected the first detailed negotiations produced some differences in readine s to proceed along certain lines In his subsc quent press conference 16 Dr Dryden noted that the ECHO II ex periment was to be implemented using radio transmissions at 162 megacycles We ourselves he said are not so much interested in 162 megacycles because our chief interest in ECHO II 15 in the rigidity and smoothne s of the balloon We really would like to use much higher frequencies frequencies of the order of those we are using with the active communications atellites to get a finer resolu tion of detail (of the character and condition of the balloon surface) We did get agreement that within the next few months the Soviets would con ider the u e of higher frequenties It depends on the availability of equipment of coure and she po sbulsfjes of modify ing misting antennas On the matter of magnetic field satellites Dr Dryden commented ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 99 Here we ran into some difficulty and ran out of time so that we will resume the discussions in Geneva I think the matters at issue are not of great importance to you at this time In general, we seek always to get close to the original data the original observations themselves and there is a little tendency (on the part of the Soviet scientists] to want to exchange data that has various corrections made to it' The language of the final agreement reached subsequently at Geneva on this point suggests that the issue of corrections was not fully resolved it stated With a view towards the desirability of working out a common method of introducing time variation correc tions into the results of observations from satellites, it is agreed that each side conduct research in this direction and exchange results with the other side 17 Dr Dryden also provided the press with an engaging insight into the human aspects of the negotiations All three of our meetings have [followed] a kind of protocol that we should meet first in the territory of one and then in the ter ritory of the other In this case the first meeting W&S & ceremonial of sorts & greeting of the two delegations by the counselor of the US Fmbassy in the ab ence of the Ambassador The second meeting it was necessary that we go to the USSR Embassy and be greeted by the Soviet Ambassador Following then we alternated between Via Abruzzi [the new of fices of the US Veterans Administration in Rome) and the summer home of the Soviet Ambaggador which is out ide the walls of Rome a very magnificent villa with Gobelin tapestries and sculpture Generally the pattern was to meet an the morning for about three hours meeting separately in the afternoon After you got established you came in with a draft from the day before on both sides and compared points and argued matters of substance and wording There was very little in the way of fraternizing socially so to speak There were tho social occasions a cocktail party given by [Dr Walter] Ramberg the Science Attache of the US Embassy at his residence and a cocktail party given by the Soviets in (their) Embassy There was no atmosphere of cold war anywhere, and has not been in these meetings since the first ons in New York when (Academician] Blagonravov scad the Soviet protest against the nuclear tests in the atmosphere Since that the after we ·100 COOPERATION YITH THE SOVIET UNION made it clear we had no instructions in that area had no com petence in that ares and would not engage in this type of discussion there has never been a mention of any of these questions The general atmosphere has been a friendly one There 18 an evident desire to cooperate within the political framework of both countries It has been realized on both sides that the only hope is to stay in areas that are not at the apex of the cold war There was a little friendly barter and gifts made I noticed some of our people exchanging TIROS (US weather satellite) cuff links or tie clasps or other little articles for similar VOSTOK. [Soviet spacecraft] items Just one more aspect that interested some people These are the aifficulties with language There was quite a battery of translators present on both sides but we have found repeatedly that the mero tra tion of a ord from one language to a word in another language is not sufficient to convey the meaning that there are all sorts of connotations that have to be taken into account For example we said the ECHO satellite was to be used for a program to demonstrate communications between the US and the USSR They could not accept this It took us a very long time to find out what the trouble was It turned out the trouble was with the word demonstrate A demonstration on the continent is & group of miners marching on Paris or it 19 a political demonstra tion of some sort The whole difficulty disappeared by simply phrasing it that we would make an experiment to test the feasi bility of direct communications It doesn t pay to be suspicious too early You have to explore by asking the same questions many different ways in order to discover what the meaning 19 It is a tedious job in many ways not as direct and straightforward as you might think Together the Bilateral Space Agreement of 1962 and the First Memorandum of Understanding of 1963 constituted a total agree ment for the first three projects (plus an arrangement attached to the 1963 memorandum for discussions on the scientific aspects of the Mars and Venus probes which had already been launched by the USSR and the US respectively) Since they have been grossly misrepresented on occasion 18 it may be u eful to state the essential character of the agreements quite clearly They provide for coordination rather than integration of effort in other words for a kind of arm s length cooperation in which ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 101 each side carries out independently its portion of an arrangement without entering into the other s planning design production opera tions or analysis No classified or sensitive data is to be exchanged No equipment is to be provided by either side to the other No funds are to be provided by either side to the other NASA is not required to embark upon any new programs or to modify existing programs The flow of data from each side to the other is conditioned upon mutuality and can easily be terminated if mutualıy is not present What then are the values to be derived from this cooperative pro gram. To operate an adequate weather satellite program for fore casting and research purposes meteorologists consider that coverage of the globe is required at least on a sıx hour basis A single satellite launched by the United States could not provide such coverage Two satellites can If the Soviet Union provides the second satellite the cost to either side of an adequate system is reduced No other impact upon the planning of either is involved in the case of the commu nications tests via ECHO II it happens that the inflation phase of the balloon was to occur in good part over the Soviet Union as a conse quence of the trajectory of the booster The manner of deployment of the balloon (its separation and inflation process) was of consider able interest to the NASA designers Therefore, the willingness of the Soviet side to consider providing radar and optical observation of this phase was of potenti zl value The communications tests via ECHO II were not in themselves of comparable interest ince it was possible to conduct them at more suitable frequencies within the US Kowever a useful exercise in working together in the definition of the tests and in their execution was at hand Finally the mapping of the earth s magnetic field in space 18 a demanding task in which there are many vanables of time space and condition Two satellites can be many times more valuable than one in such a situation Given the central importance of the magnetic field to many near earth space problems this joint project offers promise and value in proportion to the detail of the data to be provided Alway, the proof of the pudding is in the eating The critical ele ment in an agreement with the Soviet Union or any other country is ·102 CoormATION WITH THE Sotir U ol courm In ito implementation Ilow lase the first off het topmerlogo? As of this writin- lle peut la In say the Irllowina Tlm fr ! tast ol tl Drytlen ala-nntarne a tenterama in Varuw In Juf 1 In the discussion of tim Saint Mars and is longo prolmats While congrnial and Interestin- diruninn war haid It carrot ir uxlthy It was fully manfactory lenm tlal point of view (ar i may rot hure free entirely warfariory from tham Smit viewpoint chap though for different reasons) The funilarterial hosteomire fro the point of view is early replaira! Ils spalfrance for the total question ol cooperation in sparr ma loss with this Saint Lnion on the other hand la bard to overstate tipit li cartral to all arrhaging and relationships It may le illustrated by the discussion of the Sovxt micrometeoroid cıperiment carried in thr Wars prol. Soviet moen tists had reported publicly and repraled privately in pomewhat greater detail their very interesting finding micrometeoroid count crs aboard their Mars probe had apparently passed through the wrll known Taureid belt of these particles rerilying its character then recorded no luits until passing through a similar but hitherto un known shower of particles at a far greater distance from earth. The numbers of hits were given together with the duances involved To understand the data US scientists asked what was the minimum site and energy of particles which could be registered by the Soviet counters whether they had been on at all times or only at partic ular times whether micromelcoroid smpacts were recorded for a total history or were noled only periodically during samplings of the probe s experience and so on Those questions which appeared to inyols Instrumentation design and performance were not een erally an wered in meaningful terms The session actually ended up with more uncertainty than at the start There is little ground to question the sincerity of the Soviet scien fists involved their pride in their work or their desire to be fully informative about it. The facts suggest however either less familiar ity in some cases with the operational and hardware aspects of their experiments than 13 the case in the United States or a relatively greater reluctance on the part of their government authorities to re ·COOPERATION WITE THE SOVIET UNION 103 veal even peripherally the state of the art, or both In any case, the result is to handicap possibilities for cooperation most seriously at the outset. When it is remembered that in this micrometeoroid ex ample we are talking only of the instrumentation required immed: ately for pure science not of basic rocket and spacecraft technology, the extent of the handicap becomes even clearer A wider apprecia uon of thus example would make for greater realism in questions of cooperation in space matters with the USSR Indeed, an awareness of this problem accounted for the particular choice of proposals put forward to Mr Khru hchev by President Kennedy in the first place and for the relatively successful results of the subsequent negotia tions The second test of the Dryden Blagonravov agreement involved the Echo II observations and tests in the period following the launch ing of that satellite by NASA in early 1964 In the correspondence required for advance arrangements certain differences in concern for deadlines in responsiveness, and in adherence to agreed procedure emerged rather clearly However it would be premature to assess their importance or indeed to ascribe to them any particular motiva tion Still they must be reckoned in the scales With regard to sub stantive matters the Soviet participation like water tended to seek lower levels for example while the Soviet side had not wished to commit itself to optical or radar observations of Echo II s inflation phace nor to tests at higher frequencies it had been hoped that the USSR would find it possible to do a fair amount of this work In fact only the optical observations were made and the other activities were not found possible. Of somewhat more concern was the discovery that the Soviet side had been planning only to receive signals via Echo 11 not to send them This disappointment of consequence only for the symmetry of the project rather than of technical moment pos silly reflected technical obstacles but probably also a constant diffi culs oier the meaning of words like exchange whereas the NASA representatives understood the word to have a two-way con notation the Soviet side did not (And one is forced to consider that the meaning of the word may in fact have been downgraded.) In any ·104 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION event the Soviets at the eleventh hour said that the observatory chosen for the tests did not have a transmission capability at fre quencies compatible with those at the Jodrell Bank terminal to be used by the West On the positive side Soviet optical facilities did photograph the Fcho II satellite in its early passes and passed the e observations on to NASA The Soviet radio observatory at Gorky then did receive various test transmissions from Jodrell Bank over a period of days and reported back promptly on their technical aspects A fuller tech nical report was provided after a brief period including extensive details of radio oscillation effects and tape recordings of the recep tions (Academician Blagonravov later suggested the possibility of a second phase for these experiments proposals were made to him by Dr Dryden for further efforts premised clearly upon two way transmissions The results are not known at this writing ) Beyond these two direct tests implementation of the Dryden Blagonravov agreement had begun to trail well behind the specific schedules laid down Yet some balance must be preserved in these matters After all the Echo II launch by NASA came some months after it had been scheduled for use in the joint program It 19 normal that space projects suffer some slippage and the likelihood is that some simlar experience delayed initiation of the weather data and satellite project on the Soviet side Indeed this seemed to have been the case when the Soviet side agreed in a further meeting in Geneva in May 1964 to proceed al last with the weather data communications link agreed on in 1962 Accordingly steps are underway at this writing to establish the link and begin the exchange of conventional weather data in anticipation of the promised availability of (Soviet) satellite data early in 1965 It is of some significance also that Soviet initiative produced . new proposal at the May 1964 meeting This propo al called for the joint preparation of a major review in the form of a joint publica tion of pa ? US and Soviet work in space biology and medicine with some attention to future problems in the field, While of uncertain intrinsic value this depending much on the character of the contri ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 105 butions to the review such a project could serve to expand the co operative relationship into the field of manned flight Perhaps the salient conclusion at this point must be that agree ments have in fact been reached that significant efforts have followed to implement them but that restraint and constraint still figure sig nificantly on the Soviet side Nevertheless, one observer was prompted to say that the negotiations followed a path that by comparison with other attempts at Soviet American cooperation has been lined with roses all the way 21 THE LOVELL CORRESPONDENCE By all odds the strangest chapter in US/USSR space relationships and in the events leading to President Kennedy s UN proposal for a Joint lunar effort was that which opened with a letter addressed to Dr Hugh L Dryden Deputy Administrator of NASA by Sir Bernard Lovell Professor at the University of Manchester and Director of the Jodrell Bank radio telescope activity Lovell s letter was written in July 1963 immediately after a trip he had taken to the Soviet Union and was later published in the Congressional Record He reported that he had been taken to see a Soviet tracking station which has not so far been seen by Western eyes or by many Soviet scienti ts He descnbed cooperative pro Grams which he had negotiated with Soviet agencies and the Presi dent of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR He reported on three major elements in Soviet space programming including a rejection of plans for a manned lunar landing and promised the President of the Academy to convey hıs (the president s) views to appropri ate authorities in the United Kingdom and United States that he believed the appropriate procedure would be to formulate the (manned lunar) task on an international bagis The press widely interpreted Sir Bernard s letter as a feeler from the Soviet Union for cooperation in manned lunar projects in this country the letter was read into the Congressional Record with the following comment ·106 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION We have now reached a point which may be a break in what hitherto has been the intransigent opposition of the Soviet Union to any adequate cooperation in outer space No doubt many Sen ators read this morning in the Washington Post an article under the byline of Howard Simons entitled United States Russia May Join in Moon Effort The article states that the United States is interested in following up the Soviet suggestion that can lead to a jount United States Soviet effort to send men to the moon A more careful analysis of Lovell's letter raised many questions -Lovell concluded from the fact that he personally had been per mitted to visit a station in the Soviet Union that it does seem to underline the apparently genuine desire of the Academy to extend ats cooperation with the West' This conclusion is difficult to under stand unless one takes Sir Bernard to represent the Vest' in which case confusion again descends as one tries to understand why the Academy would not have invited other visitors more centrally to volved in the space programs of the West in order to expressats genuine desire to extend its cooperation' -The next six paragraphs of Sir Bernard s letter were devoted to 'cooperative programas he negotiated with Soviet agencies all except the last relating to radio and optical astronomy rather than space flight programs The last concerned an extension of our cooperative work with the Soviet Union in the tracking of their lunar and deep space probes While describing this as a cooperative program al ready negotiated Lovell nevertheless said of it, my impression is (1) that a real effort will be made to provide us with earlier and more complete information about the details of the probe (11) that quite serious consideration 19 now being given to our offer to accommodate a small number of Soviet scientists at Jodrell Bank in connection with these programs (a precedent mas set in June 1961 when two Soviet Scientists came to Jodrell Bank to search for the signals from the Venus probe) It was not clear in what sease the provision of tracking services constituted mutual cooperation particularly since the Soviet side had never provided information necegary to decipher their telemetry signals -The remainder of the etter was devoted to space projects proper, ·COOPFRATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 107 listing three major directions of the Soviet space program It was Lovells impression that the Soviets had determined to perfect the rendezvous technique with an immediate aim (perhaps 1965–66) of e tablishing a manned space platform for astronomical observations at a height of 150-200 mileg' In view of Soviet reluctance to discuss such plans with others time alone can validate this report It is worth passing mention, however that an astronomical platform is often thought of as an unmanned project because the high pointing prm cision required may easily be compromised in the weightlessness of space by the movements of a crew unless remote coupling 19 pro vided -Lovell s second observation on Soviet space plans was I think it can be assumed that apparatus is now in process of assembly for the attempt to make a soft landing of instruments on the lunar sur face and that the launching will be made in a matter of months Over one year has elapsed since this observation was transmitted but It is undoubtedly true that Soviet space schedules slip even as do those of the United States and Lovell e assumption in this case may be entirely reasonable -Without question the mo t intricate of Lovells reports was the final one relating to manned lunar programs Lovell gaid that Presi dent heldysh of the Soviet Academy informed him that plans for the manned lunar landing had been rejected for three reasons the ex posure of cosmonauts to solar radiation the absence of an economic solution to the problem of assuring a return to earth and the belief that instrumental probes could solve the scientific problems more quickly than manned probes The Academy might revive the project "sf progres in the next few years gave hope of a solution to their problems But in his next sentences Lovell said that the Academy believed that the time was now appropriate for sci enti ts to formulate on an international hi is (a) the reasons why it is desirable to engage in the manned lunar enterprise and (bi 10 draw up a list of cientific tasks which a man on the moon could deal with which could not be olsed Iny in trument alone The Academy regarded as intal tep a the fire and mot vital un any plan for proceeling on an international ba is ·Constration 11 tuit Sonit ng Il pralincontrit that vronterena el v N r ** ir 1 national rungoriation in maanr I fints in the poor treat they urnal intrinational relation o! then front 1. trimer1 miune to the moon and represally why the purpx tr ol fut red mnoore could not be arramples 1 totes and minte atraply ty by strumental prolos llamemlerin- that lovell sastha fra lemy ka! altruly reached to conclusions on their ton are misly that funnrul tunst flight was not now fravikir and that indfuryntal pribm*wrir to the preferred it would then follow from Invelf, Inter thar ihr Acallery was errking intrenational support for torp*ative confusion not cooperation in troon projecte To frixerd a slep farther thir attitude of sertit abroad toward mannel lunar flishe has been fonctally cool or even femteile anul as widely known to furso They have been trmote from the two proframs-although thr US program is open to their interrat-and have hal lutle concern for the larges technological, au contrastral with scientific values of manned missions Thus the conclusions of an International scientific body convened to consider the matters listed by Lovell would very posully be negative in other word, they could be expected to support the conclusions already said Ly Lovell to have been reached by the Soviet Academy with regard to its prom from Yet as we have seen the press and some public oficials fornel in interpreting the letter as a feeler for cooperative activity The reported Soviet decision to suspend manned lunar clorts for some years if not permanently was given wide credence li con tributed to serious debate of the need for a competitive US program were we not competing only with ourselves, some asked? And it may well have contributed to the serious budgetary reverses for the NASA program which followed No one took the time to note that the press had been riding two horses simultaneously, although the beasts were headed in opposite directions For the press sugge led both that the Sovie's had dropped their moon program and that they wished to cooperate in pursuin., The implications of NAS is own re ponee to Lovell were ap parently not understood A letter addressed to Sur Bernard by James ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 109 E Webb Admipistrator of NASA thanked him for his thoughts drew a careful distinction between Lovell s own cooperative arrange ments and space programs firmly noted that an official channel for positive agreement on space cooperation had already been established between Dr Dryden and Academician Blagonrasov and concluded with the simple remark that if the Soviet Academy is indeed in terested in the matters you describe in your letter we will look for ward to the possibility of further explorations by these two gentlemen 23 NASA s response to press inquiry might also have helped but apparently did not i sued on August 9 it tated Sır Bernard Lovells letter to Dr Dryden represents the personal impressions of a private individual on a matter of the greatest obscunty-the Soviet space program Accordingly it would pot scem wise at this time to give the letter undue importance al though naturally we are glad to have it Contrary to some reports Sir Bernard > letter does not convey any proposal by the Soviet Academy for the US and the USSR to cooperate