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·Our Western Frontier
OF
INDIA
LOYDOS:
WATERLOT DROS. LAYTOX,
1, DIRCHIN LAXE, Loxtos, Et.
1990.

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·I.-INTRODUCTO. There is nothing that strikes anyone who is acquainted, to however slight a degree, with the conditions of existence of the various mces inbabiting the wild and barten conntry intervening between our Incliaz fruntier and that of Persin, more than the persistent way in which Huropean politicians and ycogmpliers endeavour to group these moes under two distinct nationalities, and tu assign to them as such fixed territorial abodes We hear the talk of Beloochistan and Affghanistan as though thu districts thus designated were the exclasive abode of two nationalitics entirely distinct from one another, but homogcncous amongst themselves; almost as we bear the more grossly ill-informed amongst tho British pubhc. tolk of the inhabitants of thio Peninsuls of llindnytan Bu "Indinga," thereby classing all the varjcu racce of a country nimost as big as Europe, and containing quito en many «istinct nationalities under a designation winch they apply with equal readiness to tho aborigucs of Yorth Imcrica, and the inhabitants of the Cannibal Islanda. To endeavonr to cxplain the ridiculous mis. application of this term as applied to a weinber of any one of tho numerous distinct races, inhabiting the country of linlustan is too comprehensivo a subject to be attempted in connection with any other matter, my object at present licing mcrcly to point out the erroneous notions into which our European ideas have lod ng as regards the regions, wo lavo designuted trepectively as Boloochistan and Asglianistan, and the zopalation found thercia ·particularly as they effect onr frontier polies, and mode nfiniment of ihe difficnliies viih which we are now thene beset. The forms Afichanistan and Beloochistan, as territorial tiesignations applied io particular tracts of country, mas indeed be considered arbitrary--if not more than that, absolutely fictitions, for they do noi designate any country Knowa io ile inhabitants of it themselves br such ? title: they are rather terms which we have adopted from motives of convenience; and because, according to our European leis, euch nice or colleciion of races, speaking a common or kinind tongues, onghi to inhabit a region with fixed {woundaries, and be united ander; disiinci untional repre. sentitive. Such, hoverer, is not the case with the moiler varietpoſ nariunalities that iniuabit the regions in qnestion, she débris di successive social upheavals left sinunded in these inhospitable parts, for the reason that here alone they have found a refuge, the possession of which zo inrader las fonnd ii werth while to dispare with them ther still exisi, rich ne riests, and bni fer intensis in common. The east or ile rest of these regions-Persia or Hindustan --has alvars been the goal of the conquering honles which liare issued rheile: from Ceninl Isia or from Arbia, and in Balocelisian and Afghanistan are fonni the remnantseithe aboriginal mees of ihe countries which iber hare crerrun in their con se nised riih muiis and sinirs oi their eozquenrs, just as in the wildest and nosi mountainous paris of India, ar por alone {oandike surrirors of the aboriginal inhabitants of that country whe hare in ihese inhospitable reasses, foana a zeinge which has presented to chew ibeir indiriiaality throach centuries, in the course of which the more exposed in habitaurs of the plains hare len conqueryiorer and orar again till anily a iace of their ultimate origin can be found amongst then.

·3 The barren and mountainous districts bordering our Western frontier of India resemble the beach of the sea at high-water mark, nationalities from all quarters of the Asiatic world are there found stranded; of some of them, such as of the Arabs, Moguls and tribes of Persian descent, it is comparatively casy to trace the origin, but of the majority it is lost in obscurity, Of the variety of the origin of these races no greater proof could he adduced than the constitution of the Inngungee, or rather dialects spoken amongst them, which are nothing but compounds of what appears ad infinite variety of tongues; in them are alike to lvo found word pnrcly Snoscrit in their origin, and others purels Arabic, whilst many comc eren direct from the Hcbrow, and the majority from various intermediary sources, the whole being linked together by the special idiomatic forms of Apeech which have found their origin on the common meeting grunnd where all these waifs have made their homc. To arrive at n suficient compreliension of the ethnographical intricacies to bo encountered in a study of the nationalities inhabiting the regions it is necessary first to consiler the plıysical peculiarities of the homes in which they are found, and particularly the relative position of the same as regardle Inelia, for India has been the tempting unit which has led successive inrarling hosts through these poverty-stricken listricts, and given them the courage to struggle tludugh all the dificulties and privntions which their passage has bronght upon them, and it is onls llie fact of their forming the sole means of "pproach to Indin from the west that has now brought thieso regione xo pimminentlş before the notice of civilized nations, For this purporo wo may look upon llindustan ag a rast park or ganleu completely protected towards the north hy ·4. an insurmonntable wall, and shut in towards the west-by which alone lies any means of approach to it-by a tangled mass of rocks and ravines. The whole of the northern portion of Hindustan may be said to constitute a sort of depressed plain in the Asiatic landscape, for though abounding in ranges of hills that rise to a considerable height, the greater part of its surface is more or less plain in its nature, and seldom rises to a greater eleration than that of abont 2,000 feet above the sea lerel; it is owing to this characteristic, namely, the general aniformity of its surface, coupled with the abundance of its water supply, that its agricultural wealth is mainly due. This productive basin is bounded on the north and west by ranges of mountains constituting the margins of rast table-lands which, sereral thousand feet higher than the average level of the surface of the Indian Peninsula, stretch far away towards the north and fest. As regards the ranges which form the boundary towards the north of India these rise gradually, by successive leaps, as it where, from low hills, which, at a distance of from 50 to 150 miles from the Ganges, start out of the dead level plains, constituting the valley of this river, to the towering heights of the Himalayas, which rise to an altitude of from 25,000 to 28,000 feet above the sealevel, and stretch in an unbroken and impenetrable barrier from beyond Calcutta to Peshawar, a barrier such as has erer effectually prevented any ingress from this quarter to the fertile districts lying to its south. With these mountains, however, we are not now further concerned than in so far as they offer a contrast to those in which onr present interest lies, namely the mountainous district bounding the western frontier of India. In this direction the monatain ranges, instead of rising gradually oat of the piains which here constitute the valley of the Indus, ·3 spring up in most cascs alınost abruptly to a height of from 4,000 to 10,000 feet or morc. On the farther side of these precipitous ranges extend endless stretches of tablo lands, which rise to their greatest height towards the north, and descend gradually towards the south and west. The mountains that thias tcrminate towards the west the plains of Hindustan differ cntirely in all their physical characteristics from the Himalayan ranges. These latter, owing to the combined effects of the S.W. and S.E. monsoons, whoso warm moisture-laden atmosphere is arrested by their snowy tops, to descend in condensed torrents of rain upon their bases and the plains belownbound with vast forests and crery species of vegetation in its most luxuriant form; whilst their slopes are covered with endless stretches of wood-land and pasture, the vnlloys which intersect them-filled with deep, rich soil, the detritns of centuries of decayed vegetable matter wnslid down by the periodicalzains from the slopes above -produce crops of the most extraordinary abundance. Ilow different from this is the picture presented by tho mountain ranges to the west of thic Indns, these do not rise to a licight sufficient to nttract the monsoon clouds, und lience derivo no benelit from their favouring influences, tho minfall amongst them is in consequence cxtremely limited, and their summits and sides present nothing but barre'n and rugged slopes, stripped by centuries of storms and tempests of cvery restige of soil; in place of the inngnificent forests of pino and oak intermingled with <hestnut, nyh and the lovely rhodolendron which clotho the southern slopes of the Himalayas, here nothing but 12ky wasto meet the eye, unrelieved by the presence of any further sectation than that presented by a few knurled and stunted cypresses or firs, and other trees of a similar kinil, whose hanly nature lias enabled them to trurgle through every dificulty there offered them;