in their lanar program It rales only the possibility of a discussion of some of the reasons for manged lunar explora tron--the scientific reasons As Mr Webbs reply indicates we already have a channel of communications and have even achueved an initial agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences on Space matters It seems reasonable to expect that that channel will be used for any serious and ubstantne propo als regarding cooperation in major national programs in the space feld In the next several months Soviet statements by astronauts and others multiplied in contradiction to Lovells report all asserting the continuing intention of their country to pursue manned lunar pro grams A statement by Khrushchev that no deadline was nece sarıly imposed on the Soviet effort was again misinterpreted widely by the press as representing an abandonment of the project Finally exas Perated by the que tions of a touring group of American bu inessmen why he had dropped manned lunar ambitions abru. bchev lashed back saying they not lie liad stated uch a conclu sion and that nothing could be further from the truth The penultimate irony was the following pre s comment when it ay to was all over ·110 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION wise KURUSHCHEY CONFINMIS USSR LUNAR PROGRAM Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev has toade it emphatically clear that the USSR has per her deferred" po tponed or withdrawn" its competitive lunar landing program Rather he says his country will launch a man to the Moon when all preparations have been completed that will ensure his safety In making the announcement he chided United States specula tion that the Soviet Union has changed its lunar landing plans for economic reasons In regard to the question of whether we have given up the lunar project for economic reasons or other he said "we have never said we are giving up our lunar project You re the ones who said that' Khrushchev g arks hopefully coming at a time when the memories are still fresh will be a warning to members of the general press and many members of our national leadership that inaccurate translation quotation and interpretation or analysis of the antagonists proclamations on the still very technical and com plex arena of space can afford a very embarrassing paychological victory to those antagonists If members of the general press had resorted to the expediency of consulting with our own national space leadership for instance Dr Edward Welch of the National Space Council (a techni-al advisor more than a political appoint ment) it would not have appeared that our entire national space program was a tail wagged by Premier Khrushchev This past year has seen an excess of spur of the moment inter pretations reflected in assaults upon the whole concept of the national space program and the age-old philosophy of national competition to a point where there has been a weakening of our nations determination at a time when the antagonist 13 demon strating a continuing space technology leadership At the risk of being repetitive it should be recorded that many in our Congress and much of our general press have a history of placing our space leaders on trial by the proclamations from an audience either completely ignorant of the technology of space and its implica tions or from foreign or antagonistic onlookers 4 The ultimate irony was a statement by President Keldysh of the Soviet Academy repudiatın, the Lovell letter So far as can be de termined it has neser been reported in the US press (although called to prees attention) An English language radio report of a pre conlerence held by heldy h in Prague on October 11 1963 reluted the statement made by Bernard Lovell Director of the Britreh Ob ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 111 servatory in Jodrell Bank, that according to President of the USSR Academy of Sciences M V Keldysh, the Soviet Union has abandoned at least for the near future its aim to land a man on the moon The report continued . Academician Keldysh today said Professor Lovell obviously came to his conclusion by himself as we have never said this The tasks of making a safe manned landing on the moon are without doubt very exacting and demand great preliminary research We therefore cannot say precisely when we will realize this task.'' Whetlier Sir Bernard understood the Soviet scientists remarks to hum correctly, whether such remarks in any case reflected the views of Soviet authorities who in fact direct the manned space programs of the USSR and if so whether minds and policies were then changed (making an innocent victim of Sır Bernard) -- these questions are unlikely to be resoked now However the dangers of glıbness gulli bility and punditry are clear enough. TOGETHER TO THE MOON Events and information of events surrounding President Kennedy s September 20 speech at the United Nations in which he proposed to explore with the Soviets the possibility of cooperation in space exploration, including manned lunar flight, were by coincidence and happinstance confused to an unfortunate degree Lovells suggestion that the Soviets had abandoned their lunar effort for a time had been given wide publicity and neither heldysh nor Khrushchev had yet made their comments repudiating this notion The idea that the Soviet program had been dropped appeared logical to many ob &crvers who had always had difficulty in accepting the reality of the Soviet achievement and who felt that the on rushing US program must discourage Soviet competition by making it too expensive Re ports of economic difficulties in the USSR and the lengthening shadow of Chinese communism along the Soviet border tended to buttress this view So many were ready to believe that the US would hare a clear field in its manned moon program The spectre of a Soviet "first" seemed to recede To some this meant there was no reason ·112 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION for the US program at all to others it meant that there was no rea son to prejudice the increasing possibility of a US first' by suggest ing cooperation with the Soviet Union to others still it seemed that cooperation was at last feasible since the race was off 25 A few days before President Kennedy s UN remarks, Dr Robert R. Gilruth Director of NASA s Manned Space Flight Center was asked at a luncheon what his views were regarding cooperation with the Soviet Union He said I tremble at the thought of the integration of a Soviet rocket with US spacecraft when I think of the prob lems we have experienced with American contractors who all speak the same language 'Gilruth s remarks came so close in time with the President s proposal that they soon seemed to constitute a comment upon that proposal and were actually handled that way in aome press stories in fact Gilruth knew nothing of the President s intended sug gestion Moreover the President in no sense directed his proposals for cooperation to the integration of a Soviet rocket and a US spacecraft Even so Gilruth did not say this could not or should not be done His next sentence had been The proposal would be very interesting and significant--but hard to do in a practical sort of way *&_as in fact it would be Gilruth s trembling was an entirely rational reaction but in no sense to be interpreted as opposing the President s subsequent suggestion or as applying to other types of cooperation (The President was not known for his preference for easy tasks he had espoused objectives before because they were difficult One may assume that the manned lunar program itself will be hard to do and makes sensible men tremble even though they feel confident that it will ultimately be carried out successfully In any case the task of placing a man on the moon and bringing him back must in itself be considerably more difficult than the technical task of in tegrating a Soviet rocket and a US spacecraft) A further source of confusion was careless reporting of a luncheon meeting between Dr Dryden and Academician Blagonravov during the week before President Kennedy s speech Dr Dryden confirmed that he had inquired of Blagontavos regarding current Soviet at titudes toward an extension of the existing bilateral agreement to ·COOPERATIOY ITIL THE SOVIET UNION 113 manned lunar programs He noted that Blagonrasos replied that this subject might be discussed aiter instrumented unmanned landings had been accompli hed Dryden corrertis ob erved that this was "somewhat more favorable than earlier reactions insisting on total diarmament first. This simple and totally noncommillal exchange prompted by Dr Triden was neserthelese transmuted by the press into further evidence that the Soviets verc abandoning the moon project and were amenable to cien suggesting cooperation All these accounts contributed to an apparently coherent and progresive picture of Soviet readiness either to abandon their own lunar program or to join in a cooperative effort' , dangerously misleading view for the credulous the uninformed and the wishful thinkers in official and unofficial places Ready acceptance of this totally unfounded picture of Soviet in ferest in manned lunar cooperation contrasted sharply with nonac ceptance of the Presidents own con istent record of interest in the same cooperation The UN proposal having been made a numaber of Congressmen wondered of the President was backing off from a na lional goal 2* Others thought his proposal was in conflict with previ ous pouvions emphasızıng the importance of the manned lunar program " In fact the President had consistently made clear his desire for significant cooperation in space and in all other aspects of science He had vand in his inaugural address that he wished to invoke the wonders of cience instead of its terrors and that we should explore the stars together his correspondence with Khru shchev clearly contemplated cooperation in manned and unmanned planetary exploration and in lunar projects there had been no sug gestion that the Dryden Blagontavox agreement should be limited by anything but prudence and those limits self imposed by the Soviet aide nor had there ever been a suggestion that the US should seek cooperation only in unimportant projects After the initial press reaction to the UN proposal kennedy ſound at nece sary to remind the Congress and the press of the obvious that "This great national effort and this steadily stated readiness to co operate with others are not in conflict. They are mutually upport ·114 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 22 ing elements of a single policy 30 NASA s Administrator James E Webb had already been emphasizing this same point publicly a1 Nor was this view of the national space program put forward only after the fact of Kennedy s speech Much earlier, Mr Vebb had described the program as lıke Janus having two faces one looking toward competition and national distinction the other toward international cooperation In fact this basic duality was actually well understood despite the doubta vorced after the President s speech For example his con tinung purpose had been clearly stated without objection in an ex change in the Senate only a month before his speech in the UN Early in August Senator Clark proposed an amendment to action before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences the purport of his amendment was to authorize NASA to obligate and expend funds for cooperative programs with other countries on a basis of equal matching of funds Senator Clark said this us an expres. sion of a congressional intent and willingness to match funds dollar for dollar with the Russians in a joint venture to reach the moon or in any other joint venture into outer space I believe the adoption of this amendment to the committee amendment would make a very real contribution to efforts the President has been making erer since his inauguration to persuade the Russians to go along with the peaceful development of outer space 33 (Italıcs added ) The amendment was ultimately withdrawn not on the question of limiting cooperation with the Soviet Union to which no one objected--but lar.ely because it would limit NASA to programs in which cooperat ing nations could match the cost No one took exception to Senator Clark > characterization the President s long standing objectives nor to his interest in facilitating cooperation in a moon venture One cannot escape the conclusion that much of the adverse reac tion to the President s UN proposal rested on tactical grounds The Presidents specific proposal was inserted very late in the speech writing process and tus decision to go ahead with the offer wasnt widely known even within the Administration 34 (There is no question however that James E Webb NASAS Administrator was ·COOPERATION TITI THE SOVIET UNION 115 consulted by the President, he has stated this publicly ) The Wash ington reaction already noted may therefore have reflected pique rather than doubt as to the Presidents position Thus the proposal may have suffered domestically by reason of the circumstances of its introduction-omission of the usual preparation of the Congress for significant public actions through the briefing of its interested men bers (Observers have attributed a porhon of the cuts made in NASA s budget at the time to incitation at the manner and apparent meaning of the offer, 1e the failure to touch base with the Congress and the implication that the space race aspect was no longer im portant An element in this impression was the passage of an amend ment to tha NASA appropriation bill requiring NASA to come into the Congress for approval before spending any funds in a joint ven ture to the moon with the Soviet Union) Internationally the proposal can also be regarded as unsuccessful in that there has been no Soviet response formal or informal nega tive or positive 35 At the same time press coverage suggested that the proposal had a notable and positive effect upon its UN audience al though thus too in the short run at leat has little substantive mean ing Whether such a proposal has long range value of an intangible kind in contributing to a favorable world impression of US intentions or in conditioning and moderating Soviet attitudes 19 harder to say The episode po es the question of how best to initiate major proposals for cooperation between countries whether privately or publicly Presumably the nornal course where relationships are good 18 simply to advance a proposition privately Recourse is taken to public forums for imtiating propo als where it seems useful to bring public pre sure to bear in support of the effort In a more sophis Licated view the private proposal might be a first recourse even where relationships are not particularly good but if this does not bear fruit it might then be publicized in the hope of exercising Breater leverage Clearly both approaches have their time and place Yet it may be doubted whether there is a fine appreciation of the inherent limitations of dramatic public demarches A public proposal to another government to join in a complex and consequential en ·116 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION terprise 19 likely to find both political and practical obstacles in the way of acceptance one uch obstacle being the defensive position in which the other government is placed by the public initiative itself (It should be noted that White Hou e sources were cited shortly after President Kennedy s UN speech, to the effect that he had privately broached the subject of cooperation in lunar landings with Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 37 sugge ting a constructive private pre view of the UN proposttion ) Speculation as to how and whether the Presidents proposal could be implemented was of cour e rampant and was fed by various private and anonymous opinions One Washington reporter said "A broad sampling of people in the know indicates a con ensus that there is scant possibility of literal achievement of Mr Kennedy , goal 38 Another said But it is evident that most NASA leaders despite indications of a switch in the Soviet attitude have doubts about involving the US in a cooperative lunar landing effort They worry that Soviet secrecy probably would preclude obtaining the kind of information needed to join hands And they continued even of the information were available the mechanical problems of mesh ing space systems developed by two different nations might be enor 39 Apart from a certain license in the use of the words people in the know and NASA leaders these speculations undoubtedly represented a grossly oversimplified view of the Presidents propo : tron The President had said that there is room for new cooperation for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of pace I include among the e posibilities a joint expedition to the moon (Italıcs added ) Admini trator ebb and Deputy Administrator Dryden again and again empha ized that the key word in the pro posal was the word explore The President was propo in; 10 erplore whether the cienti ts and a tronauts of our two countries-- indeed of all the world-cannot work together in the conquest of *pace To jump from the vagestion that the matter be explored to the conclu on that the Pre ident was erplicitly a king to put a US spacecraft upon a Sosiet booster for a lunar voyage or vice ver43 or suggesting that American and Soviet a tronauts be paired off for mous ·COOPERATIOY TU THE SOVIET UNIOY 117 jolat trips to the moon in US or Soviet capsules euch conclusions here unnarranted Yet they ecned as the straw men for the shafts and arrows directed at the 'Ica ability" of the proposal At leat two of the constructie sugge tions made through the prees by persons with some knowledge of space operations are worth noting since the pros and cons tend to illustrate well the problems that must confront those responsible for serious advancement of US policy The magazine Blissiles and Rockets publı hed an editorial" sugge ting that a joint lunar landing was unlikely to be implemented because the US program was "too far advanced in design and en gineering to make poesible any joint technical effort on development of hardware military security freczes the two nations in a posi tion where cooperation involving hardware is undesirable such a joint project will tend to lessen the competitive drive and national support of the exi ting lunar programs (and) the mutual trust necessary to such a joint program does not exist 'Becau e of these disabling considerations the editorial suggested that sights for a cooperative venture be shifted to a more di tant major project joint program for establi hment of a scientific base on the Moon following the early exploratory lunar flights The premi e was that the planning and engineering of a joint lunar base could be carried out cooperatively without involving the nations respective space hard ware requiring no mating of equipment and therefore no com promise of security Unfortunately current concepts of lunar bases do conteraplate utilization of structures and equipments which are themselves extensions of the space vehicle systems designed for early lunar exploration There is likely therefore to be no neat dividing line between the carly exploratory programs and ultimate base opera tions of any Seen as a continuum the programs then present the same difficult though not necessarily disabling considerations (It 18 interesting that the Antarctic precedent was cited in support of this proposal for cooperative planning and engineering of a lunar base though as we have seen in Chapter I the activities of the Soviet Union and the United States in Antarctic re earch are almost entirely independent of each other and in almost a decade have produced no a ·118 COOPERATION TITI TRE SOVIET UNION more than an exchange of three or four personnel on each side and a few.visits Their real nexus is their subscription to the very general scientific goals suggested by an international committee The two countries carry out their own programs in independent fashıon leav ing each other strictly alone ) A second constructive proposal was advanced by Thomas Turner an engineer through the pages of LIFE magazine 11 As LIFE said Turner had devised an ingenious scheme for making the Presidents plan work According to this scheme the Soviet Union would use a very large booster to put a powerful spacecraft in earth orbit with a capacity for three men but a crew of two The US would use a smaller booster to put a more modest spacecraft in earth orbit thus having a capacity for two men but a crew of one The two spacecraft would rendezvous and dock (join) then proceed together into an orbit about the moon One Soviet and one American astronaut would then use the amaller US spacecraft for a descent to the moon and return to the parent vehicle Reentering the latter they would aban don the small American lunar vehicle and return to carth in the larger Soviet one All that would be needed it was said would be compatible collar and docking devices common atmospheres in the two spacecraft and common communications Billions of dollars and much time would be saved Without evaluatıng this truly ingenious proposal in definite terms a number of questions can be put to suggest that the matter is indeed far more complex than may appear at first blush. In the present state of US-Soviet relationships would cither side enter into an initial joint enterprise which would make it dependent upon the other for the capability of carrying out a given objective? Do continuing United States objectives and requirements in space permit the US 80 forego the development of large boosters leaving this to the Soviet Union? If we believe if necessary in any case to develop such boosters (on the assumption that major space projects dont end with a lunar Isrdina) what then would be the actual savings under the proposal publi hed in LIFE' Is the proposal pouble to implement in so das mnogo la la fron- could disrult renderrous and docking manuress ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 119 - be carried out for the first time in the course of an actual assault upon the moon or would not both nations want to approach the problem through identical ground simulation techniques and equipment and common drills? Ghen the very limited near term maneuverability of spacecraft in space would not extensile information and agree Dent need to be exchanged on launching schedules requiring un precedented advance notice by the Soviet side and its exposure to failure in a pre advertised venture? Can the Soviet side commit itself to boosting a US spacecraft from earth orbu to lunar orbit without knowing its weight, or could the US commit a spacecraft to such a boost without knowing the boosters thrust and concurring in the estimate of its capability? At the end of a lengthy list of additional questions which might be asked 19 it technically or politically sound to enter upon 30 integrated and portentous a project without prior establishment of mutual confidence levels technical and political through earlier and more modest joint enterprı es exchanges and disclosures? CONCT USION A conclusion to the difficult subject of US Soviet space cooperation 19 relatively easily put Efforts on the western side have been con sistent and patient They have been both specific and general and ha e ranged from modest proposals to absolutely unequivocal in dications that the US 18 prepared to go as far as the Soviets will go They have been put privately and publicly by scientists politicians and diplomats The history of rejections by the Soviet is almost ex actly as long It is both general and specific, and by omission may be assumed to have come from all of the same levels utilized by the United States to advance its purpose A small beginning but one with a large potential, has been made in virtually unprecedented fashion through the Dryden Blagonravov agreements The first imple mentation of these agreements has begun in a fashion which might, with caution be described as somewhat promising The task of ex panding this small beachhead 18 heavily burdened by the implications of space for military uses and equipments Finally while the major ·120 COOPERATION WITH TIIE SOVIET UNION US overture President Kennedy s lunar proposal has not been ac cepted it has not been rejected either The entire process has been complicated by wide swings in public interpretations of Soviet intentions arded and abetted by the predilections of at least portions of the press for the sensational, the oversimplified the controversial and the speculative When all is said and done however Soviet attitudes and per formance and indeed personal relationships with their representa tives all have come a long way since the early days of the Interna tional Geophysical Year The process has been very slow but heartening and performance has warranted a steady growth in per sonal trust In fairness one must assume that a similar view has had to grow within the Soviet Union Possibly crude pressures upon Soviet scientists by indıvıdual US colleagues in the first years of the space age have generally given way to a greater understanding of difficulties and restrictions which are sometimes more mutual than we may realize The prescription for the future can only be patience and persistence on both sides NOTES 1 The national scientific societies represented at the organizational meeting of the International Committee for Space Research were those of Australia Canada France Japan the USSR the United Kingdom and the US these having been invited as participants during the IGY in satellite sounding rocket or formal satellite tracking programas In addi tion there were in attendance representatives of the following inter national scientific unions affiliated with the International Council of Scientific Unions Astronomy Pure and Applied Physics Geodry and Geophysics Radio Science Theoretical and Applied Mechanics Biolog ical Sciences Physiological Sciences and Pure and Applied Chemistry 2 National societies repre ented at the second COSI AT meeting were tho e which had been present at the first (see above) plus that of South Africa International Unions represented at the second meeting were tho e listed above the Mathematirs Union 3"Troika" nas the term applied to tripartite (US USSR neutral) leader hip of a given furum ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNIO 121 "IG Bulletin National Academy of Sciences (Dec 1963) P 12 This visit, arranged by the National Academy of Sciences as host to the conference took place after the launching of the first Soviet sput nik on October 4 Other NASA officials present were Di Homer E Newell Dr John W Townsend and the author "The meeting was arranged privately at the Hotel Sheraton Park in Washington DC on the occasion of an annual conference of the American Rocket Society This offer of tracking and data acquisition assi tance was made in a speech by Dr Glennan on Dec 7 1939 before the Institute of World Affairs Pasadena California 9 Feb 21 1962 10 Feb 22 1962 11 Full text of President Kennedy s letter of March 7 1962 to Chair man Khrushchev proposing specific projects for cooperative action fol lows Dear Mr Chairman On February twenty second last I wrote you that I was instructing appropriate officers of this Government to prepare concrete proposals for immediate projects of common achon in the exploration of space I now present such proposals to you Tho exploration of space is a broad and varied actiny and the pos sibilities for cooperation are many In suggesting the possible first steps which are set out below I do not intend to limit our mutual considera f100 of desirable cooperative activities on the contrary I will welcome your concrete suggestions along these or other lsnes 1 Perhaps we could render no greater service to mankind through our space programs than by the joint cotablishment of an early opera tional weather satellite system Such a system would be designed to provide global weather data for prompt use by any nation to initiate this service I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union cach launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide other agreed meteorological services for all nations. The two satellites would be placed in near polar orbits in planes approximately perpendicular to each other thus pronding regular coverage of all areas This immensely Yaluable data would then be dissem ated through normal international meteorological channels and would make a ignificant contribution to the research and service programas now under study by the World Meteorolocal Organizatioi in response to Resolution 1721 (XVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 20 1961 2 It would be of great interest to those te ponsible for the conduct of our respective space programs if they could obtain operational tracking Getrices from each other s territories Accordingly I propo e that each of our countries establish and operate a rad a tracking station to provide tracking services to the other utilizing equipment which we would cach provide to the other Thus the United States would provide the technscal «quipment for a tra king station to be e tal lished in the Soviet Laion ·122 COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION and to be operated by Soviet technicians. The United States would in cum establish and operate a radio tracking station utilizing Soviet equip. ment Each country would train the other s technicians in the operation of its equipment would utilize the station located on its territory to provide tracking services to the other and would afford such access as may be necesary to accommodate modifications and maintenance of equipment from time to time, 3 In the field of the earth sciences the precise character of the earth. magnetic field is central to many scientific problems I propose therefore that we cooperate in mapping the earth s magnetic field in space by utilizing two satellites one in a near earth orbit and the second in a more distant orbit The United States would launch one of the c satel lites while the Soviet Union would launch the other The data would be exchanged throughout the world scientific community and opportu, nities for correlation of supporting data obtained on the ground would be arranged 4 In the field of experimental communications by satellize the Unued States has already undertaken arrangements to test and demonstrate the feasibility of intercortinental transmissions A number of countries are constructing equipment suitable for participation in such testing 1 would welcome the Soviet Unions joining in this cooperative effort which will be a step toward meeting the objective contained in United Nations General A sembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) that communications by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non discriminatory basis. I note also that Secretary Rusk has broached the subject of cooperation in this field with Minister Gromyko and that Mr Gromyko has expressed some interest Our technical representatives might now discuss specific pos sibilities in this field. 5 Civen our common interest in manned space flights and in insuring man ability to survive in space and return safely I propose that we pool our efforts and exchange our knowledge in the field of space medicine where future research can be pursued in cooperation with kientists from various countries Beyond these specific projects we are prepared now to discuss broader cooperalion in the still more challenging projects which must be under taken in the exploration of outer space The tasks we so challenging the costs to great and the risks to the brave men who engage in space cxploration so gra e that we must in all gond conscience iry every por ability of sharing these fusks and costs and of minimizing these ni ki. Leaders of the United States space program have developed detail d plans for en ord rly requ nce of manned and unmanned Roghts for exploration of space and ibe planet. Out of discussion of these plan end of your own for undertaking the ta ks of the drende would un dubtedly emrage po bilties for sub tanti e kientific and technical comperera en manned and mange space investigators. Some pe . bilton are not yet precisely itronfiable but shool! Ircom drar 41 the space poging of our iwo countrimo proceed In 1! case of other it may be posible to start plaanis 10-row For samaple wo maht contie 11 nino d replayıtion of the lanır surface or w Big ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 123 commence now the matual definition of steps to be taken in sequence for an exhaustive scientific investigation of the planets Mars or Venus, including consideration of the possible utility of manned Aight in such programs When a proper sequence for experiments has been determined We might share responsibility for the necessary projects All data would be made freely available I believe it is both appropriate and desirable that we take full cos Bizance of the scientific and other contributions which other statts the world over might be able to make in such programs As agreements are resched between us on any parts of these or similar programs, I propose that we report them to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space The Committee offers a variety of addı tional opportunities for joint cooperative efforts within the framework of its mandale as set forth in General Assembly Resolutions 1472 (XIV) and 1721 (XVI) I am designating technical representatives who will be prepared to meet and discus with your representatives our ideas and yours in *pirit of practical cooperation In order to accomplish this at an early date I suggest that the representatives of our countries who will be coming to New York to take part in the United Nations Outer Space Committee meet privately to discuss the proposals set forth in this Sincerely Jobn F Kennedy letter 12 Text of March 20 1962 letter from Chairman Khrushchev in reply to President Kennedy s letter of March 7 1962 Dear Mr President Having carclully familiarized myself with your message of March 7 of this year 1 note with satisfaction that my communication to you of February 21 containing the proposal that our two countries unite their efforts for the conquest of space has met with the necessary understand ing on the part of the Government of the United States In advancing this proposal we proceeded from the fact that all peoples and all mankind are interested in acharving the objective of exploration and peaceful ve of outer space and that the enormous scale of 1bus task as well as the enormous difficulties which must be overcome urgently demand broad onification of the scientific technica terial capabilities and resources of nations Now at a time when the space ape is just dawning it is already evident how much men will be called upon to accomplı It today the genius of man has created space ship capable of reaching the surface of the moon tih great accuracy and of launching the fir t co monsuts into orbit around the earth then tomorrow manned spacecraft will be able to race to Mars and Venus and the lanther bey travel the wider and more immense the pro pects will become for man penetration into the depiha of the The greater the number of countnes making their contribution 10 this truly compt ceted endeavor which involgent expense the more and ma universe ·124 COOPERATION WITU TIE SOVIET UNION swiftly will the conquest of space in the interests of all humanity proceed And this means that equal opportunities should be available for all countries to participate in international cooperation in this field It 18 precisely this kind of international cooperation that the Soviet Union uoswervingly advocates true to its policy of developing and strengthen 10g friendship between peoples As far back as the beginning of 1958 iho Soviet government proposed the conclusion of a broad international agreement on cooperation in the field of the study and peaceful use of outer space and took the initiative in raising this question for cxamina tion by the United Nations In 1961 immedsately after the first space flight by man had been achieved in the Soviet Union we reaffirmed our readiness to cooperate and voite our eforts with those of other coun tries and most of all with your country which was then making prepara tions for sumular Alights My message to you of February 21 1962 was dictated by these same aspirations and directed toward Inis same pur pose Tho Soviet Government considers and has always considered the sac cesses of our country in the field of space exploration as achievements not only of the Soviet people but of all mankind The Soviet Union us taking practical steps to the end that the fruits of the labor of Soviet scientists shall become the property of all countries. We widely publish notification of all launchings of satethtes spaceships and space rockets reporting all data pertaining to the orbit of flight weight of space den vices Jaunched radio frequencies esc Soviet scientists have established fruitful professional contacts with their foreign colleagues including scientists of your country in such international organizations as the Committee of Outer Space Rescarch and the International Astronautical Federation It seems to me Mr President that the necessity is now generally recognized for further practical steps in the noble cause of developing international cooperation in space research for peaceful purposes Your message shows that the direction of your thoughts does not differ in essence from what we conceive to be practical measures in the field of such cooperation What then should be our starting point? In this connection I should like to name several problems of research and peaceful use of space for whose solution i would in our opinion bo important to unite the efforts of nations. Some of them which are encompassed by the recent U.N General Assembly resolution adopted at the initiative of our two countries, are also mentioned in your message. 1 Scientists consider that the use of artificial earth satellites for the creation of International systems of long-distance communication entirely realistic at the present stage of space research. Realization of such projects can lead to a wgnificant improvement in the means of commun culion and television all over the globe. People would be pro nded with reliable means of communication and halberto unknown opportunities for broadening contacts between nations would be opened So let us begin by specifying the definute opportunities for cooperation in solving this problem. As I understood from your message the USA » also prepared to do this 2. It is difficult to overestimate be advantage that people would ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 125 derive from the organization of a world wide weather observation sernce using artificial earth satellites Precise and timely weather pre diction would be still another important step on the path to mans sub jugation of the forces of nature it would permit him to combat more successfully the calamities of the elements and would give new prospects for advancing the well being of mankind Let us also cooperate in this fiela. 3 It seems to us that it would be expedient to a ree upon organizing the observation of objects launched in the direction of the moon Mars Venus and other planets of the solar system by radio technical and optical means through a joint program As our scientists see it undoubted advantage would be gained by uniting the efforts of nations for the purpose of hastening scientific progress in the study of the phy ics of interplanetary space and heavenly bodies 4 At the present stage of mans penetration into space it would be most desirable to draw up and conclude an international agreement providing for and in searching for and rescuing space ships satellites and capsules that have accidentally fallen Such an agreement appears all the more necessary since it mi. ht involve saying the lives of cosmoneuts those courageous explorers of the far reaches of the universe 5 Your message contai s proposals for cooperation between our countries in compiling charts of the earth s magnetic field in onter space by means of satellites and also for exchanging knowledge in the field of space medicine I can say that Soviet scleatists are prepared to cooperate in this and to exchan, data regarding such questions with scientists of other countries 6 I think, Vr President that the tine has come for our two coun tres, which have advanced further than others in space rescarch, to try to find a common approach to the solution of the important legal problems with which life itself bas confronted the nations in the space age In this connection I find it a positive fact that at the UN General Assembly, 16th se ion the Soviet Union and the United States WeTO able to agree upon a proposal on the first principles of space law which was then unanimously approved by the members of the UN a pro posal on the applicability of international law including the UN Charter In outer space and on heavenly bodies on the accessibility of outer space and heavenly bodies for research and use by all nations 1 ac cordance with international law and on the fact that space is not subject to appropriation by nations Now in our opinion it is necessary to go further Expansion of space research be ng carried out by nations definı ely makes it necessary 10 aree also that in conducting experiments a outer space no one should create obstacles for space study and research for peaceful purposes by other nati as. Perhaps it should be stipulated that those esperiments 38 space that m ht comp! cate space research by other countries should be the subject of preliminary di-cussion and agreement on an appropriate international ba is. I ha e named, Vir President only some of the que l ops love solu tion hus, in our view Dow become urgent and requires cooperation ·126 COOPERATIOY WITH TRE SOVIET UNIOY between our countries. In the future jaternational cooperat103 in the conquent of space will undoubtedly extend to ever newer fields of space exploration if we can now lay a firma foundation for it. We hope that scientists of the USSR and the U.S.A will be able to engage in working out and realizing the many projects for the conquest of outer space hand in hand and together with tcientists of other countries Representatives of the USSR on the UN Space Committee will be given instructions to meet with representatirea of the United States in order to discuss concrete questions of cooperation in research and peaceful use of outer space that are of interest to our countries Thus Mr President do we conceive of shall we say heavenly matters We sincerely desire that the establishment of cooperation in the field of peaceful use of outer space facilitate the improvement of ten lations b tween our countries, the casing of international tension and the creation of a favorable situation for the peaceful settlement of argent problems here on our own earth At the time it appears obvious to me that the scale of our cooperation in the peacelul conquest of space as well as the choice of the lines along which such cooperation would seem possible us to a cer tain extent related to the solution of the disarmament problem Until an agreement on general and complete disarmament is achieved both our countries will nevertheless be limited on their abilities 10 cooperate in the field of peaceful use of outer space It is no secret that rockets for military purposes and spacecraft launched for peaceful purposes are based on common scientific and technical achievements It is true that there are some distinctions here space rockets require more powerful engines since by the means they earty greater payloads and attain a bigher altitude while military rockets in general do not require such powerful en ines-engines already in existence can carry warheads of great destructive force and assure their arrival at any point on the globe However both you and we know Mr President that the prin ciples for designing and producing military rockets and space rockets are the same I am expre sing these considerations for the simple reason that it would be better if we saw all sides of the question realistically. We shoull try to overcome any obstacles which may arise in the path of International coop ration in the peaceful conquest of space It is pos sible that we shall succeed in doing this and that will be useful Con siderably broader pro pects for cooperation and uniting our scientit technolo ical achievement up to and including joint construction of spacecraft for reacting other planets-the moon Tenu Mary-Will arise wlien agreement on disarmament has been achieved We l pe that a reement on general and complete disarmament will be achiese 1 we are exerting and will continue to exert every effort toward this end I tould like to believe that you al o Mr President will spare no effort in acting along these lines Fonts respectfully N hru hchev Mlo cow March 20 1962 ·COOPFRATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 127 to 24 1964) 13 Full text of the Bilateral Space Agreement between the US and the USSR together with pertinent letters of transmittal and press releases may be found in the Department of State Bulletin December 24 1962 P 962 14 Op cu pp 964–965 15 Full text of the First Memorandum of Understanding gether with press releases correspondence and appendu may be found in the Department of State Bulletin (September 9 1963) D 405 ff 14 NASA News Media Briefing "Joint US-USSR talks on Cooper ative Space Research Projects Held in Rome Italy (March 25 1963) 17 First Memorandum of Understanding Section IV paragraph 6 18 E.g. Robert S Allen and Paul Scott Los Angeles Times (January 19 This meeting occurred privately during the annual reunion of the International Committee for Space Research (COSPAR) The Chief USSR and US representatives were respectively Academician Blagon rayov and Dr Homer E Newell, then Director Office of Space Sciences NASA. 20 Both achieved in October 1964 21 "Space US and Soviet Scientists Get Along on Detailed Planning for Two Cooperative Projects Science (April 5 1963) p 39 40 22 Full text of Sur Bernard Lovells letter of July 23 1963 to Dr Hugle L. Dryden as it appeared in The Congressional Record August 9 1963 p 13903 follows University of Manchester July 23 1963 Dr H Dryden NASA Headquarters Washington, DC United States of America Dear Dr Dryden From June 23 until July 15 I was in the Soviet Union as the guest of the Academy of Sciences, Daring this time I was taken to the major Soviet optical and radio observatories and to the deep space tracking network a station which has not so far been seen by Western eyes or by many Soviet scienusts so I was told. I mention thus at the beginning of this let ter because it does seem to underline the apparently genuine desiro of the Academy 10 extend its cooperation with the West At the request of the president of the Academy (Academician M, V Keldysh) I had two meetings with bim and his senior advisers before and after the visit to the deep space facility because he asked me ta consider wbat form of cooperation might be possible between that facuity and Jodrell Bank. The e consultations seem to me to have been outstandingly successful in their promise of immediate cooperation and it is my desuo to acquaļat you with these arrangements and further to draw you at tention to an issue raised by the president of ibe Acad my in connection with the lunar space program Under (1) I outline the proposals for cooperation as far as Jodrell Bank us concerned, and vader (2) I CONTET I ·130 COOPERATIOY WITH THE SOVIET UNIOY letter of July 23 we in NASA are very glad to have the benefit of your observations and your thoughts with regard to the future interests of Soviet scientists. Your report of U.S.S R. plan to orbit a manned astronomical platform is interesting in the light of our own project for an an minded orbiting astronomical obseruatory comparison of results could be loteresting It is most encouraging that you have been able to work out cooperative programs covering certah laterests in radio and optical astronomy Walk Tegard 10 space rescurch and exploration as you know our present rela tionships with the Soviet Union have developed durectly from the corre pondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Nhrusbcber on specific possibilities of cooperation in this field Dr Drydeas discussions with Academician Blagoncayor over the past year or to have followed within this framework. There is already a current agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and NASA which represents the first rout of theso early eforts Accordingly of the Soviet Academy is indeed interested in the matters you describe in your letter we will look forward to the possibility of further explorations by Dr Dryden and Academician Blagonratov 13 10 their views and desires I will discuss this with Dr Dryden on his returr.. I assure you that there has been and continues to be a strong desire on our own part to maximize the areas of cooperation between this country and the Soviet Union with the fullest possible participation by other ► countries. Sincerely yours, James E. Webb Administrator 24 Space Darly (November 7 1963) p 217 25 Eg see Neusweek (September 30 1963) "Visit to a Small Satel lite? and Missiles and Rockets (September 23 1963) Soviets Eye Joint Moon Landing 28 TIME (September 27 1963) 21 The Wall Street Journal reported The Presidents UN offer of a joint expedition to the moon was clearly prompted by the Administra tions recent conclusion that the Russians have been reassessing their own space goals The report went on to say that the first clue to this change came from Lovell and the second from Blagonravoy during the luncheon with Dr Dryden (September 23 1963 ) 28 Eg Congressional comments are reported in the Los