·6 while the valleys and plains below, though consisting in many places of very productive soil, remain for the most part barren wastes, owing to the deficiency of an adequate supply of water, without which the intrinsic qualities of any soil, however good, are absolutely worthless, for as contrasted with the valleys of the Himalayas, which abound in streams replenished from year to year by the rainy seasons, and the annual melting of the snows, which latter form, as it were, a gigantic natural reservoir, the contents of which percolate through every mountain side, the plateau of Beloochistan and Affghanistan are either absolutely waterless or so inadequately supplied with this requisite as to render but a very small proportion of their surface available for the purposes of cultivation. The general characteristics of the landscape when one has surmounted the rugged barrier which opposes the ingress into these regions from the direction of India, may be described as à vast plateau intersected with innumerable rocky ridges rising to an height of from 1,000 to 6,000 feet above it, the intervals between which form valleys or basins, or eren extensive plains according to their degree. These latter portions of the country are alone susceptible of cultivation, and that only to the extent admitted by the limited amount of water available for this purpose, for it cannot be too clearly understood that the landscape in these regions consists mainly of rocky mountains and more or less unculturable deserts; the amount of cultur, able land, even in the more favoured localities, bearing but a very small proportion to the extent that is absolutely insusceptible of cultivation; this, as I have explained, is not so much owing to the actual want of land capable under more favourable influences of producing crops, as to the deficiency of streams or springs and the scantiness of the annual rainfall. There being here no regular seasons ·7 of rain as in India, such rainfall as does occur is both scanty and limited as regards the area affected by it, for it rarely extends beyonıl the mountain ranges, or their immediate neighbourhood. Added to these natural disadvantages of its physical characteristics, the climate of these regions is severe in the extreme. Owing to the bareness of the landscape and the general absence of vegetation, there is but little modification to be found between the extremes of lieat and cold, the heat is in consequence out of all proportion with the altitude of these regions above the sea level, and the cold is equally out of all proportion with both their altitude and latitude; while owing to the facility with which the bare surfaces of the giound, part byradiation with the heat they may have absorbed, the rapidity with which these extremes follow one another seems almost incredible,-a temperature of 110 degrees or more, Fahrenheit, by day may be 811ccceded by one of 50 degrees by night, or even in case of a trilling shower of rain. It may, indeed, be said that during the hot season the heat here is almost as great, and, owing to the bareness of the soil and the clearness of the atınosphere, quite as trying as that of most parts of India.the only advantage which it possesses over the latter being that the nights are generally cool, frequently too much so, as I have said, to be either healthy or pleasunt. In the cold season, on the other hand, though the temperature does not, perhaps, actually go down many degrecs below freezing-point, the air when in tuotion, there being nothing to obstruct its force, is more piercingly cold in its effect thau can be imagined without personal experience, while the extreme scarcity of any sort of fuel makes the severity of the climate in this 1tspect all the more difficult to contend with. It can be casily imagined from tnis description that these countries present bat little inducement to a foreign ·invnder to attempt their annexation, or even temporary occupation--the only occasion, indeed, of their ever having been entered by a forcign force is owing to their constiluting the only ineans of approach to the fertile plains of I.ndin—whilst the very fact of their inacessibility and barrenness has rendered them favonrable places of refuge to thic victims of successive invasions of thic more favonred countries to their west. Instead, t.len, of looking upon the inhabitants of these regions as constituting two distinct nationalities, and cndeavouring to classify them under the generic terms of Beloochce and Affglan we should rather consider them as composed of a number of separate units, the result of successive invasious and consequent expulsions of the aboriginal popnlation from the countries further west, scattered amongst whom tlie Belooches and Affghans are in the main in the preponderance. As to the origin of these two races, the only thing certain about it is that it must have been absolutely distinct, for they differ entirely in every characteristic of feature and character; the Affghans claim to be descendants of the Jews, and their language certainly point to a western origin, while the Belooches appear to have no tradition even amongst them as to the region from whence their ancestors came, or the circumstances under which they settled in the districts in which their descendants are now found. It is with equal incorrectness, then, that we would endeavour to apply the terms Beloochistan and Affghanistan to any clearly defined tracts of country or those of Beloochee and Affghan as the general distinctive titles of the races inhabiting these tracts. The term Beloochistan may indeed with a certain degree of reason be applied to the tract thus designated. for throughout it are found a variety of races who speak different dialects of common language, namely, Beloochee; though interspersed with these dwell large a ·. numbers of members of tribes distinct from the Beloochoc-speaking inhabitants, who acknowledge no connection whatever with them, and speak entirely «Zifferent languages. The term effghanistan, however, as applied to the entire region to which we give it, is completely out of place, for in navy parts of this region the Affghans hardly constitute a bare majority, and in others are not found at all; in any case they are scattered about in such a hap-bazard way in the region thus designated, and so intermingled with races of a different origin that it is almost impossible to define any particular portion of it as being their exclusive abode, and thus entitled to the special designation of Affghanistan, or the "abode of the Allighaus." If any part could, with justice, lay claim to this title it would be the area included between Peshawur, Cabal, Bamian, Candahar and Quettii, which constitutes the head-quarters of the Affghan population, though, even here, this is much mixed with various tribes of foreign origin; in the remaining portion the Affghan population is cither very ninch in tłe minority or settled 10 detached and isolated districts, and so blended with races of entirely distinct antionalities that it woulil be quite a misnomer to apply to the districts they are found in any term distinguishing it as the exclusire abode of the Affghans. I.-BELOOCHISTAN, If by the term Beloochistan we mean to designato & particular tract of country comprchending within its limits all the districts where the Beloochee language or a cognate dialect is spoken, the area thas desiguated would bo so irregular in its ontline, and so dovetailed into neighbouring districts, there languages entirely distinct from Beloochee are the current mediam of intercourse of tho popalation, that it would be impossible to lay i n ·10 distinctly on any map, of however large a scale. Such a tract, moreover, would include within its boundaries al number of tribes who not only lay no claim to be called by the title of Beloochee, but who, on being questioned upon the subject, would distinctly disavow any such claim, and disown all connection with the tribe whose special designation it is. Descending from the north, the first Beloocheespeaking tribe which we come across is that of the Bozdars, who inhabit a narrow strip of mountainous country between Affghanistan and the Punjaub, next come the Bugtees, then the Marris inhabiting the mountains north and west of Sibi, the present terminus of the Candahar State Railway ; all these three tribes, though speaking a common tongue, disown any sort of connection with one another, and live in a state of perpetual feud amongst themselves. Next to these comes an interval occupied by an utterly distinct race-namely, that of the Brahoes, whose language has not even the slightest resemblance to any one of those spoken around them; where they came from is an utter mystery. They compose a very numerous tribe, and the district occupied by them extends from the Bolan Pass to Quetta towards the west, and to Khelat towards the south. They are of two categories, as it were, the migratory Brahoes and the sedentary Brahoes. The former are essentially a pastoral community, their entire property consisting of immense herds of sheep, goats and camels. In these latter consist their main wealth, for they are the principal proprietors of these invaluable animals in these parts, and consequently have almost a monopoly of the carrying trade between the Sind frontier and Quetta and Khelat. They build no villages, but live in tents formed by coarse rugs made of camels' or goats' hair, and cultivate only just enough ground to supply themselves from time to ·Lime with a little coarse grain. The cold season they spend on the plains at the foot of the Bolan Pass, and as soon as the weather there begins to get hot, they more up this Pass to the plateaux in the immediate neighbourhood of its summit. Tbe sedentary Brahocs inhabit the cumparatively fertile districts between the Bolan Pass aud Khelat, where they are found settled in namerous villages. Suath of these again come a variety of tribes more or less of Persian origin, with no special character. istic about them except that they speak several debased dialccts of Beloocheo: tucse extend from Khelat (lown to lekrun upon the cuast of the Persian Gulf The true Beloochee element according to our nccepta. tion of the term, that is the aggregate of the tribes speaking the Reloochce langauge- male include the Bozlars, the Buztees, the Jarris, and the proper Beloochee---according to the nature acceptation of the term, that is, the Rind Beloochee or Belouchee of the plains of Kutchi and the mountain bontering these on the soutls and east. The Brahoes, she coustitate, as I hare alicun, 1 very important element in the population of these parts, would, if questioned, indiguantiy deny their connection with aus Belooch tribe, with all and cach of whom they leave froin time inmemoriul lived on terms of the bitterest hostility. From this it will be seen that the population of a great part of the rrgion called by us Boloochistan--50 far from being eren Belanchiet-speaking population-speak a language utterly and entirely removed from this tongue, and that this population, morcorer, inhalsits the neighboarbond of the town which we liare always credited with being the capital of our Beloochietan. Such a thing ng *king or corcreign nt 1cloochistan does not exist. Tho Klian of Khelat is only one of the taore powerful chica in these districts, and liis influence over anr portion of ·12 the various tribes inhabiting the territories which we have assumed to belong to him, is of so vague and shadowy a description that it in reality amonnts to nothing at all; indeed, till within a few years, he was unable to maintain any sort of supremacy over the tribe to which he belongs himself--namely, that of the Brahocs, with the migratory section of which he had for years been on terms of hostility ; in the course of which, so far from being able to hold his own, he had been reduced to such straits that it was nothing but the arrival of our Mission in his country in 1874 which saved him from total destruction. The greater part, indeed, of the tribes inhabiting this region would emphatically deny any claim on the part of the Khan of Khelat to a supremacy over them, and the only answer they wonld give to any suggestion on his part of such a claim, would be to recommend him to come and try to enforce it. The influence of the Khan of Khelat may be said to extend no further than over the weaker tribes in his own immediato neighbourhood; and this influence is only owing to the fact that, whereas the ordinary Beloochee is a man who despises any sort of commercial transaction, and considers the only honourable mode of gaining a living to be by the plunder of the baser and more sordid souls engaged in commerce and agriculture, the immediate dependants of the Khan of Khelat aro essentially peaceful in their habits, and commercial in their tastes/he is thus enabled to extract from the settled portion of them suficient révenue to enable him to entertain a sort of standing army; that is to say, a couple of thousand of cut-thront ruffians, whom it was his habit to let loose from time to time upon such of his neighbow's or dependants as werd unable to retaliate, with a view to asserting his position amongst them, or replenishing his exchequer by extracting black mail. Till recently, indeed, there was 110

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·15 may be adopted by us to denote the special home of t1 Afghans, but in that case it could only, as has been su with any jastice be applied to the area, included with lines drawn connecting Peshawar, Bamian, Candahar, us perhaps Girishk, and Qaetta, though even in this there is & vory large proportion of population entirely distinct from, and for a great part at perpetual fend with that of the Afghans. Beyond these limits tho Affghan tribes uro 80 closely intermingled with tribes belonging to the neighbouring races, such as Beloochces, Persiany, and Turcomans, that it would bo impossiblo to defino uny particular extent of country, as belonging to Afghanistan, Beloochistan, Persia, or Turkestan, respectively, if by these terms it be intended to imply that the population of such a tract is strictly Affghan, Belooch, Persia, or Turco. man, as the case may be, in its origin Another point that adds much to the difficulty and perplexity of defining the territories belonging to thesu re. spective nationalities, is that a very large proportion of the population of each of them are nomads, and their sole incans of livelihood being their flocks und berds, spend their lives in wandering about in search of pasturago for the same. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the provalence of this characteristic amongst the border tribes of these countries, as by it to a great extent is to be explnined tho difficulties which present themselves in laying down distinct territorial boundaries in districts where a brat part of the population is more or less incessantly on the move. The region which we have termed Aliglanistan ix, as I have said, essentially one of rocky mountains and barren plains; but, bare of all vegetation as the landscape in most places appears, there still exists a considerabl... Stuwth of a very nutritious herbage anaungst the stones und dust which constitato the leading charucteristics ·16 ; the surface of the ground. This growth is very scattered, and hardly apparent to the eye, and the sight of flocks of sheep and herds of cattle in consequence grazing upon those unpromising sites has been the occasion of many a jesting remark on the part of Europeans strange to the country, as to the powers of digestion of these animals who ippeared to thern to keep themselves in wonderfully good condition upon a diet which, as far as appearances went, consisted of little else but sticks, and stones, and dust; but, as I have said, amongst these sticks, and stones, and dust exists a certain proportion of pasturage which, though it may require a little more exercise on the part of the animals to which it affords a sustenance to obtain it, than would be required of a Southdown sheep or a Herefordshire bullock, still, when found, appears to provide a diet admirably suited to the constitutions of the animals that feed upon it, for as good mutton may be obtained from the flesh of a sheep bred in these parts as from that of any English sheep. It is thus only in the more favoured spots where a sufficient sapply of water is obtainable for the irrigation of the land and the cultivation of crops, that a settled population is to be found, while a very large proportion of the inhabitants, being pastoral in their habits, are perpetually on the move in search of the more favourable spots wherein to graze the flocks and herds which constitute their sole wealth and ineans of livelihood. As I have shewn in the case of the Brahnis-a tribe inhabiting a portion of Beloochistan-the annual migrations of this tribe extend to a distance of over 100 miles, were there then any such term in existence as that of Brahnistan, or the land of the Bralnis, how would it be possible to define its limits since the homes of the individual members of the tribe alternate, according to the season of the year, between regions more than 100 miles apart?

·L mas And this only an illustration of what is a very comm state of things, particularly in the region to the west the Helmond, where the population mainly consists tribes all more or less nomadic in their habits is long these tribes are more or less of the same origin, the ont side world is in no way interested in the movements that take place amongst them, but where tubes of one par. ticular origin border others of a different one, and it is nought to separate them by a hard and fast ime of demarcation, it is then found how almost impossible it is to Assign any definite limits of the territories thatnre to belong to each respective nationality, for the very district wluch --in the case of the border lanıls of Affghanistan be to-lay in the occnpation of a tribe of Affghan origin, and so entitled to be consulereel as constituting a portion of Affghanistan, or the land of the lffghans, may in a month or two's time be found on the occapation of a tribe of Bolooch, Persian, Turcoman descent, and thus equally entitled to be considered a portion of Beloochistan, P'ersin, or Turkestan, as the onse may be The truth is that in these uncırılızed regions all territorial limits are very vaguely defined, particularly where members of distinct nationalities, and of nomndic habits come in contact with one another The right of the sword being the only one recognized, any particularly faroumble extent of pasturge becomes, for the time bring -that is, for as long as it suits their parpose--the property of the tribe which can muster the largest number of fighting men. To attempt, therefore, in such regions to lay down, by the nid of Theololites and chains, and boundary-marks, an absolute line of demarention, is like drawing a line on the sands of the desert, or on the sca-shore below highwater mark; the first gust of wind tlint comes, or the returning tidle, will cſface it, so that not a vestigo of it ·18 will be seen. The only line of demarcation from which we have any right to expect any permanence, in such shifting sands would be that represented by a cordon of European outposts, and however much we may endeavour to stave off, for the time being, the difficulty by means of pillars and boundary marks, there is but little doubt that no permanent solution of it will ever be arrived at till we have thus distinctly marked out by a living line of demarcation, the spliere within which we are resolved at all costs, that our own influence should be supreme. IV.-THE AFFGHANS. So much for the difficulties to be encountered in defining the particular limits of the districts known to us under the comprehensive designation of Affghanistan, on the supposition that they constitute the special or exclusive abode of a distinct nationality, a term unknown to the inhabitants themselves of these districts, who distinguish them by their respective individual designations as Khorassan, Cabul, Ghuznee, Balkh, &c., &c. Vague, however, as appear to be the limits of the tract of country thus named by us, still vaguer seem the connecting links between the various tribes constituting its inhabitants, whom we have endeavoured to classify under the collective title of Affghans, which is a term but little known even to the very tribes of the particular origin which we intend to designate by its application, who distinguish them. selves by the title of Pathans, and it is by this name that they are known throughout Persia, India, and Central Asia. The tribes of Pathan origin, as has been pointed out, by no means form the exclusive population even of the districts which may be considered to form, as it were, their headquarters; for even here, intermingled with ·19 them, is found & considerable sprinkling of tribes Persian or Mogal descent. Still, as they constitute th majority amongst these, and are the dominant race ir these parts, it is with their characteristics and social con. dition that we are mainly interested. The barren anii mountainous region of Afghanistan has from time immu. morial afforded a refuge to the inhabitants of the countries further west in the course of the successive tides of invasion which have flooded these, whether from the south, as in the case of the Arabs, or from the north, as in the caso of the Turks and Mogals, for its porerty and inaccessibility--the very features which have rendered our experiences of the country so unsatis. factory in their results have always proved an ample protection against the designs of the most entei prising invaders, who have found as a rule even the temporary occupation of the more favourable distucts, an undertaking almost beyond their powers There is no doubt tliat the Pathans are a tribe of western origm, and took up their abodo in the regions in uluch we now find them as refugees from the successful invasion of their own hornes, but their origin is completely lost in obscurity, and it is difficult to make even any suggestion as to the immediate cause of their emigration, they claim themselves to be of Hebrow descent, and certain words in their language, which is more or less derived from the Pehlari are intimately connected with the Hebrew, and would thus appear to give some slew of reason to their claim to a connection with thus raco; howerer this may be, they constitute the majority of the inhabitants, and speak a variety of dialects of common language. similarity of language, howerer, constitutes locally no bond of anion between the members of the various tribes of this race, for they are divided into numerous clans, cach with entirely distinct customs and interests, 2 This