Angeles Times for September 24 1963 under a headline reading Soviet US Moon Shot Plan Balles Congress - Eg Ira C Eaker in the Chevenne Wyoming State Tribune (October 23 1963) 30 Letter from the President to Rep Albert Thomas reported in NY Times (Sept 27 1963) 31 Webb speech before Midcontinent Oil and Gas Association Hou ston Texas (Sept. 25 1963) ·COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIFT UNION 131 3 Webb address before the Institute of Foreign Affairs (Jan 24, 1963) 33 Congressional Record-Senate (Aug 9 1963) PP 13901ff 34 The Wall Street Journal (Sept 23 1963) 35 First Soviet press and radio reports of President Kennedy s UN speerh deleted references to his moon proposal (UPI reports datelined Moscow Sept. 20 1963) First comment was an article in Izzestia (Sept 28 1963) suggesting that the proposition was premature ** Associated Prese dispatches datelined United Nations N Y., Sept 21 1963 31 Associated Press dispatches Washington Post (Sept 22 1963) 38 William Hines in The Sunday Star Washington DC (Sept 22 88 Jonathan Spivak in The Wall Street Journal (Sept 23 1963) 49 A Lunar Proposal Afissules and Rorkets (Oct 14 1963) p 52 11 LIFE (October 11 1963) p 100ff 1963) ·OTHER MECHANISMS for COOPERATION While the US national space program remains the principal mecha nism for effecting international cooperation on an operational level and COSPAR is the central forum for scientific coordination neither the US nor COSPAR has a monopoly on cooperation There are other governmental as well as nongovernmental mechanisms with both operational and nonoperational roles to play The most significant in the operational area are two regional organizations the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) The mot significant on the nonoperational side is the United Nations—along with certain of its specialized agencies especially the World Meteorological Organiza tion (WMO) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Numerous other organizations have interests in the same sub ject areas and often figure in public reports suggesting cooperative activity or potential THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS All of the European nations with the possible exception of France took it for granted from the outset that major national space pro grams were beyond their financial scope Yet the appeal of entry into space remained strong in official and industrial quarters The basis of this appeal was much the same as in this country though perhaps the European have been more realistic about the values of pace activity than we have been here Pre tige is of cour e a consideration ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 133 but not the most persuasive one Far more important has been the belief that spare activity is an important element in the technological base for economic and military security The lesson of American technical preeminence has not been lost upon the Europeans It is clearly recognized that if science and technology are to move forward in quantum jumps it 13 by practicing them at their own frontiers Moreover the Europeans have had their eye more firmly fixed per haps than we do upon the ultimate practical payoffs of space re search-communications navigation weather forecasting improve ments It was these considerations more than any other which led the principal nations of the continent to enter into governmental agreements for the pooling of their resources in space activity Such pooling 19 not unique to space It was already well established in Europe in economic and scientific fields including especially nuclear energy prior to the ads ent of the space question But its spe cial application to science has been notable because of the increasing complexity and cost of research Scientific cooperation in Furope is no longer a marginal activity at represents a major and perhaps the only means for the smaller countries to keep in touch with the rapid advarce of science especially in expensive fields? In order that European motivation be fully understood it is in portant to recognize a distinction between space science and tech rology An adequate outlet for European scientific intere ts may have existed in the opportunities for cooperation with NASA in the United States. But the Europeans want to master the technology of space activity This fact accounts for the support given to the establishrrent of ESRO and ELDO even though the programs of those organiza tions must for a considerable tume follow in the tracks of the Amer can and Soviet juggernauts The experience was what was required and it would not satisfy practical self interest in Europe to delegate the technical jobs to the US While this decision has been charac terized as foolish by many it rests on a sound appreciation of the Importance of know how in advanced technology know how which cannot be acquired except by doing One Englishman dis cu sing a cooperative US UK project put the point this way ·134 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION When we have proceeded with the conception of cooperation in the technological field in terms of a sharing of technological ex perience as opposed to the division of the scientific and technologi cal aspects involved in the forthcoming Scout firings then we shall be making possible a new and immensely worthwhile attack on the large scale problems ahead" The formal establishment of both ESRO and ELDO came in March, 1964 after more than two years of sharp debate in Europe on the issues noted above ELDO had by far the more difficult sledding lis objective was to pool European efforts to produce a major satellite launcher, although no precise use for it was stated or apparent Never theless the participating nations felt there was ground enough for the effort in the technological exercise itself and in the possibilities for using the ELDO vehicle to launch communications satellites or the larger scientific satellites which might be prepared by the sister organization ESRO Basis for the ELDO booster was the Blue Streak missile put under development by Britain in the early 1950s in order to create a British nuclear deterrent Both the rocket engines and the rocket structure derived from technological information provided by the United States through industrial agreements The missile effort was discontinued in 1960 as too costly and time-consuming Arrangements were then worked out with the continental powers to utilize the Blue Streak as the first section of a three stage satellite booster for cıvıl purposes France would provide the second stage and West Germany the thurd. The Netherlands and Belgium assumed responsibility for much of the electronics, tracking installations and guidance while Italy was to engage u advanced spacecraft design Because use of the major launching range in Woomera Australia was required Australia too became a member An ELDO Preparatory Commission was established in Paris :D 1962 Jt successfully weathered a difficult organizational penod dur ing which major responsibiliues were apportioned plans for the several tages pressed forward problems of technical compatibility sorted out and industrial contracts let through the member countries - despite funding restrictions which applied until parliamentary rali

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·136 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 13 predicated upon a high degree of initial success in the development and testing of the three stages of the booster One may hazard the guess that the costs will ultimately be greater The final booster will be a powerful one falling somewhere between the American Thor and Atlas systems It is hoped that its actual performance will be up to placing a ton and a half payload in a near earth orbit The facil ities developed for its testing and operational launching at Woomera (largely for the earlier missile program) are comparable to those for Atlas launchings at Cape Kennedy with the added advantage of a very long (1 000 miles) over ground test range The ELDO program in principle presents the United States with a problem central to space cooperation Because ELDO 19 devoted entirely to rocket development any relationship between ELDO and the United States must rest squarely upon technical cooperation in this field Earlier NASA as the agency charged with cooperation in space for the United States had avoided missile-related security dif ficulties by stressing cooperation in scientific payloads and space craft Yet ELDO cannot be blinked it represents an additional opportunity to extend cooperative relationships particularly in light of its charter provision excluding military purpo - and espousing civil applications only Clearly then cooperation with ELDO either directly or through the authorization of commercial relationships must find a valid dividing line between technical exchange which contributes to military applications and such technical exchange as falls short of the military A superficial view and one quickly as sumed by the lay observer is that a missile is a missile technical assistance for a scientific satellite booster will not preclude the use of that booster for military purposes Actually this will depend very much upon conditions and circumstances Generally speaking mis. siles using cryogenic fuels for example do not commend themselves for use with deterrent forces since it is too difficult and expensive to keep them in a stand by -tatus skoraðle propellants are mucň to be preferred Thus fuels and other missile elements requiring the use of cryogenic equipments are unlikely to be used for weapon systems Similarly certain guidance systems are adequate for space applica.

·OTHER MECIIANISSIS FOR COOPERATION 137 tions hut do not commend themselves for targeting applications It is perhaps sufficient here to say that the matter is most complicated but that distinctions appear possible and have in fact been made As 4 consequence an area of uncertain dimensions one beset by difficult regulatory problems may be assumed to exist for cooperation be tween ELDO and NASI The Department of State bas stated a general policy goverping this area making clear that cooperative undertakings including the ex port of techrology would depend upon the differentiation of civil from strategic applications and would preferably more through the multinational channel of ELDO rather than bilaterally " The present planning of ELDO is substantially limited to comple tion of a first configuration of the Blue Streak satellite launcher system On this relatively little mutual interest can be based since the program is essentially a re tracing of technology alrcady existing in the United States But while ELDO pursues its first program it is casting its eyes also to the future to upgrading its system and to Entering into andvanced space technology Here then may lie mutual interests ESRO devotrag itself entirely to scienufic satellites and sounding rockets presents no such obstacles to international collaboration with the United States The decreased sensitivity of this enterprise 19 ap parent in the fact that some of the neutral nations of Europe joined with the leaders to bring the total membership of ESRO to nine nations, Belgium Denmark Federal Republic of Germany France The Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland and the United King dom, with Italy delayed only on technical grounds 5 ESRO Like ELDO worked out a prospective program on a multinational basis while existing only as a Preparatory Commission its level of effort established at some $300 000 000 over eight years the preparatory group proceeded to plan for the establishment of headquarters in Paris, a technical center a data cenier in Darmstadt a sounding rocket range in Kiruna (Sweden) and a satellite tracking and data acquisition network in several widely scattered locations By pooling their resources ESRO s members felt they might ·138 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION carry out a scientific sounding rocket program with about 60 or more launchings per year over two thirds the NASA rate As for satellites they counted on perhaps two satellites per year after the fourth year of the program with near earth researches first and then perhaps astronomical or lunar observatories as it might become possible to look to more ambitious undertakings NASA early welcomed the efforts to organize ESRO Dr Dryden, NASA $ Deputy Administrator, wrote to Sir Harrie Massey, Presi dent of ESRO s Preparatory Commission, in May, 1962 to express this welcome and offer to ESRO the same terms for cooperative activ ity which applied to bilateral relationships Thus ESRO was invited to send trainees for assignment in NASA centers or in graduate pro grams in US universities the possibility of joint satellite projects was held out as well As it has developed an increasingly close rela tionship between ESRO and NASA appears assured A dozen Euro pean trainees were accommodated at NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center during 1963–64 for work in satellite engineering in anticipa tion of joint satellite projects ESRO sponsored each year begin ning in 1962 an increasing number of graduate students from all over Europe for training in US universities engaged in space te search under NASA grants or contracts Arrangements were worked out for an exchange of services in connection with bibliographuc and documentation activities with the result that a single publication will report and abstract most of the literature of interest in both the US and Europe for both organizations Perhaps most important ESRO circularized its member nations for proposals for the first European satellite experiments drafted proposals for two satellites which would be engineered in Europe and asked NASA to consider launching them lith technical approval in the Spring of 1961 by MASA Office of Space Sciences and Applications a truly multi national pace program was a sured At the same time ESRO a ked for support from the NASA network in the tracking of atellites and the acquisition of data from them (Such inquiries had come from other interests as well ) But MASA S network had been e tabli hed to meet dome tic requirements little ·OTHER MECHANIS315 FOR COOPERATIOY 139 excess capacity esisted for the support of other programs More over, the uncertainty of schedules in space programs-characterized always hy new developments and the most advanced technology meant that neither party to a cooperative arrangement could guar antee its own schedules, the result would be slippages and resulting confiscts in schedules making commitments impossible NASA could say no more therefore, than that it would give tracking and data acquisition assistance to ESRO to the degree that tune was available and equipments compatible Whule this could indeed be important, it fell short of ESRO s obvious requirement for support upon which It could count for its various projects Accordingly ESRO accepted the necessity for establishing its own network, but in order to profit from the possibility of assistance from NASA, determined that its network should be compatible with NASA's Thus each side would be able to assist the other in emergencies and otherwise I laying out its network plans ESRO found that Alaska was well suited for the location of one of the European data acquisition sta tions The US was then presented for the frst time with a request which would allow it to reciprocate for the numerous instances in which our own overseas requirements for tracking stations had been accommodated by other nations The US agencies which were con cerned in the Alaska reque t-not only NASA but the Federal Com munications Commis on the Department of State the Interdepart mental Radio Allocation Committee and the Department of Defense --were quick to recognize the implicit obligation to do all possible to 2391st ESRO (US law does not permit foreign nationals to transmit radio signals from our territory--with the single exception of foreign embassies and so appears to preclude the reciprocal extension of privileges we regularly seek from other countries However with the sympathy and understanding of all concerned it seems possible to make suitable provision for a foreign station if a US contractor » 3wen anthonty over the use of as transmitters On this basis the proposed Alaska station may go ahead without difficulty One may hope however that it will become possible to amend the law so as to facilitate extension of transmission authority to foreign nationals on a ·140 OTHER MECITA VISUES FOR COOPERATIOY reciprocal basis in connection with experimental scientific activities, and where there is a competent sponsoring governmental authority in this country such as NASA ) Apart from cooperative programs with NASA, ESRO naturally looks to ELDO for major launch capabilities but these arc far of perhaps 1967 or later Morcover the ELDO launch vehicle is suited only to heavy carth satellites or to probes to the moon and beyond Between the small carth satellites which may be done in cooperation with NASA and the larger ones appropriately fitted to the heavy ELDO booster there may be a necd for middle weight scientific satel lites The purchase of US boosters like Thor Delta may be appro priate for this purpose Such arrangements are possible under curren policy and can bring far greater flerability to ESRO s program thar would otherwise be the case The costs of the two regional European space organizations are apportioned among the member states with the United Kingdom bearing the heaviest burden something in the neighborhood of two fifths of the total France and Germany sharing roughly another two fifths and the other nations splitting the remainder The fact that space science and technology have brought these practical and hard headed governments together to shoulder two programs representing more than a half billion dollar investment over eight years 19 evi dence enough of the value which they attach to space activity Cert fainly the dominant political and industrial interests in Europe be lieve strongly in these activities and the benefits whırh may follow from them Moreover the participating nations hase concluded that the benefits can be realized only through collective action--evidence of the unifying forces inherent in the massive technologies of the future The order of investment nevertheless is far from comparable to that by the United States Whereas we are intesting over one percent of the gross national product in space research and exploration no European country is investing even a considerable fraction of this percentage of its GNP in space activities Franre is the most energetic and aggressive nation in this regard but its expenditures on space are ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 141 probably well under one tenth of one percent of GNP Thus the total effort in Europe despite pooling of resources is far below that in the United States, a fact which it is well to keep in mind when assessing the full potential of cooperation between NASA and ESRO/ELDO Valuable individual and specific technical exchanges and cooperation may be had together with valuable political impact, but no large scale sharing of major research and development pro brams is yet in view THE UNITED NATIONS The United Nations is our most comprehensive international politi cal organization and space science is one of the most complex sci ences in terms of its social requirements Therefore it should not be surprising that each has taken notice of the other ? The United Nations first approached the problems of outer space through disarmament A resolution of the General Assembly a few days after the second Sputnik was launched in November, 1957 urged an international convention on disarmament and a nuclear ban In cluded among its objectes was The joint study of an inspection sy tem designed to ensure that the wending of objects through outer spach shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes This action was taken as a consequence of proposals put forward by Ambassador Lodge for the US during the previous month Lodge re minded his UN audience that tho US had proposed to internationalize atomic energy at a timc (1916) when it alone had nuclear weapons he then said We now have a similar opportunity to harness for peace mans new pioneering efforts in outer space We must not miss this chance We have therefore propo ed that a technical committee be set up to work out an in pection system which will a sure the ure of outer space for exclusively peaceful and scientific purposes The Soviet Union objected to the resolution without success, and later asyanced proposals of its own to ban the mhtary u e o pace 10 The difference betspeen the two sides was that the US was willing to negotiate on the subject of outer space and mı ile controls with ·142 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION ag out regard to other issues whereas the Soviet Umon declined to separate this matter from questions such as US military bases on earth In any case the objective of peaceful uses of outer space stated by the United States became the focal point for UN considera tion of space matters However, the theme underwent a subtle transition Since the UN could not restrict outer space to peaceful purposes it slufted its efforts to encourage peaceful activities In following this line in the next half dozen years the UN had to work out two problems First was a long series of political dificulties between East and West in connection with the establishment of a UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space The second was the task of determining just what the UN s proper role might be in space matters and what such a UN committee might do if and when estab lished Both problems were joined when the General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1958 to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 11 The resolution expressed a wish to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field,' noted "the success of the scientific cooperative program of the International Geophysical Year in the exploration of outer space and the decision to continue and expand this type of cooperation and endorsed continuing cooperation The Ad Hoc Committee was asked to report on the resources of the UN complex and other inter pational bodies on outer space matters and to indicate appropriate areas for the UN to work in what organizational arrangements within the UN framework might facilitate cooperation and what legal problemas might be expected to arise from space activity The resolution was supported by both the Icading space poners but they parted company when it came to determining the composition and leadership of the Ad Hoc Committee of the eighten wember 08 tions three Soviet bloc counsles boycotted the Committee and two neutrals (India and the UAR) abstained on the ground that nothing could be accomplshed without both the US and the USSR parties palio, devertheless the Committee met and prepared a report This 19

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·144 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION the way for Soviet participation in a broadly supported UN effort to contribute to international space objectives The political issues had narrowed down to the method of reaching agreement within the committee the committees composition and its leadership The Soviet Union wished the committee to act only by unanimous con sent, the US refused to abandon the UN General Assembly practice of majority rule This matter was compromised with an understand ing that without prejudice to recourse to majority vote the commit tee would do its best to reach a concensus without the need for Yoting The composition and leadership issues were resolved by the addition of several states swelling the committees total to twenty eight and by the selection of Committee officers representing West ern Bloc and non aligned countries The result was another General Assembly resolution (1721) 13 now the basic UN document in the space field This resolution Commended to member states two principles Interna tional law including the UN Charter applies to outer dace and celestial bodies both space and celestial bodies are free to all and are not subject to national appropria tion ✓ Invited the Committee to report on legal problems which might arise from the use of space V Asked member states to report space launchings to the UN for a public registry V Requested the Committe on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to maintain with other space organizations -provide for exchange of information voluntarily sup plied by governments but without duplıcaling exist ing scientific and technical channels study measures to promote cooperation in space V Asked the VMO to report on the ads ancement of weather research and forecasting techniques with special reference to space developments.