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·21 elements of disanion amongst these various tribes are augmented a hundred-fold by the treacherous, ferocivus and vindictire disposition which is the special characteristic of the Affghan portion of them, amongst whom any injury sustained by an individual member of a trive or cron section of a tribe may be the occasion of a feud between the two communities which may last for generations. Cases from time to time occur in which, in consequence of a fead of this description, the weaker family or tribe has been entirely extirpated-to which a parallel may be found in the famons Massacre of Glencoe but as a rule the feud does not terminate thus abruptly, either family or tribe contents itself with assassinating a member of the tribe it is at feud with whenever it can do so without much risk, or with raiding into the territory belonging to it, whenever a favourable opportanity occurs Amidst all these conflictos interests and distracting feuds the only point, indeed, at which any sort of colesion is to be fuund amongst the inotley variety of nativnalties in. habiting these districts, 19 when, descending the scale, we arrive nt the unit of sub-division amongst them, and that is a household or collection of households forming a section of a tribe, while the only common meetingground is, atuong the tribes of Affghan origin, a fanatical devotion to the Mahoumedan religion It appears, then, that in this country we have no distinct nationality to deal with, but rather an infinite number of social units cach with more or less different customs and direrging interests, and having but little in common bat their suspicion and hatred of a foreigner in general, and an infidel in particular. Thodisunited condition of the various tribes constituting ho Afghan population of these regions las always been a abject of regret and lameutation to the more patriotic ad intelligent amongst them who have had fou

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·23 i saperior skill and ability Their greed of money is heyond all description, and there is no atrocity of which they are not capable for a sufficient bribe, but as may be imagined from their fickle and treacherous nature to persist in a system of bribing, or as we term it euphemisrically subsidizing such a people is like pouring water into a sieve, for the recipient only considers himself bound by such a bribe in so far as it offers the prospect of another, or until the possibility presents itself of obtaining such an indncement from another party; even then he would endearonr secretly to extract such bribes from both parties, and would consider the achievement of such a purpose the acme of diplomatic skill; erentually when no longer able to continuo it, throwing in his lot--only for the time, however, until something better turned up with the one that promised best The characteristic qnalitics of the Affghan population may then be described as those of a fanatical devotion to tho Maliommedan religion, and a reckless courage and a love of independence, coupled with the most ferocious vindictiveness and sordid greed and duplicity. Their love of independence and fanatical hatred of a foreigner and infidel form the great obstacle to our dealing with them while their quarrelsomeness and cupidity are qualities which give us field to work upon V.-THE AMIR OF CABUL. Ag regards the relative position of the Amir of Cabal lowards the varions tribes over which he is supposed to exercise a nominal suzeranity, we shall again find an cxcellent aualogy to this in the mutual relations existing between the kings of Scotland and the turbulent Highland clans over whom they claimed to exercise

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·25 there exists no such an analogy to a European Sorereign, and it is rather our European ideas as to what would be a proper state of things than a correct appreciation of the state of things actually existing, which has led us into the error of regarding the Amir of Cabul as the personal ruler of a distinct nationality. The impressions thus originaterl have indeed been apparently confirmed by the fact, that in our several invasions of the country, wo have fonnd ourselves opposed by what ap. peared to us the mass of the population united under the (lirection of a distinct ruler, but such a state of things crists only in our imagination, and the appearance that led to this apparent confirmation of our impressions is only owing to the fact that, however separated by indirunal dissensions and private feuds, there is one point on which the conflicting interests of all these tribes, which constituto the most fanatical class of Mahommedans in the world-would always agree, and that is for the exclusion from the common country of an infidel For such A pirpose they would always rise en masse, and naturally mily round the chief of the most powerful tribe amongst them; the moment, however, that the intruder has been repulsed, all appearance of colegion or organization disappears, nnd the Amir of Cabul, who has apparently to us been the director of an organized vational opposition to our ingress, becomes nothing more than what he was before, previons to the development of the magnetic influence of fanaticism which caused all the various atoms constituting collectively the Affghan population to mange themselves round him, namely, the chief of a very powerful tribe whose influence amongst, or snpreinacy orer, Ins nciglıbonrs depends almost entirely upon the state of his excucqaer, and his personal popularity amongst his own immediato adherents. In all our nea ares for the protection of our restern frontin ·26 of India, the greatest stumbling-block that we have encountered, has been this lack of cohesion amongst the different nationalities, inhabiting the adjacent districts, and our policy has consequently been naturally to remedy it by supporting and exalting the most influential chieftain amongst the various tribes, constituting these nationalities with a view to treating with them subsequently as their national representatives; but in the case of the Affghan tribes this aim has always been thwarted by the invincible suspicion and aversion entertained by this independent and fanatical race towards an infidel. So long as we have limited our support to our would-bo national representative to the payment of subsidies and supply of arms and ammunition, the position and prestige of the recipient of these favours amongst his fellowcountrymen has been improved and strengthened in consequence to the utmost extent of our anticipations, and that not only on account of the material assistance thus derived, but from the fact that to a devout Mussulman to bleed the infidel of these requisites upon every possible pretext would always appear a right and fitting procedure, and the more successful the operation, the higher would be the opinion entertained by all “true believers ” of the orthodoxy and ability of the operator; but as often as we have attempted to further our object by a personal intervention in the politics of the country, and an actual resort to force of arms, our appeal to such a measure has been followed by the most unfortunate consequences both for our own interests and for those of the particular protégé on whose behalf we have interfered, or whom we have subsequently selected for support, for it has then become apparent that so great is the aversion of the Mahommedan population of these parts to the intrusion of an infidel that the mere fact of his having availed himself of our assistance has effectually ruined in the estimation ·27 of his fellow-countrymen, oar candidate for sovereignty, so much so that he has lost all hold upon even his own immediato adherents in consequence, and so upon the withdrawal of our armed sapport he has forthwith either disappeared or been removed, and the whole country has in an instant reverted to even a more digorganized and distracted condition than before VI.-AFFGHANISTAN. As regards the physical characteristics and natural resources of the region of Afghanistan, too much attention cannot be paid to the fact that even under its moro favourable aspects, it is a country which can offer but little commercial inducement for its occapation Let it be remembered that it is essentially a land of stony mountains and sandy plains, in most parts of which, works of agriculture are quite impossible, and in others only carried on by dint of the most persevering labonr on tho part of the inhabitants. The valleys, indeed, which intersect the mountain ranges, and are watered by the streams issuing from their sides, are the only portions really susceptible of cultivation to any appreciable degree, for, as I have explained, the rainfall in these countries is very precarious, and no conjecture can, as a rule, be formed as to the period of its occurrence; when it does occur, morcover, it is only partial, and is principally confined to the neighbourhood of the monntain ranges. The gencral character of the country may thus be said to be of 80 poor and unproductive a nature as to be unable to provide a sulficient sustenance even for the seanty popalation which is indigenoas to it, and does not, I believe, exceed an average of from 15 to 20 souls per square mile, a large portion of these are, in consequence, forced from ·28 their homes to wander about India and the adjacent countries in search of any means of gaining their living which may present itself. This insufficiency can be attributed to no lack of industry upon the part of its inhabitants, for a more hard-working race than that of the Pathans does not exist, as is well known to our engineers and contractors in India, who are mainly dependent upon them for the execution of any work involving exceptional laboriousness, such as works of excavation and embankment. No greater proof of the difficulties to be encountered in many parts of this country in all agricultural operations as well as of the patient and laborious efforts of the population to overcome them, could be presented than the existence of such works as are locally terined karczes, that is, subterranean watertourses constrncted for the transmission of a stream from some spring to a site selected for cultivation. These are constructed by sinking a well at some spot, at the base of a hill gencrally, where a subterranean spring has been ascertained to exist, and again digging a line of wells along the interral between this and the selected spot; the bottoms of these are then connected by channels scooped through the intervening soil, and the water from the spring is thus conveyed along the whole distance in a subterranean channel, where it is protected from any loss or waste which might ensue from evaporation consequent upon exposure to the sun, or from other causes. As, owing to the irregularities of the ground, it is frequently necessary to conduct these channels for several miles by circuitous routes through gravelly or even rocky soil in order to bring them out exactly at the selected spot, it is easy to see that the labour involved is enormous, and such that nothing but a spirit of the most dogged and patient industry on the part of the population would have undertaken. These latter qualities are, however, as ·29 much a characteristic of the Affghan population as sterility and erery natural disadvantage are that of their native land. What astonishes every visitor to the latter is that such a miserable country should produce such a fine race of meu; for there, bred apon a diet of little more than cakes made of coarse grain with a little butter and very marels a piece of meat, may be seen great stalwart figures with thews and muscles that would rival those of an English narvy. The fact, howover, of the splendid physiquo which is the general characteristic of the lower classes here may rather be explained apon the theory of tho "survival of the fittest," than by any special attri. butes of the soil or climate, for nothing but a combination of the strongest constitution and physique conld possibly withstand the trials which here await it from its earliest childhood. The fact is that, taken as a whole, this country never has produced more food-supplies than the amount abso. lately required for its own existant population, and very frequently theso also are deficient, and a considerable portion of tho population is compelled in consequence to wander forth in search of a living throughout the weighbouring countries. That it never will produco much more than it does now is a matter wlich may also most probably be taken for granted; for in such parts as the soil and the nature of the surface of the ground admits of cultivation, there being no rainfall to depend upou, such works are limited to the amount of water available from springs and streams and rivers for the purpose of irriga. fion, and the industry of the population has availed itself of this to the utmost extent possible, even at the cost, in many cases, of almost increible labour. Enough lines been said to shew that from the carrying ont of such a measut as the occupation of tlie moie favourable positions cten of Afghanistan, we could anticipate no actual com- ·30 mercial profit which would accrue would accrue to us, while by endeavouring to persuade ourselves to the contrary we shall only lay up for ourselves a future harvest of failure and disappointment; the most we could expect from such il stop would be by a very careful system of administration the defrayment of the actual expenses of such an occupation. Amongst the various districts constituting the country of Affghanistan, that of Cabul has for some hundreds of years held the first place as being the seat of the most powerful and influential Affghan tribe of the country, and occupying a position particularly inaccessible to invader; the valley, moreover, over which it extends, is ono peculiarly fertile for the country; thus, owing to these advantages, it is the point which would always form the centre of opposition to an invading force, and one round which all Affghans would always rally for a last struggle ; for the same reason it is one from the successful occupation of which by an invader all organized opposition on the part of the remainder of the inhabitants of the country would collapse. The district of Candahar comes next in importance to that of Cabul; for, though a far more extensive and fertile one than the former, and though the city from which it takes its name is the great entrepôt for Central Asian traffic with India, it has never formed more than an appanage of the Ameer of Cabul, and that only so long as he possessed funds and forces to retain it; for owing to its defenceless position, and to its very wealth, which has made it an object of avarice to neighbouring powers, it has never been able to maintain its independence for any prolonged period, but has fallen a prey to every invader, and been included more than once within the boundaries of Persia. Its population, however, is strictly Pathan in origin, though speaking a dialect different from that of ·31 Cabal. It offers 'faz super le to the former place for the location of Emma Ered as regards supplies and a strategical Sittain situate half way between Karit si tiene Izdis, it has always formed 3 mixes ir armies, whether adran of the west, themselves where there is firerious to it is, indeed, the unle halting.com for the supplies ebtainable in th: ( quite inadequate to the support ble dimensions, and from the rest van motion in any force an nemas would be bored from moring either way, for at the country is of so sterile and watcf-* that nothing more than a force of emerge insimmiscant dimensinns could Miracce the at a time. Though it is a mistake to lmk and Conditet er forming an integral partion of the MIT Thích Tre mill Afghanistan, for, as I have "xplained it as pere fred more than an appanage of the three Caftill. by its alienation or occapation los a firmei Pover, the position of the muler of Cahul rould be moeh cara berted, both as regards prestige and manos; when the ininence of the latter over most of the trikes of sErhanistan is, as I have silewn, of so rape and pings a description, that a question of this kind 26 Berdis morth considering. One thing, how. puter. in certain, sad that is that the loss of prestige and popolaritr vluch lie woud raffer by his acqniescence in ibe Irmation of European force in Affghan territory, woull fer uatsir ons financial loss which he might wystain by the fusible and permanent occupation of the Lada?r district, and that the introdaction by him of & Prognoza Stur rithio his dominions tould be the signal for bir spreads downfall. Under the present cirrnin.

·32 secure a stances, as we have adopted the fiction of the Amir of Cabul being the responsible ruler of the region called by us Affghanistan, and persisted in treating with him as such, the only means by which we could position in Candahar without absolutely ruining his position with his fellow-countrymen, would be to make a demonstration of breaking from him and occupying the place by force of arms; we might then offer him any additional subsidy which we thought advisable as a compensation for the loss of its revenues. Such a proceeding also appears to me to be the only satisfactory way of establishing ourselves there, for the great mistake which we made during the last war in Affghanistan was that, while holding the country and maintaining order by sheer force of arms, as regards the districts of Candahar, at any rate, we abandoned the population to the tender mercies of there own civil governors. Under these circumstances, how could our presence there be other than an utter abomination to the inhabitants, for they had to endure the presence of the hated infidel amongst them without deriving any of the reputed benefits of his rule?-nay, rather the injury done to them by our presence, appeared to them aggravated a thousandfold by the fact that we were there as the supporters of their own native rulers in every sort of rapacity and extortion; not that I mean that any such measures were for a moment countenanced by the responsible European authorities, but that every Asiatic official is by nature rapacious and extortionate, and only looks upon his term of office as a period in which to accumulate, by hook or crook, the greatest amount of treasure possible, the only check to his rapacity being the limits of endurance of the population under his charge. Such a man, finding himself supported by an irresistible foreign force, would naturally think it ·. throwing situr the guia which thrlene had put in his mas, did he neglect his or wanitr. The onstant me plaint of the enforanste inlisbitants of the many districts daring our late arnpation, as they were oppressed and squeezed by their native ruters whom we set op mus " The scenre? Feringhi is lier, lut * here is the bogsteel clemency of his rute! If we am to be subjected to the exactions of our ralers, let it be at all events without the support of the baronets of the Infidel" It is mut to lie wondered at then, that the moment they are a chance they against us as one man, and thint on our departutiv 1109 more trace was left of onr presence than if we lever been there. There is no donht that it always link x1, au alungs will be a bitter thing for an fighan populatum *** have to ruhmit to European rules, and to tolerate 1). presence of n Enropean force amongst them; and the only thing that will ever reconcile them to our presenten in the Tepatch mildness and clemency of our awny thiem, forever, the full nuvantages of t1, it will be necessary that the entiro administration of nny powition or district which wo occupy shonli be entrusted to European oflicers. By working upon their nxorice unul internal dissensions we mny nötnin n position ninong tliem, and, by ensuring thein n just nul impartint alministration, we mny, after Romo years, with fact and judgment, sccnre one which will lie buses more ajun their an appreciation of the benelite of our rule linn, in liitherto, upon the mero prrence and Angoport of mir inyonets Tie Affghan tribe so not, lowrver, 114 lisey lwe*p1 gwintool out, by any means constitute the whole of the inhabitants of the repinne to which we liave rives the collective ristne of Afghanistan, for intersporened with this trifwow of work Durge nomlis of Hazamy nr Vownlo,thir diesreruinufe nof "To give ·34 the followers of Jenghez Khan or Tamerlane. These tribes inhabit the regions north and west of Candahar; they live in a state of Perpetual feud with their Alighan neighbours, from whom they differ in many characteristics, notably as regards fanacticism and vindictiveness; they are possessed by no fanatical hatred to n European as an infidel, and do not consider it a point of honour to perpetuate a feud; they are also less trencherous, thongh equally avaricious, and perhaps not quito so brave. Altogether, they are of a more malleable nnture than the Affghans, and as there are large numbers of them in the country their presence might, in the event of our advancing onr position, on account of their traditional hostility to the Affghans, be turned to valuable account, by our organizing large bodies of them into local police or levies, which could be easily done with a little tact und judgment. They are, of course, like all the tribes of these parts, a wild and ignorant people, unaccustomed to any sort of discipline, and jealous of any control; but oflicered by men of experience and judgment, who knew when to tighten, and when to slacken, the rein they would be of most valuable assistance, for the puupose of the protection of outposts, and the lines of communication, for their devotion to a European, whencver they do attach themselves to one, is most affecting. The other inhabitants of these regions are principally tribes of Persian origin, who have wandered thither, or been introduced by different invaders and conquerors of the country. VII.