·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 145 Asked the ITU to report on opportunities and actions to prepare the way for the expected benefits promised by communication satellites, and asked UN technical assist ance agencies to assist member states to develop their domestic capabilities for taking advantage of such benefits The new Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met briefly for the first time in March 1962 in New York Recognizing the essential division of its interests at provided for two subcommit tees one on Legal problems the other on Scientific and Technical matters The new Chairman expressed the consensus of the Commit tee that its function was necessarily one of encouragement and facılı tation rather than operation The work of the Committee was at the outset unexpectedly success ful on the technical side where only limited objectives were sought. It was more difficult and slow going on the legal side where broader objectives were attempted But even here progress has been made The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee met in Geneva in May 1962 The Subcommittee unanimously recommended the publication of information on national space programs, as well as technical in formation of interest to nations beginning space research It solicited support for certain activities of the world scientific community and at asked for UN sponsorship of an international sounding rocket range to be established on the geomagnetic equator Both the parent Committee and the General Assembly gave their ble« ing to this modest program Positive results have been forth coming COSPAR and UNESCO have been induced to collaborate in the preparation and publication of certain documents expected to be of tree to nations turning to space research for the first lime India promptly came forward to offer the range at Thumba for international use under the terms provided by the Subcommittee (See olso p 62) A special UN committee subaorquently inspected the Indian range at Thiumba and recommended its sponsorshup by the United Nations, France and the USSR have pledged contributions (of equip ·146 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATIOY ment) to the range to complement those already made by the United States The first joint US French and Indian erperiments were succesa fully conducted at Thumba in the early months of 1964 Here per haps a basis may have been established for the first intimate associa tion of eastern and western technicians in the conduct of space research although within the limited context of small sounding rocket projects One potentially dificult and even disruptive question put to the Subcommittee was resolved in such a way as to minimize its political and maximize its scientific consıderation The question related to international consultation prior to the conduct of space activiting which might cause harmful effects or interfere with other scientific investigations Rather than treat such matters in the political atmos phere of the UN the Subcommittee chose to rely upon COSPARinasmuch as COSPAR had established a Consultative Group designed to attack questions of this kind through objective expert and quanti tative analysis The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee reconvened in Geneva in mid 1963 but little more was accomplished The Subcommittee agreed that the secretariat should try to assemble background infor mation for the use of members for example on opportunities for technical training-a matter of some interest to the less advanced countries But even relatively simple proposals met heavy going An illustration was a British proposal that the Secretariat act as a clear ing house bringing requests for training together with opportunities for training although final arrangements would be made directly between the countries concerned Since the Subcommittee sought to operate on a unanimous basis Soviet opposition was sufficient to defeat this quite simple plan despite wide support from the other countries represented In general the absence of progress at this meeting may be ascribed in part to Soviet inhibitions but also to the limited scope available for UN activity within its prescribed non operational function The 1961 meeting of the Subcommittee repeated 11 large part the ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 147 experience of its predecessor, although progress was now begun in some of the matters snagged in earlier sessions Thus the clearing house function of the Secretariat in training matters was finally en dorsed However political issues continued to raise their heads the Soviet Union registered strong objections for example to factual re ports regarding the new European Launcher Development Organiza tron because West Germany was a member, and the Soviet felt "no assurance that Germany would not use the missile technology it might gain through ELDO for military purposes (Of course there was no such assurance from any nation except as it had tated its in tentions and ELDO was pledged to civil applications only ) It was apparent that the Scientific and Technical Committee would continue to operate in a heavily political atmosphere The first sessions of the Legal Subcommittee were considerably more frustrat I than the first very productive meeting of the technical group In a sense the background was less well defined and more political With man extending himself into space without benefit of markers boundaries or rules a wide spectrum of views exists as to the possible legal complications At one extreme is the happy notion that spare activity having progressed for some years without benefit of legal regulation or principle now requires none At the other ex treme is the notion that not a moment s further use of space can be made unless the legal fraternity by thorough and careful prescription, first removes the totally disabling uncertainty as to where we stand legally As in most such antitheses the truth undoubtedly lies some where between On the one hand it is perfectly correct that about two hundred satellite launchings have taken place over the better part of a decade without legal question If one includes international participation in NASA satellite projects and the initial test launchings of ELDO some eleven countries are already involved in launch ing objects into outer space Well over a dozen countnes are launch ing small sounding rockets into outer space Some 38-40 countries are participating in tracking and data arquisition from satellites either directly or through the accommodation of another country s stations and often under government to government agreement An ·146 OTHER MECHANISSES FOR COOPERATION ment) to the range to complement those already made by the United States The first joint US French and Indian experiments were success fully conducted at Thumba in the early months of 1964 Here per haps a basis may have been established for the first intimate associa tion of eastern and western technicians in the conduct of space research although within the limited context of small sounding rocket projects One potentially difficult and even disruptive question put to the Subcommittee was resolved in such a way as to minimize its political and maximize its scientific consideration The question related to international consultation prior to the conduct of space activities which might cause harmful effects or interfere with other scientific investigations Rather than treat such matters in the political atmos phere of the UN the Subcommittee choce to rely upon COSPARinasmuch as COSPAR had e tablished a Consultative Group designed to attack questions of this kind through objective expert and quanti tative analysis The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee reconvened in Geneva in mid 1963, but little more was accomplished The Subcommittee agreed that the secretariat should try to assemble background infor mation for the use of members for erample on opportunities for technical training & matter of some interest to the less advanced countries But even relatively simple proposals met heavy going An allustration was a British proposal that the Secretariat act as a clear ing house bringing reque ts for training together with opportunities for training although final arrangements would be made directly between the countries concerned Since the Subcommittee sought to operate on a unanimous basis Soviet opposition was sufficient to defeat this quite simple plan despite wide support from the other countries represented In general the absence of progress at this meeting may be ascribed in part to Soviet inhibitions but also to the limited scope available for UN activity within its prescribed non operational function The 1961 meeting of the Subcommittee repeated in large part the ·to either directly or through the accommodation of another country s OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 147 experience of its predecessor, although progress was now begun in some of the matters snagged in earlier sessions Thus, the clearing konse function of the Secretariat in training matters was finally en dor ed However, political issues continued to raise their heads the Soviet Union registered tong objections for example, to factual re ports regarding the new European Launcher Development Organiza tion because West Germany was a member, and the Soviet felt no assurance that Germany would not use the mis ile technology it might gain through ELDO for military purposes (Of course there was no such as urance from any nation except as it had stated its in tentions and ELDO was pledged to cıvıl applications only ) It was apparent that the Scientific and Technical Committee would continue operate in a heavily political atmosphere The first sessions of the Legal Subcommittee were considerably more frustrate 1 than the first, very productive meeting of the technical group In a sense the background was less well defined and more political With man extending him elf into space without benefit of markers boundaries or rules a wide spectrum of views exists as to the possible legal complications At one extreme is the happy notion that apare activity, having progressed for some years without benefit of legal regulation or principle now requires none At the other ex treme 18 the notion that not a moment s further use of space can be made unless the legal fraternity, by thorough and careful prescription first removes the totally disabling uncertainty as to where we stand legally As in most such antitheses the truth undoubtedly lies ome where between On the one hand it is perfectly correct that about two hundred satellite launchings have taken place over the better part of a decade without legal question If one includes international participation in NASA satellite projects and the initial test launchings of ELDO come eleven countries are already involved in launch ing objects into outer space Well over a dozen countries are launch ing small sounding rockets into outer space Some 38-40 courtries are participating in tracking and data acquisition from satellites lations and often under government to government agreement An ·148 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION even larger number of nations have interested themselves in the satel lite work of the experimenting countries an international organı zation of multinational participation in communications satellite systems is in being There is little question then that a very consid erable consensus regarding the legitimacy of space activity has been established in fact On the other hand numerous fragments from decaying space ob jects have impacted the earth-so far without verified damage or injury (although Cuba has claimed the undoing of a cow) Both the US and USSR are reported to have conducted nuclear tests in outer space and there have been objections by scientists to one US project in which copper filaments were deployed in space to act as a radio communications reflector Although these objections were discredited by the demonstrated harmlessness of the project in factł4 and by a clean bill of health from COSPAR 15 the question of unilateral inter ference remains in principle Moreover we face a time in the near future when men shall have landed upon the moon although both the US and the Soviet have frequently disclaimed any intention to assert sovereignty over the moon such disclaimers may vary in quality and circumstance Perhaps most important, the increasing frequency of manned flight inevitably brings closer the day when emergency or accidental landings will raise questions of recovery and repatriation Thus there is little question that some thought and action are required to handle legal issues which may reasonably be thought to be close at hand How close at hand was dramatically brought home by a circum stance during a United Nations discussion in the fall of 1962 Some difference of view had been expressed by Soviet and American repre sentatives as to the immediacy of legal questions concerning the re covery of astronauts and liability for damages During the course of these discussions word reached the US delegation that watch teams of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory had re covered an object on a main street of Manitowoc Wisconsin follow ing the re-entry of fragments from a Soviet sputnik 16 The object was positively identified as man made and as having been in outer moon ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION*** 149 space Its recovery, still warm in the area of the spetmk s re-entry from space left no doubt as to its origins and identity Close to a foot in diameter and several inches thick the steel fragment also left its mark upon the Manitowoc street where it fell The object was introduced by Ambassador Francis Plımpton US Delegate to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space just after his Soviet colleague had expressed doubt as to the immediacy of the question of Liability for damages which might be caused by objects returning from outer space 11 The incident reflected an early division betweeen the US and Soviet Union—whether to proceed with the two matters believed by the US to be of immediate concern (liability and recovery) or to attempt to frame all-embracing legal principles for the total space problem Apart from the doubt expressed by the US regarding the general readiness to enter into the larger task so early in the space age the question of a legal code was complicated by the fact that the USSR wi hed to include in it a number of provisions which were plausible enough but objectionable in fact These would include bang on surveillance by 'spy satellites 18 on the use of satellites for propa sanda " and on the launching or use of satellites by any but govern ments also the Soviet side suggested what amounted to the right to Teto experiments which might possibly interfere with another nation s Space research The United States maintained that surseillance satellites were not aggressive weapons that ban upon propa Sanda broadcasts of any kind had already been agreed to by the Soviet Union in another forum but then withdrawn (besides posing a question far broader than space applications alone) and that the US could not agree under our private enterprise system to fore close the commercial use of satellites (such as might be made under government regulation by common carriers in a communications net Horl) Finally no one seriously believed that the Soviet Union would itsell submit to a veto upon space experiments or that it would in any case volunteer the information that a Sostet experiment might possibly interfere with other space activities The tho viewpoints were compromised by combining the two mat ·150 OTHIER MECHIANISSIS FOR COOPERATION ters of immediate interest (liability for damages and recovery ar rangements) with the broader principles suitably modified The re sult embodied in Resolution 1962 in the late fall of 1963 restated the principles that international law applies in outer space and that no state may appropriate celestial space or bodies to its own u c The resolution went on to say that stales are responsible for their national activities in space and must supervise activities by non governmental agencies that states launching or arranging the launching of objects Into space are liable for damage or injury caused by those objects that states of registry retain jurisdiction and control over such ob jects and personnel and that there is an obligation to return space objects and personnel to the state of regi try wherever they have gone astray by reason of emergency or accident International organizations were to be responsible under the legal code along with their member nations (This was to become a slicky matter in sub sequent more detailed deliberations ) International consultation was prescribed for any nation which had reason to believe that a prospec tive space project might interfere with the space activities of other nations The next task for the Legal Subcommittee was to attempt the elabo ration of international conventions detailing the responsibility and obligations of nations in the two most immediate matters recovery and return of spacecraft and their occupants, and liability for dam ages or injury Considerable progress was made toward the e ends in the Spring of 1961 in Geneva but it was necessary for further work to be done Two issues thought to be of high importance in me quarters were not seriously debated in the United Nations proceedings First was the question of defining the boundary betweeen air space and outer space The second was a definition of peaceful uses The importance of the first 1 sue derives from the fact that national sovereignty includes the air space above a state s territory but by general resolution of the United Nations and the practice of space faring nations does not extend into outer space Where does one leave off and the other begin? Numerous arbitrary and natural boundaries ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 152 have been suggested generally set at 25 or 50 miles above the earth or fixed at the limits to which aerodynamic lift can be obtained (that 15 where aircraft can 11y) 19 The difūculty is that technology itself is dynamic and that yesterday s low orbiting or high lưft limits may change today and again tomorrow Even the density of the almos phere (and therefore its lift characteristics) at any given level changes with diurnal and seasonal cycles In any case the United Na uons discussions do not reflect serious concern over this matter at this time and it remains a critical item only in the view of a few Other experience suggests that the legal definitions of both ar and outer space are inseparable from the capacity to use them or any their use The smaller nations in the UN have repeatedly vented their view that the use of space should be limited to peaceful purposes broadly defined (broadly defined in that peaceful as used as the antithesis of military rather than only of aggressive" as used in the UN Charter ) Since for the most part the smaller nations are engaged in no use of space at all this viewpoint is easy to come by, to understand and even to sympathize with The matter is more difficult for the United States because activities openly carried on in space by the US railitary are understood so far to have involved no weapons systems and to have no aggressive character The United States therefore con siders thern entirely peacefal (Indeed it is readily conceivable that surveillance acuvities now reported to be conducted by the military of both the US and the USSR could make a significant contribu tion to peaceful purposes if some day carried out by or on behalf of an international authority ) In contrast the interests and activities of the Soviet military in space are totally clandestine Accordingly they have not presented as convenient a target as the relatisely open business of the American military As a consequence the Soviet has not often been called apon in the UN to answer for military activities which must be assured to parallel or exceed those of the United States Nevertheless the Soviet is conspicuously reluctant to support the efforts of smaller nations to