-HERAT. As to the occupation by us of the district of Herat, even if we had the forces available to place a permanent ·35 Farrison in this city and along the lines of communication, the maintenance of such a force at a point so distant froin its baso and through a country where wo should have to bo mainly dependent upon that base for supplies, wonld constituto such a drain upon our Indian finance, 29 would place it almost beyond our means, if only from a financial point of viow; indeed, it is a question whether it is not a mensure which is equally impracticablo to ng from a practical point of view as regarding the amount of transport and supplies which we shonld require to convey thither a force of the requisito strength, and maintain it there in r condition of dao efficiency. To begin with, the oply raison d'étre of any such a garrison of oars in Herat would be to provent an anticipated Russian occupation of the district, and no Nassian General would think of attempting such an undertaking with a forco of Ics, than about 20,000 men, duls cqnipped with artillery anıl siege. train, &c. On our part we could not expect to render the Afghan population any material assistance in their opposition to the invader, with a force of less than 3,000 to 10,000 men; to kcop open communication with Quetta woull necessitate the posting nlong tho 500 miles intervening between this place and lernt a force of about 3,000 nien, for the attitude of the population in these parts could never be dependeri upon in an emergency, ns wng sufliciently demonstrated in the interval between the battles of Miniwand and Condnhar, when the very stations apon our lino of rail weru menaced by bodies of marauders, and there has not a single post throughout the whole length of our line of commnnications which was not threatenedornttacked in many places in localities where tho populntion appearer derotel to ue, and it had been years cinco any sort of disturbance had occurred. In addition to this it would bo necessary to locato a forco of about 5,000 men in the Candahar district to replace caganities a ·36 sarply reliefs, so that altogether we should not give ourselves a chance of attaining our object with a force of less than 15,000 to 20,000 men, while to place ourselves beyond all possibility of failure, a force of at least double this strength would be reqnired. Let us first consider the difficulties of transport alone to be encountered in conveying to Herat a force of, say 7.000 men. Experience has shewn us that, in these regions, there frequently for Tery long distances the local food supplies are very limited and cannot be depended upon to any sensible degree in the conduct of military operations, the amount of transport requisite to convey any given force of the mixed arms, including tent equipage and the convoys of commissariat supplies, and ammunition and military stores, required to provide men and animals alike with proper sustenance during their march, and to maintain the whole in a due state of efficiency, amounts, roughly speaking, to about one camel for each combatant unit of the force employed. In making this estimate special notice should be taken of the fact that the unit of transport to which it has reference is that of a camel, an animal peculiarly adapted to the climate and conditions of existence in these regions, amidst the pecnliar and scanty vegetation of which it can, nnder the most disadvantageous circumstances, find a sustenance which it would be impossible to depend upon in the case of any other beast of draught or burden, and that consequently in this case it is assumed that the transport employed would carry exclusively the supplies required for the men and animals composing the force, being itself dependant for its sustenance upon the forage it could pick up en route. Were any other species of transport employed a very much larger proportion of mules or bullocks, as the case might be, would be reqnired in order that these animals themselves might ·37 carty with them a sufficient amount of food to keep them in an efficient condition, so that the total amonnt of bollocks or mnles required for the purpose in question, woald amount to, from 15,000 to 20,000, the carrying capacities of cither being about equal; that is less than half n camel-load, which may be taken at about three to foar hundreilweight. It minst be remembered, again, with reference to this estimate that it is based upon the reqniremonts of a march from the Indus to Candahar, which is a distanco of only about 300 miles, whereas that between Quetta and Herat is over 500 miles, but this would not really involve the necessity of any large extra amount of transport, as fresh supplies would be procurable en route in C to take the place of those consumed on the way thither, and the force would thus be able to start thence on its march across the 300 miles lying between that place and Horat with its full allowance of supplies Flow ntterly helpless any force is in these regions, if not supplierl with a requisite amount of transport, has been amply demonstrated by tlie failure of General Phayre's force in its attempt to reach Candaliar after the battle of Maiwnnd, and that in spite of the most strenuons efforts on the part of the Gorernment, and the unwearied exertions of its energetic commander, and indeed of every individual ollicer employed. The spectacle presented would have been ludicrous in the extreme had it not beun for the disastrous consequences to human life, which accompanied it in the fntal climatc, in wlich it took place. There, at the very hottest season of the year, in the place then constituting tlic railway tcrminus, Fhich has always liad the reputation of being the hottest spot in that part of India eren, rere shot ont diny after day on tlie sands of the desert, lundreds and hundreds of troops who were compelled to move on forth with at all cost to get out of the fenrful climate they were tlins stranded in, and to ·38 mako room for others, but with no other transport availableto convey the stores and supplies which were absolutely indispensable to them over the 100 miles of desert and rocky passes intervening between the railway terminus and Quetta, which after all was only the rendezvous and base for the intended operations, but a limited number of lauw ponies and bullocks, which for the most part had never had a load upou their backs before; for these, then, constitued the only transport procurable throughout India, and to collect even them money had beeu poured out like water. Day after day these troops struggled up the Bolan Pass to Quetta, where they arrived in what indeed might be called the lightest of light marching order, their cquipage being limited to the clothes they had upon their bucks, and their ammunition to the contents of their pouches, while the whole line of march was strewn with the baggage and equipage they had been obliged to abandon upon the way, a welcome prey to the wandering Belooches, who opprcared shortly afterwards looking so respectable in the suits they had made for themselves out of the tents and blankets that they were perfectly unrecognisable, and there was not a camping-ground where, in the case of the European troops, they did not leave several of their number: dead or dying from sunstroke or exhaustion. And when they arrived at Quetta they had only the disappointment of finding that the very deficiency which had caused their previous experiences to be so miserable would prevent their continuing their march or accomplishing the object with which they had struggled so far. No sooner, moreover, had these reinforcements arrived at Quetta than it became apparent that the food supplies stored up there or procurable in the neighbourhood were totally inadequate to their maintenance. Upon the occurrence of the battle of Maiwand, when Government were at their wits' end how to obtain transport for the ·39 troops which were intended to relieve Candahar from this side, hundreds upon hundreds of bullock-carts were mannfactured in India and sent up to work between the Railway terminus at Sibi and Quetta, and it was upon these that the troops in the latter place were mainly dependent for their supplies; upon calculating, however, the amount that could be forvarded regularly by thiese, it was found that, on the assumption that no supplics of grain or forage were procurable to any reliablo extent, locally between these two points, a pair of draught-bullocks would in the course of their transit consume about half as moch again in weight of grain and forage as they could draw,--that is that, the distance being 100 miles divided into about 10 stages cach constituting a day's march, and the food allowance of . bullock being about 6 lbs. of grain and 20 lbs of grass per day, the actual amount of food which a pair of bullocks would have had to convey with them for their own consumption en route would have anionnted in weight to about 500 lbs or half as much again as the weight they were calcnlated to draw, which was fixed at 350 lbs The despair of the commissariat authorities at the result of this calcnlation may be imagined, fortanntely some local snpplies, which thouglı of an inferior description, answered their immedinte purpose in this emergency, were rendered available, and the difficulty was thus overcome The dea of transport in tliis emergency may best be estimated by the rates of carriage demanded by the Incal camel-os ners for the correyance of stores between Sili and Quetta which rose to about 15s. per cwt. and upwards; as a great part of the camels were able to carry abont live liandrcdwciglit the cost of the two trips represented about the pnlue of tho animal employed; while of the deficiency of all food supplies somc idea ·40 Scarce 1 may be formed from the fact that the local prices of grass and grain rose respectively to upwards of £14 a ton and 12s. a bushel respectively, which in a country where money is amount to worse than famine prices. Since then, the difficulties of transport over this particular extent of our lines of communication have been to a great degree overcome by the construction of a line of rail which now traverses a great part of the distance intervening between Sibi and Quetta, but beyond this latter place there still remains the same difficulty of providing with transport and supplies a force intended to proceed to Herat. Admitting that the transport available in India has recovered to a considerable extent from the