impose a ban upon all space aclıy Mies except those for "peaceful purposes While the non spaceſaring ·152 OTHER MECHANISBIS FOR COOPERATION nations have made little progress on this point it may safely be assumed that they will pursue their objective having nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain in seeking some restriction of space activity to peaceful parpo es At bottom however, the matter must be linked as the US has said to disarmament discusions rather than to space alone and must rest upon some verification procedure Otherwise an endorsement of peaceful purposes only 19 mere cant Another area in which international accord is required for the or derly conduct of space research and applications is the allocation and use of radio frequencies questions which are of concern to the Inter national Telecommunications Union (ITU) a specialized agency of the UN Several years of careful preparation were required by tele communications etperts the world over in anticipation of an Futraor dinary Administrative Radio Conference of the ITU to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radio Communications convened in Geneva in October and November 1963 The task was to make ade quate provision for space research tracking and telemetry on the one fand and on the other to provide for the future exprcted u c of the radio frequency spectrum for various space orrvices including atellite inctcorolosy navigation and most importantly teler mmunications Since the radio spectrum is already heavily encum cred by exi ting scrvices of one kind or another serious if not fatal difficultire could have been po ed had not the nations come to a con ensus on the neces. sary allocations for immediate ur as well as futurc uses that may rea onally be espected to materialuze Thr United States reflected relatively bullish entiments for the future of space radio u rs and wished to provide for them in a hberal and comprehensive ft hion Other countries took a more conxrxatire view of futurr needs and were more reluctant to rearran" etistinn allorations to arcommodatn them \evertheless an apparently very satisfactory osim ol alla trons was made representing arteritert by all the major natione irrludin-th. Suet Loion I sommary of the Corferentes actions was rrad into the Con FTPt10nal Rimord ly Pepresttaline llarfit of Arkanas irti spa :* Yr 113778arerthat ·OTHER MECHANISBIS FOR COOPERATION 153 The Conference agreed to set aside 2800 megacycles for com munications satellite services The United States had proposed 2725 megacycles while the Soviet proposal was limited to 1600 megacycles For the most part the Soviet proposal was in frequency bands different from those proposed by the United States Only 800 megacycles were common to both proposals Under the.e circumstances it is most gratifying that the 2800 megacycles agreed to by the Conference include four 500 mes acycle bands which were contained in the US proposal Apart from the question of the number of frequencies to be allocated for space communications the Conference was called upon to consider the procedure to govern the use of the frequen cies thus allocated Several countries including the Soviet held out for provisional use only of the allocated frequencies pending a future planning conference The US position was that the u e of the frequencies had to be sufficiently definitive to permit long tange plannig and major investments in a global communica trons atellite system Thanks only to the diligent efforts on the part of our delegation to persuade other nations that they too would stand to benefit from the establishment of an early system did the Conference reach the decision permitting immediate use rather than provisional use of the allocated frequencies Another of the aperialized agencies of the UN the World Meteor ological Organization (WMO) has been diligent in exploring and at tempting to provide for the special opportunities which the space age brings to the international collection of weather information The launching by NASA of the remarkably successful TIROS series of satellites to observe cloud systems and radiation balance both key indices of weather made it obyious that both weather foreca ting and research must now take the satellite fully into account The funda mental questions to be solved are these How can satellite sy tems which only one or two countries can afford and launch be integrated with the conventional weather ob ervation exchanges condurled by the generality of nations? What is to be WMO s coordinating role in this process? Recognizing that enormous quantities of data are gath cred by weather satellites what communications arfangements can and must be made to handle their dis emination within the frame work of interna'ional meteorological data exchanges?

·151 OTTIER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION For several years the e questions have been considered in the councils of the WMO Necessarily the US and Soviet representatives have had a special role in these discussions and there have been both formal and informal attempts to reach a meeting of minds. Since however the US TIROS program was in existence and open while the Soviet side spoke only vaguely of future plans the con sensus was necessarily highly generalized Ultimately the WMO took the position that the development and use of meteorological satellites had to be left to the launching nations with the expectation that the information they obtained would be contributed along with con ventional data for further distribution in accordance with WMO practices and recommendations This position was consistent with the developments which occurred almost simultaneously in the Dryden Blagonravov channel. (See Chapter'III ) Here the ground was laid for bilateral underwriting of the satellite portions of a global operational weather system but with due consideration to WMO objectives This has left WMO rela tively free to concentrate on its broader interests in an expanded global weather system for the future in which satellites will be only one element The WMO at the request of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has reported regularly to the Commit tee on its progress An overview of UN space activities suggests the following con clusions From a rather poor start heavily snarled in political ob structionism the United Nations complex has moved forward slowly but steadily to make a few very real contributions to the orderly in ternational use of space Certainly the agreement reached for radio frequency allocations for space use represents a solid achievement and the fulfillment of a real requirement The endorsement of an international launch site in India is also valuable technically and politically And the progress toward international conventions on Kabwe'y' and spacecraft'astronew recovery is heartening The Soviet Union has joined increasingly in this activity to a degree that was quite unexpected Yet care must be exercised lest the substantive value of the progress made to date be overstated Morecver the scope for ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 155 further contributions may be limited though it is too soon even to say this The most frutíul possibilities for future UN action may be found to fall more in the legal and regulatory field than in the tech mical field And the basic import of the technical and legal accords obtained so far in the UN itself must in good part be left to the long term to assess for at may lie as much in the fact of agreement between east and west as in the content of that agreement. OTHER AGENCIES A unique mechanısm for international understanding the annual Pugwash conferences have attracted much attention, but it may be doubted whether the public differentiates betwixt these private and unofficial conferences and the official but nongovernmental confer ences of say, COSPAR, or the official and governmental conferences of the United Nations or whether there is much awareness of the Tespective roles and limitations of these various organizations The Pugwash meetings stem from the private initiative of Bertrand Russell who addressed a lette- in July 1955 to prominent scientists asking them to meet 'to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction 'Requiring only support for travel to the meeting place many of the recipients of the letter journeyed to Pugwash Nova Scotia, where they were accommodated by an American industrialist, Cyrus Eaton The meet ings have been held each year since 1955 most often in Canada but also in Austria, the Soviet Union, the United States Britain Yugo alania France and Italy In the Vienna meeting their third the sembled scientists assued a declaration stating Scientists are because of their special knowledge well equipped for early awareness of the danger and the promise arising from scientific discovery Hence they have a special computence and a special responsibility to relation to the most pressing problems of ottr time. Much bas already been written by able commentaton on the basic assumption involved in this declaration—with the result that the role ·156 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION and competence of individual scientists with respect to major public issues, even technical ones, may be better understood and more humbly conceived today than half a dozen years ago A frequent participant in Pugwash meetings H Bentley Class, has observed that, } On the international scale, scientists have become very active politically Disarmament and arms control negotiations are now conducted by scientists teamed with diplomats although currently their success 13 none too obvious The trouble seems to be that often scientists engaged in such efforts have forsaken the scientific approach to the problem at issue Glass feels that the Pugwash meetings offer more hope than docs assistance by scientists in diplomatic meetings because they make use of the international character of science and the objectivity of its practitioners 13 Does specific competence carry over from the lab. oratory to the resolution of public issues arising from the products of the laboratory? Do the individual or collective opinions of scientists on public issues exent a positive influence upon their governments? Answers that must give pause have been provided by many Albert Wohlstettera notes that Bertrand Russell's initial call to Pugwash began with the seatence, 'I enclose a statement signed by some of the eminent scientific authorities on nuclear warfare but none of the ten eminent scienusta listed)ħad done any empirical stody of milltary operations likely in a nuclear war." The distinction between loch pical competence and The larger problems raised by technical devel ogmenta is real and does not need to be stressed Wohlstetter makes twa Additonal youportént points: First he remarks Icon Questions of milliary worth are broader than physirs and in poma ways harder They ol'rouise xe hoi purely mil tary questions any more than they are purely techoologgal. They may involve : for biad ng best of problems includ ng polical an Tronomic *s nilory and technological, guest ons. However, on the ele gunsling tidt hele stay foc avstemaye anatos, planetesti Canly there has been no expérience that a precisely selerant For these questions relate to a rest or distant future attech by acve) techniques ard political uncerturies ExperX 25£ velion rupert beyond esperience, and asalny us needed not to replace Intus well as m lo 1 ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 157 1 2 1 si ton, but to sharpen and supplement it and to make it more public and yenfiable His second point is the following The scientists have been very far from agreement In retrospect their news sure World War II on major strategic issues the leasibility and usefulness in deterring or fighting a war of active or civil defense of the ability to bomb enemy industry or cities or military forces of tactical buclear weapons of restrant un nuclear war and any others-show kn extraordinary sequence of sudden and repeated reversals The principal factions of scientists have to mained in oppo ibon-sometimes, bowever almost exactly chang ing place Moreover the thought devoted to defining these issues and "the evidence gathered for resolving them in no case warranted the certainty with which opposing news were propounded This is not to say, of course the politici and the generals with whom the physical scientists are contrasted, have been right. It would be hard to show however that the scientists have been on the whole more realistic or more prescient. Aloral certainty and feelings stof prescience bave been a pretty uncertain guide to the future.com * of even, to, the immediately next future beliefs, of the prophets Assuming competent and objective contributions, to what extent, can scientists acting unofficially influence their governments? In the, United States the technical requirements of three wars, together with the pluralistic character of our society, hayo brought into being an, organizational and representational complex which igives scientists unparalleled access to goveșnment It may indeed be assumed that positions adopted by respected scientists in Pugwash meetings can be brought to oficial notice an this country and pay receive consyderaj tion commensurate with the sypport attached to those views, by the sculentafiç, popgrauņuty in the Spviet Union, the facts may be otherwise It may be doubted that views daliesing semificantly from official Soylet policy will be yolynteered at aļl in Pugwash or in other sumlar läpetings by, Sovjet, scientist, Not can it be expected that Sovieti sciendsats mall subscribe to views pitated by the scientists of pter i countries when these conflict with domestic pobcy Itas difficult, there jo fore, to understand what meshapism cao in fact exist in the Puswash it formas, to peekiniesch any consensus phuch, is different to begin with from Soviet policy Of course Soviet scientiste may, bę 10dayıd11 $ 4 1 1 r ·158 OTHER MECHANISYS FOR COOPERATION ually impressed with argumentation heard during their participation in these meetings and may carry these arguments home for considera tion We do not know what machinery may operate to this purpose in the Soviet Union nor how effective it may be Ve can only assume that it may be far less effective in a totalitarian society than in our own 24 The effectiveness of Pugwash is likely to be limited then in the same degree that freedom and objectivity of discus son may be limited behind the Iron Curtain It will be further limited by the degree to which the participants (principally those from the West) represent themselves rather than organized or official views A summary evaluation was provided perhaps inadvertently, by an American scientist attending the 1963 meeting in Dubrovnik He was quoted by the press as suggesting that this is the first Pugwash meeting during which the Governments have mirrored the trend of our talks 25 (Since this was the eleventh meeting some measure of the effectiveness of the program may be inferred ) Among the allus trations of Pugwash effectiveness he cited was President Kennedy s proposal for manned lunary cooperation put forward in the United Nations a few days earlier The Presidents proposal was said to re flect a suggestion broached' at the Pugwash conference of 1961 In fact the 1961 conference framed a proposal for cooperation in the instrumental study of the moon rather than in its manned explora tion It may be stated with confidence that no causal connection existed between the Pugwash meetings and the Kennedy proposal Careful review of the proposals of the 1961 conference the most ex tensive in the space field suggests quite clearly that they reflected rather than stimulated consideration of propositions for possible cooperation Periodic international symposia on the physics of space and the effects of the space environment on life were recommendedbut were already being carr ed out regularly in the conferences of COSPAR and the International Astronautical Federation Exchanges of information on these items as well as on methods and instrumenta tion were recommended—but had been ought through the IGY and COSPAR forums for six years The already scheduled plans of the ITU to rationalize the use of radio frequencies for space purposes ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 159 were supported The common use of USSR and US tracking stations was recommended but had already been proposed by NASA s Ad ministrator Programs for the International Years of the Quiet Sun and the World Magnetic Survey already planned were urged World wide systems of communications and meteorological satellites then already in the experimental stage and long publicly discussed and planned were endorsed n principle And a symposium on avoid ance of contamination of extraterrestrial bodies was advocated although a COSPAR group (CETEX) on the broad subject of con tamination had already and unsucces fully sought Soviet participation on this matter Thus it cannot be said that Pugwash was plowing new ground in the space field or that it was contributing significantly to discussions already under way in other forums Indeed the in terest in reaching a consensus had obviously reduced the discussion on space matters to the lowest possible denominator More recently, Pugwash has issued only very brief statements on space and seems to have left the subject to the direct bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union The conclusion which suggests itself is not that Pugwash should be abandoned or ignored Nothing is lost through such discussions and confrontations and it remains entirely possible that something of value may well 1sgue from them The process is undoubtedly educa tional not necessarily in achieving better understanding in the sense of increasing sympathy but in the sense of better understanding of the objective realmes encountered by scientists za negotiating heavily political matters If the Soviet Union is indeed mellowing the chances of effective communication from scientists to government should an crease correspondingly and should be encouraged and facilitated. But the character function and utility of such forums sheuld also be well understood At the opposite end of the spectrum from Pugwash, a remarkable early success has been achieved 10 establishing an internanonal co operative structure ba ed upon joint governmental and commercial interests in the field of communicalion satellites Following the inihal ·160 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPETTOY demonstration by NASA and its contractors of the feasibility of such satellites, the United States Congress passed the Communicating Satellite Act of 1962, providing for a Corporation to function as the US clement in a future global syslern in what was at first are luctant partnership which then fonctioned moro cllectively than could have been expected the Corporation and the Department of State undertook exploratory meetings with technical and governmental authorities in the countries which were most likely to become early participants in such a global system The issues which were met were quite understandable The desire of the United States to proceed with dispatch to exploit the technics! competence which had been achieved in this country di qareted the advanced European countries. They, quito naturally wished to be more than bystanders in the desclopment of a commercial com munication satellite system and they wished to participate in all phases of the effort from the beginning The need to get on with an increase in world communications capacity the logic of proceeding from the technical base already established in the United States, and the willingness of the US Corporation to accept at the outset the concept of an international committee under which it would function bs a management entity all this helped to bring about an agreement On July 21, 1961 representatives of Au tralia Belgium Canads Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Japan the Netherlands Switzerland, the United Kingdom the United States and the Vatican City State inilitled two related agreements establislung Interim Ar rangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite Sys tem The first agreement is at the governmental level and provides the organizational principles for the internationals, ter' The agreement announces a common objective to provide non discriminatory com munications services of an advanced type on a global basis conforra irig to principles laid down in the United Nations The cooperation of the parties is to cover all phases from design to operation The parties designate repre entative communications entitleg to enter into traffic agreements and an Interim Communications Satellite Com 1 ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 161 mittee is set up to give effect to the cooperation cnvisaged Reprosentation is provided on the basis of agreed quotas or shares of the total estimated cost of $200 000 000 for the interim program and Foling is arranged accordingly Decisions are to be made by majority Fole but a list of fourteen subjects of more than ordinary interest is set out as requiring a greater degree of concurrence by the heavier investors Not later than January 1959 and hopefully much before the Committee is to report its recommendations for definitive ar rangements for a system to supersede the Interım Arrangements (A specific question put to the Committee in this connection is whether It should continue as a permanent entity or should give way to an International organization with a General Conference and an internatronal administrative and technical staff The future decision on this matter will be remarked by those interested in the most effective mechanisms for international activities ) The initialing authorities formally signed the interim agreement on August 19, 1964 after which it was to remain open for six more months for additional signatures The second or special agreement deals with the commercial finan cial and technical operations of the interum system and is signed by operating communications entities governmental or otherwise in particular the special agreement provides considerations which will determine the acceptance of ground terminals (earth stations for satellite communications purposes) into the system essentially tech nical in character The basic requirement, for nondiscrimination is then pas ed on to the ground terminals for application to all areas which they may serve The allocation of satellite channels and the charges for them are also covered Other provisions define the limita tions and prerogalises which attach to the Corporation management function under the Committee and state the interests of all posts in the insentions and technical data derived from the operating function No liability is chargeable by a signatory again the Corporation or Bny other signatory because of satellite or ground terminal failure Disputes under the agreement are to be handled by arbitration The United States had on more than one occasion formally invited 7 1 ·162 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION the Soviet Union to participate in the preliminary discussions which this country had carried out in advance of reaching the interim and special agreements The first invitation was ignored Then in the late Spring of 1964 the Soviet side requested a meeting (Its chief rep resentative had no known relation to communications matters ) The Soviet group expressed its view that the US was bent upon com mercial exploitation of communications satellites in a discriminatory fashion However no country prepared to share in the costs and/or tasks of establishing a global communications satellite system has been denied participation It is widely assumed that the Soviet Union has uttle practical requirement because of its unitary land mass for communications satellites Nevertheless it would be premature to read the Soviet Union out of this activity The achievement of the interim and special agreements remains a remarkable one for which the working level leadership in the Depart ment of State as well as the officers of the Corporation deserve con siderable credit The obstacles both political and technical were forroidable Success may be attributed in the most general sense to political decisions here and abroad that cooperation was to be achieved In a narrower sense the readiness of US interests to proceed on their own, technically and financially was undoubtedly a contributing factor Sull another type of mechanism well worth consideration in con nection with international cooperation 19 the direct commercial tie without benefit of such a governmental framework as applies in the case of communications satellites EUROSPACE an association of European Industries interested in space serves to introduce the subject of commercial international ties 26 EUROSPACE IS somewhat analagous to our trade associations in general and to the Aerospace Industries Association in particular It enlists some sixty or seventy companies on the continent and in the United Kingdom in activities calculated to raise the sights of European governments in their space planning Thus EUROSPACE has laid out broad space programs which it has commended to the notice ·OTJIER MECITAVISSIS FOR COOPERATION 163 of ESRO and ELDO, as well as of individual countries in Europe (Such planning, of course has 119 official character ) EUROSPACE has retained an American company on at least one occasion for the purpose of providing a critique of its proposals the critique con cluding that the time scale of the European effort should be accel erated and its budgets increased EUROSPACE has sought status of some kind for direct dealing with official space agencies in Europe as well as in the United States However these agencies are reluctant to extend official recogniuon to commercial organizations although informal contacts are encouraged 01 special interest 19 EUROSPACE s invitation to American com panies to become associate members of the organization Over half a dozen have taken up this invitation and at this writing the American companies were planning to host a EUROSPACE conference in the Vated States during 1965 This innovation--perhaps experiment 19 8 better word-reflects a growing interest in the aerospace industry in international corporate bies of one kind or another This interest in turn grows out of experience in the closely related munitions in dustries in which companies everywhere have found that their efforts to share in foreign markets are likely to be more successful if they Erst associate themselves with companies native to those markets Rather than confine themselves to domestic markets only, many firms have broadened their philosophy to the point that they are ready to accept foreign participation in their own markets as a necessary guid pro quo for entree abroad or for necessary technical assistance The rationale is two fold first the total velocity and amount of business is likely to be greater with more for all of international markets are opened up second security in the market place rests ultimately upon technical progress and energy This line of thinking by organized industry as represented both in EUROSPACE and the US Aerospace Industries Association is material to the thinking and planning of government agencies con cerned with international cooperation for several reasons First, com mercial interrelationships are as constructive and effective as any other in developing that matrx of international ties and understand ·164 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION ing which we seek through cooperation Second it devolves upon the government agencies to facıktate these commercial relationships be cause their success depends in the final analysis upon the political and regulatory climate which the government agencies create in the area of erport controls Clearly the maximum freedom for such ex ports consistent with hard security requirements is desirable~not only to proliferate interrelationships but also to contribute to an acceptable balance of payments Finally commercial interests can be enlisted directly in cooperative relationships For example it is clear that foreign governments desire the involvement of their indu tries in advanced technology just as we seek the advancement of our own industry through space technology in order to realize one of the important benefits of space research and development programs This interest in industry s participation in advanced technology sives foreign governments a motivation to enter into cooperative programs with each other and with the United States One can visualize a pattern of arrangements under which foreign agencies might join in the development of future NASA projects on a cooperative basis, cach agency meeting its obligations through contracts to its own industry NASA stands to gain in that a foreign agency underwrites a portion of the NASA program The foreign agency gains in that at partakes in space development without having to undervite total programs Indeed the ISIS program (see page 44) is an outstanding example of such an arrangement the Canadian Government contracting to its own industry for an agreed portion of the established NASA sono spheric satellite program The pattern has also been applied in reverse NASA contracting with American industry for the engineer second British satellite Anel II Such patterns could well develop through industry initiative as well the cooperative element being supplied when foreign govern ment finances all or part of the cost of contracts performed by its ing of indu try $ith sufficient enlightenment in both government and industry commercial ties could well become a most important element in co operative international programs with tangible benefire all cound ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 165 not least of which would be the redaction of those trade and tech Dology barriers which have contributed so much to major political dificulty in the world and even in the Western World The International Astronautical Federation, which began meeting na 1951 annually brings together national rocket societies and private space groups from many countries The Federation embrares the engineers scientists industrialists and laymen who were among the first to take space flight seriously and who as individuals have probably contributed most to it. Operating at some remove from government sponsorship, or control TAF members meet in the con Genial and professional'atmosphere of exten ive and detailed sym posta, focusing primarily bắt not exclusively upon the engineering aspects bf space technology and exploration In their professional capacitie many of its members are clotely a sociated with the direc tion or implementation of national space programs and so bring to the organization both knowledge and competence in their discussion However the IAF tests primarily upon a structure of essentially private societies in contrast to COSPAR for example which brings together public or quası public in' titutions Governmental agencies are therefore more likely to be clo ely concerned in the activities of COSPAR and its adhering bodies than in those of the IAF, although cupporting both in many ways One reflection of the samewhat art ferent status of the two organizátions is the formal designation of COSPAR as an interested observer by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Väes of Outer Space along with UNESCO the ITU and the WMO Apart from the exchange of techmirát information through, so posia the IAF' has encouraged discussion of the legal and 'ocial aspects of space activity, in parallel synopo la One of its leading figures the late Theodore Von Karmań, was in trumental in establish ang an Academy of Astronautica as an adjunct of the IAF electing scientists and enginrers from many coun tries The Academy has sym to it distinguished spasestablished one or more awards to encourage ·166 OTHER MECILANTSUS FOR COOPERATION distinction in space research and exploration More recently, the IAF has initiated special efforts to bring Soviet and American astronauts together in public professional exchanges (unsuccessfully) and to stimulate discussion of such future cooperative pos ibilities as an international lunar laboratory In the latter CAJE, IAF & role must be similar to that of the Pugwash meetings suggesting and stimulating but lacking official basis for initiating projects or programs (though this distinction may sometimes be confused by lack of precision 20 press reports or by the chance that an IAF spokesman may in an unrelated capacity hold an official position in his government) A number of observers have remarked the inherently comple mentary character of the IAF and COSPAR in that the IAF focuses principally upon space engineering while COSPAR concerns itself almost exclusively with space science As the space age matures, the organizations which make up the IAF may well become further in stitutionalızed making possible some consideration of a planned relationship between the two bodies Even at the present time some thought might profitably be given to the scheduling of alternating or complementary symposia to the avoidance of overlapping in content and so forth Both organizations have much to contribute to interna tional cooperation in space within their natural scopes of activity From time to time suggestions have been made to the effect that a cooperative space program should be based upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the Organization for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD) or one or another existing body Such suggestions are sometimes made with little awareness of the existing modes and extent of space cooperation A brief comment may therefore be pertinent in this discussion of Inechanışıs for space cooperation Of primary concern is the fact that the European community has itself selected the machinery through which it wishes to conduct civil space research and exploration namely ESRO and ELDO In the face of this fact advocacy of an alternate base for cooperation however

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·U 1 168 OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION, will tend to simplify the subject matter and eliminate at least some of the peripheral considerations encountered when scientific functions are attempted by political bodies Nevertheless international political organizations can make substantial contributions through endorse ment and financial support of international scientific efforts The development and operation of space vehicles and rockef syg tems of all types with the elaboşate ground support required 15 essentially a technical function of engineering character with strong scientific backing It is now carried out exclusively by national and multinational operating agencies Economic, security, and other con siderations leave little question but that governmental agencies prim of a national character or under close national control must for some time retain direction over the development, operation and use of space vehicles. Direct bilateral and multılateral agreements between such agencies for cooperative projects have clearly been suc cessful and will no doubt be extended in the future However the early state of the art requires continuing close operational control by the responsible agencies The provisjon of equipments for direct use hy international organizations lacking comparable background 15 virtually certain at this time to entail degradation of performance and results as well as duplication of facılıues, costs and personnel The u c of space technology for practical applications such as communications meteorology and navigation, will undoubtedly bo particularly complex internationally, and may differ in each cuac Communications applications involve commercial janferests more di recily than, piher applications and require direct international ar fangements of one kind or another So far they bave, found their organizational" basis at the level of the responsiblc operating com munications authorities in each country,çoncerned, as seems very sens ble although this has been buttressed at government insistence by government to-government agreements Generally speaking on both national and internațional fronts useful distinction can be made between the experimental pl ase and the operational phase of space applications developments. With a good deal of necessary in terchange between the two agencias primarily of space deyelopment 2 ·OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION 169 haracter are likely to carry the experimental work forward wbule Iztacles specializing in the application itself (communications, Larigation weather analysis and forecasting) are best suited to take in the operational responsibilities Thus on the international level, inc will not look to the World Meteorological Organization to design, levelop or construct weather satellites or operate such sy tems or her ground sopport but will hope to see WMO recommend stand unds for world wide weather observations provide sponsorship for a global system to be provided and launched by contributing coun tries and organize the coordination and di emination of data As international efforts to rationalize the use of space in the inter ests of all continue it will be nece ary to strike a balance between the national seguirements for flexibility and such international restric tions or controls as may be required in the general interet It must be recognized that the activities of all international forums dealing with space matters whether in basıc science regulation, or other fields, inevitably carry with them politiral implications Differences are only those of degree but this fact has a two fold ergnificance Fir e it should warn us that there is so totally a political interna. tional forum in the space field (because there is ineyitably political content whene er discussions between eat and west are held) At the same time the differences sa degree are real and provide oppor Buni es to make greater progress on sorne subjects in certain forums) rather than in others It is ittportant for progress in International cooperation that Wechanıms and functions not be confused nul 7 TE NOTES 71 11 1 1 Alexander hing Science and Technologs Daedalus (Winter 1951). 4.3 S Greenwood Space and the entern World Aeronakties! (May 190) p 29 1 Pridepal officer of the ELDO I Preparatory Commi lon were TAX bonsabor Corrobte di Corrobo (Italyte Secretary General Mrtal Lam # Prepbens (UN) Technical Director Ceara! PUL G tardin ) L 1 1 7 I! 1 1 فا * ·5 REPRISE Any analysis of the international elements of our space experience to date tells us that we must at the outset recognize and accept a basic duality in the national motivation We seek new levels of joint enterprise with other nationg particularly the Soviet Union yet simulareously we compete fos preemserce and the presentation of the national security There are in short elements of both coopera tion and competition in the picture It is of critical importance that neither factor be argued or pursued to the exclusion of the other Far from being incompatible they must both be advanced in a mature mix of prudence and progress short and long term interest But given our long and necessary preoccupation with national security the greater danger now is that we may slight cooperation we may fail to take the dificult steps which alone can bring cooperation to substantive fulfillment We must therefore be particularly alert to opportunities for joining our efforts with those of other countries and we will need to be courageous as well as generous in accommo dating our own highly prized projects to these opportunities We have seen also that science as a medium for cooperation among peoples is indeed international but in the sense of professional in tercour c and understanding There is virtually no evidence of an International quality in science or scientists which can over ride or negate political loyalties or alignments Nor have scientists a special capacity for the resolution of political problems In fact we have seen that science must yield when political reality constrains the organization or content of scientific programs even those dear to the community Nevertheless the drama and interest inherent in today!