disastrous effects of the last Affghan war; when upwards of 50,000 camels perished upon our frontier, exclusive of countless ponies and bullocks, till the breed of camels became almost extinct in many places, and the prices of ponies rose after the termination of the war to nearly four and five times what it had been before its commencement still I think we should find some considerable difficulty in mustering the number required to conveyour intended force to Herat; the number, moreover, thathas been mentioned, namely, about 7,000 to 10,000 camels would be required for the mere conveyance of the troops with the indispensable accessories of tent-equipage, military stores, and a sufficient amount of commissariat supplies for their sustenance, it being assumed that on their arrival at their destination they would be able to provide for themselves locally, with such supplies of the latter nature as they might l'equire; for the conveyance of such stores or supplies as should subsequently become necessary to maintain our troops there in an efficient condition we should then be as we were throughout the late Affghan war-mainly dependent upon local transport in the hands of the ·41 various tribes inhabiting the districts boricring upon our lince of communication. This transport is limited, and being the monopols of tho tribes in question, is alwny's unreliablo, nt any timo of particular emergency it jų 118 likels as not to be withheld with a view to obtaining higher mtes for carriago; the owners, morcover, of them local transport aro of an independent character, and would be most reluctant to bind themselves to any sort agreement to os. The only way in which our uyance in force to Herat would be practicablo woald bo by stocking tho various camping-grounds on the route thither from Candnliar with the necessary supplios nnil sending on such a force by comparatively small detach. mints, but such an operation would require months of previous preparation in order to accumulate along the lino of marele the required amount of these necessarien, while it would not obriate the expense and difficulty of maintaining a constant supply of the same and of other indispensable stores It appears, then, that however much politicians and theorists may rare aboat the vital importance of not allowing Herat, The Key of India" as they call it, though on what particular grounds they assign it this reputation no one seems able to explain very satisfactorily - to fall into the lands of a forrign power, such a measure as that of occupying it ourselves, which is the only means by which we could actually prurent such a contingenes-there being no middlc coure open to ns, in as much as any opposition that could be offered by the inhabitants of the district with tho assistance of a few British oficers and a handful of Indian troops would be merely contemptible tha Rassian forre of any strength-would be a measure extremely diſlicnlt for as to carry oat from a practical point of view, if not absolately beyond our piger. Instead, then, of ·42 wasting our time and money and efforts upon fruitless negotiations and subsidies and boundary commissions, we had better reconcile ourselves to the fact that if Russia be bent upon continuing her advance upon the western frontier of Affghanistan as far as Herat, there is but little we can do in these regions to arrest it, unless we are prepared to make tremendous sacrifices, and saddle ourselves with a burden which will be a perpetual drain upon our Indian finances. If it be deemed of absolutely vital importance to arrest her progress, the only means by which such an object could be attained would be by attacking her interests in some other quarter, and thus compelling her to relinquish her views in these regions, for the time being at any rate; if, howcver, it he considered that the respective interests of the two nntions are not so irreconcilably opposed to one another in the matter, but that it would be possible for their frontiers to meet here, the most simple and advantageous solution of the difficulty would be by coming to a compromise with her for the mutual occupation of Herat and Candahar by herself and us respectively. There is no further objection to a measure of such a nature in the case of Affghanistan than there was in the case of Poland, or in numbers of similar cases in which two great Powers have found themselves compelled to absorb a smaller power placed between them to prevent the perpetual annoyance and uneasiness which must inevitably accrue to either of them from the intrigues in which it must be perpetually engaged in its struggles to maintain its position, while sentiment any apon the would be subject entirely thrown away, as it has been shewn that even in that portion of the regions to which we have given the collective designation of Affghanistan which can with any shew of reason lay claim to this title as ·constituting the special abode of the IA latter crist divided into different tribes witbasis of tio or bond between ther, whilst barang they are so much in the minority a odisert mingled with other races that the moont de nom to represent to ans appreciable damage the 131 population. As to the district of Heren ST 1 comparativels recent acquisition of the dric Cabas having previously been included for the most of its history within the limits of Persia; its its morcover, are all more or less of Persian origine dete the greatest arersion to the brutality and preci Affghan rule, from which they would gladsfreeths sale, their special ambition being to constitute de State of their own. With reference to ortowo positive in Candahar, the interests of the inhabitants of the districts that trould be thas occapiet bras, combat derive every possible adraatage from the estab5zbrator amongst them of a settled Gorerament replacing the present disorganised and distracted state of things whis 18 to the inclinations of the same cod barbation remainder, it is not reasonable that such sboald 7 a moment be allowed to form any obstacle to the interest of two great civilised poners, such as Enlard zzi Patriz. It is a popular craze that a Russian ocupation , Hernt would only be a prelude to an immediate jotaissa of India from that quarter, but it is most impmisable tha: klio really entertains any such a wild ides, thought from east her more enthusiastic military oficers may lzte IPPC) an opinion that it was a feasible one, or tres gone 12: ng to draw up a scheme for its execation. This is a pá: regnnling which tre can best console ourselves, and 1505 effectually set our minds at rest by a considerato 6 tyre difficulties we should have to encounter, 301 !!! EZT we should have to incor in our proaspution of th: 12+ ·44 simpler enterprise of despatching a force in the contrary direction, for whatever applies to us on this score regarding the movements of troops in these quarters at distances comparatively so trifling from our base of operations, which moreover is in a country abounding in every species of resources, would apply with tenfold force to a Russian army moving in the opposite direction at enormous distances from its base, and with that base, too, in a poorly-cultivated and semi-subjugated country. It may be taken for granted that the Russians have had too much experience of the difficulties and dangers of encountering barbarous tribes under these circumstances, to think of engaging with a civilized foe upon such terms. It cannot be too clearly understood that the importance of a Russian move on to Herat as affecting our interests, depends entirely on the fact of whether we make a similar move on to Candalar or no ourselves, if we do so any possible ill effects of the Russian move are completely neutralised; if we do not, the whole of the country of Affghanistan would fall under Russian influence in course of time, and our frontier position, nay even our very hold of India would be shaken, and that not so much from any possible hostile measures of the Russians themselves, as from the fact that in India we occupy the position of a mere handful of foreigners holding in check by the effect of our prestige and moral influence the most varied and antagonistic interests, and that the unopposed presence and adverse influence of a rival power so near our possessions would unsettle the minds of the more turbulent nationalities inhabiting various portions of the country, and set the numerous restless and disaffected spirits with which India abounds on the watch to tu'n this feeling of unsettledness to their own advantage. An occupation of Candahar has this advantage that it is a move distinctly within our means, and one which ·45 could bo carried out at a few days' notice almost, while the district which we should thus occupy is separated from llerat by 300 miles of a country of such & barren and waterless description that it may be considered as absolutely nntraversiblo by European troops encumbered with artillery and baggage, except in comparatively small numbers such as could be atterly destroyed in detail by a vory small forco posted on the Helmund. The intervening country between the two positions would thus constitute Azono of neutral territory which would separate the outposts of the rival interests more effectually than any river or range of mountains; and thus wonld not be the cuse were we to take up our position in Herut, for there wo could not fail to find ourselves being continually entangled in all sorts of complications, and drawn into all sorts of difficulties at every disadvantage to ourselves on account of our distance there from our base for supplies and reinforcements. It appears, then, that the occupation of Herat by ourselves would bo an enterprise of extreme difficulty to 119 whilst the maintenance of the districts intervening hetween the present positions of Russia and ourselves respectively as a neutral territory would, in the case of a country sach as Affghanistan where under the mere shadow of a responsiblo Government are comprised races of the most varied nationalities and conflicting interests, containing amongst themselves cvery element of discord and digunion, and constituting a very hotbed of intrigae and every possible complication-be a measure leading only to perpetual complications and consequent sonrces of irritation between the two countries. There remains, then, as has been pointed out, but two courses of policy for us to pursue, either with the aid of 8 European or otlıer ally to pat & stop to Russia's designs in these regions by an attack upon her interests

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·+ Lic 1 the troups composing it u lett Cabul !! tin trust their arriral at Candabar, they wtle with their of tac British outpust it belts-wholziu cumple les Lut off from all woninungsunitha the outside 1 Sach a state of bin vuld 'It'P rcur u thu het! ons making da aviace v Herde, tos at woulu wound alyulutely accessary for ar sistemit there, that we should maintains tung und spieltsive Evimu tions with India, thru Dareu und mne w lewill dispused, of cot, juta.ily buscale wountr's Yothing, indeed. cand bro 192 Qurratud wlyatagey thay proti he was of by with from Cibul to Caalehur chi' the question of required to march traie Vale. E tlceast, as Tu thai opposite direction, the clım sit !!! there mustustend as they are mostly at a very low level soulal Kcepe in the cold westber this! betincell the launchs of November and Jared be t'atrzeby tryin us for 4* heat and dasi and glan are evacetueel, 16 mvutil preudubly hare the adraatar of mwit parts of Egypt in these respects, though it would mod lw yuntes fout is the Soadas; tho water supply soulil bu axtarmely dedicant, and ia msay places, uien whrss purestila, smutid lige hardly drinkablo on account of the autoctails held in kulu tion in it which would only looget mul of hoy osaposikit, il eren then complotuly. {uirtles, nith thu oko opis tho Candalur district, which is, fly War', il vity24 in the descrt, the regions interventi Twittu tho I'moon Valley and llerat an af a gunudurly and live und Aterilu character, cungist.my for the most point of water And sands plaisis ni an altitul af little more than from -,000 to 3,00w fret novo the scale where the boat during the ony Mt's of the year, ss us ex® as it t' rold during tim atler; mature soulreol afai truts, from the heavivery of the 2 ·48 irregularity of its surface, which is broken by innumerable deep ravines, as well as by the above-mentioned characteristics of climate and physical attributes, to offer every possible opposition to the movement through them of troops and material of war. Again, in the event of our making a movement on Herat, it would no longer be the case with us that it was in 1880, when we had thousands of war-proved soldiers, and an unlimited transport at our disposal to pick from, for we should now have to start afresh with troops necessarily out of condition by the interval of some years of an easy life in cantonments, whilst the transport l'equired would actually have to be collected, organised and trained anew. Amongst a certain class of Russophobists, it is a fixed idea that in the case of the occupation of Herat, by Russia, one of the most formidable weapons with which she would assail us in India would be the Affghan population, armed, trained, and disciplined by herself, just as amongst the military enthusiasts in Russia, who are advocates of an invasion of India, it is a dogma that the Mohammedan population of this country are only awaiting a demonstration on their part, sufficiently near to our frontier, to rise against us en masse; but these ideas are alike delusions, and dictated only by a view of the state of affairs, as much too pessimist on the one side as it is too sanguine upon the other. Whatever may be the personal objection of the Affghan population to the presence of an infidel force amongst them, if they were reduced to the alternative of acquiescing in the admission into their country, of either an English one or a Russian one, there is not a man amongst them that would hesitate to throw in his lot, heart and soul, with us, against the latter; while as to the Mohammedan population of India, ·19 not onls are the discordant units, of which it is composed atteris incapable of amalgamation for any sort of immon enterprise, but the mass of them, in common with that of their Hindoo and other fellow-subjects, arc far too well asrare of the case and comfort which they enjoy under the present regime to have the remotest inclination to change it for another, much less for such an one as 08413 vogid offer them. There is no particular creed or cozarannity amougst the pxpulation of India, that entertains seditious or disloyal views towards our rule. The classes amongst wluch such feelings are most rife are those which we are educating to look forward to a time when they may relieve the Earupean oficials of a great portion of the work of dministration of the coantry, and into whose minds the utru perpctually instilling the fact that the prestige and suoral infance to which we ons our sapremacy amongst them, are traditions of bygone and barbarous times, and Lyonch, not adapted to the present civilized epoch. These lare ficou but too reads to lend their ears to such Egestions, and alrcadg begin to look upon or presence in the country at all as a grievance, and our exercise of wathority amongst them as a usurpation of their om nghts Fiom these we shall bare trouble enoagh in time; the only consolution is that, koverer much the ideas luck wo bare suggested to tkem, and which they them. melres are box labwuring to their atmost to spread generally amongst all classes and races of the native population, may weaken or prejudice our position in the country; being mainly derired from castes of peaceiul instincts, such as the mercantile and writer castes, in inda- 205 785, they any time of disturbance, so far from exercising any e tice or haring their tiews consulted in moplul mect with bat very little mercy from the sahke tastes of their respective commodities.

·48 irregularity of its surface, which is broken by innumerable deep ravines, as well as by the above-mentioned characteristics of climate and physical attributes, to offer every possible opposition to the movement through them of troops and material of war. Again, in the event of our making a movement on Herat, it would no longer be the case with us that it was in 1880, when we had thousands of war-proved soldiers, and an unlimited transport at our disposal to pick from, for we should not have to start afresh with troops necessarily out of condition by the interval of some years of an casy life in cantonments, whilst the transport required would actually have to be collected, organised and trained anew. * Amongst a certain class of Russophobists, it is a fixed idea that in the case of the occupation of Herat, by Russia, one of the most formidable weapons with which she would assail us in India would be the Affghan popu. lation, urmed, trained, and disciplined by herself, just as amongst the military enthusiasts in Russia, who are advocates of an invasion of India, it is a dogma that the Mohammedan population of this country are only awaiting a demonstration on their part, sufficiently near to our frontier, to rise against us en masse; but these ideas are alike delusions, and dictated only by a view of the state of affairs, as much too pessimist on the one side as it is too sanguine upon the other. Whatever may be the personal objection of the Affghan population to the presence of an infidel force amongst them, if they were reduced to the alternative of acquiescing in the admission into their country, of either an English one or a Russian one, there is not a man amongst them that would hesitate to throw in his lot, heart and soul, with us, against the latter; while as to the Mohammedan population of India, ·2 *missaries, bat it will be fruip the fruits of vur me inconeriralle folly acd weakoe in yolontarily ablatios the position of sepenurits amvast the population which se hare hell Prer since we entered the mountry, and which we use ustinl; the muntenance of our supremacy therein. Any one who has had sufficient experience of Isinties to uadentand ckeir train of thought well know that what is termerl plitically a conciliatory policy" towards its saljert in the movt fatal one that would be silopted bsn raling power, expertalls it, as in the rise of our position in India. ic constitutes an intimesimal minorits amongst the local guapolation, for to their mind. It contifs no impressinn bar that of weakness. Tyranns and every sort of nppression ther any oued to from the **pyn natíre mers, and they appreciate folls the funefit of rtrict justice but anything beyond this is more than thes can comprehend. Of no penple cool the farliur pirns curts thiet "Familiamtr breeds contempt" he spokes with srcater jnetice se moramoz oar dealing with them; No long as we do not cheapen oorseite in their agent they will continge towards us the respect that there linne lnc'! accastomed to run ne with hitherto, but if *** kes*j» «oss winning in their mrs that they art i «very ********* 191} qunir, they will end bg beliusink it, and thorou Philing in "Cancer their rironmstances, by wint portar reasoning we can claim any right to wir gernepuce in the constry ther will intrigar tre rrlirer lenmelerin alle So Inny 14 the manillin unlimenta al lui far luns Untir "and" Enziani's Hirsi in fon" 13 ) di aar Engliels pritiriane, the Planningin liraya theo Incontro ta lurry on thrir por pamtime fur an imanion of the nantry, lil thirsisemitoptate aurks # kleinlits, leur lies liare only to await the natural rolul mente, und liepa najk in withoot pigrizitiri, terulf to fills! ** this listsrisi Balka), am the fly fish ·52 pampered, and encouraged in their pretensions by us, as they art now, and the Native Press is allowed its present license, there will be no occasion for Russia to put herself to any expe se for the purpose of sending emissaries to stir up disco ent and sedition in the country, for this is all being done for her at our cost, and under our imme. diate patronage. We may not have the same qualities of amalgamating ourselves with on : Asiatic fellow-subjects as the Russians have, and it is not owing to the possession or exercise of such that we owe the position which we have obtained, and night still hold, amongst them, but of this I am convinced that in no part of the Asiatic possessions of Russia will a spectacle he exhibited similar to that which may be seen any day, and in the most remote districts of India; indeed, according to the present lines upon which our civilization of the country and education of its inhabitants are based, it may be said that the moro uncivilized the district, and the more uneducated its inhabitants, the more marked the spectacle, and that is that of a solitary English official separated by miles and miles from his nearest fellow countryman exercising the most unlimited influence and unquestioned control over an extent of country perhaps as large, if not larger, than an English county, and containing quite as large a population. Our national position in the coui depends upon that of each one of our individual represe tives. It remains to be seen how far this is being strengtuened, or the contrary, by our present internal policy. C. E. BIDDULPH, M.A., Bombay Uncovenanted Ciril Scrrice. ; Waterlou Bros. I- Luyton, Printers, 24, Birclin Irane, London, 15.C.

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