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·174 Petrus meteorological satellite systems and in the conduct of scientific satel lite projects Fxtensnc foreign technical and financial participation in the overscas operations of NAS I S tracking and data acqui ttion network has been a constructive factor in the program Underlying all these activities has been an effective on the job training and uni versity fellowship program for forcign technicians and cientits, again operating on the basis of mutual contribution The Lonefits of this international collaboration have len tangible They have been evident in the specific scientific and technical results of joint projects (many of them unique) and in the access afforded to foreign regions to meet scientific or operating requirements Benc fits have been forthcoming also in economic terms reducing the cost of certain US space programs stimulating foreign commercial in ferest in US hardware technology and services and contributing modestly to a favorable gold flow balance Some evidence uggests solid political benefits in that the mounting testimony in international forums to broad participation in our cooperatie programs bas moderated uninformtd criticism of the US space effort itself and bas inspired the Soviet Union to upgrade its own performance in these forums The total tangible gain augmented by intangible benefits which we have not tried to a sess but do not doubt has e tablished a solıd and permanent foundation for more ambitious collaboration in the future (This may be contrasted with less sound projects for attracting international notice which after an initial eclat often have faded from vicw leaving cynicism rather than farth frustration rather than rapport ) Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space matters has on the other hand been nore restricted in the root IGY period and there. after the simplest cientific exchanges despite the undoubted per sonal interest of Soviet scientists were bogged in military security and the greater immediate attractions of a competition in which the USSR had a comfortable lead More recently however the US space program has surpassed the Soviet in breadth depth beneficial ap plications cooperative relation hips and even weight lifting capacity These factors evidence of the dynamic force and will behind the ·REPRISE 175 American space effort may combine with other strategic and political factors to dispose the Soviet Union to a greater degree of bilateral casperation In any case there has been a small beginning toward sach cooperation in the Dryden Blagonravov agreements, the most important and prom ing of which provides for the establishment of Keather data exchanges and the coordinated launching of weather satellites by the two countries This modest mellowing has been noted also mainly on the level of appearances, in the other principal channels of contact with the Soviet Union in space matters, COSPAR (the International Com mittee o. Space Re rarch) and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Still other channels exit and can contribute much to professional exchanges and the broad under standing which is required if we are ultimately to progress to sub stantial program involvement on a cooperative basis But it 19 important to recognize that not all channels are suitable for the same Purpo es The United Nations clearly has a sperial value and a unique contributior to make in establishing an authoritative govern mental framework for the use and regulation of space The UN can serve also lo air the interests and needs of the non pacefaring na tions who are nowhere else represented Efforts to utilize any of these forums to achieve space objectives beyond their authority com Prtence or command of resources is frustrating wateful of time and more disruptive to progress in the proper channels than may be realized 2 too too often men and nations expect the laws of nature the state of technology and the abilities of people and of institutions to conform to their aspirations instead of making their aspirations conforth to the obdurate world of science and acchnology We have seen also in the examples of President hennedy . United Mations proposal of September 1963 and Sir Bernard Lovells cor respondence of the previous summer that the course of the American and Soviet space programs, the dificult and delicate ta k of formulat ing national and international space policy, and the meaning of ·176 REPRISE specific proposals and reports on these matters all have been seriously and needlessly confused from time to time National as well as human interest could be better served The bard facts of space cooperation and competition the character of science and the contribution that scientists can make to interna tional accord the limitations of cooperative programs and their po tential these are not to be confused with negativism There is always tbe risk that enthusiasts unencumbered by specific knowledge will confuse realism with negativism The enthusiasts tend to slp more easily into the role of prophet and agent of a perfectly peaceful world' But those with responsibility for translating ideas into reality for making programs tork must give due regard to means channels and objectives This is necessary not necessarily negative and does not constitute fighting the problem (Wohlstetter has observed that the weapons claque tends to regard the consideration of counter measures not as necessary but as hostile ) Realism is the indispensable ingredient making for success in in ternator al cooperation A hard won and limited succes will be morm productive of future successes than will a flamboyant beginning with luctle solid content Having said this it only remains to be emphasized that there is every reason to proceed imaginatwely aggressively, and even con fidently o widen and deepen the cooperation which has already been won in the space field The possibilities for success have been dem onstrated and a solid foundation established The Yested interests are comparatively ſew and the major one the carly Soviet lead may already have been liquidated in fact though this possibility will require some time to come to general appreciation There is clearly a compelling public interest and high visibility" in space activity The fact that it is linked through common techniques and tools to military matters may make cooperation all the more important for there may indeed be some carry over to arms control and inspection The implications of collaboration in space by virtue of its lounda tion in advanced technology of the broadest chararter reach tar into the economic commercial academic and political life of nations #5

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·178
REPRISE
2J R Pierce Satellite Science and Technology Saence (July 19
1963) p 244
* Albert Wohlstetter Scientists Seers and Strategy Foreign Al
fairs (April 1963) P 474
+ Wohlstetter op cit p 474
& Pierce op cul

·INDEX See also Academy of Astronautics 165 negotiations with Dryden 94 Academy of Sciences of USSR accepts Dryden view of scope of seeks US recordings of Soviet sat negotiations 93 revives Echo I ellites 20 21 Lovell reports at demonstration proposal 95 96 titudes toward cooperation and contribution 96 at Rome and manned flight 105 ff Geneva meetings 1963 97 99 US/USSR Cooperation comment to Dryden on prospects Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful for manned lunar cooperation Uses of Outer Space see United 112 113 Nations Brazıl 66 67 Alouette satellites 44 74 75 Bridgman Percy exclusion of stu Amrine Michael quoted on inter dents of totalitarian countries national communities 10 11 from laboratory 14 Antarctic treaty relationship to British National Space Committee ICY discussed 21 22 117 118 see United Kingdom ALT 66 Argentina cooperation with 54 Canada cooperative projects with Anel satellites 43-45 164 44-47 51 66 67 70 71 74 75 Atomic Energy Commission Centre National d Etudes Telecom pact on pace program 31 raunications (CNET) di cus Australia cooperation with 54 66 sions with NASA leading to joint 70 satellite project 40 see France Aitation Week and Space Technol China participation of two Chinas y quoted 177 an IGY 19 Clark Joy S proposal to author Benefits of cooperation in space ize joint venture to moon with 7479 Soviet Union 114 Bilateral Space Agreement of 1962 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of see US/USSR Cooperation Outer Space see United Nations Blackett PMS quoted 60 Communications Satellite Act 160 Blagenratov A visit to Naval Re Communications Satellite Corpora search Laboratory 89 Novem tion 160 ber 1999 meeting with NASA Communicalions satellites Use of o cual 89 on use of Echo I in in NAS4 cooperatise program US USSR communications test for intercontinental testing 63 90 represents Soviet Union in 64 multilateral character of co m ·180 INDEX operation in 71 international continuing discussion of same commercial arrangements at gov 40 interest in synoptic sounding ernmental and operational levels rochet projects 71 contrast be 159 162 tween US and Soviet perform Congress, reactions to Kennedy ance in 73 91 175 11 C. Van proposal for lunar landing proj de Hulst elected preydent, 85 ect with Soviet Union 2 3 cre dispute over organizational basis ates NASA 7 in National Aero 86 87 compromise 87 slow nautics & Space Act provides si progress in data exchange agree multaneously for US competition ments 87 88 collaboration with and cooperation in space, 8 first UNESCO in preparation of docu report to by Pres Johnson 8 ments for UN 145 Consultative charters National Academy of Group recognized by UN Sub- Sciences 13 hearings on Space committee on matters of inter Act of 1958 28 30 joint commit ference with space experiments tee review of AEC International 146 prior performance of Pug activities after 5 years 31 NASA wash recommendations 158 159 response to mandate of 68 and IAF 165 166 Clark proposal to authorize joint Costs of space cooperation 77 78 venture to mnoon 114 Cooperation (in space) FS com Davy Humphrey travels to Paris petition 2 3 5 10 172 defined during Napoleonic wars 12 16 17 philosophy for 28 35 de Beer Gavin his book The Sci initiation 36-41 specific proj ences Were Never Al Far dis ects 41 74 benefits 74 79 be cussed 12 13 tween US and USSR 85 131 Denmark cooperation with 57 66 174 through European regional 67 organizations 132 14) through Department of Defense position on the UN 141 155 in a signment space agency ball 30 of radio frequencies 152 153 Department of State relationship in space meteorology 153 154 to NASA in international negoti through Pugwash conferences afions 34 92 arrangement of 155 159 through commercial exchange of notes in US UK communications satellite agree space program 42 policy toward ments 159 162 EUROSPACE cooperation with ELDO 137 and 162 164 IAF and 165 166 participation in discussions on MATO OECD and 166 177 international commercial con mu ummarized 172 177 See also nications satellite arrangements US/USSR Cooperation national 160 162 Aeronautics & Space Adminis Dryden liugh L on competing tration United States Sotret space interests al road 39 on ad Union Unued Nations 7 ing proepective foreign experi COSPAR as igned race concerns menter 40 erpli ratory merling of IG) 37 8 serves as forum In 1939 with Blagonrarov 89 for initiation of MAS4 interna appointed chief negotiator 1962 tional program 38 39 and for for di cujons with Soviet Union ·INDEX 181 94 clarifies authority 95 con 137 140 program 137 138 cotribution toward agreement of operation with NASA 45 50 1962 96 supplementary weet 138 139, and EUROSPACE ingy in 1963 describes negotia 163 and NATO 166 167 tions 97 100 receives Lovell let EUROSPACE and the role of ter 105 channel for negotiation cominercial organizations in in with Soviet Academy affirmed by ternational space relationships Webb 169 report of Blagon 162 165 Tavor views on manned lunar co Explorer satellites as contribution operation 112 113 emphasis on to IGY 4 US request for Soviet Kennedy s intent to "explore" lu recordings of 20 nar cooperation with Soviet Un Extraordinary Administrative Ra 1on 116 dio Conference 152 153 DuBridge Lee A testimony on space agency bull 29 France, cooperation with 40 45 47 53 55 63 66 67 71 76 Echo satellites proposed use for comparison of US and French US-Soviet experiment 4 90 93 spare expenditures 140 141 co- 98 operation in Thumba range proj Ehricke krafft testimony on space ects 62 145 agency bill 29 Franklin Benjamın gives safe-con Eisenhower Dwight D interpreta duct to Captain Cook 12 tion of National Aeronautics & Fulbright J W draft resolution Space Act to permit executive supporting cooperation with Soagreements for international co viet Union,2 3 operation in space matters 30 31 79 90 Germany cooperation with 40 55 European Launcher Development 66 Organization (ELDO) as signifi Gilruth Robert R comment on in cant regional space agenry 132 tegration of Soviet rocket with considerations leading to organi American spacecraft, 112 zation of 133 establi hed 134 Glass H Bentley 156 member responsibilities in 131 Glennan T Keith reports first ef history 134 135 finances 135 forts of NASA officials to discuss 140 question of cooperation cooperation with Soviet Union 4 with in missile development, 89 offers use of manned flight 136 Department of State policy tracking net to Soviet Unior 4 toward 137 and EUROSPACE, 89 163 and NATO 166 167 European Space Re earch Organı Hailsham Lord quoted on relation zation (ESRO) as significant tebetween international coopera gronal space organization 131 tion and national excellence 9 considerations leanmg 10 VITIN Wake George Elier) eTorts to di zation of 132 133 formal petab rect National Academy of Sci 11 hment 131 cope of unicret ences and National Research 137 member hp 137 funding Council to national purpo e in ·182 INDEX par WYI 13 14 pioneers in inter mittee see Communications sal national organization of science ellites 16 International Research Council Hayward John T testimony on modeled on National Research space agency bill 28 Council 16 Harris Oren summarizes results International Telecommunications of Extraordinary Administrative Union 76 152 153 Radio Conference of ITU 152 ISIS satellites 41 45 161 153 Italy cooperation with 40 45 47 Hong Kong 66 56 66 75 INCOSPAR see India Japan cooperation with 56 66 India impetus lent by IGY to set Jenner Edward influenced pris ence in 23 cooperation in sound oner exchanges of scientists dur ing rocket programs with 51 52 ing Napoleonic wars 12 53 Thumba equatorial rocket Johnson Lyndon B welcomes colaunching station 62 75 operation in space activity but ticipation in APT program 66 states intention to proceed alone Indonesia 66 if nece sary 8 9 79 International Astronautical Feder at on role in international space Keldysh M V 97 107 110 111 projects 36 40 90 91 158 hennedy John F 1963 propo ni 165 165 Stockholm meeting 90 to explore cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agen viet Union in maoned lunar pro cy 31 39 ects 13 5 111 120 Press an International Council of Scientific congressionalreaction to proposal Unions 85 of 2 3 213 120 report of 1961 International Geophysical Year overture on joint lunar effort, generates first proposals for 116 1962 proposals to Khrt space research 3 4 first satel shchev 4 92 91 support of colites launched as contributions operation in space 79 cited by to 4 as erimple of scientits Pugwa h participant 158 contribution to cooperation 9 Khrushchev N correspondence character of IGY as an interna with Pres Kennedy on spacc cotronal program 17 23 partici pation of two Chinas 19 Soviet operation 3 92 91 113 rejects deadline for Soviet Junar land attitudes toward 1921 space activity as a special case 20 21 ing, 109 rejects conclu son that connection with Antarctic treaty Soviet Union abandons lunar 21 IGY evaluated, 22 23 basis landing 109 110 reported refor success 22 23 173 influence ceiving 1961 overture from hea on National Aeronautics & Space nedy for cooperation in lunar Act 28-30 role in cooperative programs 316 space projects 37 progress Astiakowsky George B quoted since 120 on the international role of sci Ir lernational Ground Station Com ence 11 ·INDEX 183 Legal Subcommittee see United Nations Lovell Sir Bernard assistarce in US USSR ue of ECHO satel lites 90 98 letter of July 1963 to Dryden on Soviet plan att: tudes toward cooperation and manned space fight 105 ff NASA respon e to 108 109 Leldysh disavowal 110 111 175 Marshall Charles Burton ccm ments on unique international groups 15 Massey Sır Hartie 42 Mexico 70 Musules and Rockets editorial on cooperative manned lunar pro Eram with Soviet Union 117 Monge Gaspard Napoleon e model of gond scientist 13 90 directed by Congress toward both prceminence and coopera tion 8 legislative authority te cooperation distinguished 31 philosophy of cooperation 28- 35 initiation of international program 37 collaboration with National Academy of Sciences Space Science Board 37 38 1959 European tour to stimulate joint projects 39 types of cooperative projects 41 joint sat ellate projects with United King dom 42 44 45 with Canada 44 45 with France 45 with Italy 45 with European Space Re search Organization 45 tabu lated 46 50 program for 8ccom modation of individual foreign experiments on NASA satellites 51 tabulated 52 53 program for joint rounding rocket inve u Gations 51 tabulated 52 53 program for ground ba ed coop eration 63 65 tabulated 66 67 programs for training fellow ships te idencies 65 68 tabu lated 69 program for foreign visitors 68 69 effect of coop erative programs upon Soviet Union 73 benefits of NASA cooperatire program 74 79 cooperative program briefly tum marized 79 for cooperation with Academy of Sciences of USSR see also US/USSR cooperation Unued States Aational Research Council rcx on for etabli liment in WWI 13 model for International Research Council 16 NATO 166 167 Arrell Womer E content organ sational meeting of COSPAN 20 21 Napoleon concept of science s aime 13 National Academy of Sciences im poses loyalty oath during Cuvil War 13 offers resources to US President in WWI 11 expert ence with Soviet Academy in ex change of satellite recording tance to NASA in ini tuating international space pro fram 37 38 administration for MASA of training programs 69 tran mi 10 of cooperative ofer from NASA to Soviet Academy 82 National Aeronautics & Space Act prout in for cooperation with other nations in space actinte 8 30 effect of IGY on 28-30 Svetion 20 Interpreted, 30 31 MASA te tone to 68 69 National Acton iuties & Space Ad ·181 INDEX see National Nigeria 66 by technical achievements, 9 Norway cooperation with 57 67 possible special role in interos tional cooperation 0.17 political Odishaw llugh cited 26 27, 81 alignments in WWII 14 OECD 166 Sedoy L. 88 89 Sounding rockets Pakistan cooperation with 51 57 deronautics & Space Adminis view of science advisor toward tration space activity by developing South Africa Republic of 70 countries 60 Soviet Union Kennedy proposal to Pelly TM amendment to NAS4 explore joint lunar landing with, appropriation re cooperation with 13 reaction to early overtures by Soviet Union 2 115 US 5 carly space success and Pickering William F 90 leadership 6 launches Sputnik Pierce JR quoted epigraph I 7 participation in IGY 19. 175 177 21 contribution to equatorial Porter RV letter to COSPAR rocket range 62 offered partici 38 cited 81 pation tests of communica Pugwash Conferences role in in tions satellites 64 reporting to ternational space cooperation 37 COSPAR and UN contrasted 90 155 159 166 with that of US 73 position in UN 141 152 criticizes global Rabinowitch Eugene quoted 11 comsat system 162 see also US/ Relay satellites 66 67 see also USSR Cooperation Communications satellites Space Sciences Board see National Rickover Hyman testimony on Academy of Sciences space agency bill 28 Spain 66 Royal Society role in Bratı b co Sputnih satellites as contribution operation with NASA 42 to IGY 4 dual objectives 6 Russell Bertrand 155 156 spur to competition 6 precede National Aeronautics & Space Salaam Aldus views on space ac Act 7 US recordings of protivity by developing nations 60 vided to Sovict Union 20 Sarabhai Vikram Chairman of Sweden cooperation with 51 58 INCOSPAR 61 views on space 67 75 activity by developing nations 61 62 Thumba 62 145 146 Satellite projects see National de TIROS satellites 67 66 71 ronautics & Space Administra Townsend John W offers Soviet 11on scient ts US magnetometer for Science as an international medi space research 88 um 10 17 futility of barriers to Training see National Aeronautics 16 & Space Administration Scientific & Technical Subcommit Tracking stations coopera ion with tee see United Nations re pect to 70 71 76 map of Scientists new importance given centerpiece US and Soviet net ·INDEX 185 works contrasted 77 hennedy national interest 13 16 efforts propo al to Khrushchev for co to strengthen international scien operation in 93 Khrushchev tific ties 16 participation and counterpropo 21 91 Lovell visit performance in IGY 1921 Te to Soviet station, 105 porting to international forums Turner Thomas proposal for joint contrasted with that of Soviet US Soviet manned lunar project Union 73 positions on space 118 119 questions in UN 141 152 invites Unued Kingdom cooperation with Soviet participation in comsat 4245 48 49 52 53 59 60 66 system 161 162 67 70 71 76 US/USSR Cooperation early ef United Nations kennedy proposal forts 4 88 ff Soviet argument to explore joint space efforts with that disarmament required first, Soviet Union 1 role in interna 91 91 contrast in cooperation tional space cooperation 36 93 with third countries 91 sought sponsor hip of rochet range at in correspondence between hen Thumba India 62 63 affords nedy and Khrushchev 92 94 contrast between US and USSP Dryden Blagonravoy negotiations in cooperation 91 turns to prob begin 94 97 first Agreement lems of space 141 US and (1962) 96 97 supplementary USSR approaches 141 142 con Memoranda 97 100 evaluated sensus to encourage peaceful ac 100 101 tested in Warsaw distivities 142 establishment of cussions of Mars and Venus Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful probes 102 and in Echo II tests Use of Outer Space 142_recom 103 104 establ. hment of meteor mendations of Ad Hoc Commit ological data link and exchange tee 143 General Assembly reso- 101 Soviet proposal for review lution 1721 141 permanent of space biology and medicine Committee on Peaceful Uses of lu: 105 Kennedy UN proposal Outer Space 140 establi hment to e plore further cooperation of Legal and Scientific Technical 13 111 120 relative to WMO Subcommittees 145 work of activities 154 offered in con subcominittees 145 152 nection with commercial com YICY of space activity in 154 munications satellite sy tens 155 175 161 162 summarized 174 175 United States offers 10 explore US Weather Bureau 64 66 Joint lunar project with Soviet Union 1 early efforts to intro. Van Allen James testimony on duce cooperation in space mal pace agency bili 29 ters 35 motivated to "catch Van de Hult HC. elected pre! up with Soviet Union 6 space dent of COSPAR 86 contribu budgets 6 response to space tion toward establishment of COSPAR 66 87 challenge in National Aeronau tics & Space Ict of 1938 7 8 Vanguard I as contribution to development of organized science ICY 4 in illustratik responsiveness to Jon harman Tlicodore 165 over

·186
INDEX
data erchange during IGY
World Meteorological Org!
tion 96 153 154
Warsaw Jure 1963 COSPAR
mecling 73
chb James F 897 108 109
111 116
Tohlstetter Albert 156 157
Torld Dsta Centers function in
Zanztar TO